CaseMap Facts Report - [Redacted] Interview 1

The document includes notes from interviews conducted with FBI personnel [Redacted], regarding his work experience with the Hostage Rescue Team, concerns about the Department of Defense's interrogation techniques, and the discrepancy between his answers to a questionnaire on the subject of detainee mistreatment and his real experience.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Fact Text
of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and
b)( ),(L'A' AL') said when he first started his HQ position he reported tc (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
who was within Counter Terrorism Division - FBI.and then to Andrew G. Arena, and then
Pasquale D'Amuro
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid he was present at a VTC at which the military claimed that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation had agreed to its interrogation plan for (bX1)
(b)(1) using "Fear Up" and "U.S. Army (b)(5)
tactics against him — when it fact it had disagreed. aid it might have been at the same
(b)(1) beyond
VTC at which he stated the Department of Defense had not obtained intell from (b)(1)
lawenfOrbce e
aid at some point ": (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) —
myoenn d t
oonfelnvestigation had obtained using
and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) expressed
concern about where they thought the Department of Detense's interrogatio of (b)(1)
(b)(1) Jnay have been heading, or the amount of pressure they believed
Department of Defense was going to apply to this detainee, could have been problematic.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that it was not Federal Bureau of Investigation policy to put detainees
through sleep deprivation, so we don't do it and we don't participate in it if others do it.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(B) says that "participation," for purposes of the rule that Federal Bureau of
(b)(6),(b)(7)(P interview
1 at 11:30-12:04
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) :nterview
I at 15:00, 15:56, 16:04
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C Enterview
1 at 43:55-45:30
I (b)(6),(b)(7)(C Interview
1 at 47:55-48:15
b)(6),(b)(7)( Interview
1 at 56:20
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C Interview
e avior
he knee (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
id that, because he used to work at Hostage Rescue Team (which, like
is part of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime,
who used to be a Hostage Rescue Team guy, and knew the names
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Date &
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Filter: Linked To Source(s)
CaseMap Facts Report
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Jnterview 1" or Linked To Source(s): (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview Notes 7/12/05" - 96
of 7882 (1.2%) Filtered
Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/25/2009 3:36:20 PM
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.1
Investigation does not participate in interrogation tactics beyond what it is authorized to do,
means "sitting in the room, participating in the interrogation, posing questions.'0)(6),(b)(7)(c)
nays "I guess" it also means sitting in the obsery butl(b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
o svations of interrogation of FO)T1.) ere strictly to try to exert a
moderating influence, a "safety net," to say, stop, this isn't working."
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says, at some point, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) bowed out of the Department of
Defense's interrogation of (b)(1) saying, in effect, "if you guys
want to do business this way, we are not going to be a part of it."
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) .ays his opinion is that the aggressive techniques are not effective b/c the
1 detainee will tellyutxvhat you want to hear to remove the stress, strain, discomfort.
1:))(6),(b)(7)(C) pays that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) wanted to know what he (and others) should do
when they were exposed to these techniques, and he said that Andrew G. Arena and he
traveled to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and spoke to r(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
possibly (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was there as well, and Andrew G. Arena's advice was, don't
participate, can give advice on what has worked in the past for Federal Bureau of
Investigation and provide behavior analysis of what is going on — this could include a
judgment of "is he is being forthright or is he lying? —" but beyond that, stay away from it.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid exactly where the line falls in terms of even that level of participation
may be up to the individual, how to apply the general "do not participate" policy.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) vas read 018223 (think this is not the right bates), an e-mail
(b)(6),(b)(7) to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 1n which (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) wrote:
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was
advised of the above [the plan to take (W ItoW1Hind silbject him to 20-hour
interrogation sessions] and asked to provide guidance to us as the Defense Humint Services
wanted us to be part of the interrogation teams. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) jaid as long as there was no
'torture' involved that we were within our guidelines (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) actually encouraged
us to be a part of this as we would be able to provide Headquarters (FBI) with `updates' of
what was happening.1(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ;aid he thought he had given
guidance to that effect.
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 'aid that "it would be nice to have something in writing" from an under
secretary of Defense that a particular interrogation technique is truly authorized, but the
issue becomes the relationship with the military if the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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1 at 56:30-57:16
I at 57:25
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
at 59:20
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 1:06:54 1:08:05
I at 1:09:00 - 1:09:52.
(b)(6),(6)(7)(C nterview
at 1:12:06- 1:13:03
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.2
I at 1:18:11
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
I at 1:20:45, 1:21:18
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says, in riforonees niR/12 han,0:1 fl,.....(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
re. interrogation of
that details "sleep deprivation, loud
music, bright lights, and 'body placement discomfort"), that he believed all these techniques
were approved by Donald Rumsfeld (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ys he may seen the authorization in
writing or may have learned this during a meeting with Andrew G. Arena and either
Michael E. Dunleavy or General Geoffrey D. Miller were present, during which Andrew G.
Arena expressed his dissatisfaction or disapproval of some of these methods, and the
Commanding General said we'll just agree to disagree, and that "I have my marching orders
from the Secretary of Defense, you've got your orders from the Attorney General, we are all
here to try to win the war on terrnrien, %mix are going to try to play fair in the sandbox."
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes -aised a legal concern via an e-mail he sent to
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sayhes with (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) "Legal Analysis" document.
says he recalls that the plan was to try various things and then if it didn't
work to move on to the next category.
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not recall what we told (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
in response to his concerns
other than, if there is a plan in place..! (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) then declined to elahoratp hormiqp
of classification issues. soecifically M(O)
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always asks for written proof that a technique is authorized (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said Federal
Bureau of Investigation is trying to foster good relations and partnership with the
Department of Defense and intelligence agencies and it is a fine line to walk if Federal
Bureau of Investigation is perceived as "telling" on these other entities.
(b)(1) a vas
vs you have to recognize "where the US was" at the time (b)(1)
kbeing interrogated: he said that in response to Pearl Harbor the US
dropped atomic weapons on Japan; in 9/11, the US lost about the same number of lives. So
you have to put yourself in the position of where the USG was at the time. (b)(6),(b)(7)(c)
said that people were trying to do what was right at the time, but what was right at the time
may not be right today and we should recognize that.
to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
,b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
I at 1:14:10-1:14:40
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1 at 1:24:00, 1:25:10,
L,.elieves that, in response ti
L.,egal Analysis Memo, To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) jinterview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
I at 1:15:40-1:17:55
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.3
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) knterview
I at 1:31:30 - 1:34:40
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which contained an urgent request for guidance, we talked to him and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
about it, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) net with David Nahmias and asked him to tell him what was
considered torture under the Constitution, and he said he may have shared with David
Nahmias ,1.:,)),(6),(3)(7) ..egal Analysis or the actual interrogation plan for (b)(1)
said that, in res
torture under the Constitutio (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
"cruel and inhumane" though
nse to his request to David Nahmias to define what is
believes David Nahmias may have said
oes not recall exactly what he said. The
conversation would have been as a side bar during a meeting to discuss somet 'ng else, and
the conversation would have been like, David Nahmias askerI(b)(4(b)(7)(C) hat was
going on at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) vouid have
mentioned the issues raised by (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and asked, what is Department of
Justice's position? Can you get with Department of Defense OGC on this? It would be nice
to clarify this, etc.[--- hink he may have given Nahmias a copy of the plan and that
David Nahmias may have approacF (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) m. Department of Defense OGC with
1 at 1:22:27-1:23: 50
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, in sum, he did receive statements of concerns from (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and others the advice back was don't participate in non law
j enforcement techniques; then l (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) received from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)
(b)(6)(b) oncerns that went beyond that, namely, what do we do when we are exposed to
these techniques? (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid he would then raise those concerns with Andrew G.
Arena and David Nattnuas — is this something we need to be concerned about? And the
answer back was uniformly, stay away from that, and we'll take it up with the Department of
Defense's general counsel's office — specifically, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) hinks, within SOLIC --
Special Operations Low Intensity Conflicts.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he conferred with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman regarding certain issues,
but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks he spoke more with Department of Justice (pz -- David Nahmias)
Marion E. "Spike" Bowman.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) assumed that Andrew G. Arena would have shared these issues with the AD
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 1:35 - 1:36:05,
Determined j (Pa s wale D'Amuro), who had the discretion to decide to share them with the Director. 1 at 1:38:00 - 1:38:35
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 1:37:10-1:37:30
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.4
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
1 at 1:3g:57
had on him.
tactics used against
aid he didn't think (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(1 )
at which ( b)(6),(b)(7)(C) uas present. The meetings were not designed to be about
interrogation tactics, but about what investigative info we
w about the particular interrogatin
1 at 1:38:55 - 1:39:25
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was aware of the use of some tactics t
ri aggressive than the Federal Bureau of Investigation would have used, and (ibb)1(L67)1.'t ehimnkorse
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 'na haveraisecse issues with Department of Defense OGC.
b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Interview
(b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C')1 Interview
Ir.) MyS attended some meetings related to detainee policy.
1 at 1:40:23
says Nahmias and I were in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) jvere there, and they may have raised their
concerns with David Nahmias directly
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) :'ecalls video teleconference discussing (b)(1)
Determined interrogation plan and David Nahmias was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
participating in the video teleconference from there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) mys that during the
video t/c, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Presented the the Department ot"Detense's plan. Central
Intelli ence Agency OGC was present via video. 'entagon also present jb)(6)(b)
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) maybe (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Dr (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
L(5X6),(b)( OM saysp)(6),(b)(7)(C) • :v explanation of all the information he got
using his interrogation practices (b •
),(b)( )(C) peaks up and says, "look, everythin
you've gotten thus far is what F' • eral Bureau o nvestigation gave you on b)(1 )
(b)(1) from its paper investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) rays the conversation got
-h-e-a-0,,-(-1I 0-)(7)(c) said he agreed with both that the info he
presented was given to him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that his methods
were not effective, not providin sitive intell, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the meeting ended
because of the controversy (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) -hays Nahmias agreed with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's position a ut what were effective interrogation tactics and what would be
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1 at 1:40:49
links Nahmias said
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) iTtervieW
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 1:44:30 - 1:47:15 -
I :48:10, I :49:00-
1 at 1:44:06
the most useful should there be any legal process, and
the v. eo teleconference.
believes the issue of whether certain of the proposed interrogation
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.5
all involvement
leave U.S. Naval
with the interrogation of (b)(1) jet may as well
Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba altogether.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Is aid David Nahmias told him that the information about whc (IT=1.2 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
Determined b)(1 ) (b)(5) I at 2:06:00 - 2:08:05
(b)(5) I and the question
was whether there was any interest in prosecuting this guy, and the answer back was that
there was no interest in ever prosecuting this guy, he would never see the inside of a
To Be
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says David Nahmias told him he raised the issue of the lack ofefficacy of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
Department of Defense's
OGC, that more
Department of Defense's
Base Guantanamo
and Donald Rumsfeld
interrogation plan of MO ) i0 DOD- 1 at 2:08:55-2:11:15
effective methods should be used, and the answer back was that he is
detainee, Federal Bureau of Investigation is a guest at U.S. Naval
Bay, Cuba, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed its view,
will decide how to proceed because, ultimately, (b)(1)
N 00 0
Determined I techniques were lawful was not discussed during the video telephone conference. J at 1:51:15
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Delieve- ("1) could eventually be tried in a US (b)(6),(b)(7) Interview
Determined I courtroom and these methods would be a huge problem legally because they were coercive. t at 1:54:40
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he saw General Geoffrey D. Miller's signature of (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C"i_IInterview
Determined (b)(1) interrogation plan, so he had some comfort it was all authorized, but he 1 at 1:56:55 - 1:59:00
thought that was pretty suspect to have a two star general sign off on the plan that,
realistically, would have gone to the Donald Rumsfeld to approve.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he made David Nahmias aware of the details of the proposed harsh "6)'("7)(C) nterview
Determined interrogation plans for (b)(1) and that David Nahmias said, don't 1 at 1:59:25
participate, but you can still stay there.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he recalls email from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Ito him (No. 018154). b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
Determined 1 1 lat.C:VI.S.5
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the reference in 018154 to his meeting at 16:00 is a meeting between b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
Determined and David Nahmias and possibly Andrew G Arena to &cam the situation 1 at 2:02:40, 2:04:50
involvine interrogation of (b)(1) (I3)(6),(b)(7)(C) ;ays that
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Iv iewl was that, it the federal Bureau ofvestigation pulled out of
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.6
(b)(1) belongs to him and Department of Defense, not John Ashcroft and Department
of Justice.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OW David Nahmias told him David Nahmias also raised these concerns
Determined about the methods Department of Defense used on fb)(1) 'up the
chain," but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not know the details of those communications — to what
level, and where it went.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ]said the IP for (b)(1) _Calling for rapport-building,
Determined gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation only five days to do the ra rt building before
moving on to phase II (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Said this was "ridiculous." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid he
wanted military to know it would take more time.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) iaid he forwarded various info to Marion E. "Spike" Bowman re.
1 at 1:15:32
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he was involved in forwarding questions to be asked of detainees
to US intelligence agencies, which would then ask the questions, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Said
that, because of classification issues, he couldn't say whether those qutons were posed
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Said that the policy "is and was" that if any Federal Bureau of Investigation 1 "6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
during interrogation sessions at which coercive tactics were used.
employee observed unlawful abusive or coercive interrogation, he or she should tell their 1 at 2:22:00, 2:25:10
supervisor of a problem, He also said that, if someone came to him with such a concern, he
certainly passed it on to his superiors or David Nahmias because it wasn't his position to
filter such concerns, but rather to be a messenger.
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he was not aware of any written policy governing what Federal (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) interview
Bureau of Investigation employees were supposed to do if they observed detainee treatment I at 2:22:00, 2:26:00-
that was inappropriate until the May 19 2004 EC, but that in meetings with Frankie Battle 2:27.12
and T.J. Harrinpn, he was also told bring those things to their attention.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aaid that he answered "do not recall" for some of his responses to the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) )nterview
questionnaire, including 19, because a truthful answer went beyond the "secret" and there I at 2:33:00
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 2:12:46
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Notes 7/12/05 at p. 19
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Department of Defense techniques
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explained that, contrary to his questionnaire answers, he had been deployed
about ten times overseas zones at which detainees were being held from 7/2002 to 12/2004.
He said he could obtain exact info by reference to his travel vouchers at a later time.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) i
Notes 7/12/05 at p. 20
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(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
1 at 2:18:00 - 2:19:00
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.7
1 at 3:04:00
1 at 3:14:25
was no room to indicate that on the form.
. id that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided to David Nahmias, in
addition to the 11/22/02 EC, earlier e-mails from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) setting out his
concerns, in the Federal Bureau of Investigation weekly meetings with David Nahmias.
Department of Justice, either Nahmias or (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) lad liaison with Department of
Defense, and they would have Tided this info to epartment of Defense. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
said therree was no follow up with (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) contemporaneous of the sort that took
place in the Spring of 2004 (he was interviewed, etc), because there was no directive from
the Department of Justice or from Office of the General Counsel - FBI to go back and do
such follow up. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, probably what triggered the follow up in the
Spring of 2004, was that the Abu G scandal made people think about what had been going
on back in 2002 and made the light bulb go off and made people realize, "hmm, that could
be problematic." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) also said he asked David Nahmias what Department of
Defense's response was about the concerns in (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) emails and EC, and that
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could not recall David Nahmias's response. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) I later said he
did not think he ever got any info back from David Nahmias or[(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) "OK, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, here's your marching orders." but (3)(6),(b)(7)(C)
certain Department of Defense was made aware of the concerns.
In response to question about Office of the Inspector General's possible recommendations
coming out of the review,r(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) hays it would greatly help Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Department of Defense if someone would clearly and specifically define
what is torture, what is inhumane, what is cruel, etc.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) hays he thinks David Nahmias mentioned to him that Department of Justice
had prepared something in writing to Department of Defense about interrogation tactics --
along the lines of some of these things we think do not need to be going on, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
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(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Said that he had weekly meetings with David Nahmias from about May
2002, when (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) first took this position, to 2003. The general purpose of these
meetings was NOT to discuss treatment of detainees, but rather, to ensure Department of
Justice was in the loop on intell developments from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba detainees that could affect possible criminal prosecutions or ongoing criminal
investigations in the US. Andrew G. Arena was in these meetings. *
said he was
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 2:49:00 - 2:50:00,
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
1 at 2:53:00 -2:54:35.
2:55:20, 3:05:50,
L(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.8
(b)(1) is video when he was in
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Intetview
s not r
says there were guidelines overning Mee
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
To Be
(b)(1) Jwas taken up in a elicopter and threatened to be pushed out if he
didn't admit to being Al Qaida and describe his cell -- in a plan approved by General
Geoffrey D. Miller — and ("1) urinated and defecated on himself.
Thinks (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have later told him, no, it didn't happen, though they
To Be b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
may have taken him in a helicopter and flew hi aarmouunndd
says he believed they did shave ("1) (read and
Determined beard as part of his interrogation. [1MB question - Who is "they"?]
To Be ' b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says someone may have described to him a situation in which a female
Determined interrogator showed her breast to a detainee or putting it on or around a detainee.cb)(6),(b)(7)
L guesses because she thought it would cause the detainee mental discomfort. [1MB
questions - What is "it"?: Where?] (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nay have mentioned that to Frankie
Battle or someone else; it could have been done to (b)(1)
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(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) adjustment/disruption for use at (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
rays this was common
Determined about 03)(1 ) iand had a keen interest in him., as soon as that happened, he
became an "icon" at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and other entities wanted to
interrogate him for their own reasonsaid that he was told, after the fact, that
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, once MO )
Brig, he was put into (b)(1) Stnc
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said Federal Bureau of Investigation had learned some significant info
went to
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) if nterview
I at 3:47:12 - 3:50:00
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
I at 4;08:48
1 at 4:10:10 - 4:11:40
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 'd he observed
isolation in the Navy brig, and he was hallucinating from the lack of an human interaction.
was moved out of the Navy (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(1) ind they decided to use I at 3:44:00
;aid that someone told him that someone had taken Wesson oil, claiming it
was pig's oil, and rubbing a detainee with it because the detainees' hated anything coming
from a Dig. fLAIII question -Where?]
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he did not believe Department of Defense would have had any
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1 at 4:12:10
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) linterview
1 at 4:14:20
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.9
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that Office of the Inspector General really should interview (b)(6),(b)(7)(C b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Determined i not just because (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had grave disagreements with, but in the interests of 1 at 4:16:00 -4:18:30
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice and the 240 million people
who live in this country.
To Be
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that there was no "dissension in the ranks" between Counter Terrorism (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Division - FBI and Military Liaison and Detainee Unit in . There was a "gallant effort at I at 4:28:50
cooperation" between the two units, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said, in trying to do the right thing to
handle the situation. For exampleJ(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he thinks after (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
wrote his 11/22/02 EC, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 'told him the people to whom (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
should send it
To Be -1(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) sa id certain Behavioral Analysis Unit agents were more excitable, like (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
Determined (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Would check in with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)( at 41:2V:VP
received info from Behavioral Analysis Unit folks to see what
take was, as
J Behavioral Analysis Unit worked for (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Aid he had daily interaction re. these issues with Frankie Battle, who (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Determined succeeded Raymond S. Mey. who succeeded Arthur M. Cummings, who succeeded Andrew
G. Arena. The two individuals who had the most knowledge were Frankie Battle and
Andrew G. Arena.
I at 4:32:10 - 4:34:11
- 4:37:25
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said his first AD was Pasquale D'Amuro, who probably had the most (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Determined intimate knowledge of his successors; he was followed by Larry A. Mefford, John S.
Pistole. and then Gary M. Bald. After Pasquale D'Amuro, John S. Pistole had the next most
knowledge and had more continuity because he was DAD under Larry A. Mefford and
Pacemala Amum.
I at 4:36:20
To Be (b)(6).(b)(7)(C)
;** with T.J. Harrington; (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interaction (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) lInterview
Determined - 4:37:56
T4..erlles7ailrdintshitaotnhwe ahsadinptrheettlyoroepguolfamr iomsteoraf,.t.h.ioe
that happened. [LM 1 at 4:37:29
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) knew a lot about these issues, at least from the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) _interview
Determined time he started, so other things he just had learned about afterwards. [Lllffi queniem -
I at 4:38:00
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.10
" jilterVieW
1 at 4:39:15
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 4:40 - 4:43:30
To Be 1(b)(6),(b)(7)—(Ca)-ld that he believed that some of his ADs or the DAD briefed Robert S.
Determined Mueller, III on some of these issues. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Isays Chuck Rosenberg, who was
special assistant to Robert S. Mueller, HI, may have "hit me up" a few times for info for
Robert S. Mueller, III.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) mid he interacted with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Dn a regular basis. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Determined said he may have had one or two meetings where Michael Chertoff was present, at which
Alice Fisher was also present. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid he was friendly with Alice Fisher.
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) id he never briefed her on interrogation tactics or policies, but may have
spoken with er one time about how Michael E. Dunleavy was runnin U.S. Naval Base
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and, does he know what he is doing. (b)(6)-(b)(7)(C) thinks Alice
Fisher may have gone to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba once.
To Be
To Be
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
To Be
says he thinks the USG has done the best it can under the circumstances (of
[dealing with the detainees).
Re the May 10, 2004 e-mail from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) [Ding Laura Parsky, David Nahmias,
Alice Fisher & Bruce Swartz,l(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sa-the e-mail might be a little misleading in
that it could be read to suggest that the four were all in weekly meetings on these issues;
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) jaid David Nahmias was the one he met with frequently, could have been
weekly, Alice Fisher on occasion attended the International Terrorism Operations Section 1
meetings, maybe (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) ilso attended and others from Department of Justice CT, and
Bruce Swartz went with David Nahmias and I to the Polic Coordinatin mmittee
detainee policy meetings at the National Security Council. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) id the issue
detainee treatment never arose during these meetings, but rat er, in orma y, in the car on
the way over, for example. In response to question whether Policy Coordinating Committee
detainee policy meetings would have been the forum for ironing out the dispute between
FBI/DOJ and Department of Defense re. treatment of detainees)(b)(6),(b)(7)(c) aid, no,
those meetings were for other issues like foreign policy — how get detainees to go to other
countries, to get them to build prisons for them..
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (said that Federal Bureau of Investigation had never done anything like U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.— Federal Bureau of Investigation sitting in front of
captured real live terrorists. Also different because military detainees in that, no lawyer
present, fresh off the battlefield, but still doing what the Federal Bureau of Investigation had
1 at 4:47:25
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Fat 4:49:45 - 4:53:00
1 at 5:11:08 - 5:13:45
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.11
To Be
always done. Also, big difference in that DOFFBI interviews normally done in context of
ssible criminal trial; not so milita .
said he thought a lot of SACs looked at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay,
Determined u-b.-r s a way to get their new agents a crash course in interrogation and terrorism. *
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 's ays that he, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ilid (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sat down and
Determined drafted the 5/26/04 EC. He saidif was drafted in responseestions "what are we
• allowed to do and not do?" post Abu G becoming public. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said there was a
specific incident or person asking questions. After looking at the 5/19/2004 EC, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
L said he "believed" the 5/26104 EC was in response to the 5/19 "because there were
some people who came out..." [pz: I question lief here because I think there are
drafts of the 5/26 EC that pre-date the 5119 E ; the 5/26 EC does not cite, quote, or discuss
the 5/19 EC, nor set out guidance for how to apply or interpret the 5/19 EC, and I doubt
there would have been time for read the 5/19 ec, communicate concerns about it, and for a
new ec responsive to those concerns be drafted by 5/26. I think the 5/19 and 5/26 ECs were
different branches off the same tree.] (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could not recall what needed
clarification from the 5/19/2004 EC.
To Be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aware that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was involved in some program- (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Determined said he decided to pull him back home because he was concerned wit (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) kvell
being, as other Federal Bureau of Investigation employees had called me and told me they
were also concerned. *
??/??/2002 said his understanding from HQ 1(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was that Robert S. Mueller, III
visited U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in early 2002 and was very unhappy with
the way it was organized and structured, as it was being administered from the Miami Field
Office, so Robert S. Mueller, III decided that it could be better managed out of Federal
Bureau of Investigation HQ so that, per (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) S. Mueller, III could "have
his hand on the pulse of the operation."
xplained that Robert S. Mueller,
HI wanted to be able to have immediate access to info and get answers to his questions re.
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba quickly, and that.he sometimes would stop by the
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba task force and ask "what's going on at U.S. Naval
Base Guantanamo Ba , Cuba" — couldn't do that if thin s were run out of Miami. *
??/??/2002 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the other individuals in the Director's office who were involved were (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
b)(6),(b)(7)(c) Interview
1 at 5:15:30
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
1 at 5:19:10
1 at 5:40:00
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
1 17:13-17:35, 18:25,
18:44, 22:08-30.
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.12
Pasquale D'Amuro, Chuck Rosenberg (now in the DAG's office, then Special Assistant to
Robgrt S. Mueller, M),
1 21:25- 21:40
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) _says he then asked for the calling card platform of Mohammed Atta (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
and his callingrd had made calls to the 9/11 financier, right around the timeR)(1 ) 1 J I at 28:00 - 0:58
flight arrived, then another right rightf(b)(1 )
was stopped by INS — calls from a pay phone 40 feet away. In sum.[(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
explains how he basically discovers several links between MO ) I
and the hijackers.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, as a result of determining MO ) J
I ( )(6),(b)(7)(C) ALn- terview
connection with 9/11 plot, his stock "rose higher than anyone else at U.S. Naval Base 1 at 31:16
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) id that on 5/2002 he took a HQ position in Counter Terrorism Division -
FBI to help organize investigative efforts at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
replacing ( who had served TDY. He said this was initially called the
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba task force and roughly eight months later Military
Liaison and Detainee Unit was organized and structured.
07/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that in July 2002, he received a call from INS, which had been working
with Criminal Justice Information Services Division in analyzing fingerprints, telling him
that there is a detainee (b)(1) — in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba who tried to enter the country through Miami in August 2001. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
found this disturbing — this detainee had come through Orlando, like many of the 9111
hijackers, so I asked for the travel pattern of several of the hijackers and found that it
matched what (b)(1) had done per his travel documents.
07/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aid he was back and forth to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
repeatedly within the time period from July 2002 to September 2002.
08/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he collected sufficient info that he made a presentation to the Director's
Office re. (b)(1) r(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) jays he then tells U.S. Naval
Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC, either (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
or (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) iin . d directed him to share the info with military counterparts (Gen.
Dunleavy not Gen. General Geoffrey D. Miller.). That was about I week after the Director
C(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
1 at 14:06; 15:25
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
1 at 26:09, 26:43,
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 41:00
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 31:56, 32:25,
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.13
1 at 39:45
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
I at 41:20 - 43:52
:ame to says in Aug 2002, there were only a few agents in Afghanistan. (b)(6)'(b)(7)
me and asked if it was worth it to have agents there. I said yes. He met with
Pascual D'Amuro and Andrew G. Arena and they decided I should go with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(5),(b) rice o do an evaluation and we came back with yes, we should be there. We gave a
1 written document to Pasquale D'Amuro, maybe even a note. *
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the military's initial response to learning about the identity of
(b)(1) was to increase the pressure on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to get info from him.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during the August-
September, 2002 time period Ipz: timeframe seems wrong -- he said it was AFTER Gen.
MillerG took command], with David Nahmias, for a presentation of updated intelligence
obtained from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba — Gen General Geoffrey D. Miller
and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) iwho ran_theinterugintintis fimction at the time in U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Ba Cub with
and David Nahmias in th back —
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
I I at 5:28:22 - 5:30:05
to the Pentagon (with Dr. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) an (b)(1) via
videophone. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) !aimed to have obtained intelligence using the
Department of Defense's new interrogation tactics, when in fact tie was just repeating info
Federal Bureau of Investigation already had obtained using investigative tactics. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), said so during the VTC and things got somewhat heated.
(b)(7)(C) • — said the wav the military met-paced nrpcalre on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
get info out oft(b)(1) vas by giving it a deadline for "getting the
job done or we're moving in," i.e., get info or the military was taking over interrogation of
(b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said ultimately we were guests at U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they were military detainees, we were there to gather
intelligence and trying to produce fruitful information for our investigations in the US, and
so, ultimately Department of Defense took control of hi inn
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that as soon as the military knew o (b)(1)
keen interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the military wanted to take anwre
aggressive approach to interrogating him and use interrogation methods on him that
xlieved, and that Behavioral Analysis Unit and Headquarters (FBI), believed,
I might produce information that was unreliable and what he, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ;believed would
I at 47:20 - 47:44.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
at 46:00 - 46:42
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.14
probably be a problematic to use at a military tribunal or Article 3 prosecution.
10/??/2002 (b)(6), said that he recalled speaking "a couple of times" by telephone to (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C)
and recalled receiving e-mails from Rb)(6),(b)(7)(C) iidvising him of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
observations of the interrogation of (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
recalled receiving 10/1/2002 e-mail from ("6),(b)(7)(C) 1018224), which details the
plan to put him back int "1) and conduct 20-hour day interroszaticasessions with
successive teams of Defense Humint Services interrogators. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ;aid he
believed he had advised Andrew G. Arena about the Behavioral Analysis Unit's concerns
about the Department of Defense's methods, and that Behavioral Analysis Unit would back
out of any participation in the interrogation plan, just continue to advocate for a rapportbased
10/r/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
II ' i b 6 (b)(7)(C) in San
Francisco, was placed in a cell nearby to b)(1) 11 (b)(1)
an undercover agent posing as a detainee (b)(6).(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7) is a Christian
Lebanese native Arabic speaker.
10/r/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, in response to concerns communicated from (b)(6)0)(7)(C)
and others to '(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) incl then fron(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Ito Headquarters (FBI), that
Headquarters (FBI) was concerned and adamant that Federal Bureau of Investigation will
not engage in any kind of tactics that go outside of the normal practices we would use in the
US, and that was pretty much what we told all agents. P)(6),(b)(7)(C) jaid we were there
doing things we do in the US or outside the US -- there was no revision to Federal Bureau of
Investigation policy about interviews. We were told to stay away from any tactics that were
questionable, regarding what Department of Defense was doing, we were told not to
participate in that.
10/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that Andrew G. Arena was concerned that the interrogations in U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were not producing results that were conducive to
investigationsPid he and Arena were aware that Department of Defense was
"putting these ys through sleep deprivation."
11/r/2002 1(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he recalled receiving 000091 (11/22/02 EC). (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) explained
that (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) vas the OSC at the time it was written. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Is aid that he
discussed the contents of the EC, as well had on going dialogue re U.S.-Will-Base
—1j7:1)(6),(b)(7)(C) jnterview
I at 53:55 - 54:45
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
1 at 55:15 - 55:35
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
1 at 7:41:40- 2:46:10
(b)(6),(b)(7,( —In terview
1 at 48:20 ;50:15,
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) .nterview
1 at 52:22, 53:38
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.15
1 U??/2002
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba issues generally, with Andrew G. Arena most, but also Larry A.
Mefford and John S. Pistole
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, in response to 000091, he believed David Nahmias took up the
issues with DOD-OGC to ask if Department of Defense was going to investigate allegations
of any inappropriate interrogation tactics. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he may have given a
Nahmias or
Arena may have done so. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
grfiSSea its cents wqith him, or that Andrew G.
said he recall notifying Nahmias
of the EC during a conversation'wt—th Andrew G. Arena. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) also said he was
confident David Nahmias was aware of the details of the observations set out in the
11/22/02 EC — specifically sleep deprivation, duct tape on an individual's mouth. loud
music, bright lights, growling dogs. "Oh yeah, Dave knew that" (b)(5)
copy of this EC to David
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
1 at 2:47:20 - 2:48:13,
2:48:45, 2:56:30-
11/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) flterview
I at 3:35:10, 3:37:32 -
1 1/??/2002
say (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) >r someone from Behavioral Analysis Unit told him
that one of the planned or actual techniques applied to (b)(1) was
simulated drowning. 110 if" Nahmias about this at the time, October-
November 2002 timeframe, (b)(6)'
(b)(7)(C) il ndae it clear to David Nahmias that this was
something that needed to be addressed, among of ons, so that we could determine if
Department of Defense was authorized to do this inks Andrew G. Arena was aware
of (b)(6),(b)(7 )(C) ,.oncerns about this particular technique and that he raised it with David
Nahmias. (b)(6).(b)(7)(C) Said he believed David Nahmias or someone else in the
Department of Justice would contact Department of Defense to follow up with this,
aid there was a sense of urgency in addressing this concern because we didn't
believe it was appropriate.
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that. at some point, the (aggressive) interrogation of (b)(1 )
(b)(1 ) Mopped. (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) thinks the concerns about his interrogation reached
Paul Wolfowitz or Donald Rumsfeld and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) —thinks the concern was that,
because this was being brought up by the Dep meet of Justice_ is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation watching us?, and so that is whe ("1 ) got pulled
out of the Navy Brig and put intg(b)(1 ) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) rp saw it mWhTve been
coincidental, but it seemed to him that the aggressive interrogation tactics stopped in
(b)(6),(b)(7 )(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7 )(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7 )(C)
(b)(6 ),(b)(7 )(C) nterview
I at 3:41:30 - 3:42:35,
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.16
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
(b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) at 5:15
I Glinntanamnily, Cuba Task Force became Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. • 1 at 23:56
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said
it was around the time Military Liaison and Detainee Unit was formed
changes were made: Pasquale D'Amuro was promoted to EAD
Division - FBI: Larry A. Mefford became AD for Counter Terrorism
M. Cummings replaced Andrew G. Arena as the Section Chief.
i ransferred to Germany, ultimately replaced by Michael J. Heimbach (now
that the following 1 at 24:05 -24:50
of Counter Terrorism
Division - FBI:
section chief ofInternational Terrorism Operations Section 1).
Re. 11/25/2003 EC, documenting (b)(1) 'helicopter ride,''(b)(6)'(b)(7)(C) b)(6),(b)(7)(C) nterview
b)(6), pLAaiys he may have known that a female TDY agent from Tampa FL (named 1 at 3:51:41-3:55:45,
Lila learned about the incident and started to write it up, and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ¶Imm‘aayy have 4:26:32
advisel(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) o write it u in a more clear version and put 't into an EC.
s upset because
old her to go
b)(6),(b)( )(I.4 Said tha (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) me to him and said she ws
b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did not want her to do the EC, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
was a ro i nate on the EC. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) say s Federal Bureau of Investigation Point of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
J Contact/liaison withh)(1) Says he sits over at (b)(1) 1 at 5:45 - 6:06
(b)(1) HQ and reports to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI AD Willie T
I connection with Department of Justice raising concerns. Timeframe is about Oct-Nov. 2002
12/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said it was roughly Dec. 2002 - Jan. 2003 that the U.S. Naval Base
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explained he met witt ("1)
I and Federal Bureau of InvestigationPt iC— %)W,.. th-e
to prepare for his Office of the Inspector General interview.
ACLU-RDI 6160 p.17