CaseMap Facts Report - Pat D'Amuro Interview 1

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concluded that Federal Bureau of Investigation should not be involved in the interviews
I where those techniques were used Pasquale D'Arnuro said he learned about this from
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[Pasquale D'Anturo said it came to light that when certain HVT were captured, the Central
Intellistence..Astencv and Department ofDtfense_wanted to entolov:c4rtain interview
Pasquale D'Amuro said Rollice handled any formal agreement or communication between
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and military related to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's deployment to Afghanistan to military zones. Pasquale D'Amuro thinks this
document did not include anything about detainee interviews, just documentary Well. *
Pasquale D'Aniuro said the initial plan was to deploy Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents to Afghanistan attached to military components conducting searches of caves and
homes that had been vacated during attacks to obtain intelligence re. Al Qaeda and 9/11
investigation. This was the document exploitation group --military, Central Intelligence
Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation jointly participated. *
Pasquale D'Anano said as Chief Inspector he had direct access to Robert S. Mueller,
Also reported to to Dale Watson (EAD for CT/Cl) and Tim Caruso (DEAD for CT/Cl).
As part of being the Inspector in charge of the 9/11 attacks, Pasquale D'Anium gave daily
threat briefings to Robert S. Mueller, M and John Ashcroft. It then included the
Afghanistan deployment.
eM
Pat -.1:0Amuro Interview 1
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Pat D'Amuro Interview I
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Pat D'Arnuro Interview I
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Pat D'Amuro Interview I
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Pasquale D'Amuro said that, other than the meeting at Chertoffs office, the only
conversation with any Department of Justice officials re. this topic was one with Larry
Thompson when he was the DAG. Pasquale D'Amuro said 'this issue was constantly
coming up ... with every HVT that they obtained, the issue again would arise, who is going
Pasquale lYAmuro recalls only one the particular meeting in Michael Chertoffs office re. '
whether Federal Bureau of Investigation would participate and the legal authority, but also
a few other conversations. He did not know all the techniques that may be were being
authorized, but aware of rumors flying around. Almost every day, John Ashcroft and
others from Department of Justice were coming over for briefings, and I either provided or
sat in those briefings. He also briefed the White House at times. So there were
conversations every day with Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher and others from
Department of Justice. He said he was being kind of "boastful" or "voiceful" (???) in
saying we really would like the opportunity to have agents with the knowledge and
background about the HVTs to get involved with those interviews. Those conversations
continued through the picking up of the HVTs like Zayn Abidin lvfuhammed Hussein abu
Zubaida and KSM. Pasquale D'Ainuro said he recalled having a meeting with Robert S. '
Mueller, BI and Tenet trying to discuss how Federal Bureau of Investigation could
participate in the interviews, but we kept coming back to the same situation -• if those
techniques were going to be used, we would not participate. He said he suggested giving
Federal Bureau of Investigation access before the techniques would be used, but we lost
because everyone thought the people would ask for attorneys and not talk to us anyway.
We also thought there would be a taint problem even if we got access after the techniques
were done outside of our resent so that would not work either.
and be wanted to be able to say, "the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not participate in
that type of actiVity." Yes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has agents who do Well
interviews, but they also may be called upon to testify and we cannot have them in that
position. Pasquale D'Arnuro said he also thought this was wrong. He hilly anticipated this
would come out and this gives at qaeda the opinion of the US it wants to be able to
circulate. He said he took some criticism from agents who wanted very much to
participate in these interviews, but I felt very strongly that we not participate in that, and
the Director agreed with me.
Pat D'Ainuro interview 1
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whose name he can't recall, after a white house briefing
Pasquale IYAmuro said that there were several reasons for his argument against Federal
Bureau of Investigation involvement in the interviews. One problem with Federal Bureau
of Investigation participation in these techniques was giglio — if these agents were called to
testify later in their careers, would they be asked about whether they ever lied participated
in the use of coercive techniques? A second problem was moral — Pasquale D'Amuro
thought these techniques were wrong. Another problem was, despite the claim that these
interviews were for intell rather than for criminal prosecution, at the end of the day, what
was the USG going to do with these HVDs? Prosectition, even in the military tribunal
context, would require some standard of evidence. He said he believed that someday this
was going to come back to haunt us. Finally, he also said the use of these techniques was
not necessary: in the investigations into prior terrorist acts East Africa bombings, first
Wit, USS Cole the Federal Bureau of Investigation had successfully obtained
information through cooperation by those who eventually flipped without the use of these
techniques. And Pasquale IPAmuro•said the techniques were not going to be effective. He
said the individuals came from parts of the world where much worse was done to them
than these interview techniques. And they expected the US to use these harsh techniques.
What they did NOT expect was to treat them as human beings, and then, when you know
your subject matter and catch them in lies, when you vet out the information, you can
eventuallyg ett hemt ot ellt hemt het ruth.If youu set hes pecial techniques longe nough,
people will start telling you things just to get you to stop doing the technique to them — we
wanted accurate inner.
to conduct the interview and .. what techniques were going to be utilized." Pasquale
D'Amuro said he recalled a conversation with Larry Thompson while riding back from the
White House, where Pasquale D'Amuro and Larry Thompson had attended a deputies'
meeting, during which Pasquale D'Amuro again was making the case for the value of
having Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewers who had been investigating these
people for years involved, and he said the impression he got from what Larry Thompson
was saying was that problems already were ari sing from the use of these special
techniques..
Pat D'Amuro Interview
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Pasquale D'Amuro said there Clime a time when he heard that agents were noticing some of
these techniques at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; when that happened we
reiterated our instructions that agents are not to participate in any part of of these types of
Pasquale D'Ainuro said the way he took the meeting in aerial's office was that
Department of Justice was "very familiar" with what techniques were going to be utilized,
but there was not a discussion of all the techniques — they didn't focus on that particular
issue. He said that be thought Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher probably did know more
aboutt he techniques, buth es aidh ed idn'tk noww hatt h eir knowledgew as.
Pasquale D'Anturo said that the purpose of the meeting in Chertoff's office, at which Alice
Fishera ndC hertoff andh ew erep resent,w asn ott od iscusst het echniques;th ep urpose
was to discuss how the Federal Bureau of Investigation could get involved in the
interviews of some of the HVTs, because "we felt so strongly that is would add value to
be able to obtain infb because we knew the subjects so well. So we discussed, how can we
participate in interviews when these techniques are being used. As examples of Federal
Bureau of Investigation "value added," Mike Op?) Frank Peligrino had worked KSM for
several years, be knew more about him than anyone in the Central Intellieenee Aaencv
we were discussing the interviews with HVTs and how we could poiy—work something
out where we could have access to the detainees before the special techniques would take
place. Pasquale D'Arnuro says they had the discussion, but nothing ever changed. Once it
was decided that the techniques were going to be utilized, we had difficulty going back in
to conduct interviews. Pasquale D'Aniuro says Tenet was possibly considering how this
could be done, but it was never worked out.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) tunied the situation around, got the detainee to be given a prayer rug, etc.,
and got him to flip, to cooperate, Pasquale D'Amuro thinks he was a body guard for UBL,
and now the military decided to prosecute this detainee. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) obtained four
voluntary confessions from detainees, all of whom the military now wants to prosecute in
military courts. *
To Be Pasquale D'Amuro said he is unaware of any of these techniques being used in Afghanistan Pat D'Amuro Interview I
Determined in interviews in which Federal Bureau of Investigation was participating. * (CPD Note: at 1:01-50
What Techniques?)
To Be Pasquale D'Amuro said, in 1.1 S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, when a detainee was Pat D'Ainuro Interview I
Determined ID'd as potentially having a lot of knowledge of CT issues or intell about UBL, that usually at 1:03-1:04:05
when we sent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C or someone with more specialized knowledge. He said one of
the generals (Michael E. Dunleavy) who ran U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
asked ii (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could stay down there for one year, and we said no we can't do that.
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Pasquale D'Amuro DNR Behavioral Analysis Unit agents communicating concerns about
techniques actually or planned to be used on detainees in. U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, but does recall reiterating the "do not participate in those interviews "policy,
that Andrew G. Arena and others would have reiterated that policy, in response to agents
asking to be allowed to participate in those interviews. The response was, no, there are
reasons we are not going to be participatingin_tho.winteniews.
Pat D'Ainuro Interview 1
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Pasquale D'Amuro said the interrogation of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was one that Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have mentioned to him, but DNR any specifics. at 1:09:19
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Pasquale D'Amuro said he DNR conversations with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman about
interview techniques at U S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:09:45
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Pasquale D'Amuro said he DNR Larry• A. Mefford advising him that Behavioral Analysis
Unit agents were concerned about interrogation techniques they were aware of at U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- but that Larry A. Mefford "regularly" went around
him and brought info directly to Bruce J. Gebhardt or Robert S. Mueller, El.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:11:05 - 1:11:50
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Pasquale D'Amuro says he may have had a discussion with Andrew G. Arena in May or
June of 2003 about putting out written guidance that agents were not to pa rticipate in any
Pat D'Amuro Interview I
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activity "like that" and agents should be so informed, but DNR if Andrew G. Arena put
something like that out.
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Pasquale D'Amuro said he has heard, after the fact, that there may have been memos by
agents raising issues about possible witnessing criminal acts and what should they do, but
he was totally unaware of that at the time — this may have been something Larry A.
Melford failed to bring to his attention.
When asked if he was aware whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Department of
Justice ever tried to raise the issue of efficacy to the White House or other part of the
Executive Branch to try to "overrule" the agency's approach or the military•'s approach, to
try to get the use of these ineffective interrogation techniques out of the picture, Pasquale
D'Amuro said he thought the Administration and White House was well aware of this, but
he has no specific evidence to support that. He may have had a conversation with Robert
S. Mueller, HI in which Mueller said "we're going to lose that battle" regarding the
techniques and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's desire to conduct those interviews.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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Pasquale D'Amuro said something sticks in his mind that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Tom the
White House, was involved in working with John Ashcroft and Department of Justice on
the issue of the techniques and was aware of what was taking place .
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Pasquale D'Amuro recalls a conversation with Valerie E. Caproni, perhaps in early Spring
of 04. when she asked me some questions — that's where I remember first hearing about
some documentation by agents questioning some of what was being done.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:22:18
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Pasquale D'Amuro says that Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher made it clear that the
Central Intelligence Agency had asked Department of Justice for a legal opinion about the
use of these techniques.
Pat D'Amuro Interview I
at 1:23:25 - 1:24:06
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Pasquale D'Anniro said that at the meeting with Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher, he was
very vocal in trying to get the Federal Bureau of Investigation involved in those interviews,
and he thought it was important to raise all the issues relevant to that.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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Pasquale D'Amuro said that, what kept coining back (from the military? (TD) was that, if
the Federal Bureau of Investigation did it these HVT interviews, the detainees would just
lawyer up and not talk, so "we going to do it our way."
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:27:45
To Be Pasquale D'Amuro said that there was an instance in which it was worked out where the Pat D'Amuro Interview I
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Federal Bureau of Investigation was going to try to participate in the interview of b)(6),(b)(7) O
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) at the beginning. Pasquale D'Amuro
was one where they were trying to make it work. Pasquale D'Amuro said (b)(6)'(b)(7)(C)
and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were the two agents deployed. They "hooked up" with
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) The (b)(1) kaersonnel who was
going to participate in the interview, for some reason, was not on the plane with (b)(6),(b)(7)(
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) he later
ind(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) kook care of
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ,cleaned his wound, cleaned him up after
he had defecated on himself, helped to feed him), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
b)(6),(b)(7)
once thej (b)(1)
arrived to the location where they went (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
started to talk with them about things, started to provide some intelligence
which (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) documented through agency channels. Once ther(b)(1)
(b)(1) arrived on scene, the decision was made to use the techniques, and we kept saying:
"Wait a minute. He's talkin to us already. He's already got a relationship that is starting
to build with (b)(6),(b)(7) nd (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 1..et us continue to talk to him." And the
answer was "no_ we are nninn to start with the techniques." Pasquale D'Amuro said that,
made this decision to use these techniques and start
he instructed —
and (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) 'should "come home — do not
that kin of interview withi(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
through the section — that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C
participate in the interviews." *
at 1:30:23 - 1:32:15
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
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Pasquale D'Amuro said that, shortly after the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
interview involving (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) described above, he told
Robert S. Mueller, HI that "we snouid sit down with them and try to resolve this," and that
led to the meeting with Tenet and the (b)(1) agent at the White
House described above. Pasquale D'Amuro thinks this meeting took place in 2002.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:32:20 - 1 :33:45
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Pasquale D'Amuro says that another consequence of these techniques is that it makes it all
the more difficult to develop sources and cooperators -- when people hear this type of
activity is on-going, in his opinion, it makes the job more difficult.
Pasquale D'Amuro said that agents should never have even been put in the position to
observe these techniques, because we made it very clear they are to avoid those types of
activities. *
Pat D'Amuro Interview
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Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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Pasquale D'Amuro said that, at the time, he was asking. "what is the end game? Are they
going to be prosecuted by the military, by the federal courts?" Pasquale D'Amuro said the
answers "were not there." So, in another discussion with Robert S. Mueller, III or with
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1 -44: I0 - 1:46.20
Department of Justice officials, possibly (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) asquale D'Amuro said, let's not go
down the road where we eliminate tools in our arsenal." [I.e.. by using techniques that
would make evidence inadmissible.]
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Pasquale D'Ainuro said that, right after 9/11, the role of Department of Justice was
"minimized." Prosecution and law enforcement took a "way back seat."
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 1:46:25 - 1:47:05
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Pasquale D'Amuro says the Federal Bureau of Investigation has long been involved in
terrorist prevention, not just after the fact enforcement, especially the NY officer he
pointed to the Blind Sheik and the prevention of the potential bombing of the UN, the
Lincoln Tunnel, and the Federal Building, and the Ramsey Yousey and the prevention of
the bombing of I I jumbo jet airliners over the Pacific ocean. He said the E. Africa
prosecutions was put on for the world to see, and it was done properly, legally, and above
board, and the world saw these people killed not only Americans but innocent Muslims --
and that is the way we should be going forward. The rest of the world looks at us, and
using these techniques comes back to hurt us hie when detainees get out, they are going to
use it to generate additional terrorist attacks.
Pat D'Amuro interview I
at 1:48:30 - 1:50:45
10/??/2001 Pasquale D'Amuro was in a briefing, mid to late Oct. 2001, where they learned hostilities
were commencing in Afgh, and he said he suggested to Robert S. Mueller, III that Federal
Bureau of Investigation should have agents ready to deploy to collect intelligence. He said
he knew significant intell would be collected -- including documents and material being
collected, some terrorist subjects would be there, maybe would be killed so Federal Bureau
of Investigation should know that. He said he recommended to Robert S. Mueller, III to to
coordinate with the military to get agents deployed. He said Robert S. Mueller, III thought
it was a good idea. Mike Rollince, who was section chief for international terrorism, and
Dale Watson, who was AD for CT, were tasked with following up with that. It was a
month or so later, or maybe a few months later, when the first Federal Bureau of
Investigation people were actually going in to Afghanistan. *know
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
at 10:30-13:45
Thu
03/31/2005
Pasquale D'Amuro said he left the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 331/05. At the time
he was AD in charge of the NY Field Office. He had been in that position since 8/3/03.
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
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Prior to that he was EAD CT/C1, which he held since Nov. 02. Prior to that he was AD for
CT since Jan or Feb of 02. Prior to that, I was in the NY Field office when, in Oct 2001
when I was asked to come to DC as Inspector in Charge of the 9/11 investigation.
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