Army Report re: Army Central Command Combined Arms Assessment Team Initial Impressions Report (IIR), Chapter 3: Operational Intelligence

Report with observations and assessment of operations at detainee collection points in Afghanistan. This is Chapter 3: Operational Intelligence; Topic D: Collection.

Oversight Report
Tuesday, February 14, 2006

Chapter 3
Operational Intelligence
Topic D: Collection

Observation Synopsis:
In an unconventional environment such as found in Afghanistan, HUMAN Intelligence (HUMINT) was the most effective collection method and supported actions from the tactical to strategic level. Beyond the theater MI brigade's interrogation and counterintelligence assets, the CFLCC possessed few organic collection assets, relying primarily on national and theater capabilities to collect information in support of ground operations. The Interrogation and CI battalion typically drew 90% of its linguists from contractors, other services, and the reserve component, but for this operation, received only Reserve Component augmentation. In other cases, the Army identified and deployed linguists, only to discover that their language or proficiency level was incorrect or insufficient.
The CFLCC had access to non-Army collection systems, such as the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which became an essential tool in collecting information in a highly non-permissive environment. Access and tasking priority was not always sufficient to meet organization needs, particularly because ground force commanders found innovative uses for the employment of this scarce resource that conflicted with the owning service's view of targeting and collection.
The Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF). The Theater MI Brigade had the capability to establish only one JIF capable of gathering information from prisoners or detainees. While with augmentation this would have been adequate for sequential operations, larger or more simultaneous operations likely would have overwhelmed the unit's ability to _ accomplish the mission.
In the context of unconventional operations countering terrorists, Military Police and Military Intelligence doctrinal solutions for establishing tactical interrogation and holding facilities were proven to be inadequate in providing the war fighters and the commanders with the capability to exploit HUMINT sources and develop future contacts. Operations at Bagram demonstrated that an organization like the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) must play a central and leading role in interrogation operations because of the nature of the war on terrorism. The JIATF integrates the capabilities of CIA, DHS, FBI, and conventional military HUMINT forces into a fusion cell capability. The JIATF must have the authority to task military units and must have the resources and authority to conduct unique HUMINT operations. These types of operations require a non-doctrinal approach to interrogation operations and innovative or "outside the box" methods to interdiction operations. The typical "JIF" or tactical exploitation facility is not the appropriate solution. It requires an integrated operational focus supported by fused intelligence to conduct responsive detection and apprehension operations of terrorists. Furthermore, from an MP perspective it is also a uniquely different mission as it is not
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just a "Detainee" or EPW holding facility. Instead, it is a unique operational intelligence
exploitation facility in which the MP resources must be subordinate to the JIATF in
regards to evacuation / release decisions on detainees.
A related point is that the doctrinal approaches to "EPW" or "Detainee" operations initially utilized by CFLCC did not take full advantage of the various policies adopted by civilian leadership to deal with the unique nature of this unconventional operation. The laws and policies regarding the war against terrorism must be used to the maximum extent possible and support flexibility for commanders instead of acting as restrictive barriers. The laws permit greater latitude than what is exercised in conventional operations. Commanders must understand the need for custodial interrogations of people whom U.S. forces have no intention of detaining. In addition, there is a need for absolute non-disclosure of the identities of all persons in custody until they have been determined to be not of high value or high intelligence value. This approach is not risk free, but success requires innovative action. This innovative action must facilitate:
Segregation of high value individuals.

"Incentive Program" controlled by intelligence personnel dictates level of treatment above minimal standards.

Release v. Repatriation of individuals (There are differences between the two.)

Interrogators must have TS Clearances

Interrogators must have more strategic level training (i.e. — Training must emphasize unconventional interrogation operations and place less emphasis on tactical EPW interrogations). In addition to this increased training, all interrogators should have TS Clearances to be able to work seamlessly with the JIATF.
Flexibility should be provided to commanders on the ground on the ability to determine _ to hold or release persons that are not deemed to be a High Value or High Intelligence Value.
High Value individuals must be segregated from the general detainee populace. MP and interrogation assets must be able to cover and accommodate these situations.
Linguist Support. The Interrogation and CI Battalion, lacked sufficient linguists to accomplish the mission without augmentation from contractors and Reserve Component augmentees.
The Joint Interrogation Facility was designed to fill 90% of its requirements from joint, contractor, and reserve component manning. The Reserve Component provided limited, high quality manning, but no other services contributed to the manning of the JIF, except for the USMC while it was responsible for the installation at Kandahar. The result was a shortage of linguists, and initially, insufficient manning.
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The mission of screening and interrogating large numbers of important detainees
demanded native-proficiency level linguists in order to perceive cultural nuances,
understand a variety of dialects, and accurately understand acquired information. The
most effective means of acquiring native linguists was through contracting. The Army
could not provide, and did not have an effective system in place to identify and contract
for, this support. On its own initiative, the Interrogation and CI Battalion was able to
initiate the process to find and contract for a linguist in a critically short, but essential,
language prior to deployment.
Another factor contributing to initial difficulties was that the Army identified linguists by language group, not specific language and dialect, and many linguists were only marginally proficient. As a result, the Interrogation and CI Battalion had to return 60% of the linguists provided to the United States because they did not possess the requested language, or where not sufficiently skilled in the language they possessed.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UA UAVs became one of the most important collection
assets in theater because they allowed commanders and intelligence staffs a real time, visual view of the battlefield. Overall, the Predator met CFLCC requirements for
imagery collection in Afghanistan and could support Army operations in the future,
although its capabilities could be improved with the addition of a laser designator for
locational and targeting use.
The USAF operated and controlled all military UAVs in theater. The CFLCC was given tasking authority of these UAVs during high priority operations, but there were often conflicts of purpose and task. Because the system resided with the Air Force, their analysts were trained primarily to identify and track air-appropriate targets. While the Air Force was supportive to Army requirements when tasked by CENTCOM, they were not capable of exploitation the ground-oriented products required by the CFLCC. This need, to exploit imagery in a more rapid, focused fashion tailored to Army needs was not acknowledged by the USAF during the operation. The Theater MI Brigade has created a UAV Exploitation Team (UET) that captured UAV images and exploited them to facilitate ground-oriented analysis, adding considerably to the amount of intelligence derived from each UAV mission.
The ability to see the battlefield on video and simultaneously at virtually any level of command also created the opportunity for leaders to participate in battles to an unprecedented degree. While this had benefits in terms of speed of the decision-making process and shared awareness of the battlefield, it may have resulted in multi-echelon participation in decisions normally made at lower levels. Most commanders and staff officers expressed frustration at being "micromanaged" from one or two levels above them.
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ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)
generally reduced when NGOs begin sustained operations. The C-JCMOTF's continued
presence could have caused tensions with NGOs. NGOs cooperated with our HA efforts, but
prefer to avoid an obvious association with the military. A Civil Military Operation Center
(CMOC) in title alone creates the perceived association NGOs seek to avoid. CMOCs in direct
support (generally battalions) were referred to as Civil Humanitarian Liaison Centers (CHLC­
pronounced Chic-lit), the term used by the British military. It also immediately identifies the
level of the CA force, since CMOC is used at all levels of support.
The collection and classification of information and samples of Dexorybo Nucleic Acid (DNA) collected through the Personnel Identification Data (PID), and the subsequent Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT) process has enhanced the ability to provide FP through the immediate identification of suspected criminals, and it has also enhanced the nations ability to collect criminal intelligence information for future pursuit and processing of suspected criminals (terrorists). When the campaign on the "War Against Terrorism" in Afghanistan, the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) were already holding approximately 3200 detainees throughout the Coalition Joint Operational Area (CJOA) Afghanistan. US forces were directed to collect PID on all potential Taliban and al-Qaeda members in an effort to identify America's newest enemies. PID collection packets (consisting of names,ngerprints, DNA, and digital photos) became a key tool in our fight in the AOR. Once a detainee has completed the PID process, they are screened by the MIT to determine if they meet the criteria established by the CFLCC for retention under the custody of the US forces and subsequent movement to the Theater Short Term Holding Facility (STHF) in the AOR. Increased training needs to occur between the MP and the Military Intelligence (MI) community to ensure that all tactics, techniques and procedures (TIP) are comprehensively addressed. These types of missions are ideal for both the MP and the MI branches because of the mobility and flexibility of the MP Corps, and the MI requirement for collection and processing in information. Due to the uniqueness and newly implemented process that occurred, it is recommended that the both the MP and MI communities address the cooperative affect that these missions require.
The additional duty appointment of an MP Bn staff officer was assigned to address the issues and concerns identified by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in reference to the detainees being held throughout the AOR. The MP Battalion staff officer provided a cooperative relationship between the ICRC and the MP Bn conducting the detainee operation. The ICRC staff representative performs as a liaison/mediator between the Bn Commander, the unit conducting the interment process within the wire and the ICRC detainee representative. The additional tasking of an ICRC Coordinator is usually conducted at the brigade level. However, the MP Bn Commander identified the need to have a facilitator within his own staff in order to facilitate the relationships that he knew were required when working with the ICRC. The ICRC involves itself with the observation and interaction of detainees/EPW within a area of conflict. The ICRC consistently referred to the detainees as EPWs; however, the MP Bn continued to explain and enforce the use of the term detainee when coordinating/cooperating with the ICRC. Several issues arose regarding the ICRC at Kandahar and Bagram due to the amount of time the detainees were being held. The collection facility at both Kandahar and Bagram were originally designed to be temporary (24-48 & 24-72 hour) holding facilities. The average time a detainee is being held at Bagram in one month, Kandahar's
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average time is a little longer. This presents inherent danger to the overall base/base cluster defense plan due to the target of opportunity the detainee facility provides to the enemy. The unit ICRC (additional duty appointee) needs to receive training/information exchange of the requirements/responsibilities of the ICRC prior to arrival in theater to conduct detainee operations. Staff representatives tasked to perform as C2 multipliers when dealing with agencies outside of the traditional military spectrum, is an overall positive approach to addressing entities that will inherently be on the battlefield and within the AOR during most operations.
Several training requirements may be identified for future development of units/services who are responsible for the preponderance of FP activities in an active theater of operations. The initial hand-off between the Marine Corps and the MP Company (Co) (CS), and the MP Co (CS) and the MP (Guard) Company incurred several issues concerning consistent implementation of procedures in reference to conducting the handling of the detainees. In order to facilitate the training and hand-over, CFLCC sent a specialized detainee/Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) team to help ensure that as smooth a transition between units would occur. Eventually the issues were resolved, but have created persistent problems with the unit, the detainees and the ICRC.
Additional training requirements when working in a Joint operations include, but are not limited to the following: detainee security in-transit, coordination with Military Intelligence in the conduct of internee interrogation, and EPW processing, etc., and extraction of detainees by air and other available means. Future warfare will require MPs to extract detainees/EPWs early in the fight. During the unconventional warfare phase, and starting in early combat operational phases, to gain real time intelligence value which will shape the current operations (Personal Identification Data (PID)/Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT)/and Military Intelligence Support Team (MIST). The MIST consists of, but not limited to, Special Operation Forces (SOF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Counter Intelligence (CI). The purpose of the MIST is to repair inadvertent/perceived damage conducted by United States personnel and is information based, not the retrieval of suspects (i.e., low over flight of homes without roofs was considered an invasion of privacy, particularly concerning the female Afghan). Presently conducting inter-theater transfer of detainees. The collection of detainees initially begins in a forward collection sight. Then the detainees are moved to a Detainee Collection Point, formerly known as the Division Collection Point, for initial processing. The detainees are then moved to a Short Term Holding Facility (STHF), formerly known as the Corps Holding Area. Ultimately, the detainees will be transferred to an out of theater longer term holding facility. Echeloning of evacuation level does not necessarily, in the nonlinear battlefield, connote threat level. In this AO the division collection point was at lower threat condition (THREATCON) Level than in the STHF, although the division collection point was closer to the objective area. This is a change in the traditional battlefield approach to the collection and processing of detainees/enemy prisoner of war (EPW), and an excellent representation of a noncontiguous asymmetrical environment. MPs remain the force of choice in these environments, and thus ultimately an increase is feasible in order to support CINC's objectives, and ultimately National Command Authority (NCA) goals.
The ability to conduct United States (U.S.) Law and Order (L&O) missions, both on Camp Doha and in the theater of operations are restricted to U.S. military personnel only. The ARCENT Kuwait PM is only authorized to conduct L&O requirements within the confinement
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of Camp Doha. During events where U.S. personnel participate in misconduct off post, they are subject to the local law enforcement agencies this is where the OMC is utilized. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) provides a liaison to assist in any incidents that may occur both on and off the installation. U.S. security contract personnel are not authorized to perform personal security details (PSD) off post due to the restriction of weapons off post. However, U.S. soldiers are allowed to conduct military operations off post while armed. L&O missions vary depending on the location within the area of responsibility for the Central Command (CENTCOM). L&O missions conducted in the theater of operations allows for the investigation and prosecution of any case against a U.S. soldier by U.S. forces. A cooperative approach to establishing L&O authority is very dependent on the situation, and most importantly what the Host Nation wishes to allow. Establishing a cooperative approach to conducting L&O missions should be conducted by highly trained and experienced personnel within the Military Police/Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) field.
The training of leaders in the field, particularly those dealing with the interpretation and enforcement of FP in a battlefield environment, needs additional Level II threat and anti­tetrorism training. Additional Force Protection training will enhance Military Police and other Force Protection personnel/entities capability to provide guidance and overarching planning concerning the needs for - standoff, entry control requirements, identifying high value targets (HVT), airport security, etc. This is especially important when integrated into a joint/combined/coalition operation. By providing Force Protection Level II threat and anti­terrorism training to both officer's and non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) will enhance their ability to respond to these types of requirements in the growing number of joint/combined/coalition operations. Recommend officer's and NCO's ability would greatly improve if these types of topics were included/improved in current officer and NCO career developmental courses. For officer's, this training would be best provided as a supplement to the Officer's Basic Course (OBC) with a refresher or advanced level of training at the Advance Course (OAC). For the NCO, this training would be best provided at the Basic Non-Commissioned Officer's Course (BNCOC) with a refresher or advanced level of training at the Advance Non-Commissioned Officer's Course (ANCOC). The recommendation for this training at these levels is because of their increased opportunity to become involved with these types of requirements/missions.
Key Lessons Learned:

Providing HA concurrent with combat operations may result in continued military presence of NGOs in the AOR.

Uniforms can be a force protection issue when conducting HA in a semi-permissive environment. It is important to have a good relationship with the NGOs and address their concerns, but to not compromise safety of soldiers or integrity of mission.

Increased training needs to occur between the MP and the Military Intelligence (MI) community to ensure that all tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are comprehensively addressed.

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These types of missions (PID/MIT) are ideal for both the MP and the MI branches due to the mobility and flexibility of the MP Corps, and the MI requirement for collection and processing in information.

Combined training, incorporating several different Army branches of service, needs to occur due to these increasing mission requirements concerning detainees/EPW, and engaging populations in the AOR.

The preferred methods for the use of linguists are those habitually found within the MI community due to the security and sensitivity of the interview. However, due to the shortage of military linguists versed in the languages used throughout the AO, civilian contract linguists were required in order to complete this process. The lack of Army linguist presents an increasing problem as we employ our forces in remote and austere environments.

A cooperative approach to establishing L&O authority is very dependent on the situation, and most importantly what the Host Nation wishes to allow.

A cooperative approach to conducting L&O missions should be conducted by highly trained and experienced personnel within the Military Police/Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) field.

By providing Force Protection Level II threat and anti-terrorism training to both officer's and non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) will-enhance their ability to respond to these types of requirements in the growing number of joint/combined/coalition operations.

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ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)
Chapter 9
Public Affairs
Chapter Contents Page
Introduction 195
Topic A: Providing Public Affairs 196
Topic B: Media Operations/ Public Information 201
Topic C: Command/ Internal Information 210
Topic D: Public Affairs Logistics and Technology 213
Annex A: Coalition Task Force Afghanistan Annex F 217
Annex B: Master Ground Rules 228
Annex C: Task Force Commander's Initial Press Briefing Statement 231
Annex D: Public Affairs Annex for Operation Anaconda 236
Annex E: Public Affairs Paragraph to Operation Anaconda Order 243
Annex F: Operation Anaconda Mission Ground Rules 245
Annex G: Public Affairs Paragraph to Post-Operation Anaconda Order 247
Annex H: Secretary Rumsfeld's Principles of Information 249

This chapter focuses on the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Public Affairs (PA) mission to fulfill the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and to help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the Army's readiness to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Public Affairs are critical battlefield functions in the War on Terrorism in today's global environment.
Public Affairs assisted the commander in monitoring and understanding public opinion, explaining the situational context of events and communicating the Army's perspective clearly and accurately. Synchronized, well-planned and actively executed public affairs tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) significantly clear the fog of war and impacted the morale and effectiveness of the force. Public affairs reduced distractions, misinformation, uncertainty, confusion and other factors that cause stress and undermine efficient operations.
Coalition Forces Land Component Command Public Affairs Mission Statement:
"Conduct Public Affairs activities in support of coalition land forces operational objectives to destroy Al Qaida and resisting Taliban forces in order to prevent the re-emergence of transnational terrorist groups, and expand stability operations to support the Interim Authority/Government of Afghanistan in order to establish a safe and secure world environment."
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