Army Memo re: Inquiry into Iron Gunner Operations

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS TASK FORCEIRONHORSE
TIKRIT, IRAQ

AFYB-ADC-S 12 September 2003
MEMORANDUM FOR: MG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, Commander, 4 th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Tikrit, Iraq

SUBJECT: Commander's Report of Commander's inquiry
1. GENERAL.
A. Pursilant to memorandum dated 15 July 03, Subject: Appointment of investigating
Officer, I conducted an informal Commander's Inquiry of Task Force Iron Gunner detainee
operations. Although the appointing memorandum directed a general inquiry into Iron Gunner
"operations," a review of the attached statements prompting the inquiry clearly indicated a
concentration on detainee operations. The subsequent inquiry focus on three specific areas:

Task Force Iron Gunner procedures for identifying Iraqi national's for detention.
Tactics, teeliniques, and procedures used when detaining Iraqi Nationals during
raids and other operations.
Procedures used to transport, in. process, and interrogate detainees.

In addition; a number of other, specific concerns raised in the attached statements were also
explored as outlined below, The original packet was submitted to the TF Ironhorse StaffJudge
Advocate office for legal review in early August and was returned with recommended areas for
additional inquiry on or about 20 August 2003_ During the intervening time one witness whom
SJA had recommended be asked an additional question had departed theater on emergency leave.
Submission of the revised report was initially held until the scheduled return of the individual
during the first week in September. Subsequently been

B. On 4 July 2003111111111.111111111111, team member assigned to Psyops TTP
1683, forwarded through his command a list of concerns with the effectiveness of detainee
operations within Task Force Gunner (Exhibit B). At the same time he approached

of the 37t CI THT, asking him to provide his observations aIso.01111111111111
without . • er consultation with, forwarded his statement (Exhibit C). The

-statements assert:
That 1111111111111111had an "unorthodox method of deciding Who was a bad guy and needed to be detained" and that decisions on who was suspect in the Task Force Gunner's AO are routinely based on personal feelings instead of active or passive intelligence.
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-
•
That Task Force Gunner continually detains Iraqis on little more than a whim, e.g. for nothing more than having $100 in their possession. Many times the Task Force kept that money and never returned itarairjan

•
That few of the raids and detentions executed by Task Force Gunner have resulted in the capture of any anti-coalition members or the seizure of any weapons. Hundred of detained Iraqi Nationals are eventually released for lack of evidence of any Wrongdoing.

•
That during interrogation at Task Force Jail, many detainees were not being informed of why they were there nor was the interrogation team privy to this information. Only 20 of 650 detainees interrogated have had any real intelligence

vaidie.4111111111/
• That has made it clear that shooting and killing an Iraqi National
for running on Task Force members is acceptable and even required. mg111111111 •
•
That on or about 11 JUN 03 following clearance of a house, a Bradley Fighting Vehicle opened fire causing the house to burst into flames in front of the "weeping and distraught families". mum

•
That in separate incident a father of a 12-year-old boy killed in operations was

forced to wait days to recover the body and was "made to dig it up himself."111111 1111111111111111101111.

•
That Members of Task Force Gunner, especially the S-5, are running their own intelligence show; that the Task Force was acting on this information-without comb -ting this information through the proper intelligence channels. all

•
That on one occasion 111111111lwas told to reveal a source of intelligence, classified information, to a detainee by the S-2.

2.. FACTS
A. The target and purpose for raids and other operations within Task Force -Gunner are determiied throigh a staffing process whirl culminates-with a daily 1930 planning meeting involving the TF staff, subordinate col-mart ers or their representatives, and the command group. Issues regarding types of individuals to be detained are not generally discussed as part of the planning meeting although specific detainee targets may be designated if suspected to be at the site. The opportunity for further clarification of detainee, guidance is available during subsequent mission back briefs and rehearsals. 1111.110 was present a an observer for some of these meetings early on but has participated recently due to other assigred duties. (Exhibits A, B, C, D,. H)
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B. TF Gunner has not promulgated written guidance or an SOP regarding the types of
individuals to be detained. TF personnel rely upon an evolving understanding of individuals to
detain who are or are suspected of falling into theater designated A-D categories for additional
questioning. During missions, on-site commanders may/do request additional guidance from
Gunner 6 when they feel clarification is required. Early on in the campaign as the TF sought
former regime members funding attacks on coalition forces, large amounts of cash were
considered an important indicator for questioning. Subsequently, as this threat subsided and the
conversion rate for DINARS was more fully undergtood the frequency incident of apprehension
associated solely for carrying large amounts of cash has largely been eliminated. In addition, TF
Gunner routinely detains a significant number of locals infiltrating Gunner FOB for the purpose
of scavenging and looting the abandon Iraqi military stores located there. The requirement to
detain and interrogate these individuals to determine their real intent and category further
exacerbates the impression that TF Gunner is detaining folks with "no real intelligence value."
(Exhibits A, B, H, Q, V, W, T,

C. There is no evidence that individuals are detained at the "whim or personal fee,ligs"
. of UMW Early pn in the campaign, NM did accompany the initial set of raids and did personally designate certain individuals for detaimnent. Accordingto 't only witness to accompany on those raids, his interpreter 10.11.11bodecision to detain an individual was based upon his professional assessment that the individual Might pose a threat to the force. There is no evidence to corroborate that assertion that iingur choose to detain individuals that did not wave back at him.
1111111111no longer routinely accompanies operations and is, therefore, not present to personally direct individual detentions. The decision as to who will be detained is made by the commander on the scene. wimigalonly beco es involved when consulted by the on-scene commander, normally by radio. Both indicate that their stateinents relied upon second hand accounts rather than personal observation of 2.111111110, role in determining who was riP•tain,d. (Exhibit A, C, K, Q, R, S, T, U)
D. The inquiry revealed that some Coalition Capture Forms accompanying detainees to
Gunner Jail (estimates provided place the number at less than 30 of hundreds) have been
annotated in the reason for detention block direction or words to that effect.
This annotation was apparently added in some cases when 1111111.1.11111had been consulted by
on-site commanders to discuss detention of individuals apprehended at the scenes. These
annotations coupled with second hand accounts seem to be the source of much of the assertion of

direct and personal involvement. (Exhibits C, J, F)
• E. The inquiry revealed a continuing problem with the timeliness and accuracy of coalition capture forms detailing the circumstances and reason why the people were being detained. In a significant percentage of cases, the capturing units fail to properly fill out the form to include the detailed circumstances surrounding detention of the individual. Frequently the capturing unit fails to complete the form at all, leaving the task to a designated transfer unit that moves detained personnel to the Gunner Jail. In addition, post operation after the action reports required by the TF within four hours of termination are frequently tardy_ As a result, interrogators often lack the knowledge of why the person is being detained and are unable to
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focus their interrogation to derive the greatest possible intelligence benefit. This has contributed . to the opinion held by some interrogators that individual's lacks intelligence value and have been detained for no specific, discernable reason. (Exhibits 5, F)
F. TF Gunner readily admits that issues did exist with accountability of detainee property as detention operations were being established in May 03. This was recognized by the command and procedures instituted to safeguard property to include cash. All personnel questions to include agree that procedures enacted in the last two months to safeguard and ensure return of personal property to detainees have been. effective. In addition, TF Gunner is actively involved in assisting Iraqi claims for recovery of loss money and personal effects. (Exhibit 5, I)
G. Regarding the Bradley firing incident cited by UMW The operation cited was
._
mounted following an exchange of fire between coalition forces and Iraqis on 10 5UN 03 at that
site. Upon review of the firing exchange, the TF executed a raid on the property the following
evening called Operation Knight Rider IL The raid began with a broadcast PSYOPS directive to
residents to exit the house for questioning. Adult males present were detained for farther
questioning. A bunker was observed on the roof the night prior and it was decided by
and MOM that in this operation the bunker would be destroyed using 25mm cannonand coaxial machine wan fire from accompanying Briis given force protection considerations. A small fire began and subsequently died, resulting in some damage to a portion of the house. The site was then cleared revealing a weapon cache including mortars, artillery projectiles, rocket motors, and other items. Actions taken during the operation are seem consistent with command guidancehandling of non-combatants, the use of non-lethal
?
actions to minimize loss of life and stand off fires to protect troop safety_ The fire and
subsequent &image to the residence was incidental to the action and there is no evidence that the
Bradley engagement was punitive or taken in retribution. (Exhibit A, Q, R)
a Regarding the incident cited in both statements concerning recovery of remains by the father of an Iraqi boy killed as a part of operations. --The remains of 4 unidentified Iraqis killed during a raid were brought to FOB Gunner when no civilian site for drop off could be identified. Lacking storage capability, the command decided for humanitarian reasons and out of concern for Islamic burial customs to have the remains interred that evening at the FOB. Internment was conducted under the supervision of the DIVARTY Chaplain, a mortuary affairs officer, and a lay Muslim cleric (US Army 2LT). Two days following the .burial, a group of purported family members approached the'command and requested recovery of the remains_ At that time, it was noted that some members of the group were wanted for questioning and were detained. The father of the boy was questioned as part of that process, released and asked to return the following day_ Subsequently the father returned with other relatives and, consistent with security requirements, was admitted to the burial site for recovery of remains• Engineering equipment detailed to support recovery broke down necessitating manual excavation of the burial site. By reports family members requested to recover the remains without additional US assistance. US .
personnel provided site security and water to the family members. On scene observers note that US forces maintained the proper decorum appropriate for the situation and that the father was ­conciliatory in his comments Both and110.1. admitted they were not present at the scene and largely came to their. conclusions based on second-hand accounts. (Exhibits A, E, N)
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L Early during operations, TF Gunner employed a variety of means to gather
intelligence. These included using CA and SS operations to develop informants and intelligence.
Information generated by these means was normally integrated with other sources as a part of a
systematic "red, amber, approach of cross-referencing and confirming intelligence prior
or
to determine whether or not operations should be launched. TF Gunner routinely uses its
PSYOPS and CI capabilities to corroborate intelligence or to assess public responses to
operations. On occasion, however, based on the fleeting value of intelligence, operations were
launched without full corroboration and sometimes failed to net detainees of intelligence value.
The command agrees that early operations were sometimes launched based on limited, S5 --
generated intelligence but that is not the norm. (Exhibits C,
J. Regarding assertion that he was told to reveal a source of intelligence information (the name of an informant) to a civilian detainee by the S2. the assistant 1111111.11istates,that early in the operation she inquired of am= if such a release would be allowable. Although it is unclear what generated the question, 001.111.1i assertionlhat the matter was dropped when gimpastated that he should and Would -not release such classified information appears to be true. confirmed that the matter was dropped at 110/1116 insistence. (Exhdbits G, H, .1) .
No one interviewed specifically corroborated 111111111111allegaion that..umhad "made it very Clear on every occasion that shooting and killing an Iraqi national for running on task force members is acceptable and even required." All parties interviewed expressed doubt that 8111.111Whad specifically made that statement. Clearly, discussions were held concerning actions to be taken regarding personnel fleeing from US forces as part of mission briefings, rehearsals, -and general discussions concerning the application of the ROE. It is possible that 41111111111Wmay have stated or eluded to the acceptability of engaging fleeing
-
Iraqis under specific selected conditions without the intent to communicate the requirement to shoot fleeing Ira._qis. or to direct engagement as part of the SOP -within the task foice.
-addressed this allegation in his statement specifically noting that " there are no standing orders in Task Force Gunner to shoot an Iraqi nimiing away, but according to ROE if the person has just performed a hostile act then TF members are to engage. All acts are according to ROE. Running away from US forces do not necessarily constitute a reason to use deadly force." (Exhibits 5, T, U, V, W, X)
3. FINDINGS
A. M.assertion that only 20 of 650 detainees have had intelligence value is an opinion not based on fact. A total of 82 detainees have been forwarded from TF Gunner to TF Iron Horse to date for additional intelligence exploitation. Likewise, it ignores the broader range of detainees being apprehended by TF Gunner that must be interrogated before their intelligence value can be decided. Similarly,OM. assertion that few Task Force Gunner raids and detentions have resulted in the significant capture of personnel or equipment is opinion not fact based on second hand stories and impressions.
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B. With regards to the Bradley firing incident on 11 JUN 03, actions of the command were in accordance with accepted procedures and appropriate force protection measures. The fire that began at the home was incidental to the action. There is no evidence that the firing was used as a punitive measure or act of retribution.
C. With regards to the recovery of the Iraqiremains, there is not evidence that US forces acted in any way other than affording the dignity.and respect due the remains and adherence of Islamic custom in the handling of the remains and their recovery.
D. There is no evidence to support the allegatidn that1111111111111M has issued
instructions or implied the rules involving the use of deadly force outside of those prescribed
with the current ROE or that he directed the blanket shooting and killing of Iraqis running from
coalition forces. It is likely that -discussions concerning the use of force were overheard by

Maud taken out of context or interpreted to be more directive than understood by other members of the chain of command It must be noted that no members of the chain of command interviewed believed 111110111 had made or implied such a statement and that no one expreSsed doubt concerning tie ROE in this area.
E. This inonitv finds that 11111111111111assertion that TF Gunner's operation are viewed
„. ., ..
by the population as bad as the old regime is not supported by any of the facts. The operational requirement to conduct raids and other -operations is likely to concern or alarm local citizens but is a military necessity during this phase of the operation. TF Gunner is aware, however, of this fact and routinely uses it in PSYOPS and other resources to address these concerns as part of a post operations follow-up.
F. The inquiry finds that early in TF -Gunner operations, operations were initiated based upon a variety of sources to include the S5 informant and that these operations were launched on occasion without corroboration through normal intelligence channels. Some of these. operations resulted in the appreherKinn nrid subsequent relenc.; of individuals with little intelligence v allure, the lack of corroboration significantly contributed to stated concerns. These issues have largely been resolved, as S5 operations have been integrated into the general intelligence assessments of the 52.
G. Regarding assertion that he was told to reveal classified information to a civilian detainee by the S2, it is likely to have been derived from his interpretation of the intent of the discussion held with mum and Williand not by a specific request to do so. Since that date, the issue has surfaced again:
EL With regards to the statement made by.. it is uncertain to the timing and context of the discussion at TF Gunner. While it appears certain lid not issue instructions or direct soldier that shooting an Iraqi national was desirable. It ikely as a Commander discussing ROE and the use of deadly force in that context may have assumed a level of mislead direction from the discussion by staff who were privy to certain information that was not. The contex . ,00k the discussion in was not shared by or his staff. Clearly the Commander and the staff understand the gravity of using deadly force and the ROE authorities granted them. The Commander and his
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staff understand the ROE and use it to protect themselves against those committing hostile acts' or fleeing a scene having committed a hostile act With regards to Iraqis being detained for not waving atellilliplitthis assumption was not corroborated by any of the individuals being interviewed.
I. The inquiry has been unable to find anyone who would corroborate
statement made during his second interview that members of the unit were "understands _y'
reluctant to corroborate his statements to avoid trouble. No one questioned indicated any
reluctance or sense of coercion in making their statements.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. No additional inquiries or investigations be initiated in reference to the issues jaised NW and
by
B. That TF Gunner review and enforce procedures to insure that Coalition Capture Forms are being prepared in a complete and timely manner by the capturing unit. Specific emphasis needs to be placed on relating both the general situation surrounding the detentions and
specific firr,nmstnces involved with the individual in question: This inform9tion should made available prior to initial screening at IF Gunner jail to support isolation of those most likely to have intelligence value and subsequently, to the interrogation team so to help focus their efforts. In addition, the command needs to enforce its established SOP to conduct a detailed AAR within 4 hOurs of the detention and to transmit important information developed to the interrogation tears.
C. That Task Force Gunner continue to review procedures for handling of detainee personal property to insure that it is safeguarded and that procedures for claims operations are supported
D. That TF Gunner actively pursues alternatives to deal with civilian ICA to preclude future incidents. In the interim, the Division might explore options for providing reefers for local, short-term body storage.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPOINTMENT ORDERS
111111110 STATEMENTS
STATEMENTS
FINDINGS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

EXIBIT A -SWORN STATFMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT B SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EX1BIT C — SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT D —11111111111SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT E —11111111111111111111SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT F— SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 G —
SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT H —1111.11111 SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXTRIT I —110111111111 SWORN STATEMPNT DATED 2n030726 EXIBIT SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT K —1111111111110 SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726 EXIBIT L —11.11111111 SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726
EXIBIT M — SWORN STATEMENT DATED 2003072©
EXIBIT N — DA CIVILIA SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726
EXIBIT 0 — DOD CIVILIAN SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030726
EMIT P — FIRST REVIEW OR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
EXIBIT Q SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818
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EXIBIT R -1111111111111SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT S -1111111111111111SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT T SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT U-SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EMBIT V -11111111.11. SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT W -111111111111111111,WORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT X -11/11111111SWORN STATEMENT DATED 20030818 EXIBIT -111MIONSWORN STATENWNT DATED 20030812
EXIBIT Z - 2-20 FA Cour.Eter Reconnaissance Patrol :Summary
EXIBIT AA - TF PAYBACK AAR
EXIBIT BB - TF PAYBACK AAR
)ri
ATTIWV C' e"' P-E" I) Add A irvEr eirDect­
.e.:..r.n•—ILAVA.—.A' A.A Ad.._.
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EXIBIT-DD - MEMORANDUM OF BURIAL OF HOSTILE IRAQI KILLED IN ACTION
EXIBIT - rkPN DE aiti cE TARGET INTEL1 :16Q-vNec BRWF
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EXIBIT FF - TF GUNNER OPORD 03-05/PHASE IV
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS TASK FORCE IRONHORSE
TIKRIT, IRAQ

REPLY TO 'kW!, ATTENTION OF .
a,-6
15
AFYB-CS 15 July 2003.
MEMORANDUM FOR: 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Tikrit, Iraq
SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer
1.You are hereby appointed to assist me in conducting a Commander's Inquiry into operations at Task Force Iron Gunner. Additionally, you are to identify any systemic problems that the command can address and correct, if necessary.
2. All vsfitness statements will be sworn and recorded on a DA Form 2823 if possible and you will obtain Privacy Act Statements from all witnesses who complete a written statement. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to suspect that an individual may be criminally responsible,. you will advise that individual of his or her rights under Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment as appropriate. Use the DA Form 3881 to advise -soldiers of his or her rights.
3, Legal advice and assistance must be obtained from the Office of the Staff -Judge Advocate before you-take any action on tins matter. Consult with your legal advisor prior to your investigation.
4. Your report, together with all evidence marked as exhibits, will be submitted to me in memorandum format no later than 72 hours from receipt of this memorandum. Submit any requests for delay to me either orally or in writing.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
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TASK FORCE GUNNER'
I have now been assigned to Task Force Gunner for three months. 1 have witnessed several violations of the; Geneva Convention and ;rules of Engagement established for this theater. I will address these from a Counterintelligence standpoint as that is my profession. The following are some examples:
1) Task Force.Gunner continually detains local civilians on nothing more than a whim. At first, detainees were brought in for nothing more than having the equivalent_ of $100 on their possession, as there are no functional banks, many people are forced to travel with their life savings. Many times this task force kept that money and never returned it (ROE states, persOnal property will only be taken -With a receipt and all detainees and their property will be treated with respect). Civilians are being detained and treated as Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)(even though the President of the United States declared over hostilities in May,), EPW's are those taken in armed conflict, not a civilian detained at a checkpoint. During interrogations at Gunner jail, many detainees were not informed as to why they were being detained, nor was the interrogation team privy to this information. -The criterion fordetentionconstantly changes and civilians are being kept at Gunner jail, with no way of informing their families as to their whereabouts_ Of the over 650 detainees interrogated, only 20 have proven to be of any real intelligence value.
-, \
L., On a raid conducted approximately one month ago by 2/20 Field -Artillery, a 12-year-old boy was killed, along with two adult males. TITSCai
n-red due to the vehicle allegedly rring at the 2/20 convoy, though the report failed to mention any weapons being recovered. The bodies were promptly buried on Taji military complex, and when the family inquired as to their.where.abouts, they:were detained temporarily, and told to come back on the following , day to -Claim the bodies. The father returned the next day, and had. to dig the bodies of his. sons up. Whether the deceased were guilty Of shooting at a convoy or not, is not relevant, having a father dig up his dead son is very immoral and cruel. •
3) Members of Task Force Gunner, especially the S-5, are running their own intelligence sources. .This inforinatiori is not being reported to the G-2 for analysis and raids and other operations are being conducted withOut validating. the source of information or the information itself Task Force Gunner is conducting an active intelligence source network, without any kind of G-2 approval.
4) On one occasion, I was told to reveal a source of intelligence information to a civilian detainee by the S-2, I refused. I was not about to reveal classified information to a local national.
These are the only events I. have first hand knowledge of, though I am certain more
questionable activities .haVe Occurred within this area Of o.eration.
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00 1 1 0 0

SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 ISSN). PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval. DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.
1. LOCATION . 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
DIVARTY TOC, TAIL IRAQ Zoo3 e -2.(0 i SA-LI,
5. LAST NAME, FIRST N • . E, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRAD STATUS

um,
8. 0; ANIZATION OR ADDRESS
'II IVARTY, TAM, IRAQ
9.
I, , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
Detainees are identified as associated with three types of operations: deliberately planned raids based on•two independent sources, immediate (2-4 hours) reaction to -time sensitive intelligence, or as part of a patrol "action on contact" situation. Deliberate operations •are planned, rehearsed and executed based on multiple information/intelligence sources. Given a reliable HUMINT source I may will authnrize an operation based solely on one informants data. For example, Operation Payback conducted in June was an operation based on informant information, TUAV input, SIGINT hits and multiple reconnaissance missions. Additionally, the informant was willing to be part of the raid and agreed to be incarcerated with the detainees to cover his involvement in the
¦ operation. Immediate or time sensitive operations are usually driven by intelligence received by higher headquarters. Several TF2O operations were supported in this manner. Our armed counter-reconnaisance patrols typically conduct the third type of operation by LciriuLiLig to uoiltaiAt and/or developing the situation when the enemy either attacks or is observed preparing for an attack. Additionally, our QRF will react to situations both inside and outside the Taji Military Complex (TMC). These situations range from stopping gun market activity, to securing a LZ for MEDEVAC to conducting a cordon and search of a farmhouse deemed to be a target. In all three types of operations detainees are habitually taken to the Gunner Jail for questioning and evaluation by our Counter-Intelligence Team.
Commanders on the ground make the call on who should be detained and questioned. After questioning, I alone make the decision to release a detainee. I don't have a fixed or written policy. or SOP for who is to be detained. Typically all non-compliant
' forces, individuals acting suspiciously and personnel violating weapons policies are detained. This is not an all encompassing list as the commander on the ground have to make the subjective call. We do not limit our detainee population to males. On occasion I will authorize the detention of women if I believe they have intelligence value. We have in the past notified TF Ironhorse of this activity. During all operations if I ant not on the ground during the operation I am within radio contact of the commander conducting the operation. In April, May and early June, during the initial phase of the operation, I participated in most of our raids and did on occasion direct that certain individuals be detained. Detention of an individual was always linked to the situation as I or the ground commander saw it. Some detainees were only suspects but were linked to the incident site. If after questioning the individual was deemed by the CI team to be clear of wrong doing I would consider the individual's release after further review of the circumstances. A detainee may not have intelligence value but may be a criminal. In this case the detainee is processed through the local police. I am confident that all units are acting within the ROE and that there are no rogue actors in TF Gunner. When detainees are brought to TF Gunner, they are met at the gate by a detainee transport team. This allows the capturing unit to focus on mission continuation. It is the capturing unit's responsibility to fill out a complete data sheet on each detainee. Early in the campaign this was not the case, however, we have taken action to refine this procedure. Last week I heard a report some detainees were "roughed up" by the detainee transport team. All detainees are to be treated with respect, but I have personally told all our soldiers not to be hesitant to use force when warranted. I went down to observe transfer operations and saw nothing out of the ordinary. I usually try to go to the Gunner Jail about 3 times a week if the volume of the detainees is up. When the volume is low I visit about once a week. A member of the command group typically visits the jail on a daily basis.
Deliberate offensive operations are based on the targeting results of our nightly 1930 hrs plans huddle. Most often targets are developed from informant information and verified by a secondary source and/or reconnaissance. The bulk of the decision making in an operation lies with the commander on site. I am consulted by the commander if the situation needs clarification. It is difficult without local law enforcement to sometimes tell the thugs from those with further intelligence value so we sort them out into four categories once detained and questioned.
Concerning the two specific situations mentioned by TF Gunner soldiers prompting this investigation: (1). Operation Night Rider involvedour Armed-Counter Reconnaissance Patrol developing a situation after observing Cocal nationals acting suspiciously while pushing a motorcycle. We had intelligence from TF Ironhorse that motorcycles were being used to support RPG attacks on coalition forces. Upon arrival at a court yard where the motorcycle had entered our patrol came under attack by RPG and small arms fire. A firefight ensued and several Iraqis were killed and the motorcycle destroyed. The patrol
10. EXHIBIT 11. INITI • • P PERSON MAKING STATEMENT A PAGE 1 OF 7— PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGE,S MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT TAKEN AT DDATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00
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STATEMENT OF . TAKEN AT . DATED .
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
withdrew and, after an intelligence review a deliberate raid was planned and conducted the next night. After our PSYOPS team used a loudspeaker to tell residents to come out of the complex a number of men, women and children exited. A bunker was identified on the top of the building and consistent with the ROE/TTP, the on-site commander gave instructions for the Bradleys to engage and destroy it. The house was then cleared by the team and a weapons cache including small arms (rifles, pistols), rockets and other contraband were found. I monitored the commander's decision to engage the bunker and concurred with his decision consistent with the situation and force protection considerations. I understand a fire did start but was contained and ultimately extinguished. (2).The second operation (Operation Payback) involved the exhuming of enemy KIAs by family members: During Operation Payback the C2 node of the operation came under fire from a passing vehicle. The unit returned fire which resulted in four enemy KIA and two US soldiers being WIA. The KIAs were killed near a soccer field where children might play and there was evidence of dogs in the area that could effect the KIAs remains. ussing the situation with the commander I directedhim to bring the bodies to TF Gunner for a proper burial. The Divarty was contacted as well as a Lay Muslim cleric to properly bury the bodies IAW Muslim religious custom. The bodies had no entification at the time we received them. The bodies were washed and buried toward Mecca as is the Muslin custom in a six foot grave. Several days after the operation relatives of the KIAs arrived at the TMC to claim the bodies. Several of the family members were detained as they were deemed to be accomplices in attacks on coalition forces. The father of the youngest KIA was included with the detainees. After questioning, the father was released and subsequently told to comeback the next day to receive the KIA. Upon his return, he and a small group were escorted to the burial site. They appreciated our efforts to make sure that the bodies had received a proper Muslim burial. We used engineer equipment to help exhume the bodies. The family members requested to recover the bodies themselves without US help. Every effort was made to ensure the remains were properly handled regardless of the circumstances surrounding their death.///End of Statement/II
AFFIDAVIT
I,
.

, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
c... -
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE '''' -----. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY W .
D, WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE
ement)
WITNESSES: Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this -\ (.0 day of .'15-k-;
7
at L.41/1 e
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Person Administering Oath)
( ype.e of son Administ ring Oath)
4—
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority) To Admio'ister Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
1
PAGE " OF.PAGES
PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 USAPA V1.00
001102

DODDOA 026516
(6))./--3) TPT 1683 ON TASK FORCE IRON GUNNER'S OPERATON IN ri HE T AW AREA
On our initial attachment to Task Force Iron Gu.r it was brought to our attention by some of the soldiers (interpreters that worked with the .ersonally) that .had an unorthodox method of deciding who was a 'bad guy' and needed to be detained; he would wave at them and if they did not wave back, he had them arrested. It is unclear as to whether this is an isolated incident or a regular occurrence. It is to be noted that decisions .suspect in Task Force Gunner's AO is routinely based on personal feelings that .has, if an incident occurs in a certain area by some dwellings, anyone in those dwellings is en targeted. In example, Coalition forces were fired upon from a location on Highway 1. Th.had a raid executed on the dwelling closest to the incident, (actual planning and intelligence gathering on this mission is unknown) in which this TPT was included to broadcast a surrender appeal. On the broadcast of the surrender appeal, the residents of the house (approximately 19 women and children and 3 men) immediately surrendered to us. When the residents were clear, a Bradley fighting vehicle then opened fire on the house for approximately 1 minute, at which point the house burst into flames right in front of the weeping and distraught families. To this team's knowledge, none of the detainees from this raid proved to be criminals of any sort, or have any knowledge of anti-coalition forces.. -— ..•
In actuality, few of the raids and detentions executed by Task Force Iron Gunner have resulted in the capture of any anti-coalition members or the seizure of illegal weapons..lt has, however, -resulted in the detention of hundreds of Iraqi nationals who are eventual! .released for lack of evidence of any wrongdoing. These raids are again based often On. 'feelings' instead of the active or passive gathering of information, in effect; the actual Inte seems to be an afterthought. This observation is from the attendance of the plans meetings held every evening where this team has witnessed the colonel initiate these events.
In another raid executed approximately 1 I/2 months ago. by Task Force Gunner that this TPT was not a part of, 4 nationals, including a 12 Year old boy were shot and killed. The K.I.A. were brought back to Taji Airfield and buried there. When the father of the 12-year old boy came to the airfield to claim his son's body, he was put off for a day while they tried to figure out what should be done. At one point they even considered detaining the boy's father to see if he had any intelligence value. When he was.finally allowed in to claim his son's body, he , was made to dig it up himself because 'our soldiers don't do that.' Members of Task Force Gunner stood around and watched while he dug. (This account is from the CA, CI, and Task Force Gunner's 5-2 relating of the facts and monitoring of radio traffic concerning the incident.)
The.has also made it very clear on every occasion that shooting and killing an Iraqi
national or running on task force members is acceptable and even required.
When this team first assessed the village of Tarmiah, the initial reception was that of feel -and
---trepidation,-the citizens did•notWave -but giereraird -§hied -gv-gYfrOM thT66iivoy. When this TPT approached some the shop owners and town elders with PSYOP product with a friendly demeanor, citizens wanting our product and askin auestions swarmed us. The reoccurring theme in our conversations (through an interprets. was that we (Coalition Forces in that area) were as bad as the old regime, we kicked ow their doors, took their weapons from homes and businesseS, arrested them for no reason, and killed those who got in the way. It should be noted that arthis time the village of Tarmiah was in Task Force Gunner's AO, and had been the scene of their raids.
MEM
001103

0
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your .social security number is voluntary.
1. LOCATION 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
DIVARTY TOC, TAJI; IRAQ
I
Q.-(1D-a-5-9--( 0
ST NAM T NAME, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADE/STATUS
sioni
IIIIII
: • : • ION OR ADDRESS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, TAJI, IRAQ
9.
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I amain' of TF2-20 FA. We are the primary maneuver force for TF Gunner. I do not believe there to be a written -policy letter for detaining Iraqi Nationals at this time. We detain persons for having fire arms, persons threatening U.S. troops, or persons involved in crimes ie: looting. or rape. We no longer detain a person for having a large amount of money unless we -obtain permission from higher on specific occasions. • The criteria put out to identify a -erson fo- de -Li..Lug comes from the Plans ! meeting at 1930 or is expressed during commanders updates from Iron Gunner 6 . It is also clarified throughcommand channels with personnel on the ground. We must have positive identification o - a person who has fired upon us toreturn fire. During the raids that I conduct I report back to Gunner 6 every 15 minutes if situation requires it allocapture unitshave the Coalition Capture form (CPA) and the DA 4137 filled out. Gunner 6 doesn't come with us. I was not physically presen for operation Knight Rider, but I gave guidance over the ne -t.ii/End of statementiii
/1/ .
10. -EXHIBIT 1 11. INIT ALS/OF KING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF PAG S
et
1
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ..TAKEN AT.•.DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
.
DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00
DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
001104
DODDOA 026518
USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.
STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE OF PAGES
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001105

DODDOA 026519

STATEMENT OF . TAKEN AT . DATED .
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
AFFIDAVIT
I,. , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1; AND ENDS ON PAGE .. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD)_ WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAW,FJ L, INDUCE
(Signature of Person Making Statement)
Subscribed and sworn tobefore me, a person authorized by Iav to
WITNESSES: administer oaths, this . ()-(0 day of.) , 0 at. pt e
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS. (Signature "Person Administering Oath)

ftiminimr
(Typed Name of Pelson Administerin 0 th )
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS u onty o m n er at s)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE.OF.PAGES
USAPA V1.00
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001106

DODDOA 026520

SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the propcinent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: -Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be-accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used es an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.
1. LOCATION 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
DIVARTY TOC, TAJI, IRAQ
I ,-C7-s.t.-C)--7,:----X0
5. 4 • ki ; . • kJ MIDDLE NAME [6. SSN 7. GRADE/S
8. •: • -OR ADDRESS
4 INFANTRY DIVISION, TAJI, IRAQ
9.
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I am the and have been with TF Gunner operations since May. One of my, responsibilities as the is to
assist the S-2 OIC when analyzing intelligence that comes in. I then assist the S-2 OIC in putting together package 0 ers to
present to 4.11111111.11in the nightly Plans meeting which occurs at 1930. Around 1600 I meet with the S-2, CA, Psyops, and
CI to share and access the information obtained from that day. The staff gives our o-erational rec^rnmendation toillIIMMIIIIII
in the Plans meeting. We talk about about who we might target as part of the raids. does not give s ecific
guidance, regarding detainees, it's situationally dependent. The staff provides a recomm 1 a ion, then COt gives his
guidance regarding the raid- either execute or no execute until further mtel is received. To my knowledge there is no specific
policy on the apprehension of Iraqi Nationals.11111111111111 ¦111 is not directly involved in the detaining of Iraqi Nationals. The
commander on the scene is given control of the situation. 1.111111111111pis only directly involved when the commander on the
scene radios him and asks for his guidance.

The operation during which the Bradley fired on the house bunker was called Operation Knight Rider. My personal knowledge
of operation Knight Rider is based on what I heard on the radio. I have a packet for you on the -operation.1110.1111111M1111111111111
commanded by.1111•11110 requested pennission to destroy a bunker on top of a house after all the civilians had cleared the
house. 2-20 Field Artillery runs the majority of our maneuver operations. ///End of Statement/ii

---..... -----..„
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10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF PERS KING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF S PAGES

C •
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OFDc"--DTAKEN AT DDATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER
MUST BE BE INDICATED.
DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USA
nnl10i
DODDOA 026521
USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.
STATEMENT OF . TAKEN AT . DATED .
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
.I
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE.OF.PAGES
USAPA V1.00
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001108
DODDOA 026522

STATEMENT OF . TAKEN AT . DATED .
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
AFFIDAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
1118110111111/101/1111W
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1/, AND ENDS ON PAGE .. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENE.E.ROR-REVy.A2p, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWF.UL INDUCEMENT.
(SigAatureiof PersOn Yking Statement))
t
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
WITNESSES: administer oaths, this ;AG; day of 111y • .(2.(2-
,0.
at.----C , ,.fi-7 LiVii"),P r". -
---)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS. Signature of Person Administering Oath)
(Typed Name of Pelson Administering Oath) I
f.\.
k A
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Administeir Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE.OF.PAGES

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001109
DODDOA 026523

'.1.4
1.2
-SWORN-STATEMENT - -•-•
•
=e AR 190-45. the proponent ag ency is nnccnps
LOCATION -• --, , I FILE NUMBER

DATE TIME0e7y i:.4j
DIVARTY TOC, TAJI, IRAQ '1)/-./7.7.1-1 -7

-/ V C/1-.4 di .,
LAST NAME IRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME-SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBE GRADE/STI.
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
, TAJI, IRAQ

I, fiagyirit
, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I have been assigned as theaMMIlkince g, At the beginning I wasn't here at

the beginnin of the deployment. DIVARTY headquarters. I was at the DTAC. IIIIII.IIPIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIjlle was here. I moved down here a few weeks ago.
I lhIINI As the glimig collect intelligence from S-5, CI, CA, and G-2. We hold a huddle around 1700 daily to compare information obtained throughout the day. I -then try to validate the informationn -given to us from human sources if time ermits by using another informant. The S-3 and I put together a packet using ground and aerial recons to present to it the 1930
.
Plans meeting. I give my opinion during the meeting, but it is ultimately Mill11111scall on which mission is to take place. does not usually go out on missions. He has been out only two times when things have happened. What role does with detainees? I laiow he is the only one that can release them.
Out of about 600 detainees we have held, about 20-25% have intelligence value for the mission. The reason for not. taking , petty criminals to civilian jail` is:because they don't have the capacity to hold them over night. The jails are ill equipped. They I have no food or running water. The interpreters aren't always able to be on raids to chmitY simatiom so suspicious personnel I are brought in for an initial screening. . , . .
1 ' °
II don't remember anything about asking 1111111110116to reveal the name of an informant. You need to ask who was
I. here, then. . ' • -
To my knowledge we have never detained people for just having money. If they were held having less than $100 they had , weapons too. The person apprehended with $34,000 was screened on site and thought to be suspicious and detained. /// End of statement///
1 1
I
i .
/i/it.'
7
,-:,--

Pi V
-V
EXHIBIT I INITIALS OF PERSON M^" " EMENT [D ., PAGE I OF PAGES
1
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT 0 .TAKEN ATDDATEDDCONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE OF PAGFE." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILI7FD, THE 8.4 CK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.
0 0 1 1 1 0
DonnnA (19R94
USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.
STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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DODDOA 026525