Army Magazine: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

VISIT CALL AT OUR WEB SITE: http://call.army.mil
THE EDITORIAL STAFF
Director, CALL-
COL Michael A. Hiemstra
Managing Editor -Dr. Lon R. Seglie
Senior Editor plus Layout and Design -
Mary Sue Winneke
Labels and Distribution -
Mrs. Mary Lee Wagner
DISCLAIMER
This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. Our intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.
A REMINDER!
If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Com I (9 I 3) 684-3035/2255 or DSN 552-3035/2255; FAX DSN 552-9564/9583; e-mail: segliel@leavenworth.army.mil.
If possible, articles should be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart should be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.
Need help? Have ???s?
Need copies of CALL pubs?
Just call us at DSN 552-2255/3035;
ComI (913) 684-2255/3035

Our FAX No. is DSN 552-9564/9583;
Coml (913) 684-9564.

Our E-mail address is:
cal1@leavenworth.army.mil

REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE THIS BULLETIN TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS!
CALL NFTF! 2 SEP-OCT 02

DonnOA n1~?nA
~.
~'.
ty
I;
f1 "
S
~I
Currently, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS)) dedicates a lesson to ethical decisionmaking. An incident that occurred in Operation DESERT STORM, involving a Special Forces "A Team," and a child is examined. The situation is reprinted in its entirety below. The situation remains relevant, in the context of the current worldwide war against terrorism, with Afghanistan as the predominant theater of operations presently, with the possibility of a renewed conflict with Iraq looming on the near horizon.
"SITUAnON:
You are a captain and the leader of a Special Forces "A Team."
Your team is hiding in a wadi (depression) well forward of other U.S. forces to monitor enemy troop

movements along a key MSR (main supply route). There's not much movement on the MSR during the day, so the members of your team normally stay well camouflaged in "spider holes" to prevent discovery. At night, the soldiers come out of their spider holes to observe and report movement on the MSR, as well as to take care of any other essential activities. On the second day of the operation, a group of Bedouins (nomads) set up camp near the team's position. A young girl-she looks to be about 5 or 6 years old -wanders into the wadi and finds a U.S. candy wrapper that had been carelessly dropped by one of your soldiers. The little girl picks up the candy wrapper and begins to walk back toward her camp. You don't know the loyalties ofthis particular group of the Bedouins, but you're reasonably sure the adults will be curious enough that they'll come looking for the source of the obviously American candy wrapper. Although the spjder holes are well camouflaged, someone walking among them will undoubtedly notice them. Your position, and, therefor'e, your mission, will be compromised. All the members of your team have weapons with silencers. Anyone of them can shoot the girl before she leaves the concealment of the wadi. Chances are, the Bedouins won't see or hear a thing. You quickly review several possible courses of action:
1) You can order your team to kill the girl before she leaves the wadi.
2) You can do nothing and hope that no one finds the team's hiding position.
3) You can send a soldier out to capture the girl and prevent her from returning to the Bedouin camp.
4) You can abort the mission, and the team can exfiltrate and evade enemy forces until reaching safety or being extracted."l
",,' ..'·.m·.·.
After some period of discussion, the CAS) students agree on what they would do in this type of situation. The actual course of action (COA) that was pursued and successfully accomplished by the actual A Team was to abort the mission, and extract the team (COA 4). This lesson brings to life the enhanced situational awareness that soldiers must possess when engaged in potential or actual armed conflict, when civilians, and especially children, are present on the battlefield. This can occur unexpectedly in a remote area (as illustrated in the above scenario in an Iraq desert), or in a crowded urban area. In the CAS) example, the child is clearly not a hostile, active combatant. The young nomad girl is simply a curious child.
From the last two decades of the 20th century to the present, an estimated two million children died in armed conflicts, many in Africa. Three times that number may have been seriously injured or permanently disabled. Over 12 million children became orphans. Many ofthe children that perished in the tribal, ethnic wars (such as Rwanda) were bearing arms. It was not uncommon to see a male child as young as five years'old up to 17 years of age conscripted to fight or perish.
"Ethical Deci~ion Making," US. Army Combined and Services Staff School, Appendix 10 to Section II,
Lesson 7. The Candy Wrapper, F440-7, September 2002.

DODDOA 013?OQ
CALL NFTF! 3 SEP-OCT 02

So what is new in the fact that children are serving as hostile combatants? During World War II in Western Europe, young German youth served in the Wehrmacht (translated as "German Army"), especially during the latter stages of the conflict, circa 1944. The Hitler Youth Brigade that fanatically and hopelessly helped defend Berlin against the rapid onslaught of the Soviet Army from the East, and the converging allied forces, led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower from the West, comes to mind. The German youth that served during this period of World War II were predominately teenagers between the ages of 13 to 17. In a war of attrition, the manpower pool was drying up for Nazi Germany. Hitler, in addition to impressing the youth of Germany into the dying war effort, also resorted to
conscripting older adults (50 to 65 years of age). What Nazi Germany did in World War II in losing a war of attrition as a nation state is not dissimilar to what other nations have done in modern warfare (since the 18th century). When pressed for manpower needs, the nation resorts to widening the available draft ages for combatants, thus teenagers and senior citizens in increasing numbers begin to appear in armed conflicts.
In the same recent period (1980s to the present) that produced massive children casualties in tribal, ethnic and civil wars in Africa, an even larger number of males fatally succumbed to the sexually transmitted disease that continlH~s to threaten the continent -the HIV -AIDS virus. Thus armies were filled with whatever resOUrces were available -young male children. One could speculate)n this manner that nations are doing what they have always done -fill armies with whatever manpower pool is readily available for the stated purpose of conducting warfare.
The role of children as primary hostile combatants is expanding worldwide. "Wars are now being fought in backyards and in the streets of cities instead of on more defined battle lines, putting women and children at more risk," according to Christine Knudsen of Save the Children organization. Her observations are based on work done in Chechnya and Guinea in West Africa.2 According to a Reuters Foundation report in May 2002, civilians are increasingly bearing the brunt of war casualties, and, in particular, children. Around the turn of the 20th century, only five percent of war casualties were civilian. That figure jumped to 65 percent in World War II, and has reached astronomical propOltions with more recent conflicts -90 percent.J
With asymmetrical warfare, there are no front lines. In Africa, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Burma, EI Salvador, Mozambique and many other areas that have intrastate conflicts between informal militia, war takes place in the midst of communities. Civilians are targets because of the ethnic, religious and/or tribal group to which they belong. Caught in this crossfire, children and adolescents are vulnerable to exploitation by the opposing warring factions. In 1986, when the National Resistance Army battled its way into Kampala, Uganda UN observers were shocked to see four and five year olds in the ranks. Uganda's rebel anny had an estimated 3,000 child soldiers under the age of 16, including 500 young girls.4 Approximately 250,000 children under 18 (some as young as five) served in 33-armed conflicts in 1995 and 1996 alone.s
2 "Women and Children Bear Brunt of War," Reuters Foundation Report, Sue Pleming, 2 May 2002, website: http://'vvww.alertnet.org/thencws/newsdeskl43 1553. J Ibid.
• Admiral John Shanahan (USN Retired), Television Show Transcript, "Child Soldiers: Invisible Combatllnts,"
produced on 29 June 1997, website: hllp:/I\\"ww.cdi.onr/adm/l 042/lranscripl.hlml. 5 Ibid.
DODDOA 013?10
CALL NFTF! 4 SEP-OCT 02

Why are children being thrust into the role of combatants? Is it merely to fill manpower requirements? There are other reasons for the recent dramatic upsurge in seeing children as combatants:
• Forced recruitment, also known as press-ganging or impressments. This was commonplace in the EI Salvador civil war of 1980-1992, and in Afghanistan. This is the beginning of a tyranny of fear and indoctrination that is designed to weaken the child psychologically, and to make them highly compliant and subservient to their
commanders.6
• Some children volunteer for duty because they believe it's the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing and protection. Unaccompanied children with no parents to protect them, people who are fearful that they will die of hunger or from inadequate health care seek

•
Many current religious, ethnic-rooted disputes, such as Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Northern Ireland, have taken place over generations. In-bred hatred passed down from their parents compels children to become soldiers as soon as they enter teens.8

•
"I joined because 1wanted power, because the first rebel soldiers who came into Sierra Leone were killing our brothers, seizing power and were bad," the words of a former child soldier.'

•
Light assault weapons, such as the American M-16 and widely available AK-47, are casier for chpdren to use and shoulder. The worldwide spread of these weapons makes them more accessible to obtain.to

•
In many ways children make desirable soldiers; they do what they are told. If they are recruited early enough, they have only a limited sense of right or wrong. Sometimes, they are given dangerous assignments, or they are given orders to commit acts of atrocity. From the mouth of a former child soldier; "Sometimes we killed 10,15, or 30. And at the end of it all, we all celebrate by drinking rum, smoking cannabis. We could even take the blood and rub it into our skins."11

•
Survival in "total war." The "African World War" still simmering in central Africa grew directly from the

Rwandan Civi I War and consequent genocide. After the war began, the then government of Rwanda mounted a sustained
information campaign to portray all rebels and their sympathizers -defined as anyone not pro-government -as subhuman. The most common label applied was the Kinyarwandal1 term for ·'cockroaches." Rebel military leaders took in children of both ethnic groups to protect them. Calling them "the little boys," the children were often under 1 0 years of age. They served as messengers, and in extremis combatants. The government on the other hand created an entire youth-based militia, the fnterahamwe, dedicated to extermination ofthe Tutsi and all Hutu tribe moderates. The post­genocide dilemma has been: What to do with such youths afterwards? It supposedly has been easier to demobilize the little boys of the rebel army that won the war. The genocidal youth of the fnlerhamll'e have been a thornier issue. Indeed, the continued existence of Interahamwe, and allied hardcore military units from the previous regime led to the expansion of the Rwandan war beyond the country's borders.
6 Admiral John Shanahan (USN Retired) Television Show Transcript, "Cllild Soldiers: Invisible Combatllnts,"
produced on 29 June 1997, website: http://www.edi.ondadm/\ 042/trunscripl.l1tml. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. , Ibid. 10 Ibid. II Ibid.
CALL NFTF! 5 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 013?11

The overwhelming majority of the estimated quarter-million child soldiers are found in the poorest nations on earth such as Afghanistan, Angola, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. It is entirely possible that U.S. soldiers may have faced young soldiers in recent skirmishes in Afghanistan.
Lessons Learned
Situational Awaren ess: Since an estimated quarter-million soldiers in the world are children, we may end up fighting afaction or nalion that has a portion oftheir force that is under the age of18. Enhanced situational awareness of civilians on the battlefield, along with carefully monitored and well-reasoned rules of engagement to limit collateral damage to civilians, must be constantly monitored. With no front lines in asymmetrical warfare, this will be a complex issue with which to wrangle.
Rules of Engagement (ROE): Many American soldiers are socialized in Judea-Christian values during their adolescent years prior 10 active military service. They are not conditioned to respond to fight against "kids." This constitutes an "unfair tight" in most minds raised in the U.S. However, when someone is shooting at you with live ammunition, should the ROE remain the same? Do you return fire with the intent to maim or kill your opponent? Soldiers need to quickly discern between a hostile combatant and an innocent civilian and make the right choice at the right time (e.g., the candy wrapper scenario). Some ofthe pointed issues that relate to ROE are:
•
How do you distinguish between children and adult fighters in combat?

•
How should the ROE be adjusted to accommodate the possibility of fighting children?

•
What is the ROE for children combatants collecting intelligence; is it the same or different than adult soldiers?

Leader Attributes: FM 22-100, Army Leadership, outlines the physical, mental and emotiollal a/tributes that our leaders must possess. Some of the notable mental attributes that would be brought to bear in a situation that involves U.S. forces fighting children are:
•
Possess and display will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, common sense and cultural awareness.

•
Analyze situations.

•
Balance resolve and flexibility.

•
Think and act quickly and logically, even when there are no clear instructions or the plan falls apart. (NOTE: Perhaps clear, well-thoughtout ROE as applied to children combatants will help ameliorate this challenge.)

Combat leaders will be challenged to the maximum to maintain emotional equilibrium when lighting adolescents. The applicable emotional attributes that will challenge leaders in a situation that deals with U.S. forces fighting children are:
•
Remain calm during conditions of stress, chaos, and rapid change.

•
Exercise self-control, balance, and stability.

•
Demonstrate mature, responsible behavior that inspires trust and eams respect.

The physical attributes that challenge leaders when faced with fighting under-age soldiers are:
•
Cope with hardship.

•
Continue to function under adverse conditions.

CALL NFTF! 6 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 01~?1?
Post-Conflict: Some ofthe myriad considerations to consider after hostilities cellse are:
•
What accommodations should be made for adolescent enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and casualties?

•
What are the public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs considerations?

•
What role do non-government agencies play in regard to children soldiers; how much interface and responsibility do U.S. forces have in this effort?

•
What roles, if any, do U.S. forces have in repatriation of former children soldiers?

•
What post-conflict needs do U.S. soldiers have (i.e., post-traumatic syndrome, other psychological adjustments to "normalcy")?

Conclusion and Recommendations
It is difficult to predict the next conflict -what conditions may exist, where, and how the fight will take place. In the COE, with no front lines associated with an asymmetrical threat, "total" warfare cuts a large swath, engulfing communities, and increasingly endangering civilians, especially children. In an age of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the variety of threats has multiplied exponentially. The "threat" now encompasses many more children serving as combatants. Our forces need to recognize this and be prepared to deal with the complexities associated with this alarming trend. How can we more effectively deal with the role of children on the modern battlefield?
•
Military leaders at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic), in concert with political and diplomatic officials State department) associated with the nation's security, must be cognizant of the emerging dangers of children serving as hostile combatants.

•
Army leaders must exercise sound judgment in conjunction with the desired leader attributes highlighted from FM 22-100 when dealing with children (as intelligence gatherers, actual combatants, and innocent bystanders) on the battlefield.

•
Innovative, comprehensiVe, detailed deliberate planning that factors in ROE for children on the battlefield, ethical decision making, cooperation and integration of non-government agencies (NGOs) to deal with hostile conflict and post-conflict concerns needs to take place with a goal of minimizing civilian casualties, while Simultaneously ensuring adequate force protection for U.S. troops.

• Integrate role players as children in an urban environment at the combat training centers (CTCs). In this manner, our troops will be confronted with the multi-faceted roles of children on the modern seamless battlefield of the present and near future. It will surely test their I'esolve, the Military Decision­Making Process (MOMP), leader attributes, ROE and force protection. Role players should serve as sources of human intelligence (HUMINT), hostile combatants, innocent bystanders, and as orphaned, homeless, and starving refugees. This would give our troops rotating through the CTCs a more realistic portrayal of Children and civilians on the battlefield in an urban warfare setting that U.S. forces are already facing now in parts of Afghanistan and the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and theaters of operation on the horizon.\J
Photo courtesy of
Center for Defense Information website.

CALL NFTF! 7 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 013?13

The Infantry Platoon: A Diary of Trends
by SFC Robert J. Ehrlich, Task Force 2, JRTC
T
his diary was compiled from 13 rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk,
Louisiana. It draws lessons from 33 platoon after-action reviews (AARs), offering them under the categories
of sustain and improve. The diary is intended as a broad brush of typical platoon operations during rotations at
JRTC. It is not set in a format of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) or field manual (FM). It does provide an
excellent start point for the junior leader preparing for a rotation. It is also useful for the company commander in
establishing training goals at Home Station.
1. SUSTAIN:
a.
Soldier attitudes. Soldier attitudes on JRTC rotations have been generally high. Soldiers are motivated and ready for the training. Although there are some soldiers that do not want to be in the rotation, a majority are highly motivated, eager to get into the field, and looking for a fight with the opposing forces (OPFOR).

b.
Mail. Every unit on a JRTC rotation has gotten mail, even during short rotations such as the Army
Nationai Guard units. This helps ensure that motivation and morale stay high.

c.
Rations. T-Rations and hot rations have been delivered during many rotations in the defense phase or in battalion or brigade assembly areas. This has a profound impact on soldier attitudes. During a few rotations, some companies set up assembly areas and serve T-Rations during the movement-to-contact phase. Again, this is a great morale. booster. Many soldiers commented that unit leaders really care about them if they are willing to set up an assembly area with perimeter security and provide a hot meal. A refit and re-arming operation during combat operations works wonders.

d.
Taking charge. Junior leaders are quick to take charge when senior leaders become casualties. Although they are sometimes not fully prepared to plan and conduct combat operations, they assume command quickly and take action. Some Home-Station training needs to be conducted to help better prepare them for leading patrols, especially the junior NCOs and senior specialists.

e.
Rehearsals. Generic rehearsals are conducted almost every rotation, especially at the immediate staging base (ISB) or prior to deployment.

f.
Aggressiveness. Soldiers and platoons are aggressive during rotations. Sometimes they are overly aggressive and fail to use battle drills. That said, an aggressive stance against the enemy shows them you are ready to fight and they often break contact from the unit. Channel the aggression into violent execution of battle drills.

g.
Use of strong skilled soldiers. Using soldiers with strong skills provides immediate benefits and shows that leaders know their men, their strengths and weaknesses. All too often, units depend too much on the strong skilled soldiers and burn them out. The wise leader makes sure that the others are up to speed on their training, and rotates soldiers on the various duties.

h.
Communicating with locals. This is a plus in combat operations. Talk with the locals when you come in contact with them. They are a wealth of information about trails, weather, location of enemy, when the enemy comes around, and other matters. Some units avoid the locals, but the ma,jority approach and talk to the locals.

i.
Encoding num bers. Some units use this to great effect on internal platoon frequencies. The format of "STOP DANGER" has been widely used as such:

S T o p D A N G E R
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 1
Any other I O-Ietter word group can be used, so long as the letters do not repeat. How it is used. Grid coordinated and frequencies are the most common use for this. Example: A frequency of 55.750 would be sent as AAGAS.
DonnOA
CALL NFTF! 8 SEP-OCT 02

j. Tiers on a I\lap. This is another technique for small unit communications, especially when there are not enough frequency hopping SINCGARS radios. Platoons may not have enough SINCGARS to replace all the squad radios (AN/PRC-126 or 127 radios). It is simple to LIse.
The grid you want to send in is: WQ435905.
Encoded, using tiers, it would look like: I Set -WQ, Grid -B5XS.
This allows the processing ofsensitive information over unsecured

communications.
k. Standing operating procedures (SOPs). Generally, platoon SOPs are unwritten. Even so, they are fairly well understood by all members of the platoon. This could pose a problem in war for new and replacement soldiers. They do not know the platoon SOPs and will have to learn them while they are in a combat zone.
I. Equipment accountability. Accountability of platoon
Figure 2 equipment is pretty good. Very few platoons lose gear. Platoon sergeants

and squad leaders checking soldier equipment for tie downs, and conducting hands-on checks prior to moving out on missions, pre-combat inspections (PCI) are the key.
2. blPROVE (AREAS NEEDING ATTENTION):
a. PLANNING.
(1)
Clear, simple ol'ders. Clear, simple orders are the ticket at platoon and lower levels. Many times the orders are vague in content and wordy. If the orders are vague, lower leaders add excessive words so that the soldiers think the leaders know what is going on. Leaders need to remember the old statement -Keep It Simple Soldier (KISS). A simple, clear, properly articulated order does not need to be a book or novel, but one page with the meat and potatoes of what we are doing.

(2)
Task, purpose, method, and end state = a focused mission and intent. This is the hardest for many to understand. The task is the aSSigned mission(s). The purpose is what we are to do (destroy the enemy, defend in sector). The method is how we will accomplish this. And the end state is the vision of the outcome. All must be clear, simple, and to the point so that every soldier fully understands what is to be done. But all too often, it is unclear and missing key ingredients and we execute without having a clear understanding of what we are doing.

(3)
Time Management. The 1/3-2/3 rule has pretty much died at the platoon level. Generally speaking, this comesfrom higher-level orders arriving late/or immediate execution. But leaders need to ensure that their subordinates have time to conduct their ovm planning and allow information to be disseminated prior to moving out. This holds especially true for the defense and during movement to contact. All too often, the squad leaders receive the order, and then have no time to infonn their soldiers what is going on before picking up and moving out. The outcome is soldiers do not know what the mission or task is or what they are going to do. Instead, they follow the leader and feel left in the dark.

(4)
Task organization. All 100 often platoon leaders Iry to do all planning alld Ihen execule Ihat pla/J as Ifthey were in solilmy confinemenl. In aboul 36 to 48 hours, they are lelhal weapons--/ol' the OPFOR. They must learn to task­organize the platoon and subordinate leaders, especially in the planning of missions and execution of the defense. That means tasking platoon sergeants and squad leaders in planning the operations they will have to execute. This also develops them as leaders. In the defense, they can be executing and coordinating the preparation while the platoon leader is developing the plan and verifying the plan with the commander.

(5)
Combat SCI'Vicc SUPPOl't (CSS). Generally this is poorly planned at platoon level, especially casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and resupply. Normally, there is a platoon combat command post (CCP) and a company CCP established, but no plan on how to extract casualties including routes in and out. Few personnel have or know how to use a nine­line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) request. Soldiers need to know this so they feel comfortable in the fact that th~ unit can and will get them extracted in a timely manner if they become a casualty. And that there is a planned route for resupply instead of the company supply truck or battalion resupply driving around looking for them.

(6)
I ntegration of attachments. This area is definitely one for improvement. especially when there are attachments such as engineers (breach teams). They are rarely included in the planning or issuance of the order. Even those who are rarely coordinate communications with the platoon. In the defense, BIFYs, engineers, or tanks often collocate with the platoon but never integrate into operations. The outcome is no mutual support and integration into the line of defense.

(7)
Combat multipliers. This area has profound outcomes, many negative ifnot considered. All too often, platoons conducting search-and-attack operations get decisively engaged. Even as that occurs, attack aviation are flying nearby or on top of them searching for the enemy with no communications between the ground and the air. Or in the attack, BIFYs and tanks drive into the objective while dismounted infantry is pinned down by well-aimed fire. Again no communications link these heavy and light elements.

nnnnnA n1~?1&:;
Supporting anns are invaluable when used properly. A BIFY or tank can easily provide cover and fire for a platoon to get from a wood line to a building and establish a foothold. Attack air can easily find caches or the exact position of the enemy so the platoon can close with and destroy them. But this only happens if the assets are on the platoon frequency or the platoon is given the frequencies to talk to the combat multipliers.
One unit overcame this in a unique way. A Kiowa Warrior was searching an area and located a large cache, then came to the nearest platoon and flew around them. The pilot pointed out the window to the location. The pilot then went back and flew in circles over the cache. The platoon did not understand and continued moving away from the cache. The pilot then wrote a note on a piece of paper, attached it to something heavy, and dropped it on the platoon. Then the platoon understood what the pilot wanted and destroyed the cache. Certainly not the preferred technique, but it worked in this instance because that pilot wanted to support the troops.
(8) Adjacent unit cool'dination, All too often, this is not conducted. The outcome is chance contact between units and potential fratricides. It is almost impossible to establish an effective defense without such coordination. That said, it is seldom done and even when coordination is made, it is poorly done. A checklist would help prevent fratricide and chance contacts with other friendly elements, especially when near company or battalion boundaries .
.--" (9) Rehearsals. Rehearsals need to be focused for EVERY mission even if only a backbriefwhen receiving a new mission. Such focused rehearsals are rare. Usually they are generic, uncoordinated and almost never focused on the specific mission. Prior to executing an ambush, soldiers must rehearse that ambush so each fully understands his role be it POW/search, aid and litter, or assault across the objective. But this does not happen. The results are confusion and poor performance.
(10)
Fil'e Support, Fire support at platoon level is generally planned poorly. Its execution is even worse. The FO is force-fed from above, rarely given the flexibility to plan target reference points (TRPs) for the platoon. Often TRPs are on prominent terrain features too far from the planned route, rendering them useless. Careful route planning that incorporates a fire plan can eliminate many immediate requests so often used. The forward observers (FOs) are trained in Fire Support planning, allow them to do their job. A good planning tool was developed by the fire support division here at JRTC and published in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 90-1, Fire Support!or tile Malleuver Commander, Feb 90. Have the FOs and leaders review this publication and implement the content into their planning and operations.

(11)
Contingencies. The old what-ifs need to be considered. This rarely happens at the platoon level even in the case of a basic five-point plan for a leader's recOlmaissance, a squad patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrol, or other similar operations. Again, get back to the basics here. Even a lost communications contingency is rarely ever planned. One technique is to build a set of contingencies and number them in the platoon TACSOP. Then they are part of the platoon's SOP and become known to all members ofthe platoon. This way, during operations, they can be refell-ed to as per the SOP, and only a basic five-point plan needs to be issued.

(12)
Dissemination of infol'mation. A soldier needs to know five basic things during operations: where he is going; what he is doing; when he will leave and return; when is chow; and when he will get mail? As long as a soldier has the basic inf0ll11ation, he feels like a part of a team and can focus on the mission.

b. EXECUTION:

(1)
Battle drills. Platoon and squad battle drills are rarely executed at JRTC. Usually, the unit is caught off guard and control breaks down immediately. Rather than maneuver or support by fires, soldiers just start running in the direction of fire. Battle drills are unfamiliar and there is no coordinated effort among the squad or platoon. In the best of cases, casualties are high even if the unit "wins." More often, the OPFOR inflicts casualties and fades without losing the initiative. Soldiers and smallllnits must rehearse battle drills until they can do them without thought. A technique for Home-Station training is to incorporate some drills into daily physical training (PT). They become "grass drills" for operations. While running down a road, you come across an open field. Run off illtO the field and conduct a drill or two, then get back onto the road and finish the run. This adds variety to PT and helps soldiers understand their drills and where they fit into the battle drill. The platoon and squad battle drills are:

c? React to Contact. ~Break Contact.
u:;r Platoon Attack. !!.it Breach a Mined Wire Obstacle.
or? Sq uad Attack. = Enter aBuilding/Clear a Room.

DODDOA 013?1R
(2)
Navigation skills. Navigation is one ofthe oldest and most difficult of soldier skills. It requires practice to master and the number of masters are steadily declining. GPS is not a panacea. Terrain association and map reading are still necessary. More and more units are relying on the plugger to give them accurate grids on where they are. Soldiers without a plugger do not know where they are. The basics need to be stressed here: a map, compass and pace count. The plugger is used to confirm location.

(3) Movement techniques.

(a)
Platoons are not using proper movement techniques. Soldiers have a tendency to walk in a file. Leaders must ensure their soldiers to do the hard right over the easy wrong. The file is for restrictive terrain or very low visibility. Even then soldiers should not trail behind the other. There is even a right way and \\Tong way to use the file. Review FM 7-8 for proper techniques. Some techniques that worked well are:

flr Platoon Wedge and Vee.
flr Squad Wedge.
""'" Fire Team Wedge on R&S patrol.

b) Individual movement is generally poor. Soldiers run toward the enemy in the open. Soldiers do lIOt use individual movement teclmiques of the Low Crawl, High Crawl and 3-5 second rush. Or they use them improperly. Even if they do use individual movement techniques (IMTs), they do not use available cover. They may get down near a tree some 20 inches in diameter but they don't use it as cover. Again, back to the basics. Employ some of this training during PT in the open field that you are running by.
(c) Night Movements. Again soldiers tend to operate in a file and forget proper movement techniques. Even
on fairly open terrain, soldiers will go into in a file if allowed rather than use a wedge. Even with night vision goggles (NVG),
th~y naturally tend to move back into a file formation. The general consensus is good illumination equals poor NVG use.

. . (4) SecUI·ity. A general lack of security is the reason units get caught unaware at JRTC. Security must be 360· at all times. Security means soldiers watch their flanks, rear elements watch behind, and soldiers scan their sectors during movements. During halts, soldiers tend to do a rucksack flop, especially radio·telephone operators (RTO) and FOs. Soldiers need to face out and scan their sectors, RTOs and FOs need to drop the ruck on a long halt and get behind their ruck in the prone to monitor the radio. At danger areas, such as roads or clearings, leaders must heighten awareness of the situation and increase security rather than allow soldiers to bunch up. At patrol bases or assembly areas, security should never go below 50 percent unless approved by the company commander. If a patrol or other mission departs, security should be at 100 percent until they return. These are all basics taught in our schools. But time and time again, units disregard them when out in the box. Soldiers always drift toward an individual "Cone of Comfort." For most soldiers, this is that area from their feet to about 15 feet in front of them on the march. As fatigue increases, the cone narrows, especially with a heavy rucksack. Soldiers tend to watch this area, dulled into believing that as long as the enemy is not inside the cone of comfort they are safe. Scan your sector not the cone. The OPFOR can and will hurt you without even getting close to the cone.
(5)
Awareness. Battlefield awareness and situational awareness are the foundations of security. If the soldiers scan their sector on the move, they are aware of their surroundings. They are less likely to be caught off guard. They are also less likely to miss opportunities to hurt the enemy. It is not uncommon for a platoon or company to walk right next to an enemy CP or cache and never see it. Everyone is in the cone of comfort, watching the soldier in front of him. At times, they get into a firelight with a friendly unit because the two elements bumped into each other. Situational and battlefield awareness comes from constant scarn1ing of sectors and equally constant monitoring ofone's position in the unit scheme of maneuver. Fixated compass men or leaders' eyes glued to a plugger rather than guiding on a map drift into another unit's sector. Surprised, they fail to identify targets. The results are fratricide, confusion, and a golden opportunity for an OPFOR counterstroke.

(6)
Use of combat multipliers. As discussed earlier, attack aviation, BIFVs, MI tanks, engineers, and other support equipment can have a profound impact on engagements with the enemy. But they need to be integrated from the planning of the operation to its execution and future operations. Know their strengths and lilllitations. Those guide how to employ them. They can easily be integrated into the find, fix, or finish aspect. Even if they are not task·organized to the platoon, they can still be used for support if they are in the area. This means having a communications plan and frequencies. As far as equipment goes, knowledge on the proper use of and employment of the MOPMS, JAVELlN, M240MG, and the WAM is lacking. Many times units and soldiers have difficulty using the equipment. Clearly, equipment familiarization and training at Home Station would reduce these problems.

DODDOA 01~?17
CALL NFTF! 11 SEP-OCT 02
(7) Fire Support.
(a) Clearance of fires is a systemic problem at the platoon and company levels. Battle tracking can eliminate 90 percent of the problem. The fix is simple: a platoon calls in'a grid every 300 meters. If operating as squads, then squad grids are called in all the way up to the company; platoon grids are called into the battalion. This way fires can be cleared as quickly as possible and placed on the enemy.
concepts of Defense
:~:. ~'t;~,~,~~;:'~::::~";1'·Io:n: ',"1"''''''
(1, ·/,n;,,',. om'oJ'? (r"",.:;7. .,'-,dG"c.,,,,,'~, '";;]
", ",'".".";;'r~~::~~h~2~:~~::;~":'" ,.,.,',.,-;.:
(:.) W:,ere do 1"'''"' '" ,;,:11 hr..1 ",,,:.,,~,,.,,,,,;: I~~"i
~~~ C:CJt z.:::;v~ -0' tiny 1:.1';::1\'( rorl'~\!'!l }J'-:!I~ ':'.J;~~C-~:;!'
-Co "''..,J;th ;, S~·"ro;h.::.'t1 "'\1:..1('. r~'::"Ir,1a:·!:-·
Grr ....1:--1.--7 .! ...."M~~~....~_•••p .'
Iy

l:l'~ n~·::Qn Ihli Dl.'I':j)!;.;·I'II-Z{)I~I) f.;s,·.n~ eLF. ,,~ i\~.'.2.m P~()f,br:io)

(b)
Shift vs Polar missions. During movements, the platoon FO can really make some money ifhe and his RTO know the polar mission technique. Polar missions are simple, requiring friendly location, direction to the enemy, distance, method, and a target description. Every leader should know that basic information at all times. Even a single soldier can make all the difference in the world here, as was the case during one rotation. The platoon was caught in a crOss fire and was down to a single man who grabbed the FO radio. He initially tried a grid and when that didn't work, in a polar mission. He placed 45 rounds of HE right on top of the enemy platoon, inflicting, 95­percent casualties and destroying two 82-mm mortars before being shot by a sniper. He was named hero of the battle in the rotation AAR.

(8)
Reporting. Clear, concise, timely reports must be sent up to higher, Poor reporting results in missed opportunities and casualties, All soldiers need to use the basic SALUTE fomlat. Ifthe battalion or (;ompany uses a differentformat, thell every soldier lIeeds to fully ullderstand it and know how to use it. And all higher and support units must Iwow it! In one event, a platoon literally filed past an enemy CP and resupply point just 50 meters away, No one saw the vehicles and OE-254 until the last platoon noticed it. They tried to call in a report, but it was not timely and the description was not clear. As a result, the unit was ordered to continue to march, missing an opportunity to take out the enemy CP and resupply point. The unit kicked itself during the AAR when it became clear what they had missed. Again this goes back to basics: scanning sectors; situational and battlefield awareness; timely and accurate reporting.

(9) Mission-essential equipment. All mission equipment must accompany the platoon on every mission.
(a)
Binoculars allow users to scan greater distances with greater Clarity. The binocular (bino) reticles can aid the user in calling and adjusting fires. Assistant gunners, FOs and leaders should all have binos with them.

(b)
Pluggers allow the unit to conflfll1location and get accurate grids for indirect fire missions. If used properly and soldiers have a strong working knowledge of the equipment, it can back up navigation. By punching in way-points, units can navigate with azimuths and distances from way point to way point. For fires, using the Average Mode can get the grid locked into a 10 digit with accuracy (a field survey), but this requires time (360 seconds or 5 minutes).

(c)
Spare Barrels are rarely carried during training because of MILES play. But the unit should train as it fights. These items should NEVER be left behind. Tripods, T&Es and Pinttes should ALWAYS be near the machine gunners. At every long halt, the gun should be mounted and placed at a minimum the 12 o'clock position and the main avenue of approach. The tripod allows the gunners to placed well-aimed, controlled fire onto any target that may present itself.

c. DEFENSE:

(1)
Clear the area to occupy. Units must search and attack an area selected for the defense prior to an occupation. This ensures that the area is clear of the enemy and that the enemy does not have eyes on all the defense operations. This is a technique and has been proven effective during mUltiple operations at JRTC at the platoon and company levels.

(2)
Positioning of crcw-sen'cd weapons. Crew-served weapons are the small unit's greatest source of firepower. The defense should be built around them with the infantry set in to protect them. Usually the exact opposite takes place. They are tacked onto the platoon defense almost by route method, one on either flank or assigned by subunit or leader. That often puts them in poor areas for observation and avenues of fire. Careful consideration must be taken to ensure that the crew-served weapOns can cover the areas of highest threat for dismounted and light skin-mounted operations. They must also ensure that tlley meet the requirements of the defense, The only way to detemline where those emplacements should be is to look at the terrain as the attacker will look at it.

(3)
Range cards and sector sketches. Range cards and sector sketches are for the most part sub-standard and do not provide a clear picture of the area of coverage or have adequate in fomlation to support the area of coverage. Again, the best way to develop a range card and sector sketch is to study the terrain frolll the attacker's viewpoint. Soldiers and leaders need to refer to FM 7-8 and STP 7-11BCHM l.:l-SM-TG, Task 07/-312-3007. Prepare a range card for an M60 or M240 MG. Bring copies of DA Foml 5517-R, Standard Range Card. Range cards printed on plastic are durable and are not affected by weather. For sector sketches, refer to FM 7-8, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-23.

CALL NFTF! 12 SEP-OCT 02

nnnnnA n1~?1A
them in poor areas for observation and avenues of fire. Careful consideration must be taken to ensure lhallhe crew-served
weapons can cover the areas of highest threat for dismounted and light skin-mounted operations. They must also enSure that
they meet the requirements of the defense. The only way to detennine where those emplacements should be is to look at the
terrain as the attacker will look at it.

(3)
Range cards and sector sketches. Range cards and sector sketches are for the most part sub-standard and do not provide a clear picture of the area of coverage or have adequate information to support the area of coverage. Again, the best way to develop a range card and sector sketch is to study the terrain from the attacker's viewpoint. Soldiers and leaders need to refer to FM 7-8 and STP 7-1IBCHM 14-SM-TG, Task 071-312-3007. Prepare a range card for an M60 or M240 MG. Bring copies ofDA Fonll 5517-R, Standard Range Card. Range cards printed on plastic are durable and are not affected by weather. For sector sketches, refer to FM 7-8, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-23.

(4)
Security. Security during defense operations is another problem area. Take a unit that has been on the move for several days and then put it in the defense. Soldiers will, without fail, see that as an opportunity to rest. The defense is a leadership challenge. During the preparation phase, the soldicrs are busy. Most soldiers are busily preparing their positions and units have but one to two personnel on security. That is a calculated risk that sometimes has to be accepted; the key is realizing that it is a risk as the unit focuses on setting in the defense by the specified "not later than (NTL)" time. When the clock strikes that hour, platoons are set at I DO-percent readiness. They are keyed up, but they are also tired. In a short time, they reduce security 50 percent. Then human nature starts to work and soon 25-percent security is in effect. By the wee hours of the morning, platoons are usually at 5-percent security or less. Observer/controllers (O/Cs) have videoed every soldier in platoons in the fetal position in the bottom of the fighting positions. Hence, the leadership challenge of the defense. Soldiers are already tired and face a wearing job in establishing a defense. Once that is ready, leaders need to troop the line hourly after the NLT defend time. Rotate the responsibility among the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and squad leaders to ensure that all the soldiers are perfonning their tasks and ready to defend when the enemy comes into the sector. Never allow the soldiers to go below 50-percent security, unless directed by the company or battalion headquarters. The defense is not a rest stop.

-.' (5) Priol'ities of work. Platoons fail unifonnly to set priorities of work. The platoon and company teanl must establish clear priorities of work list, then enforce it. There is a list pUblished in FM 7-8 that can be used as a guide or adopted as the platoon priorities checklist. Trying to handle too many tasks at once prevents unified effort in task accomplishment or accomplishment at sub-standard levels. Focus and unity in effort will help prevent this from occurring.
(6)
Manuals and government training aids (GTA). Field manuals are called field manuals for a reason. They are not "coffee table books" intended for the unit recreation area at Home Station. FM 7-8, Infanlry Rifle Platooll and Squad, and FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and GTA 7-4-6, Company Team Defense, are valuable sources of information when preparing for the defense, and must be on hand when preparing and executing the defense. On average, there is only one copy ofFM 7-8 available and this is usually provided by the O/Cs to assist the unit in its efforts.

(7)
Interlocking fires. A defense that has gaps in its fires is an invitation for defeat. Every platoon sets in a defense that has at least one area with NO interlOCking fire. Each time, the enemy finds and exploits it. Care and attention must be taken to ens~re that interlocking fire is obtained in the platoon defense, and mutually supporting fires are obtained in the company defense. Again, walking the terrain and exanlining it from the attacker's perspective is key. Have an individual go dO\~11fange while the sector sketches are being made. This identifies dead space and areas not covered by grazing fire. It also confinns interlocking fire. If the soldier is within the sectors of fire for the two positions, then there is interlocking fire. If not, then sectors need adjusting to support each other.

(8)
Communications plan. During the defense, communications are essential. They tie the positions together, keeping soldiers infomled on what is happening. They provide information to the subordinate leaders. They need to be as secure and as quiet as possible. PRC-126s and 127s are fine but are unsecure. Wire communications are secure and should extend from the CP to each of the squad leaders. A tug line is a silent means of alerting individual positions and to upgrade security. The tug line can be simple 550 cord in the platoon defense kit. But communications are more than simple means of passing information. Communications are personal, both spoken and unspoken. Leaders need to get out of their positiol1s and go to each of the squad's positions. That effort does more than simply tell the soldiers what is going on. It lets them know that tlleir leaders care. Lastly, there needs to be a no-communication plan. Losing communications with the company with no backup can be more than embarrassing; it can be fatal. 'If the company headquarters and or adjacent platoons have been over-run by the enemy and are coming up the flanks, it is better to find that out earlier. A good communications plan can help prevent some of the problems associated with lost communications.

CALL NFTF! 13 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 013219

ground. and not used in the defense is rarely concealed. This provides a signature for the enemy to focus on and gives the platoon defense away. Generally, the barrier materials are left on the ground, right where they were dropped off. Rucksacks are positioned behind the fighting positions and rarely, if ever, camouflaged. Attention to detail, and adding this to the defense checklist or priorities of work would help prevent this from occurring.
(12)
Fighting positions. Fighting positions have rarely been built to standard. To survive the indirect fire attack that precedes an attack, the fighting positions must have a minimum of 18 inches of overhead cover. The engineer section at JRTC has put together a diagranl and standard (tested) for a fighting position built with long pickets. It takes 18 long pickets for a two-man fighting position. There are other diagrams available at JRTC and are sent to each of the engineer elements prior to arrival at JRTC. Ifyou didn't get them, ask your o/es; they will be happy to provide the diagrams.

(13)
Alternate and supplementary positions. These are rarely designated. Even if they are, soldiers do not know where they are, much less prepare them. Usually, the factor related to this is time management. Alternate and supplementary positions must be designated, and at a minimum, dug to hasty standards.

(14)
Reheal·sals. Defensive rehearsals are generally radio drills, well after the NLT defend time. Rehearsals must be conducted during both day and night conditions. This will help ensure that all soldiers know the plan and how their part fits into the plan. A physical rehearsal to shift to alternate positions or perhaps reinforce flanks allows the soldiers to see the terrain. It may also uncover weaknesses that a radio drill won't get at. As a minimum, soldiers must know the withdrawal from primary to alternate and supplementary positions, and the reinforcement drill for the flanks. Otherwise, when attacked and they begin to fall back to altemate/supplementary positions, they become disoriented.

(15)
Hasty positions. There have been several instances when a platoon has been moved only minutes or an hour or so prior to the dismounted attack. In this case, soldiers picked up and moved, then simply lay on the ground to defend. The earth is the defender's friend: get close! Leaders and soldiers need to get down and scratch out hasty positions as quickly as possible in the new area to defend. Even a basty fighting position adds needed protection for the force. In the event artillery begins coming in on the element, being slightly below surface level gives more protection than laying on the surface; some oftbe shrapnel will pass over and miss the soldier in a hasty position. Units in a company assembly area or battalion assembly area should prepare hasty position. This simple act of scratching out a hasty position will help save a soldiers life, and presents less of a target for the enemy to place well-aimed, accurate fires upon.

U. ADMIN.

(1)
SOPs. SOPs at platoon level are generally weak to non-existent. What procedures do exist are usually passed word of mouth and vague at best. Platoons need to establish a platoon tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) or use tbe sample version tbat is outlined in FM 7-8. Anything that soldiers can refer to in hard copy to refresh their memory is better than a non-existing (written) reference. This will also help to integrate new or replacement soldiers as to how tbe platoon operates in a field environment.

~ ....,~_ .. ,.~, I'O~ ..
""1 .',"'TIU"1;rJl;l.rl«.~.,~·ii";;"'·",,"m'''''·' II

i' ....._~_~.H............., ....-...

\J-'f .... .: ..." ....
! ;~f;..-... ·),'\r."'"'... ~..." "",,,_, "·Ah"''' •• ,-II

~11¥tl'li ~ r~~~~.~~~:·,~:, I:
' ::,.:.:~"" . "''''''''. '.-. ,~ .. ,~ .. --.....
nit

I r .... '" ", •• ", ... : ;0.L-_____.:.:.:.....:::..:. .... _____.....
'" ~"".'" 4..... " •••~
•.u._...
(9)
CASEVAC. This area concerns the CSS community and line soldiers. But is otten poorly planned. The service support plan must incl ude a route into and out of the platoon and company sector of defense. It must also include a route from the platoon CCP to the company CCP.

(10)
Escape routes. An escape route needs to be planned in the platoon defense in case the platoon is over-run, a possibility almost never addressed. An escape route allows survivors to get to a covered and concealed area, consolidate and reorganize, then counter-attack the enemy. Instead, the escape efforts are ad hoc, leaving the survivors to fend for themselves against a focused enemy.

(11)
Camouflage and concealment. Equipment left on the

DODDOA 013220

(2)
Doctl'inal manuals. FM 7-8 needs to be carried by team leaders and above at the platoon level. This is a ready reference to many of the questions that arise during normal operations at JRTC and the field exercises at Home Station. Many view this manual as the bible for squad and platoon operations, but it is simply a reference item that has proven its worth in many exercises and operations.

(3)
Company and battalion TACSOPs. Company and battalion TACSOP must be on hand at the platoon level. At a minimum, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant must have a copy during operations. During every rotation, there have been instances that an event occurs and could be answered by the company or battalion TACSOP if the platoon had a copy with them. Not to mention the reports that are contained within each,'that are often neglected to be included in the platoon TACSOP.

(4)
Pre-combat checks and inspections. These generally occur at the ISB and nowhere else. All too often, an R&S patrol is sent out during the day and fails to take mission-essential items for the patrol. Then the patrol gets caught in the dark without NVGs because they planned on getting back before dark. Or a patrol moved out to register fires but forgot to take binoculars or a spare plugger battery. Proper planning, and PCls prevent such mistakes.

(5)
Mal·ksmanship. Marksmanship is an area ofOPFOR excellence and blue forces (BLUFOR) mediocrity. Soldiers need to practice, practice, practice prior to entering the area of operations. Some techniques that have been tried, tested and proven are:

a) Hose-clamp the transmitter in place, but not so tight that it starts to destroy the transmitter.
b) Do not drop or bang the rifle around once it has been zeroed.
c) Day zeroing and training.

•
25 meters initially.

•
Then confirm the zero at 50 and 100 meters.

•
Practice at 150 then 200 meters with a harness.

•
Practice at 150 and 200 meters with a soldier with harness and halo. Soldier needs to be

walking, running, and conducting IMT.
d) Night zeroing and training.

•
Ze.-o PVS-4s, P AQ-4s, and AIMs at 25 meters initially.

•
Confirm the zero at 50, then 100'meters.

•
Practice at 100, then 150 meters with the SAAF and a harness.

• Practice at 100 and 150 meters with a soldier with harness and halo. Soldier needs to be walking, running, and conducting IMT.
(6)
Weapons and equipment maintenance. Weapons and equipment are routinely neglected during the rotation. Al! too often, the weapons are seen with the brown rusty camouflage on them. Equipment is broken and not turned in for repair or replacement. Even the crew-served weapons are have been neglected and fail to operate when needed. A little attention to detail, preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and priorities of work would go a long way here. Every gun and every other soldier should have a weapon cleaning kit at a minimum. Broken or unserviceable needs to be identified and turned in for repair immediately, not carried around as dead weight. Keep mission-essential equipment in top working order.

(7)
Personal hygiene. After a couple of days, soldiers start to look like the war tom and tattered men of World War II. An unshaven face, weak to no camouflage, even bad breath really takes its toll. Soldiers must carry and use a personal hygiene kit, even in the field. There is no excuse for this at any level, but every rotation it is seen. Leaders must enforce personal hygiene standards with their soldiers even in the field; it must be one of the priorities of work before anyone gets any sleep.

(8)
Physical fitness. Physical fitness at home stations must be geared to the unit mission essential task list (METL). Very often, soldiers are ill prepared for the movements in the field and fall out of the movement, especially with their rucksack load. Non-battle injuries play just as hard a toll on the unit and morale as a valid battle injury, perhaps even more so. Soldiers expect some to be injured during hostile acts. They don't expect soldiers who cannot carry their loads to fallout ofthe movement. Every rotation, there are multitudes of non-battle injuries (NBI) attributed to heat, soldier load, lack of sleep, or physical fitness. Better training before deployment can help prevent some of this from happening, especially on the fitness-level issues.

(9)
What else wOI'ks? What else works are the things that are non-standard, but should be considered to help the unit fulfill its wartime mission.

(10)
CamclBak hydration system. One of the greatest inventions yet seen at JRTC is the CamelBak. Every OIC is issued a CamelBak and thoroughly believes in its worth. The bottom line is "Hydrate or Die."

(11)
Walkie-Talkies. Several units came through JRTC with Radio Shack walkie-talkies fitted with whisper microphones and earpieces. Although this was a platoon solution to broken squad radios turned in to maintenance, it worked very well. They bought, OUt of pocket, several sets and had them all tuned to the same frequency, which was below what could be punched into a 127 or 77 radio. It worked well, and was very quiet. (NOT AUTHORIZED AT JRTC.)O

DonnOA n1~??1
CALL NFTF! 15 SEP-OCT 02
(

The best form ofwelfare or soldiers is realistic, tou h, first class traillill{!. --Rommel
INTEGRATING Combat Service Support WITH THE Milita Decision-Makin Process TECHNIQU

by LTC Matt Higginbotham, DLRO, Command and General Staff College
Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, in his summary of Rapid Deploymellt Logistics: Leballoll, 1958, states: "General Adam'sforces accomplished the overall missioll ill Lebanon. The tailorillg o/logistical/orces worked, hut 1I0t without drawbacks. The designated support units must have a workillg knowledge 0/the plans so that tlley call devise complemelltary plans. Support units, like combat lIlIits, mllst train together to ensure teamwork. Higher headquarters must illtegrate the 110norganic combat service support units into tile pla/lnillg process to ensure that those units have the opportunity to rehearse the aspects ofpllllls that affect t!zeir operatiolls."
C S S
planning, logistics estimates, and integration continually receive a "needs emphasis" rating at the combat training centers (CTCs). The complexity of integrating CSS with the MDMP at the brigade, di~sion and corps levels remains a challenge for logistic planners.
Regardless of the type of operation (offense, defense, support or stability), successful integration of CSS during the MDMP is paramount. CSS integration is most effective if it is continuous, concurrent and provides detailed logistics analysis. Unsuccessful integration of CSS in the MDMP results in an unsubstantiated logistics analysis provided to commanders during critical decision-making.
This article is written for the tactical CSS planner (specifically, the G4, S4, and Support Operations Officers). Hopefully, it will provide a useful technique in integrating the CSS Battlefield Operating System with the MDMP to facilitate a thorough logistics analysis. Consider the following steps:
STEP 1: CSS integration before the MDMP (Integration of the CSS planner with the planning staff).
Prior to a staff planning session, CSS planners must integrate their staff/section with the respective planning staff (includes all BOS representatives). This requires the G4/S4 and Support Operations Officers to proactively seek information from either the Chief of Staff or Executive Officer (XO) of the planning headquarters. Staff planning SOPs, FM 101-5, Sta//Orgallizations (lnd Operatiolls, and planning timelines assist planners in the MDMP. The linkage of the CSS planner with other BOS planners provides the logistician a 360-degree picture before, during and after the MDMP.
The CSS planner contributes to the MDMP by knowing his or her respective supported unit's task organization (habitual) and all organic capabilities. A unit's task organization with its current capabilities provides the foundation for future CSS planning. The challenge becomes how to build upon and organize a unit's current CSS status with new mission requirements.
STEP 2: ess integration during the MDMP cess Analysis).
Typically, CSS planners focus more on CSS products (resulting from the MDMP) than conducting a thorough logistic analysis of the mission. CSS products include the following:
a.
Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of an OPORD/OPLAN.

b.
The CSS Overlay.

CALL NFTF: 16 SEP-OCT 02

nnnnnA n1 ~???

c. Annex I (Service Support) to an OPORD/OPLAN.
The logistician has several planning tools and techniques to assist with CSS planning. Unfortunately, many planners fail to consolidate, organize and prepare the enormous amounts of data for analysis. The planner's challenge becomes how to prepare and organize the information for a thorough analysis (See enclosure. Note: The enclosure provides the CSS planner a technique in aligning (integrating) CSS considerations with the MDMP).
The G4/S4 and Support Operations Officer identifies, organizes and analyzes logistic data. This process is often referred to as the "science" of logistics planning. The "art" of logistic planning is taking this analysis and applying it to the battlefield in a support concept (visualization). Commanders expect a thorough logistic analysis prior to the CSS planner recommending the feasibility and acceptability (regarding resources) of a COA. The results from the CSS analysis may significantly influence a commander's decision to approve or disapprove a staffs recommended COA. Therefore, how do CSS planners prepare the required CSS information for analysis? One tool often neglected by CSS planners in preparing information for analysis is the logistics estimate.
The Logistics Estimate seems to be one of the most misunderstood documents for the CSS planner. According to FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, Appendix C:
"The logistics estimate is an analysis ofhow service support factors can affect mission accomplishment It contains the G4 's (S4 's) conclusions and recommendations about the feasibility ofsupporting major operation III and tactical missions. "
The logistics estimate is a tool used to consolidate all characteristics of the area of operations (AO), enemy forces, friendly forces, and CSS considerations. Consolidating CSS considerations/data with other BOS information enables the CSS planner to properly conduct an analysis. Based on the results from the CSS analysis, planners have enough information to conduct a separate analysis for each COA. The last section of the logistics estimate includes a CSS comparison of COAs with recommendations followed by conclusions. These recommendations and conclusions provide the commander critical CSS information required in COA decision-making.
The doctrinal format for the logistics estimate and other staff estimates is FM 101-5 (Appendix C). Additionally, another logistics estimate format is found in CGSC ST 101-6, CSS Battlebook (Chapter 2). NOTE: Automated and other logistic planning tools provide the logistician quantifiable data by the various commodities. This data is only useful ifthe proper analysis is conducted. Inserting tllis data into the logistics estimate requires the CSS planner to ask the questioll, "So what?"
STEP 3: CSS out uts resulting from the MDMP CSS analysis.
The primary CSS products required for an OPORD/OPLAN are paragraph 4 (Service Support), the CSS Overlay, and Annex I (Service Support). Upon completion of Step 6 (Course-of-Action Approval) to the MDMP, all staff sections prepare OPORD/OPLAN products for submission to subordinate units. The G3s/S3s may distribute initial products as early as the warning order. CSS products are most effective if prepared concurrently throughout the MDMP (refer to enclosure). The information for CSS products results from the analysis provided in the logistics estimate.
CONCLUSION

Successful integration of CSS within the MDMP remains a challenge for the tactical logistician. CSS planners today use different planning resources to assist them with CSS analysis. Generating numbers and data is but one step in the overall process. The most important step becomes properly integrating this data into the MDMP. Otherwise, the volume of CSS information serves a less valuable purpose, and may fail to answer the question, "So what?"O
CALL NFTF! 17 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 013??~

';j C" C"
cr
T'"
C
l
C
Enclosure: CSS Steps to the MDMP

C C
C
C
CSS CONCURRENT STEPS TO MDMPMDMP STEPs
1. Gather CSS Tools.

1. Receipt of Mission.
0
Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Orders.
0
Task Organizations.
0
Para 4 (support concepts).
0
Annex I
0
CSS Overlays with Maps of AO.
0
CSS Matrices.
0
Parent unit capabilities.
0
Automated Planning Tools (LEW, OPLOG Planner).
0
Staff planning SOPs/planning timelines. . Historical logistics estimates/logistics estimate formats .

2a. Analyze HHQ orders with focus on task organization (attachments/detachments), mission, commander's intent, Analysis.
2. Conduct Mission concept of operations, AO boundaries (contiguous, noncontiguous, linear, nonlinear), paragraph 4 (support concepts), support relationships and service support annexes (Annex I, two levels up).
a. Analyze HHQ Orders.
b. Conduct IPB/LPT and LPB (Logistic Preparation of the Theater or Battlefield). CSS planners assist the G2/S2 and engineers with CSS logistic preparation of the battlefield information such as: support infrastructure of AO, HNS, airfield/road network, bridge classifications, hard-stand utility, possible logistiCS nodes, MSRs, LOCs inside and outside AO, support area requirements, RSOI considerations.
b. Conduct IPB.

c. Determine tasks (specified, implied, and essential). Extract specified tasks from HHQ orders under task to
tasks (specified,

c. Determine

subordinate units. Many maneuver tasks will generate implied CSS tasks. Include all CSS FACTS and
implied, and

ASSUMPTIONS. Extract any REQUIREMENTS from these initial tasks and facts/assumptions. Additionally, based
essential).

on unit capabilities and CSS facts, calculate initial REQUIREMENTS from the various logistic planning tools.

d. After studying the task organization, specified and implied tasks, the CSS planner analyzes the support
available assets.

d. Review relationships of assigned, attached, OPCON, or DS units. Based on the relationships, additional internal or external support REQUIREMENTS may be generated. Compare organic support CAPABILITIES with additional support CAPABILITIES of assigned, attached, OPCON or DS units added to task organization. Build a separate TASK ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT highlighting all additional support CAPABILITY required that exceeds organic support capability. This generates SHORTFALLS. In addition, provide the present CSS situation (current status of all CSS functions) as a start point for future CSS analysis. The current status can be in matrix formal.

e. Determine e. Determine constrainls/SHORTFALLS. This is where the logistician identifies all shortfalls in support
constraints.

requirements. Task organization changes (noted above) and CSS considerations to the type mission (offensive, defensive, stability or support) generate SHORTFALLs. Prepare initial CSS OVERLAY. At a minimum, include locations of current and proposed support locations, operational boundaries (from operational graphics). MSRs from HHQ locations of maior maneuver HQ locations of maior CSS units and mission graRhics_(OBJs) if available.
CALL NFTF! 18 SEP-OCT 02

MDMP STEPs CSS CONCURRENT STEP& TO MDMP
f. 10 critical facts and assumptions. f. Refine critical CSS FACTS and ASSUMPTIONS list from all available plans, orders, estimates and AO/country studies. Focus on critical CSS facts and assumptions before operations and possibly during operations. Structure by CSS function.
g. Conduct risk assessment. g. Conduct CSS RISK ASSESSMENT. Prepare initial LOGISTICS ESTIMATE. Consolidate all CSS information gathered from previous paragraphs into the logistics estimate. Remember, the logistics estimate is a working docLlment.
h. Determine initial CDR's CCIR. h. Know what they are. Also, focus on reqUirements from actions at NAls.
i. Determine initial i. Determine support requirements and concept for reconnaissance effort. At corps level, include a support
recon annex concept lor the ACR; at division level, a support concept for the Division Calvary Squadron; and at brigade level, a support concept for the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop. Include these concepts in the logistics estimate. Additionally, prepare initial REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANS.
j. Plan use of available lime. j. Refine PLANNING TIMELlNE, LOGISTICS ESTIMATE, and develop initial CSS MATRIX (optional). Prepare initial SUPPORT CONCEPT from information gathered in logistics estimate and concurrent planning with BOS reps.
k. Write the restated mission. k. Continue to refine the SUPPORT CONCEPT, CSS OVERLAY, and prepare an initial ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) from logistics estimate.
I. Conduct mission analysis briefing. I. As part of the MA briefing, the CSS planner must prepare to brief the initial SUPPORT CONCEPT and current statuses of commodities, by CSS function. Additionally, include any critical logistics TASKS and SHORTFALLS. Any shortfalls mentioned must include proposed recommendations to alleviate sllortfall.
Ill. Approve restated mission. m. Understand restated mission and any CSS implications.
n. Develop initial CDR's intent. n. Understand CDR's intent. Ensure information and CSS 'analysis captured in logistics estimate support this intent.
o. Issue the Cdr's guidance. o. Capture CSS PRIORITIES and CONSIDERATIONS mentioned by the Commander when issuing guidance. ENSURE all logistic analysis meet this guidance.
p. Review facts and assumptiolls. p. Review CSS FACTS and ASSUMPTIONS. Focus on those assumptions Ihat have become facts.
3. Course·of-action development 3. Based on logistic information gathered in logistics estimate, begin to apply analysis of REQUIREMENTS, CAPABI L TI ES, and SHORTFALLS to each proposed COA. Consider developing a CSS MATRIX highlighting key considerations by CSS function for each COA (a technique).
4. Course·of-action 4. Apply information Irom the logistics estimate to the operational synchronization matrix to assist in the wargame.
analysis (wargalne). Each COA should have specific CSS considerations, priorities of support identified, logistic unit locations, and a feasibility analysis conducted with CSS risk identified. The greater the risk to CSS units, the lesser the feasibility (supportable), or identification of ways to mitigate tile risk.
5. Course·ol-action 5. During COA comparison, the CSS planner must inform the Commander, Chief 01 Staff or designated
comparison. representative of the CSS feasibility or supportability of a COA. DO NOT WAIT FOR COAAPPROVAL TO PROVIDE SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS. This is where the CSS planner needs to articulate, from the analysis of information in logistics estimate. the following: Most Supportable, with associated risks; Supportable, with associated risks; and Least Supportable, with associated risks.
6. Course-of-action approval. 6. CSS planners refine SUPPORT CONCEPT (Para 4), TASK ORGANIZATION for SUPPORT, CSS OVERLAY, and refine ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT), from information in the LOGISTICS ESTIMATE.
7. Orders production. 7. CSS Planners prepare and submit Paragraph 4, ANNEX I, and the CSS OVERLAY to the OPLAN/OPORD for distribution to subordinate units.

o
o
o
o
o CALL NFTF! 19 SEP-OCT 02
»
o
....l.
0J
I\,) I\,) Ul

A Company-Grade Guide to Strategic Deployability in the Light Artillery World by 1 L TAssi an Sayyar, Bn Adjutant, 3-32Oth FA, 101 st ABN Div (Air Assau It)
A light artillery battalion, in tI,e mil/st oftheir support cycle, has all ofits personnel tasked out in every conceivable direction. Soldiers man gates and head out onfuneral detail. Large-scale collective training is not being conducted and personnel are not available. It is at a moment like this wilen a single phone call can instantly alter the immediate,foreseeablefuture. . . deploymellt. A deployment that is to occllr within 48-36 hours via strategic air into hostile territory. The battalion immediately mobilizes its resources to pushing thefirstfiring battery out while continuing to support their tasking requirements. Tile hours Lellgthen,fatigue sets in, but the task is done. The Lead elements are ready to deploy and those Left behind shore up the Lessons learned. While the mission was accomplished, the amount ofquick­reaction required by company-grade officers at the battery level couLd have largely been prevented ami it can cause olle to ask the question, "Were we really preparedfor this?"
How often have we overlooked the shortcomings in Ollr battery's ability to depLoy by justifying to ourselves that "when the time comes, we'll have time," or "we'll get plenty ofnotice," or "there will be a build-up period?" The nature oftoday's international scene makes statements like these sound quite irresponsible. In the world ofthe light division, the likelihood ofdeploying to meet threats that require quick reaction remains high. It is important to note that the maneuver elements we support do not .. possess the amount ofequipment, and do not ne(!d the amount ofreaction time that {/ light artillery battery does. As a result, it is vital that lieutenants and captains in firing and headquarters batteries alike devote the extra time to ensure that they will be ready to move when the brigade combat team (BeT) they su ort does.
T
he company grade officer, especially the lieutenant, is the first line of attack in ensuring that adequate
preparation is being conducted in the realm of strategic deployability. Executive officers, fire direction
officers, and platoon leaders are the planners in the unit that is closest to "the trenches." Lieutenants that devote the
time to ensure their battery is prepared will allow their chain of command to be free to concentrate on the tactical
realities deployed units face once in theater. This article outlines areas within impacting readiness that lieutenants
and captains can expertly manage and improve upon. As a company grade officer, you can enhance your battery's
readiness in the realms of training, supply, maintenance, and personnel management.
Training

Instruction at the battery level in all facets of deployability is vital. However, before that is to occur, the leadership must be well-versed in the requirements and direction the battery training must take. The leadership involved comprises your unit'smovement team. An officer representative can direct the planning involved while an NCO representative can bring practical experience to the table. It is also recommended that the battery's mechanic is also a part of this team since he has immediate knowledge of the unit's equipment and its status. At Ft. Campbell, KY, there is a Strategic Deployability School (SDS) that a large portion of the 10Ist Airborne Division (Air Assault)'s lieutenants attend which satisfies the requirement for trained leaders. It is recommended that this course, or the equivalent on other posts, be completed prior to entry into a firing battery if possible. Individuals occupying Fire Support Officer positions are prime candidates for this option. Outside of SDS, being hazardous material (HAZMA T) qualified is also important. A large quantity of the equipment we transport via air and sea is SUbject to stringent United Nations (UN) and federal regulations with which we mUSl comply if we are to flow into theatre unhindered.
Once the leadership is trained at the individual level, the battery can be trained at the collective level. Training should focus primarily on the areas of rail and air. Soldiers need to be trained in proper rail-loading techniques to include all safety requirements. A proper understanding of the manning necessary, along with the blocking and bracing needed for each load, is imperative. Air movement encompasses a wider range of tmining. This includes proper preparation of vehicles for airlift. pallet-building classes, training identified chalk-leaders in their
CALL NFTF! 20 SEP-OCT 02
DODDOA 01 ~??R