Army Letter to Army Officials re: Public Affairs Guidance for the Public Release of the Investigation of Intelligence

This letter is for the Army officials who will be fielding questions regarding the allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. The letter is a set of talking points and policy statements that focus on the theme that "the Army is committed to ensuring all Soldiers live up to the Army Values and the Laws of Land Warfare regardless of the environment or circumstance".

Doc_type: 
Letter
Doc_date: 
Wednesday, August 25, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Sunday, January 30, 2005
Doc_text: 

Subject: Public Affairs Guidance for the Public Release of the Investigation ofIntelligence
Activities at Abu Ghra~b
Background:
a.
On 31 March 2004, at the request of the Combined Joint Task Force Seven
(CJTF-7) commander, LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, the Department of the Army appointed MG
George Fay to investigate allegations that members of the 20Sth Military Intelligence Brigade
(20S MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility.

b.
In mid June 2004, following LTG Sanchez' decision to recuse himself, the
Acting Secretary of the Army designated General Paul Kern, commander ofthe U.S. Army
Materiel Command, to be the new appointing authority for this investigation.

c.
On 2S June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Cgm~anding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, as an additional investigating ofticer.

d.
GEN Kern signed the investigation report on 6 August 2004, finalizing its
content.

Posture: Public Affairs posture is ACTIVE following the public release of the investigation of
intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib (a.k.a. Jones-Fay Report). Refer queries specific to the
findings of the report, and requests to interview the report's investigators, to Army Material
Command PAO. Refer general questions concerning detainee abuse to the Media Relations
Division, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, HQDA.
Policy: Refer to the report as the investigation of intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib. Do not use the term "Procedure IS" as a stand-alone term, unless you are using it to explain the context and method of conducting the investigation. Procedure IS is a technical term that may cloud the public's understanding of this sensitive issue. (Covered under AR 381-10, US Army Intel! igence Activities, it is one of several existing procedures used when an intelligence activity is suspected of being questionable. Procedure IS is used to determine whether intelligence activities are legal and consistent with applicable policy.) For external communications, refer to the investigation's findings as the investigation of intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib. For internal communications, you may refer to the investigation by the more commonly known "Jones-Fay Report." Organizations and leaders will not comment beyond their knowledge or involvement in the investigation.
Statement: (QUOTE) The Army has concluded its inve.stigation of intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib. Begun March 31 and concluded on August 6, it is a comprehensive review of the 20S th MI Brigade, including contractor support, and higher chain of command through CJTF-7. The investigation determined that the primary causes of abuse at Abu Ghraib are misconduct by a small group of soldiers and civilian contractors who apparently failed to respect the dignity of those in their custody, a lack of discipline on the part of leaders and soldiers of the 20S th MI
( I
DonnnA n1~~17
Brigade, and a failure of leadership by multiple echelons within Combined Joint Task Force 7. Twenty-seven (27) 205th MI Brigade personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited MP personnel to abuse detainees and lor participated in detainee abuse and / or violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. Leaders bear responsibility for lack ofoversight, failure to react to warnings and indications, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross report, and policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for intelligence gathering execution at the tactical level. The 205th MI Brigade and 800th MP Brigade leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to supervise or provide direct oversight, to properly discipline their soldiers, to learn from prior mistakes, and to provide continued mission-specific training. Additionally, some allegations pertaining to "ghost detainees" were substantiated. Interrogation practices of other governmental agencies were a contributing factor to a loss ofaccountability at Abu Ghraib.
The abuses occurred in a dangerous place where young men and women faced hazards that many people cannot comprehend. Abuses, even under these conditions, are not excusable. Those allega~ions that indicate criminal activity on the part ofU. S. Army Soldiers have been referred to the U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and to their respective chains of command. Allegations of abuse by civilian contractors have been referred through the Department of Defense to the Department ofJustice.
The Army remains committed to ensuring abuses like those committed at Abu Ghraib never happen again, and that all Soldiers live up to the Army Values and the Laws ofLand Warfare, regardless of the environment or circumstance. The report can be found at http://www4.armV.mil/ocpa/reports/ (END QUOTE)
Theme: The Army is committed to ensuring all Soldiers live up to the Army Values and the Laws of Land Warfare regardless of the environment or circumstance.
Key messages:

The Army said it would go where the facts lead. This investigation is just one of several into various aspects ofthe overall issue of detainee abuse.


The abuses occurred in a dangerous place where young men and women faced hazards many of us cannot comprehend. Abuses, even under these conditions, are not excusable.


The American people can be justly proud of the conduct and accomplishments of American Soldiers fighting in the Global War on Terrorism. They should not allow the actions of a few to taint their respect for the honor, courage, commitment, sacrifice and selfless service of those living up to the Army Values.


The primary causes of abuse at Abu Ghraib are misconduct by a small group of soldiers and civilians, a lack ofdiscipline on the part of leaders and soldiers ofthe 205 th MI Brigade, and a failure of leadership by multiple echelons within CJTF-7.


Twenty-seven (27) 20Sth MI Brigade personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited MP personnel to abuse detainees and / or participated in detainee abuse and / or violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.


Organizations or personnel higher in the chain of command of the 20Sth MI Brigade were not directly involved in abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, leaders bear responsibility for lack of oversight, failure to react to warnings and indications, such as the International Committee ofthe Red Cross report, and policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.


The 20Sth MI Brigade and 800th MP Brigade leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to supervise or provide direct oversight. Leaders failed to properly discipline their soldiers, learn from prior mistakes, and provide continued mission-specific training. (note: the Jones/Fay report does not speak to the 800th MP Brigade. That is within the purview of MG

-- .. Taguba's report.)
• Confusion about which interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from 1) a proliferation of guidance and information from other theaters of operation; 2) individual interrogator experiences ih other theaters; and 3) failure to distinguish between interrogation operations in other theaters and Iraq.
Supplemental communications points:

These abuses run counter to U. S. Army values. Our efforts to correct these abuses serve as an example ofthe institutional standards we maintain and our commitment to ensuring abuses like these do not happen again.


Contributing factors can be traced to issues affecting command and control, doctrine, training, and the experience ofthe soldiers performing this vital mission.


Most, not all, violent or sexual abuse occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes. No policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused the abuses.


Over 170 interviews were conducted of interviewees with knowledge of interrogation and detention operations at Abu Ghraib and / or their knowledge of and involvement in detainee abuse.


Working alongside non-DOD organizations / agencies in detention facilities proved complex and demanding. The perception that non-DOD agencies had different rules regarding interrogation and detention operations was evident. Interrogation and detention policies and limits of authority should apply equally to all agencies in the Iraqi Theater of Operations.


Our Soldiers were operating in a complex and dangerous environment. The incidents should not blind us to the noble conduct of the vast majority of our Soldiers.

Communications plan: Public release of the investigation ofintelligence activities at Abu
Ghraib.
a.
Purpose: To inform and educate our internal and external audiences on the findings ofthis report; to demonstrate the Army's resolve to ensuring all Soldiers live up to the Army Values and the Laws of Land Warfare regardless of the environment or circumstance; and to communicate that those responsible for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib will be brought to justice.

b.
It is essential that commanders and spokespersons use this Public Affairs Guidance to engage the public on this critical issue of institutional credibility and individual accountability. This Public Affairs Guidance will enable the Army to speak with one voice.

_.c. Xhe Army leadership is briefing Members of Congress. Refer questions concerning the Congressional briefings to the Media Relations Division, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, HQDA.
d. Schedule of media events in support of the public rollout.
1.
25 AUG 04: A senior Army leader will conduct an embargoed background interview with Pentagon media (before the afternoon Pentagon press briefing) to explain the context of this investigation and how it fits in with other Army and DOD investigations. Information from this background briefing is embargoed until the start of on-the-record Pentagon press briefing at approximately 1330 (EDT). Also on 25 AUG, senior Army leaders will conduct an on-the-record media briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, DC at approximately 1600 (EDT).

2.
The redacted report will be made available to the public via the Army website at the start of the Pentagon press briefing (approx. 1330 EDT) at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/.

3.
26 AUG: Senior Army leaders will conduct editorial boards with the Washington Post, USA Today, NY Times and the Wall Street Journal.

4. A hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee will be held ola 9 SEP

04.

e. Command Information:
1.
25 AUG: An Army News Service (ARNEWS) story will be posted to the Web at 1500 (EDT). It will have a link to the redacted report and its EXSUM. A transcript of the Pentagon press briefing will also be posted to army.mil as soon as possible.

2.
SRTV will carry the press briefing live on SoldiersRadio.com.

3.
PAO's should make every effort to view the press briefing live on the Pentagon

Channel, www.pentagonchannel.milortolistentoitliveonSoldiersRadio.com. http://www.army.mil/srtv/SoldiersRadio/SRL.html
4. PAO's will maximize the use ofHQDA provided Cl products (ARNEWS article, SoldiersRadio.com and SRTV products) in the installation CI publications --to include web.
5. PAO's should save space in their installation newspapers for the ARNEWS article.
Points of Contact:
a.
The POC for this Public Affairs Guidance is
OCP A (SCD) at COMM e-mal

b. The HQDA POC for media inquiries is OCPA (MRD) at COMM. e-mail'

c.
The POC for media queries on the AMCPAO, at COM~e-mail'

/9

Topic K: Detainee Operations
Observation Synopsis: Interrogators need as much detailed information as possible on the detainee capture tag in order to conduct an effective interrogation. The interrogators use the information to focus questions and develop actionable intelligence. Units are not completing the detainee capture tags on a consistent basis. The tags are readily available. Without complete information the interrogation process is more challenging and exploiting the detainees is much more difficult. Also, when detainees have documents or other equipment, units must mark and bag these items with the corresponding detainee in order to allow the interrogators to exploit any applicable information.
Key Lessons Learned:

Leaders must ensure accuracy and completeness of capture tags for all detaine~s.


Unit leaders should scre,en everything~to ensure proper documentation of the e~ents leading to capture as weIr as creating a~ inventory of all personal belongings for each detainee prior to transferring the detainee to the hold,ing facilitj ~Ul].its should ,conduct training for leaders and indNiduals to highlight the importance of preparing complete and 'accurate capture tags. J


Battalion S2s must integrate THT members into their cordod/nd search teams and

follow uP. on recommelldations for detainee disposition ( such "'as further exploitation or release). ~ . .' .'
DOTMLPF Implications: None
Source: TASK FORCE DEVIL -1 ST BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION CALL IIR 20040101

Doc_nid: 
2668
Doc_type_num: 
69