Army Field Manual No. FM 3-19.1: FM 3-19.1 Military Police Operations

Manual laying foundations for military police operations; its various functions; and limitations.

Thursday, March 22, 2001
Thursday, December 30, 2004

FM3-19.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Military Police Operations1 Page 1 of 5
*FM 3-19.1 (FM 19-1)
Field Manual1 Headquarters No. FM 3-19.11 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 22 March 2001
FM 3-19.1
Military Police Operations

Table of Contents

Operational Framework
Battlefield Organization
Types of Military Police Units
Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations

Battlefield Visualization
Commander's Intent
Concept of Operations
Command and Control Relationships
Support Relationships
Staff Relationships

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Chapter 3 THE THREAT
Rear-Area and Sustainment Operations
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Operations
Threat Priorities
Threat Location
Countering the Threat

Maneuver and Mobility Support
Area Security
Internment and Resettlement
Law and Order
Police Intelligence Operations

Military Police Support

The MP Brigade (CS)
Command and Control


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Division Military Police Company
Command and Control
Military Police Employment

Support to Separate Brigades
Support to the Initial/Interim Brigade Combat Team

Command and Control
Wartime Support

Support to Offensive Operations
Support to Defensive Operations

Force Suitability
Stability and Support Operations
Org_anizations and Capabilities


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Support to Force Protection


Army Information Systems
Military Police Automated Systems

Sample Scenario


'DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
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* This publication supersedes FM 19-1, 23 May 1988.

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FM 3-19.1 Change 1 Page 1 of 2
FM 3-19.1 (FM 19.1) Cl
CHANGE 1 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 31 January 2002
Military Police Operations
1. Change FM 3-19.1, 22 March 2001 as follows:
1-7 and 1-81 1-7 through 1-19
Glossary-5 through Glossary-161Glossary-5 through Glossary-16
A star ( * ) marks new or changed material.

File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
General, United States Army Chief of Staff
Administrative Assistant to
Secretary of the Army

DISTRIBUTION: DODDOA-006524 12/28/2004
FM 3-19.1 Change 1 Page 2 of 2
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 111046, requirements for FM 3-19.1.

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The Military Police (MP) Corps supports the commander across the full spectrum of military operations. This manual is the foundation for all MP doctrine as it relates to this support. It communicates to all levels of leadership and staffs how the MP provides a flexible and lethal force capable of operating across this full spectrum. As the keystone manual, it identifies what the MP train on and how their forces are organized and equipped in support of all Army echelons. Additionally, this manual provides guidance that can be used by United States (US) Army service schools, students, sister services, and federal agencies.
This manual is based on the purpose, organization, responsibilities, and goals of the US Army as set forth in Field Manuals (FMs) 100-1 and 100-5, as well as corps, division, and brigade manuals. Additionally, this manual is fully compatible with current joint, multinational, and interagency doctrine.
Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), ATTN: ATSJ-MP-TD, 401 Engineer Loop, Suite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
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Chapter 1
The MP Corps has a strong history evolving over the past five decades. We, as a corps, continue to transform our organizations and doctrine as we have in the past to support the Army in the active defense of the 1970s, the AirLand battle of the 1980s, and now the force projection doctrine of the 1990s. Our five MP functions clearly articulate the diverse role the MP play across the full spectrum of military operations. We cannot bask in our successes, nor reflect or celebrate. Our charter is to continue our legacy of stellar performance and strive to perfect it.
BG Donald J. Ryder
When the Army developed the Active Defense strategy in 1976, the US was facing the Cold War scenario of central Europe. Military strategy and doctrine were related to a single, focused threat that revolved around the countries in the Warsaw Pact. We were an outnumbered and technically inferior force facing an armor-dominated European battlefield. The MP Corps supported the Active Defense strategy by tailoring its forces to meet the threat. In 1982, when the AirLand Battle strategy was developed, US forces were still outnumbered, but were no longer technically inferior. Still threat-based and focused on a central European conflict, the AirLand Battle strategy used a relatively fixed framework suited to the echeloned attack of soviet-style forces. It delineated and clarified the levels of war; emphasized closed, concerted operations of airpower and ground forces; balanced the offense and the defense; and highlighted the synchronization of close, deep, and rear operations. MP doctrine kept pace with the Army's AirLand Battle strategy by supporting the battlefield commander through four basic missions—battlefield circulation and control, area security (AS), enemy prisoner of war (EPW), and law and order (L&O).
1-1. In October 1983, MP capabilities in the AirLand Battle strategy were tested during operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The MP performed missions that ranged from assisting the infantry in building-clearance operations to assisting Caribbean peacekeeping forces in restoring L&O. These actions secured our place in the combat support (CS) role, demonstrating the professional knowledge and flexibility necessary for rapid transition from combat to CS to peacetime missions. The changing battlefield conditions of operation Urgent Fury set the stage for the demand of MP units today.
1-2. Evolving simultaneously with the changing definition of the modern battlefield, MP performance in Operations Hawkeye, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm galvanized their ability to perform at any point along the operational continuum. With the publication of FM 100-5 in 1993, the Army adopted the doctrine of full-dimensional operations, relying on the art of battle command to apply those principles and to shift the focus from AirLand Battle to force-projection doctrine. This new doctrine was based on recent combat experience in a multipolar world with new technological advances. Already trained and expected to perform in this new strategy, MP support was already in place and fully operational. The MP continued to perform their basic battlefield missions and to refine their capabilities while supporting the battlefield commander as he deployed to contingency operations throughout
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the world.
1-3. In 1996, the MP Corps went through a doctrinal review process to determine if it was properly articulating its multiple performance capabilities in support of US forces deployed worldwide (see Appendix B). The review process identified the need to restructure and expand the EPW mission to include handling US military prisoners and all dislocated civilians. This new emphasis transformed the EPW mission into the internment and resettlement (I/R) function. The review process also identified the need to shift from missions to functions. In the past, the four battlefield missions adequately described MP capabilities in a mature theater against a predictable, echeloned threat. However, that landscape is no longer valid. Accordingly, the four MP battlefield missions have become the following five MP functions:
Maneuver and mobility support (MMS).


• L&O.

Police intelligence operations (PIO).

1-4. These new MP functions are shaped by the following factors:
The application of stability and support operations where the integration of joint, multinational, and interagency capabilities are common occurrence.

The lack of traditional linear battlefields, requiring theater commanders in chief (CINCs) to request forces that meet a specific function to accomplish operational requirements.

• The impact of asymmetric threats (such as drug traffickers and terrorist factions) and the effects of man-made and natural disasters.
¦ The impact of advances in information and communication technologies and specifically in understanding the increased vulnerabilities presented by these technologies.
1-5. Articulating MP capabilities along functional lines benefits the MP and the Army echelon commander as well as the combatant commander. Since there is a multinational, interagency, and sister-service overlap of security services, the importance of including MP leaders and staffs early in the operational planning process cannot be overemphasized. This means before units are designated, before unit boundaries are drawn, and before unit missions are assigned. Early involvement ensures the proper development of common security responsibilities, communication and connectivity, liaisons, processes, and the rules of interaction between all forces. The ultimate goal should be the optimal, phased employment of MP forces in support of a commander's operational plan. MP functions not only reflect and capture current capabilities, they define the MP Corps in the twenty-first century.
1-6. As the Army reshapes and focuses its resources on transformation, Force XXI, and
other redesign efforts, the MP Corps stands proud and ready to support this progress and
reiterate their commitment to assist, protect, and defend.
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1-7. The operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources
in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other, the enemy, or the situation (see
Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1. Operational Framework
The operational framework for Army forces (ARFOR) rests within the combatant commander's theater organization. Each combatant commander has an assigned geographical area of responsibility (AOR), also called a theater, within which he has the authority to plan and conduct operations. Within the theater, joint force commanders at all levels may establish subordinate operational areas such as areas of operation (AOs), joint operations areas (JOAs) and joint rear areas (JRAs). The JRAs facilitate the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. When warranted, combatant commanders may designate theaters of war, theaters of operations (TOs), combat zones (CZs), and communications zones (COMMZs).
1-8. A theater of war is that area of air, land, or water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war may contain more than one TO. It does
not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR. A TO is a subarea (defined by a geographic combatant commander) within a theater of war in which specific combat operations are conducted or supported.
1-9. A CZ is the area required by combat forces for conducting operations. It normally
extends forward from the land force's rear boundary. The COMMZ is the rear part of the
TO (behind but contiguous to the CZ) that contains the lines of communications (LOC) and
provides supply and evacuation support. Other agencies required for the immediate support
and maintenance of field forces may also be located in the COMMZ. The COMMZ spans
back to the continental US (CONUS) base, to a supporting combatant commander's AOR,
or both.
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1-10. An AO is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. An AO does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force command (JFC), but it should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their mission and protect their forces. Army commanders use control measures to describe AOs and to design them to fit the situation and take advantage of the joint force's capabilities. Commanders typically subdivide the assigned AO by assigning subordinate­unit areas. These subordinate-unit areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure 1­2).
Contiguous AOs Noncontiguous AOs
Adjacent subordinate unit AOs share Subordinate units receive distinct AOs. The
boundaries. In this case, the higher head-higher headquarters retains responsilility for
quarters allocates all of the assigned PCI the unassigned portion of the AO.
• to subordinate units.
Figure 1-2. Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs
When friendly forces are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When friendly forces are
noncontiguous, the concept of operations links the force's elements, but the AOs do not
share a boundary. The intervening area between noncontiguous AOs remains the
responsibility of the higher headquarters.

1 -11. Battlefield organization is the arrangement of forces according to purpose, time, and
space to accomplish a mission. Battlefield organization has both a purpose- and spatial­
based framework. The purpose-based framework centers on decisive, shaping, and
sustaining (DSS) operations. Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield organization by
providing the common focus for all actions. However, forces act in time and space to
accomplish a purpose. The spatial-based framework includes close, deep, and rear areas.
Despite the increasing nonlinear nature of operations, there may be situations where
commanders describe DSS operations in spatial terms. Typically, linear operations involve
conventional combat and concentrated maneuver forces. Ground forces share boundaries
and orient against a similarly organized enemy force. In such situations, commanders direct
and focus simultaneous DSS operations in deep, close, and rear areas; respectively (see FM

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1-12. MP battlefield organization supports every Army echelon, from the Army service component command (ASCC) and the theater support command (TSC) to the maneuver brigade. Regardless of the battlefield organization (purpose or spatial based), MP support to the Army commander is based on available resources and mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC).
1-13. MP support throughout the theater of war may include MP units in the JOA and in the TO. If the combatant commander designates a COMMZ and a CZ within his TO, MP support will come from the established MP modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) at the subordinate command echelon. MP support to the JOA is also provided based on METT-TC and available MP assets. Typical MP support may include an UR brigade liaison detachment (BLD), MP brigades and battalions, a division MP company, a military-working-dog (MWD) team, a L&O team, and a customs team. Figure 1-3 depicts a typical MP organization throughout the TO. In the COMMZ, Figure 1-3 depicts the different types of MP units that are assigned to echelons above corps (EAC) (the ASCC or the TSC). In the CZ, Figure 1-3 depicts the different types of MP units that are assigned to corps, division, and the separate brigades.
Figure 1-3. MP Structure in the TO SUPPORT IN THE COMMZ 1-14. MP support in the COMMZ is provided by an array of multifunctional MP units. The following MP units provide MP support to EAC:
¦ The MP brigade (I/R). The MP brigade (I/R) may augment the ASCC or the TSC
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during wartime. Its mission is to provide command, staff planning, and supervision of UR operations. This includes coordination with joint and host-nation (I-IN) agencies, civilian police authority, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and US federal agencies.
The MP brigade (CS). The MP brigade (CS) is assigned to the ASCC or the TSC during wartime (based on METT-TC). The MP brigade (CS) is capable of performing all five MP functions.

The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) group. The CID group is a stovepipe organization that reports directly to the Commander, US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). The CID group provides support to the ASCC and subordinate commands (TSC, corps, or division). See Chapter 9 for further discussion of CID support.

1-15. MP support to other EAC subordinate commands is performed only if MP resources are available. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of MP support to EAC.
1-16. MP support is provided in the CZ to each corps, division, and brigade (separate teams or initial/interim brigade combat teams [IBCTs]). An MP brigade (CS) is assigned to each corps, and the MP brigade commander is the corps's provost marshal (PM). A PM and his section, along with an organic division MP company, are assigned to each division. A PM cell and an MP platoon are organic to a separate brigade. A two-person PM cell is organic to the IBCT. The MP units assigned to corps, divisions, and separate brigades are capable of performing all five MP functions. They provide combat, CS, and combat-service-support (CSS) operations within their command's AO.
1-17. Most MP units supporting a TO and a JOA are capable of performing all five MP
functions. However, the functions must be prioritized based on METT-TC and the
availability of MP assets. Current MP structures are designed and tailored to better support
the level of command deployed. For example, at the division level, division MP companies
are organized as light, heavy, airborne, or air assault and are organic to their respective
divisions. The EAC and corps MP brigades and battalions are equally designed to command
and control a force mix of up to six battalions or companies. An MP escort-guard and guard
company are designed to transport, guard, and provide security to EPWs, civilian internees
(CIs), or dislocated civilians. The MP escort-guard company is assigned to the MP brigade
(I/R), and the MP guard company is assigned to the MP battalion (I/R).
* 1-18. MP units can also be tailored and augmented to accomplish multiple, diverse,or specific missions. Customs, L&O, and MWD teams are examples of MP capabilities and flexible responses to a combatant commander's operational requirements. (See Table 1-1 for
a more complete description of MP units. See FM 19-10 and Army Regulation (AR) 190-12 for further information.) The battlefield workload analysis (BWA) is a tool used to determine the number of MP units required to perform some of these multiple missions (see AppendixC).
* Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions
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Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continuc

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions Jcontinued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions(continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions_fcontinued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

Table 1-1. Unit Descriptions (continued)

1-19. In today's environment, the Army will rarely operate or fight alone. The high
probability that the Army will operate in concert with its sister services, in an alliance with
the forces of foreign nations, or in support of United Nations (UN) operations (when it is
committed) is fully reflected in joint doctrine. In such operations, protecting LOC, key
facilities, and command and control (C 2) centers will be a shared responsibility. Under this
framework, MP units can expect to share the AO with joint, combined, multinational, or
interagency resources. MP forces must be prepared to conduct a number of full-spectrum
operations with a variety of government and nongovernmental agencies, other services,
allied nations, and international agencies.
1-20. Corps and division commanders and staffs must plan (in advance) the transition from
a single-service headquarters with joint representation to a joint headquarters capable of
functioning as a joint task force (JTF) headquarters. When tasked to form a JTF
headquarters, the corps or division must ensure that all of the staff sections and agencies
have joint representation (see FMs 100-15 and 71-100). To this end, MP planners must
ensure that the JTF is augmented with the appropriate MP forces and with the appropriate
echeloned C 2
1-21. Regardless of the force mix, the MP provide the force with unparalleled,
multifunctional capabilities. Among these capabilities is the MP's ability to generate
firepower or to handle populations such as EPWs/CIs, dislocated civilians, and refugees.
Additionally, MP expertise in investigations and law enforcement enhances the capabilities
of other joint, multinational, and interagency police and security forces.
1-22. MP security plans must reflect the joint synergy derived from combining the multiple and diverse capabilities of all participants. To capitalize upon that synergy, MP leaders must
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keep an open line of communication and coordination to offset the challenges presented by interoperability. Some of these interoperability challenges include-
Differing political objectives.

Differing capabilities.

Cultural/language differences.

Legal and policy constraints.

Media impacts.

Compromise of sensitive processes, procedures, and equipment.

• C 2
¦ Communications (digital- and analog-equipment differences).
1-23. MP plans must also accommodate differences in planning capabilities, as well as
differences in doctrine, training, and equipment. The intent is to match security missions
with force capabilities. MP leaders must understand that operations will often involve
multinational teams. While US forces routinely task-organize, this may be more difficult to
accomplish with some multinational security forces. This kind of orchestration requires
employing standardized procedures, communications, equipment, and liaison within the
constraints of operations security (OPSEC).
1 24. Coordination is the key to mission accomplishment in multinational and interagency
operations. A military coordination center or a civil-military operations center (CMOC) may meet this coordination requirement. The CMOC provides access for nonmilitary agencies desiring military (to include MP/CID) assistance and coordination. These nonmilitary agencies may include-
¦ Government organizations (GOs).
• NGOs.
International organizations (I0s).

International humanitarian organizations (IHOs).

• HN authorities and agencies.
1-25. The introduction of US Army MP in any joint, multinational, or interagency operation
is based on METT-TC and the capabilities they bring to the operation. Effective integration
of MP forces with other security forces reduces redundant functions, clarifies
responsibilities, and conserves resources.
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Chapter 2
Battle Command
Command is the authority a commander in military service laufully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. Leaders possessing command authority strive to use it with firmness, care, and skill.
FM 101-5-1
Battle command is the exercise of command in an operation against a hostile, thinking
opponent. Battle command includes visualizing the current state and the desired end state,
then formulating concepts of operations to get from one state to the other at the least cost. In
addition to visualizing and formulating concepts, battle command encompasses assigning
missions; prioritizing and allocating resources; selecting the critical time and place to act;
and knowing how and when to make adjustments in the fight. Battle command enables MP
commanders to lead, prioritize, and allocate assets required in support of the Army
commander. MP commanders must observe, orient, decide, and act on their decisions
quickly. Information is the key element in the battle-command process; therefore, the
commander must have accurate and timely information upon which to base his decisions.
2-1. The battle command of MP units is typically decentralized due to the nature of their CS functions, METT-TC, and the needs of the Army commander. This places the burden of sound, timely decision making to the lowest levels. MP leaders must develop a keen sense of situational awareness and visualization, and they must constantly track the actions of supported units.

2-2. The ability to visualize the battlefield is a critical element of battle command. Battlefield visualization is an essential leadership attribute and is critical to accomplishing the mission. It is learned and attained through training, practice, experience, technical and tactical knowledge, and available battle-command technologies. It results when the MP commander understands the higher commander's intent, his assigned mission, the enemy, and the friendly force's capabilities and limitations. See Appendix D for further information on command technologies.
2-3. Battlefield visualization includes the MP commander's view of what his forces will do
and the resources needed to do the mission. He envisions a sequence of actions that will
cause his MP forces to perform at the desired end state. Ultimately, the MP commander's
battlefield vision evolves into his intent and helps him develop his concept of operations.
2-4. The commander's intent is a key part of Army orders. It is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired end state. It provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating key 12/28/2004
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tasks. These tasks, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of operations no longer applies. MP leaders at all echelons must ensure that the mission and the commander's intent are understood two echelons down (see FM 101-5).

2-5. The commander's intent does not include the method by which the MP units will
accomplish the mission. This method is called the commander's concept of operations. It must-
¦ Convey the commander's vision of how to accomplish the mission in a manner that allows his subordinates maximum initiative.
• Build around intelligence gathering and the precise employment of MP resources.
¦ Provide the basis for task organization, scheme of maneuver, terrain organization, tasks to subordinates, and synchronization.
2-6. MP units are assigned to, attached to, or placed under the operational control (OPCON) of MP or other units they support. OPCON is the authority to perform command functions over subordinate forces. This includes organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designing objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission. MP C 2 relationships may be changed briefly to provide better support for a specific operation or to meet the needs of the supported commander. MP units may be placed under the OPCON of another unit commander for short-term operations. The MP unit remains in this relationship only as long as it is needed for that operation.
MP support to the Bosnian municipal elections consisted of one division and two corps MP companies. These MP assets, attached to Task Force (TF) Eagle, were task-organized from different sources. The division MP company and the PM cell were organic to TF Eagles mechanized infantry division headquarters, but the two corps MP units were from US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) MP battalions in CONUS.

2-7. MP units on the battlefield provide two types of support—general support (GS) and direct support (DS). Corps and EAC MP units provide GS to their respective corps/EAC subordinate commands. Light, airborne, and air-assault MP companies provide GS to their respective divisions. Heavy-division MP companies provide GS to the division rear and DS to the division's subordinate brigades.

2-8. The PM for each level of command is that command's advisor on MP combat, CS, and CSS operations. The PM-
¦ Advises the commander and staff about MP abilities/capabilities.
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Supervises the preparation of plans and dictates policies.

Coordinates MP operations.

Assists and supervises the interaction of supporting and supported units.

Reviews current MP operations.

• Coordinates with allied forces and FIN military and civil police.
¦ Ensures that MP plans and operations supporting the commander's tactical plan are carried out.
• Recommends when and where to concentrate the command's MP assets.
¦ Supervises or monitors MP support in the command's AO.
2-9. The PM works daily with the commander and staff officers who employ MP resources and whose AORs influence MP support. The PM works closely with the coordinating staff at the appropriate command level to coordinate MP support. He ensures that MP planning is practical and flexible, that plans are coordinated with staff sections and subordinate commands, and that plans reflect manpower and resources needed by MP. (This includes
the need for C 2 fire support, equipment, and supplies. It also includes construction,
communication, transportation, and aviation support.) As new information is received, the PM reviews, updates, and modifies the plans. He ensures that the echelon commander gets the necessary MP support.
2-10. In the absence of specific directions or orders, the PM plans the use of MP assets. He evaluates the current operations and projects the future courses of action (COAs). He bases his plans on assumptions consistent with the commander's intent and a thorough knowledge of the situation and mission. The PM considers-

Current estimates developed by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the police information assessment process (PIAP).

The environment within the AO. This includes the climate, the terrain, and obstacles. It also includes the legal authority and status of the force; the width, depth, size, and location of built-up areas; and the attitudes and abilities of the local populace.

The types of units operating in the area (to include joint, combined, multinational, and interagency units) and the missions and capabilities of these units. This knowledge is imperative to understand their capability to counter threats in their area.

The specific missions of MP units in the area and the impact that rear-area security operations will have on the ability of these units to perform other functions.

Personnel, vehicles, and equipment in the MP units.

2-11. Coordination and communication between the PM and Army commanders is
essential. Such actions ensure timely and efficient MP support to all levels of command
during any operation. The informal, technical chain of coordination is an open line of
communication between PMs at different echelons. The informal chain of coordination
fosters cooperation and help among the MP elements at each echelon. For instance, when
the division PM needs more assets to accomplish added missions, he initiates coordination
with the corps PM. If the corps PM can provide support, the division PM formalizes his
request for assistance through the division Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and
Plans) (G3).
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Chapter 3
The Threat
In the 40-odd years of the Cold War, in many locations around the world, the Army performed a deterrent role as part of the containment strategy. In other places, at other times, the Army fulfilled the Nation's expectation in operations too small to be called "wars," although no less dangerous. To the soldier on the ground, Operations Urgent Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in Panama were indistinguishable from combat operations of their forefathers. Operations Provide Comfort in Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia, although peace operations, also proved to be dangerous.
The end of the Cold War has reduced, but not eliminated, the most immediate threat to the
security of the US and other western nations. However, the absence of a dominant,
identifiable threat has produced a far more complex and confusing strategic environment
than the one that was present during the Cold War. Forward-deployed and CONUS-based
ARFOR and civilians are and will continue to be engaged in a range of military actions.
These actions stem from deterring conflicts to conducting peacetime engagement operations
to providing support to civil agencies at home and abroad.
3-1. During the past decade, the US has deployed forces in multiple operations that have included crisis response in combat situations as well as participation in noncombat activities. The Army's presence in South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and its deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are clear indicators that the military must be prepared to face not only the traditional threat, but also a nontraditional, nonecheloned enemy. To support Army commanders successfully, MP leaders must understand the nature and complexity of these threats and how they can potentially affect the desired strategic, operational, and tactical end states.
3-2. The rear area for any particular command is the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions. Operations in the rear area
assure freedom of action and continuity of operations, sustainment, and C 22 Sustainment
operations are those that enable shaping and decisive operations by assuring freedom of action and continuity of operations, CSS, and C 2 (see FM 3-0). Sustainment operations include the following elements:

Rear-area and base security.

Movement control.

Terrain management.

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3-3. During the Cold War, the danger to rear areas included forces that would be deployed in support of major soviet-style operations. The adversaries using the soviet model could be expected to engage in intense combat activity in their enemy's rear area. Their forces were prepared to penetrate into the enemy's rear and to attack and destroy its reserve forces and rear-area installations. To protect the rear areas, the MP were among the first mobile fighting forces available to the battlefield commander and thus, a source of combat power. Today, the Army commander uses the MP's flexibility and their modular-force training, adaptability, and mobility to serve as a combat multiplier throughout his entire AO. During sustainment operations, the MP perform all functions to ensure freedom of maneuver in support of the overall operational effort.
3-4. Failure to protect our forces during sustainment operations normally results in failure of the entire operation. Sustainment operations determine how fast ARFOR reconstitute and how far they can exploit success. The likelihood of MP units encountering the enemy and engaging in direct combat (not only in the rear area, but also during sustainment operations) cannot be underestimated.
3-5. Threats to rear-area and sustainment operations exist throughout the full spectrum of military operations. These threats may be related or independently engaged, but their effects are frequently cumulative. Threats to rear-area and sustainment operations are usually theater-dependent and are not limited to those outlined in this manual. Joint Publication (JP) 3-10 further discusses the threat in the rear area. Although JP 3-10 defines the threat in the context of a JRA, MP leaders can expect the same level of activity anywhere that US forces are deployed.

3-6. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations consist of essential and interrelated processes in the AO that transform arriving personnel and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. During RSOI operations, the threat encountered will depend mostly on the type of entry, the nature of the operation, and the enemy. During major contingencies, forces deploy from power-projection platforms within the US or forward bases. The PM must plan MP support during the initial stages of the deployment to ensure the protection of follow-on forces and the detection of potential threats (see FM 100-17-3).
3-7. MP support to RSOI operations includes, but is not limited to-
Conducting AS operations to counter or prevent enemy actions against marshalling and staging areas.

Conducting convoy, airport, and rail security operations.

Conducting populace- and resource-control operations.

Conducting other physical-security and force-protection measures.

Conducting other MP functions (as determined by the PM).


3-8. The threat is divided into three levels. These levels provide a general description and categorization of threat activities, identify the defense requirements to counter them, and 12/28/2004
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establish a common reference for planning guidelines. MP leaders must understand that this does not imply that threat activities will occur in a specific sequence or that there is a necessary interrelationship between each level.
Level I
3-9. Level I threats include the following types of individuals or activities:
¦ Enemy-controlled agents. Enemy-controlled agents are a potential threat throughout the rear area. Their primary missions include espionage, sabotage, subversion, and criminal activities. Their activities span the range of military operations and may increase during both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). These activities may include assassinating or kidnapping key military or civilian personnel or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targets in the rear area.
• Enemy sympathizers. Civilians sympathetic to the enemy may become significant threats to US and multinational operations. They may be the most difficult to neutralize because they are normally not part of an established enemy-agent network, and their actions will be random and unpredictable. During war and MOOTW, indigenous groups sympathetic to the enemy or those simply opposed to the US can be expected to provide assistance, information, and shelter to guerrilla and enemy unconventional or special-purpose forces operating in the rear area.
Terrorism. Terrorists are among the most difficult threats to neutralize and destroy. Their actions span the full spectrum of military operations.

Civil disturbances. Civil disturbances, such as demonstrations and riots, may pose a direct or indirect threat to military operations. Although this threat may not be of great impact during war, it may significantly change and affect MOOTW.

Level II
3-10. Level II threats include the following types of forces:
Guerilla forces. Irregular and predominantly indigenous forces conducting guerrilla warfare can pose a serious threat to military forces and civilians. They can cause significant disruptions to the orderly conduct of the local government and services.

Unconventional forces. Special-operations forces (SOF) are highly trained in unconventional-warfare techniques. They are normally inserted surreptitiously into the rear area before the onset of an armed conflict. They establish and activate espionage networks, collect intelligence, carry out specific sabotage missions, develop target lists, and conduct damage assessments of targets struck.

Small tactical units. Specially organized reconnaissance elements are capable of conducting raids and ambushes in addition to their primary reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions. Small (size or capability), bypassed conventional units, as well as other potential threat forces, are also capable of conducting raids and ambushes to disrupt operations.

Level III
3-11. Level III threats are made up of conventional forces. Potential threat forces are
capable of projecting combat power rapidly by land, air, or sea deep into the rear area.
Specific examples include airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations; large, combined-
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arms, ground-forces operations; and bypassed units and infiltration operations involving large numbers of individuals or small groups infiltrated into the rear area, regrouped at predetermined times and locations, and committed against priority targets. Level III forces may use a combination of the following tactics as a precursor to a full-scale offensive operation:
Air or missile attack. Threat forces may be capable of launching an air or missile attack throughout the rear area. It is often difficult to distinguish quickly between a limited or full-scale attack before impact; therefore, protective measures will normally be based on the maximum threat capability.

Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack. Commanders must be aware that NBC munitions may be used in conjunction with air, missile, or other conventional­force attacks. The NBC weapons could also be used at Level I or II by terrorists or unconventional forces in order to accomplish their political or military objectives.

3-12. Table 3-1 lists the threat levels and their likely appropriate responses. The threat levels listed are based on the type of threat. The table should not be construed as restricting
the response options to any particular threat.
Table 3-1. Threat Levels
Threat Level Example Response
I Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, and terrorists Unit, base, and base-cluster self­
defense measures
II Small tactical units, unconventional-warfare forces, Self-defense measures and
guerrillas, and bypassed enemy forces response forces with supporting
III Large tactical-force operations (including airborne, Timely commitment of a TCF
heliborne, amphibious, infiltration, and bypassed enemy

3-13. The threat will attempt to perform the following operations against targets in the rear area:
Detect and identify targets.

Destroy or neutralize operational weapons-system capabilities.

Delay or disrupt the timely movement of forces and supplies.

Weaken the friendly force's C 2 network.

Disrupt support to combat forces.

Set the stage for future enemy operations.

Create panic and confusion throughout the rear area.

3-14. Typical examples of enemy priority targets include the following:
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NBC-weapons storage sites and delivery systems.

Key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) facilities.

Air-defense artillery (ADA) sites.

• Airfields and air bases.
Port facilities.

Main supply routes (MSRs) and MSR checkpoints.

Key LOC.

Reserve assembly areas (AAs).

¦ Troop barracks.
• Critical civilian and logistics facilities.

3-15. The fact that the Cold War has ended does not imply that our traditional threat has ended. North Korea and Iraq are constant reminders of this fact. For the near future, Army commanders will fight units with Cold-War-era equipment and tactics. The Army trains and is prepared to fight an enemy capable of interfering with our freedom of maneuver throughout the battlefield. On an extended battlefield with asymmetric threats, the danger to
high-value assets (HVAs) (including CSS, C 2 communication nodes, and MSRs) only
increases. The idea that the danger to the rear area decreases as you travel farther away from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is not true. Threat intensity does not depend on geographical location; it depends on what operations the enemy believes must be initiated (and to what degree) to achieve its objective in the rear area. Military commanders depend on the MP to delay and defeat threats in their AO with a mobile reaction force.
3-16. The nature of the COMMZ will encourage Level I and II threats to concentrate along
the LOC and other areas of military significance. MP units will encounter an enemy that is
capable of disrupting operations throughout the COMMZ while employing terrorist
activities, enemy-controlled agent activities, enemy sympathizers, and saboteurs. If the
enemy is Level III capable, MP leaders must expect infiltrations and air, missile, or NBC
attacks as a precursor to a major Level III operation.
3-17. The activities in Levels I and II will be similar in composition and density as in the
COMMZ, but they will target key corps units, key facilities, and corps sustainment
capabilities. The threat activities, especially at smaller unit levels, may even precede
hostilities. MP leaders must be alert and prepared to encounter unconventional forces
conducting diversionary or sabotage operations and small combat units conducting raids,
ambushes, or reconnaissance operations or collecting special warfare intelligence. With the
fast tempo of offensive operations, MP leaders must also be alert and prepared to encounter
bypassed forces that can disrupt operations in the corps rear area.
3-18. The division rear area (DRA) contains many types of CS and CSS units and conducts
many complex operations. As in the COMMZ and the corps rear area, the full spectrum of
Level I, II, and III activities may occur in the DRA. The main target will be the division's 12/28/2004
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HVA (including key C 2 facilities; airfields; artillery, aviation, and air-defense assets; LOC; and essential CSS units). The threat may conduct diversionary attacks, sabotages, raids, ambushes, and reconnaissance operations to affect the commander's freedom of maneuver and the continuity of operations. Unlike corps MP, the likelihood of division MP encountering bypassed enemy forces is expected. Failure to delay or defeat these forces will impact division operations.
3-19. As US forces are deployed throughout the world, they will have to face nontraditional, asymmetric threats (other than those listed in Table 3-1, page 3-5) that may be geographically specific. As part of situational awareness, and in coordination with military intelligence (MI) and CID personnel, MP leaders must evaluate and assess the impact of these threats in their AO. A TO is vulnerable to any or a combination of the following threats:
National or international organized crime.

Narcotics traffickers.

Narcotics terrorists.

Extremist groups.

Paramilitary groups.

Ethnic or religious disputes.

Trade in illegal weapons or strategic materials.

3-20. MP leaders must be aware that other threats exist and that they have the same potential as the Level I and II threats to disrupt operations in rear-area or sustainment operations. In some instances, the above threats' capabilities or the massing of personnel may have the same potential threat as a Level III threat.
3-21. The disruption of rear-area and sustainment operations directly affects military efforts. Three types of forces may be used to counter the threat in these areas—a base/base-cluster self-defense force, a response force, or a tactical combat force (TCF). ,
3-22. A base cluster is established when the appropriate echelon rear-operations cell or
command post (CP) places geographically contiguous or noncontiguous bases under the
control of a headquarters. The base cluster becomes the next higher tactical C 2
headquarters of those bases. The rear-operations cell or the rear CP may also establish a
base cluster for a corps support group (CSG), an area support group (ASG), or other CSS
units operating in the corps or division rear areas.
3-23. US ARFOR have the inherent responsibility to contribute as many forces as possible
for base defense and local security for themselves and their facilities, installations, and
activities. Each base and base-cluster commander must develop a defense plan to detect,
defeat, and minimize the effects of Level I and limited Level II threat attacks on his base or
base cluster (including NBC attacks). To maximize the unit's mission accomplishment,
defense plans must be flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the
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probability of threat activity. Defense plans are given to MP units operating near the base or base cluster. The base commander most often employs a series of defense measures providing internal and perimeter security. His internal reaction forces use organic weapons to neutralize and defeat most low-level threat activity. Although not fully equipped to engage major conventional or unconventional enemy forces that may confront him, a base commander must deploy his personnel to defend themselves until MP, HN, local police, or combat forces (if available) can respond.
3-24. A response force is summoned when the base or base cluster is faced with threat forces that are beyond their self-defense capability. If the MP are the designated response force, they must-
¦ Coordinate with the supported bases or base-cluster commanders to conduct a joint IPB.

Review base and base-cluster self-defense plans.

Exchange signal-operating-instructions (SOI) information.

Identify MP contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.

Integrate ADA, engineer, chemical, field-artillery (FA), Army-aviation, and close-air­support (CAS) fire support into their plans (if available).

3-25. MP units help the base or base cluster return to its primary mission by defeating Level
II threats. MP units closely watch likely avenues of enemy approach, possible landing zones (LZs), drop zones (DZs), C 2 facilities, and other key installations. They accomplish this through the MMS, AS, and PIO functions.
3-26. If MP units are not the designated response force, they may become the initial'
response force for units within their AO. When this occurs, they block, delay or, if possible, destroy enemy elements within their capability. If the attack is by a larger or more capable force, they will maintain contact and continue to develop the situation or delay until the appropriate response force appears or the battlefield commander commits the TCF.
3-27. When the MP response force encounters or engages threats beyond its ability to defeat, it immediately notifies the higher headquarters. The battlefield commander will then evaluate the situation and commit the TCF to defeat the Level III threat. The TCF is normally a combined-arms organization tailored by the corps or division G3, based on METT-TC. The TCF normally receives fire, aviation, or other support needed to fight and defeat the threat. Once the TCF is identified and before it is committed to battle, it will conduct direct coordination with the MP or other response forces regarding the exchange of reconnaissance information, battle-handoff procedures, and contingency plans for TCF operations. Once the TCF is committed, the MP unit performing as the response force becomes OPCON to the TCF commander.
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aviation assets, or CAS. The specific type of augmentation is METT-TC dependent. Additionally, the MP C 2 headquarters must receive the respective liaison officers to ensure that augmentation forces are synchronized and employed according to their capabilities. The MP commander's situational awareness and battlefield visualization are key elements to TCF operations. Once designated as the TCF, the MP unit commander establishes liaison with the appropriate rear CP to obtain-

The current rear-area IPB.

The friendly unit disposition.

Defense plans.

Priorities for protection.

The fire-support plan.

3-29. Based on the above information, the MP commander conducts his own IPB and develops a concept of operations. He then forwards it to the appropriate higher echelon for coordination and approval.
3-30. The MP's ability to employ organic MP assets as part of the TCF is limited by the following factors:
MP availability. Normally, all MP assets available are committed at all times. The specific function and scope that MP units perform during the operation are determined by the Army commander's needs, the intensity of the conflict, and the availability of MP resources. The commander, with advice from the MP leader, must decide which MP operations must be scaled back, delayed, or shifted before the MP unit can be designated as part of the TCF.

MP dispersion. MP units are normally displaced over a large geographical area. Technological capabilities and mobility allow them to operate over great distances. In today's battlefield, a typical MP company employment covers between 1,000 and 1,200 square kilometers and performs numerous missions in support of all five functions. The distance between elements, the reprioritization and movement of other MP units, the difficult terrain, poor roads, and bad weather may slow down the MP's commitment as a TCF.

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Chapter 4
Military Police Functions
Military police support the Army commander's mission to win the battle. They help the commander shape the battlefield so that he can conduct decisive operations to destroy enemy forces, large or small, wherever and whenever the Army is sent to war.
MAJ(P) Anthony Cruz
The MP Corps supports shaping and sustainment operations while performing its five basic functions as a flexible, economy-of-force organization. Through these functions, MP units are able to provide the commander with an array of CS operations across the full spectrum of military operations (see Table 4-
Table 4-1. MP Functions
Support to river- Recon operations
crossing and
Subtasks breaching operations and passage of lines Straggler and dislocated-civilian control Route R&S MSR regulation enforcement ADC Base/air-base defense Response-force/TCF operations Critical site, asset, and HRP security Force protection/physical security IPB support PIAP Active and passive roles Information collection and dissemination Joint, interagency, and multinational coordination Law enforcement Criminal investigations US Customs operations Related L&O training handling EPW/CI US military prisoner handling Populace and resource control Dislocated civilians

NOTE: Subtasks not all-inclusive.

4-1. MP assets are limited. Specific functions are performed at any given time and are determined by the supported commander's need, the intensity of the conflict, and the availability of MP resources. The supported commander, through the command's PM, sets the priorities for MP operations.
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be provided. To meet the priorities set by the commander's tactical plan, the PM recommends the allocation and employment of MP assets for MP combat, CS, and CSS operations.

4-3. The MMS function involves numerous measures and actions necessary to support the commander's freedom of movement in his AOR. The MP expedite the forward and lateral movement of combat resources and ensure that commanders get forces, supplies, and equipment when and where they are needed. This is particularly important in the modem battlefield where there is a greater geographical dispersal of forces and lengthened LOC.
4-4. The MP maintain the security and viability of the strategic and tactical LOC to ensure that the commander can deploy and employ his forces. The MP support the commander and help expedite military traffic by operating traffic-control posts (TCPs), defilades, or mobile patrols; erecting route signs on MSRs or alternate supply routes (ASRs); or conducting a reconnaissance for bypassed or additional routes. The MP move all units quickly and smoothly with the least amount of interference possible.
4-5. As part of the MMS function, the MP support river-crossing operations, breaching operations, and a passage of lines. They also provide straggler control, dislocated-civilian control, route reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), and MSR regulation enforcement.
4-6. US forces conduct river-crossing operations to move a large force across a river obstacle with a minimum loss of momentum. The MP play a vital role by assisting the force commander in crossing the river as quickly and efficiently as possible. The crossing is usually planned and conducted by the headquarters directing the crossing. As such, a division crossing operation is conducted by a corps. Whether a brigade or division is crossing, the division MP company may also cross to provide uninterrupted support to the division. In these instances, there is a total reliance on the corps MP to support the crossing. The same is true for breaching operations and a passage of lines.
4-7. MP support for river-crossing operations reduces the crossing time and promotes the efficient movement of vehicles. It reduces congestion, speeds the crossing, and enables the maneuver commander to continue his momentum toward his primary objective. The MP establishes staging and holding areas and TCPs to control movement to and from these areas (according to the traffic-control plan). The MP may be called on to provide security for crossing forces at the crossing sites. In most cases, the MP TCPs and engineer regulation
points (ERPs) are located on both sides of the river to improve communications and coordination between the units.
4-8. MP employment for river crossing is influenced by METT-TC. The number and
placement of MP assets supporting a river-crossing operation varies with the size of the
crossing force, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), and the degree of
enemy resistance expected or encountered.
4-9. The MP operating inside the crossing areas are OPCON to the crossing-area commander for the duration of the operation. The MP operating outside of the crossing area
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are under the command of their appropriate echelon commander.
4-10. The main thrust of MP support to river-crossing operations is within the immediate river-crossing site. The MP direct units to their proper locations (such as holding areas and staging areas) and ensure that units move through the area within the time listed on the movement schedule. This is a highly critical aspect of river crossing because the number of crossing sites is limited. MP assets are placed where they can stress MMS operations on MSRs leading into the crossing area.
4-11. The MP also provide AS to allow crossing forces to cross the river without losing momentum or forces. On both near and far sides, the MP are used to recon the crossing unit's flanks and rear to enhance security (see FM 19-4).
4-12. Breaching operations are conducted to allow forces to maneuver through obstacles. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the farside of an obstacle that may be covered by fire. It is perhaps the most difficult combat task a force can encounter. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle, and they end when the battle handover has occurred between the follow-on forces and a unit conducting the breaching operation (see FM 90-13-1).
4-13. The MP support breaching operations in numerous ways. MP assets are employed based on METT-TC, the available resources, and the commander's priorities. As a minimum, MP support may include, but is not limited to-
Establishing TCPs along routes leading to or departing from the breaching site.

Establishing holding areas.

Establishing TCPs at the breaching site.

Assisting engineers with temporary route signs.

Establishing straggler-control operations.

Conducting AS operations.

4-14. The most critical MP support is provided at the breaching site. The MP provide the commander with a means to control traffic flow to appropriate lanes. When multiple lanes branch off of a single far-recognition marker, the MP assist in directing the formation through various lanes. They also assist in modifying the traffic flow when lanes have been closed for maintenance or expansion. The MP conduct close coordination with the crossing-force commander and the TF commander executing the breaching operation. The MP enable the commander to make last-minute changes in traffic flow, thereby giving him increased flexibility to react to the enemy situation.
4-15. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward
through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact
with the enemy. The passage of lines is a high-risk military operation that requires close
coordination between the passing unit, the stationary unit, and the MP providing the
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4-16. The MP help reduce confusion and congestion during a passage of lines. They provide security in areas surrounding passage points and passage lanes to ensure that the passing unit has priority for using routes to and through the areas. The headquarters directing the operations sets the route's priority. The MP can support a forward, rearward, or lateral passage of lines. Before the actual operation, the MP in the AO conduct an area or zone reconnaissance to become familiar with the routes to, through, and beyond the area of
passage. This enables the MP to extend the commander's C 2 by providing directions at passage points and by guiding the units through the passing lanes. Maintaining unit integrity and reducing incidents of stragglers is vital to maintaining the passing unit's momentum in a forward passage of lines. The MP perform aggressive straggler- and dislocated-civilian­control operations to prevent possible infiltration of the enemy.
4-17. A passage of lines is usually planned and coordinated by the headquarters directing the passage. A division's passage of lines is planned and coordinated by the corps headquarters. The detailed plans are made and coordinated between the divisions involved. Close coordination between the division and corps PMs is essential. An MP unit may be the unit involved in passing through the lines of another unit. When conducting a delay of a Level II threat, the MP are likely to conduct a passage of lines with the TCF. To avoid fratricide, close coordination between the MP response-force commander and the TCF is imperative (see FM 19-4).
4-18. Mobile patrols, TCPs, and checkpoint teams return stragglers to military control as part of their operations. Most stragglers are simply persons who become separated from their command by events in the CZ or while moving through the COMMZ. If a straggler is ill, wounded, or in shock, an MP must give him first aid and, if needed, call for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). If a straggler is uninjured, an MP directs him to his parent unit or to a replacement unit (as command policies dictate). The MP ensure that stragglers attempting to avoid return to their units are escorted back to their command (as a minimum).
419. The MP set up special posts for straggler control following NBC attacks or major
enemy breakthroughs that result in large numbers of lost, dazed, and confused military personnel. Mobile MP teams operate between posts, and they also direct or collect stragglers. Straggler collection points may be needed if many stragglers are present in a combat theater. If allied forces are present in the theater, each nation establishes a collection point for its own personnel. MP teams are aware of each allied location and are prepared to assist allied soldiers in returning to their respective command. The MP use available transportation assets to transfer stragglers from TCPs and checkpoints to a straggler collection point. At the collection point, they are screened and sorted for removal to a medical facility or returned to their units to reconstitute the tactical commander's combat force.
420. The MP report information about stragglers with whom they come in contact. This
information is compiled by the MP headquarters and forwarded through appropriate
channels to the higher command. Information given by stragglers that is of immediate
tactical value is reported without delay.
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4-21. The MP expediting traffic on MSRs may encounter dislocated civilians that could hinder military traffic. The MP assist and divert dislocated civilians from MSRs and other areas to I/R facilities. They may also deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions may be a threat to themselves or to the combat operation. The HN government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of dislocated civilians out of an AO. If needed, the MP assist the civil-affairs unit and the HN in redirecting dislocated civilians to alternate routes established by the HN government.
4-22. The US forces do not assume control of dislocated civilians unless requested to do so by the HN or unless operating in an environment with a hostile government. When the senior US commander assumes responsibility, the MP coordinate with civil affairs to set up TCPs at critical points along the route to direct dislocated civilians to secondary roadways and areas not used by military forces. As required, MWD teams may be used as a show of force or as a deterrent to assist with uncooperative personnel.
4-23. The MP conduct hasty and deliberate route reconnaissances to obtain information on a route and nearby terrain from which the enemy can influence troop movement. A route reconnaissance focuses on continually monitoring the condition of MSRs, ASRs, and other areas. MP patrols look for restricting terrain, effects of weather on the route, damage to the route, NBC contamination, and enemy presence or absence. When enemy activity is spotted, the MP report it, maintain surveillance, and develop the situation. To gather information for proposed traffic plans, they look at the type and number of available routes; and they check load classifications, route widths, obstructions, and restrictions.
4-24. The MP undertake MSR regulation enforcement to keep the routes free for DSS operations. MP units support the command's MSR regulation measures as stated in the traffic-regulation plan (TRP). The TRP contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network. It assigns military route numbers and names, the direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned MP TCPs. Most importantly to the MP, it gives the route's control classification. The MP ensure that classified routes are used only by authorized traffic. Vehicles traveling on roads too narrow for their passage or on
roads unable to support their weight can obstruct the route.
4-25. To expedite traffic on MSRs, the MP operate special circulation control measures such as-

Temporary route signing.

Static posts such as TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, and defilades at critical points.

¦ Mobile teams patrolling between static posts and monitoring traffic and road conditions.
4-26. They also gather information on friendly and enemy activities and help stranded
vehicles and crews. The MP also place temporary route signs to warn of hazards or to guide
drivers unfamiliar with the route. Using these measures, the MP exercise jurisdiction over
the road network in the AO and coordinate with the HN (whenever possible) to expedite
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movement on MSRs.
4-27. The MP perform the AS function to protect the force and to enhance the freedom of units to conduct their assigned missions. The MP who provide AS play a key role in supporting forces in rear-area and sustainment operations. The MP are a response force that delays and defeats enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. The MP's mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. The MP's organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases, base clusters, and moving units of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, the MP are capable of engaging in decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of the TCF.
4-28. Throughout all aspects of the AS function, the MP perform counteractions to protect
the force and to prevent or defeat a Level II threat operating within the MP's AO. MP
countermeasures may include implementing vulnerability assessments, developing
procedures to detect terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and
conducting offensive operations to destroy the enemy. The MP use checkpoints and
roadblocks to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, and materiel and to prevent
illegal actions that may aid the enemy. The use of these control measures serves as a
deterrence to terrorist activities, saboteurs, and other threats. However, at the same time,
checkpoints and roadblocks expose the MP to these potential threats. To counter this fact,
the MP may upgrade or harden vehicles and defensive positions.
4-29. The MP provide combat power to protect the C 2 headquarters, equipment, and
services essential for mission success. The MP provide the battlefield commander with a
light, mobile fighting force that can move, shoot, and communicate against any threat.
Major subtasks associated with the AS function include reconnaissance operations; area
damage control (ADC); base/air-base defense; response-force operations; and critical site,
asset, and high-risk personnel (HRP) security.
4-30. As part of their AS mission, the MP serve as the eyes and ears of the battlefield commander by seeking out the enemy and reporting information obtained by recon patrols. The MP conduct area and zone reconnaissances, screening, surveillance, and countersurveillance to gain information to help guard against unexpected enemy attacks in the AO. The MP monitor likely avenues of approach and potential LZs and DZs. They become familiar with towns and other populated areas, ridgelines, woods, and other terrain features from which the enemy can influence movements along road networks. The MP pay close attention to areas near facilities designated critical by the commander. These areas include key MSR bridges and tunnels, depots, terminals, logistics-support bases,
ammunition supply points (ASPs), communications centers/nodes, and C 2 headquarters. The MWD teams provide explosive detection and personnel detection/tracking capabilities that enhance reconnaissance operations (especially in urban terrain).
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4-31. MP units take measures to support ADC before, during, and after hostile actions or natural and man-made disasters. The ADC actions integrate CS and CSS functions for many units. Engineers, medical personnel, and Army aviators work closely to ensure quick relief operations. The MP provide MSR regulation enforcement, refugee control, and some local security when required. As with reconnaissance operations, the MP may use MWD explosive-and personnel-detection capabilities to augment all MP missions in rear-area and sustainment operations.
4-32. The MP are the base and base-cluster commanders' links for detection, early warning, and employment against enemy attacks. The information gathered is dispersed throughout the rear area to help apprise the commander of enemy activities near bases. Base defense is the cornerstone of rear-area security. When the threat exceeds the base/base-cluster capability, the base/base-cluster commander requests MP assistance through the appropriate
C 2 element.
4-33. Air-base defense requires special MP coordination with the US Air Force (USAF). The MP treat air bases like any other base or base cluster. A USAF air base may house the base-cluster commander, or it may be a cluster by itself The MP are responsible for the air base's external defense. Its internal defense is primarily the responsibility of the Air Force's security forces. The security force provides in-depth defense for weapons, weapons systems, command centers, personnel, and other priority resources established by the base commander.
4-34. The security force is trained and equipped to detect, delay, and deny Level I and II threats. If a Level III threat is present, the security force is tasked with delaying actions; however, the HN, a sister service, or other support must be employed to defeat this threat. If the security force requires assistance to defeat a Level II threat, it may rely on MP response forces or another response force to assist in the defense. If available, the MP response force will react to the air-base defense, just as it would for any other base or base cluster within the MP's AO. However, the key to successful MP employment depends on the critical exchange of information before and during the MP employment. Good communications, an understanding of the defense plan, and liaison operations are vital in preventing responding forces from entering a situation that could result in fratricide.
4-35. The MP are the base and base-cluster commanders' response force against enemy attacks in rear-area or sustainment operations. The MP gather information about the enemy while performing missions throughout the AO. This information provides commanders with enemy activity near bases. When needed, the MP provide a mobile response force to respond to bases under attack and to destroy the enemy. A base commander's defense plan is the cornerstone for protecting rear-area and sustainment operations. The base commander is responsible for defeating all Level I threats. When this threat exceeds his capabilities, he requests MP support. The MP located near bases or patrolling or conducting AS operations consolidate their forces, respond as quickly as possible, and conduct combat operations to destroy the enemy. If needed, the MP conduct a battle handover to the TCF.
4-36. MP forces performing as a response force are capable of conducting the following
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offensive operations:
¦ A movement to contact.
• A hasty ambush.
¦ A hasty attack.
• A delay.
A call for fire.

A repel attack against critical sites.

A defense of critical sites.

4-37. To conduct these missions, the MP consolidate into squads or platoons to delay, defeat, or defend against the threat. See FMs 71-3 and 71-100 for more information on battle-handover operations.
4-38. The MP perform their AS function across the entire designated AO. When the MP provide security around a critical site or asset, they usually provide a mobile security screen, taking advantage of its weapons and communications platforms. This standoff protection detects and defeats the threat before it can move within direct-fire range of the facilities. The MP may be tasked to provide detail security to key facilities, assets, and personnel.
4-39. The MP provide security to major CPs and other facilities within the AO. Their employment maximizes mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities as a security screen. They may be required to establish local AS measures (such as checkpoints and listening/observation posts) to further protect these facilities. The MP provide internal access-control points to critical facilities, and they act as a response force. When the critical CP relocates, the MP provide in-transit security. Other types of critical site security include
ASPs; deep-water ports; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) terminals and pipelines; trains and railways; and air bases.
4-40. The MP may provide convoy security for top-priority units transporting especially critical supplies to combat forces. MP assets should be employed primarily on aggressive
patrolling, route, area, and zone reconnaissance measures that would create a safe and secure environment for all types of vehicular and unit movement.
4-41. The MP and the CID provide protective services to designated key personnel by
providing access control to restricted areas within CPs, providing in-transit security, or
providing static security measures around the clock. The MP coordinate with the CID when
close-in protection of key personnel is needed. The MP and the CID also provide training
for personal-protection countermeasures. The MWD teams may be employed to enhance
MP and CID detection and protection capabilities.
4-42. The Army is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) executive agent for all EPW/CI
operations. Additionally, the Army is DOD's executive agent for long-term confinement of
US military prisoners. Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MP are
tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for EPWs/CIs.
The UR function addresses MP roles when dealing with EPWs/CIs, dislocated civilians, and
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US military prisoners.
4-43. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving US forces, safe and humane treatment of EPWs/Cls is required by international law. Military actions on the modern battlefield will result in many EPWs/CIs. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and can significantly reduce the capturing unit's combat effectiveness. The MP support the battlefield commander by relieving him of the problem of handling EPWs/CIs with combat forces. The MP perform their UR function of collecting, evacuating, and securing EPWs throughout the AO. In this process, the MP coordinate with MI to collect information that may be used in current or future operations.
4-44. Although the CS MP unit initially handles EPWs/CIs, modular MP (I/R) battalions with assigned MP guard companies and supporting MWD teams are equipped and trained to handle this mission for the long term. A properly configured modular MP (I/R) battalion can support, safeguard, account for, guard, and provide humane treatment for up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs; 8,000 dislocated civilians; or 1,500 US military prisoners.
4-45. The MP are tasked with collecting EPWs/Cls from combat units as far forward as possible. The MP operate collection points and holding areas to temporarily secure EPWs/Cls until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon's holding area. The MP escort-guard company assigned to the MP brigade (I/R) evacuate the EPWs/CIs from the corps's holding area to the COMMZ's internment facilities. The MP safeguard and maintain accountability, protect, and provide humane treatment for all personnel under their care.
4-46. In a mature TO, MP (I/R) units process EPWs/CIs collected by MP teams and other units in the CZ. MP guard companies assigned to the MP (I/R) units guard EPWs/CIs at designated camps (see FM 19-40).
4-47. Populace and resource control (PRC) denies adversaries or insurgents access to the general population and resources. The MP supports civil-affairs personnel and the tactical commander in planning and conducting PRC programs employed during all military operations. These programs may consist of curfews, movement restrictions, resettling dislocated civilians, licensing, ration control, regulation enforcement, amnesty programs, inspecting facilities, and guarding humanitarian-assistance distributions. The MP also direct dislocated civilians to resettlement camps where they are cared for while NGOs work to coordinate their relocation.
4-48. The MP's security capability, acceptability, and interface with the populace make them suitable as the primary forces of choice in these operations. The MP I/R units are specifically designed to fill this need (see FM 41-10).
4-49. The MP detain, sustain, protect, and evacuate US military prisoners. Whenever
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possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their units, unless reasonable grounds exist to believe that they will not appear at the trial, the pretrial hearing, or the investigation or that they will engage in serious criminal misconduct. Under either of these two pretrial confinement instances, the commander must also reasonably believe that a less severe form of restraint (such as conditions of liberty, restriction in lieu of apprehension, or apprehension) are inadequate. When these circumstances exist and other legal requirements are met, US military personnel may be placed in pretrial confinement under the MP's direct control. Convicted military prisoners are moved as soon as possible to confinement facilities outside of the AO.
4-50. MP confinement operations parallel (but are separate from) the MP's EPW/CI operations. No member of the US armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate association with an EPW or other foreign nationals who are not members of the US armed forces. A confinement facility is maintained within the TO only if distance or the lack of transportation requires such a facility. When military prisoners are retained in theater, temporary field detention facilities may be established in the CZ and a field confinement facility in the COMMZ (see FM 19-40 and AR 190-47).
4-51. The L&O function consists of those measures necessary to enforce laws, directives, and punitive regulations. The MP's L&O function extends the battlefield commander's C 2 . The MP, in close coordination with the CID, work to suppress the chance for criminal behavior throughout the AO. By coordinating and maintaining liaison with other DOD, HN, joint, and multinational agencies, the MP at all levels coordinate actions to remove conditions that may promote crime or that have the potential to affect the combat force. Crime-prevention measures and selective enforcement measures are also performed as part of other functions. For example, the MP investigate traffic accidents and regulate traffic as part of the MMS function. The L&O function includes major areas such as law enforcement, criminal investigations, and support to US Customs operations. The primary units conducting L&O are the L&O detachments, customs teams, and CID units. Both the MWD team and the MP company (CS) also support the L&O function.

4-52. Law-enforcement operations assist the battlefield commander in preserving his force. The MP dedicate assets to conduct law-enforcement operations based on the commander's needs. Since MP L&O and CID assets may be limited during the initial stages of any operation, the PM depends on the supported commander's development of an effective crime-prevention program and uses established investigative tools (such as inquiries and AR 15-6 investigations) to enforce rules. This will allow the PM to employ limited MP assets to perform other functions. Law-enforcement operations include responding to civil disturbances, conducting raids, investigating traffic accidents, conducting vehicle searches, supporting the commander's force-protection program, and providing support to HN and civil-enforcement agencies. Law enforcement also includes employing special-reaction teams (SRTs), marksman/observer (M/O) teams, and MWD teams.
4-53. The Army conducts counterdrug-support operations that generally fall within several
DOD counterdrug-mission categories. The MP support the Army's role rather than directly
participating in civil law-enforcement activities (such as searches, seizures, and arrests).
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When tasked, the MP provide training to law-enforcement agencies in common soldier skills, physical security, and tactical planning and operations. US Code (USC) Title 18, Posse Comitatus Act, Section 1385 prohibits the use of DOD assets to enforce civilian law (federal and state) except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or by an act of Congress.
4-54. In multinational operations, the MP may assist with the creation of multinational police units. Circumstances that may support the establishment of these police forces include existing or negotiated terms of international agreements or security-assistance programs, a multinational operational agreement, or appropriate military directives. The MP provide the capability to train foreign MP and/or reconstitute indigenous constabulary • forces as part of stability and support operations. The MP can provide the initial mentoring to these forces and provide temporary, emergency law-enforcement capabilities until the foreign military or civilian police forces are functional (see FM 100-8).
4-55. The MP investigate offenses against US forces or property committed by persons subject to military law. Investigations against minor crimes (such as low-value, personal­property thefts or simple assaults) are normally investigated by the MP's L&O detachment. Investigations against major incidents involving wrongful death, serious bodily injury, and war crimes are referred to special agents of the USACIDC. The USACIDC conducts death investigations in the absence of HN agreements or in conjunction with the HN. The USACIDC special agents are authorized to investigate any alleged criminal conduct in which there is an Army interest unless prohibited by law or higher authority.
4-56. The USACIDC's investigative authority and investigative responsibility outside of the US are determined by international treaty or agreement (including status of forces agreements [SOFA*, the policies of the HN government, the US ambassador, and AR 195-2. In the absence of such provisions, the following guidelines apply:
On Army-controlled installations, the USACIDC has the authority to investigate alleged crimes.

Outside of an Army-controlled installation, the USACIDC may investigate after coordinating with I-IN authorities.

4-57. In all environments, the USACIDC has the responsibility to investigate all felony crimes involving Army personnel, DA civilians and agencies, and companies working for the Army. The USACIDC investigates war crimes and crimes involving personal and government property affecting the Army's mission (logistics security [LOGSEC]). Other investigations (such as those based on international treaties, SOFAs, and joint investigations with the HN) may be undertaken if requested by the supported commander in support of the overall Army mission. See Chapter 9 for a complete discussion of the USACIDC.
4-58. The MP support the US Customs Service (USCS), the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA), other federal agencies, joint staffs, and commanders who enforce the laws and
regulations of the US concerning customs, agriculture, and immigration border clearances.
Support to the USCS also includes assistance to federal agencies to eliminate the illegal
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traffic of controlled substances and other contraband through Army channels. MP support to customs operations are normally performed by specially trained MP customs teams. Although other MP units are not trained in all facets of customs operations, they may assist MP customs teams, the USCS or the USDA, and other federal agencies in the enforcement of applicable laws and regulations. When tasked, the MP/CID supports the investigation of violations of US Codes, DOD or DA regulations, and applicable provisions of SOFAs.
4-59. The MP report violations of customs laws, regulations, inspections, and investigative results to the installation's PM, the supported commander, and affected units. During redeployment from outside the continental US (OCONUS) to CONUS installations, the MP support the USCS or USDA efforts to ensure that personnel, equipment, and materiel meet customs, immigration, and agriculture requirements as stated by all applicable laws and regulations. As with other functions, MWD teams may be employed in support of customs operations for the detection of explosives or narcotics.
During operation Just Cause, an MP platoon temporarily assumed the
customs mission at the main terminal of the Torrijos International Airport
located just outside of Panama City. Their mission supported the air
evacuation of foreign-national civilians and the redeployment of some of
the initial-entry US forces.
4-60. The PIO function supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by portraying relevant threat information that may affect his operational and tactical environments. This threat information—whether it is police, criminal, or combat information—is gathered while conducting MP functions. The PIO function-
Demonstrates the MP's/CID's capability to collect relevant threat information actively or passively.

Ensures that all information collected while conducting MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O functions continues to be reported through the proper channels so that it can be analyzed by the Intelligence Officer (US Army) (S2) or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence) (G2) with support from the appropriate MP echelon.

Coordinates with USACIDC elements to employ data developed by the USACIDC's programs. These programs include-

The Combating Terrorism Program as outlined in AR 525-13 and CIDR 195-1.

The Criminal Intelligence Program (CIP).

Personal-security vulnerability assessments (PSVAs).

A crime threat analysis.

¦ Logistics-security threat assessments (LSTAs).
NOTE: The MP/CID must ensure that criminal information is released according to existing controls and restraints.
¦ Maintains constant liaison and communication with the higher echelon S2/G2; psychological-operations (PSYOP) units; HN police and other law-enforcement agencies; joint, combined, interagency, and multinational forces; the staff judge 9. 1 /ch4.htm.12/28/2004
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advocate (SJA); the CMOC; civil-affairs teams; and the force-protection officer.
4-61. The MP brigade commander, the battalion commander, and the PM are responsible for the PIO function. As such, each one must determine the best way to employ the available staff resources to monitor the execution of the PIO function within his command.
4-62. The IPB is a systematic, continuous process for analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield by-
Determining the threat's likely COA.

Describing the environment the unit is operating within and the environmental effects on the unit.

4-63. The IPB process consists of the following four steps:
Define the battlefield environment. The S2/G2 identifies the battlefield characteristics that will influence friendly and threat operations, establishes the limits of the area of interest (AOI), and identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings.

Describe the battlefield effects. The S2/G2 evaluates the environmental effects with which both sides must contend. The S2/G2 identifies the limitations and opportunities that the environment offers on the potential operations of friendly and threat forces. This evaluation process focuses on the general capabilities of each force until COAs are developed later in the IPB process. This environmental assessment always includes an examination of terrain and weather, but it may also include discussions of characteristics of geography and infrastructure and their effects on friendly and threat operations.

Evaluate the threat. The S2/G2 and his staff analyze the command's intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar circumstances. When facing a well-known threat, the S2/G2 can rely on historical databases and threat models. When operating against a new or less known threat, he may need to develop his intelligence databases and threat models concurrently.

Determine the threat's COA. Given what the threat normally prefers to do and the effects of the specific environment in which he is operating, his likely objectives and the COAs available to him are determined. The S2/G2 develops enemy COA models that depict the threat's available COAs. He also prepares event templates and matrices that focus intelligence and identify which COA the enemy will execute (see FM 34­130).

4-64. Although the S2/G2 has the staff responsibility for the command's IPB, he is not the only one who conducts or needs to understand and use the IPB. Every Army commander and staff member must understand and apply the IPB process during the staff planning process. The MP on the battlefield are no exception. The MP employ the IPB process as their first step in developing and implementing the PIO function within their commands.
4-65. During the IPB process, the S2/G2 uses all available databases, intelligence
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sources/products, and related MI disciplines to analyze the threat and the environment. The
PIO function supports this process by providing the S2/G2 with collected police, criminal,
and combat information that can directly and significantly contribute to the success of the
MI effort. In addition to the combat information, the PIO function provides additional
information on possible criminal threats and COAs that may support the S2's/G2's IPB
process and that can be used by the commander to upgrade the force-protection posture.
4-66. Like the S2/G2 uses the IPB process to continuously analyze the threat and the
environment in a specific geographical area, MP leaders use the PIAP as a tool to
continuously collect, organize, interpret, and gain access to police/criminal information in
support of the IPB process. Criminal trends may have an impact on the tactical scenario,
and the PIAP is a method used to consider this threat and its impact on friendly forces. MP
leaders cannot use the PIAP as a substitute for the IPB process—the PIAP complements the
IPB (see Appendix E).
4-67. Every MP conducts the PIO function in a passive mode during their normal day-to­
day operations and across the full spectrum of military operations. In the passive mode, PIO
are not a stand-alone function; as such, they cannot be separated from other MP functions.
4-68. During the performance of MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O functions, the MP develop and
exchange information with other organizations in the AO. The MP obtain information
through contact with civilians, NGOs, IHOs, local and HN police, multinational police, and
other security forces. If the MP receive, observe, or encounter information (police, criminal,
or combat) while performing these functions, they will immediately submit a report to relay
information up the chain of command. This report may be in the form of a size, activity,
location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report; a spot report (SPOTREP); or another
appropriate report. When the higher echelon (brigade, battalion, or PM) receives this
information, it is simultaneously integrated into the ongoing IPB/PIAP and forwarded to the
higher echelon S2/G2 (see Figure 4-1 below).
During Operation Uphold Democracy, an MP team was conducting a TCP
as part of a cordon and search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While
performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team informing them
of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the interview, the MP team
prepared a sketch of a house and surrounding areas. The team also
obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons..
Recognizing that the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/
mercenary group named FRAP, the MP team radioed the platoon leader
and forwarded the field irterview to higher headcparters. Two days later, a
unit from the 10th Mountain Division raided the house, capturing weapons,
ammunition, and equipment.
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MP may obtain
PI while conducting the four functions
Figure 4-1. PIO—Passive Mode
4-69. If police/criminal information is obtained, the MP—
Update the previous police/criminal estimates provided to the S2/G2.

Identify new or potential criminal threats or trends in the AO.

Consider recommending that the supported commander upgrade the force-protection level.

Notify adjacent units of the potential criminal threat that may affect their forces.

• Consider reprioritizing MP support to the identified threat area.
¦ Share information with HN/local police and other agencies.
4-70. If combat information is obtained, the MP-
Forward the information to the higher headquarters S2/G2.

Forward the information to the MP chain of command, integrate it into the MP's IPB process and, if necessary, take appropriate action.

• Notify the adjacent unit of the potential threat that may affect their forces.
4-71. The preceding vignette demonstrates the MP performing the PIO function in the
passive mode. The MP team received the information while conducting a TCP and
submitted it through the appropriate chain of command, which resulted in an action taken.
This example stresses the importance of submitting information up the chain of command
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regardless of whether it may be police, criminal, or combat information.
4-72. The MP perform the PIO function in the active mode and across the full spectrum of military operations when directed by higher headquarters. In this mode, the MP conduct specific MMS, AS, YR, and L&O missions with the intent to collect information actively in support of the S2's/G2's IPB process or the PIAP.
4-73. When the S2/G2 identifies a gap in the command's knowledge of the threat and the current threat situation, it may be recommended to be included as priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The S2/G2 will then develop a collection plan to assist him in filling this gap. Part of his collection strategy is to select the best collectors available to cover each intelligence requirement. After a thorough analysis (which includes availability, capability, and performance history), the collection manager identifies which collection asset can best be used in response to a given requirement, and the Operations and Training Officer (US Army) (S3)/G3 tasks the asset. If the S2/G2 determines that the MP is the right force to serve as collectors, the S3/G3 will go through the appropriate request channels and task the PM. The S2/G2 will then provide the PM with a specific guideline and a prioritized collection requirement (see FM 34-2).
4-74. On receipt of the mission, the PM will conduct a mission analysis to decide which specific MP function (MMS, AS, I/R, or L&O) is needed to satisfy the S2's/G2's requirement. Once the analysis is completed and the appropriate function selected, the PM will then task subdrdinate units with the collection mission. Once the mission is completed, the PM may receive another collection tasking or continue with previous MP tasks.
4-75. When the MP commander or the PM conducts the PIAP, he may also encounter a police/criminal information gap. This gap may become the MP commander's police/criminal information requirements (PCIR). If the gap cannot be filled with available data from the S2/G2, the CID, the I-IN, and other agencies, the MP commander/PM may task subordinate MP units or request CID assistance to support the collection effort. On receipt of the mission, the MP will then conduct a mission analysis and decide which specific MP function (MMS, AS, I/R, or L&O) is needed to satisfy the PM requirement. Once the mission is completed, the MP may receive another collection tasking or continue with previous MP tasks (see Figure 4-2 below).
4-76. Since any soldier on the battlefield can report police or criminal information, the MP commander or the PM must constantly coordinate and communicate with the S2/G2, PSYOP, and other agencies to obtain information that could be of MP/CID interest. This constant coordination is a key factor for ensuring that the MP/CID has visibility over the police/criminal information that is reported through non-MP channels.
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MP may employ any of the other four functions to satisfy the PI requirement
Figure 4-1. PIO—Active Mode
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Chapter 5
Military Police Support to Echelons Above Corps
MP units supporting EAC perform combat, CS, and CSS operations. Like the MP supporting corps and divisions, MP units supporting EAC units perform the five MP functions based on available assets and the supported commander's needs.
MP support to EAC includes support to the ASCC and the TSC. The ASCC is responsible
for Army Title 10 requirements in support of a combatant commander. This support
includes recruitment, organization, supply, equipment, training, servicing, mobilizing,
demobilizing, administration, and maintenance functions.

5-1. The ASCC may also be responsible for significant DOD- and combatant-commander­designated Army support to other services. As the senior Army commander in the AOR, the ASCC commander tailors and designates ARFOR to accomplish operational-level tasks while conducting major land operations. The ASCC's operational responsibilities include-
¦ Recommending the proper employment of Army-component forces to the joint-force
commander or to the subunified commander.
do Accomplishing operational missions as assigned.

• Selecting and nominating specific Army units for assignment to subordinate theater forces.
Informing the combatant commander of the Army's CSS effects on operational capabilities.

Providing data to the supporting operations plans (OPLANs) as requested.

• Ensuring signal interoperability.
5-2. The ASCC provides administrative and logistics (A/L) services to assigned ARFOR and to those of subordinate JFCs. When appropriate, the ASCC delegates the authority for support tasks to a single subordinate Army headquarters. In major operations, the TSC (along with other EAC support commands) would be the ASCC's lead organization for planning, coordinating, executing, or providing required support functions (see FM 100-10).
5-3. The TSC is the senior Army support organization in a theater. Its commander reports to the ASCC or ARFOR commander. The TSC normally operates at the operational level of CSS with links to the strategic and tactical levels. Unity of command is the critical element that the TSC brings to the fight. The TSC is a multifunctional organization that centralizes the command, control, and supervision of support functions at EAC as directed by the ASCC or ARFOR commander. The TSC's mission is to maximize throughput and follow-on sustainment, including all CSS functions, of ARFOR and other designated supported elements. The TSC is capable of synchronizing logistics and other support operations for the ASCC. It provides area support to EAC units in the COMMZ and sustainment support to tactical forces. This support may include supply, procurement, property disposal, maintenance, transportation, field services, health services, civil-military affairs, MP
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support, engineer support, religious support, finance support, and personnel and administrative services.
5-4. Units and commands requiring support coordinate with the TSC support-operations
staff to secure their initial support, to reestablish support, or to resolve support problems. In
a fully developed theater, the TSC coordinates with a corps support command (COSCOM)
for support of combat forces, although direct coordination with a division support command
(DISCOM) is sometimes necessary. The TSC, augmented by a rear operations center, is
also responsible for security operations as directed by the ASCC/ARFOR commander (see FM 63-4).
5-5. MP support to EAC units is provided through an array of multifunctional MP units.
The nature of the operation, METT-TC, and the requirements of the supported commander
will determine which type of MP unit is appropriate to augment, assign, attach, or place
under OPCON to an EAC unit. The types of MP units that support EAC include CS, I/R,
CID, and L&O teams (such as MWD or customs teams).

5-6. The MP brigade (CS) provides MMS and AS to extended LOC within the COMMZ. These supply corridors include ports, inland waterways, railways, pipelines, airfields, MSRs, and MSR critical points. The MP support the users of the COMMZ's LOC by aggressively patrolling the area along the LOC. They play an important role in securing rear areas by performing combat operations against the threat. When properly augmented, the MP brigade headquarters may serve as the TSC's/ASCC's TCF headquarters. The MP provide MMS on the COMMZ MSRs leading into the corps's rear area. The MP implement the plans of HN and US staff elements to control the forward movement of combat resources along the LOC.
5-7. If resources are available, the MP brigade (CS) provides escorts to move US noncombatants (if present) from AA points to theater embarkation terminals. Until the MP brigade (I/R) arrives in theater, the CS MP units also perform EPW, confinement, and other operations normally performed by the MP I/R units.
5-8. The organization of an MP brigade (CS) supporting EAC includes the following:
A brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).

Up to six MP battalions (each with up to six companies).

Numerous L&O detachments and MWD teams.

5-9. Additionally, the ASCC's PM or commander may attach or direct OPCON of customs
teams to the MP brigade (CS). Battalion and company organization in the MP brigade is the
same as that in the corps MP brigade; however, METT-TC determines the number of
battalions and companies. The MP brigade (CS) has additional MP companies to provide
security for EAC-specific units/activities such as-
A unified command.

An ASCC and TSC headquarters.

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LOC seaports, airfields, and railways.

EAC ammunition storage areas.

EAC petroleum terminals and pipelines.

5-10. While the corps MP brigade (CS) MWD teams are employed in a GS role, the MP
brigade (CS) MWD teams are employed to augment seaport security and to conduct
inspections of postal items to detect explosive materiel and narcotics.
5-11. The C 2 within the MP brigade (CS) is consistent with that in any Army brigade. The . MP brigade commander works directly for the EAC commander, the battalion commander works for the brigade commander, and the company commander works for the battalion
commander. However, this usual C 2 relationship may be altered briefly (based on METT-TC) to enhance the overall EAC combat capability for responding to a Level II threat. For example, MP units operating within an ASG's AO may be under the OPCON of the ASG's rear-area operations center (RAOC), which directly tasks MP units responding to Level II threats. The same is true for placing MP units under the OPCON of the EAC's TCF headquarters for responding to Level III threats. Any conflict in mission priorities is
resolved through MP C 2 channels.
5-12. The MP brigade commander is both the MP brigade commander and the EAC's PM.
He employs his assets according to METT-TC and the commander's concept of operations.
Factors affecting his employment of MP assets include the-
¦ Nature of the operation (joint, combined, or multinational).

HN's ability to provide MP-related support (such as port security).

Custody and location of EPWs/CIs during internment operations until I/R units arrive in theater.

Number of kilometers of the MSR in relationship to movement-control requirements.

Number and kinds of critical facilities.

Number of HRP requiring close-in security.

HN's ability to control the civilian populace, refugees, and dislocated civilians.

Supply distribution strategy.

Risk acceptance and threat in the AO.

¦ Communications requirements (such as using teams as relays).
5-13. Whenever possible, the MP brigade's AO coincides with the territorial responsibility
of the supported command. The MP brigade commander assigns the MP battalion's AO by
the above factors as well as by METT-TC. For example, the AOR for an MP battalion may
be a large population center of larger geographical areas in which CSS complexes and
MSRs are located. But as employment factors and the commander's needs change, so will
the MP's AOR. The MP brigade commander must move and tailor his forces to meet the
current and projected mission requirements. Unlike many other EAC assets, MP units
require 100 percent mobility to shift AOs frequently and rapidly. The following vignette
depicts the required MP flexibility to support EAC operations:
During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, MP units were supporting and moving units
throughout their AOs at a such an extraordinary rate that many of them had to relocate
their headquarters multiple times just to keep pace with their changing AO.
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5-14. Most EAC MP assets are employed along LOC and around areas of high troop concentration. Few EAC MP are dedicated to support fixed commitments (such as ports, air bases, and headquarters [discussed in paragraph 5-8]). When supporting fixed commitments, MP units provide a mobile security screen, and they man static positions when directed or when based on METT-TC. The MP brigade (CS) may have to plan for and actually perform the evacuation and internment of EPWs/CIs and the confinement of US military prisoners until the MP brigade (I/R) arrives.
5-15. US policy requires that all persons held in Army custody be accorded humane care and treatment from the moment of custody to their final release. The policy applies to detained or interned civilians as well as to EPWs and confined US military personnel. This policy is equally binding on all US troops (see FM 19-40).
5-16. The ASCC or the TSC supports US laws, regulations, policies, and international agreements by providing personnel, administrative, morale, internment, resettlement, and confinement services for the TO. The TSC's MP brigade (I/R) in the TO provides this support. However, since most I/R units are in the reserve components, the initial I/R operations (as mentioned above) may have to be conducted by the MP brigade (CS). Once the I/R unit arrives in the AO, it is responsible for-
• Providing firm but humane control of EPWs/CIs and dislocated civilians.
Coordinating with HN personnel, military territorial organizations, civilian police authorities, NGOs, private volunteer organizations, and US federal agencies on matters pertaining to I/R operations.

Performing C 2 operations for all I/R units.

• Controlling, employing, and releasing EPWs/CIs as set forth by the Geneva convention and other international laws and by the UN and other governmental bodies.
¦ Handling US military prisoners.
5-17. In a mature theater in which large numbers of EPWs are captured, the EPWs' requirements may exceed the capacity of the MP brigade (I/R). In this instance, an I/R command is established. An MP command (I/R) has two or more MP brigades (I/R) and will normally be assigned to the ASCC. When the MP command (I/R) assumes OPCON of the MP brigades (I/R) from the lower echelon, it assumes that echelon's I/R mission.
5-18. If the US decides to transfer captured EPWs/CIs to the HN or to another nation, the US must ensure that the nation is a party to the Geneva convention and is willing and able to comply with the convention. In this case, the number and type of I/R MP units required for processing and retaining EPWs/CIs before the transfer is based on agreements and on METT-TC. Additionally, the MP brigade (I/R) is assigned I/R teams that are located at the processing and transfer points and at the HN or third-country EPW camps. The MP brigade (I/R) liaison team will supervise these dispersed teams to ensure that the HN or the third country provides adequate care and security of US-captured EPWs/CIs and that accountability is maintained according to the Geneva convention.
5-19. The MP brigade (I/R) HHC is the C 2element for the brigade's assets. It consists of
the following elements:
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¦ A brigade command section.
• A company headquarters.
An Adjutant (US Army) (S 1).

An S2.

An S3.

A Supply Officer (US Army) (S4).

A Civil-Affairs Officer (US Army) (S5).

A Communications Officer (US Army) (S6).

Finance and accounting.

Medical operations.

Public affairs.

• A unit ministry team.

An inspector-general (IG) section.

5-20. Other brigade assets may include the following:


An I/R information center.

An MP escort-guard company.

An MP I/R battalion headquarters.

MP I/R (EPW/CI) detachments.

MP I/R (confinement) detachments.

MP guard companies.. DODDOA-006567

MWD teams.

Processing squads, processing liaison teams, camp liaison teams, and evacuation teams (all as required to support EPW transfer or to conduct an out-of-theater evacuation).

5-21. The MP brigade (I/R) subordinate units are employed most often in the COMMZ near CSS facilities and are placed near sea, air, and rail terminals. They receive, process, and intern EPWs/CIs; confine US military prisoners; or assist in the resettlement of refugees or dislocated civilians.
5-22. The MP brigade (I/R) escort-guard company supports the evacuation of EPWs/CIs from the CZ. The company has a company headquarters and four platoons. The escort­guard company requires sufficient mobility to transport MP personnel to the CZ and to operate mobile teams while escorting the EPWs/CIs. The MP go forward to the corps's
holding area to take custody of the EPWs/CIs. They may go forward to division collecting
points, if distances and resources permit. Using any means of available transportation, the
MP ensure that the EPWs/CIs are quickly evacuated to MP battalions (I/R) in the COMMZ.
Close coordination with the EAC and corps movement-control centers and the corps MP
brigade is required to ensure that transportation assets returning to the COMMZ are
employed to evacuate EPWs/CIs from the corps's holding area. Walking wounded
EPWs/CIs are evacuated by the same means as other EPWs/CIs, while litter patients are
evacuated through medical channels. Guarding EPWs/CIs while in the MEDEVAC
channels and during their hospitalization is not an MP mission; therefore, there is not an MP
force structure to support this mission. In most instances, the impact of having the MP
perform this mission causes trade-offs in missions for which they are responsible.
5-23. The theater MP brigade (I/R) and out-of-theater MP brigade (I/R) subordinate units .12/28/2004
FM 3-19.1 Chptr 5 Military Police Support to Echelons Above Corps . Page 6 of 7
will evacuate EPWs to internment sites within CONUS (if directed). The theater brigade structure is based on the projected capture rate over time and available out-of-theater transportation assets (frequency and capacity). The out-of-theater brigade structure is based on the total EPW/CI population, the number of internment sites, transportation nodes, and escort requirements. Theater escort-guard MP move the EPWs/Cls to the seaport and aerial port of embarkation (SPOE/APOE). The escort-guard MP assigned to the out-of-theater brigade escort the EPWs/CIs from the theater ports of embarkation (POEs) to the out-of­theater internment sites. The out-of-theater brigade is assigned an I/R evacuation detachment, which is employed at and coordinates the evacuation from the theater POEs, through the out-of-theater ports of debarkation (PODs), to the out-of-theater facilities.
5-24. The MP battalion (I/R) is a modular organization and can be configured to operate internment facilities for EPWs/CIs, confine US military prisoners, or resettle dislocated civilians. When performing EPW/CI internment operations, the MP brigade (I/R) has up to 7 MP battalions (I/R); when augmented with the appropriate number of BLDs, it has up to 21 MP battalions (I/R). The ASCC, the TSC, and the MP brigade (I/R) must consider that the requirement to establish an MP battalion (I/R) internment facility is resource intensive.
Therefore, MP I/R units, other supporting units, supplies, and equipment for the EPWs/CIs should arrive in theater ahead of the projected EPW/CI arrival at the internment facilities. Early arrival should be based on the time required to establish fully operational facilities
(construct and man) and resupply operations before the EPWs/Cls arrive.
5-25. The MP battalion (I/R) has a command section, a company headquarters, and various
staff sections. The staff sections provide the core battalion-level capabilities to conduct
internment operations. The modulated design expands as the EPW/CI population increases.
The battalion is assigned up to four detachments, two guard companies and, if needed, a
processing squad. When fully operational, an MP battalion (I/R) operates an enclosure
capable of interning 4,000 EPWs/CIs. The battalion mission centers on eight 500-man
compounds. The battalion operates the compounds in close proximity to maximize its
resources for the security and internment of the EPWs/CIs. This includes the resources
needed to employ EPWs/CIs as a labor force according to the provisions of the Geneva
5-26. Each MP detachment (I/R) (EPW/CI) operates two 500-man compounds and provides
augmentation to the battalion staff sections to support 1,000 EPWs/CIs. Each guard
company is capable of providing security for 2,000 EPWs/CIs. The guard company has a
company headquarters and three platoons. The guard company requires sufficient mobility
and communications to support routine battalion missions. While minimum mobility and
communications is required to support EPW/CI internment operations, on-site guard
personnel must often move considerable distances guarding labor groups performing work
projects throughout the COMMZ.
5-27. The MP (EPW/CI) processing squad is capable of processing eight EPWs/CIs per
hour and includes interpreters to support the processing. If processing squads are required to
augment MP battalions (I/R), the operational requirements will be based on METT-TC.
MP-Battalion Resettlement Operations
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