Army Field Manual No. FM 3-0: FM 3-0 Operations

FM3-0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Operations Page 1 of 4
*FM 3-0 (FM 100-5)
Field Manual Headquarters
No. FM 3-0 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Table of Contents
FIGURES
HISTORICAL VIGNETTES
PREFACE

PART ONE THE ENVIRONMENT OF OPERATIONS Chapter 1 THE ARMY AND THE ROLE OF LAND POWER
The Role of the Army
Army Mission Essential Tasks
The Operational Environment
Doctrine and the Army
Full Spectrum Operations
Training for Full Spectrum
Soldiers and Leadership

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Chapter 2 UNIFIED ACTION
The Levels of War
Conduct of Unified Action
Considerations for Unified Action

Chapter 3 STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS
Responsive Army Forces
Force Projection Operations

PART TWO FOUNDATIONS OF FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Chapter 4 FUNDAMENTALS OF FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

The Elements of Combat Power
The Foundations of Army Operations
The Operational Framework
Army Capabilities

Chapter 5 BATTLE COMMAND
The Art of Command
Visualize Describe, Direct

.
Chapter 6 CONDUCTING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Plan
Prepare
Execute
Assess

PART THREE CONDUCTING DECISIVE FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Chapter 7 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Purposes of Offensive Operations Offensive Operations at the Operational and Tactical Levels of War
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Characteristics of Offensive Operations Offensive Operations Within the Operational Framework Forms of Maneuver Types of Offensive Operations Conducting Offensive Operations The Impact of Technology
Chapter 8 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Purposes of Defensive Operations Characteristics of Defensive Operations Types of Defensive Operations Defensive Operations Within the Operational Framework Conducting Defensive Operations The Impact of Technology
Chapter 9 STABILITY OPERATIONS Engagement and Response Characteristics of Stability Operations Types of Stability Operations Considerations for Stability Operations
Chapter 10 SUPPORT OPERATIONS Characteristics of Support Operations Types of Support Operations Forms of Support Operations Considerations for Support Operations
PART FOUR Chapter 11 ENABLING OPERATIONS INFORMATION SUPERIQRITY Characteristics of Information Superiority DODDOA-007873
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The Information Environment Contributors to Information Superiority Planning and Preparing to Achieve Information Superiority Information Superiority Execution The Impact of Technology
Chapter 12 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Purpose of Combat Service Support Combat Service Support Characteristics Combat Service Support Functions Combat Service Support Planning and Preparation Combat Service Support Execution The Impact of Technology
SOURCE NOTES
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUTHENTICATION

'DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
* This publication supersedes FM 100-5, 14 June 1993.
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Figures
Figure 1-1. The Range of Army Operations 1-2. Full Spectrum Operations 2-1. The Levels of War 2-2. The Chain of Command and Control 2-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities 2-4. Joint Support Categories 2-5. Considerations for Unified Action 3-1. Force Allocation and Augmentation 3-2. Allocation: Force Refinement 3-3. Staff Tailoring: Task Force Eagle 3 -4. The Force Projection Process 3-5. Intermediate Staging Base 4-1. The Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations 4-2. The Elements of Combat Power 4-3. Theater Organization 4-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operations 4-5. Battlespace Components 4-6. Close, Deep, and Rear Areas 4-7. Army Command and Support Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities 4-8. Complementary Effects 4-9. Reinforcing Effects 5-1. Visualize, Describe, Direct
5-2. Interior and Exterior Lines of Operations
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5-3. Logical Lines of Operations 6-1. The Operations Process
672. Linear and Nonlinear Combinations
6-3. Combinations of Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Linear and Nonlinear Operations 7-1. Operational Framework in the Offense 7-2. Envelopment 7-3. Turning Movement 7-4. Infiltration 7-5. Penetration 7-6. Frontal Attack 8-1. Mobile Defense 8-2. Area Defense 8-3. Operational Framework in the Defense 9-1. The Army Role in Theater Engagement 10-1. Types and Forms of Support Operations 10-2. Domestic Support Operations in Disaster Relief 10-3. Domestic Support Relationships for CBRNE Consequence Management Support 11-1. Information Superiority 11-2. Information Operations and Information Superiority 11-3. Situational Understanding 11-4. Information Superiority and Strategic Responsiveness 12-1. Combat Service Support Reach
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Historical Vignettes
The Army— A Proud Histou of Full Spectrum Operations
Task Force Eagle in Bosnia
Technology Aids Soldiers— Operation Desert Hammer VI
Unified Action in Haiti
Operation Assured Response—An Example of Joint Synergy
Responsive and Agile— Operation Uphold Democracy
Precision and Speed— VII Corps Deploys to Southwest Asia
Close Combat at Landing_Zone X-Ray
Operational Maneuver and Fires— Operation Desert Storm
Field Discipline— Preventive Medicine in Combat
Information Modernization— AH-64D Longbow
Experience and Innovation on Grenada
Commander's Intent and Sherman's "March to the Sea"
Planning Guidance— Grant and Thomas at Chattanooga
Change of Plans at Normandy
Home Station, Predeployment, and Deployment Training
Surprise— Coup de Main in Panama
Audacity— Turning Movement at Inchon
Desert Storm— A Decisive Offensive Operation
Decisive Defensive Operations— Pusan, Korea
Shaping Defensive Operations— 2d SANG Brigade at Khafji
Ongoing Deterrence— Forward Presence in Korea
Stability Mission at Brcko

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Foreign Internal Defense in El Salvador Conventional Arms Control Operations— Task Force Eagle in Bosnia Vietnam— A Case Study in US Military Involvement Refugee Processing A Support Operation JTF Support Hope— Foreign Humanitarian Assistance in Africa JTF Andrew— Disaster Relief in the Continental United States Measures of Effectiveness— Operation Support Hope
Information Superiority in the Gulf Contractor Support— Operations in the Balkans Full Spectrum Support— 22d Support Command in Southwest Asia Leveraging Technology— Real-time CSS
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Preface
Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army
forces aggressively gain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the
nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war.
Execution of this doctrine requires well-trained soldiers and units fueled with the warrior ethos, the best
weapons and equipment available, and the solid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers of
character and competence.

PURPOSE
FM 3-0 establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The doctrine holds
warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land
warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. The
foundation of FM 3-0 is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force
operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

FM 3-0 is compatible with joint doctrine. It provides overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of
full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals. As the Army's principal tool for professional
education in the art and the science of war, FM 3-0 presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted
in actual military experience. FM 3-0 provides a foundation for the development of tactics, techniques,
and procedures.

SCOPE
FM 3-0 is divided into four parts. Part One (Chapters 1-3) discusses the Army's role in peace, conflict,
and war. Part Two (Chapters 4-6) discusses the fundamentals of full spectrum operations, battle
command, and the operations process. Part Three (Chapters 7-10) discusses the four types of Army
operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Part Four (Chapters 11 and 12) discusses
information superiority and combat service support as enabling operations.

APPLICABILITY
FM 3-0 provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the
foundation for curricula within the Army Education System. Its audience is broad, from battalion
through corps to other operational-level organizations. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers
must read and understand FM 3-0.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
The proponent for this manual is Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.
Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
This publication contains copyrighted material.

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Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.
The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-0 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk. The glossary does not contain these definitions, but lists the numbers of paragraphs where terms are defined. Definitions for which FM 3-0 is the proponent manual are printed in boldface in the text. Other definitions are not printed in boldface. Partial definitions of some terms for which FM 3-0 is not the proponent manual are provided in text boxes. See JP 1-02 for complete joint definitions and FM 1-02 for complete Army definitions.
The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined in JP 1-02 and FM 1­
02. It does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations and acronyms—for example, the abbreviations for military ranks and publications—are not spelled out; refer to the glossary. Since ARFOR is a defined term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out.
Some figures show engagement areas and objectives without names. These control measures are
normally given names (see FM 1-02).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. Other sources of quotations and material used in examples are listed in the Source Notes.
Excerpts from Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 3, The War Years, edited by Alfred D. Chandler Jr. © The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
Excerpt from This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, by T. R. Fehrenbach © New York: MacMillan, 1963.
Excerpts from The Civil War, A Narrative, vol. 3, Red River to Appomattox, by Shelby Foote, © Random House, Incorporated, 1974.
Excerpts from We Were Soldiers Once ...and Young, by Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, © LTG H. G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, Random House, Incorporated, 1992.
Excerpts from War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by Major General George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Co. All rights reserved.
Excerpt from Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton by Martin Van Creveld, © Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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PART ONE

The Environment of Operations
The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.
"The Army Vision," 1999
Part One discusses the Army's role in peace, conflict, and war. Warfighting is the Army's primary focus. The ability to dominate land warfare underscores the effectiveness and credibility of Army forces in full spectrum operations. Army forces are the centerpiece of unified action on land. They are strategically responsive, prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations as part of joint, multinational, and interagency teams.
Chapter 1 describes the Army's role in national defense, the six dimensions of the operational environment, and how Army forces prepare for and operate in that environment. It outlines the Army's mission essential tasks and describes doctrine for full spectrum operations. Finally, it discusses how leaders mold soldiers and units into confident, competent teams through.tough, realistic training.
Chapter 2 discusses unified action— the joint, multinational, and interagency aspects of full spectrum operations. It describes the contributions each armed service makes and how Army forces are employed within combatant commands.
Chapter 3 addresses strategic responsiveness and force projection. It discusses the attributes of strategically responsive Army forces and the considerations that complement them. It describes the characteristics of force projection operations and the joint systems that support them. It outlines the different types of entry operations. It concludes with an overview of security during force projection and the use of intermediate staging bases.
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Chapter 1

The Army and the Role of Land Power
Mou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.
T. R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War, 1963
1-1. Army forces are the decisive
component of land warfare in joint

CONTENTS
and multinational operations. The
Army organizes, trains, and equips

The Role of the Army
its forces to fight and win the
.
Army MissionEssential Tasks
nation's wars and achieve directed
Shape the Security Environment
national objectives. Fighting and
Respond . Promptly to Crisis
winning the nation's wars is the
Mobilize the. Army
foundation of Army service—the
Conduct Forcible Entry Operations
Army's nonnegotiable contract with
Dominate Land Operations
the American people and its
Provide Support to Civil Authorities
enduring obligation to the nation.
The Operational Environment The Threat Dimension
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY
The Political Dimension The Unified Action Dimension
1-2. Because Army forces fight
The Land Combat Operations Dimension
and win the nation's wars, they also
The Information Dimension
deter them. The object of deterrence
The Technology Dimension
is the will of state and nonstate
Doctrine and the Army
political and military leaders.
Full Spectrum Operations
Deterrence establishes in the minds
Training for Full Spectrum Operations
of potential adversaries that their
Soldiers and Leadership
actions will have unacceptable consequences. Today, potential adversaries rely on land-based military and paramilitary forces to retain power, coerce and control their populations, and extend influence beyond their borders. Army forces deter by threatening these means of power retention and population control with the ability to engage in decisive combat and seize and occupy adversary territory. Army forces also deter cross­border aggression through forward presence, forward deployment and prompt, flexible response. Army forces poised for action signal the unquestioned commitment of America to fight and win if deterrence fails.
1-3. Deployed, combat-ready Army forces reassure allies as they deter potential enemies. The presence of Army forces usually contributes more to the situation than their potential combat power. Army forces on the ground demonstrate that the US is willing to back the host nation with military power. Historically, that backing brings opportunity for stability,
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1-4. The Army's warfighting focus produces a full spectrum force that meets the needs of joint force commanders (JFCs) in war, conflict, and peace. In war, Army forces form the nucleus of the joint force land component—imposing the nation's will on the enemy and causing his collapse. In conflict, Army forces deploy quickly into an area of operations (AO) to deter adversaries and potential enemies from establishing their forces and preclude them from gaining an operational advantage. If deterrence fails, Army forces defeat the enemy, end the conflict on terms that achieve national objectives, and establish self­sustaining postconflict stability. Early movement of Army forces retains initiative and freedom of action by providing JFCs complementary means of conducting decisive offensive operations at times and places of their choosing. If circumstances require, Army forces block an enemy offensive and deliver the counteroffensive blow necessary to win as rapidly as possible. In peace, Army forces train for war. They also help shape the international security environment through peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. Army forces help civil authorities, both at home and abroad, prepare for and respond to natural or manmade disasters as well.
The Army—A Proud History of Full Spectrum Operations
Since 1775, Army forces have deterred, compelled, reassured, and supported in war, conflict, and peace. The Army's history spans over 225 years of service to the nation, domestically and overseas. Army forces have fought 10 wars, from the American Revolution to the Gulf War. They have engaged in expeditions and contingency operations in US territories and projected power around the world. They have performed stability operations in Latin America and the Caribbean and defended friendly countries in Asia and Europe during the Cold War.
Soldiers have been involved in support operations as well. They conducted the Lewis and Clark expedition, supported civil authorities during the San Francisco earthquake, and worked with the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Depression. They have eased human suffering during natural disasters worldwide. More recently, Army forces served or are serving as peacekeepers in the Sinai, Northern Iraq, Rwanda, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Today, Army forces help maintain regional stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf region.
Throughout the nation's history, Army forces have demonstrated that the Army
remains the nation's strategic land combat force, a service with the diverse
capabilities needed to conduct full spectrum operations—anytime, anywhere.
ARMY MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS
Army Mission Essential Tasks
1-5. The Army's mission essential tasks derive from statutory
• Shape the security environmentrequirements, operational experience, • Respond promptly to crisis
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strategies for employing military forces, • Mobilize the Armyand operational requirements of the • Conduct forcible entry operationscombatant commanders. They are the • Dominate land operationsoperational expression of the Army's • Provide support to civil authorities
core competencies contained in FM 1. Although these tasks are termed the Army mission essential task list (METL), all Army units develop their own battle focused METLs as described in FM 7-0. To perform the Army METL tasks, the Army continuously integrates doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) (see AR 71-9; FM 3-100.11).
Full spectrum operations are the range of
1-6. The Army METL tasks describe
operations Army forces conduct in war
what well-trained, superbly led, and well­
and military operations other than war.
equipped soldiers do for the nation. They state what the Army does so the nation can use its military power effectively across the full spectrum of operations in war, conflict, and peace. While focused on the land dimension, Army forces complement other service forces in unified action. The ability of Army forces to perform these tasks generates the credible land power necessary for JFCs to preclude and deter enemy action, win decisively if deterrence fails, and establish a rapid return to sustained postconflict stability. Thus, Army forces expand a JFC's range of military options in full spectrum operations.
SHAPE THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Instruments of National Power
1-7. The national security and
national military strategies establish an
• Diplomatic
imperative for engagement. The US will • Informationalremain politically and militarily engaged • Militaryin the world and will maintain military • Economic
superiority over potential adversaries. Engagement elevates to mission status the role of the US armed forces in shaping an international environment that promotes and protects US national security interests, before the threat of conflict arises. Forward basing, forward presence, and force projection enhance the ability of Army forces to engage other nations—their people, governments, and militaries.
1-8. Army forces pursue engagement through overseas presence and PME activities.
Army forces conduct PME activities at home and abroad. Through PME, Army forces
contribute significantly to promoting regional stability, reducing potential conflicts and
threats, and deterring aggression and coercion.
1-9. PME activities are proactive, opportunity-based endeavors conducted at home and
abroad to shape the international security environment to favor US interests. Most nations
maintain armies and paramilitary organizations as their primary military instruments.
Through many day-to-day interactions with these forces, Army forces strengthen alliances
and coalitions and foster the development of democratic institutions. Working with allies
and potential coalition partners, Army forces foster bilateral and multilateral relationships,
increase military openness, enhance cooperation, and advance regional conflict prevention
and resolution mechanisms.
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1-10. Other PME activities are directed at potential adversaries. Those activities reduce the potential for instability and conflict by discouraging arms races, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), combatting terrorism, and deterring aggression. The presence of Army forces performing these PME activities provides a visible sign of US commitment to peace and stability.
1-11. By conducting PME activities, Army forces continually help combatant commanders shape their areas of responsibility (AORs). In this context, PME activities are developmental stability operations directed within a combatant commander's theater engagement plan. As such, they are planned and conducted like any other military operation. Army forces, especially Army special operations forces (ARSOF), are well suited for PME missions.
RESPOND PROMPTLY TO CRISIS
1-12. JFCs organize actions in time and space to present the enemy with simultaneous, multidimensional threats—land, air, sea, and space. The strategic responsiveness of Army forces adds dominance of the vital land dimension to the capabilities of joint forces. In today's environment, potential enemies understand the dynamics of dimensional combat. They will attempt to sequence their activities to avoid air and naval strikes, while consolidating their position before significant land forces can defeat them. Responsive Army forces give JFCs the ability to conduct operational and tactical maneuver on land early in the operation. Operational and tactical maneuver provides the basis for Army forces to seize and retain the initiative and dictate the terms of land combat. Prompt response increases the magnitude of the enemy's dilemma exponentially. It allows the JFC to apply US military power in complementary and asymmetric ways. This allows the joint force to quickly build and maintain momentum and win decisively.
1-13. Army forces respond to crises in all environments. They are versatile enough to
dominate any situation. Army commanders tailor and train forces to react quickly to any
crisis, regardless of its nature or the circumstances.
MOBILIZE THE ARMY
1-14. The Army maintains the ability to mobilize reserve component (Army National
Guard and US Army Reserve) forces to meet combatant commanders' contingent needs or
the requirements of war or national emergencies. The Army also has the facilities,
equipment, systems, procedures, and manpower necessary to generate sustained combat
power rapidly and effectively.
1-15. It is impossible to guarantee that active component forces will always be properly
configured or sufficiently manned and equipped to meet either unexpected contingencies or
the requirements of sustained land combat. Providing the means to expand the Army
ensures that the National Command Authorities (NCA) can confront unforeseen threats to
national security. Integrated approaches to DTLOMS ensure that all Army components
stand trained and ready for action.
CONDUCT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
1-16. Army forces make it possible for JFCs to seize areas previously denied by the

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enemy force. Army forces can strike contested areas from the air, land, and sea. They can establish and secure lodgments for projecting follow-on forces and sustaining the joint force. The airborne and air assault capabilities of Army forces allow JFCs to seize airfields or other important facilities, such as WMD production and storage sites. In conjunction with the Navy and other services, Army forces can conduct amphibious operations. Seizure and retention of land areas extends beyond points of entry. It can occur at any point where JFCs need to conduct operational maneuver.
DOMINATE LAND OPERATIONS DODDOA-007887
1-17. For war to be decisive, its outcome must be conclusive. Army forces today are the preeminent land forces in the world. That preeminence translates into the ability to dominate land operations—the decisive complement to air, sea, and space operations. The threat or use of Army forces is the ultimate means of imposing the nation's will and achieving a lasting outcome. Land operations seize the enemy's territory and resources, destroy his armed forces, and eliminate his means of controlling his population. Only land forces can exercise direct, continuing, discriminate, and comprehensive control over land, people, and resources.
1-18. Ultimately, it is the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy that allows the Army to dominate land operations. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces through maneuver and precision direct and indirect fires. An adaptive enemy attempts to lessen the effects of operational fires. However, with their inherent qualities of on-the-ground presence and situational understanding, Army forces make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of fires alone. Domination extends from the certainty in the minds of enemy commanders that close combat with Army forces, backed by superlative US air and naval forces, will have two outcomes—destruction or surrender.
1-19. Sustained land operations establish the conditions required for long-term national objectives. Army forces can conduct sustained, large-scale full spectrum operations throughout the theater of operations. Army forces are inherently durable, self-sustaining, and self-replenishing. This endurance allows them to remain in a theater of operations as long as the NCA require. Faced by an enemy capable of prolonged resistance, Army forces create and maintain conditions that lead to the enemy's ultimate defeat.
1-20. Army operational-level organizations include corps, Army service component commands (ASCCs), numbered armies, and other functional and multifunctional units. These organizations are resourced, trained, and equipped to dominate opposing land forces, control vast land areas, temporarily govern occupied areas, and control populations and resources. Their capabilities include operational and tactical maneuver and fires; command and control (C2) of Army, joint, and multinational forces; theater air and missile defense; intelligence; military and civil engineering; and combat service support (CSS). In addition, ARSOF add special operations capabilities to joint forces. These capabilities include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, information operations (I0), WMD counterproliferation, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, civil affairs, and psychological operations.
1-21. Robust combat support and CSS to the joint force make sustained land action
possible. Normally, Army forces, through the ASCCs, provide CSS; land-based theater air
and missile defense; and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense to support or augment
the capabilities of all joint force components. Key Army operational-level support
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1-22. The Army also maintains the structure and expertise necessary to develop, acquire, and supply the equipment and supplies for full spectrum operations. In addition to supplying Army forces, the Army manages certain commodities, such as conventional ammunition, for all services. It also maintains the research and development capabilities and linkages to the US industrial base that give Army forces the best equipment in the world.
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
1-23. Army forces adapt and tailor their warfighting capabilities to complement and support civil authorities and agencies at home and abroad. In times of need, Army forces provide support and expertise to reinforce or fill critical requirements beyond the immediate capabilities of civil authorities and agencies. The presence of trained and ready Army forces from active and reserve components in the United States contributes to security and defense of the homeland. The Army can rapidly respond to natural or manmade disasters as well as threats to security because it possesses a robust and diverse force structure, maintains a substantial physical presence throughout the US, and has forces based or deployed forward in every theater. Prompt Army assistance to civil authorities is often a decisive element in disaster relief and crisis resolution. Army forces continue sustained support until civil authorities no longer require military assistance.
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Dimensions of the Operational Environment
1-24. The operational environment
has six dimensions. Each affects how
• Threat
Army forces combine, sequence, and • Politicalconduct military operations.
• Unified actionCommanders tailor forces, employ • Land combat operationsdiverse capabilities, and support • Informationdifferent missions to -succeed in this • Technologycomplex environment.
THE THREAT DIMENSION
1-25. The potential for armed conflict between nation-states remains a serious challenge.
Despite the best efforts of many, disparities in wealth, technology, and information create
unstable conditions among nations. Additionally, the influence of nonstate actors has ever
increasing regional and worldwide implications. Nations, nonstate actors, and transnational
entities compete in the diplomatic, informational, military and economic arenas of the
strategic environment. Rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. More often,
one multinational group opposes another similar group with conflicting interests. Even
within alliances or coalitions, the different parties have their own purposes.

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1-27. In the foreseeable future, most nations will modernize and maintain military capabilities for countering regional threats or seeking opportunities. Military change will incorporate advances in information technology, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, WMD, and genetic engineering. Potential threats vary from heavy conventional units to adaptive, asymmetric forces structured for local and regional use. Adversaries will seek and obtain technologies that challenge US strengths in information technology, navigation, night vision systems, and precision targeting and strike capabilities. The proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery systems will enable adversaries to threaten US forces at greater ranges with increased lethality and precision.
1-28. Adversaries will develop warfighting doctrine that takes perceived US strengths and vulnerabilities into account. They will try to prevent projection of US forces and control the nature and the tempo of US actions through asymmetric operations and adaptive forces. They will try to counter US air operations and neutralize US technological advantages, such as precision strike capabilities. Adversaries will adapt to more nonlinear, simultaneous operations conducted throughout the AO. They will use conventional and unconventional means to destroy'US national will and the capability to wage war.
1-29. Adversaries will also seek to shape conditions to their advantage. They will try to
change the nature of the conflict or use capabilities that they believe difficult for US forces
to counter. They will use complex terrain, urban environments, and force dispersal
methods—similar to those used by the North Vietnamese, Iraqis and Serbs—to offset US
advantages. These methods increase targeting difficulties and may result in US forces
wasting precision weapons on relatively unimportant assets. Generally, adversaries will
seek to operate against US forces according to these concepts:
•
Conduct force-oriented operations. Inflict unacceptable casualties.

•
Attempt to control the tempo. Create conditions to defeat US forcible entry operations.

•
Transition to a defensive framework that avoids decisive battle, preserves capability, and prolongs the conflict. If US forces deploy, use terrorist tactics and other attacks to erode public support, alliance or coalition cohesion, and the will to fight.

•
Use modernized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and WMD to conduct sophisticated ambushes. Destroy key operating systems or inflict mass casualties within and outside the theater of operations.

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•
Use terrain and urban areas to disperse mechanized and armored units. Concentrate and disperse them as opportunities allow. Maneuver forces during periods of reduced exposure to US technology. Use upgraded camouflage and deception capabilities.

•
Form coalitions against the US.

•
Acquire or modify advanced technology systems to create surprise and limited duration overmatch in specific areas.

Adversaries will continue to seek every opportunity for advantage over US and multinational forces. When countered, they will adapt to the changing conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat. This environment and the wide array of threats present significant challenges. Army forces must simultaneously defeat an adversary while protecting noncombatants and the infrastructure on which they depend.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
1-30. The national security strategy defines how the US meets challenges in the complex and dynamic global environment. It establishes broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests through the instruments of national power. The detailed formulation of national strategic policy and direction is beyond the scope of this manual. Nevertheless, the national military strategy, derived from national security policy, forms the basis for all operations in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) (see JP 1; FM 1).
1-31. The military component of the national security strategy focuses on using military force as an instrument of national power. The NCA combine it with other instruments of national power to preserve, protect, and advance US interests. Military operations influence, and are influenced by, political direction and the integrated use of other instruments of power. The military objective in war is rapid, decisive victory. The NCA determine how that victory contributes to the overall policy objectives. War makes the most overt use of military force. However, successful military operations in any form require Army force commanders with a clear sense of strategic policy goals and objectives. They must understand how using military force fits into the national security strategy and the desired military conditions required to meet policy objectives. In addition, commanders must be able to clearly and concisely articulate this understanding to the US and international media. All political decisions made during operations have strategic, operational, and tactical implications. Likewise, each strategic, operational, and tactical action directly or indirectly affects the political dimension. Translating political decisions into military missions depends on informed and candid assessments. Army force commanders must articulate the military capabilities and limitations of their forces to the JFC, and when required, directly to the NCA.

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Task Force Eagle in Bosnia
Beginning in December 1995, Task Force (TF) Eagle deployed to Bosnia to support
a unified action conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under
the Dayton Accords. The Army-led task force moved elements from Western
Europe to the Balkans by air, rail, and road under severe winter conditions. The
force encountered several challenges as it closed into the AO. The area was a former
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war zone, heavily laden with unexploded munitions and millions of landmines.
Armed former warring factions faced each other along battle lines, where a tenuous
cease-fire remained in effect. TF Eagle's AO contained forces under the United
Nations Protection Force, a situation that required extensive information exchange
and coordination before mission transfer to the NATO Implementation Force
(IFOR). Adding to the complexity was TF Eagle's multinational composition of
25,000 soldiers representing 11 nations. TF Eagle closed in the theater of operations
on 14 February 1996. The credible, overwhelming force coupled with extensive
planning, liaison, leadership, and discipline overcame language and cultural barriers
to move the former warring factions into designated garrisons. Within one year,
IFOR carried out the military provisions of the Dayton Accords and created
conditions for implementing their civil provisions.
THE UNIFIED ACTION DIMENSION
1-32. The national military strategy calls for Army forces to act as part of a fully interoperable and integrated joint force. Consequently, the employment of Army forces in campaigns and major operations is viewed from a joint perspective. JFCs synchronize Army force operations with those of other service forces. They exploit Army force capabilities and create an effective joint team.
1-33. Land operations determine the outcome of major theater wars (MTWs). In an MTW, the nation employs large joint and multinational forces in major combat operations to defeat an enemy nation, coalition, or alliance. The Gulf War of 1991 is an example of an MTW. Army forces are the decisive forces for sustained land combat, war termination, and postwar stability. JFCs normally designate the land component as the supported force during those phases of a campaign. In other phases, they may designate another component as the supported force. In such cases, Army forces support the lead component. During all campaign phases, JFCs synchronize the complementary capabilities of the service components that comprise the joint force. In all cases, JFCs have access to the full complement of versatile Army forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives (see FM 3-100.7).
1-34. Smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) encompass a wide range of joint and multinational military operations that fall between MTW and PME. While not all-inclusive, Army forces committed to SSCs protect American lives and interests, support political initiatives, facilitate diplomacy, promote fundamental American ideals, or disrupt illegal activities. As in MTWs, the JFC assigns supported and supporting relationships to components of the joint force to best accomplish the mission.
1-35. Army forces work with multinational and interagency partners to accomplish their missions. Ideally, multinational and interagency partners provide cultures, perspectives, and capabilities that reinforce and complement Army strengths and capabilities. Close coordination is the foundation of successful unified action.

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THE LAND COMBAT OPERATIONS DIMENSION
. 1-36. Land combat continues to be the salient feature of conflict. It usually involves destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking land objectives that reduce the enemy's
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effectiveness or will to fight. Four characteristics distinguish land combat:
•
Scope. Land combat involves contact with an enemy throughout the depth of an operational area. Forces conduct simultaneous and sequential operations in contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. Commanders maneuver forces to seize and retain key and decisive terrain. They use maneuver, fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy enemy forces. Land combat normally entails close and continuous contact with noncombatants. Rules of engagement reflect this.

•
Duration. Land combat is repetitive and continuous. It involves rendering an enemy incapable or unwilling to conduct further action. It may require destroying him.

•
Terrain. Land combat takes place among a complex variety of natural and manmade features. The complexity of the ground environment contrasts significantly with the relative transparency of air, sea, and space. Plans for land combat must account for the visibility and clutter of the terrain and the effects of weather and climate.

•
Permanence. Land combat frequently requires seizing or securing ground. With control of the ground comes control of populations and productive capacity. Thus, land combat makes permanent the temporary effects of other operations.

THE INFORMATION DIMENSION
1-37.. All military operations take place within an information environment that is largely outside the control of military forces. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information; also included is the information itself (see JP 3-13; FM 3-13). National, international, and nonstate actors use this environment to collect, process, and disseminate information. The media's use of real-time technology affects public opinion, both in the US and abroad, and alters the conduct and perceived legitimacy of military operations. Now, more than ever, every soldier represents America—potentially to a global audience.
1-38. Historically, information superiority has enabled decisive Army force operations. Information superiority enables Army forces to see first, understand the situation more
quickly and accurately, and act faster than their adversaries. Derived from the effective
synchronization of ISR, information management (IM), and 10, information superiority is
an operational advantage that results in friendly forces gaining and retaining the initiative.
Effective ISR operations and IM identify the information commanders require, collect it,
and get it to them when they need it. Offensive I0 degrade an adversary's will to resist and
ability to fight while simultaneously denying him relevant friendly force information.
Defensive I0 protect friendly information and C2 systems. Information superiority means
commanders receive accurate, timely information that enables them to make better
decisions and act faster than their adversaries. Early attainment of information superiority
influences all aspects of Army force operations. For example, sharing accurate, current
information between initial-entry and follow-on forces creates the conditions for rapid
transition from deployment to employment. Sharing real-time changes in the situation
among all elements of a force in contact facilitates synchronization and encourages
subordinates to exercise initiative.
THE TECHNOLOGY DIMENSION

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1-39. Technology enhances leader, unit, and soldier performance and affects how Army forces conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) full spectrum operations in peace, conflict, and war. For example, commanders and staffs assess capability differences among Army forces along with those of multinational forces when designing plans, preparing forces, and weighing employment options. Quality information provided by advanced communications and ISR capabilities assist commanders in making decisions. Battle command benefits from the ability of modern microprocessors and telecommunications to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information faster and with greater precision. Technology improves soldier endurance and protection, thereby increasing the potential for mission accomplishment. Army warfighting methods adopt expanded capabilities in lethal and nonlethal weapons, projectiles, propellants, and power sources. Battlefield lethality increases due to changes in target acquisition, armament, and delivery means. Commanders leverage technological advancement in force protection and discriminate use of force in stability operations. They use improved C2, mobility, and CSS in support operations. Enhanced CSS, C2, and IM increase operational reach.
1-40. In any operation, Army forces assume that adversaries possess at least some advanced weaponry. Their weaponry may range from a computer connected to the Internet to WMD. Adversaries may also possess information-based technologies or capabilities, such as satellite imagery, night vision devices, or precision-delivery systems. These can present asymmetric threats to Army forces. The potential for asymmetric threats puts a premium on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the other intelligence tasks, to include situation development and providing indications and warning. Operational success requires identifying enemy capabilities (strengths and vulnerabilities), intentions, and courses of action.
1-41. Fielding technologically advanced systems means that commanders will have to combine the capabilities of units at different modernization levels. For example, digitized forces have advantages—such as precision location, precision fires, and in-transit visibility of equipment, personnel, and stocks—that other forces do not. Digitized forces use fires and maneuver with a precision and tempo that less modernized forces cannot match. Force tailoring creates hybrid forces with dissimilar capabilities and technologies. Additional challenges arise during multinational operations. Technological, organizational, and doctrinal differences require exchanging liaison teams and C2, communications, and intelligence equipment. Integrating Army and multinational forces in a way that synchronizes and maximizes their various capabilities is one aspect of unified action.
—
Technology Aids SoldiersOperation Desert Hammer VI
Army force commanders use technology to enhance operations and provide an edge
over adversaries. In April 1994, Army aviation and ground forces participated in
Operation Desert Hammer VI, an advanced warfighter experiment conducted at the
National Training Center (NTC). During the exercise, soldiers of TF 1-70, 194th
Separate Armored Brigade conducted simulated combat operations using digital
technology that enhanced their capabilities against the NTC opposing force. Army
forces used the Dismounted Digital Soldier System to enhance visibility during day
and night as well as through obscurants and to radio timely scouting reports to
higher headquarters. Tanks employed the Intervehicle Information System to
enhance mission planning through shared information and increased situational
understanding on the move. TF 1-70 received fire support from Paladin, a digitized

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During Desert Hammer VI, Army forces confirmed that, while technology improved
their performance, soldiers remain the Army's most important resource.
1-42. The US does not have a monopoly on technology. Just as US forces exploit technology to achieve an operational advantage, so might an enemy force. Never in history has access to advanced technology been so widespread. Even adversaries lacking a research and development capability can purchase remarkably sophisticated systems in the global marketplace. Commanders and staffs should prepare for adversaries who use technology in very sophisticated ways. These ways may differ sharply from the ways that US forces use similar technologies. Some adversaries may apply new technologies altogether.
1-43. Ei en with its advantages, the side with superior technology does not always win in land operations; rather, the side that applies combat power more skillfully usually prevails. The skill of soldiers coupled with the effectiveness of leaders decides the outcomes of engagements, battles, and campaigns. This fact does not lessen the positive effects of advanced technologies. It does, however, challenge soldiers and leaders to realize and use the potential of advanced technologies in the conduct of full spectrum operations.
DOCTRINE AND THE ARMY
An operation is (1) a military action or
1-44. Doctrine is the concise expression
the carrying out of a strategic, tactical,
of how Army forces contribute to unified
service, training, or administrative
action in campaigns, major operations,
military mission; (2) the process of
battles, and engagements. While it
carrying on combat, including movement,
complements joint doctrine, Army doctrine
supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers
also describes the Army's approach and
needed to gain the objectives of any battle
contributions to full spectrum operations on
or campaign.
land. Army doctrine is authoritative but not
prescriptive. Where conflicts between Army and joint doctrine arise, joint doctrine takes .
precedence.

1-45. Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates communication among
soldiers no matter where they serve, contributes to a shared professional culture; and serves
as the basis for curricula in the Army Education System. Army doctrine provides a common
language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations. It is rooted
in time-tested principles but is forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies,
threats, and missions. Army doctrine is detailed enough to guide operations, yet flexible
enough to allow commanders to exercise initiative when dealing with specific tactical and
operational situations. To be useful, doctrine must be well known and commonly
understood.

1-46. As the Army's keystone operations manual, FM 3-0 provides the principles for
conducting operations. It describes the Army's operational-level role of linking tactical
operations to strategic aims and how Army forces conduct operations in unified action. FM
3-0 bridges Army and joint operations doctrine. It also links Army operations doctrine with
Army tactical doctrine.

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FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1-47. Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum
of conflict (see Figure 1-1). Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types
of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW.
For each mission, the JFC and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army
forces place on each type of operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally
dominate military operations in war and some SSCs. Stability operations and support
operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and PME.
Gonend OpondIons US Goal Ottonso Defense Sternly Support
Ii
1111
I
powsepoem.•
LEGEND
ITN -rnsipr theater ow
SIC -ornollopsooks cor*girey
PINE -powatirrie agility erimarnent

Figure 1-1. The Range of Army Operations
1-48. Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations (see Figure 1 -2). Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations:
•
Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory.

•
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.

•
Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and

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• Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.
Domestically, Army forces respond only when the NCA direct. Army forces operate
under the lead federal agency and comply with provisions of US law, to include the
Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts.
Armyforces accomplieh missions by combining
and executing tau 0111 of many operations

Offense Defense Stability Support
In Joint multinedonal, and bdensgency environments.
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Figure 1-2. Full Spectrum Operations
1-49. When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to accomplish the mission. The JFC and the Army component commander for a particular mission determine the. emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive,
stability, and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change from promoting
peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and
transitions between these operations require skillful assessment,planning, preparation, and
execution. Operations designed to accomplish more than one strategic purpose may be
executed simultaneously, sequentially, or both. For example, within a combatant
commander's AOR, one force may be executing large-scale offensive operations while
another is conducting stability operations. Within the combat zone, Army forces may
conduct stability operations and support operations as well as combat operations.
1-50. Commanders allocate different proportions of their force to each type of operation
during different phases of a mission. Large units are likely to conduct simultaneous
offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Units at progressively lower echelons
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receive missions that require fewer combinations. At lower echelons, units usually perform
only one type of operation. For example, an Army corps acting as the joint force land
component may allocate two divisions to attack (offense) while a third division secures a
port and airfield complex (defense). The defending division may order one brigade to
eliminate small pockets of resistance (offense) while two others prepare defenses in depth.
Around the airfield and port, designated units distribute food and provide medical support
to refugees (support). Still other corps units and ARSOF equip and train host nation forces
(stability).

TRAINING FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
The whole of military activity must
1-51. Every day, the Army trains soldiers

therefore relate directly or indirectly to the
and units while developing leaders.

engagement The end for which a soldier is
Effective training is the cornerstone of

recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the
operational success. It is a full-time job for

whole object of his sleeping, eating,
commanders in peacetime and continues

drinking, and marching is simply that he
when units deploy. Training to high

should fight at the right place and the right
standards is essential for a full spectrum

time.
force; Army forces must train to, and
maintain, the highest readiness levels.
Clausewitz
Battle-focused training on combat tasks prepares soldiers, units, and leaders to deploy, fight, and win. More often than not, Army forces execute full spectrum operations as part of a joint force. Joint training is a critical part of mission planning and preparation for Army leaders and units. Upon alert, initial­entry Army forces deploy immediately, conduct operations, and—if necessary—complete any mission-specific training in country. Commanders of follow-on forces conduct pre- or postdeployment mission rehearsal exercises, abbreviated if necessary, based on available time and resources.
1-52. The METL development process describes the links between mission and training (see FM 7-0; FM 7-10). Commanders focus their METL, training time, and resources on combat tasks unless directed otherwise. Because Army forces face diverse threats and mission requirements, commanders may need to temporarily adjust their METL from battle focused tasks to focus on preparing for anticipated missions. Major Army command (MACOM), ASCC, continental US Army, and corps commanders determine the battle focus, resources, and METL that maintain the required readiness posture for anticipated operations in war or MOOTW. MACOM commanders decide for operational-level units, corps commanders for corps units. Commanders at lower levels conduct battle focused training unless otherwise directed.
SOLDIERS AND LEADERSHIP
1-53. Soldiers provide the capability for decisive victory. Success in battle depends on
sound doctrine; competent leadership; effective weaponry, equipment, and organizations;
and well-trained, motivated, quality soldiers and units. The most important of these factors
is soldiers. Their character and competence, combined with the warrior ethos, comprise the
foundation of a trained and ready Army. The combination of quality soldiers, competent
leaders, and cohesive units creates a versatile, powerful force.
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FM3-0 Chapter 1 The Army and the Role of Land Power Page 16 of 16
1-54. The Army needs competent and versatile soldiers able to accomplish missions in a challenging and ever changing global environment. They must be able to successfully accomplish tasks while operating alone or in small groups. Soldiers and leaders must exercise mature judgment and initiative under stressful circumstances and be capable of learning and adapting to meet the demands of full spectrum operations.

No man is a leader until his appointment is
1-55. Soldiers must also be technically

ratified in the minds and hearts of his men.
and tactically proficient. They must employ
and maintain increasingly complex and Anonymoussophisticated equipment. Current and future
The Infantry Journal, 1948
technology requires skilled soldiers who understand their systems. Regardless of the importance of equipment or the expansion of technological capabilities, soldiers are more important than machines. Soldiers, not equipment, accomplish missions and win wars. Leadership links soldiers' technical and tactical competence to operational success. Achieving combined arms effectiveness with complex systems demands adaptive and flexible soldiers.
1-56. The role of the leader and leadership is central to all Army operations (see FM 6­
22). Leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—
while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. Purpose gives
soldiers a reason to do tasks. Direction communicates the way to accomplish the mission.
Motivation gives soldiers the will to accomplish the mission. Leadership and the warrior
ethos sustain soldiers during the brutal realities of combat and help them cope with the
ambiguities of complex military operations.
1-57. Leaders create conditions for success. Organizing, equipping, training, and leading
soldiers to accomplish operational missions are the goals of leaders. Will and determination
mold soldiers into effective organizations. Full spectrum operations demand Army leaders
who are masters of both the art and the science of military operations, and have the training
and temperament to adapt to any situation. Success comes from imaginative, flexible, and
daring soldiers and leaders.

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Chapter 2

Unified Action
[S]eparate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958
2-1. In full spectrum operations, Army
forces operate as part of a joint force,
CONTENTS
often within a multinational and
interagency environment. Unified action
The Levels of. War
.
describes the wide scope of actions
The Strategic Level
(including the synchronization of
The Operational Level
activities with governmental and
The Tactical Level
nongovernmental agencies) taking place
Conduct of Unified Action
within unified commands, subordinate
Joint Operations
unified (subunified) commands, or joint
The Other Armed Forces
task forces under the overall direction of
Employing ArmyForces in Joint
.
the commanders of those commands.
Public law charges combatant
Operations
commanders with employing military
Multinational Operations
forces through unified action. Under
Interagency Coordination
unified action, commanders integrate
Considerations for Unified Action
joint, single-service, special, and
Military Considerations
supporting operations with interagency,
Political Considerations
nongovernmental, and multinational—to
Cultural Considerations
include United Nations (UN)—
operations (see JP 0-2).

2-2. Unified action links subordinates to the combatant commander under combatant
command (command authority) (COCOM). Multinational, interagency, and nonmilitary
forces work with the combatant commander through cooperation and coordination.
Regardless of the task or the nature of the threat, combatant commanders employ air, land,
sea, space, and special operations forces, and coordinate with multinational and interagency
partners, to achieve strategic and operational objectives. They formulate theater strategies
and campaigns, organize joint forces, designate operational areas, and provide strategic
guidance and operational focus to subordinates. The aim is to achieve unity of effort among
many diverse agencies in a complex environment. Subordinate joint force commanders
(JFCs) synchronize joint operations in time and space, direct the action of foreign military
forces (multinational operations), and coordinate with governmental and nongovernmental
organizations (interagency coordination) to achieve the same goal.
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Unified Action in Haiti
In September 1994, the US Army's XVIII Airborne Corps participated in Operation
Uphold Democracy, a UN-sanctioned operation to return Haiti's deposed president,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to office. The National Security Council's Haiti Interagency
Working Group planned the operation with the UN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US
Atlantic Command, and XVIII Airborne Corps. Together, the agencies and
headquarters developed flexible force deployment options that reflected changing
political conditions. Army forces with staff augmentation served as Joint Task
Forces (JTFs) 180 and 190. On arrival, they stabilized the country until President
Aristide's return. JTF 190 worked with the combatant commander, supporting
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, joint and multinational forces, and
nongovernmental organizations to secure the cities and countryside, disarm the
Haitian military, replace the local police, and assist the Haitian people. Army forces
then supported the UN by stabilizing the country until elections were held in March 1995.
THE LEVELS OF WAR
2-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational and tactical. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives (see Figure 2-1).
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Figure 2-1. The Levels of War
THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
2-4. The strategic level is that level at which a nation, often as one of a group of nations, determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish them. Strategy is the art and science of developingand employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These national strategic objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. Military strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations (see JP 3-0).
.
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

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2-5. The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations
are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of
operations (AOs). It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The
focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals
through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns,
major operations, and battles. A campaign is a related series of military operations aimed at
accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. A major
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operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area.
These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Figure 2-1 illustrates the link between the levels of war and the plans and actions of military forces.
2-6. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It includes employing military forces and arranging their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements with relative attrition the only measure of success. Operational art requires commanders who can visualize, anticipate, create, and seize opportunities. It is practiced not only by JFCs, but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.
2-7. Operations usually imply broader dimensions of time and space than tactics; the . strategic orientation at the operational level requires commanders to look beyond the immediate situation. While tactical commanders fight the current battle, operational commanders look deeper in time, space, and events. They seek to shape the possibilities of upcoming events in advance to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders, whose tactical activities execute the campaign. Likewise, operational commanders anticipate the results of battles and engagements, and prepare to exploit them to obtain the greatest strategic advantage.
2-8. Operational commanders continually communicate with their strategic superiors to obtain direction and ensure common understanding of events. Mutual confidence and communications among commanders and staffs allow the flexibility to adapt to tactical circumstances as they develop. Tactical results influence the conduct of campaigns through a complex interaction of operational and tactical dynamics. Operational commanders create the conditions for the conduct of battles and engagements, while the results of battles and engagements shape the conduct of the campaign. In this regard, commanders exploit tactical victories to gain strategic advantage, or even to reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses.
2-9. Operational art is translated into operation plans through operational design. A well­designed plan and successfully executed operation shape the situation for tactical actions. Executed skillfully, a good plan increases the chances of tactical success. It does this by creating advantages for friendly forces and disadvantages for the enemy. A flexible plan gives tactical commanders freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions and capabilities. Flexible execution maintains the operational initiative and
maximizes tactical opportunities.
2-10. Without tactical success, a campaign cannot achieve its operational goals. An
essential element of operational art, therefore, is the ability to recognize what is possible at
the tactical level and design a plan that maximizes chances for the success in battles and
engagements that ultimately produces the desired operational end state. Without a coherent
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operational design to link tactical successes, battles and engagements waste precious resources on fights that do not lead to operational goals. A thorough understanding of what is possible tactically, and the ability to create conditions that increase the chances of tactical success, are important attributes of an operational commander. Tactical commanders must understand the operational context within which battles and engagements are fought as well. This understanding allows them to seize opportunities (both foreseen and unforeseen) that contribute to achieving operational goals or defeating enemy initiatives that threaten those goals. Operational commanders require experience at both the operational and tactical levels. From this experience, they gain the instincts and intuition, as well as the knowledge, that underlie an understanding of the interrelation of tactical and operational possibilities and needs.
2-11. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the
following questions:
•
What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)?

•
What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition (ways)?

•
How should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?

•
What are the likely costs or risks in performing that sequence of actions (risk management)?

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THE TACTICAL LEVEL.
2-12. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered • arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below. Engagements are usually short—minutes, hours, or a day (see FM 3-90).
2-13. Tactics is also the realm of close combat, where friendly forces are in immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat or destroy enemy forces and to seize or retain ground. Exposure to close combat separates Army forces from most of their counterparts. Army forces fight until the purpose of the operation is accomplished. Because of this, they are organized to endure losses, provided with combat service support (CSS) to generate and sustain combat power, and trained to deal with uncertainty.
2-14. The operational-level headquarters sets the terms of battle and provides resources
for tactical operations. Tactical success is measured by the contribution of an action to the
achievement of operationally significant results. Battles and engagements that do not
contribute to the campaign objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided. Figure 2-1
illustrates the linkages among the levels of war using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991. The strategic guidance issued by the president translated into orders and actions that
led to the staff sergeant tank commander engaging Iraqi tanks in the middle of the night.
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.
The destruction of the Iraqi tanks in turn enabled the coalition to restore the Kuwaiti
government.
Operation Assured Response—An Example of Joint Synergy
During the 1996 Operation Assured Response in Liberia, forces from the Republic
of Georgia, Italy, and Germany joined with US special operations, Air Force, Navy,
and Marine forces to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation. In early April 1996, gunmen had filled the streets of Monrovia, Liberia, as the country split into armed factions intent on seizing power. The situation worsened as faction members
took hostages. On 9 April, President Clinton ordered the US military to evacuate
American personnel and designated third-party foreign nationals. The Army
deployed Special Forces, an airborne company, signal augmentation and a medical
section as part of a special operations task force from Special Operations Command-
Europe. Army forces entered Monrovia's Mamba Point embassy district, where they
established security for international relief agencies headquartered there. Additional
Army forces reinforced the Marine guards at the American embassy and secured the
central evacuee assembly collection point. Upon securing the evacuees, Navy
helicopters took them to Sierra Leone. The combined capabilities of Army forces,
other services, and multinational troops demonstrated joint synergy and resulted in
the successful evacuation of individuals from 73 countries.

CONDUCT OF UNIFIED ACTION
2-15. In unified action, Army forces synchronize their actions with those of other participants to achieve unity of effort and accomplish the combatant commander's objectives. The capabilities of joint, multinational, and interagency partners can expand strengths, compensate for limitations, and provide operational and tactical depth to Army forces.
JOINT OPERATIONS
Unless limited by the establishing directive,
2-16. Joint operations involve forces of

the commander of the supported force will
two or more services under a single

have the authority to exercise general
commander. Land operations and joint

direction of the supporting effort General
operations are mutually enabling—land

direction includes the designation and
operations are inherently joint operations.

prioritization of targets or objectives,
Joint integration allows JFCs to attack an

timing and duration of the supporting
opponent throughout the depth of their AO,

action, and other instructions necessary
seize the initiative, maintain momentum,

for coordination and efficiency.
and exploit success. Effective joint
integration does not require joint commands JP 0-2
at all echelons, but does require understanding joint synergy at all levels of command. Joint synergy extends the concept of combined arms synergy familiar to soldiers. The strengths of each service component combine to overcome the limitations or reinforce the effects of the other components. The combination of multiple and diverse joint force capabilities creates military power more potent than the sum of its parts.

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THE OTHER ARMED FORCES
2-18. Through Title 10, US Code (USC), and DODD 5100.1, Congress has organized the national defense and defined the function of each armed service. All US armed forces— Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard— and special operations forces (SOF) are'required to provide globally responsive assets to support combatant commanders' theater strategies and the national security strategy. The capabilities of the other armed forces complement those of Army forces. During joint operations, they provide support consistent with JFC-directed missions.
Air Force
2-19. Air Force air platform support is invaluable in creating the conditions for success before and during land operations. Support of the land force commander's concept for ground operations is an essential and integral part of each phase of the operation. Air Force strategic and intratheater airlift, directed by US Transportation Command, supports the movement of Army forces, especially initial-entry forces, into an AO. Air assets move Army forces between and within theaters to support JFC objectives. Fires from Air Force systems create the conditions for decisive land operations. In addition, the Air Force provides a variety of information-related functions— to include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance— that support land operations.
2-20. Support from Army forces made available to the JFACC for tasking—including Army aviation, air defense, military intelligence, and field artillery—is invaluable in accomplishing portions of the counterair, interdiction, theater reconnaissance, and surveillance missions. Such missions may support operations directed by the land component commander or JFC. The effectiveness of air interdiction and close air support depends, to a large degree, on integrating land maneuver with the joint force concept of
operations. Land force commanders understand that defeating enemy air and space capabilities is necessary to ensure freedom of action on the ground.
Navy and Marine Corps
2-21. The Navy and Marine Corps conduct operations in oceans and littoral (coastal)
regions. The Navy's two basic functions are sea control operations and maritime power
projection. Sea control connotes uninhibited use of designated sea areas and the associated
airspace and underwater volume. It affords Army forces uninhibited transit to any trouble
spot in the world.
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2-22. Maritime power projection covers a broad spectrum of offensive naval operations. Those most important to Army force operations include employment of carrier-based aircraft, lodgment by amphibious assault or maritime pre-positioned deployment, and naval bombardment with guns and missiles. Naval forces establish and protect the sea routes that form strategic lines of communications for land forces. The Navy provides strategic sealift vital for deploying Army forces. Army forces cannot conduct sustained land operations unless the Navy controls the sea. Additionally, naval forces augment theater aerospace assets and provide complementary amphibious entry capabilities.
2-23. The Marine Corps, with its expeditionary character and potent forcible entry capabilities, complements the other services with its ability to react rapidly and seize bases suitable for force projection. The Marine Corps often provides powerful air and ground capabilities that complement or reinforce those of Army forces. When coordinated under a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), Army and Marine forces provide a highly flexible force capable of decisive land operations in any environment.
Coast Guard
2-24. The Coast Guard is an armed force under the Department of Transportation. It has a statutory civil law enforcement mission and authority. Army forces support Coast Guard forces, especially during counterdrug interdiction and seizure operations. When directed by the president or upon a formal declaration of war, the Coast Guard becomes a specialized service under the Navy. The Coast Guard and Navy cooperate in naval coastal warfare missions during peace, conflict, and war. During deployment and redeployment operations, the Coast Guard supports force projection. It protects military shipping at seaports of embarkation and debarkation in the US and overseas. The Coast Guard supports JFCs with port security units and patrol craft.
Special Operations Forces Army Special Operations Forces
2-25. SOF provide flexible, rapidly
deployable capabilities that are useful • Special Forcesacross the range of military operations.
• Rangers
SOF can reinforce, augment, and
• Special operations aviationcomplement conventional forces. They • Civil affairscan also conduct independent operations • Psychological operationsin situations that demand a small, • Signal unitsdiscrete, highly trained force. SOF • CSS unitsprovide the NCA and combatant
commanders with options that limit the risk of escalation that might otherwise accompany the commitment of larger conventional forces. In war, SOF normally support the theater campaign or major operations of the JFC. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), SOF support combatant commander theater engagement plans, often directly supporting a
US ambassador. Combatant commanders establish or designate operational command and support relationships for SOF based on mission requirements.
2-26. Land force commanders frequently require Army special operations forces
(ARSOF) assets. ARSOF can conduct diverse missions and are a valuable combat
multiplier for land operations (see FM 3-05). For example, psychological operations units
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can fuse the capabilities of US government departments and agencies to counter adversary
propaganda, misinformation and disinformation. SOF language capabilities and regional
and cultural skills are also useful in stability operations and support operations.
EMPLOYING ARMY FORCES IN JOINT OPERATIONS
2-27. Joint doctrine describes the employment of US forces in joint operations. Army force commanders are always either subordinate to or designated as a JFC. Understanding the command and control (C2) relationships among the components of a joint force is the key to effective joint operations.
Army Forces in Unified Commands
2-28. Except for forces exempted by
the secretary of defense, military
departments assign all forces, to include
nonfederalized Army National Guard
and unmobilized US Army Reserve
forces, under COCOM of combatant
commanders (see JP 0-2). The Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
apportions major Army forces by type
to combatant commanders for deliberate
planning. In addition to forces assigned
in peacetime, Army forces are allocated
to com a an comman ers m responseb t t.di
Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the secretary of defense. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.
Apportioned forces and resources are those
made available for deliberate planning as of
a certain date. They may include assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed.
Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation.
Augmentation forces are forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the NCA.
crises. The secretary of defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs other combatant commanders to reinforce the supported combatant commander with
augmentation forces.
Chain of Command
2-29. The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain
of command with two branches (see Figure 2-2). One branch goes from the NCA to
combatant commanders to the service component commands and subordinate joint
commands. It is for the conduct of operations and support. The other branch goes from the
NCA to the military departments to their respective major service commands. An
administrative control relationship exists between the secretary of the military department
and the respective service component commands. It is for carrying out the military
departments' Title 10 responsibilities of recruiting, manning, equipping, training, and
providing service forces to the combatant commanders. Although the service branch of the
chain of command is distinct from the operating branch, both the Army service component
command (ASCC) and the ARFOR operate within the combatant commander's chain of
command.

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.
himident
I
••••¦
CMS
May

Osportment
E Wiled
Commands

Ilemiee Pomo Met amionsd by °Comm Foil
COCOM
I
Unit Fenno Fimellormi Commonest

OPCON
limrnenv111
ecel;olee.
Farces.SubonlInsie
Unaled
Commend

OPCON
Pouvelionel
*Moe

Component Joint
COMMialleit
Teed Form OPCONITACON
Fames

CIPCCeirrACOM
Serving
OomponenV
Farms

Note

LEGEND
This diagram is only an seampla n dam
ChM of Comma
not prescribe Joint brut organizetbr .
-.- Administrate Conirol

Service components at lower echelons
•— Channel oiCaormunkation

nay only contain swim forme.
Figure 2-2. The Chain of Command and Control
Command Relationships
2-30. At theater level, when Army forces operate outside the US, they are assigned under
a JFC (see JP 0-2; JP 3-0; FM 3-100.7). A JFC is a combatant commander, subunified
commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise COCOM or
operational control (OPCON) over a joint force. Combatant commanders provide strategic
direction and operational focus to forces by developing strategy, planning theater
campaigns, organizing the theater, and establishing command relationships. JFCs plan,
conduct, and support campaigns in the theater of war, subordinate theater campaigns, major
operations, and battles. The four joint command relationships are COCOM, OPCON,
tactical control (TACON), and support (see Figure 2-3).
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.
Inherent
responsibilities are: COCOM OPCON TACON
Gaining combatant
Has command relationship with: commander; gaining service component commander Gaining command Gaining com­mend
May be task organized by: Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component Gaining command Parent unit
commander
Receives logistic support from: Gaining service corn-ponent commander Service component command; parent unit Parent unit
Assigned position or AO by: Gaining component commander Gaining command Gaining corn-mend
Provides liaison to: As required by gain­rning component co-mender As required by gaining command As required by gaining com-mand
Establishes and maintains comma-nications with: As required by gain-ing component corn-mender As required by gaining command As required by gaining corn­mend & parent units
Has priorities established by Gaining component commander Gaining command Gaining corn-mand
Gaining unit can impose further command relation-ship/ authority of: OPCON; TACON; direct support: mutual support; general sup-port; close supportsupport OPCON; TACON; direct support: mutual support; general support; close support Direct support; support: general sup-port: close support

-
Figure 23. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities
2-31. Combatant Command (Command Authority). COCOM is a nontransferable command authority exercised only by combatant commanders unless the NCA direct otherwise. Combatant commanders exercise it over assigned forces. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces to accomplish missions. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM through subordinate commands, to include subunified commands, service component commands, functional component commands, and JTFs.
2-32. Operational Control. OPCON is inherent in COCOM. It is the authority to perform those functions of command that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of the combatant command. It can be delegated or transferred. Army commanders use it routinely to task organize forces. The secretary of defense must approve transferring OPCON of units between combatant commanders.
2-33. Tactical Control. TACON is authority normally limited to the detailed and
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specified local direction of movement and maneuver of forces to accomplish a task. It allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of CSS assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative or logistic support. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive Combatant commanders use TACON to delegate limited authority to direct the tactical use of combat forces. TACON is often the command relationship established between forces of different nations in a multinational force. It may be appropriate when tactical-level Army units are placed under another service headquarters. Army commanders make one Army force TACON to another when they want to withhold authority to change the subordinate force organizational structure and leave responsibility for administrative support or CSS with the
parent unit of the subordinate force.
2-34. Administrative Control. Unless the secretary of defense specifies_ otherwise, administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces remains within the Army chain of command, from lowest levels to the ASCC to the secretary of the Army. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support. It includes organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness,

Sample Army ADCON Responsibilities
•
Personnel (including postal and personnel accounting)

•
Finance (including commercial or vendor services)

•
Medical and dental

•
Legal

•
Provost marshal

•
Logistics: Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX, maintenance, distribution, contracting, and mortuary affairs

•
General engineering (including public works)

•
Chaplain and religious activities

mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with Title 10 USC administration and support responsibilities. It is always subject to the command authority of the combatant commander.
2-35. Support. Joint doctrine establishes support as a command authority. Commanders establish it between subordinate commanders when one organization must aid, protect, or sustain another (see JP 0-2; JP 3-0). Under joint doctrine, there are four categories of support (see Figure 2-4). General and direct support describe the supporting.command's focus. Mutual and close support are forms of activity based on proximity and combat actions. Army doctrine establishes four support relationships: direct, reinforcing, general, and general support reinforcing (see Chapter 4).

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CATEGORY' OE.i1t1li
The action given to the supported force as a whole
General support
rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
The action that units render each other against anenemy because of their assigned tasks. that position
Mutual support
relative to each other and to the enemy, and their

inherent capabilities.
A mission requiring a force to support anotherDirect support specific force and authorizing it to answer directly thesupported forces request for assistance.
The action of the supporting force against targets orobjectives that are sufficiently near the supported
Close support force as to require detailed integration or coordinationof the supporting action with fire. movement, or other actions of the supported force.
Figure 2-4. Joint Support Categories
The Army Service Component Command
2-36. The ASCC commander is the senior Army commander in a combatant
commander's area of responsibility. The ASCC commander, using ADCON authority, is
responsible for the Army Title 10 functions of preparing, maintaining, training, equipping,
administering, and supporting Army forces attached to joint forces subordinate to the
combatant command. Peacetime training of assigned Army forces is also under the ASCC.
Combatant commanders may assign ASCCs responsibility for significant lead-service
combat support (such as chemical decontamination) or common user logistic (CUL)
functions. The ASCC also provides theater-strategic and operational-level support to
combatant command campaign and major operition planning.
2-37. The ASCC commander normally designates an Army unit within each joint force subordinate to the combatant command as the ARFOR for that joint force. These ARFORs are responsible for accomplishing operational-level Army tasks within the joint force to which they are assigned. ASCC commanders establish C2 relationships for ARFORs and tailor the forces assigned to them to best meet combatant commander guidance. The ASCC commander may delegate authority to coordinate and execute Army operational-level Title 10 and lead-service CUL support responsibilities to a subordinate Army support unit, normally a theater support command (TSC). Other ASCC tasks described in JP 0-2 include-
•
Recommending to the JFC or subunified commander the proper employment of Army component forces.

•
Accomplishing operational missions as assigned.

•
Selecting and nominating Army units for assignment to subordinate theater forces.

•
Informing the combatant commander of Army CSS effects on operational capabilities.

•
Providing data to supporting operation plans as requested.

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The ARFOR
2-38. An ARFOR consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces
assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command,
joint functional command, or multinational command. Providing Army forces within a
joint operational area (JOA) is the responsibility of the ASCC of the combatant command.
The term ARFOR is commonly used to describe both the headquarters of the Army forces
provided to the joint force and the Army forces themselves. An ARFOR commander may
not have OPCON of all of Army forces provided to the JFC; however, the ARFOR
commander remains responsible for their administrative control (ADCON). See FM 3-100.7 for ARFOR organizational structures.
2-39. An ARFOR is designated whenever Army forces are involved in an operation. Even if separate Army forces are conducting independent operations within a JOA, there is only one ARFOR headquarters in that JOA. ASCCs, numbered army, and corps headquarters (with augmentation) are capable of serving as ARFOR headquarters. In certain smaller-scale contingencies, a division headquarters may be designated as ARFOR headquarters; however, a division headquarters requires extensive augmentation for this mission.
2-40. The ARFOR commander may also serve as JFLCC. A dual-hatted ARFOR commander normally gives some Army-specific tasks to a deputy commander. However, if an ARFOR commander becomes JTF commander, the next senior Army headquarters assumes ARFOR responsibilities. Combatant commanders may receive another Army headquarters for this.
2-41. An ARFOR headquarters may have a TSC attached to perform operational-level logistic and personnel support tasks. These include Title 10 lead service CUL support
responsibilities and interagency support requirements.
.

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MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
2-42. Although the US sometimes acts unilaterally, it pursues its national interests through alliances and coalitions when possible. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, more than 800,000 military personnel from 36 nations combined their will, forces, and resources to oppose the Iraqi armed forces. Forming the coalition increased the size of the overall force, shared the cost of waging the war, and enhanced the legitimacy of the strategic aims. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the advantage of successful multinational warfare over unilateral efforts.
2-43. Multinational operations are
An alliance is the result of formal
conducted within the structure of an alliance
agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or
or a coalition (see JP 3-16; FM 3-16).
more nations for broad, long-term
Military alliances, such as the North
objectives which further the common
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may
interests of the members.
afford participating nations time to establish
formal, standard agreements for broad, long-
A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement
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term objectives. Alliance members strive to
between two or more nations for common
field compatible military systems, establish
action.
common procedures, and develop
contingency plans to meet potential threats in a fully integrated manner.

2-44. Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. Often, coalition
operations are conducted under the authority of a UN resolution. In successful coalitions,
all parties agree to the commitment of forces, even if the resources each invests are
different. While each nation has its own agenda, each brings value to the coalition, even if
solely by contributing to the legitimacy of the enterprise.

2-45. An Army force commander designated as a multinational force commander faces many complex demands. These may include dealing with cultural issues, interoperability challenges, and an immature theater C2 organization. Commanders may also be required to address different national procedures, the sharing of intelligence, and theater support functions. Since coalition operations are not structured around standing agreements, a preliminary understanding of the requirements for operating with a specific foreign military may occur through peacetime military engagement. These developmental activities include, but are not limited to, ongoing personal contacts, pre-positioning of equipment, exercises, exchange programs, and humanitarian assistance. Every
The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theater. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field.... This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower "Memorandum for an Allied Command. For Admiral Louis Mountbatten," 1943
multinational operation is different. Commanders analyze the mission's peculiar requirements so they can exploit the advantages and compensate for the limitations of a multinational force.
2-46. The ASCC function of providing theater-level support is demanding in a multinational environment. Integrating the support functions of several national forces, which may be spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is a challenging task. However, multinational partners provide additional resources to address the CSS challenges inherent in a force projection strategy. Deploying and employing combat power from a force projection base that is friendly, secure, and close to the AO— especially when that base offers a mature infrastructure—is preferable to making a forcible entry from a distant base.
2-47. The Army TSC normally provides multinational CSS and, with proper augmentation, other specific CSS functions. Although each nation is responsible for sustaining the forces it deploys, multinational CSS may achieve significant economy of force. Multinational CSS may be provided by lead nation, role specialist nation, or acquisition and cross-service agreements. However, an international agreement is required

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to provide support under the lead nation and role specialist nation methods. Ideally, the
TSC provides common multinational CSS, and with proper augmentation, other CSS
functions, as the ASCC determines. For theater-level support operations to function
properly, combatant commanders must clearly articulate their CSS priorities. The formation
of multinational CSS staff sections facilitates CSS coordination, reduces competition
among multinational partners for common support, and lessens the burden on each (see JP_
4-08).
Command and Control of Multinational Operations
2-48. Unity of command is unlikely in multinational operations. The level of command
authority vested in a multinational force commander is established by agreement among the
multinational partners. The president of the United States retains command authority over
US forces. Most nations have similar restrictions. However, in certain circumstances, it may
be prudent or advantageous to place Army forces under OPCON of a foreign commander.
2-49. To compensate for limited unity of command, commanders concentrate on achieving unity of effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful multinational operations. Political and military policies of multinational partners can limit options for the organization of a multinational command. Long-standing alliances, such as NATO, have integrated command structures with designated nations providing force commanders. Staffs are integrated, and senior representatives from member nations often lead subordinate allied commands. Coalition command is more challenging because it involves combining forces with no standing C2 arrangements. Command relationships and C2 structures usually evolve as the coalition develops. Multinational C2 structures are usually one of three types: parallel command, lead nation command, or a combination of the two (see JP 3-16).
2-50. Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. It is
the simplest to establish and may be the only arrangement that satisfies national sensitivities. However parallel command may weaken unity of effort and should be avoided if possible. Under parallelcommand, multinational forces are directed through existing national chains of command. Decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. Because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.
2-51. Lead nation command exists when the nation providing most of the forces and resources provides the multinational force commander. The lead nation can retain its own C2 structure and employ other national forces as subordinate formations. Commanders may combine other nations' staffs to better coordinate complementary capabilities. More commonly, limited integration of national staffs characterizes lead nation command. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a multinational force. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. This was the command arrangement used by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership while Islamic forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.
2-52. The creation of an effective multinational staff requires experience, imagination,

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2-53. During multinational operations, US forces establish liaison with assigned
multinational forces early. Additional specialized liaison personnel in fields such as aviation, fire support, engineer, intelligence, public affairs, and civil affairs are also exchanged based on mission requirements. This integration fosters common understanding
of missions and tactics, facilitates transfer of information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence.
2-54. An integrated command structure is probably most effective when partners are similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experience exists. This approach requires each troop-contributing nation to receive, understand, plan, and implement missions the same way as the other troop-contributing nations. However, if the multinational force is composed of dissimilar nations, it may require a modified approach to achieve unity of effort. The JFC or multinational force commander may use his own staff for most planning functions, other national augmentees for their national expertise, and liaison officers to translate and relay instructions to their national forces. As capabilities develop, commanders may also consider using coordination centers to enhance stability and interaction within the multinational force (see JP 3-16; FM 3-16).
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2-55. Commanders have to accommodate differences in operational and tactical capabilities among multinational forces. For example, not all armies have the staff structures or means to process, reproduce, or rapidly disseminate plans and orders. Decision authority delegated to staffs and subordinate commanders also varies among armies.
2-56. The commander's intent and concept of operations must be clearly and simply articulated to avoid confusion resulting from differences in doctrine and terminology. Integrating indirect fires, naval surface fires, close air support, interdiction, and information operations requires common maneuver and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs). All elements of the force must fully understand and strictly adhere to them. Detailed war­gaming, planning, and rehearsals help develop a common understanding of the operation plan and control measures. Operational and tactical plans address recognition signals, FSCMs, air support, communications, and liaison.
2-57. The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence are major challenges
in a multinational operation. There are many instances in which direct access to finished
intelligence, raw data, source information, or intelligence systems is not allowed outside
national channels. Multinational partners also normally operate separate intelligence
systems to support their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary
widely in sophistication and focus. However, at a minimum, each nation contributes
valuable human intelligence to the multinational effort. Commanders establish systems that
maximize each nation's contribution and provide an effective intelligence picture to all
units. Commanders arrange for the rapid dissemination of releasable intelligence and the
use of available intelligence assets by all partners. A multinational intelligence staff at the
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2-58. Mission assignments of multinational units should reflect the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent. Some significant factors are relative mobility and size; intelligence collection assets; and long-range fire, SOF, and organic CSS capabilities. The ability to contribute to theater air and missile defense, training for operations in special environments, and preparing for defensive operations involving weapons of mass destruction is also important. Rapport with the local population, language considerations, and special skills should be considered as well. Multinational commanders may assign host nation forces home defense or police missions, such as rear area and base security. They may also entrust air defense, coastal defense, or a special operation to a single member of the multinational force based on the special capabilities of that force. The national pride of multinational partners is an important intangible factor that is considered when assigning missions.
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INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
2-59. The instruments of national power complement and reinforce each other. By understanding the influence of other agencies, commanders can add diplomatic, informational, and economic depth to their military efforts. US military capabilities allow other agencies to interact with foreign powers from a position of strength and security. Just as integrating different unit capabilities results in the advantages of combined arms warfare, so synchronizing military power with other instruments of national power leads to dynamic strategic capabilities.
2-60. As campaigns and major operations develop, tasks and objectives that directly support military operations but are the responsibility of other agencies are identified. When commanders and planners identify these objectives, they submit them thrqugh the JFC to the Joint Staff for consideration and nomination to interagency working groups. Formal and task-specific interagency working groups coordinate policy and assign tasks among the various departments and agencies. Once a department or agency accepts a task, it reports through the interagency working group to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff links the JFC to this process.
2-61. The intricate links among the instruments of national power demand that commanders consider how all capabilities and agencies can contribute to achieving the
desired end state. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between military operations
and the activities of organizations such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);
governmental agencies of the US, host nation, and partner nations; and regional,
international, and UN organizations. Theater strategies routinely employ the capabilities of
the entire US interagency network. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes an
interagency process for national security-related issues. The National Security Council
provides national-level oversight of this process (see JP 3-08).
2-62. Interagency cooperation poses challenges. Among the most difficult is lack of
mutual familiarity among the various agencies. In joint operations, leaders from the
different services generally share a common tradition and understanding of military matters.
Interagency operations bring together leaders and staffs that often have no common
experiences. The institutional values and experiences of the separate agencies and
departments sometimes have few common points of reference. Some may even conflict.
However, education and teamwork can create an understanding and awareness of the
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missions, strengths, weaknesses, and outlooks of the interagency members. This understanding can mitigate the friction inherent in interagency operations.
2-63. Along with international, host nation, and official US agencies, Army forces frequently operate with NGOs, such as the American Red Cross and World Emergency Relief. Working with NGOs often requires soldiers and leaders to be flexible and adaptive. Sometimes these organizations may not care to cooperate with military forces. However, US armed forces cooperate as much as their mission allows. Effective cooperation and coordination with NGOs reinforces the legitimacy of the armed forces involved in a unified action. Often NGOs—if they are well disposed toward the military— can provide useful information and insights concerning the local populace.
2-64. NGO capabilities can dramatically reduce the military resources required for civil­
military operations. NGOs have local contacts and experiences. They conduct such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and developmental programs. NGOs are frequently on the scene of a crisis before US forces. They routinely operate in high-risk areas and usually remain long after military forces have departed. They are a significant factor and must be integrated into planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing military operations. Commanders consider the activities
of NGOs as well as mutual security and resource or support requirements when conducting unified action.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNIFIED ACTION
2-65. Joint doctrine addresses employment of Army forces in unified action. Each
operation is different: factors vary with the situation and perspectives of the participants.
Unified action has military, political, and cultural considerations (see Figure 2-5). These considerations are not all-inclusive but highlight factors important to effectively employing
Army forces in unified action.
•
Targebng • Goals and objeceves • Culture and language

•
Fire support coordination • National control of • Communication forces

•
Air and missile defense • Media relations

• Consensus building

•
Teamwork and trust • Law enforcement

•
Doctrine, organization.
and training

•
Equipment

Figure 2-5. Considerations for Unified Action
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
2-66. Unified action requires commanders to consider the same military factors they consider when conducting joint operations (see FM_3-16; FM 3-16). However, participation of multinational and interagency partners adds additional layers of complexity. The following areas require additional attention from commanders and staffs of units conducting unified action.
Targeting.
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Fire Support Coordination Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt,
2-68. JFCs and multinational force
delay, or destroy the enemy's surface
commanders normally establish AOs for
military potential before it can be used
their subordinates. Within their AOs, land
effectively against friendly forces.
and naval force commanders are normally
supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. These
commanders designate target priories and the effects and timing of fires. However, all
missions must contribute to accomplishing joint force objectives.
2-69. Synchronizing operations in land or naval AOs with wider joint operations is
particularly important. To facilitate synchronization, JFCs establish priorities for execution
of operations throughout the theater or JOA, including within the land and naval force
commanders' AOs. Commanders assigned theater-wide functions by the JFC coordinate
with the land and naval force commanders when their operations, to include attacking
targets, occur within a land or naval AO (see JP 3-09).
2-70. Army force commanders recognize the enormous potential of synchronizing maneuver with interdiction. They visualize the links between operations within the land AO and joint operations occurring outside it. They identify interdiction targets outside the land AO that can help create conditions for their decisive operations. They advocate combinations of maneuver and interdiction inside and outside the land AO that impose dilemmas on the enemy. Army commanders understand the theater-wide flexibility and reach of unified air operations. When required, they support joint interdiction outside land AOs with Army assets.
2-71. Integrating joint fires requires the development and full understanding of and strict adherence to common maneuver control measures and FSCMs. To ensure timely and
effective fires, JFCs develop control measures and FSCMs early and emphasize them
continuously. Land and amphibious force commanders may establish a fire support
coordination line (FSCL) within their AO to facilitate current and future operations, and to
protect the force (see JP 3-09). The FSCL is an FSCM that is established and adjusted by
land and amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with
superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. FSCLs facilitate the
expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An
FSCL applies to all fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of
ammunition. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially important to
commanders of air, land, and special operations forces.
2-72. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in enough time to allow necessary action to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground.
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In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination does not preclude
attacking targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to coordinate increases the risk of
fratricide and may waste limited resources. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack
operations. For example, air strikes short of the FSCL—both close air support and air
interdiction—must be under positive or procedural control (for example, by forward air
controllers or tactical air control parties) to ensure proper clearance of fires. This control is
exercised through the operations staff or with designated procedures.
2-73. The FSCL is not a boundary. The establishing commander synchronizes operations on either side of the FSCL out to the limits of the land AO. The establishment of an FSCL does not create a "free-fire area" beyond the FSCL. When targets are attacked beyond an FSCL, the attacks must not produce adverse effects forward, on, or to the rear of the line. Attacks beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing commander's priorities, timing, and desired effects. They are deconflicted with the supported headquarters whenever possible.
Air and Missile Defense
2-74. The area air defense commander (AADC) establishes rules of engagement and assigns air defense missions for operational-level air and missile defense assets. Army force commanders communicate their requirements through the JFC to the JFACC and AADC when developing air and missile defense plans. When the JFC apportions ARFOR assets, including operational-level assets, to the air component for counterair missions, they are generally placed in direct support to the air component. Normally, Army corps retain control of organic air defense units. The JFC may designate the joint or multinational air component commander as the AADC.
Teamwork and Trust
2-75. In unified action, commanders rely upon rapport, respect, knowledge of partners,
team building, and patience. Commanders build teamwork and trust in a joint or
multinational force in many ways. They and their staffs should establish a direct, personal
relationship with their counterparts. Commanders must establish and maintain a climate of
mutual respect. They should know their partners as well as they know their adversary.
Team building is essential. It can be accomplished through training, exercises, and
assigning missions that fit organizational capabilities. Building teamwork and trust takes
time and requires the patience all participants. The result is enhanced mutual confidence
and unity of effort.
Doctrine, Organization, and Training
2-76. National and service military doctrines vary. Some doctrines emphasize the
offense, others the defense. US Army doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations based on
exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. When determining the units
best suited for particular missions, commanders must be sensitive to doctrinal differences
and their consequences. In dealing with joint and multinational forces, commanders must
remember that doctrine and organization are closely linked. Removing part of a service's or
nation's force structure may make it unbalanced and make it fight in a way not supported
by its doctrine and training. Adjusting a component's force structure, if authorized, must be
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done with extreme caution. Commanders also need to understand the training level of
participating forces. All armies do not have the same training resources. A battalion-sized
unit from one country may have different capabilities than one from a different country.
Commanders must understand that not all organizations are the same.
Equipment
2-77. Different equipment and technologies may result in a mixture of systems in a joint or multinational force. The modernization levels, maintenance standards, mobility, and degree of interoperability of different partners will probably vary. Commanders of a joint or multinational force may have to compensate for significant technological differences among its components. Incompatible communications, unfamiliar CSS needs, and differences in vehicle cross-country mobility can pose difficulties. Some multinational partners may use systems similar to enemy systems, making measures to preclude fratricide vital. However, one nation's capabilities may reduce another's vulnerabilities. Commanders position units and assign command and support relationships to exploit interoperability and complementary capabilities.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-78. Political considerations are prominent in unified action. Gaining and maintaining
unity of effort in multinational and interagency environments requires constant attention.
Commanders remain aware of the goals and objectives of the various participants. They
recognize that control of national forces and nonmilitary partners by their political leaders
may affect mission accomplishment. Commanders constantly work to sustain political
consensus among the leaders, nations, and organizations involved in the operation.
Goals and Objectives
2-79. States act to serve their national interests. No two partners share the same reasons for conducting a military operation. National goals can be harmonized with a common strategy, but they are seldom identical. Motivations of multinational partners may differ,
but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined, and supported by each
member state. Successful coalitions and alliances build upon a common purpose. Emphasizing commonalties can reduce friction and maintain cohesion.
National Control of Forces
2-80. Most forces and agencies have the capability for direct and near immediate
communications from the operational area to their respective political leaders. This
capability can facilitate coordination of political issues. It can also allow those leaders to
issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces or veto operational decisions.
Likewise, Army force commanders are linked to the appropriate US agencies and political leaders.
Consensus Building
2-81. Reaching a consensus on a goal is the most important prerequisite for successful
unified action. Because consensus is frail, commanders continually nurture it. A common
goal is important, so commanders expend a lot of time and effort clarifying and restating it.
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Commanders seek a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state and measures of
effectiveness. Some partners may resist establishing these to the level of detail that US
commanders prefer. The minimum requirement is a set of identifiable military conditions
that commanders can use to direct military operations.
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-82. Understanding and dealing with cultural considerations can make the difference
between success and failure in unified action. National and organizational culture, language, communication, media relations, and law enforcement all play important roles in this environment.
Cultural and Language
2-83. Each partner in unified action has a unique cultural identity. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs, and international organizations approach war and MOOTW from different perspectives. National and organizational values, standards of social interaction,
religious beliefs, and organizational discipline all affect the perspectives of multinational
partners. Partners with similar cultures and a common language face fewer obstacles to
interoperability. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions or officer­enlisted relationships, can significantly affect military operations. Commanders may have to accommodate cultural sensitivities and overcome diverse or conflicting religious, social,
or traditional requirements.
2-84. Overcoming language barriers is a significant challenge. Unified action is often
multilingual. Even when partners share a common language, different terminology and
jargon can hinder understanding. Whether spoken or written, all participants must
understand all communications. Commanders recognize translation difficulties. Translating
orders adds time to planning. Translation errors can cause mistakes or misunderstandings.
Few translators have both the language and cultural expertise and the depth of doctrinal
understanding necessary. Dedicated liaison and linguist teams can mitigate this problem but
cannot eliminate it. Clear; concise orders and briefings are easier to translate than
complicated ones. Simplicity helps achieve the mutual understanding necessary for success.
Backbriefs to commanders ensure that multinational subordinates understand intent and
tasks.
Communication
2-85. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can cloud common understanding. Commanders involve representatives from each partner in defining issues in clear, unambiguous, agreed-upon terms. How something is said is particularly important in the interagency environment. To preclude misunderstandings, military planners anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. To reduce duplication and increase coherence, commanders get from all participants a clear expression of their perceived role and mission as well as the resources they intend to contribute. Understanding each participant's agenda helps commanders synchronize the efforts of the each organization throughout the campaign. Common understanding also helps identify obstacles, such as conflicting multinational or interagency priorities.
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Media Relations
2-86. Within security requirements, commanders facilitate national and international
press activities. In multinational environments, media from partner states have their own
standards and requirements. Commanders work with leaders of partner forces and their
national press elements to develop an open, mutually beneficial environment. To avoid
misunderstanding, senior multinational political and military representatives establish
media ground rules that are as simple as possible. To facilitate foreign and US media
relations, US forces follow the DOD Principles of Information whenever possible. Military
plans anticipate the effect of media actions. The media shape public attitudes and can
influence operations. Commanders recognize that gaining and maintaining public support
requires clearly expressing the desired end state, objectives leading to it, and measures of
effectiveness through the media. Different partners do not necessarily send the same
messages; but commanders determine and coordinate methods to avoid contradictions.
Law Enforcement
2-87. Often US forces will not have the authority or capability to enforce civil laws in the
operational area. Commanders seek clear law enforcement guidance from US and
multinational political leadership during planning for unified action. The entire chain of
command must understand status of forces agreements (SOFAs), or status of mission
agreements (SOMAs), which apply to UN operations. Where civil law enforcement is
present and functioning, commanders establish systems and procedures to use it. Where
civil law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, commanders should
deploy with appropriate US forces or use the capabilities of other partners.

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Chapter 3

Strategic Responsiveness
Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at
ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary.
Sun Tzu The Art of War
3-1. Strategic responsiveness requires
CONTENTS
Army forces trained, organized, and
equipped for global operations, and
Responsive . Army. Forces
commanders and units proficient at force
Attributes of Strategically
projection. Strategically responsive
Responsive Army Forces
Army forces —including active
Considerations of Strategic
component (AC) and reserve component
Responsiveness
(RC) forces based in the continental
Force Projection Operations
United States (CONUS) and overseas—
Force Projection Characteristics
generate and sustain maximum combat
Joint Systems
power at the time and place joint force
Entry Operations
commanders (JFCs) require.
Security of Force Projection Operations IntermediateStaging Bases
.
RESPONSIVE ARMY FORCES
Force tailoring is the process of
3-2. Strategic responsiveness imposes a
determining the right mix and sequence
unique set of dynamics on the US Army.
of units for a mission.
The Army depends on assets apportioned by
the National Command Authorities and allocated by the US Transportation Command to combatant commanders and JFCs. The combatant commander establishes the priority for
movement of forces into the theater. That decision drives allocation of strategic lift and
ultimately determines how rapidly Army forces deploy. Although US strategic lift assets
exceed those of any other nation, the available lift is almost never enough to move large
Army forces at one time. Consequently, commanders carefully tailor both the elements of
the force and the sequence in which they deploy them to match theater conditions.
3-3. The range of possible scenarios complicates training. Army forces cannot train for
every possible mission; they usually train for war and prepare for specific missions as time
and circumstances permit. The volatile nature of crises requires Army forces to
simultaneously train, deploy, and execute. Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute,
and continuously assess) operations with initial-entry forces, while assembling and
preparing follow-on forces. To seize the initiative during deployment and the early phases
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of an operation, commanders accept calculated risks, even when the enemy situation is not well developed. Balancing these dynamics is an art mastered through study, experience, and judgment.
3-4. Modernization will transform Army force projection capabilities. Contingency operations in the 1990s normally followed a sequence of alert, deployment, extended build­up, and shaping operations—followed by a period of decisive operations to terminate the conflict. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm exemplify this sequence. The interim Army force now being developed will consist of lethal and highly mobile initial-entry Army units that will deploy, contain large-scale aggression, and shape the situation in the land area of operations (AO) for much earlier decisive operations. In smaller-scale contingencies, combinations of modernized brigades and forcible entry units will provide JFCs with decisive initial-entry capabilities. When fielded, the objective Army force will achieve the strategic responsiveness necessary to conduct nearly simultaneous deployment, shaping, and decisive operations in a manner similar to that of Operation Just Cause, but against more robust opponents. The Army is modernizing combat service support (CSS) capabilities as well. Improvements are underway to reduce the CSS footprint and replenishment demands by leveraging CSS reach capabilities. At the same time, the Army is investing in new systems that minimize support requirements and radically improve the manner in which it transports and sustains soldiers, equipment, and materiel.
3-5. The payoff for mastering the art of strategic responsiveness is operational success. Fast deploying and rapidly expansible Army forces provide JFCs with the means to introduce an operationally significant land force into a crisis theater on short notice. Responsiveness provides JFCs a preemptive capability to deter adversaries, shape the situation, and fight and win if deterrence fails. Responsive Army forces provide immediate options for seizing or regaining the operational initiative. They complement and reinforce
. the other services with combat, combat support (CS), and CSS units that can be swiftly tailored, deployed, and employed to produce decisive effects.
ATTRIBUTES OF STRATEGICALLY RESPONSIVE ARMY FORCES
Attributes of Strategically Responsive Forces
3-6. Seven attributes of strategically
responsive forces drive programmatic

• Responsiveand operational requirements. The Army • Deployableis redesigning the force around them.
• AgileStructure, equipment, and training— • Versatileincluding deployment doctrine; power • Lethalprojection platforms; command and • Survivablecontrol (C2) systems; intelligence, • Sustainable
surveillance, and reconnaissance
systems; and joint transportation systems—establish the foundation for responsive forces.

3-7. Each operation is different: there may not be a single ideal deployment sequence that

optimizes all seven force attributes. However, from an operational perspective,

commanders train their forces to emphasize all seven. Upon alert, commanders tailor and

sequence the force to balance the attributes while meeting JFC requirements.

Responsive

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3-8. Responsiveness is an attitude that spans operational planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment. It establishes the conditions for successful operational and
tactical maneuver at the outset of operations. Responsiveness is more than the ability to
quickly deploy: it requires that the right Army forces—those the JFC needs to deter an
adversary or take decisive action if deterrence fails—deploy to the right place at the right
time. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military
engagement, and force projection from anywhere the needed capabilities reside all
contribute to Army force responsiveness.
3-9. Responsiveness also emphasizes training, planning, and preparation for deployment. Commanders recognize that crises rarely allow sufficient time to correct training deficiencies between alert and deployment. They ensure that their units are prepared to accomplish their mission essential task list (METL) tasks before alert and to concentrate on mission-specific training in the time available afterwards. In addition, commanders emphasize individual preparation and equipment readiness. Finally, commanders review and practice alert and deployment plans and procedures, updating them based on lessons learned. They pay particular attention to the automated data used for deployment planning, ensuring that it accurately reflects unit organization and equipment.
3-10. Responsiveness requires balancing the demands of readiness with the realities of
day-to-day training. Commanders develop and implement mission readiness postures
appropriate for their unit. They evaluate the mission of the unit and carefully design
mission readiness cycles to match the required readiness posture.
Deployable
3-11. Army forces combine training, facilities, soldiers, and equipment to deploy with speed and force. Commanders view deployment as more than getting people and equipment on ships and airplanes; they visualize the entire process, beginning with the fully operational unit deployed in theater, and reverse plan to the unit's predeployment location. They include deployment details in standing operating procedures (SOPs). Plans focus not only on the sequence of actions but also on force packages for different scenarios. Deployment rehearsals occur as often as time permits. Commanders and subordinate leaders conduct reconnaissance of deployment facilities and routes, and review contingencies. They stress junior leader initiative and responsibility as essential during deployment. The intelligence community supports deployability through readiness and the ability to quickly collect information about the enemy or adversary, process it into intelligence, and disseminate that intelligence as relevant information.
Agile
3-12. Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well as a responsive force attribute. A
responsive, agile force package is one that is sustainable and mobile enough to accomplish
the mission. Limitations on available lift compel commanders to balance competing
mission requirements, in some cases developing innovative solutions. It also requires
commanders to anticipate a full range of tasks and include capabilities to accomplish them.
Finally, agile forces are mentally and physically able to transition within or between types
of operations without losing momentum. Commanders develop this state of mind through
tough, realistic training. Mentally agile commanders, staffs, and soldiers adapt force
packages, strategies, and tactics to mission requirements in dynamic environments.

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Responsive and Agile—Operation Uphold Democracy
The 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti demanded Army forces to
demonstrate an extraordinary degree of agility and responsiveness. Months before
operations began, the 82d Airborne Division prepared plans for a short-notice
forcible entry into Haiti. Completed plans detailing the use of overwhelming lethal
force to seize key targets awaited only a decision to execute. Then, on 19 September,
with the 82d already in flight to execute the plan, word suddenly arrived that a last­
minute diplomatic effort had succeeded in securing the permissive entry of US
forces.
With the sudden change in conditions, the Haiti mission passed from the invasion force, which returned home, to the 10th Mountain Division, which began arriving in Port-au-Prince in a matter of hours. In addition, special operations forces (SOF) blanketed the country within a week. Active engagement of the populace quickly established a measure of trust that furthered both SOF security and the effectiveness of the mission. Meanwhile, although initial living and working conditions in Port­au-Prince and elsewhere were predictably austere, CSS forces responded rapidly as equipment and other resources poured into Haiti.
American agility notwithstanding, conditions on the ground in Haiti remained unclear. Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 commander, LTG H. Hugh Shelton, found himself in the unanticipated position of negotiating the terms of a transition of power and working with representatives of the very regime he had earlier expected to remove. In turn, JTF 190 commander, MG David Meade, worked to secure the cooperation of police and civil officials in the capital. Army forces responded flexibly to a highly fluid and ambiguous situation.
Versatile
3-13. Like agility, versatility is a tenet of Army operations. Army forces conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations with forces tailored to accomplish the mission. Versatility requires Army force packages able to reorganize and adapt to changing missions. Commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces into theater, making sure forces have the necessary C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets. Whenever possible, commanders deploy multifunctional teams. However, they understand that teams gathered from different organizations do not execute efficiently unless trained to work together. Thus, training emphasizes teamwork and adaptability. Commanders stress versatile C2 and practice reconfiguring headquarters to control multiple missions.
Lethal Elements of Combat Power
3-14. Army forces combine the elements of combat power to defeat the
• Maneuver
enemy. When deployed, every unit—
• Firepower
regardless of type—generates combat
• Leadership
power and contributes to the fight. From
• Protection
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the operational and tactical perspectives, I
• Information
commanders ensure deployed Army forces have enough combat power to overwhelm any likely enemy. The art of strategic responsiveness requires that commanders balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ those systems. Commanders assemble force packages that maximize the lethality of initial-entry forces consistent with both the mission and the requirement to project, employ, and sustain the force. They tailor and sequence follow-on forces to increase both the lethality and operational reach of the entire force.
Survivable
3-15. Survivability combines technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to Army forces. Lethality enhances survivability: lethal forces destroy enemies before they strike and can retaliate if necessary.
3-16. Deploying commanders integrate sufficient force protection assets to ensure mission accomplishment. Engineer, air defense, and chemical units increase the survivability of deployed Army forces. As with the other attributes, lift constraints and time available complicate the situation. Survivability requires an astute assessment of operational risk. In many operations, rapid offensive action may provide better force protection than massive defenses around lodgment areas.
Sustainable
3-17. Generating and sustaining combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness. Commanders reconcile competing requirements: On one hand, Army forces must accomplish JFC-assigned missions. On the other, they need adequate sustainment for operations extended in time and depth. Commanders tailor force packages to provide sufficient CSS while exercising every solution to reduce the CSS footprint. In some cases, commanders augment CSS capability with host nation and contracted support.
CONSIDERATIONS OF STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS
3-18. Applying the art of strategic responsiveness requires mastery of the considerations of strategic responsiveness. These considerations complement and supplement the attributes of strategically responsive Army forces.
Anticipation Considerations of Strategic Responsiveness
3-19. Commanders anticipate future
operations. They train their units for

• Anticipationalert and deployment and prepare them • • Command and controlfor any likely change of mission. If units • Lethality of the deploying forceare assigned a peacetime region or _ • Force tailoringmission focus, mental and physical • Combat service supportpreparation and planning can occur long • Training
before alert and deployment. The intelligence system gives commanders the ability to anticipate future operations by
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3-20. Decisions about size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence create the conditions for success in theater. Ideally, commanders identify potential decisions before the actual event. Prior planning develops options to meet possible situations. Exercises refine concepts and procedures. However, the nature of an operation can change significantly before execution. Commanders ensure that their.plans and decisions do not foreclose options the deployed force may need later. Operational and tactical plans as well as the deployment process and flow need to be flexible enough to accommodate changes made after the alert. Other important decisions include-
•
Command and support relationships.

•
Prioritization of unit and equipment movement (see JP 3-35).

•
Transportation modes for early deploying units.

•
Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) responsibilities and procedures (see JP 4-01.8; FM 4-01.8).

•
Plans for interacting with media and other civilian agencies and organizations.

Command and Control
3-21. Strategic and operational commanders decide strategic aims, force requirements, force allocation, which organizations to mobilize and deploy, and when to do so. Seldom are these decisions clear at the outset. Mobilization, deployment, and employment occur simultaneously against a backdrop of fog and friction, challenging commanders to make timely decisions that set the basis for future success. Effective C2, equipment, facilities, intelligence, and procedures give commanders the support they need to visualize the operation, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct actions to implement their decisions. In particular, modem information systems provide commanders with a common operational picture (COP) that allows them to see and track forces from home station through arrival in theater to combat employment. The COP—which includes friendly, threat, and environmental elements—helps commanders make timely, accurate decisions about force sequence and direct resources and forces where needed by units in theater.
3-22. Modular C2 enhances the commander's ability to tailor the headquarters for split­based-operations throughout the operation. For example, deployment may physically separate units from their higher headquarters and sister elements. A modular C2 structure allows the leadership of a deploying unit to retain command of the unit and control RSO&I in the theater staging base before employment.
3-23. Commanders require home station, en route, and in-theater communications that are secure, reliable, and timely. Communications must be compatible with the mix of
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supporting forces and services in theater, including civilian agencies of the US government.
Units establish communications with other organizations and services participating in the
operation.
Force tracking is the identification of
3-24. Army and joint systems track forces
units and their specific modes of
and forecast their arrival in theater. Force
transport during movement to an
tracking reports combat status to JFCs. It
objective area.
provides immediate and constant information about present and forecasted unit combat capability during force projection operations. Support units and staffs report unit movements, while operations staffs track them and report the build-up of operational capability. Force tracking requires a definition of readiness against which commanders can evaluate unit status and visibility of all assets required. JFCs normally define combat readiness based upon the operation or situation.
3-25. Commanders visualize force projection as one seamless operation. Deployment speed sets the initial rate of military activity in theater. Commanders understand how speed, sequence, and mix of deploying forces affect their employment options. In turn, they see how their employment concept establishes deployment requirements. Commanders prioritize the force mix on the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to get forces in theater where and when required. They recognize that decisions made early in the force projection process affect employment throughout the JFC's campaign. Singular focus on the land component plan may result in the incorrect force sequencing. Active and continuous command involvement during all stages of force projection, coupled with detailed reverse planning, combine to ensure the right forces with the right support are available and ready to conduct decisive operations when needed.
Lethality of the Deploying Force
3-26. An important strategic factor is the early introduction of credible, lethal forces into the theater. This action may quickly convince a potential enemy that further aggression is too costly. Initial-entry forces need to be interoperable and flexible enough to handle unforeseen circumstances. Initial-entry forces require enough combat power to establish and protect lodgments and begin simultaneous shaping operations immediately upon arrival. Doing this requires tailored and very precise relevant information. The ability to fight at the outset is crucial to the successful execution of the theater campaign plan. A
tailored force with the capability to dominate situations early enables the JFC to seize the initiative.
Force Tailoring
3-27. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of
units for a mission. Army commanders tailor forces to meet specific requirements
determined by the JFC and passed through the Army service component command (ASCC).
Units identified for rapid deployment are tailored to mission requirements. They
standardize, as much as possible, an initial-entry force package based on anticipated
deployment requirements. These force packages consist of configured and basic loads that
are included in the TPFDD. Units develop tailored load plans to match anticipated
contingencies. These force packages include enough combat power to sustain and protect
themselves for the short term, wherever they might go. Follow-on forces are tailored to
meet specific concerns of the long-term mission.

DODDOA-007929
http://atiam.tiain.army.mil/portal/atia/adlseview/public/297153-imm/3-or... 12/28/2004 3-28. Generally, commanders tailor subordinate forces. For example, a corps commander may tailor a deploying division by augmenting its organic assets with an additional infantry brigade and two corps artillery brigades. During tailoring, commanders balance the combat power necessary to accomplish the mission with the speed of deployment to ensure the deploying force is operational and sustainable upon arrival.
3-29. During mission analysis and force tailoring, commanders pay special attention to
strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, host nation support, and theater support contracts. For
an unopposed entry operation, for example, commanders schedule CSS, engineer, military
police, civil affairs, and combat health support to deploy early, particularly if faced with
limited host nation support and infrastructure. Faced with a forcible entry operation,
commanders tailor their flow and mix differently, placing the right mix of combat units in
the early deploying echelons. Commanders may find they need to substitute one type of
unit for another or add units that have never trained together. This places a premium on
early and continuous teamwork. Such teamwork, emphasized by visits and other contacts,
builds the cohesion in the new team that is essential for mission success. Tailoring focuses
on the vertical integration of the force; it ensures capabilities are matched in the proper
combinations and sequence at each echelon. Tailoring the force includes force allocation,
force augmentation, and force refinement.
3-30. Force Allocation. Commanders tailor a force to ensure that its size and
capabilities—especially C2 capabilities—are sufficient to accomplish the mission. This
process begins with the combatant commander allocating a basic force. Normally, the basic
force is a combat unit—a division, an armored cavalry regiment, a Special Forces group, or
a combined arms maneuver brigade. In stability operations or support operations, however,
the basic force may be a CS or CSS unit, such as a military police, medical, civil affairs, or
water purification unit.
3-3 1 . Force Augmentation. Force augmentation rounds out the basic force with
specialized capabilities. Army force structure is designed so that at each echelon has a set
of capabilities that augment it from the next higher echelon. Once the combatant
commander allocates the basic force, the major Army command, in conjunction with the
ASCC, augments it with the necessary supporting units. Figure 3-1 illustrates some
representative echelons above division augmentations for a deploying division. Based on
the mix of operations, these capabilities augment the organic capabilities of the basic force.
They are not normally assigned to the division, although they may be placed under its
operational control or in direct or general support to it.

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The canbetantcommander requests an addilional dvision from the NCA. The NCA c
aro the chrisibn to the combatant command. The owning MACOM provides the division.
Echelons above Division
Army planners augment the division with combat. CS. and CSS farces. Evertence and planning guides provide the basis for augmentation. Where posable, the habitual assignment of subordinate unils to headquarters is maintained.
The ASCC commander assigns albcatedforces to the in-theeter headquartersbased on the combatant commander's
11 plan and METT-TC.
11W
Figure 3-1. Force Allocation and Augmentation
3-32. Force Refinement. The basic force and its augmentation forces are refined to account for the multiple constraints of the projected operation. Force refinement is a repetitive, continuous process that involves all Army components and members of joint and interagency organizations. It includes JFCs and representatives from the Department of State, Joint Staff, Army Staff, ASCC, ARFOR headquarters, and other involved government agencies. Force refinement involves METT-TC adjustments, force sequencing, and staff tailoring, and task organizing.
• METT-TC Adjustments. Commanders analyze the basic force and its general augmentation using the factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations—to identify any changes necessary to account for the realities of the planned operation. Force allocation seldom produces an exact fit. Commanders refine the tailored force based on factors such as those in Figure 3-2. They apply the factors of METT-TC to the assigned unit organizations to determine necessary adjustments.

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Based an METE-TC, the ARFOR tailors and ranee the tics sedates to inset the cerallkes tnihesise The processof blab* and nerd% the Sans pave continues as ihs ellusbon develops end the Woo deploys.
Added because of WOAD threat.
Added because ("Bob
ardlerylhreat.
Remosed dos b weather and
terrain oondlions.
Added due to weather and
terrain condlions.
Removed— LOGCAP
prurides cepability.
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Figure 3-2. Allocation: Force Refinement
•
Force Sequencing. Commanders next compare the in-theater situation—in terms of the factors of METT-TC—against available lift to determine the appropriate deployment sequence. Balancing rapid response with the mix of combat power and resources that will accomplish the mission while protecting the initial-entry force is critical. Commanders seek a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, and a range of options for responding to possible conditions. Lift availability is always a constraint, so difficult trade-off decisions are routine. For example, commanders often balance early deployment of combat forces against the need to deploy tailored CSS capability to generate and sustain combat power. Commanders and staffs keep in mind not only the priority for each capability's arrival but also its relationship to other capabilities. These relationships are key; changing the deployment sequence reschedules associated capabilities.

•
Staff Tailoring. Commanders tailor units and staffs, both in size and organization, to meet mission conditions. The standard peacetime staff may undergo significant changes in both size and organization to meet conditions. For example, the 1st Armored Division staff and headquarters underwent a dramatic transformation upon its commitment to Bosnia .as the Task Force Eagle headquarters (see Figure 3-3). To gain the personnel necessary to round out the staff, a headquarters identifies requirements to its higher headquarters. This begins a series of requests that are either filled by the next higher headquarters or passed up the chain of command.

•
Task Organizing. Force tailoring is not synonymous with task organizing. While

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FM3-0 Chptr 3 Strategic Responsiveness Page 11 of 19
tailoring is a method to match force capabilities necessary to accomplish a mission, task organizing is the establishment of an organization with certain command relationships to accomplish the tasks at hand.
I Augmening Staff 1
special OPPradcms
POD Mos Gartman(' and Control Joint Information Bureau Bernont
r
Mins
Fusion Col

Joint
Aims
Durso

0i Mt on
ADE ALO Lisinon

ADADO
Cell
I Original Matt I MP
Safety

Moe Signe,
Summon
ems Comp Conizinadngi Avow Joint Miliary Commission

Center for Amy Lessors Learned Delimnrnent OPotelions
Figure 3-3. Staff Tailoring: Task Force

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Combat Service Support
Factors Affecting CSS Operations
3-33. Generation of decisive combat
power requires carefully balancing CSS

• Enemy threatassets with combat and CS assets.
• Size of friendly forcesAchieving the right balance is an art; • Maturity of the theatercommanders attempt to maximize • Theater evacuation policycombat power while deploying only • Supported force's CSS needsessential CSS capabilities. Too little • CSS infrastructureCSS ties Army forces to their lodgment, • Availability of in-theater suppliesunable to create and exploit • Host nation supportopportunities. Too much CSS slows the • Theater support contractsarrival of combat power and leads to the • Acquisition and cross-servicingsame result. Likewise, accumulation of agreements
vast stockpiles of materiel and
expendables may cede the initiative to the enemy.

3-34. To estimate the appropriate force mix, commanders thoroughly review and
understand the effect of CSS operations on generating combat power. Force tracking, asset
visibility, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and logistic preparation of the theater
are essential to responsive CSS. Logistic preparation of the theater assesses the existing
theater infrastructure, which greatly affects planning for both CSS and operations. The
availability of ports, roads, and other assets affects the sequencing of units and tempo of
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entry operations (see JP 4-0; FM 4-0). Force projection may require intermediate staging bases (ISBs), in-theater lodgment areas (with associated intratheater movement capabilities), or joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations (when port infrastructure is limited or nonexistent) (see JP 4-01.6). Contracted CSS to augment military capabilities or provide initial support must be preplanned and reflected in the TPFDD. Split-based and modular CSS operations may reduce the burden on the intratheater deployment flow and preclude maintaining unnecessary supplies in theater. Split-based CSS operations, enhanced with robust automation and communications networks, allows much of the CSS and distribution management structure to operate from an ISB or CONUS.
Training
3-35. Training is the linchpin of strategic responsiveness. Prior to alert, units train for
wartime missions and conditions first. Unless directed otherwise, division and lower-level
commanders develop battle focused METLs. When corps and higher-level commanders
anticipate a stability mission or support mission, they may direct subordinate commanders
to develop METLs to support employment in those missions. Leaders at every echelon
conduct mission essential individual and collective training before and during deployment.
Tactical commanders identify tasks that apply to all types of operations and ensure
individual and collective proficiency in them. Commanders accept risk and defer training
for some tasks until the unit alerts and prepares for deployment.
3-36. After alert, Army forces conduct mission-tailored training and rehearsals. If time
permits, commanders conduct mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs) to reinforce their vision
and intent. A good MRX exposes units to conditions approximating those in theater.
Commanders ensure that rehearsals are realistic and take full account of chance, friction,
and ruthless, thinking opponents. Good rehearsals allow room for initiative and
improvisation. Even when time is very short and resources scarce, commanders conduct
some type of rehearsal, such as map-based or computer-supported virtual MRXs, with
subordinates.
3-37. Force projection operations vary in time, distance, and size but always include
certain actions and functions. Most force projection operations include data preparation;
planning; and rail, air and ship loading. These operations provide opportunities for
multiechelon training. Training—to include rehearsals—begins at home station and
continues throughout an operation, as the situation permits. Units also perform the
coordination necessary to pass lessons to follow-on forces. Training to maintain readiness
for future operations continues after hostilities cease.
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FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS
3-38. Force projection is the military component of power projection. It is a central element of the national military strategy. Projecting the force anywhere in the world involves AC and RC units, the mobilization base, DA civilians, and industry. Army organizations and installations, linked with joint forces and industry, form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and sustain Army forces, wherever they deploy.
3.-39. Force projection encompasses a range of processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment (see Figure 3-4). These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Force projection
http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/297153-1/fm/3-... 12/28/2004 operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. Decisions made early in the process may determine the success of the campaign.
•
Mobilization is the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It assembles and organizes resources to support national objectives. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the reserve components, and assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and materiel (see JP 4-05; FM 3-35).

•
Deployment is the movement of forces and materiel from their point of origin to the AO. This process has four supporting components: predeployment activities, fort to port, port to port, and port to destination (RSO&I) activities (see JP 3-35; FM 3-35 series; FM 4-01.8).

•
Employment is the conduct of operations to support a JFC (see JP 3-0 series; FM 3­100.7). Employment encompasses a wide array of operations including but not limited to-

¦
Entry operations (opposed or unopposed).

¦
Shaping operations (lethal and nonlethal).

¦
Decisive operations (combat or support).

¦
Postconflict operations (prepare for follow-on missions or redeployment).

•
Sustainment involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain the operation throughout its duration. It is essential to generating combat power. CSS support may be split-based between locations within and outside of CONUS (see FM 4-0).

•
Redeployment is the process by which units and materiel reposture themselves in the same theater; transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC's operational requirements; or return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. Redeployment operations encompass four phases:

• Recovery, reconstitution, and pre-redeployment activities.
¦ Movement to and activities at the port of embarkation.
•
Movement to the port of debarkation (POD).

•
Movement to home station (see JP 3-35; FM 3-35).

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Figure 3-4. The Force Projection Process
FORCE PROJECTION CHARACTERISTICS
3-40. The objective of force projection is to conduct decisive operations so rapidly that the enemy is defeated before he can effectively confront US forces. That objective requires efficient and effective projection of Army forces. Taken as a whole, effective and efficient force projection-exhibits four characteristics: precision, synchronization, speed, and relevant information. Commanders incorporate these characteristics into the conduct of force projection operations.
Precision
3-41. Efficient force projection makes maximum use of available time and lift.
Eliminating wasted space and time requires precision in every activity and each piece of
data related to it. The effect of precision is far-reaching; its payoff is speed of deployment
and increased combat power in theater. Precise deployment equipment lists, for example,
allow correct lift assets to be quickly assigned against requirements. Precision in loading
increases departure speed and safety. Precision in meeting the JFC's time line supports the
concept of employment. Up-to-date doctrine, realistic training, an adequate support
structure, and timely enablers provide the framework for precision.

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Synchronization
3-42. Commanders synchronize deployment activities. Resources—lift assets, enablers, time, and information—are scarce. Effective synchronization produces maximum use of every resource. Synchronization normally requires explicit coordination among deploying forces and staffs, supporting units and staffs, a variety of civilian agencies, and the other
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services. Frequent and realistic joint exercises and training are the key to successful
synchronization.
Speed
3-43. Commanders view force projection as a race between friendly forces and the enemy or situation. The side that achieves a decisive operational capability first seizes the initiative. Thus, it is not the velocity of individual stages or transportation means that is decisive; it is the combat ready force deployed in theater before the enemy is ready or the situation gets out of control.
3-44. Speed is more than miles per hour: it is the sustained momentum achieved with the complete complement of joint lift assets. The volume steadily delivered by ship can often outpace the pieces delivered by air in terms of operational capability. Speed is also the velocity of the entire force projection process, from planning to force closure. It depends on many factors, to include maximizing the other force projection characteristics. Some factors are established before deployment starts. Planning— exemplified in factors such as the existence of efficient planning tools and maintaining unit integrity—helps operations progress smoothly. Allocating resources to deployment training results in trained unit movement officers and preparation for safe and efficient loading. Submission of accurate reports, timely arrival of throughput enablers, delivering capabilities, and POD throughput combine precision, synchronization, and relevant information. These and other factors all contribute to speed.
—

Precision and SpeedVII Corps Deploys to Southwest Asia
The Army projects power to support joint operations quickly and on short notice. In
November 1990, VII Corps shifted its mission from the defense of Western Europe
to coalition operations in Southwest Asia. The Operation Desert Shield mission
required VII Corps to conduct crisis action planning for an unfamiliar theater while
task organizing with units from V Corps and CONUS. The headquarters developed
TPFDD and cross-leveled personnel and equipment on the move to the seaports of
embarkation. The corps support command created new CSS capabilities to replace
nondeployable host nation support assets. The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, -
arrived in Southwest Asia early and established port support activities at Dammam
and Jubayl in Saudi Arabia to assist VII Corps with RSO&I. VII Corps deployed
over 35,000 soldiers from Europe to Southwest Asia and off-loaded over 6,000
tracked vehicles at the ports between November 1990 and February 1991. VII Corps
units underwent technology modernization in theater, repainted their vehicles for
desert warfare, and conducted numerous training exercises prior to executing
Operation Desert Storm.

Relevant Information DODDOA-007937
3-45. Successful force projection requires commanders to combine knowledge of the deployment process, judgment, and relevant information. There is a short period in which deploying commanders make decisions that determine the conduct of the deployment and the available employment options over time. Many of the decisions are impossible or very hard to change. Making the right choices requires relevant information. For example, relevant information and understanding the TPFDD are imperative when establishing high-
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priority items, determining sequencing, deciding how to use time, and setting priorities. Relevant information concerning theater throughput allows commanders to manage deployment to enable employment. Relevant information does not guarantee a smooth deployment; however, combined with their experience and judgment, relevant information allows commanders to control the situation and make good decisions.
JOINT SYSTEMS

3-46. Force projection is an integral part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is constantly evolving. It includes joint operation planning tools, policies, procedures, and reporting structures (see JP 5-03.1). Communications and automated data processing support the entire system. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. It provides the framework within which JFCs design theater operations. Army force projection is nested within this framework. The global command and control system (GCCS) is the worldwide automated network of systems that supports JOPES. Army commanders ensure that unit data provided to GCCS
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
The TPFDD is the JOPES database portion of an operation plan. It contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan. The TPFDD includes-
•
In-place units.

•
Units to be deployed.

•
Desired sequence for arrival.

•
Routing of forces to be deployed.

•
Movement data.

•
Estimates of nonunit-related cargo. '

•
Personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the force deployments.

The TPFDD also contains estimates of common-user transportation requirements and requirements to be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources.
databases is accurate. Up-to-date information allows joint planners to produce timely,
efficient, and accurate force projection estimates and plans. Several deployment planning
tools under development, such as the Transportation Coordinators Automated Information
for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II) and the Joint Force Requirements Generator II
(JFRG II), will enhance the deployment process and accelerate TPFDD development.
3-47. A crisis for which no plan exists requires the JFC to rapidly develop a TPFDD. Standard contingency force packages support this time-sensitive preparation.cycle. While METT-TC may cause variations, tailored force packages contain a balanced mix of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities.

DODDOA-007938
ENTRY OPERATIONS
3-48. When responding to a crisis, initial-entry forces often establish a lodgment area
and expand it into a theater base. From the lodgment, US forces conduct RSO&I,
reconfigure, build combat capability, and train. They also assist multinational and host
nation forces, protect the force, and acclimate themselves. The JFC sequences combat and
support units into the lodgment so that the force gains the initiative and completes
deployment. Army forces always prepare for simultaneous deployment and employment.
Even in stability operations and support operations, the force is prepared to defend or attack
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to retain the lodgment. Units may enter the theater in a variety of ways. They either enter unopposed or use force.
Unopposed Entry
3-49. Whenever possible, US forces seek unopposed entry, which may be either assisted
or unassisted. Assisted entry requires the cooperation of the host nation. In assisted entry,
initial entry Army forces are tailored to deploy efficiently and transition to follow-on
operations quickly. The CSS package is tailored to take full advantage of the host nation
assets. RSO&I focus on cooperative effort to expedite moving units to their tactical
assembly areas. For example, Saudi Arabia provided extensive support to US forces during
deployment for Operation Desert Shield.
3-50. Often, circumstances leading to deployment make it impossible for the host nation to provide secure facilities for US forces as they arrive. An entry operation in such a case is an unassisted entry. An example of an unassisted entry was the deployment of US forces to Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. In unassisted entries, JFCs deploy balanced combinations of combat, CS, and CSS forces. Forces with enough combat power to secure an adequate lodgment must be dispatched immediately. Initial-entry CSS forces must be included to establish and support RSO&I within the lodgment. Force sequencing for an unassisted entry is similar to that of a forcible entry.
Forcible Entry
A coup de main is an offensive operation
3-51. Aforcible entry is an offensive
that capitalizes on surprise and
operation for seizing and holding a military
simultaneous execution of supporting
lodgment in the face of armed opposition
operations to achieve success in one swift
(see JP 3-18). Supported by joint firepower,
stroke.
forcible entry operations capitalize on
strategic and operational mobility to surprise the enemy, seize a lodgment, and gain the
initiative. Once the assault force seizes the lodgment, it normally defends to retain it while
the JFC rapidly deploys additional combat power and sustainment by air and sea. When
conditions are favorable, the JFC may combine a forcible entry with other offensive
operations in a coup de main, achieving the strategic objectives in a simultaneous major
operation. Operation Just Cause is an example of a forcible entry coup de main.
3-52. The Army maintains formidable forcible entry capabilities. There are three types of forcible entry operations: air assault, parachute assault, and amphibious assault. The Army specializes in parachute assault and air assault. The Marine Corps specializes in amphibious assault; Marines usually conduct air assaults as part of an amphibious operation. Air assaults and parachute assaults permit JFCs to introduce combat power very quickly. They accomplish this without the normal hindrances imposed by port, airfield, or beach restrictions. For example, an airborne or air assault force can be delivered in a matter of minutes. The entry force either resolves the situation or secures a lodgment for the rapid delivery of larger forces by aircraft or ships. The three forms of forcible entry complement each other. Combining all three may allow the JFC to immediately seize the strategic, operational, and tactical initiative.
3-53. Usually, forcible entry operations secure an initial lodgment that includes an
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airfield. Once secure, this airfield becomes the focal point for rapid reinforcement of the entry force by air-delivered combat, CS, and CSS units. When required, initial-entry forces expand the lodgment to include a port or suitable seaport of debarkation for follow-on forces. When the lodgment is secure, follow-on forces deploy into the lodgment.
3-54. Forcible entry operations are complex and always joint. Often only hours separate alert and deployment. The demands of simultaneous deployment and combat employment create a unique set of dynamics. Operations are carefully planned and rehearsed at training areas and in marshaling areas. In contrast to most strategic deployments, equipment is configured for immediate use; ammunition and fuel are stored on board. Joint and Army commanders carefully balance C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets to obtain the maximum combat power quickly. Wherever possible, the commanders exercise C2 from aircraft and ships and use air- and sea-based fire support assets. Doing this dedicates the available strategic lift to placing Army maneuver and sustainment forces on the ground. For example,
the staff of an initial-entry force may orbit in specially equipped Air Force aircraft, while
Navy and Air Force elements deliver precision strikes to support the force.
SECURITY OF FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS
3-55. Enemies possess the motives and means to interrupt the deployment flow. Threats
to deploying forces may include advanced conventional weaponry, weapons of mass
destruction, and various types of sea and land mines. Sea and air PODs are particularly
vulnerable targets since they are the entry points for forces and equipment. POD operations
involve relatively soft targets; in addition to military forces and materiel, host nation
support personnel, contractors, and civilians may all be working there. Many of these
lucrative targets are within the range of enemy forces. A successful attack on a POD can
have a major impact on force projection momentum. Commanders at all levels focus
attention on security actions that reduce vulnerabilities. To avoid threats to entry
operations, the force may operate through ISBs.
INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES
3-56. An intermediate staging base is a secure staging base established near to, but
not in, the areas of operations (see Figure 3-5). ISBs are temporary staging areas en route
to an operation. They may also be used to sustain forces in the AO (see FM 4-0). In the best
case, secure bases are available within the AO. Unfortunately, the situation that compels
deployment may negate the advantages of basing within the AO. When deciding whether to
operate through an ISB, JFCs weigh sustainment requirements against risks.

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Figure 3-5. Intermediate Staging Base
3-57. ISBs are normally located within the theater of operations and outside the AO. They are established outside the range of enemy tactical and operational fires and beyond the enemy political sphere of influence. In cases where the force needs to secure a lodgment, an ISB may be critical to success. Using ISBs is not without a price. Because they are transshipment points, ISBs add handling requirements and can increase deployment time. They may also require infrastructure (personnel and equipment).
3-58. ISBs may serve as the principal staging base for entry operations. They take advantage of existing, sophisticated capabilities, serving as efficient transfer points from high volume commercial carriers to a variety of tactical, intratheater transport means. Tactical transports can serve smaller, austere ports or—with the right lift—bypass them. Upon arrival at an ISB, a force conducts limited RSO&I and configures for operations. The JFC can then project forces ready to conduct operations immediately into the AO. While not a requirement in every case, an ISB can provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances call for it. ISBs are not limited to a single location; an ISB can consist of several points within a region. The capability and throughput of available facilities determine ISB configuration.

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PART TWO

Foundations of Full Spectrum Operations
Part Two discusses the foundations of full spectrum operations: fundamentals, battle command, and conduct. Warfighting is complex, but its essence is simple, and may be distilled into five general rules: Army forces win on the offense; initiate combat on their terms—not their adversaries; gain and maintain the initiative; build momentum quickly; and win decisively.
The three chapters in this part provide the foundations for these rules and provide greater detail on aspects of how to think about operations
Chapter 4 describes the range of Army operations, elements of combat power, principles of war, tenets of Army operations, operational framework, and Army capabilities. Army forces can be tailored to create combined arms teams able to mass complementary and reinforcing effects across the range of military operations—war and military operations other than war—at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information—connect Army doctrine, organizations, and operations. Army commanders use the principles of war and the tenets of Army operations to apply the elements of combat power in decisive full spectrum operations. They use the operational framework to arrange their forces in time, space, purpose, and resources to accomplish the mission.
Chapter 5 examines battle command. Battle command is the application of leadership as an element of combat power. It involves four functions: visualizing, describing, directing, and leading. Commanders visualize an operation in terms of METT-TC, the elements of operational design, and their own experience and judgment. Commanders use the commander's intent and planning guidance to describe their vision. Commanders use the concept of operations and the seven battlefield operating systems to direct their forces. Throughout, commanders apply the art of command to lead their soldiers and organizations to success.
Chapter 6 describes the conduct of full spectrum operations in terms of the operations process. The operations process consists of the activities units perform as they conduct operations: planning, preparation, and execution with continuous assessment. It translates the commander's vision into action.
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Chapter 4

Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations
The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire
that theory, and lodge it in our heads—otherwise, we will never get very far.
Frederick the Great
4-1. Doctrine for full spectrum
CONTENTS
operations depends upon certain
fundamentals. These
The Elements of Combat Power
fundamentals provide the
Maneuver
conceptual foundations for
Firepower
execution in the field as well as
Leaders_hip
leader development in the
Protection
classroom. They provide the
Information
basis for the efficient and
The Foundations of Army Operations
effective generation,
The Principles of War
employment, and sustainment of
The Tenets of Army Operations
Army forces. Ultimately,
The Operational Framework
knowledge and application of the
Theater Organization
fundamentals enable Army
Area of Operations
forces to be decisive across the
Battlespace
range of military operations.
Battlefield Organization Army Capabilities
4-2. The fundamentals provide
Task Organization
the basis for full spectrum
Combined Arms
operations (see Figure 4 1). The
-
Army Command and Support Relationships
elements of combat power are
Complementary and Reinforcing Effects
building blocks that underlie the
Asymmetry
generation of combat power. In
land operations, commanders
combine and apply the elements of combat power to produce overwhelming effects. The principles of war guide and instruct commanders as they combine the elements of combat power. The principles reflect the distillation of Army experience into a set of time-tested guidelines. The tenets of Army operations characterize both the substance and form of full spectrum operations. The tenets permeate Army doctrine. The operational framework relates the activities of Army forces in time, space, and purpose. Combined with tenets of Army operations, the framework provides commanders with a conceptual basis for applying combat power. Commanders combine and use the capabilities of combined arms formations in complementary, reinforcing, and asymmetric ways. Combined arms organizations apply combat power to achieve decisive results across the range of operations.
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Figure 4-1. The Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations
THE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER
4-3. The ability of Army forces to fight and win underlies success in all operations,
whether lethal force is used or not. Combat power is the ability to fight. It is the total means
of destructive or disruptive force, or both, that a military unit or formation can apply against
the adversary at a given time. Commanders combine the elements of combat power—
maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information— to meet constantly changing
requirements and defeat an enemy (see Figure 4-2). Defeating an enemy requires increasing
the disparity between friendly and enemy forces by reducing enemy combat power.
Commanders do this by synchronizing the elements of friendly force combat power to
create overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place. Focused combat power ensures
success and denies an enemy any chance to maintain coherent resistance. Massed effects
created by synchronizing the elements of combat power are the surest means of limiting
friendly casualties and swiftly ending a campaign or operation.

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Leadership Probadoa
27.71v
ttt t ..
Understanding
Inikernelion
Figure 4-2. The Elements of Combat Power
MANEUVER
4-4. Maneuver is the employment of forces, through movement combined with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.
Operational Maneuver
4-5. Operational maneuver involves placing Army forces and resources at the critical
place in time to achieve an operational advantage. It is complex and often requires joint and
multinational support. Deployment and intratheater movements are operational maneuver if
they achieve a positional advantage and influence the outcome of a campaign or battle.
4-6. To achieve operational results, commanders seek operational advantages of position before combat begins and exploit tactical success afterwards. Ideally, operational maneuver secures positional advantage before an enemy acts and either preempts enemy maneuver or ensures his destruction if he moves. Operational movements and maneuver allow commanders to create the conditions they desire for battle and take full advantage of tactical actions. During Operation Desert Storm, for example, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) moved VII and XVIII Corps west of Kuwait to position them to envelop or turn the strongest Iraqi defenses. This undetected operational movement resulted in surprise at both the operational and tactical levels. This surprise, combined with rapid tactical movement and overwhelming combat power, resulted in the decisive defeat of the Iraqi army.
Tactical Maneuver
4-7. Tactical maneuver wins battles and engagements. By keeping the enemy off balance,
it also protects the force. In both the offense and defense, it positions forces to close with
and destroy the enemy. Effective tactical maneuver continually poses new problems for the
enemy. It renders his reactions ineffective and eventually drives him to defeat.
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4-8. In stability operations, effective tactical maneuver preempts adversary options. It concentrates friendly combat power where it can deter or reduce the effects of violence and places friendly forces in position to use firepower should combat follow. Tactical maneuver gives credibility to an operation by providing tangible evidence of Army force capabilities. In support operations, maneuver positions Army forces to apply their capabilities where they are needed.
Close Combat
4-9. Close combat is inherent in maneuver and has one purpose—to decide the outcome of battles and engagements. Close combat is combat carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces, or seizes and retains ground.
The range between combatants may vary from several thousand meters to hand-to-hand
combat.
Close Combat at Landing Zone X-Ray
On 14 November 1965, soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry engaged in close combat with North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam.
Specialist 5 Marlin T. Dorman recalled hugging the ground because "if you moved you got hit." He noted that "our training really showed then. We shifted into defensive positions. We had five men killed in 25 minutes. Then all of a sudden they [the NVA] tried a mass assault from three directions, rushing from bush to bush and laying fire on us. We put our M-16s on full automatic and killed most of them." Specialist 4 Galen Bungum added, "We gathered up all the full magazines we could find and stacked them up in front of us. There was no way we could dig a foxhole. The handle was blown off my entrenching tool and one of my canteens had a hole blown through it. The fire was so heavy that if you tried to raise up to dig you were dead. There was death and destruction all around."
On the third morning of heavy fighting, the NVA tried one last attempt to break
through the battalion perimeter. Under the light of flares, the NVA massed 50 yards
in front of the American positions and ran forward. The soldiers responded with air
burst field artillery shells, mortar rounds, machine guns, and small arms. After 14
minutes of continuous combat, the NVA force broke off the attack and ended the
three-day battle at Landing Zone X-Ray.
4-10. All tactical actions inevitably require seizing or securing terrain as a means to an end or an end in itself. Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces toclose with and destroy the enemy. During offensive and defensive
,
operations, the certainty of destruction may persuade the enemy to yield. In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions. In all cases, the ability of Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a situation.

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FIREPOWER
4-11. Firepower provides the destructive force essential to overcoming the enemy's ability and will to fight. Firepower and maneuver complement each other. Firepower magnifies the effects of maneuver by destroying enemy forces and restricting his ability to counter friendly actions; maneuver creates the conditions for the effective use of firepower. Although one element might dominate a phase of an action, the synchronized effects of both are present in all operations. The threat of one in the presence of the other magnifies the impact of both. One without the other makes neither decisive. Combined, they make destroying larger enemy forces feasible and enhance protection of friendly forces.
4-12. Firepower is the amount of fires that a position, unit, or weapons system can deliver. Fires are effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons. Fires include fire support functions used separately from or in combination with maneuver. The extended range, capabilities, and accuracy of modern weapons systems (direct and indirect) and target acquisition systems make fires more lethal than ever before. These capabilities also allow commanders to create effects throughout the area of operations (AO). Commanders integrate and synchronize operational and tactical fires to accomplish their mission.
Operational Fires
4-13. Operational fires are the operational-level commander's application of nonlethal and lethal weapons effects to accomplish objectives during the conduct of a campaign or major operation. They are a vital component of any operational-level plan. Assets other than those supporting tactical maneuver normally furnish operational fires. Commanders direct operational fires against targets whose destruction or neutralization they expect to significantly affect a campaign or major operation. Planning operational fires includes allocating apportioned joint and multinational air, land, and sea means. Operational fires can be designed to achieve a single operational-level objective, for example, interdiction of major enemy forces to create the conditions for defeating them in detail.
4-14. Operational maneuver and operational fires may occur simultaneously but have very different objectives. In general terms, operational fires are not the same as fire support, and operational maneuver does not necessarily depend on operational fires. However, operational maneuver is most effective when commanders synchronize it with, and exploit opportunities developed by, operational fires. Combining operational fires with operational maneuver generates asymmetric, enormously destructive, one-sided battles, as the Desert Storm ground offensive showed.
Tactical Fires
4-15. Tactical fires destroy or neutralize enemy forces, suppress enemy fires, and disrupt enemy movement. Tactical fires create the conditions for decisive close combat.
Commanders take special care to synchronize fires with the effects of other systems.
Massing maximum fires requires a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and
the ability to employ all available means simultaneously against a variety of targets. The
effective application of tactical fires relies on procedures for determining priorities;
locating, identifying, and tracking targets; allocating firepower assets; and assessing effects.
Effective fires demand well-trained, competently led units with a high degree of situational
understanding.
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Operational Maneuver and Fires—Operation Desert Storm
On 27 February 1991, Operation Desert Storm demonstrated how operational fires
and maneuver can generate a one-sided, decisive battle. The campaign plan
identified the Iraqi Army, a force whose elimination would decisively conclude the
war, as the operational center of gravity.
XVIII Airborne Corps turned Objective Tim into Forward Operating Base Viper and launched two aviation brigades into Engagement Area Thomas, north of Basrah. There they destroyed over 80 Iraqi vehicles. To the south, the corps pushed eastward. They seized Jalibah Airfield and moved at speeds approaching 40 miles per hour as they overran and destroyed Iraqi forces.
After destroying the Iraqi Tawakalna mechanized and Medina armored divisions,
VII Corps pressed an attack that destroyed more than 100 tanks and armored
personnel carriers just short of the Kuwaiti border. British forces under operational
control of the corps pressed the attack beyond the Basrah-Kuwait City highway to
the coast. The remaining Iraqi forces fled encircling coalition forces for sanctuary
across the Euphrates River.
LEADERSHIP
4-16. Because it deals directly with soldiers, leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power. Confident, audacious, and competent leadership focuses the other elements of combat power and serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for success. Leaders who embody the warrior ethos inspire soldiers to succeed. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation in all operations. Leadership is key, and the actions of leaders often make the difference between success and failure, particularly in small units.
4-17. The duty of every leader is to be competent in the profession of arms. Competence requires proficiency in four sets of skills: interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. Army leaders hone these skill sets through continual training and self-study (see FM 6-22).
4-18. Leaders instill their units with Army values, energy, methods, and will. The professional competence, personality, and will of strong commanders at all levels represent a significant part of every unit's combat power. All Army leaders must demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards. Leaders are soldiers first: they know and understand their subordinates and act with courage and conviction. During operations, they know where to be, when to make decisions, and how to influence the action.
4-19. Leaders build teamwork and trust. Trust is a key attribute in the human dimension of combat leadership. Soldiers must trust and have confidence in their leaders. Leaders must command the trust and confidence of their soldiers. Once trust is violated, a leader becomes ineffective. Trust encourages subordinates to seize the initiative. In unclear situations, bold leaders who exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent accomplish the mission.
PROTECTION
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FM3-0 PART THREE Conducting Decisive Full Spectrum Operations.
PART THREE

Conducting Decisive Full Spectrum Operations
Part Three discusses the four types of operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—that Army forces conduct. It illustrates how to apply the concepts described in Part Two within the operational environment described in Part One.
Chapter 7 discusses offensive operations. The offense is the decisive form of war. The will to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative defines the spirit and purpose of the offense. It is essential to success in all operations—defensive, stability, and support— as well as offensive. Combined with a demonstrated combat capability, it makes Army forces credible in any situation. Circumstances may require defending; however, victory requires shifting to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when the force accomplishes the mission, reaches a limit of advance, or approaches culmination. It then consolidates, resumes the attack, or prepares for another operation.
Chapter 8 discusses defensive operations. Commanders direct defensive operations to defeat enemy
attacks. buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for the offense. Although the
defense is the stronger form of war, it normally cannot achieve a decision. Thus, commanders
simultaneously or sequentially combine defensive operations with offensive operations.
Chapter 9 discusses stability operations. Stability operations include a range of actions that Army forces conduct outside the US and US territories. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. Stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. However, the credibility and staying power of Army forces allow them to maintain stability until the situation is resolved. Army forces may execute stability operations as part of a theater engagement plan, smaller­scale contingency. or follow-on operation to a campaign or major operation. They are inherently complex and place great demands on leaders. units. and soldiers. Stability operations require the mental and physical agility to shift among situations of peace, conflict, and war and between combat and
noncombfit operations.
Chapter 10 discusses support operations. Army forces conduct support operations to relieve suffering and help civil authorities prepare for or respond to crises. Support operations are divided into two categories: Domestic support operations are conducted within the US and US territories. Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted outside the US and US territories. Domestic support operations include civil support—operations to help civil authorities protect US territory, population, and infrastructure against attacks. Other government agencies have primary responsibility for these areas; however, Army forces have specialized capabilities and provide important support. Support operations usually aim to overcome manmade or natural disaster conditions for a limited time until civil authorities no longer need help.
In all environments, the initiative of Army leaders, agility of Army units, depth of Army resources, and versatility of Army soldiers combine to allow Army forces to conduct decisive full spectrum operations. Commanders synchronize offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to defeat any enemy or dominate any situation—anywhere. anytime.
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4-20. Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. Protection is neither timidity, nor risk avoidance. The Army operates in tough, unforgiving environments where casualties occur. Full spectrum operations create an inherently tense relationship between accomplishing the mission and taking casualties. Accomplishing the mission takes precedence over avoiding casualties. However, soldiers are the most important Army resource, and excessive casualties cripple future mission accomplishment. Casualties from accident and disease are particularly galling. They contribute nothing to mission accomplishment and degrade unit effectiveness. Commanders are responsible for accomplishing the mission with the fewest friendly casualties feasible.
4-21. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance. Force protection, the primary component, minimizes the effects of enemy firepower (including weapons of mass destruction [WMD]), maneuver, and information. Field discipline precludes losses from hostile environments. Safety reduces the inherent risk of nonbattle deaths and injuries. Fratricide avoidance minimizes the inadvertent killing or maiming of soldiers by friendly fires.
Force Protection
4-22. Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. It includes air, space, and missile defense; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; antiterrorism; defensive information operations; and security to operational forces and means. The increased emphasis on force protection at every echelon stems from the conventional dominance of Army forces. Often unable to challenge the Army in conventional combat, adversaries seek to frustrate Army operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics. Force protection counters these threats.
4-23. Force protection at all levels minimizes losses to hostile action. Skillful and
aggressive counterintelligence and threat assessments decrease the vulnerability of friendly
forces. Effective operations security (OPSEC) keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly
information. Proper dispersion helps reduce losses from enemy fires and terrorist action.
Camouflage discipline, local security, and field fortifications do the same. Protection of
electronic links and nodes, to include combat troops with electronic devices, is vital to
protecting information, information systems, and soldiers. At the operational level, rear area
and base security contributes to force protection. Air defense artillery forces protect
installations and civilian populations from over-the-horizon strikes by conventional
warheads and WMD. Army air and missile defense units complement the air component's
control of the air. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense measures provide the
capability to sustain operations in nuclear, biological, or chemical environments.
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4-24. Field discipline, a second component of protection, guards soldiers from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. Oppressive environments can sap
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soldier strength and morale far more quickly than enemy action. Soldiers can adapt to the point that they outperform indigenous populations; however, this adaptation can only stem from training in fieldcraft skills and thorough preparation.
Field Discipline—Preventive Medicine in Combat
In the 1898 war with Spain, the US mobilized the Army and sent soldiers to fight in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Combat claimed 379 American lives. Well over 10 times that number were lost to disease. Almost 1,000 soldiers died from typhoid fever and diarrhea in crowded, filthy training camps in the US. Once in the tropics, malaria and yellow fever increased the disease-related deaths to several thousand. The resulting scandal led to efforts to reform the War Department.
Nearly a century after the Spanish-American War, the US conducted contingency
operations in Panama (1989-90) and Haiti (1994-96). In both cases, combat
casualties were minimal, while deaths from disease were nonexistent. Today, good
leadership, the advanced state of medical knowledge, formalized measures designed
to prevent disease, and first-rate medical treatment ensure that US troops sent
overseas are among the healthiest in the world.
4-25. Commanders take every measure and precaution to keep soldiers healthy and maintain their morale. Such actions include securing equipment and supplies from loss or damage. Commanders ensure systems are in place for adequate combat health support (to include preventive medicine) and the quick return of minor casualties. They provide effective systems for maintenance, evacuation, and rapid replacement or repair of equipment. Tactical commanders take care of their soldiers' basic health needs and prevent unnecessary exposure to debilitating conditions.
Safety
4-26. Safety is a third component of protection. Operational conditions often impose significant risks to soldiers' lives and health and make equipment operation difficult. Trained crews and operators must know the capabilities and limitations of their weapons systems. Commanders must know how to employ them. In designing operations, commanders consider the limits of human endurance. They balance the possible benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations with the risks involved. In combat, fatigue extends reaction times and reduces alertness. Fatal accidents, loss of combat power, and missed tactical opportunities may follow. Command attention to safety and high levels of discipline lessen those risks, particularly as soldiers become exhausted. Safe operations come from enforcing standards during training. While taking calculated risks is inherent in operations, commanders are obligated to embed safety in the conduct of all operations.
.
Fratricide Avoidance
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resulting in positive weapons control, control of troop movements, and disciplined operational procedures contributes to achieving this goal. Situational understanding and using friendly personnel and vehicle identification methods also help. Eliminating fratricide increases soldiers' willingness to act boldly, confident that misdirected friendly fires will not kill them.
INFORMATION
4-28. Information enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and protection. In the past, when forces made contact with the enemy, commanders developed the situation to gain information. Today, Army leaders use information collected by unmanned systems to increase their situational understanding before engaging the enemy. They also use offensive information operations (I0) to shape the operational environment and create the conditions for employing the other elements of combat power.
4-29. The common operational picture (COP) based on enhanced intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and disseminated by modern information systems
provides commanders throughout the force with an accurate, near real-time perspective and
knowledge of the situation. Information from the COP, transformed into situational
understanding, allows commanders to combine the elements.of combat power in new ways.
For example, superior understanding of the situation allows commanders to avoid enemy
engagement areas, while concentrating fires and maneuver at the decisive place and time.
This ability increases the survivability of the force without substantially increasing passive
protective systems, such as armor. Modern information systems help leaders at all levels
make better decisions faster. Better decisions rapidly communicated allow Army forces to
mass the effects of combat power more rapidly and effectively than the enemy. This enables
Army forces to see first, understand first, and act first.
4-30. Information is not neutral; opposing sides use it directly and indirectly to gain exploitable advantages and apply them against selected targets. Just as fires are synchronized and targeted, so is information. Some examples illustrate the use of information as an element of combat power: In 1989 during Operation Just Cause, and again in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, psychological operations (PSYOP) units accompanied maneuver forces. In both conflicts, PYSOP, combined with the
Information Modernization—AH-64D
Longbow

The AH-64D attack helicopter represents the wave of integrated digital weapons systems now entering service. The aircraft provides the commander with digital links to the ground and air situation. Its computer shares the situational picture with all other aircraft on the mission. The radar fire control system on the aircraft can scan, detect, and classify more than 128 targets, prioritize the 16 most dangerous ones, transmit the information to other aircraft, and initiate a precision attack'/all in less than a minute.
demonstrated destructive power of Army forces, convinced many enemy troops to surrender. In Operation Desert Storm, military deception (an element of offensive IO) resulted in the diversion of forces away from USCENTCOM's decisive operation.
4-31. Army forces are modernizing information systems to an unprecedented degree. This effort will have far-reaching effects on Army operations. The aim of these improvements is to provide all leaders with near real-time information that will allow them

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capability poses operational challenges. While subordinates have access to the broader
tactical situation, commanders have access to layers of tactical detail. Higher-level
commanders yielding to the temptation to direct minor tactical actions could reduce the
benefits of advanced information systems and the situational understanding they support.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARMY OPERATIONS
4-32. Understanding the principles of war and tenets of Army operations is fundamental to operating successfully across the range of military operations. The principles of war and tenets of Army operations form the foundation of Army operational doctrine.
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
4-33. The nine principles of war
provide general guidance for conducting
war and military operations other than
war at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. The principles are the
enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. The
US Army published its original
principles of war after World War I. In
the following years, the Army adjusted
the original principles, but overall they
have stood the tests of analysis,
experimentation, and practice.
The Principles of War
• Objective
•
Offensive

•
Mass

•
Economy of force

•
Maneuver

•
Unity of command

•
Security

•
Surprise

•
Simplicity

4-34. The principles of war are not a checklist. They do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize the characteristics of successful Army operations. Their greatest value lies in the education of the military professional. Applied to the study of past campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are powerful tools for analysis.
Objective
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable
objective.
4-35. At the operational and tactical
levels, objective means ensuring all actions
contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters. The principle of objective
drives all military activity. When undertaking any mission, commanders
No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war.
Clausewitz
should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. At the strategic
level, this means having a clear vision of the theater end state. This normally includes
aspects of the political dimension. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and
understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them.

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4-37. To accomplish missions, commanders persevere. Offensive and defensive operations may swiftly create the conditions for short-term success, but protracted stability operations or support operations may be needed to cement lasting strategic objectives. Commanders balance a natural desire to enter the AO, quickly accomplish the mission, and depart with the broader requirements for incremental achievement of national goals and objectives.
Offensive
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
4-38. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. It is the essence of successful operations. Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. They force the enemy to react. Commanders use offensive actions to impose their will on an enemy, adversary, or situation. Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.
Mass

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.
4-39. Commanders mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation. They mass combat power in time and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results. Massing in time applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously. Massing in space concentrates the effects of
different elements of combat power against a single target. Both dominate the situation; commanders select the method that best fits the circumstances. To an increasing degree, joint and Army operations mass the full effects of combat power in both time and space, rather than one or the other. Such effects overwhelm the entire enemy defensive system
before he can react effectively.
4-40. Army forces can mass effects without concentrating forces to a far greater extent than in the past. They can also mass effects more quickly. This does not imply that Army forces accomplish their missions with fires alone. Swift and fluid maneuver supported by situational understanding complement firepower. Often, this combination accomplishes in a single operation what formerly took an entire campaign.
4-41. Commanders mass the effects of combat power against a combination of elements
critical to the enemy force to shatter its coherence. Some of these may be concentrated and
vulnerable to operations that mass in both time and space. Others may spread throughout
the AO, vulnerable only to simultaneous, nonlinear operations that mass in time only.
Commanders combine simultaneous and sequential operations to mass effects in time and
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space.

Economy of Force
Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
4-42. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. It requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority—overwhelming effects—in the decisive operation. Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform.

Maneuver
Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat
power.
4-43. As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It achieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them. Army forces gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success through maneuver. Maneuver is more than just fire and movement. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well. It requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations and the skillful application of mass, surprise, and economy of force.

Unity of Command
For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.
4-44. Developing the full combat power of a force requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces
toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action.
4-45. The joint, multinational, and interagency nature of unified action creates situations
where the military commander does not directly control all elements in the AO. In the
absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to
achieve unity of effort (see JP 3-0; FM 6-22).
Security

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Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
4-46. Security protects and preserves-combat power. It does not involve excessive caution. Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security results from measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat ISR. Military deception greatly enhances security. The threat of asymmetric action requires emphasis on security, even in low-threat environments (see FM 3-13; FM 3-90; FM 3-07.2).
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Surprise
Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
4-47. Surprise is the reciprocal of security. Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared. It is a powerful but temporary combat multiplier. It is not essential to take the adversary or enemy completely unaware; it is only necessary that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry.

Simplicity
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough
understanding.
4-48. Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans and clear, concise orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The factors of METT-TC determine the degree of simplicity required. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will not be able to understand or follow it.
4-49. Multinational operations put a premium on simplicity. Differences in language, doctrine, and culture complicate multinational operations. Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in this complex environment. The same applies to operations involving interagency and nongovernmental organizations.

THE TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS
4-50. The tenets of Army operations—initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility—build on the principles of war. They further describe the characteristics of successful operations. These tenets are essential to victory. While they do not guarantee success, their absence risks failure.
Initiative
4-51. Initiative has both operational and individual components. From an operational perspective, initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle oroperation. Initiative implies an offensive spirit in all operations. To set the terms of battle, commanders eliminate or reduce the number of enemy options. They compel the enemy to conform to friendly operational purposes and tempo, while retaining freedom of action. Army leaders anticipate events throughout the battlespace. Through effective command and control (C2), they enable their forces to act before and react faster than the enemy does.
4-52. From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a self-starter, to act
when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes. An individual leader
with initiative is willing to decide and initiate independent actions when the concept of
operations no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the
accomplishment of the commander's intent presents itself (see FM 6-22). Despite advances
in C2 from digital technology, individual initiative remains important for successful
operations. In battle, leaders exercise this attribute when they act independently within the
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4-53. Initiative requires delegating decision making authority to the lowest practical level. Commanders give subordinates the greatest possible freedom to act. They encourage aggressive action within the commander's intent by issuing mission-type orders. Mission­type orders assign tasks to subordinates without specifying how to accomplish them (see FM 6-0). Such decentralization frees commanders to focus on the critical aspects of the overall operation. Using mission-type orders requires individual initiative exercised by well-trained, determined, disciplined soldiers. It also requires leaders who trust their subordinates and are willing to take and underwrite risks.
4-54. In the offense, initiative involves throwing the enemy off balance with powerful, unexpected strikes. It implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of an attack. To do this, commanders mass the effects of combat power and execute with speed, audacity, and violence. They continually seek vulnerable spots and shift their decisive operation when opportunities occur. To retain the initiative, leaders press the fight tenaciously and aggressively. They accept risk and push soldiers and systems to their limits. Retaining the initiative requires planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events. The higher the echelon, the more possibilities the commander must anticipate and the further in advance the staff must plan.
4-55. In the defense, initiative implies quickly turning the tables on the attacker. It means taking aggressive action to collect information and force the attacker to reveal his intentions. Defenders aim to negate the attacker's initial advantages, gain freedom of action, and force the enemy to fight on the defender's terms. Once an enemy commits to a course of action, defending forces continue to seek offensive opportunities. They use maneuver and firepower to dictate the tempo of the fight and preempt enemy actions.
4-56. In stability operations, initiative contributes to influence over factions. It establishes conditions conducive to political solutions and disrupts illegal activities. For instance, commanders may establish conditions in which belligerent factions can best achieve their interests by remaining peaceful. Other examples of exercising initiative include defusing complicated crises, recognizing and preempting inherent dangers before they occur, and resolving grievances before they ignite open hostilities.
4-57. To gain and maintain the initiative in support operations, commanders develop a comprehensive understanding of the situation and anticipate requirements. Doing these things allows massing of resources to mitigate and prevent the effects of disasters. Commanders can then contribute to relieving suffering, managing consequences, and providing essential services.

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Agility
4-58. Agility is the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily. It springs from
trained and disciplined forces. Agility requires that subordinates act to achieve the
commander's intent and fight through any obstacle to accomplish the mission.
4-59. Operational agility stems from the capability to deploy and employ forces across
http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlseview/public/297153-1 fm/3-0/ch4.htm .12/28/2004 the range of Army operations. Army forces and commanders shift among offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as circumstances and missions require. This capability is not merely physical; it requires conceptual sophistication and intellectual flexibility.
4-60. Tactical agility is the ability of a friendly force to react faster than the enemy. It is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Agility is mental and physical. Agile commanders quickly comprehend unfamiliar situations, creatively apply doctrine, and make timely decisions.
Depth
4-61. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. Commanders use depth to obtain space for effective maneuver, time to conduct operations, and resources to achieve and exploit success. Depth enables momentum in the offense, elasticity in the defense, and staying power in all operations.
4-62. In the offense and defense, depth entails attacking the enemy throughout the AO— simultaneously when possible, sequentially when necessary—to deny him freedom to maneuver. Offensive depth allows commanders to sustain momentum and press the fight. Defensive depth creates opportunities to maneuver against the enemy from multiple directions as attacking forces are exposed or discovered.
4-63. In stability operations and support operations, depth extends influence in time, space, purpose, and resources to affect the environment and conditions. In stability operations, ISR combined with I0 help commanders understand factional motives, identify power centers, and shape the environment. In support operations, depth in resources, planning, and time allows commanders to stop suffering and prevent or slow the spread of disease.
4-64. In all operations, staying power—depth of action—comes from adequate resources. Depth of resources in quantity, positioning, and mobility is critical to executing military operations. Commanders balance depth in resources with agility. A large combat service support (CSS) tail can hinder maneuver, but inadequate CSS makes the force fragile and vulnerable.
.
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4-65. Synchronization is arranging activities in time, space, and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. Without synchronization, there is no massing of effects. Through synchronization, commanders arrange battlefield operating systems to mass the effects of combat power at the chosen place and time to overwhelm an enemy or dominate the situation. Synchronization is a means, not an end. Commanders balance synchronization against agility and initiative; they never surrender the initiative or miss a decisive opportunity for the sake of synchronization.
4-66. Some activities—such as electronic warfare, suppressing enemy air defenses, and
shifting maneuver forces—might occur before the decisive operation. They may take place
at locations distant from each other. Though separated in time and space, commanders
closely synchronize such actions to mass overwhelming effects at the decisive time and
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place. Synchronization often requires explicit coordination and rehearsals among
participants.
Versatility
4-67. Versatility is the ability of Army forces to meet the global, diverse mission requirements of full spectrum operations. Competence in a variety of missions and skills allows Army forces to quickly transition from one type of operation to another with minimal changes to the deployed force structure. Versatility depends on adaptive leaders, competent and dedicated soldiers, and well-equipped units. Effective training, high standards, and detailed planning also contribute. Time and resources limit the number of tasks any unit can perform well. Within these constraints, commanders maximize versatility by developing the multiple capabilities of units and soldiers. Versatility contributes to the agility of Army units.
4-68. Versatility is a characteristic of multifunctional units. Commanders can take advantage of this by knowing each unit's capabilities and carefully tailoring forces for each mission. Military police, for example, can provide a mobile, lethal show of force, restore civil order, process detainees, and support peacekeeping operations. Engineer units can rebuild infrastructure, construct ports and base camps, and maintain lines of communications (LOCs). At higher echelons, versatility implies the ability to assume more complex responsibilities. For example, a corps headquarters can serve as an ARFOR headquarters or, with augmentation, a joint task force headquarters.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
4-69. The operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and the battlefield organization. The framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility, and provides a way for commanders to visualize how to employ forces against the enemy. Commanders design an operational framework to accomplish their mission by defining and arranging its three components. They use the operational framework to focus combat power.
THEATER ORGANIZATION
4-70. The operational framework for Army forces rests within the combatant
commander's theater organization. Combatant commanders with geographic
responsibilities conduct operations within an area of responsibility (AOR) (theater)
assigned by the Unified Command Plan. When warranted, they designate theaters of war,
theaters of operations, combat zones, and a communications zone (COMMZ). Joint force
commanders (JFCs) at all levels may establish subordinate operational areas (see Figure 4-
3). Joint doctrine discusses the assignment and responsibilities associated with theater
operational areas.

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.
Figure 4-3. Theater Organization
4-71. Either the National Command Authorities or a combatant commander may designate a theater of war. It is the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass a combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations. Combatant commanders typically assign theaters of operations to subordinate unified commanders.
4-72. A theater of operations is a subarea within a theater of war defined by a combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.
4-73. A combat zone is that area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations.
It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ is the rear
part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone). It contains the
LOCs, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the
immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. It reaches back to the continental
US, to a supporting combatant command AOR, or both.
.

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AREA OF OPERATIONS
4-74. An AO is an operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. AOs
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should also allow component commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders synchronize operations and are supported commanders.
4-75. Component commanders normally designate AOs for subordinate units. They use control measures to describe AOs and design them to fit the situation and take advantage of joint force capabilities. Commanders specify the minimum control measures necessary to focus combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and promote unified action. At a minimum, control measures include boundaries on all sides of an AO (see FM 3-90). In linear operations, AOs require forward boundaries.
4-76. Commanders typically subdivide some or all of their AO by assigning AOs to subordinate units. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure 4­4). When AOs are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When AOs are noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the concept of operations links the elements of the force. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous AOs.
Contiguous Noncontiguous
Areas of Operations Areas of Operations

six
. ¦,...r
4
4
vt

Q.., / 44.
xxx
Adjacent subordinate unit AOs share StpardInsis units resells AOs Mat do baundisriss. In this case, the higher not share boundaries. The higherheadquarters has assigned al of Ns AO hsedqu¦ iers retsina responsibility for lb suboldirals unit. the unassigned portion at Its AO.
Figure 4-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operations
BATTLESPACE
4-77. Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions commanders must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest (see Figure 4-5).
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.
Figure 4-5. Battlespace Components
4-78. Battlespace is conceptual—a higher commander does not assign it. Commanders
determine their battlespace based on their concept of operations, accomplishing the mission,
and protecting the force. Commanders use their experience, professional knowledge, and
understanding of the situation to visualize and change their battlespace as current operations
transition to future operations. Battlespace is not synonymous with AO. -However, because
battlespace is conceptual, Army forces conduct operations only within that portion of it
delineated by their AO.
Areas of Influence and Interest
4-79. Battlespace has an associated area of influence and area of interest. An area of
influence is a geographical area in which a commander can directly influence operations by
maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control.
Areas of influence surround and include the associated AO. The extent of subordinate units'
areas of influence normally guides higher commanders in assigning subordinate AOs. An
AO should not be substantially larger than the unit's area of influence. An area of interest is
that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence and areas adjacent to
it. It extends into enemy territory, to the objectives of current or planned operations. This
area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the
accomplishment of the mission. Areas of interest serve to focus intelligence development
and 10 directed at factors outside the AO that may affect the operation.
The Information Environment
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4-80. A commander's battlespace includes that part of the information environment that encompasses information activity affecting the operation. The information environment contains information activities that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences but are beyond direct military influence. It includes space-based systems that provide data and information to Army forces. To envision that part of the information environment that is within their battlespace, commanders determine the information activities that affect their operation and the capabilities of their own and opposing C2 and information systems.
Force Projection Bases
4-81. Army forces may deploy from home station directly to the AO or may move to the AO through force projection bases. Intermediate staging bases and power projection platforms are force projection bases. Force projection bases influence operations in a fashion similar to home stations. Sometimes one part of the deploying force will be at the force projection base while another operates in the AO. The deployed force may receive combat support (CS) and CSS from the force projection base for some or all of the operation.
Home Station
4-82. Home stations are the permanent locations of active component (AC) units and reserve component (RC) units (for example, the location of an armory or reserve center). Because the Army is a power projection force, its AC units deploy from and return to home stations. RC forces normally mobilize and deploy from installations that serve as power projection platforms (see FM 3-100.22). Although home stations and power projection platforms lie outside the AO, the commander's battlespace includes them. Home stations provide support to deployed forces until they return. The ability to receive CS, CSS, and C2 support from home station assets reduces the size of the deployed force. To a significant degree, events occurring at home station affect the morale and performance of deployed forces. Thus, the commander's battlespace encompasses all home station functions, including family readiness programs.
BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION
4-83. As part of the military decision making process, commanders visualize their battlespace and determine how to arrange their forces. The battlefield organization is the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining. Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield organization by providing the common focus for all actions. Commanders organize forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit's operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. These decisions form the basis of the concept of operations. When circumstances require a spatial reference, commanders describe the AO in terms of deep, close, and rear areas. These spatial categories are especially useful in operations that are generally contiguous and linear and feature a clearly defined enemy force.
Decisive Operations.

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4-84. Decisive operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major
http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/297153-1/fm/3-... .12/28/2004 operations, battles, and engagements. There is only one decisive operation for any major
operation, battle, or engagement for any given echelon. The decisive operation may include
multiple actions conducted simultaneously throughout the AO. Commanders weight the
decisive operation by economizing on combat power allocated to shaping operations.
4-85. In the offense and defense, decisive operations normally focus on maneuver. For example, Third Army's decisive operation in the Gulf War sent VII Corps against the Iraqi Republican Guard after a major shaping operation by the USCENTCOM air component. Conversely, CSS units may conduct the decisive operation during mobilization and deployment or in support operations, particularly if the mission is humanitarian.
Shaping Operations
4-86. Shaping operations at any echelon create and preserve
conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations include lethal and nonlethal activities conducted throughout the AO. They support the decisive operation by affecting enemy capabilities and forces, or by influencing enemy decisions. Shaping operations use all elements of combat power to neutralize or reduce enemy capabilities. They may occur before, concurrently with, or after the start of the decisive operation. They may throughout the AO.
Sample Shaping Operations
•
Economy of force actions

•
Security Operations

•
Actions designed to limit enemy freedom of action

•
Actions to deny the enemy the ability to concentrate

•
Attacks designed to fix enemy forces

•
Destruction of enemy capabilities

•
Information operations (including military deception)

•
Covering force actions

involve any combination of forces and occur
4-87. Some shaping operations, especially those that occur simultaneously with the
decisive operation, are economy of force actions. If the force available does not permit
simultaneous decisive and shaping operations, the commander sequences shaping
operations around the decisive operation. Regardless of the type of operation, commanders
may designate a successful shaping operation as the decisive operation. In that case,
commanders weight the new decisive operation with combat power from other shaping
operations. The concept of operations clearly describes how shaping operations support the
decisive operation.
4-88. Security operations are important shaping operations. They enable the decisive operation of the next higher headquarters and provide time and space for friendly forces to react to enemy activities. They also blind enemy attempts to gain information on friendly forces and protect friendly forces from enemy observation and fires.
4-89. A reserve is a portion of a body of troops, kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement and available for a decisive movement. Until committed, reserves shape through their placement within the AO. For example, the placement or movement of the reserve helps deceive the enemy as to the decisive operation and influences when the enemy commits forces. When committed, reserves either become or reinforce the decisive operation. Reserves prepare to seize and retain the initiative as a

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Sustaining Operations
A tactical combat force is a combat unit, with
4-90. The purpose of sustaining
appropriate combat support and combat
operations is to generate and maintain
service support assets, that is assigned the

combat power. Sustaining operations
mission of defeating level III threats.
are operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. Sustaining operations include the following elements:
•
Combat service support encompasses activities at all levels of war that generate and sustain combat power. It provides the essential capabilities and performs the functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all forces in theater.

•
Rear area and base security includes measures taken by military units, activities, and installations to protect themselves from acts designed to impair their effectiveness. It has four components: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response force operations, and combined arms tactical combat force (TCF) operations (see FM 3-100.40).

•
Movement control includes planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling personnel and materiel movements into, within, and out of an AO. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, managing reception and transshipment points, and obtaining host nation support are critical to movement control.

•
Terrain management includes allocating terrain, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities. It includes grouping units into bases and designating base clusters as necessary.

•
Infrastructure development applies to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities that support and control military forces. Infrastructure development focuses on facility security modifications and includes area damage control and repairs.

4-91. While sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations, they are not usually decisive themselves. However, in some support operations, CSS forces may be the decisive element of the Army force. Sustaining operations occur throughout the
AO, not just within a rear area. Failure to sustain normally results in mission failure. Sustaining operations determine how fast Army forces reconstitute and how far Army
forces can exploit success.
4-92. At the operational level, sustaining operations focus on preparing for the next phase
of the campaign or major operation. At the tactical level, sustaining operations underwrite
the tempo of the overall operation; they assure the ability to take immediate advantage of

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any opportunity.
Main Effort
4-93. Within the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, commanders designate and shift the main effort. The main effort is the activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time.
Commanders weight the main effort with resources and priorities and shift it as
circumstances and intent demand.
4-94. The main effort and the decisive operation are not always identical. Commanders anticipate shifts of main effort throughout an operation and include them in the plan. In
contrast, changing the decisive operation requires execution of a branch, sequel, or new
plan. A shaping operation may be the main effort before execution of the decisive
operation. However, the decisive operation becomes the main effort upon execution.
Close, Deep, and Rear Areas
4-95. Despite the increasing nonlinear nature of operations, there may be situations
where commanders describe decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in spatial terms
(see Figure 4-6). Typically, linear operations involve conventional combat and concentrated
maneuver forces. Ground forces share boundaries and orient against a similarly organized
enemy force. Terrain or friendly forces secure flanks and protect CSS operations. In some
multinational operations, the capabilities and doctrine of partners may dictate spatial
organization of the AO. In such situations, commanders designate close, deep, and rear
areas.

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Figure 4-6. Close, Deep, and Rear Areas
4-96. Close Areas. When designated, the close area is where forces are in immediate contact with the enemy and the fighting between the committed forces and readily available tactical reserves of both combatants is occurring, or where commanders envision close combat taking place. Typically, the close area assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates' rear boundaries to its own forward boundary.
Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations through maneuver and fires in the close
area and position most of the maneuver force within it.
4-97. The activities of forces directly supporting fighting elements also occur in the close
area. Examples of these activities are field artillery fires and combat health support. Within
the close area, depending on echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while
others conduct shaping operations. Commanders of forces engaged in the close area may
designate subordinate deep, close, and rear areas.
4-98. Deep Areas. When designated, the deep area is an area forward of the close area
that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in
the close area. Typically, the deep area extends from the forward boundary of
subordinate units to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon. Thus, the deep
area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms of purpose and
time. The extent of the deep area depends on the force's area of influence—how far out it
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can acquire information and strike targets. Commanders may place forces in the deep area to conduct shaping operations. Some of these operations may involve close combat. However, most maneuver forces stay in the close area.
4-99. Rear Areas. When designated, the rear area for any command extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions and is where the majority of the echelon's sustaining operations occur. Operations in rear areas assure freedom of action and continuity of operations, sustainment, and C2. Their focus on providing CS and CSS leaves units in the rear area vulnerable to attack. Commanders may designate combat forces to protect forces and facilities in the rear area. In some cases,• commanders may designate a noncontiguous rear area due to geography or other circumstances. In this case, the rear area force protection challenge increases due to physical separation of forces in the rear area from combat units that would otherwise occupy a contiguous close area.

ARMY CAPABILITIES
4-100. Commanders combine AC and RC Army forces—consisting of different types of units with varying degrees of modernization—with multinational forces and civilian agencies to achieve effective and efficient unified action. A broad range of organizations makes up the institutional Army that supports the field Army. Institutional Army organizations design, man, train, and equip the force. The institutional Army assists effectively integrating Army capabilities. It does this through leadership and guidance regarding force structure, doctrine, modernization, and budget (see FM 3-100.11).
TASK ORGANIZATION
4-101. The Army supports JFCs by providing tailored force packages to accomplish joint missions and dominate enemies and situations on land. Trained and equipped AC and RC units comprise these force packages. Within these force packages, Army commanders organize groups of units for specific missions. They reorganize for subsequent missions when necessary. This process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships is called task organizing. A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission is a task organization. The ability of Army forces to tailor (select forces based upon a mission) and task organize (temporarily organize units to accomplish a tactical mission) gives them extraordinary agility. It allows operational- and tactical-level commanders to organize their units to make best use available resources. The ability to task organize means Army forces can shift rapidly among offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.
COMBINED ARMS
4-102. The fundamental basis for the organization and operations of Army forces is
combined arms. Combined arms is the synchronized or simultaneous application of
several arms—such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and
aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used
against the enemy separately or in sequence. The ultimate goal of Army organization for
operations remains success in joint and combined arms warfare. Its combined arms
capability allows commanders to form Army combat, CS, and CSS forces into cohesive
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ARMY COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-103. Commanders build combined arms organizations using command and support relationships (see Figure 4-7). Command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another.
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NOTE 2. Commanders Of units in OS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and ele­ments of the supported unfit after coordination with the supported commander.
Figure 4-7. Army Command and Support Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities COMPLEMENTARY AND REINFORCING EFFECTS DODDOA-007969
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4-104. The services and the various arms within Army forces complement each other by posing a dilemma for the enemy. As the enemy evades the effects of one type of action, he exposes himself to destruction by another. This leads to enemy paralysis, destruction, or surrender. A tactical example of complementary effects is suppressing a defender with indirect fires while maneuvering to envelop and destroy him. If the enemy attempts to move to meet the threat, he risks destruction from the fires. If he remains in place to survive the fires, he risks being encircled and trapped.
4-105. Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization
with the capabilities of another (see Figure 4-8). For example, tanks combine protection,
firepower, and mobility. However, they are vulnerable to mines, antiarmor missiles,
concealed infantry, and restricted avenues of approach. They are particularly vulnerable in
urban areas and dense vegetation. Therefore, commanders combine tanks, infantry, and
engineers into combined arms teams and task forces. The infantry maneuvers on terrain
where armor cannot and eliminates concealed threats to the tanks. The engineers clear
obstacles, restoring the mobility of the armor. Unhindered by small arms fire, the armor
maneuvers to deliver devastating firepower to support the infantry and engineers. CSS units
support, providing the capabilities that the mix of systems requires.
Figure 4-8. Complementary Effects .DODD0A-007970
4-106. At the operational level, the capabilities of the services complement each other.
This situation provides JFCs with a wide range of options and confronts enemies with difficult dilemmas. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force aircraft engage targets that degrade enemy capabilities. Space, airborne, and land-based sensors monitor enemy reactions. Pilots and aviators use this information to refine and sharpen strikes. Ground forces maneuver, seize terrain, and destroy enemy forces. If the enemy attempts to meet the ground maneuver, he leaves his protected areas and exposes himself to the full weight of air power and long-range missiles. He is then even more vulnerable to the effects of maneuver. If the enemy attempts missile strikes on US air bases and lodgments, theater missile defenses, supported by space systems, intercept the weapons. As US ground forces maneuver, they oven-un enemy air defenses, air bases, launch areas, command posts, and CSS units,
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eliminating both tactical and operational threats and rendering the enemy's situation hopeless.
4-107. Army forces and those of the other services reinforce each other when they combine the effects of similar capabilities (see Figure 4-9). Commanders reinforce to achieve focused, overwhelming effects at a single point. When massed, different types of field artillery systems, such as howitzers and missiles, reinforce each other. Aerial fires have similar effects and can reinforce indirect fires. In a similar manner, commanders reinforce maneuver elements to guarantee superiority at the decisive time and place.
Figure 4-9. Reinforcing Effects
4-108. Achieving complementary and reinforcing effects requires synchronization, initiative, and versatility. Synchronized action is the basis for complementary and reinforcing effects. Commanders focus systems in space and time to generate synergy that increases effects. The initiative of leaders combines units and systems in the fluid circumstances of action, often in the absence of orders. Confronted with a constantly changing situation, leaders develop new combinations of systems and pose new dilemmas for the adversary. Properly combined, these effects produce asymmetries that the joint force uses to achieve theater objectives.
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ASYMMETRY
4-109. Asymmetry concerns dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly
strengths and enemy vulnerabilities, and to preserve freedom of action. Engagements are
symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces,
technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more
conventional rules of engagement are the norm. In one sense, there are always asymmetries
between forces: differing circumstances lead to differing military structures. Asymmetry
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exploitable advantages. Asymmetric engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the
target is not ready to defend itself against the asymmetric threat. Asymmetry tends to decay
over time as adversaries adapt to dissimilarities exposed in action. In a larger sense,
asymmetric warfare seeks to avoid enemy strengths and concentrate comparative
advantages against relative weaknesses. The following tactical and operational examples
illustrate the dynamic nature of asymmetry.
4-110. Third Army forces in the Gulf War were equipped with second-generation thermal sights. Iraqi units depended upon older, far less capable active infrared and light amplification systems. In engagement after engagement, US, British, and French armor destroyed Iraqi units, who could only return ineffective fire. At the system level, the advanced armor on the US and British tanks resisted the occasional hit from Iraqi fire, while friendly rounds immediately destroyed their targets. At tactical levels, Army forces exploited asymmetry in terms of equipment and organization.
4-111. In 1999, Serbian forces in Kosovo faced unrelenting aerial bombardment by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air forces. As the air operations intensified, NATO refined its strike techniques while the Serbs applied techniques learned by the Iraqis during the Gulf War. Over time, the Serbs became very proficient at using decoys and concealment. Although they were unable to prevent losses, Serbian units protected most of their ground combat systems from this asymmetric attack. Thus, the asymmetric advantage conferred by advanced air power over ground elements decayed over time.
4-112. At the operational level in the Gulf War, USCENTCOM exploited the inherent flexibility of sea power and amphibious assault to threaten the Iraqi forces in Kuwait with a major strike from the Persian Gulf. Lacking a navy, the only possible 'operational response by the Iraqi high command was to shift six divisions to coastal defense. The coalition ground offensive enveloped and destroyed these Iraqi forces, which were fixed by the threat of amphibious assault.
4-113. The likelihood of asymmetric attack increases with the continued conventional dominance of US forces at sea, on land, in the air, and in space. Such attacks may only disrupt tactical activities briefly; however, the operational and strategic consequences, particularly in stability operations and support operations, may be far-reaching. In Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, and again at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, in 1996, massive truck bombs destroyed portions of US military compounds, with heavy loss of life. Both attacks demonstrated asymmetry in terms of equipment and values. In addition, each was a political act of terrorism taken against a military objective. The risks of asymmetry multiply with the
threat of WMD.
4-114. Asymmetric attacks pose dilemmas to both friendly and enemy forces. Countering asymmetric attacks requires the disadvantaged side to alter rules of engagement, organization, doctrine, training, or equipment. The higher the echelon, the longer it takes to remedy an enemy asymmetric advantage. To reduce the vulnerability to asymmetric attacks and to minimize their effects, Army organizations, training, and equipment emphasize flexible employment in diverse situations. Protective measures, such as physical security and OPSEC, lessen the effects of asymmetry. A credible NBC defense capability at the tactical level deters the use of WMD. Commanders must anticipate asymmetries and take preventive measures that reduce adversary advantages. Commanders identify and exploit friendly capabilities that pose asymmetric challenges to the enemy force, even as Army

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forces act to counter hostile asymmetric threats.Asymmetric attacks pose dilemmas to both
friendly and enemy forces. Countering asymmetric attacks requires the disadvantaged side
to alter rules of engagement, organization, doctrine, training, or equipment. The higher the
echelon, the longer it takes to remedy an enemy asymmetric advantage. To reduce the
vulnerability to asymmetric attacks and to minimize their effects, Army organizations,
training, and equipment emphasize flexible employment in diverse situations. Protective
measures, such as physical security and OPSEC, lessen the effects of asymmetry. A credible
NBC defense capability at the tactical level deters the use of WMD. Commanders must
anticipate asymmetries and take preventive measures that reduce adversary advantages.
Commanders identify and exploit friendly capabilities that pose asymmetric challenges to
the enemy force, even as Army forces act to counter hostile asymmetric threats.

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Chapter 5
Battle Command
...[It is] essential that all leadersfrom subaltern to commanding general familiarize themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking. It is more valuable to be able to analyze one battle situation correctly, recognize its decisive elements and devise a simple, workable solution for it, than to memorize all the erudition ever written of war.
Infantry in Battle, 1939
5-1. Battle command applies the
CONTENTS
leadership element of combat
power. It is principally an art that
The Art of Command
employs skills developed by
Visualize, Describe, Direct
professional study, constant
Visualize
practice, and considered judgment.
The Factors of METT-TC
Commanders, assisted by the staff,
The Elements of Operational Design
visualize the operation, describe it
Input From Other Commanders and
in terms of intent and guidance,
Staff
and direct the actions of
The Commander's Experience and
subordinates within their intent.
Judgment
Commanders direct operations in
Describe
terms of the battlefield operating
Commander's Intent
systems (BOS). They directly
Planning Guidance
influence operations by personal
Direct
-presence, supported by their
Intelligence
command and control (C2) system.
Maneuver
Fire Support
THE ART OF COMMAND
Air Defense Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
5-2. Command is the authority a
Combat Service Support
commander in military service
Command and Control
lawfully exercises over
Personal Impact of the Commander
subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. Leaders possessing command authority strive to use it with firmness, care, and skill. Command remains a very personal function. As such, it is more an art than a science, although it exhibits characteristics of both.
5-3. Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy. Skilled judgment gained from practice, reflection, study, experience, and intuition often guides it. The art of command lies in conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership. Using judgment acquired from experience, training, study, and creative thinking, commanders visualize the situation and make decisions. In unclear situations, informed intuition may help
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commanders make effective decisions by bridging gaps in information. Through the art of command, commanders apply their values, attributes, skills, and actions to lead and motivate their soldiers and units. Well-led units succeed in training and accomplish their missions. As the senior leaders of organizations, commanders apply the leadership element of combat power. Subordinate commanders and small unit leaders reinforce it.
5-4. Effective battle command demands decisions that are both timely and more effective than those of the enemy. Success often depends on superior information that enables superior decisions. Effective decision making combines judgment with information as an element of combat power: it requires knowing ifto decide, when to decide,and what to decide. It requires commanders to judge information quality. It also requires identifying important information and focusing subordinates and the staff on it. These are tactical, operational, and strategic judgments. Commanders anticipate and understand the activities that follow decisions, knowing that once executed, some commitments are irretrievable.
5-5. Battle command puts a premium on leader skills and actions that contribute to effective decisions. The volume of available information challenges all leaders. They assimilate enormous amounts of information as they visualize the operation, describe their intent, and direct their subordinates' actions. Visualizing the operation is continuous. It requires commanders to understand the current situation, broadly define the future situation, assess the difference between the two, and envision major actions that link them. Commanders accept calculated risks to seize and retain the initiative. They assess the tradeoff between risks and opportunities and apply it to their vision.
5-6. To translate the commander's vision into action, the staff and subordinates must
understand it. Commanders describe their vision in succinct planning guidance and the
commander's intent, providing enough detail to focus planning and preparation. To
command is to direct. Commanders direct the outcome of major operations, battles, and
engagements by
•
Assigning missions.

•
Prioritizing and allocating resources.

•
Assessing and taking risks.

•
Deciding when and how to make adjustments.

•
Committing reserves.

•
Seeing, hearing, and understanding the needs of subordinates and superiors.

•
Guiding and motivating the organization to accomplish the mission.

.
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5-7. Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Technology, the fluid nature of operations, and the volume of information
. increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe operations. Commanders' perspective and the things they emphasize change with echelon. Operational
http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/297153-1/fm/3-... .12/28/2004 art differs from tactics principally in the scope and scale of what commanders visualize, describe, and direct. Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose, and action of land operations and relate them to the joint force commander's (JFC's) operational design. In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an area of operations (AO) designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment
'allocated, and time available specified.
5-8. While JFCs and component commanders exercise leadership primarily through subordinates, small unit commanders command face to face. Operational success depends
on the ability of operational commanders to visualize and describe complex land
operations; tactical success depends on the ability of small unit commanders to motivate and direct soldiers.
5-9. Commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess the situation. Staff estimates and collaborative information sharing among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. Commanders then visualize the operation, describe it within their intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine the elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operation. Commanders direct operations and synchronize the BOS through plans and orders. They personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and priorities (see Figure 5-1).
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Figure 5-1. Visualize, Describe, Direct
VISUALIZE
5-10. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders consider their battlespace and conduct a mission analysis that results in their initial vision, which they continually confirm or modify. Commanders use the factors of METT-TC, elements of operational design, staff estimates, input from other commanders, and their experience and judgment to develop their vision.
5-11. To visualize the desired outcome, commanders must clearly understand the
situation in the battlespace: What is the mission? What are the enemy's capabilities and
likely actions? What are the characteristics of the AO? Do weather and terrain favor
friendly or enemy actions? How much time is available? What combat service support
(CSS) factors are most important? What role do civil considerations play? This framing of
the battlespace takes place during mission analysis (see FM 5-0). Additionally, commanders
draw on the principles of war, tenets of operations, and their experience.
The Factors of METT-TC
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5-12. METT-TC refers to factors that are fundamental to assessing and visualizing: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. The first five factors are not new. However, the nature of full spectrum operations requires commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. Because of this added complexity, civil considerations has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC. All commanders use METT-TC to start their visualization. Staff estimates may address individual elements of, and add to, the commander's visualization.
5-13. Mission. Commanders determine the mission through analysis of the tasks assigned. The results of that analysis yield the essential tasks that, together with the purpose of the operation, clearly indicate the action required. The mission includes what tasks must be accomplished; who is to do them; and when, where, and why the tasks are to be done.
5-14. Enemy. The analysis of the enemy includes current information about his strength, location, activity, and capabilities. Commanders and staffs also assess the most likely enemy courses of action. In stability operations and support operations, the analysis includes adversaries, potentially hostile parties, and other threats to success. Threats may include the spread of infectious disease, regional instabilities, or misinformation. Commanders consider asymmetric as well as conventional threats.
5-15. Terrain and Weather. Analysis of terrain and weather helps commanders determine observkion and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment (OAKOC [see FM 6-0]). Terrain includes manmade features such as cities, airfields, bridges, railroads, and ports. Weather and terrain also have pronounced effects on ground maneuver, precision munitions, air support, and CSS operations. The nature of operations extends the analysis of the natural environment (weather and terrain) into the context of the physical environment of a contaminated battlefield. To find tactical advantages, commanders and staffs analyze and compare the limitations of the environment on friendly, enemy, and neutral forces.
5-16. Troops and Support Available. Commanders assess the quantity, training level,
and psychological state of friendly forces. The analysis includes the availability of critical
systems and joint support. Commanders examine combat, combat support (CS), and CSS assets. These assets include contractors (see FM 3-100.21).
You can ask me for anything you like,
5-17. Time Available. Commanders
except time...
assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing the mission. They Napoleon
consider how friendly and enemy or adversary forces will use the time and the possible results. Proper use of the time available can fundamentally alter the situation. Time available is normally explicitly defined in terms of the tasks assigned to the unit and implicitly bounded by enemy or adversary capabilities.
5-18. Civil Considerations. Civil considerations relate to civilian populations, culture, organizations, and leaders within the AO. Commanders consider the natural environment, to include cultural sites, in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. Commanders include civilian political, economic, and information matters as well as more immediate civilian activities and attitudes.
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5-19. At the operational level, civil considerations include the interaction between military operations and the other instruments of national power. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation; however, they also consider larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. Civil considerations can tax the resources of tactical commanders while shaping force activities. Civil considerations define missions to support civil authorities.
5-20. Political boundaries of nations, provinces, and towns are important civil considerations. Conflict often develops across boundaries, and boundaries may impose limits on friendly action. Boundaries, whether official or not, determine which civilian leaders and institutions can influence a situation. These considerations can be important at all levels.
5-21. Media presence guarantees that a global audience views US military activities in near real-time. Commanders factor public opinion into their vision of the battlespace. The activities of the force-including individual soldiers-can have far reaching effects on domestic and international opinion. The media also affect activities and opinions within the AO and often prove a valuable information resource.
5-22. The local population and displaced persons influence commanders' decisions. Their presence and the need to address their control, protection, and welfare affect the choice of courses of action and the allocation of resources. In stability operations and support operations, these people are a central feature of AOs.
The Elements of Operational Design Elements of Operational Design
5-23. A major operation begins with a
design-an idea that guides the conduct • End state and military conditions(planning, preparation, execution, and • Center of gravityassessment) of the operation. The • Decisive points and objectivesoperational design provides a conceptual • Lines of operationlinkage of ends, ways, and means. The • Culminating pointelements of operational design are tools • Operational reach, approach, and pausesto aid designing major operations. They • Simultaneous and sequential operationshelp commanders visualize the operation • Linear and nonlinear operationsand shape their intent.
• Tempo
5-24. The elements of operational design are most useful in visualizing major operations.
They help clarify and refine the vision of operational-level commanders by providing a
framework to describe operations in terms of task and purpose. They help commanders
understand the complex combinations of combat power involved. However, their
usefulness and applicability diminishes at each lower echelon. For example, senior tactical
commanders must translate the operational commander's operational reach and culminating
point into a limit of advance for ground forces. Decisive points become geographic or
force-oriented objectives. Senior tactical commanders normally consider end state, decisive
points and objectives, culminating point, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and
nonlinear operations, and tempo. However, their subordinates at the lowest tactical
echelons may only consider objectives.
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5-25. End State and Military Conditions. At the strategic level, the end state is what the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude— both those where the military is the primary instrument of national power employed and those where it supports other instruments. It marks the point when military force is no longer the principal strategic means. At the operational and tactical levels, the end state is the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation.
5-26. JFCs establish the end state for campaigns or joint major operations and set the military conditions necessary to accomplish them. Army operations at the theater level focus on achieving the military conditions on land necessary to achieve the JFC's objectives and end state. In situations where military force is employed with nonmilitary means, commanders designate measures of effectiveness to focus military action. In many operations particularly short-notice, smaller-scale contingencies the end state and supporting military conditions may be poorly defined or entirely absent. In other operations, the end state may be vague or evolving. Therefore, commanders at all levels monitor and assess progress toward the end state. Operational commanders continuously assess the major operation and campaign objectives against measures of effectiveness and the strategic end state.
5-27. Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, a direct approach may be costly and sometimes futile. Commanders examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.
5-28. .The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the commander's intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions.
5-29. Commanders not only consider the enemy center of gravity, but also identify and
protect their own center of gravity. During the Gulf War, for example, US Central
Command identified the coalition itself as the friendly center of gravity. The combatant
commander took measures to protect it, including deployment of theater missile defense systems.
5-30..Decisive Points and Objectives. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. Normally, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Part of operational art consists of selecting the decisive points that will most quickly and efficiently overcome the enemy center of gravity. Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.
5-31..Some decisive points are geographic, for example, a port facility, transportation network or node, or base of operations. Other physical decisive points include elements of
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5-32..Decisive points may have a different character in support missions and stability operations. During hurricane relief efforts in Florida, for example, the Joint Task Force Andrew commander identified the reopening of public schools as a decisive point. This decisive point was physical in nature, but its real value was psychological. Reopening schools signaled to residents that they were on their way to recovery.
5-33. Lines of Operations. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of the objective or defeat of the enemy force.
5-34. An operation may have single or multiple lines of operation. A single line of operations concentrates forces and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operations increase flexibility and create several opportunities for success. Multiple lines of operations make it difficult for an enemy to determine the friendly objectives and force him to disperse resources against several possible threats. Each potential option further complicates the enemy's situation and stresses his C2 system. The strategic responsiveness and tactical agility of Army forces create opportunities for simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations.
5 35..Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior (see Figure 5-2). A force
-
operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the enemy force by shifting resources more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile enemy; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.
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Friendly forces operate on Visitor Inge Fdenttg boss wends on sodsrior Ines
when their operations diverge from a when their operations converge on
central point The trendy force it door control enemy.
to impend. enemy forces than the
enemy forces are to each other.

Figure 5-2. Interior and Exterior Lines of Operations
5-36..The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. An enemy force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force; however, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile enemy forces, the friendly force may defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.
5-37..When positional reference to an enemy or adversary has little relevance, commanders may visualize the operation along logical lines (see Figure 5-3). This situation is common in stability operations and support operations. Commanders link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose-cause and effect. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of lines of operations may be evident. Multiple and complementary lines of operations work through a series of objectives. Commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operation to achieve the desired end state. Logical lines of operations also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.
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Figure 5-3. Logical Lines of Operations
5-38..Culminating Point. Culminating point has both operational and tactical relevance. In the offense, the culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond their culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat and continue the offense only at great peril. Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully or counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. Commanders tailor their information requirements to anticipate culmination early enough to either avoid it or, if avoiding it is not possible, place the force in the strongest possible posture.
5-39..In operations where stability or support predominate, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. Operational culmination in a stability or support mission usually occurs when the force is spread too thinly to control the situation, from a lack of resources, or from the inability to supply resources when needed. Then small failures may cascade into larger defeats, shocks in the political arena, or inability to provide the necessary support.
5-40..Operational Reach, Approach, and Pauses. Good operational design balances
operational reach, operational approach, and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves
its objectives before it culminates. Commanders carefully assess the physical and
psychological condition of friendly and enemy forces, anticipate culmination,' and plan
operational pauses if necessary. They commit the required forces and conduct operational
risk assessments. Commanders aim to extend operational reach while avoiding culmination
and operational pauses.
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5-42..Operational approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity. The direct approach applies combat power directly against the enemy center of gravity or the enemy's principal strength. The indirect approach attacks the enemy center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points • that avoid enemy strengths. When possible, commanders choose an indirect approach: they maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and degrade enemy capabilities; they refuse combat when the situation is unfavorable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operation. An effective operational approach, whether direct or indirect, focuses symmetric and asymmetric effects on the objective. By a shrewd operational approach, careful integration of joint capabilities, and agile BOS combinations, Army forces bring enemies within their operational reach while protecting themselves.
5-43. An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the force has culminated, because the character of the operation has changed (by the intervention of another enemy, for example), or through a combination of other factors. If the situation requires an operational pause, the commander should designate a new main effort. Army forces coordinate operational pauses with other components so the joint force can maintain the initiative and momentum.
5-44..Simultaneous and Sequential Operations. The sequence of operations is closely related to the use of resources. ARFOR commanders synchronize subordinate unit actions in time, space, and effects to link the theater strategy and design of joint major operations to tactical execution. Without this linkage, major operations deteriorate into haphazard battles and engagements that waste resources without achieving decisive results.
5-45. When possible, Army forces conduct simultaneous operations throughout the AO.
They seek to employ combat power against the entire enemy system. Army forces
concurrently engage as many decisive points as possible. Simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces. It threatens opponents with immediate consequences throughout the AO. The presence of multiple threats overloads enemy C2 systems. Enemy commanders confront many decisions within a very short period. The chance of a serious
mistake is high, and each mistake creates opportunities for friendly forces.
5-46..Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and overwhelming combat power. In practical terms, the force size and force projection constraints may limit the ability of Army forces to achieve simultaneity. Effective operational designs employ complementary and reinforcing joint and service capabilities to achieve maximum simultaneity.
5-47..Sequential operations achieve the end state by phases. Commanders concentrate
combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled series of
steps. Often the scale and scope of the campaign or major operation, together with the
resiliency of the enemy, compel commanders to destroy and disrupt the enemy in stages,
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5-48..Nonlinear and Linear Operations. Nonlinear operations are now more common than ever. Stability operations and support operations are normally nonlinear. Operation Just Cause and the last 36 hours of Operation Desert Storm featured large-scale nonlinear offensive operations. Ideally, a mobile defense transforms an enemy attack into a nonlinear operation that destroys him.
5-49..In nonlinear operations, maneuver units may operate in noncontiguous areas throughout the AO. Even when operating in contiguous AOs, maneuver forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on multiple decisive points. Simultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and retains the initiative. Nonlinear operations proceed along multiple lines of operations geographic, logical, or both. LOCs often diverge from lines of operation, and sustaining operations may depend on CSS moving with maneuver units or delivered by air.
5-50..Smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more lethal forces sustained by efficient, distribution-based CSS systems lend themselves to simultaneous operations against multiple decisive points. Situational understanding, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to maneuver against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive pointssupported by precise, concentrated fire induces paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders.
5-51..In linear operations, maneuver units normally operate in contiguous AOs. Each combined arms force directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. The ratio of forces to space and the array of maneuver forces emphasize geographic position and tend to create a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). This protects and simplifies LOCs. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of Army forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods.
5-52..A linear battlefield organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily. Coalition operations may also require a linear design.
5-53. Nonlinear and linear operations are not mutually exclusive. Depending upon perspective and echelon, operations often combine them. For example, a corps may employ its forces in noncontiguous areas, operating simultaneously against multiple decisive points. A brigade combat team in the same corps operating within an urban area may employ units in a linear array.
5-54..Tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate is
necessary to retain the initiative. Army forces adjust tempo to maximize friendly
capabilities. Commanders consider the timing of the effects achieved rather than the
chronological application of combat power or capabilities. Tempo has military significance
only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the enemy's ability to
react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage.
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5-56. Army forces generally pay a price for rapid tempo through greater fatigue and resource expenditure. Commanders judge the capacity of their forces to operate at high tempo based on theater resources and deteriorating friendly performance. They design the operation for various tempos that take into account the endurance of the force.
Input from Other Commanders and Staff
5-57..Subordinate, adjacent, and higher commanders use similar factors but different perspectives to visualize their battlespace. Commanders increase the depth and sophistication of their visualizations through exchanges with other commanders: Advanced C2 systems support this collaboration by allowing commanders to share a common operational picture (COP). In a similar fashion, staff input, in the form of estimates, provides focused analysis of the situation and its potential effects on operations. Commanders direct staffs to provide the information necessary to shape their vision.
The Commander's Experience and Judgment
5-58..Commanders consider the context of the operation, the relationship of Army forces within the joint team, and JFC-designated roles and missions. Experience, combined with situational understanding, provides the intellectual setting around . which commanders visualize the operational design. Based upon the commander's direction, Ariny units plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess the operation.
5-59. Judgment provides the basis for the considered application of combat power in innovative ways adapted to new situations. In circumstances where experience provides few answers, commanders combine their experience, intuition, and judgment with the recommendations of the staff and subordinates to create new strategies. In many instances, solutions to tough questions may come from the reasoned application of historical study, a hallmark of professional development. In other situations, small unit leaders or soldiers invent solutions to tactical problems. When proposed solutions appear, commanders consider them and decide on appropriate actions.
Experience and Innovation on Grenada
In October 1983, Army forces invaded Grenada as part of Joint Task Force 120.
During operations on 27 October, paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division
advanced eastward across southern Grenada. Army forces cleared all enemy forces
in their AO, phase line by phase line. During operations, soldiers discovered that
runway problems at Point Salines had delayed the arrival of the division's attack
helicopters, a critical means of fire support. Without the helicopters, the 82d soldiers
relied upon naval aircraft and naval gunfire. Their tactical radios, however, were
incompatible with communications systems aboard the ships of the Independence
battle group. Army soldiers invented a solution to their dilemma by using
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commercial telephone cards to send their request for fire support to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Fort Bragg personnel then relayed the requests via satellite to the ships. Army soldiers developed an innovative solution to a complex problem and, by doing so, helped to identify and later correct the joint compatibility issues.
DESCRIBE
5-60. To describe operations, commanders use operational framework and elements of operational design to relate decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to time and space. In all operations, purpose and time determine the allocation of space. Commanders clarify their description, as circumstances require. They emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relates to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation. When appropriate, commanders include deep, close, and rear areas in the battlefield organization. Whether commanders envision linear or nonlinear operations, combining the operational framework with the elements of operational design provides a flexible tool to describe actions. Commanders describe their vision in their commander's intent and planning guidance, using terms suited to the nature of the mission and their experience.
Commander's Intent
5-61 . Commanders express their vision as the commander's intent. The staff and subordinates measure the plans and orders that transform thought to action against it. The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state. Commanders make their own independent, and sometimes intuitive, assessment of how they intend to win. The final expression of intent comes from commanders personally.
5-62..Intent, coupled with mission, directs subordinates toward mission accomplishment in the absence of orders. When significant opportunities appear, subordinates use the commander's intent to orient their efforts. Intent includes the conditions that forces meet to achieve the end state. Conditions apply to all courses of action. They include the tempo, duration, effect on the enemy, effect on another friendly force operation, and key terrain.
Commander's Intent and Sherman's "March to the Sea"
On 4 April 1864, LTG Ulysses S. Grant wrote to MG William T. Sherman regarding
his plan for conducting a spring campaign against the Confederacy. LTG Grant
conveyed his intent to "take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of
the army together, and somewhat toward a common center." LTG Grant informed
MG Sherman of what his fellow commanders would be doing to accomplish that
intent. Then he told MG Sherman to "move against Johnston's army, to break it up
and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the
damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a
plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and
leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as
you can, your plan of operations."
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trusted that MG Sherman understood what he was to do, adding, "I believe you will
accomplish it." The operation that resulted from this intent was MG Sherman's "march to the sea." The operation forced the Confederacy to divert resources from
the forces opposing the Union main effort by the Army of the Potomac and hastened the end of the war.
Planning Guidance
5-63. From the vision, commanders develop and issue planning guidance. Planning guidance may be either broad or detailed, as circumstances dictate. However, it conveys the essence of the commander's vision. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. Commanders attune the staff to the broad outline of their vision, while still permitting latitude for the staff to explore different options.
Planning Guidance—Grant and Thomas at Chattanooga
On 18 November 1863, MG Ulysses S. Grant gave MG George H. Thomas his
planning guidance for seizing Confederate positions near Chattanooga, Tennessee, a
critical city lying along vital Confederate LOCs. MG Grant told MG Thomas of his
plan for a daylight assault to seize Missionary Ridge, thereby gaining key terrain
from which to weaken the Confederate defense. He stated that "the general plan, you
understand, is for Sherman to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the
mouth of Chickamauga...to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the
railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will cooperate
with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on
your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right
and center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever
ordered. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near
simultaneously with him as possible." Once the two forces converged, MG Thomas
was told to establish communications "at once between the two armies by roads on
the south bank of the river." MG Grant intended to move fast; thus, he added that
wanted the troops to be "provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks and
one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier." MG
Grant's guidance was simple and clear. MG Thomas accomplished his mission, and
the Union Army defeated the Confederate forces at Chattanooga.
DIRECT
5-64. Armed with a coherent and The Battlefield Operating Systems focused intent, commanders and staffs develop the concept of operations and • Intelligence synchronize the BOS. The BOS are the • Maneuver physical means (soldiers, organizations, • Fire support
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and equipment) used to accomplish the • Air defense
mission. The BOS group related systems • Mobility/countermobility/survivabilitytogether according to battlefield use.
• Combat service supportInformation about specific tasks • Command and control
associated with each BOS is in FM 7-15.
Intelligence
5-65..The intelligence system plans, directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the threat and environment to perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the other intelligence tasks. A critical part of IPB involves collaborative, cross-BOS analysis across echelons and between analytic elements of a command. The other intelligence tasks are-
•
Situation development.

•
Target development and support to targeting.

•
Indications and warning.

•
Intelligence support to battle damage assessment.

•
Intelligence support to force protection.

Intelligence is developed as a part of a continuous process and is fundamental to all Army operations.
Maneuver
5-66. Maneuver systems move to gain positions of advantage against enemy forces. Infantry, armor, cavalry, and aviation forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for maneuver. Commanders maneuver these forces to create conditions for tactical and operational success. By maneuver, friendly forces gain the ability to destroy enemy forces or hinder enemy movement by direct and indirect application of firepower, or threat of its application.
Fire Support
5-67..Fire support consists of fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces in engaging enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Fire support integrates and synchronizes fires and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces, systems, and facilities. The fire support system includes the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, electronic warfare, and other lethal and nonlethal means to attack targets. At the operational level, maneuver and fires may be complementary in design, but distinct in objective and means.
Air Defense
5-68..The air defense system protects the force from air and missile attack and aerial
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surveillance. It prevents enemies from interdicting friendly forces while freeing
commanders to synchronize maneuver and firepower. All members of the combined arms
team perform air defense tasks; however, ground-based air defense artillery units execute
most Army air defense operations. These units protect deployed forces and critical assets
from observation and attack by enemy aircraft, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The
WMD threat and proliferation of missile technology increase the importance of the air
defense system. Theater missile defense is crucial at the operational level.
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
5-69. Mobility operations preserve friendly force freedom of maneuver. Mobility missions include breaching obstacles, increasing battlefield circulation, improving or building roads, providing bridge and raft support, and identifying routes around contaminated areas. Countermobility denies mobility to enemy forces. It limits the maneuver of enemy forces and enhances the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include obstacle building and smoke generation. Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapons systems and from natural occurrences. Hardening of facilities and fortification of battle positions are active survivability measures. Military deception, OPSEC, and dispersion can also increase survivability. NBC defense measures are essential survivability tasks.
Combat Service Support
5-70..CSS includes many technical specialties and functional activities. It includes the use of host nation infrastructure and contracted support. CSS provides the physical means for forces to operate, from the production base and replacement centers in the continental US to soldiers engaged in close combat. It is present across the range of military operations,
at all levels of war.
Command and Control
5-71. Command and control has two
components the commander and the C2
system. Communications systems,
intelligence systems, and computer
networks form the backbone of C2
systems and allow commanders to lead
from any point on the battlefield. The
C2 system supports the commander's
ability to make informed decisions,
delegate authority, and synchronize the
BOS. Moreover, the C2 system supports
the ability of commanders to adjust
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
plans for future operations, even while focusing on the current fight. Staffs work within the commander's intent to direct units and control resource allocations. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that require command decisions and advise commanders concerning them. Through C2, commanders initiate and integrate all military functions and systems toward a common goal: mission accomplishment (see FM 6-0).

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5-72. Reliable communications are central to C2 systems. Effective battle command requires reliable signal support systems that enable commanders to conduct operations at varying tempos. Nonetheless, commanders, not their communication systems, dictate command style. Signal planning increases the commander's options by providing signal support to pass vital information at critical times. This capability allows commanders to leverage tactical success and anticipate-future operations. Communications planning is a vital component of maintaining or extending operational reach.
PERSONAL IMPACT OF THE COMMANDER
5-74. Command occurs at the commander's location, whether at a command post, infiltrating at night with light infantry elements, or in a combat vehicle with the decisive operation. Commanders balance inspiring soldiers through leading by example with the need to maintain C2 continuity. Even when equipped with advanced C2 systems, commanders carefully consider their personal location and its impact on their ability to recognize opportunities. In larger tactical and operational formations, the command post is normally the focus of information flow and planning. There, information systems, the staff, and the COP enhance commanders' ability to visualize possibilities and recognize opportunities. Yet there are times when commanding from forward locations is necessary. Plans should account for such temporary requirements as well as the possible loss of the commander. Commanders at all levels locate where they can not only exercise command but also sense the battle. Sometimes this is at the command post; sometimes it is face to . face with subordinate commanders and soldiers.
5-75. The commander's will is the constant element that propels the force through the shock and friction of battle. Things can and will go wrong. The ability of leaders and soldiers to concentrate erodes as they reach the limits of their endurance. If the enemy is skilled and resolute, soldiers may approach that point when "can't be done" and "can't go any further" dominate their thinking. At that point, the will and personal presence of commanders provide the impetus for action.
Modern land warfare is tough, uncompromising, and highly lethal. The enemy is
found and engaged at ranges from a few meters to thousands of meters. Casualties
are sudden and unexpected even though you know they will happen. Because of
that, commanders and soldiers at every level are aware not only of the tactical,
operational, and strategic problem solving demands of war but also the intense
human dimension. They know results are final and will be frozen in time for a
lifetime. Objectives are achieved but always at a cost to your soldiers. It is why at
all levels the aim always is mission at least cost Often that least cost is achieved by
seizing the initiative and by bold action. Commanders and soldiers have to feel it
all to really know what to do. But in feeling it all they must not be paralyzed into
inaction. They must decide, often in nanoseconds, make the decision stick, and go
on. They must feel but they also must act. They cannot give in to second guessing
themselves nor to their emotions. That is what makes combat leadership so
demanding. It is why commanders train hard and continually throughout a
professional lifetime so they can make the few tough decisions they have to make
in battle to put their soldiers at the best possible advantage over the enemy.
Soldiers trust battle commanders to be able to do that, but also to assume

responsibility when things do not go as planned and quickly make the right
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adjustments to keep them at that advantage.
General Frederick M. Franks Jr. VII Corps Commander, Operation Desert Storm
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FM3-0 Chptr 6 Page I of 22
Chapter 6
Conducting Full Spectrum Operations
I think the time has come when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones...
6-1. While differing dramatically in their particulars, full spectrum operations follow a cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and continuous
assessment. These cyclic activities are
sequential but not discrete; they overlap
and recur as circumstances demand. As
a whole, they make up the operations process. Battle command drives the
operations process (see Figure 6-1). Army forces design and conduct operations to win on the offensive;
dictate the terms of combat and avoid
fighting the enemy on his terms; seize
and retain the initiative; and build
momentum quickly to win decisively.
Major General William Tecumseh Sherman
CONTENTS
Plan Operational_ and Tactical Planning Phasing Branches and Sequels Concept of Operations Risk Management Offers
Prepare
Staff Preparation
Unit Preparation
Individual Preparation
Rules of Engagement

Execute Seize and Retain the Initiative Build and Maintain Momentum Exploit Success Combine Decisive, Shaping, and
Sustaining Operations
.
ComplexOperational Considerations
.
Follow-On Operations
Assess

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Figure 6-1. The Operations Process
PLAN
6-2. The commander's intent and planning guidance direct the activities of the staff and
subordinate commanders. The staff assists the commander with the coordination and
detailed analysis necessary to convert the planning guidance and commander's intent into a
plan. The plan becomes a common reference point for operations (see FM 5-0).
6-3. Planning is the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome,
lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his subordinates his vision,
intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he expects to achieve. Plans forecast but do
not predict. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that
maximizes opportunities. It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the
operation. Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the
letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned but
whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans
foster initiative.
6-4. Scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons differ between operational and tactical planning. Campaign planning coordinates major actions across significant periods. Planners mesh service capabilities with those of joint and multinational formations as well as interagency and nongovernmental organizations. Tactical planning has the same clarity of purpose as operational planning, but has a shorter planning horizon. Comprehensive, continuous, and adaptive planning characterizes successful operations at both the operational and tactical levels.
6-5. Plans specify what commanders will decide personally. In the offense, for example, commanders normally decide when to commit the reserve. In a tense stability operation, the commander may decide the exact positions of tactical elements. Regardless of echelon,
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commanders identify those information requirements they consider most important to their decisions the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). These are typically information requirements that help them confirm their vision of the battlefield or identify significant deviations from it. The staff incorporates CCIR into the appropriate parts of the plan and passes them to subordinate units.
6-6. Plans give subordinates the latitude and guidance to exercise disciplined initiative
within the bounds of the commander's intent. For example, aviation and ground maneuver
elements might attack enemy missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) wherever located, no matter what their mission at the time. Some operations
require tight control over subordinate elements. However, commanders ensure that plans
remain as flexible as possible and impose the minimum control required for mission
success. Commanders encourage subordinates to seize the initiative through plans and
directions that provide guidance concerning opportunity.
6-7. German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (victor in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870) observed that "no plan...extends with any degree of certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force." This is as true today as it was more than a century ago. Moltke's dictum, rather than condemning the value of planning, reminds commanders and staffs of the relationship between Planning and execution during operations. The purpose of any plan is to establish the conceptual basis for action. The plan provides a reasonably accurate forecast of execution. However, it remains a starting point, not the centerpiece of the operation. As GEN George S. Patton Jr. cautioned, "...one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans. That way danger lies."
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL PLANNING
6-8. Planning is dynamic and continuous (see JP 5-0). Operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns, subordinate campaigns, and major operations. Combatant commanders develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives. Subordinate unified commands typically develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish theater strategic objectives. Joint task force (JTF) commanders may develop subordinate campaign plans if the mission requires military operations of sufficient scope, size, complexity, and duration. Land component commanders normally develop plans for major operations that support the campaign plan.
6-9. In major operations, Army force commanders choose to accept or decline battle, decide what use to make of tactical successes and failures, and advise joint force commanders (JFCs) on the long-term needs and prospects of their operations. Since campaign plans generally set a series of long-term objectives, they often require phases. Therefore, a campaign plan normally provides a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and a specific operation order for the campaign's initial phase. Planning for major operations mirrors planning for the overall campaign but is reduced in scope. Even if a major operation is not the initial phase of a campaign, planning for it as a branch or a sequel may begin long before actual execution.
6-10. Operational and tactical planning complement each other but have different aims. Operational planning prepares the way for tactical activity on favorable terms; it continually seeks to foster and exploit tactical success. Major operations depend on creatively using
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tactical actions to accomplish strategic or operational purposes in specific contexts against adaptive opponents. Tactical planning emphasizes flexibility and options. Planning horizons for tactical actions are relatively short. Comprehensive planning may be feasible only for the first engagement or phase of a battle; succeeding actions depend on enemy responses and circumstances. The art of tactical planning lies in anticipating and developing sound branches and sequels.
6-11. Brevity is essential; so is speed. Staffs must avoid consuming too much time developing lengthy plans that contain irrelevant details. When plans arrive late, subordinate units can only react. To save time and shorten plans, commanders and staffs anticipate support requirements and forecast options. Headquarters at each level plan in parallel with higher and lower headquarters. Parallel planning expedites the exchange of information among headquarters and should be used as much as possible. Commanders exploit technology to increase situational understanding and speed of planning.
Change of Plans at Normandy
On 6 June 1944, Army forces executed Operation Overlord, an air and sea invasion of Western Europe. VII Corps planned an assault on Utah Beach by the 4th Infantry Division along with predawn airborne drops by the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Like most D-Day operations, events proceeded differently than planned.
Upon execution, the airborne units were scattered across the French countryside with some units forming quickly while others grouped into small, isolated pockets. Regardless, airborne troops pressed on to their objectives or fought where they were, creating disorder among the defenders.
The 4th Infantry Division landed at Utah Beach where, of four beach control vessels
guiding the force, one broke down and two others were sunk. The remaining vessel
guided the landing force to the beaches, but they arrived south of their designated
areas. BG Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the assistant division commander, made a
personal reconnaissance and realized that the original plan must change. He returned
to the landing site and ordered the two infantry battalions to advance inland instead
of realigning onto the original amphibious landing sites, a decision that was
executed without confusion. Changing plans fit the circumstances, and the 4th
Infantry Division successfully pressed the fight inland.
6-12. There are two doctrinal planning procedures (see FM 5-0). In units with a formally organized staff, the military decision making process helps commanders and staffs develop estimates, plans, and orders. It provides a logical sequence of decision and interaction between the commander and staff. The military decision making process provides a common framework for all staffs that supports the maximum use of parallel planning. At the lowest tactical echelons, commanders do not have a staff. Consequently, commanders and leaders follow the troop leading procedures. Both procedures hinge on the commander's ability to visualize and describe the operation. Both are means to an end: their value lies in the result, not the process.
PHASING
6-13. A phase is a specific part of an operation that is different from those that
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precede or follow. A change in phase usually involves a change of task. Phasing assists. in planning and controlling. Considerations of time, distance, terrain, resources, and important events contribute to the decision to phase an operation.
6-14. If Army forces lack the means to overwhelm an enemy in a single simultaneous
operation, then commanders normally phase the operation. A phase is a period when a large
portion of the force conducts similar or mutually supporting activities. Operations link
successive phases. Individual phases gain significance only in the larger context of the
campaign or major operation. Each phase should strive for simultaneity in time, space, and
purpose. In this way, commanders combine simultaneous operations within phases while
sequencing operations to achieve the end state.
6-15. Links between phases and the requirement to transition between phases are critically important. Commanders establish clear conditions for how and when these transitions occur. Although phases are distinguishable to friendly forces, the , operational design conceals these distinctions from opponents through concurrent, complementary joint and Army actions.
BRANCHES AND SEQUELS
6-16. Operations never proceed exactly as planned. An effective design places a premium on flexibility. Commanders incorporate branches and sequels into the operational design. to gain flexibility. Visualizing and planning branches and sequels are important because they involve transition—changes in mission, in type of operation, and often in forces required•for execution. Unless planned and executed efficiently, transitions can reduce the tempo of the operation, slow its momentum, and cede the initiative to the adversary.
61 7. A branch is a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the
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basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions. Commanders anticipate and devise counters to enemy actions. Although anticipating every possible threat action is impossible, branches anticipate the most likely ones. Commanders execute branches to rapidly respond to changing conditions.
6-18. Sequels are operations that follow the current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate of the current operation. A counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider sequels early and revisit them throughout an operation. Without such planning, current operations leave forces poorly positioned for future opportunities, and leaders are unprepared to retain the initiative. Both branches and sequels should have execution criteria, carefully reviewed before their implementation and updated based on assessment of current operations.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
6-19. The concept of operations describes how commanders see the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. As a minimum, the
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description includes the scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. The concept of
operations expands the commander's selected course of action and expresses how each
element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the mission. Where the commander's
intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the method by which
the operation uses and synchronizes the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to translate
vision and end state into action. Commanders ensure that the concept of operations is
consistent with both their intent and that of the next two higher commanders.
RISK MANAGEMENT
6-20. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making an informed decision that balances risk cost with mission benefits. It provides leaders with a systematic mechanism to identify risk associated with a course of action during planning (see FM 3-100.14; FM 5-0). Commanders integrate risk management into all aspects of the operations process. During planning, commanders identify, assess, and weigh risks. They convey risk considerations as guidance. Risk guidance affects course of action development. It also affects application of some elements of operational design, such as end state, designation of objectives, and lines of operation. Risk management also influences task organization; control measures; and the concepts of operations, fires, and CSS. During execution, assessment of risk assists commanders in making informed decisions regarding changes to task organization, shifting priorities of effort and support, and shaping future operations. Effective risk management results in mission accomplishment at least cost.
ORDERS
6-21. Orders translate plans into execution. When possible, commanders issue them
personally, face-to-face. If this is not possible, a video teleconference or other communication means can substitute. Commanders allow their subordinates maximum freedom of action, providing mission-type orders whenever practical. Mission-type orders specify what to do and the purpose for doing it, without prescribing how to do it (see FM 6-0). Control measures should aid cooperation among forces without imposing needless restrictions on their freedom of action.
PREPARE
6-22. Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement. It requires staff, unit, and soldier actions. The complexity of operations imposes significant challenges. The nature of land operations differs tremendously from situation to situation. Mission success depends as much on preparation as planning. Rehearsals help staffs, units, and individuals to prepare for full spectrum operations. Preparation includes a range of activities. These include mission rehearsals, brief-backs, equipment and communications checks, standing operating procedure (SOP) reviews, load plan verification, soldier readiness preparation, and weapons test-firing.
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STAFF PREPARATION
6-23. Each staff section and element conducts activities to maximize the operational
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effectiveness of the force. Coordination between echelons and preparation that precedes
execution are just as important, if not more important, than developing the plan. Staff
preparation includes assembling and continuously updating estimates. For example,
continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) provides accurate situational
updates for commanders when needed. Whether incorporated into a formal process or not,
the preparatory activities of staff sections and force elements inform planning and continue
throughout preparation and execution. Updated estimates form the basis for staff
recommendations; the value of current, reasonably accurate estimates increases
exponentially with tempo.
UNIT PREPARATION
6-24. Warfighting skills developed and honed in training form the base of mission success. Without the Army's ability to fight and win, commitment of its units to a theater would entail unacceptable risks. Combat-ready units can adapt readily to noncombat situations; units not trained to standard cannot survive in combat situations. The knowledge, discipline, cohesion, and technical skill necessary to defeat an enemy are also fundamental for success in environments that seem far removed from the battlefield. The combat capability of Army forces is the basis for all it does. In a stability operation, the threat of force may deter escalation. In a support operation, it may preempt violence and lawlessness.
6-25. The tempo may not allow commanders to withdraw entire formations for extensive reorganization and training. However, Army unit modularity lets commanders designate some elements for training while the rest of the force continues the mission. This concurrent training may take place in theater-designated training areas, where units receive intensified maintenance support while conducting individual and collective training. The creation of training areas is both necessary and a challenge for Army commanders.
INDIVIDUAL PREPARATION
6-26. Before the force deploys, soldiers prepare for overseas action. Army units
frequently receive augmentation and replacements during preparation for deployment.
Commanders pay special attention to the reception and preparation of these soldiers and to
integrating their families into support groups. In addition to preparing replacements for
deployment, commanders ensure that gaining units rapidly assimilate them as team
members.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
6-27. Operational requirements, policy, and law define rules of engagement (ROE). ROE always recognize the right of self-defense, the commander's right and obligation to protect assigned personnel, and the national right to defend US forces, allies, and coalition participants against armed attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff standing ROE provide baseline guidance (see CJCSI 3121.01A). The standing ROE may be tailored and supplemented for specific operations to meet commanders' needs. Effective ROE are enforceable, understandable, tactically sound, and legally sufficient. Further, effective ROE are responsive to the mission and permit subordinate commanders to exercise initiative when confronted by opportunity or unforeseen circumstances.
6-28. In all operations, whether using lethal or nonlethal force, ROE may impose
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political, practical, operational, and legal limitations upon commanders. Commanders factor these constraints into planning and preparation as early as possible. Withholding employment of particular classes of weapons and exempting the territory of certain nations from attack are examples of such limitations. Tactically, ROE may extend to criteria for initiating engagements with certain weapons systems (for example, unobserved fires) or reacting to an attack. ROE never justify illegal actions. In all situations, soldiers and commanders use the degree of force that is militarily necessary, proportional to the threat, and prudent for future operations.
6-29. ROE do not assign specific tasks or require specific tactical solutions; they allow commanders to quickly and clearly convey to subordinates a desired posture regarding the use of force. In passing orders to subordinates, commanders act within the ROE received. However, ROE never relieve commanders from the responsibility to formulate an operational design. The end state, objectives, and mission must be clear. Commanders at all levels continually review the ROE to ensure their effectiveness in light of current and projected conditions. Such considerations may include ROE for computer network attack. Soldiers who thoroughly understand ROE are better prepared to apply the proper balance of initiative and restraint.
Home Station, Predeployment, and Deployment Training
In 1995, the 1st Armored Division changed its mission essential task list (METL) to
prepare for peace enforcement operations in Bosnia. The nature of ongoing
diplomatic negotiations created difficult circumstances for commanders trying to
determine when they would deploy. Regardless, the on-again, off-again nature of
diplomatic negotiations allowed the 1st Armored Division to transition from a
wartime to a peacekeeping METL. The division made maximum use of the available
time, undergoing a two-month intensive training and certification process at home
station and the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.
Commanders and staff participated in command post exercises 'designed to match
Balkan political-military realities, while leaders and soldiers engaged in situational
training exercises and cold weather training. Upon deployment, observers from the
Center for Army Lessons Learned accompanied the division and observed ongoing
operations. Center for Army Lessons Learned members sent reports to Combat
Maneuver Training Center trainers, who updated existing training scenarios to match
changing operational conditions in the theater. The division also continued training
after deployment to keep a warfighting edge during the peace enforcement
operation. 1st Armored Division maneuver battalion soldiers rotated from Bosnia to
Taborfalva Training Area in Hungary once during their tour. There they underwent
gunnery qualification. The soldiers then returned to Bosnia and resumed their
mission.
EXECUTE
6-30. Execution is concerted action to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. The tenet of initiative is fundamental to success in any operation, yet simply seizing the initiative is not enough. A sudden barrage of precision munitions may surprise and disorganize the enemy, but if not followed by swift and relentless action, the advantage diminishes and disappears. Successful operations maintain the momentum generated by initiative and exploit successes within the commander's intent.
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SEIZE AND RETAIN THE INITIATIVE
6-31. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. Operationally, seizing the initiative requires leaders to anticipate events so their forces can see and exploit opportunities faster than the enemy. Once they seize the initiative, Army forces exploit opportunities it creates. Initiative requires constant effort to force an enemy to conform to friendly purposes and tempo while retaining friendly freedom of action. From the leader's perspective, commanders place a premium on audacity and making reasoned decisions under uncertain conditions. The commander's intent and aggressiveness of subordinates create conditions for exercising disciplined initiative.
6-32. Enemies who gain and maintain the initiative compel Army forces to react to their strengths and asymmetric capabilities. Ways enemies may try to do this include attempting to neutralize US technological and organizational superiority, adapting the tempo to their capabilities, and outlasting Army forces. Therefore, Army forces seize the initiative as soon as possible and dictate the terms of action throughout the operation. Army forces compel the adversary to accept action on terms established by friendly forces. Provoked to react to US actions, the adversary cedes the initiative and opens himself to exploitation when he errs or fails to react quickly enough.
Take Action
6-33. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to reduce the uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might reduce uncertainty, but will not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with time to seize the initiative. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting and developing the situation. When the immediate situation is unclear, commanders clarify it by action, not sitting and gathering information.
6-34. Commanders identify times and places where they can mass the effects of combat
power to relative advantage. To compel a reaction, they threaten something the enemy cares
about his center of gravity or decisive points leading to it. By forcing the enemy to react,
commanders initiate an action-to-reaction sequence that ultimately reduces enemy options
to zero. Each action develops the situation further and reduces the number of possibilities to
be considered, thereby reducing friendly uncertainty. Each time the enemy must react, his
uncertainty increases. Developing the situation by forcing the enemy to react is the essence
of seizing and retaining the initiative.
6-35. Action is not solely offensive. Force projection may initiate enemy reactions.
Movement of forces, together with military deception, often triggers an enemy response.
Commanders may deter or induce a desired enemy action by beginning defensive
preparations. Aggressive reconnaissance, in particular, allows commanders at every level to
gain and maintain contact with enemy forces. Reconnaissance develops the situation,
protects friendly forces from surprise, and retains the initiative. Action includes force
protection activities that preclude or reduce specific enemy threats.
Create and Exploit Opportunities
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6-36. Events that offer better ways to success are opportunities. The key to recognizing them is continuous monitoring of the battlespace in light of the objectives and the commander's intent. Failure to understand the opportunities inherent in an enemy's action surrenders the initiative. CCIR must include elements that support seizing and retaining the initiative so soldiers can recognize opportunities as they develop.
6-37. Commanders encourage subordinates to act within their intent as opportunities occur. Vision, clear communication of intent, and the command climate create an atmosphere conducive to the exercise of subordinate initiative. Digitized information processes, the common operational picture (COP), and situational understanding enhance commanders' ability to recognize possibilities, visualize opportunities, and share them with others.
Assess and Take Risk
6-38. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in all military operations. Recognizing and acting on opportunity means taking risks. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and minimizing as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised plan that accounts for those hazards contributes to successfully applying military force. Gambling, in contrast, is imprudently staking the success of an entire action on a single, improbable event. Commanders assess risk in ascending orders of magnitude by answering three questions:
•
Am I minimizing the risk of losses?

•
Am I risking the success of the operation?

•
Am I risking the destruction of the force itself?

6-39. When commanders embrace opportunity, they accept risk. Audacity is a catalyst that can reverse a situation through its influence on enemy perception. It is counterproductive to wait for perfect preparation and synchronization. The time taken to issue complete orders across successive nets could mean an opportunity lost. It is far better to quickly summarize'the essentials, get things moving, and send the details later. Leaders optimize the use of time with warning orders, fragmentary orders, and routine COP updates. Too great a desire for orderliness leads to overdetailed orders, overcontrol, and failure to seize and retain the initiative.
BUILD AND MAINTAIN MOMENTUM
6-40. Army forces fight thinking, adaptive enemies. Presented with consistent patterns of activity, enemies devise countermeasures. The benefits of seizing the initiative do not last long, given enemy determination to overthrow the friendly design. Momentum retains and complements initiative.
6-41. Momentum derives from seizing the initiative and executing shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations at a high tempo. Momentum allows commanders to create opportunities to engage the enemy from unexpected directions with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, commanders continue to control the relative momentum by maintaining focus and pressure, and controlling the tempo. They ensure that
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they maintain momentum by anticipating transitions and moving rapidly between types of operations. When the opportunity presents itself to exploit, commanders push all available forces to the limit to build on momentum gained.
Maintain Focus
...I am heartily tired of hearing about what
6-42. In the stress of combat, a
Lee is going to do. Some of you always
commander's instinct may be to focus on the
seem to think he is suddenly going to turn
dangers enemy activity poses. That concern
a double somersault and land in our rear
is valid, but it must not cloud the
and on both flanks at the same time. Go
commander's primary focus: achieving his
back to your command and try to think
own purpose and objectives. Commanders
what we are going to do ourselves, instead
assess enemy activity in terms of the end
of what Lee is going to do.
state and concentrate on what their forces
can do to attain it. Further, commanders

Lieutenant General U.S. Grantassess the situation to determine how they Battle of the Wilderness, 1864can best attack enemy decisive points and
protect friendly ones. Commanders evaluate the current situation, seeking opportunities to
turn enemy activity to their immediate advantage.
Pressure the Enemy
6-43. Pressure derives from the uninterrupted pace, level, and intensity of activity applied to an enemy. Once Army forces gain contact, they maintain it. Constant pressure and prompt transition to an exploitation deny the enemy time to regain balance and react. Operational pauses, even if intentional and designed to improve a combat service support (CSS) posture or restore order, may carry real dangersto include potential loss of the hard-won benefits of the offensive. Army forces press relentlessly without hesitation and are ruthlessly opportunistic.
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644. Adept commanders anticipate the need to maintain appropriate forces suitably
positioned for exploitation and continuity of action. As maneuver forces slow and approach culmination, commanders consider the best way to maintain tempo and continue to press the enemy. Commanders can replace the leading units with fresh forces, reinforce the lead units, or apply precision fires against targets in depth. As long as the force in contact can maintain pressure and is not approaching a culminating point, reinforcement is generally preferable to battle handover. Operational fires may also create new opportunities for pressing the enemy by complementing maneuver.
Control the Tempo
6-45. Speed promotes surprise and can compensate for lack of forces. It magnifies the
impact of success in seizing the initiative. By executing at a rapid tempo, Army forces
present enemies with new problems before they can solve current ones. Rapid tempo should
not degenerate into haste. Ill-informed and hasty action usually precludes effective
combinations of combat power; it may lead to unnecessary casualties. The condition of the
enemy force dictates the degree of synchronization necessary. When confronted by a
coherent and disciplined enemy, commanders may slow the tempo to deliver synchronized
blows. As the enemy force loses cohesion, commanders increase thetempo, seeking to
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accelerate the enemy's moral and physical collapse.
EXPLOIT SUCCESS
6-46. Ultimately, only successes that achieve the end state count. To determine how to exploit tactical and operational successes, commanders assess them in terms of the higher commander's intent. An operational design links objectives along lines of operations. However, success will likely occur in ways unanticipated in the plan. Commanders may gain an objective in an unexpected way. Success signals a rapid assessment to answer these questions:
•
Does the success generate opportunities that more easily accomplish the objectives?

•
Does it suggest other lines of operations?

•
Does it cause commanders to change their overall intent?

•
Should the force transition to a sequel?

•
Should the force accelerate the phasing of the operation?

6-47. Operationally, success may signal a transition to the next phase of the campaign or
major operation. Ideally, an appropriate sequel is ready. However, even a prepared sequel
requires rapid refinement to reflect the realities of the actual success. Commanders see
beyond the requirements of the moment. They employ every available asset to extend their
operations in time and space to make the success permanent. Commanders understand that
they must maintain momentum and initiative in order to win rapidly and decisively.
6-48. Exploitation demands assessment and understanding of the impact of sustaining
operations. CSS provides the means to exploit success and convert it into decisive results.
Sustainment preserves the freedom of action necessary to take advantage of opportunity.
Commanders remain fully aware of the status of units and anticipate CSS requirements,
recognizing that CSS often determines the depth to which Army forces exploit success.
6-49. Rapid tempo and repeated success always disorganize units to some extent. To exploit success and maintain momentum, reorganization occurs concurrently with other operations rather than as a separate phase. Prolonged reorganization can jeopardize momentum and require committing reserves. Enhanced situational understanding gives commanders an accurate description of unit status and expedites reorganization. Successful reorganization depends on CSS. Force commanders provide timely reorganization guidance and priorities to the CSS commanders. Doing this allows CSS commanders to anticipate requirements and position resources.
COMBINE DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
6-50. During execution, commanders combine and direct decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operations. Ideally, the decisive operation occurs approximately as planned.
However, opportunity and circumstances often alter the sequence and details of the decisive
operation. Commanders create or preserve opportunities through shaping operations.
Shaping operations precede and occur concurrently with the decisive operation. Sustaining
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operations ensure freedom of action to maintain momentum and exploit success.
6-51. Ideally, decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations occur at the same time.
Simultaneous operations allow commanders to seize and retain the initiative. However, they
require overwhelming combat power and information superiority. Commanders determine
if they can accomplish the mission with a single, simultaneous operation; if they cannot,
they phase it. In making this decision, they consider the skill and size of the opponent, the
size of the area of operations (AO), operational reach, available joint support, and the scope
of the mission. The crucial consideration is the success of the decisive operation, which
must have enough combat power to conclusively determine the outcome. If that combat
power is not available, commanders phase the operation to achieve the maximum possible
simultaneous action within each phase.
Maneuver and Fires
6-52. Through maneuver, Army forces seek to defeat the enemy decisively. Maneuver
directly engages the enemy center of gravity if feasible; if not, it concentrates against
decisive points. Maneuver implies more than the use of fire and movement to secure an
objective; it aims at the complete overthrow of the enemy's operational design. It requires
audacious concepts and ruthless execution.
6-53. Maneuver avoids those enemy forces best prepared to fight; it engages them at a
time or place or in a manner that maximizes relative friendly force advantages. Maneuver
creates and exposes enemy vulnerabilities to the massed effects of friendly combat power.
6-54. Operations may include periods of extremely fluid, nonlinear operations, alternating with linear operations (see Figure 6-2). A commander may start an operation with a compact arrangement of forces and quickly transition into nonlinear maneuver against an array of objectives throughout the AO. In different circumstances, the commander might direct multiple attacks in depth to disorganize the enemy and seize key terrain; the attacking force would then consolidate, defend, and prepare to resume the offensive. Another example: A joint land force seizes a lodgment using airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations, while special operations forces attack important facilities distributed across a portion of the AO. The airborne and amphibious units then establish a defense around the lodgment to defend against enemy reaction. When additional forces arrive, the land forces conduct nonlinear operations to end the conflict.
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In.Ow don opiraduk farm MINC01101141161noomporna10 ix lack of ambit power and Warman. An shaping °pennons awls opporturales, the operodon nsy Moon* manor, end oiplielloo on simultoneity.
Mullindlonal Foram
Figure 6-2. Linear and Nonlinear Combinations
6-55. In some cases, multinational considerations may limit the commander's ability to conduct operations throughout the AO. Multinational partners may lack the information systems, precision attack capabilities, and maneuverability of US forces. Commanders adapt their concept of operations accordingly, blending multinational and US capabilities. The multinational participants might conduct linear operations, while US Army forces conducted simultaneous nonlinear maneuver in depth. Such an operational design would employ each force according to its capabilities and complement linear operations with nonlinear operations.
6-56. More than ever, precision fires can shape the situation and create conditions for operational and tactical maneuver. Modern weapons are accurate enough for attacks to become very selective. Advanced systems land, sea, and air create effects that only complete saturation with fires could achieve in the past. Modern military forces are still assimilating the full consequences of this technological revolution. However, today's weapons allow commanders to avoid lengthy and costly periods of shaping operations to "set the conditions" with fires and other means. Avoiding a lengthy prelude to decisive operations preempts the enemy's chance to seize the initiative. Commanders determine the appropriate combination of shaping operations needed to ensure success of the decisive operation, recognizing that the effects of fire are transitory.
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6-57. The integration of operational fires with operational maneuver requires careful design and effective coordination with the joint force headquarters. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) identify specific enemy capabilities whose loss significantly degrades enemy coherence. Army forces attack the targets with organic lethal and nonlethal means or pass the mission to a supporting joint element. Ideally, the attacks are simultaneous. Simultaneity shocks enemy command and control (C2) systems and often induces paralysis. When the means are insufficient for simultaneous action, commanders plan sequential attacks.
Create Overmatch
6-58. Decisive operations synchronize the BOS to create overmatch at decisive points in
the AO. Overmatch is a quantitative or qualitative disparity of such magnitude that the
stronger force overwhelms the weaker. Overmatch may apply to one or all of the elements
of combat power in combination. Rapid tempo, offensive information operations (IC)), and
lethal fires combine to disrupt enemy C2 and create a condition of information superiority.
Fire support, force protection capabilities, and maneuver neutralize enemy fire support.
Supported by indirect and joint fires, maneuver forces close with the enemy and complete
his destruction with close combat.
Sustain Combat Power
6-59. Commanders develop a keen understanding of the effects of sustainment on
operations. They balance audacity and prudence in terms of CSS and the other BOS. To a
significant degree, sustainment determines operational reach and approach. Sustaining
operations establish the staying power of Army forces and the depth of operations. They
enable commanders to mass the effects of combat power repeatedly and maintain freedom
of action.
Use Adaptive Combinations
6-60. As they visualize their battlefield framework and operational design, commanders consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations. They choose the combination that fits the situation and the purpose of the operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations creates the four combinations in Figure 6-3).
.
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Contiguous. Noncontiguous Areas of Operations Are .of Operations
Linear Operations Linear Oporaiions mot .• Ow/ Row
IVA
-.• '.
.
60
Vriae
. er t 1.11r
mar knot "
Illtoimit
-xxx
•Korai -Kuwait •Men oporebore •Feralblo edam
Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations xxx' xxx 111101
•ifr 0 mi
xxx xxx -Boards.• JIF Andrew.• Vloinint •Peninte.•Somolla
Figure 6-3. Combinations of Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Linear and
Nonlinear Operations

6-61. Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs. Linear operations in contiguous AOs (upper left in Figure 6-3) typify sustained offensive and defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. The contiguous areas and continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT) focus combat power and protect sustaining operations. Commanders normally shape in the deep area, conduct the decisive operation in the close area, and sustain in the rear area.
6-62. Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The upper right box depicts a
headquarters with subordinate units conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In
this case, the higher headquarters retains responsibility for the portion of its AO outside the
subordinate unit AOs. The higher headquarters operational design uses nonlinear
operations. The subordinate units are conducting linear operations. The subordinate units'
battlefield organizations have close, deep, and rear areas; the higher headquarters battlefield
organization does not. This combination might be appropriate when the higher headquarters
is conducting widely separated simultaneous operations, for example, a vertical
envelopment against a decisive point (the decisive operation) from a lodgment (shaping and
sustaining operations).
6-63. Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs. The lower left box illustrates nonlinear operations being conducted in contiguous AOs. This combination typifies
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stability operations, such as those in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Hurricane Andrew support
operations also followed this design. The higher headquarters assigns the responsibility for
its entire AO to subordinate units. Within the subordinate AOs, operations are nonlinear,
with the subordinate headquarters receiving support and resources from the higher
headquarters. On a tactical scale, search and attack operations are often nonlinear operations
conducted in contiguous AOs.
6-64. Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The lower right box depicts units
conducting nonlinear operations in noncontiguous AOs. The operations of both higher and
subordinate units are nonlinear. The size of the land AO, composition and distribution of
enemy forces, and capabilities of friendly forces are important considerations in deciding
whether to use this battlefield organization and operational design. In Somalia in 1992, for
example, Army forces conducted nonlinear stability operations and support operations in
widely separated AOs around Kismayu and Mogadishu.
COMPLEX OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-65. Army forces execute full spectrum operations in environments that contain complex operational considerations. All operations include challenges. However these complex operational considerations require special attention by commanders and staffs:
•
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments.

•
Local populace and displaced persons.

•
Unconventional threats.

•
Urban operations.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments
6-66. The threat of WMD profoundly changes theater conditions and imposes major force protection requirements. A major JFC objective is to deter WMD deployment, and if deterrence fails, to find and destroy enemy WMD before they are used. The potential for destruction or contamination of infrastructure by NBC weapons increases the requirement for Army forces that can operate effectively in and around contaminated environments. To a significant degree, the readiness of Army forces to operate in NBC environments deters enemies from using WMD and encourages them to seek solutions that avoid the risk of strategic retaliation.
6-67. Operations in NBC environments demand careful preparation (see JP 3-11; FM 3-1 1 ). Vaccines protect soldiers against some biological weapons, but inoculations may need weeks to fully protect recipients. Therefore, protection against these weapons becomes part
of the continuous process of keeping units ready. In similar fashion, soldiers may receive
medical countermeasures, such as pretreatment before the operation or antidotes during the
operation. Medical surveillance programs provide tactical commanders with a tool to
develop a baseline of disease threats in the AO. This baseline aids in detecting when the
enemy begins biological warfare.
6-68. Units require equipment specifically designed for operations in an NBC
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environment. Specially trained units may be required to mitigate its effects. NBC operations are CS S-intensive; therefore, sustaining operations require careful planning.
6-69. ' Commanders at all echelons recognize that the WMD threat is also psychological. Every soldier fears these weapons and has doubts concerning countermeasure and antidote effectiveness. In many cases, the actual threat is less than soldiers imagine, but only realistic individual training will minimize their fear. Training gives soldiers confidence in their equipment and their ability to use it.
6-70. The psychological impact of NBC use goes beyond individual soldiers. Commanders and staffs must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment. Failure to exercise command and staff procedures in scenarios featuring realistic use of NBC weapons can lead to a mentality that NBC hazards present insurmountable obstacles. Only tough command post exercises that force commanders and staffs to work through the problems NBC hazards pose can overcome this attitude. Realistic training demonstrates that NBC hazards, like any other condition, are simply obstacles to overcome.
6-71. Successful US operations may increase the likelihood of enemy WMD use. If the enemy believes that only WMD will retrieve victory, he may resort to using them. Army forces adjust operations accordingly. Rapid maneuver places Army forces near the enemy,
compelling him to risk employing WMD on his own forces. Army forces disperse .as much
as possible and concentrate swiftly, and only as necessary to mass effects. Nonlinear
operations position Army forces deep within the enemy AO, complicating his targeting
decisions. Precision attacks destroy enemy C2 and CSS systems. Commanders emphasize
active and passive force protection. They disperse assembly areas and CSS units. ISR
focuses on locating and identifying WMD-capable enemy forces. Reconnaissance units
detect and mark hazardous and contaminated areas. Planning also considers US retaliatory
or preemptive strikes. Other active measures include theater missile defense, counterair
operations, precision fires against enemy WMD systems, and offensive 10.
Local Populate and Displaced Persons
6-72. Army forces create opportunities for success by enlisting the support of the local
populace and displaced persons. Frequently, Army forces operate in AOs characterized by
chaos and disorder. They may encounter populations with diverse cultures and political
orientations that may support, oppose, or remain ambivalent to US presence. In any
operation, Army forces will likely encounter displaced civilians or persons of unknown
status. Commanders identify these people and design operations with their protection in
mind.
6-73. Commanders depend on accurate knowledge of group locations and beliefs to ensure actions taken are consistent with achieving JFC goals and objectives. 10, especially psychological operations, and its related activities (public affairs, and civil-military operations) help commanders influence perceptions and attitudes of the local population. In some operations, 10 and its related activities may constitute the decisive operation. The importance of influencing civilians varies, depending on the mission and force objectives.
6-74. The cornerstone of successful action with local populace and displaced persons is
discipline. When Army forces operate with the local populace, discipline cements the
relationship. In circumstances where the populace is ambivalent or unfriendly, discipline
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prevents tension from flaring into open hostility and fosters respect. ROE guide the use of
lethal force, not to inhibit action and initiative but to channel it within acceptable limits. The
disciplined application of force is more than a moral issue; it is a critical contributor to
operational success.
Unconventional Threats
6-75. Commanders protect the force from unconventional threats in four ways. First, they train units and soldiers to protect themselves against terrorist tactics and intrusion. They complement self-defense capabilities by enforcing security policies, such as movement procedures, appropriate to the situation. Second, commanders consider the threat posed by unconventional elements and act to fill gaps in protective capabilities. Actions may include requesting additional combat forces. Third, commanders use all available information resources (including host nation, theater, national, and organic assets) to understand unconventional threats to the force. Commanders at major headquarters may form a national intelligence support team with a total focus on unconventional threats. Finally, by example and constant attention, commanders dispel any sense of complacency toward unconventional threats.
Urban Operations
6-76. • Urban operations include offense, defense, stability, and support operations
conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent natural terrain where manmade
construction and high population density are the dominant features. The world is •
largely urban in terms of population concentration. Army forces conduct urban operations
in large, densely populated areas that present distinct problems in clearing enemy forces,
restoring services, and managing major concentrations of people. The topography and
proximity of noncombatants degrade the effectiveness of techriically advanced sensors and
weapons. Thus, cities are likely battlegrounds where weaker enemies attempt to negate the
advantages Army forces have in more open terrain.
6-77. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic
feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and
infrastructure. Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis
on the three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the
population. CSS planning accounts for increased consumption, increased threats to lines of
communications, and anticipated support to noncombatants. Commanders develop ROE
carefully, adapting them to a variety of circumstances, and ensuring soldiers thoroughly
understand them.
6-78. Urban operations compress the spatial scale of tactical operations and require combined arms integration at small unit level. Units require careful preparation and thorough rehearsal to master using combined arms techniques in very close quarters. Urban operations place a premium on closely coordinated, combined arms teams and carefully protected CSS. Urban operations are CSS-intensive, demanding large quantities of materiel and support for military forces and noncombatants displaced by operations.
FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS
6-79. All operations evolve in terms of nature, purpose, and type. Successful operations
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create new conditions that lead to significant changes in the situation. A new or
fundamentally altered center of gravity may emerge. Typically, new conditions initiate
sequels.
Transition
6-80. Transitions mark the intervals between the ongoing operation and full execution of branches and sequels. Transitions often mark the change from one dominant type of operations, such as offense, to another such as stability. At lower echelons, transitions occur when one formation passes through another, for example, or when units must breach an obstacle belt. Commanders consider transitions from the current operation to future operations early in the planning process. Command arrangements, for example, often change. Typically, the command structure evolves to meet changing situations. A JTF, for example, may dissolve, and forces revert to their parent components. The operational requirements for Army forces may pass to a new commander, who continues postconflict missions even as some Army forces prepare to redeploy. Frequently, US forces transition from a US-led coalition to a multinational United Nations structure supported by US troops. This occurred at the end of Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, as US combat forces withdrew.
6-81. Changes in the strategic situation require adjusting the strength and composition of
deployed forces. When the dominant type of operation changes—from offense to stability,
for example—the types of units originally deployed may no longer be appropriate. As each
new force prepares for operations, the JFC and the commander of the Army service
component command tailor the Army force to meet mission requirements and theater
constraints. The force that initiated the operation may only superficially resemble the force
in theater when the operation concludes.
6-82. Transitions are the sequels that occur between types of operations. Commanders anticipate and plan for them as part of any future operation. Transitions between operations are difficult and during execution may create unexpected opportunities for Army forces, enemies, or adversaries. Such opportunities must be recognized quickly, developed as branches to the transition operation, and acted upon immediately. Transition between operations may be the most difficult follow-on operation to accomplish.
Reconstitution
6-83. Prolonged combat or intensive engagements diminish unit combat effectiveness. When a unit is no longer combat effective, commanders consider reconstituting it (see FM 4-100.9). Reconstitution consists of those actions that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations include regeneration and reorganization. Regeneration consists of rebuilding a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. This includes the reestablishment or replacement of essential C2 and training for the newly rebuilt unit. Reorganization is that action taken to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness.
6-84. The headquarters two echelons up normally controls reconstitution. Commanders and staffs plan reconstitution to fit mission priorities and support the higher commander's intent. The reconstitution plan takes into account follow-on missions. The final decision on
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whether to reconstitute a depleted unit depends on the situation. Commanders remain
flexible. Mission requirements and available resources (including time) determine
appropriate reconstitution actions.
6-85. Reconstitution planning is part of course of action development. Units with roles in reconstitution train to perform it. Commanders, staffs, and executing units plan and prepare for reconstitution before they confront it. Any combat, combat support, or CSS unit may require reconstitution. In particular, operations in an NBC environment increase the likelihood that some units will require reconstitution after decontamination.
6-86. Reconstitution requires aggressive application of the tenets of Army operations. Reconstitution actions must regenerate units that allow commanders to continue to set the terms of battle. These actions are necessary to maintain the agility of the force. Quickly recognizing the need for and executing reconstitution help provide the combat effective forces needed to retain the initiative. Commanders visualize reconstitution in terms of depth of time, space, and resources just as they do other operations. They look ahead, consider the resources required and available, and direct the extensive synchronization required.
Conflict Termination
6-87. Conflict termination describes the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of force to other means of persuasion. Conflict termination may take several forms: for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw, or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and staffs consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans. If the end state is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infrastructure. Regardless of how the conflict ends, it often changes into less violent, but persistent, forms of confrontation.
6-88. Conflict termination is more than the achievement of a military end state: it is the
military contribution to broader success criteria. As the policy governing the conflict
evolves, so does the end state at both joint and Army levels. Effective campaign plans
account for more than military objectives; they specify end states that support national
policy. They are also careful to distinguish between the military and other instruments of
national power.
6-89. A period of postconflict activities exists between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last US soldier. Army forces are vital in this period. As a sequel to decisive major operations, Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and that the conditions that generated the conflict do not recur. Postconflict stability operations and support operations—conducted by Army forces— transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.
ASSESS
6-90. Commanders, assisted by the staff, continuously assess the situation and the
progress of the operation, and compare it with the initial vision. Assessment is the
continuous monitoring — throughout planning, preparation, and execution — of the
current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria
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of success to make decisions and adjustments. Commanders direct adjustments to ensure that operations remain aligned with the commander's intent. Subordinates assess their unit's progress by comparing it with the senior commander's intent and adjusting their actions to achieve the envisioned end state, particularly in the absence of orders.
6-91. Assessment precedes and guides every activity within the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Assessment entails two distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operation, and evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness. Together, the two tasks compare reality to expectations.
6-92. Not all operations proceed smoothly toward the desired end state. Commanders examine instances of unexpected success or failure, unanticipated enemy actions, or operations that simply do not go as planned. They assess the causes of success, friction, and failure, and their overall impact on the force and the operation. In assessing the cause of failure or substandard performance, commanders address immediate causes while retaining the intellectual flexibility to look for related or hidden contributors. For example, a commander may replace an ineffective leader after an engagement in which Army forces suffer severe losses. In another instance, the commander may retain subordinate commanders within a defeated force. In both instances, the commander seeks answers to larger questions concerning operations security, enemy doctrine, leadership, equipment, and the state of training of friendly and enemy forces. Commanders also learn from their mistakes and allow subordinates to learn from theirs.
6-93. The American way of war has historically included rapid adaptation to unexpected challenges and situations. A tactical or operational success may prove the worth of a significant technological or procedural innovation. Conversely, Army forces may discover a dangerous vulnerability during the operation. Leaders continuously identify, assess, and disseminate lessons learned throughout the force.
6-94. Formal. postoperational assessments combine the after-action reports prepared by the units involved with the observations compiled by observers. These assessments become the basis for changes to doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel that support soldiers. They typically include interviews with commanders and staffs as well as with small unit leaders and soldiers. Just as commanders encourage and accept initiative on the part of subordinates during the operation, commanders encourage and accept complete candor during the postoperational assessment.
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Chapter 7
Offensive Operations
In war the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of the offense depends on the war-like souls of those conducting it.
7 -1. The offense is the decisive form
of war. Offensive operations aim to
destroy or defeat an enemy. Their
purpose is to impose US will on the
enemy and achieve decisive victory.
While immediate considerations often
require defending, decisive results
require shifting to the offense as soon as
possible.
PURPOSES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .
7 2. Offensive operations seek to
-
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to
defeat the enemy decisively. Army
forces attack simultaneously throughout
the area of operations (AO) to throw
enemies off balance, overwhelm their
capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and
ensure their defeat or destruction. The
offense ends when the force achieves the
purpose of the operation, reaches a limit
of advance, or approaches culmination.
Army forces conclude a phase of an
offensive by consolidating gains,
resuming the attack, or preparing for
future operations. Additional tasks
offensive operations accomplish
include-
•
Disrupting enemy coherence.

•
Securing or seizing terrain.

•
Denying the enemy resources.

General George S. Patton Jr.
War as I Knew It
.CONTENTS
Purposes of Offensive Operations Offensive. Operations at the Operational and . Tactical Levels of War
Operational Offense
.
Tactical Offense
Characteristics of Offensive Operations Surprise Concentration Tempo Audacity
Offensive Operations Within the
Operational Framework Decisive Operations in the Offense Shaping Operations in the Offense Sustaining Operations in the Offense Considerations for Nonlinear
Offensive Operations
Forms of Maneuver Envelopment Turning Movement Infiltration Penetration Frontal Attack
Types of Offensive Operations Movement to Contact Attack Exploitation Pursuit
Conducting Offensive Operations Planning Considerations for
Offensive Operations Preparing for Offensive Operations Executing Offensive Operations
The Impact of Technology
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•
Fixing the enemy.

•
Gaining information.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS OF WAR
7-3. Army operational commanders conduct offensive campaigns and major operations to achieve theater-level effects based on tactical actions. They concentrate on designing offensive land operations. They determine what objectives will achieve decisive results; where forces will operate; the relationships among subordinate forces in time, space, and purpose; and where to apply the decisive effort. Operational commanders assign AOs to, and establish command and support relationships among, tactical commanders. Tactical cortimanders direct offensive operations to achieve objectives—destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain—that produce the theater-level effects operational commanders require.
OPERATIONAL OFFENSE
7-4. At the operational level, offensive operations directly or indirectly attack the enemy center of gravity. Commanders do this by attacking enemy decisive points, either simultaneously or sequentially. Massed effects of joint and multinational forces allow attackers to seize the initiative. They deny the enemy freedom of action, disrupt his sources of strength, and create the conditions for operational and tactical success.
7-5. To attain unity of effort, operational commanders clearly identify objectives and
reinforce the relationships among subordinate forces. By minimizing interoperability
challenges and harnessing system capabilities, commanders tailor their forces to achieve
decisive effects. They allocate sufficient joint and multinational forces to achieve their
objectives.
TACTICAL OFFENSE
7-6. Tactical commanders exploit the effects that joint and multinational forces contribute to the offense. They synchronize these forces in time, space, resources, purpose, and action to mass the effects of combat power at decisive points. Commanders direct battles as part of major operations. Battles are related in purpose to the operational commander's objectives.
7-7. Battles may be linear or nonlinear and conducted in contiguous or noncontiguous AOs. Tactical commanders receive their AO, mission, objectives, boundaries, control measures, and intent from their higher commander. They determine the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within their AO. They direct fires and maneuver to attack and destroy the enemy and attain terrain objectives. Tactical commanders normally have clearly defined tasks-defeat the enemy and occupy the objective.
CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-8. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity characterize the offense. Effective
offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence and other relevant information
regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain. Commanders maneuver their forces to
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advantageous positions before contact. Force protection, including defensive information operations (EO), keeps or inhibits the enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. The enemy only sees what the friendly commander wants him to see. Contact with enemy forces before the decisive operation is deliberate, designed to shape the optimum situation for the decisive operation. The decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action that capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational picture (COP) to expand throughout the AO. Commanders execute violently without hesitation to break the enemy's will or destroy him.
SURPRISE
7-9. In the offense, commanders achieve surprise by attacking the enemy at a time or place he does not expect or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Estimating the enemy commander's intent and denying him the ability to gain thorough and timely situational understanding is necessary to achieve surprise. Unpredictability and boldness help gain surprise. The direction, timing, and force of the attack also help achieve surprise. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses his command and control (C2) systems, induces psychological shock in enemy soldiers and leaders, and reduces the coherence of the defense. By diminishing enemy combat power, surprise enables attackers to exploit enemy paralysis and hesitancy.
7-10. Operational and tactical surprise complement each other. Operational surprise creates the conditions for successful tactical operations. Tactical surprise can cause the enemy to hesitate or misjudge a situation. But tactical surprise is fleeting. Commanders must exploit it before the enemy realizes what is happening.
7-11. Outright surprise is difficult to achieve. Modern surveillance and warning systems, the availability of commercial imagery products, and global commercial news networks make surprise more difficult. Nonetheless, commanders achieve surprise by operating in a way the enemy does not expect. They deceive the enemy as to the nature, timing, objective, and force of an attack. They can use bad weather, seemingly impassable terrain, feints, demonstrations, and false communications to lead the enemy into inaccurate perceptions. Sudden, violent, and unanticipated attacks have a paralyzing effect. Airborne, air assault, and special operations forces (SOF) attacks— combined with strikes by Army and joint fires against objectives the enemy regards as secure—create disconcerting psychological effects on the enemy.
7-12. Surprise can come from an unexpected change in tempo. Tempo may be slow at first, creating the conditions for a later acceleration that catches the enemy off guard and throws him off balance. US forces demonstrated such a rapid change in tempo before Operation Just Cause in 1989. Accelerated tempo resulted in operational and tactical surprise despite increased publicity and heightened tensions beforehand.
7-13. Commanders conceal the concentration of their forces. Units mask activity that might reveal the direction or timing of an attack. Commanders direct action to deceive the enemy and deny his ability to collect information.
Surprise—Coup de Main in Panama
The activity of US forces throughout Panama during 1989 before Operation Just
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Cause provides an example of achieving strategic surprise. After assuming power in 1984, Manuel Noriega threatened Panamanian democracy and American legal
guarantees under the Panama Canal treaties. In response, US forces developed
military contingency plans known as Prayer Book and Blue Spoon. In May 1989,
Noriega's Dignity Battalions and the Panama Defense Forces increased political
pressure on the US to leave Panama by harassing American service members at
gunpoint. President George Bush responded by deploying Army and Marine forces
during Operation Nimrod Dancer as a show of force. Over the next six months,
Army forces conducted Purple Storm and Sand Fleas exercises to reinforce
American maneuver rights and gain moral ascendancy over Noriega's forces.
Despite the increased US activity, Noriega discounted the possibility of an invasion.
On 20 December 1989, SOF conducted the initial assault upon Panama Defense
Forces garrisons, airports, media centers, and transportation facilities. Conventional
forces soon followed, attacking decisive points throughout Panama. Noriega and his
forces were completely surprised. He fled, losing control over his forces as US
forces tracked him down.
CONCENTRATION
7-14. Concentration is the massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve a single purpose. Commanders balance the necessity for concentrating forces to mass effects with the need to disperse them to avoid creating lucrative targets. Advances in ground and air mobility, target acquisition, and long-range precision fires enable attackers to rapidl y concentrate effects. C2 systems provide reliable relevant information that assists commanders in determining when to concentrate forces to mass effects.
7-15. Attacking commanders manipulate their own and the enemy's force concentration by combining dispersion, concentration, military deception, and attacks. By dispersing, attackers stretch enemy defenses and deny lucrative targets to enemy fires. By massing forces rapidly along converging axes, attackers overwhelm enemy forces at decisive points with concentrated combat power. After a successful attack, commanders keep their forces concentrated to take advantage of their momentum. Should enemy forces threaten them, they may disperse again. Commanders adopt the posture that best suits the situation, protects the force, and sustains the attack's momentum.
7-16. Concentration requires coordination with other services and multinational partners. At every stage of an attack, commanders integrate joint intelligence assets with joint fires. They capitalize on air superiority to deny the enemy the ability to detect or strike friendly forces from the air. Commanders direct ground, air, and sea resources to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy reconnaissance elements or capabilities. They also direct security, 10, and counterfire to protect friendly forces as they concentrate.
TEMPO
7-17. Controlling or altering tempo is necessary to retain the initiative. At the operational level, a faster tempo allows attackers to disrupt enemy defensive plans by achieving results quicker than the enemy can respond. At the tactical level, a faster tempo allows attackers to quickly penetrate barriers and defenses and destroy enemy forces in depth before they can react.
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7-18. Commanders adjust tempo as tactical situations, combat service support (CSS)
necessity, or operational opportunities allow to ensure synchronization and proper
coordination, but not at the expense of losing opportunities to defeat the enemy. Rapid
tempo demands quick decisions. It denies the enemy the chance to rest and continually
creates opportunities.
7-19. By increasing tempo, commanders maintain momentum. They identify the best
avenues for attack, plan the action in depth, provide for quick transitions to other
operations, and concentrate and combine forces effectively. Commanders and staffs ensure
that CSS operations prevent culmination. Once combat begins, attackers execute violently.
They follow reconnaissance units or successful probes and quickly move through gaps
before defenders recover. Attackers shift combat power quickly to widen penetrations, roll
up exposed flanks, and reinforce successes. Friendly forces attack in depth with fires and
maneuver to shatter the enemy's coherence and overwhelm his C2. While maintaining a
tempo faster than the enemy's, attackers balance the tempo with the ability to exercise C2.
Commanders never permit the enemy to recover from the shock of the initial assault. They
prevent defenders from massing effects against the friendly decisive operation.
AUDACITY
7-20. Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Commanders display audacity by developing bold, inventive plans that produce decisive results. Commanders demonstrate audacity by violently applying combat power. They understand when and where to take risks and do not hesitate as they execute their plan. Commanders dispel uncertainty through action; they compensate for lack of information by seizing the initiative and pressing the fight. Audacity inspires soldiers to overcome adversity and danger.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
7-21. Commanders conduct offensive operations within the operational framework (AO,
battlespace, and battlefield organization). They synchronize their forces in time, space,
resources, purpose, and action to conduct simultaneous and sequential decisive, shaping,
and sustaining operations in depth (see Figure 7-1). In certain situations, commanders
designate deep, close, and rear areas.
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