Army Field Manual No. 34-52: FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation

Army Field Manual No. 34-52: FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation. Manual sets forth basic principles of interrogation doctrine and procedures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations. Includes a prohibition againts the use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind.

Friday, May 8, 1987
Thursday, December 30, 2004

Field Manual *FM 34.52

No 34-52
Table of Contents
Page Preface iii
Chapter 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator 1.0
Principles of Interrogation 1-0 Sources of Information 1-1 Personal Qualities 1-2 Specialized Skills and Knowledge 1-4
Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator 2-0
Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Battle 2-0 Military Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 2-0 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 2-2 Counterintelligence 2-4 Electronic Warfare 2-6 Capabilities and Limitations of Interrogators 2-6
Chapter 3 Interrogation Process 3-0
Screening Sources 3-0 Interrogating Procedures 3-3
Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents 4-0
Document Handling 4-0 Document Exploitation 4-4 Evacuation Procedures 4-8 Documents Captured with a Source 4-11
Chapter 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations 5-0
Advice and Assistance 5-0 Prepare and Move to the Deployment Site 5-0 Establish a Site for Interrogation Operations 5-1 Supervise the Interrogation Process 5-1 Supervise the CED Processing Cycle 5-2 Supervise Administrative Tasks 5-2
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 3015, 29 September 1978.-


Chapter 6 Operational Environment
Command Relationships
Tasking Relationships
Support Relationships
Interrogator Training

Chapter 7 Strategic Debriefing
Duties and Responsibilities Notification Planning and PreparationContact and Interview Components of Strategic IntelligenceIntelligence Cycle

Chapter 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities

Chapter 9 Low-Intensity Conflict
Terminology Operational Concept for Low-Intensity ConflictInterrogation Support to Low-Intensity Conflict The Source

Interrogation Operations

Appendix A STANAG Extracts
Appendix B Sample Detainee Personnel Record
Appendix C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card
Appendix D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag Appendix E Sample JINTACCS Salute Report Format and Report Appendix F Sample Screening Report Format and Report Appendix G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report Appendix H Approaches Appendix I Interrogation Guides Appendix J 1949 Geneva Conventions Glossary
References .
6-0 6-3 6-4 6-7
7-0 7-0 7-0 7-0 7-0 7-1 7-3 8-0 8-0 8-1 9-1 9-1 9-1 9-3 9-6 9-9 A-1 B-0 C-0 D-1 E-0 F-0 G-0 H-0 I-0 J-0 Glossary-0 References-1

This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes proce­dures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. It provides general guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interroga­tion elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting ofintelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetimeinterrogation operations.
These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemi­cal (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 and 60A (S/NOFORN); andto the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements 1059(National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisonersof War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling andReporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents).
These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by FM 27-10, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Mili­tary Justice (UCMJ).
Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners -of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents.Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women areincluded.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving this pub­lication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.

Interrogation and the Interrogator
Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the maxi­mum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec­tors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accu­rate. An interrogation involves the interac­tion of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two differs to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities, and because the circumstances of each con­tact and the physical environment vary.

Intelligence interrogations are of many types, such as the interview, debriefing, and elicitation. However, the principles of objec­tive, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security applyto all types.

The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximun amount of usable information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a definitepurpose—to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as heobtains the information. The objective may be specific, establishing the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general, seekingorder of battle (OB) information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses the objec­tive as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should not concen­
trate on the objective to the extent that he
overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit
other valuable information extracted from
the source. For example, during an interro­
gation, he learns of an unknown, highly
destructive weapon. Although this informa­
tion may not be in line with his specific
objective, he develops this lead to obtain all
possible information concerning this weap­
on. It is then obvious that the objective of
an interrogation can be changed as neces­
sary or desired.

Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to a successful interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interroga­tion. He has certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation, such as the psychological shock the source receives when becoming a prisoner of war, which enable him to grasp the initiative and assist him in maintaining it. An interrogator may lose control during the interrogation by allowing the source to take control of the interrogation. If this occurs, he must post­pone the interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a different interrogator should conduct the interrogation. In addition, the interrogator must identify and exploit leads developed during the interrogation.

The interrogator makes every effort to obtain accurate information from the source. He assesses the source correctly by repeating questions at varying intervals. The interrogator, however, is not the final analyst and should not reject or degrade information because it conflicts with pre­viously obtained information. The interro­gator's primary mission is the collection ofinformation, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all

information as the truth: he views all information obtained with a degree of doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm informationreceived and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is of great impor­tance to report accurate information to the using elements. The interrogator checks his notes against the finished report to ensure that the report contains and identifies the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the source.

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohi­bited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experi­ence indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, ver­bal trickery, or other nonviolent and non­coercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and princi­ples outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brain­washing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willingcooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally consti­tute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an inter­rogator ineffective should the source chal­lenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agree­ments, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as inter­rogation techniques.

The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a great deal of classified informa­tion. He is aware constantly that his job is to obtain information, not impart it to the source. He safeguards military information at all times as well as the source of informa­tion. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, thereare those attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect any attempt made by the source to elicit information.

The interrogator is concerned primarily with two sources of information in his intel-. ligence collection effort: human sources and material sources (mainly captured enemy documents (CEDs)). The senior interroga­tor, depending on the supported command­er's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR), decides which of these sources will be more effective in the intelligence collection effort.

The interrogator encounters many sources who vary greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation, military specialty, and political and religious beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health, their intelli­gence levels may range from well below average to well above average, and theirsecurity consciousness may range from the lowest to the highest. Sources may be ci­vilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec­tors, refugees, displaced persons, andagents or suspected agents. Because of these variations, the interrogator makes a careful study of every source to evaluate his mental, emotional, and physical state and uses it as a basis for interrogation. He deals mainly with three categories of sources: cooperative and friendly, neutral and non­partisan, and hostile and antagonistic.


Cooperative and Friendly

A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount of informa­tion from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those pri­vate affairs which are beyond the scope of the interrogation. At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and losing control of the interrogation.

Neutral and Nonpartisan

A neutral and nonpartisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in low­intensity conflict (LIC) where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the information required.
Hostile and Antagonistic

A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real chal­lenge to the interrogator. An interrogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when dealing with him. As a rule, at lower echelons, it is considered unprofitable to expend excessive time and effort in interro­gating hostile and antagonistic sources. When time is available and the source appears to be an excellent target for exploi­tation, he should be isolated and repeatedly interrogated to obtain his cooperation. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where more time is available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources.


CEDs include any piece of recorded information which has been in the posses­sion of a foreign nation and comes into US possession. This includes US documents which the foreign nation may have pos­sessed. There are numerous ways to acquire a document, some of the most common ways are: found in the possession of human sources, on enemy dead, or on the battle­field. There are two types of documents: (1) official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters, diaries, news­papers, and books.


An interrogator should possess an inter­est in human nature and have a personality which will enable him to gain the coopera­tion of a source. Ideally, these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator; however, in most cases, an interrogator can correct some deficiencies in these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote time to study and practice. Some desirable personal qualities in an interrogator are motivation, alertness, patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor.

An interrogator may be motivated by several factors, for example, an interest in human relations, a desire to react to the challenge of personal interplay, an enthusi­asm for the collection of information, or just a profound interest in foreign languages and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is the most significant factor used by an inter­rogator to achieve success. Without motiva­tion, other qualities lose their significance.The stronger the motivation, the more suc­cessful the interrogator.

The interrogator must be constantly
aware of the shifting attitudes which nor­mally characterize a source's reaction to

interrogation. He notes the source's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. He determines why the source is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the source's mood and actions that the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is with­holding information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for diminishing resistance, for contradictions, or other tendencies, to include susceptibility.
The interrogator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby, enhancing the success of the interrogation. Additionally, the validity of the source's statements and the motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of tact and patience. Display­ing impatience encourages the difficult source to think that if he remains unres­ponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will stop his questioning. The display of impatience may cause the source to lose respect for the interrogator, thereby, reduc­ing his effectiveness. An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and later continue further interrogation without arousing apprehen­sion or resentment.

The interrogator must maintain credi­bility with the source and friendly forces. Failure to produce material rewards when promised may adversely affect future inter­rogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are often the basis for tactical decisions and operations.

The interrogator must maintain an objec­tive and a dispassionate attitude, regardlessof the emotional reactions he may actuallyexperience, or which he may simulate dur-ing the interrogation. Without this required objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effectively.

The interrogator must have an excep­tional degree of self-control to avoid dis­plays of genuine anger, irritation, sym­pathy, or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative during the interroga­tion. Self-control is especially important - -when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emo­tions or attitudes.

An interrogator must adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during interro­gations. He must also adapt himself to the operational environment. In many cases, he has to conduct interrogations under a va­riety of unfavorable physical conditions.

A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an interroga­tor who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes eas­ily discouraged by opposition, noncoopera­tion, or other difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a suc­cessful conclusion nor seek leads to other valuahle information.

The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the interrogation and the attitude of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a neat, organized, and professional appearance willfavorably influence the source. A firm,deliberate, and businesslike manner of

speech and attitude may create a proper environment for a successful interrogation.If the interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and morereceptive to questioning. However, depend­ing on the approach techniques, the inter­rogator can decide to portray a different (for example, casual, sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the willing cooperation of the source.

The interrogator must be knowledgeableand qualified to efficiently and effectivelyexploit human and material sources whichare of potential intelligence interest. He istrained in the techniques and proficiencynecessary to exploit human and materialsources. His initial training is in foreignlanguage, and his entry-level training is inthe exploitation of documents and human sources. The interrogator must possess, oracquire through training and experience,special skills and knowledge.

The most essential part of the interroga­tor's intelligence collection effort is report­ing the information obtained. Hence, he must prepare and present both written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise,and accurate manner. He must possess a good voice and speak English and a foreign language idiomatically and without objec­tionable accent or impediment.
Knowledge of a foreign language is nec­essary since interrogators work primarilywith non-English speaking people. Lan­guage ability should include a knowledge ofmilitary terms, foreign idioms, abbrevia­tions, colloquial and slang usages, and localdialects. Although a trained interrogatorwho lacks a foreign language skill caninterrogate successfully through an inter­preter, the results obtained by the linguisti­cally proficient interrogator will be moretimely and comprehensive. Language labs,tapes, or instructors should be made avail­able wherever possible to provide refresher and enhancement training for interrogator linguists.

Interrogation operations contribute to the accomplishment of the supported com­mander's mission. The interrogator must have a working knowledge of the US Army's missions, organizations, weaponsand equipment, and methods of operation. This knowledge enables him to judge therelative significance of the information he extracts from the source.

Every interrogator should be knowledge­able about his unit's target country, such asarmed forces uniforms and insignia, OBinformation, and country familiarity.
Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia
Through his knowledge of uniforms, in­signia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of unit, and military experience of a mili­tary or paramilitary source. During the planning and preparation and the approach phases, later discussed in this manual, theidentification of uniforms and insignia is very helpful to the interrogator.
Order of Battle Information
OB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposi­tion of personnel, units, and equipment ofany military force. OB elements are separ­ate categories by which detailed informa­tion is maintained. They are composition,disposition, strength, training, combateffectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronictechnical data, and miscellaneous data. During the questioning phase, OB elements assist the interrogator in verifying the accuracy of the information obtained and can be used as an effective tool to gain new

information. Aids which may be used to identify units are names of units, names of commanders, home station identifications, code designations and numbers, uniforms, insignia, guidons, documents, military pos­tal system data, and equipment and vehicle markings.
Country Familiarity

The interrogator should be familiar with the social, political, and economic institu­tions; geography; history; and culture of the
throat eriiintrit ginra many ariiirras will
readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the interrogator may induce reluctant prisoners to talk by discussing the geography, eco­nomics, or politics of the target country. He may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and atti­tudes in the target country. He should keepabreast of major events as they occur in the target country. By knowing the current events affecting the target country, the interrogator will better understand the gen­eral situation in the target country, as well as the causes and repercussions.

Interrogators must be proficient in all common soldier skills. However, map read­ing and enemy material and equipment are keys to the performance of interrogator duties.
Map Reading

Interrogators must read maps wellenough to map track using source informa­tion obtained about locations of enemy activities. Through the use of his maptracking skills, the interrogator can obtain information on the locations of enemy activities from sources who can read a map. Furthermore, his map reading skills are essential to translate information into map terminology from sources who cannot reada map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26.
Enemy Material and Equipment

The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and employ­ment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infan­try support weapons, artillery, aircraft, ve­hicles, communications equipment, and NBC defense. FM 100-2-3 provides informa­tion on enemy material and equipment.
Specialized Training

The interrogator requires specialized training in international regulations, secu­rity, and neurolinguistics.
International Agreements

The interrogator should know interna­tional regulations on the treatment of pris­oners of war and the general principles of the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Interrogators must know how to identify, mark, handle, and control sensitive mate­rial according to AR 380-5. He should have received special training on Subversion andEspionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA).

Neurolinguistics is a behavioral commu­nications model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The interro­gator should read and react to nonverbalcommunications. An interrogator can bestadapt himself to the source's personalityand control his own reactions when he has an understanding of basic psychologicalfactors, traits, attitudes, drives, motiva­tions, and inhibitions.

Role of the Interrogator
An interrogation element does not operate on its own. It conducts operations in re­sponse to an assigned collection mission and reports the information it collects back into the system to help support combat commanders in fighting the air-land battle. The intelligence preparation of the battle­field (IPB) process is the framework inwhich intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations take place Interrogation assets operate within that framework to support the commander.

All combat commanders have the same basic responsibility. They must destroy the enemy's capability to conduct further oper­ations within their assigned areas of opera­tion. To accomplish this mission, com­manders must locate, identify, engage, and defeat enemy units. A commander can only engage the enemi, after that enemy has entered the commander's area of opera­tions. The depth of this area is determined by the maximum range of the weapon sys­tems controlled by the commander. High technology battlefields of the future will be characterized by high mobility, devastating firepower, and tactics which take maximum advantage of both. On such battlefields, a commander whose sole interest is his area of operations is a commander who has lostthe initiative. Losing the initiative on a bat­tlefield means losing the battle. Air-landbattle doctrine projects a way for com­manders to preserve the initiative. Itrequires commanders to expand their out­look on the battlefield to another area, the area of interest. This area contains those enemy elements which may be close enough to effect the outcome of combat operations in the immediate future. If commanders can locate, identify, and accurately predict the intentions of enemy units while they are in the area of interest, it may be possible toinhibit or destroy their ability to conduct future combat operations. In combat opera­tions against the enemy, air-land battle doctrine concentrates on deep, close, and rear operations. Air-land battle doctrine requires all commanders to have a mental and emotional commitment to the offensive. They must set primary and secondary ob­jectives in terms of enemy formations, notterrain features. They must attack units and areas critical to coherent enemy opera­tions, not just the enemy's lead formations. Commanders must possess the spirit of of­fensive determination. They must directpowerful initial blows against the enemy, placing him at an immediate disadvantage. These initial blows must be rapidly followed by additional strikes to keep the enemy off balance. To successfully implement the
air-land battle doctrine, commanders
Hold the initiative.

Operate across the entire width and
depth of the battlefield.

React rapidly to changes in the ene­my's intentions.

Synchronize the operations of their

The air-land battle doctrine places an extremely heavy burden on all command­ers. However, these burdens must be borne, if commanders expect to win against heavy odds on the battlefield of the future.

Like all other intelligence assets, interro­gators serve the commander. Interrogation operations are of no value unless they con­tribute to the accomplishment of the sup-ported commander's mission. To under­stand the interrogator's role in mission accomplishment, the overall contribution made by military intelligence must be understood. Military intelligence is respon­sible for providing commanders with anaccurate and timely estimate of the enemy's
capabilities and probable courses of action. that satisfies their assigned collection mis-This estimate must consider the terrain fea-sions. As collection assets gather informa­tures in the area of operations, the number tion, they report it. The reported informa­and type of enemy units in this area, and tion is consolidated and analyzed tothe prevailing weather conditions. Intelli-determine its reliability and validity. Valid gence assets collect and analyze informa-information is collated and used to producetion to develop this estimate, then, give the intelligence, which is then provided to theestimate to commanders in sufficient time commanders, and simultaneously to collec­for use in their decision making. tion assets to provide immediate feedback
to assist in collection operations. This pro-Commanders request the information cess is continuous, since commanders mustthey need. These information requests are react to a constantly changing battlefield.
translated into collection requirements. The The following illustration shows the overallcollection requirements are consolidated process followed by intelligence personnelinto collection missions and assigned to in producing this estimate.
specific collection assets. Collection assets conduct operations to obtain information





Analysis is the heart or center of theintelligence process. The collection effort isdriven by an analysis of the commander'smission and the information needs this analysis identifies. The information col­lected is analyzed to determine how well itfills the commander's needs. IPB is the initial step in performing this analysis. IPBintegrates enemy doctrine with the weatherand terrain as they relate to a specific bat­tlefield environment. This integration allows enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities,and probable courses of action to be deter­mined and evaluated. On the battlefield, IPB is dynamic. It produces graphic esti­mates that portray the enemy probable courses of action in the immediate situa­tion. Commanders and their staff elements use IPB products to help them determinehow to achieve decisive results with limited resources.

IEW operations are conducted to satisfy the aggregate intelligence, counterintelli­gence (CI), and EW requirements of thecommander. IEW operations include bothsituation and target development activities.They are collectively oriented on the collec­tion, processing, analysis, and reporting ofall information regarding the enemy,weather, and terrain. IEW operations gen­erate combat information, direct targeting data, all-source intelligence, and correlatedtargeting information. CI supports OPSEC, deception, rear operations, and EW. CI sup­port to OPSEC and deception protects friendly command, control, and communi­cations (C 3) programs. These are integral toIEW operations performed in support of the commander's combat objectives.

Situation development requires the collec­tion of information that accurately de­scribes the enemy, weather, and terrain within the supported commander's area ofinterest. The following questions exemplify the types of information required.
0 How will the terrain features and cur-
rent weather affect the enemy's menand equipment? How will these effectschange his operational timetables?
• What tactics will the enemy employ to achieve his objectives? What equip­ment will he employ? How will heorganize his forces?
O Where will the enemy fight? What arehis current unit locations? What are the strengths and weaknesses of those dispositions?
O What are the enemy's intentions? Where will he move next? What will he do when he gets there? Will he attack, defend, or withdraw? Where, When, How?
O Who, exactly, is the enemy? What are the capabilities, limitations, and opera­tional patterns of specific enemy unitsand their commanders?
. Where is the enemy vulnerable? Whatare his technical, operational, and human weaknesses?
Target development requires the collec­tion of combat information, targeting data,and correlated targeting information. Itsobjective is to accurately predict where and when the enemy will establish dispositions that will yield the most decisive results when struck by a minimum of firepower. The following questions exemplify the types of information required.
O Where, exactly, are the high value targets? Where are the locations of .enemy weapons systems, units, and activities that may impact on combatoperations?
What, exactly, is at these locations? How much equipment? How many per­sonnel? To what units do they belong?

How long will these locations betargets? When did the units, equip­ment, and personnel arrive? Where will they locate?

Specific Information Requirements

Tactical intelligence operations beginwith the commander. He conveys his

information needs to the intelligence staff who converts them into PIR and IR for the commander's approval or modification. The intelligence officer translates PIR and IR into specific collection missions for subor­dinate, attached, and supporting units and requests information from the next higher echelon. He receives and evaluates informa­tion from all sources, develops and nomi­nates high-payoff targets (HPTs), and reports intelligence results to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
Battalion Specific Information

Battalion commanders need specific information and accurate intelligence from the brigade and higher headquarters to plan their operations. They need timely combat information and targeting data from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units to refine their plan and to win their offensive and defensive battles. Their spe­cific information requirements (SIR) for attacking and defending are consolidated, due to the speed with which they must reacton the extremely dynamic and volatile air-land battlefield. They must know-
Location, direction, and speed of pla­toon and company-sized elementswithin the enemy's first-echelon battalions.

Location, direction, and speed of enemy second-echelon battalions which indicate the first-echelon regi­ment's main effort.

Disposition and strength of enemy de-fensive positions and fortifications.

Location of antitank positions, crew-served weapons, individual vehi­cle positions, and dismounted infantry.

C Locations of barriers, obstacles, mine­fields, and bypass routes.
• Effects of terrain and prevailing weather conditions throughout the course of combat operations.
Capability of enemy to employ air

Availability and probability of use of enemy radio electronic combat (REC) assets to disrupt friendly C 3 .

Possibility of special weapons.

Probability of enemy use of NBC

Brigade Specific Information

Brigade commanders need and use speci­fic information to plan, direct, coordinate, and support the operations of the division against enemy first-echelon regiments, their battalions, companies, and combat support units—the sustainers. They also need accu­rate intelligence about enemy second---echelon regiments within first-echelon divi­sions and any follow-on forces which canclose on their area of operation before thecurrent engagement can be decisively concluded.
Brigades strive to attack enemy first­echelon forces while they are on the move and before they can deploy into combatformations. The brigade commander needsspecific information about-
Composition, equipment, strengths,and weaknesses of advancing enemyforces.

Location, direction, and speed of
enemy first-echelon battalions and
their subordinate companies.

Locations and activities of enemy second and follow-on echelons capable of reinforcing their first-echelon forces in the operations area.

• Location of enemy indirect fire weapon systems and units.
Locations of gaps, assailable flanks, and other tactical weaknesses in the enemy's OB and operations security (OPSEC) posture.

Air threat.

Enemy use of NBC.

Effects of weather and terrain on cur­rent and projected operations.

Anticipated timetable or event sched­ule associated with the enemy's mostlikely courses of action.


Should the enemy succeed in establishing his defensive positions, then, brigade com­manders' SIR increase. They must then know the specific types, locations, and organization of enemy first- and second­echelon defensive positions and fortifica­tions. These include-
. Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, and
antitank strong points.

O Locations of antiaircraft and missile artillery units.
Locations of surface-to-air missile

Location of REC units.

Location of reserve maneuver forces.

• Enemy ability to conduct deep attackinto friendly rear area.
Brigade commanders given defensivemissions, or forced to defend given sectors, . require specific information about assault­ing enemy companies, battalions, regi­ments, and divisions—generally, their strength, composition, and direction of attack. The same information is required about enemy follow-on units that can affect brigade combat operations. Of specific con­cern are the locations, size, activities, direc­tion, and speed of enemy air-assault, heli­borne, and tactical air units capable of dealing lethal and decisive blows to brigade units and which could potentially be used to thwart any counterattack.
Specific information about enemy first­and second-echelon regimental el facilities is of paramount concern to the brigade commander, whether on the offense or defense. He must know the specific loca­tions of enemy-
Division forward and main command posts (CPs).

Regimental and battalion CPs.

Fire direction control centers.
O Command observation posts.

Radio and radar reconnaissance sites.

REC sites.

• Target acquisition sites.
The suppression, neutralization, and des­truction of enemy C" systems and facilities are critical to the success of close opera­tions. Brigade commanders, in concert with supporting division and corps IEW, and maneuver and fire support units use all available means to identify, locate, disrupt, and destroy these extremely HPTs. Their objective is to neutralize the enemy com­manders' capability to command troops and control weapon and combat support sys­tems. Thus, to degrade or deny the ability of the enemy commander to conduct his attack as planned, this is crone by systematically attacking key nodes and information links in the enemy commanders' command and control (C 2) system, which supports their decision-making process. This form of C 2 warfare is founded upon the basic tenets of command, control, and communications countermeasures (C 3CM) strategy and is defined as—
The integrated use of OPSEC,
military deception, jamming,
and physical destruction, sup­ported by INTELLIGENCE, to
deny information, influence,
degrade, or destroy enemy C3
capabilities and to protect
friendly C3


The protection of friendly C1—protect C 3—is the number one priority under C 3CM strategy. Intelligence supports the protec­tion of friendly C 3 primarily through CI support to OPSEC and deception.

The mission of CI is to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligencecollection, subversion, sabotage, and inter­national terrorism conducted by or onbehalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of the US Army. CI personnel identify the hostileintelligence collection threat. They, together with operations personnel, develop friendly force profiles, identify vulnerabilities, andmake recommendations to reduce those vulnerabilities. CI operations supportOPSEC, deception, and rear operations.


CJ support to OPSEC is the principal role of CI at echelons division and below. It includes-
The identification and analysis of enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabili­ties, personnel, units, and activities.

The identification and analysis of
enemy.REC units, locations, and

Assisting in the development of
friendly force profiles.

Determining friendly vulnerabilities to enemy RSTA and REC activities.

Recommending and evaluating
appropriate OPSEC and deception


Military deception operations are planned, controlled, directed, and conducted by commanders at echelons above division. They are designed to mislead enemy senior military and political leaders regarding our true military objectives, our combat capabili­ties and limitations, and the composition and disposition of our combat forces. Bat­tlefield deception is deliberate action to achieve surprise on the air-land battlefield. Its purpose is to mislead enemy ground force commanders as to our true combat objectives; tactical OB; major axis ofadvance; and the disposition of our reserve and combat support units, defensive-posi­tions, fortifications, and C 3 facilities.

CI support to rear operations includes identifying and analyzing the enemy threat to brigade trains and both division support command (DISCOM) and corps support command (COSCOM) operations. CI per­sonnel recommend steps to neutralize
enemy agents, saboteurs, terrorists, sympa­thizers, and special purpose forces. Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all subordinate personnel must be trained and prepared to identify and report enemy units or activities which may pose a threat to brigade trains, DISCOM, and COSCOM operations. The potential impact on close operations from the rear cannot be overlooked.
Black, gray, and white lists identify per­sonnel of CI interest. CI teams conduct operations that provide data used to com­pile these lists. Black lists contain the names of persons who are hostile to US interests and whose capture or nullification of their effectiveness are of prime impor­tance. Gray lists contain names of persons
whose inclinations or attitudes toward US
interests are certain. White lists contain names of persons who are favorably inclined toward US interests and need to be protected from enemy targeting.

Interrogation and CI personnel must interact to defeat the enemy's collection effort and the threat posed to our rear areas. The interrogator must work in close coordi­nation with CI personnel to keep abreast of CI targets in the event he encounters a source that possesses information of CI interest. The following questions exemplify the types of information required by CI:
. What specific intelligence collection operations are being conducted by the enemy?
O What aspects of the enemy's plans have been successfully concealed from our collection efforts?
O What aspects of friendly plans have
been discovered by the enemy, and
how were they discovered?

Does the enemy plan to conduct sabot­age operations?

Does the enemy plan to conduct sub­versive operations?

How effective are our OPSEC


0 How effective are our attempts at mil-obtained to the PIR and IR contained in the itary deception? interrogation element's collection mission.Interrogators collect information on politi-

EW is an essential element of combat power. It can provide commanders both apassive and an active means to protect their C3 systems and a passive and an activemeans to attack the enemy commanders' C"systems as well. Protecting C3 is the number one priority for EW in accordance with C 3CM strategy. Action taken to deny,influence, and degrade or destroy enemy C3 capabilities and counter-C 3 is equally important. EW, like other elements of com­bat power on the air-land battlefield, iswaged by employing a combination of bothoffensive and defensive operations, tactics, and procedures. Air-land battle doctrineand the spirit of the offense are the overrid­ing considerations in planning and con­ducting EW operations (see FM 34-1).
The following questions exemplify typesof information that the interrogator pro­vides to EW operations:
Will the enemy employ jammers?

Will the enemy augment heavy elec­tronic equipment?

What specific means of C3 are beingused by the enemy?

What problem has the enemy expe­rienced when using each of these

What has been the effect of our attempts to influence, degrade, or de­stroy these means of Ca?


Interrogators are trained as linguists toquestion sources and to exploit CEDs. Theycollect and report information that pertainsto the IEW tasks. Reportable information isdetermined by comparing the information cal, economic, and a wide range of militarytopics. In doing this, they organize their col­lection effort according to the OB elementsused by the intelligence analyst. However,at the tactical level, commanders and intel­ligence staff will generate requests for spe­cific intelligence and combat informationPIR and IR that will allow them to better conduct the war. Therefore, the collection effort should be limited to obtaining infor­mation that responds to the PIR and IR:
Missions. Information that describes the present, future, or past missions ofspecific enemy units. Each unit forwhich mission information was obtained is identified.

Compositions. Information that identi­fies specific enemy units. This identifi­cation should include the type of unit(artillery, transportation, armor, andso forth) and a description of the unit'sorganizational chain of command.

Strength. Information that describes the size of enemy units in terms of per­sonnel, weapons, and equipment. Aunit identification must accompanyeach description.

• Dispositions. Information that estab-lishes locations occupied by the enemyunits or activities. The information will identify the military significanceof the disposition, other enemy units there, and any security measures.
Tactics. Information that describes the

tactics in use, or planned for use, by specific enemy units. The doctrinegoverning the employment of thesetactics will be included in the description.

Training. Information that identifies
and describes the types of individual
and collective training being con­ducted by the enemy. The description
will include all information on the
thoroughness, degree, and quality of
the training.

Combat effectiveness. Information that describes the ability and fighting


quality of specific enemy units. Thedescription will provide unit identifica­tion and information about personneland equipment losses and replace­ments, reinforcements, morale, and combat experiences of its members.
. Logistics. Information that describesthe means by which the enemy moves and sustains his forces. This includes any information on the types andamounts of supply required, procured,stored, and distributed by enemy unitsin support of current and future operations.
O Electronic technical data. Information that describes the operational parame­ters of specific enemy electronicequipment. This includes both com­munications and noncommunications systems.
O Miscellaneous data. Information that supports the development of any of theother OB elements. Examples are per-sonalities, passwords, unit histories, radio call signs, radio frequencies, unitor vehicle identification numbers, and PSYOP.

The degree of success achieved by inter­rogation operations is limited by the envi­ronment in which the operations are per­formed. Interrogators depend on the IEW process to give direction to their collection efforts. They rely on the conduct of combat operations to provide them with collectiontargets: sources and CED.
Interrogation operations are also limited by the very nature of human intelligence(HUMINT) collection. The source or CEDmust actually have the desired information before the interrogators can collect it. With respect to sources, there is always the pos­sibility that knowledgeable individuals may refuse to cooperate. The Geneva and HagueConventions and the UCMJ set definite limits on the measures which can be used to gain the willing cooperation of prisoners of war.

Interrogation Process
The interrogation process involves the screening and selection of sources for inter­rogation and the use of interrogation tech­niques and procedures. Both screening and interrogation involve complex interpersonal skills, and many aspects of their perfor­mance are extremely subjective. Each screening and interrogation is unique because of the interaction of the interroga­tor with the source.-There are five interro­gation phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting.

Screening is the selection of sources forinterrogation. It must be conducted at every echelon to determine the cooperativeness and the knowledgeability of sources and to determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner.
Observe the Source

Screeners should personally observe the source. During this observation, the screener should first examine the EPW cap­tive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive tag will provide the screener information regarding the source's circumstances of capture (when, where, how, by whom, and so forth). This information can assist the interrogator in the conduct of the screeningand most importantly can show imme­diately if the source has the potential of possessing information which could answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. The screeners should pay particular atten­tion to rank insignia, condition of uniforms and equipment, and behavior demonstrated by the source. Screeners should look for things like attempts to talk to the guards,intentionally joining placement in the wrong segregation group, or any signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source whose appearance or behavior indicates
that he is willing to talk should be noted by the screeners. During the observation, the screener should look for signs (such as the source's branch insignia or other identifi­able features) to indicate that the source could have knowledge of information related to the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Question Guards

Screeners should question guards about the source. Since the guards are in constant contact with the source, they can provide the information on the source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how the source has responded to orders, what requests have been made by the source, what behavior has been demonstrated by the source, and so forth. In addition, the guards can help screeners with specific items of interest to identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Examine Documents

Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any docu­ments pertaining to the source. Documents captured with the source (identificationcard, letters, map sections, and so forth) can provide information that identifies the source, his organization, his mission, and other personal background (family, knowl-. edge, experience, and so forth). Available documents pertaining to the source (screen­ing reports, interrogation reports, and administrative documents, such as detainee personnel record (see Appendix B)) preparedby the military police, can help the screener by providing information on the source's physical and emotional status, knowledge, experience, and other background informa­tion. This information can be used to verify information from documents captured with the source and further assess his willing­ness to cooperate. When examining docu­ments, screeners should look for items that will indicate whether the source is coopera­tive or willing to cooperate based on any

specific personal interest. In addition, the screener should examine the documents to determine if the source has information which answers the supported commander's
PIR and IR.
If the source has information pertaining to new foreign material, contact the techni­cal intelligence element, and if the source has information of target exploitation interest, contact the target exploitation element.

Before initiating the interrogation and screening process, the interrogator estab­lishes close liaison with the supporting CI agents. The CI element provides PIR of CI interest. During the interrogation and screening process, interrogators identify sources of CI interest. After these sources have been interrogated for any informationof immediate tactical value, (as needed)they are turned over to CI personnel asquickly as possible. For example, CI is interested in sources that the following conditions apply:
Have no identification documents.

Have excessive identification

Have modified identification

Possess unusually large amounts of cash or valuables.

Possess knowledge of critical interest (for example, nuclear power plant operations, chemical plant operations, weapons test and development, and so forth).

• Are illegal border crossers.
Attempt to avoid checkpoints.

Are on the black, gray, or white list.

Request to see CI or US Army

• Have family in the denied area.
Screeners should always consider coopera­tive, knowledgeable sources first. These sources are identified through the screeners'review of documents, questioning of the guards, and their own personal observa­tions. Based on their notes, the screeners establish the order in which these sources will be screened. The guards are then told to bring these sources, in a specified sequence, to the screening site one at a time.

Screeners ask each source about the cir­cumstances of his capture, his personal background, his military job, and his unit of assignment. The goal is to get the source to talk. Once the source is talking, the screeners try to identify any strong emo­tions and the reasons for them. This will indicate how susceptible the source may be to interrogation and may identify the approach techniques which have the great­est chance of success. Screeners also inject questions designed to identify those topical areas in which the source possesses perti­nent information.

A screener must record information as it is obtained from the source on a screening report form. An example of this form is shown in Appendix F. All of the informa­tion shown is rarely obtained from any one source. The blocks are there to save the screeners as much additional writing aspossible. If size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment (SALUTE) reportableinformation is obtained during the screen­ing, it must be exploited fully and reported as soon as possible.

The screening of a source ends when thescreener is sure that he can make an accu­rate assessment of the source's potential cooperation and pertinent knowledge. Atthis time, the source is returned to the con­trol of the guards, and the screener records his assessment on the screening report form. The assessment is recorded by meansof a screening code. The screening code is a number-letter designation which reflects the level of cooperation to be expected from thesource and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. The number "1" repre­sents a source who responds to direct ques­tions. The number "2" represents a source


who responds hesitantly to questioning. those assigned to categories 2A, 1C, 2B, 3A, The number "3" represents a source who 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are nor­does not respond to questioning. The letter mally interrogated last. This order of priori­"A" represents a source who is very likely to ties ensures the highest probability of possess information pertinent to the sup-obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent ported commander's PIR. The letter "B" information within the time available for represents a source who might have infor-interrogations. Screening codes may mation pertinent to the supported com-change with the echelon. The higher themander's IR. The letter "C" represents a echelon, the more time is available to con­source who does not appear to have perti-duct an approach. The following illustra­nent information. tion depicts the order in which sources will
be interrogated.
Those sources who have been assigned tothe same category may be interrogated in NOTE: The term "screening category" any order deemed appropriate by the senior should not be confused with EPW- or
interrogator. Category 1A sources should source-assigned category that is assigned normally be the first to be interrogated. according to their intelligence value (see Category 1B sources are next, followed by Appendix A).




Once the senior interrogator has assignedspecific sources to his subordinates, theinterrogators develop a plan for their inter­rogations. These plans reflect the currentsituation and the supported commanders'PIR and IR. If they do not, the subsequent interrogations will not help the element tosatisfy its assigned collection mission, andinformation needed by the supported unitwill be missed. Each interrogator, wherefeasible, begins his preparation by examin­ing the situation map (SITMAP), the OBdata base, and pertinent information con­tained in the interrogation element's files.
Interrelation of Planning and
Preparation and Approach

The planning and preparation phase andthe approach phase are interrelated. In the planning and preparation phase, the inter­rogator gathers information on the source's circumstances of capture, comments from others who have been with the source, information on the source's observed behav­ior, and information on some of the source's personal traits and peculiarities from thescreening sheet. This information helps theinterrogator develop a picture of the sourceand enables him to select approaches mostlikely to work. There are four primary fac­tors that must be taken into consideration in selecting tentative approaches:
The source's mental and physicalstate. Is the source injured, angry, cry­ing, arrogant, cocky, or frightened? Ifso, how can this state be best exploitedin the interrogation effort.

The source's background. What is thesource's age and level of military orcivilian experience.

The objective of the interrogation. Howmuch time is available for the interro­gation? Is the commander interestedonly in specific areas (PIR and IR)? Isthis source knowledgeable enough torequire a full OB interrogation?

. The interrogator himself. What abili­ties does he have that can be brought
into play? What weaknesses does he
have that may interfere with the inter­rogation of the source? Can his per­sonality adapt to the personality of the

Questioning Guards

Interrogators should question guards aspart of their preparations. The guards are in constant contact with the sources and may be able to provide the following types of information:
Physical condition.

Demonstrated attitude and behavior.

Contact made with other guards or

How the source has been handled since
his capture.

Hearsay information from others who
have handled the source.

Confirmation of capture data, espe­cially the circumstances under which
the source was captured.

Each interrogator will unobtrusively observe the source to personally confirm hisidentity and to check his personal appear­ance and behavior.
Analyze Information

After the interrogator has collected all information available about his assignedsource, he analyzes it. He looks for indica­tors of any psychological or physical weak­ness that might make the source susceptibleto one or more approach techniques. Theinterrogator formulates a strategy to con­duct his analysis. He also uses the informa­tion he collected to identify the type andlevel of knowledge possessed by the sourcethat is pertinent to the element's collectionmission.
Modify Sequences of Questioning
The interrogator uses his estimate of thetype and extent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the basic topical

sequence of questioning. He selects only those topics in which he believes the source has pertinent knowledge. In this way, the interrogator refines his element's overall objective into a set of specific topics for his interrogation. The major topics that can be covered in an interrogation are shown below in their normal sequence. The inter­rogator is, however, free to modify this sequence as he deems necessary.


Personnel strength.

Weapons and equipment strength.




• Combat effectiveness.

Electronic technical data.


Finalize Interrogation Plan

As a result of the planning and prepara­tion phase, the interrogator develops a planfor conducting his assigned interrogation. He must review this plan with the senior interrogator when possible. Whether writ­ten or oral, the interrogation plan must con­tain at least the following items of information:
Identity of the source.

Interrogation serial number.

Topics, in sequence, that will be

Reasons why the interrogator selected only specific topics from the basic questioning sequence.

C Approach strategy selected.
• Means selected for recording the
information obtained.

The senior interrogator reviews each plan and makes any changes that he feels neces­sary based on the commander's PIR and IR. After the plan is approved, the holding compound is notified to have a guard bring
the source to the interrogation site. The interrogator collects all available interroga­tion aids needed (maps, charts, writing tools, reference materials, and so forth) and proceeds to the interrogation site.

The approach phase actually begins when the interrogator first comes in contactwith the source and continues until the pris­oner begins answering questions pertinentto the objective of the interrogation effort.Interrogators do not "run" an approach by following a set pattern or routine. Each interrogation is different, but all ap­proaches in interrogations have the follow­ing purposes in common:
Establish and maintain control over the source and the interrogation.

Establish and maintain rapport
between the interrogator and the

Manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation.

The successful application of approachtechniques eventually induces the source to willingly provide accurate intelligence information to the interrogator. The term"willingly" refers to the source answering the interrogator's questions, not necessarily his cooperation. The source may or may not be aware that he is actually providing the interrogator with information about enemy forces. Some approaches may be complete when the source begins to answer ques­tions. Others may have to be constantly maintained or reinforced throughout theinterrogation. The techniques used in an approach can best be defined as a series of events, not just verbal conversation between the interrogator and the source. The exploitation of the source's emotion can be either harsh or gentle in application (hand and body movements, actual physi­cal contact such as a hand on the shoulder for reassurance, or even silence are all use­ful techniques that the interrogator mayhave to bring into play).
Basic Concepts of Approaches

The manipulative techniques within eachapproach are different, but there are some

factors common to all approaches which affect the success or failure of the approach itself. The interrogator should establish and maintain control, establish and develop rapport, assess the source, make smooth transitions, appear sincere, be convincing, and recognize the breaking point.
Establish and Maintain Control. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and configu­ration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The interrogator must always be in control, he must act quickly and firmly. However, everything that he says and does must be within the limits of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as the stan­dards of conduct outlined in the UCMJ.
Establish and Develop Rapport. Rap­port between the interrogator and the source is really nothing more than a two-way flow of communication. It can involve showing kindness and humanity in an otherwise harsh situation, or it can mean badgering the source. Rapport is established when the source reacts to the interrogator's statement. Rapport must be maintained throughout the interrogation, not only just in the approach phase. If the interrogator has established good rapport initially and then abandons the effort, the source would rightfully assume that the interrogator cares less and less about him as the information is being obtained. If this occurs, rapport is lost and the source may cease answering questions. Rapport may be developed by—
E Asking about the circumstances of capture. By asking about the source's circumstances of capture, the interro­gator can gain insight into the prison­er's actual state of mind and more importantly, he can ascertain his pos­sible breaking points.
. Asking background questions. After asking about the source's circumstan­ces of capture, the interrogator can further gain rapport by asking ques­tions about his background. Apparent interest can be built by asking about his family, civilian life, friends, likes, dislikes, and so forth. The main point
in asking about the source's back­ground is to develop rapport, but non-pertinent questions may open newavenues for the approach and help determine whether or not the tentative approaches chosen in the planning and preparation phase will be effec­tive. If nonpertinent questions show that the tentative approaches chosenwill not be effective, a flexible interro­gator can easily shift the direction of his approach without the source beingaware of the change.

Depending on the situation, circum­stances, and any requests the source mayhave made, the following can also be used to develop rapport:
Offering realistic incentives: such as immediate (coffee, cigarettes, and so forth), short-term (a meal, shower, send a letter home, and so forth), and long-term (repatriation, political asy­lum, and so forth).

Feigning experience similar to those ofthe source.

Showing concern for the prisoner
through the use of voice vitality and

body language.
Helping the source to rationalize his

Showing kindness and understanding toward the source's predicament.

Exonerating the source from guilt.

Flattering the source.

Assess the Source. After having estab­lished control of the source and having established rapport, the interrogator con­tinually assesses the prisoner to see if the approaches, and later the questioning tech­niques, chosen in the planning and prepa­ration phase will indeed work. Remember that the approaches chosen in planning and preparation are only tentative and are based on the sometimes scanty information available from documents, the guards, and personal observation. This may lead the interrogator to select approaches which may be totally incorrect for obtaining this source's willing cooperation. A careful assessment of the source is absolutely necessary to avoid wasting valuable time in


the approach phase. Make assessment by asking background and nonpertinent ques­tions which will indicate whether or not the approaches chosen will be effective. The questions can be mixed or they can beseparate. If, for example, the interrogatorhad chosen a love of comrades approach, he should ask the source questions like "Howdid you get along with your fellow squad members?" If the source answers that they were all very close and worked well as a team, then the interrogator can go right into his love of comrades approach and be
reasonably sure of its success. However, if the source answers, "They all hated my guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," then the interrogator should abandon that approach and ask some quick nonpertinent questions to give himself some time to work out a new approach.
Make Smooth Transitions. The interro­gator must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially if he needs to move from one approach technique to another. "Poking and hoping" in the approach mayalert the prisoner of ploys and will make the job more difficult. Tie-ins to another approach can be made logically and smoothly by using transitional phrases.Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusion of simple sentences which connect the previously used approach with the basis forthe next one. Transitions can also be smoothly covered by leaving the unsuccess­ful approach and going back to nonperti­nent questions. By using nonpertinent con­versation, the interrogator can more easily move the conversation in the desired direc­tion, and as previously stated, sometimes obtain leads and hints as to source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be more successful.
Be Sincere and Convincing. All profes­sional interrogators must be convincing and appear sincere in working their approaches. If an interrogator is using argument and reason to get the source tocooperate, he must be convincing and appear sincere. All inferences of promises,situations, and arguments, or otherinvented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe depends on his level of knowledge, experience, and training. A good assessment of the source is the basis for the approach and is vital to the success of the interrogation effort.

Recognize the Breaking Point. Every source has a breaking point, but an interro­gator never knows what it is until it has been reached. There are, however, some good indicators that the source is near hisbreaking point or has already reached it. For example, if during the approach, the source leans forward with his facial expres­sion indicating an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point. The interrogator must be alert and observant to recognize these signs in the approach phase. Once the interrogator determines that the source is breaking, he should inter­ject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, the interrogator can move into the question­ing phase. If the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the interrogator must realize that the source was not as close to the breaking point as was thought. In this case, the interrogator must continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach or questioning technique and con­tinue to work until he again feels that thesource is near breaking. The interrogator can tell if the source has broken only by interjecting pertinent questions. This pro­cess must be followed until the prisoner be­gins to answer pertinent questions. It isentirely possible that the prisoner may cooperate for a while and then balk at an­swering further questions. If this occurs, the interrogator can either reinforce the approaches that initially gained the source's cooperation or move into a differ­ent approach before returning to the ques­tioning phase of the interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the amount of time that is spent with a particu­lar source is dependent on several factors, that is, the battlefield situation, the expe­diency with which the supported command­er's PIR and IR requirements need to be answered, and so forth.
Approach Techniques
Interrogation approach techniques areusually performed by one interrogator

working alone. However, sometimes inter­rogators work together. He must also remember that the tactical situation is very fluid and that the commander needs infor­mation in the shortest period of time. This means that the tactical interrogator has lit­tle time to waste, especially during the approach phase. Obviously, the more com­plicated an approach technique is, the more preparation time is required for it and its successful use. For this reason, the approach techniques discussed are those that take the least amount of time to pro­duce the most usable information possible.
The number of approaches used is limited only by the interrogator's imagination and skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are not violated. The Geneva • Conventions do not permit an interrogator to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or as a member of the Red Cross (Red Crescent or Red Lion). To every approach technique, there are literally hundreds of possible variations, each of which can be developed for a specific situation or source. The varia­tions are limited only by the interrogator's personality, experience, ingenuity, and imagination.
With the exception of the direct approach, no other approach is effective by itself. Interrogators use different approach tech­niques or combine them into a cohesive, logi­cal technique. Smooth transitions, logic, sincerity, and conviction can almost always make a strategy work. The lack of will undoubtedly dooms it to failure. Some examples of combinations are-

Direct/futility/love of comrades.

Direct/fear up (mild)/incentive.

The actual number of combinations is limited only by the interrogator's imagina­tion and skill. Great care must be exercised by the interrogator in choosing the approach strategy in the planning and preparation phase of interrogation and inlistening carefully to what the source is say­ing (verbally or nonverbally) for leads that the strategy chosen will not work. Whenthis occurs, the interrogator must adapt himself to approaches that he now believes will work in gaining the source's cooperation.

Although there is no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the question­ing phase begins, generally the questioning phase commences when the source begins to answer questions pertinent to the specific objectives of the interrogation. Questions should be comprehensive enough to ensure that the topic of interest is thoroughly explored. Answers should establish the who, what, when, where, how, and when possible why. Questions should be pre­sented in a logical sequence to be certain that significant topics are not neglected. A series of questions following a chronologi­cal sequence of events is frequently employed, but this is by no means the only logical method of asking questions. Adher­ence to a sequence should not deter the interrogator from exploiting informational leads as they are obtained. The interrogator must consider the probable response of the source to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all possi­ble, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to antagonize the source. Experience has shown that in most tactical interrogations, the source is coop­erative. In such instances, the interrogator should proceed with direct questions.
Questioning Techniques

Use good questioning techniques throughout the questioning phase. An interrogator must know when to use the dif­ferent types of questions. With good ques­tioning techniques, the interrogator can extract the most information in the shortest amount of time. There are many types of questioning techniques.
In tactical interrogations, the direct ques­tioning technique is used due to critical time factors. The direct questioning technique-
. Uses only properly formed, direct

• Properly uses follow-up questions forcomplete information.

. Properly uses repeated, controlled, pre­pared, and nonpertinent questions to control interrogation and assess source.
O Avoids confusing, ambiguous, and
time-consuming questions.

. Uses a proper, logical sequence of top­ics or questions.
Characteristics of direct questions are-
O Basic interrogatives (who, what, when, where, and how, plus qualifier).
Brief, concise, simply-worded, and
address the looked-for information.

Asks for a narrative response (cannot be answered by just yes or no).

Produces the maximum amount of usable information and gives a greater number of leads to new avenues of questioning.

Follow-up questions are used to exploit a topic of interest. Questions usually flow one-from-another based on the answer to previous questions. Interrogators ask a basic question and then based on theanswer from the source, use follow-up ques­tions to completely exploit all available information about the topic. Follow-up questions are also used to fully exploit a lead given by the source in his response.
Nonpertinent questions are used to con­ceal the interrogation's objectives or to strengthen rapport with the source. They may also be used to break the source's con­centration, particularly, if the interrogator suspects that the source is lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing liar if his concentration is frequently interrupted.
Repeated questions ask the source for the same information obtained in response to earlier questions. They may be exact repeti­
tions of the previous question, or the pre­vious question may be rephrased or other­wise disguised. Repeated questions may be
used to check the consistency of the source's previous responses. They may also be used to ensure the accuracy of important details such as place names, dates, and componentparts of technical equipment. The use of repeated questions may develop a topic thatthe source had refused to talk about earlier.
They may also be used as a means of
returning to a topical area for further
Control questions are developed from information which the interrogator believes to be true. Control questions are based on information which has been recently con­firmed and which is not likely to have changed. They are used to check the truth­fulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other questions through­out the interrogation.
Prepared questions are developed in advance of an interrogation to gain precise wording or the most desirable questioning sequence. They are used primarily for inter­rogations which are technical in nature,require legal precision, or cover a number of specific topics. Interrogators must not allow the use of prepared questions to restrict the scope and flexibility of their interrogations.
Leading questions may prompt the source to answer with the response he believes the interrogator wishes to hear. As a result, the response may be inaccurate or incomplete. Leading questions are generally avoidedduring interrogations, but they can be used by experienced interrogators to verify information. This is especially true during map tracking.
Avoid vague questions as they do not have enough information for the source to understand exactly what is being asked by the interrogator. They may be incomplete, "blanket" or otherwise nonspecific, and create doubt in the source's mind. Vague questions tend to confuse the source, waste time, are easily evaded, and result in answers that may confuse or mislead theinterrogator.

The interrogator must use the different types of questions effectively. Active listen­ing and maximum eye-to-eye contact with the source will provide excellent indicatorsfor when to use follow-up, repeated, control, and nonpertinent questions. The interroga­tor uses direct and follow-up questions to fully exploit subjects pertinent to his inter­rogation objectives. He periodically includescontrol, repeated, and nonpertinent ques­tions to check the sincerity and consistency of the source's responses and to strengthen

rapport. A response which is inconsistent with earlier responses or the interrogator's available data is not necessarily a lie. When such a response is obtained, the interroga­tor reveals the inconsistency to the source and asks for an explanation. The source's truthfulness should, then, be evaluated based on the plausibility of his explanation.
There are two types of questions that an interrogator should not use. These are com­pound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information. They are, in effect, two or more questions combined as one. They require the source to supply a separate answer to each portion of the question. Compound questions should not be used during interrogations because they allow the source to evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer. They may confuse the source or cause the interrogator to misunderstand the response. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with words like "no." "none," or "not." They should be avoided because they may confuse the source and produce mis­leading or false information. They usually require additional questions to clarify the source's responses.
SALUTE Reportable Information

SALUTE reportable information is any information that is critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. SALUTE reportable information is reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE report format, written or oral (see Appendix E for an example). Information may beSALUTE reportable even when an interro­gator cannot determine its immediate intel­ligence value. SALUTE reportable informa­tion is always time sensitive and answers the supported, higher, or adjacent unit's PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable informa­tion is identified by its potential value. If the information indicates a change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is SALUTE reportable. If an interrogator cannot decide whether or not a piece ofinformation is SALUTE reportable, he should act as though it is. This means thathe should exploit it fully and record all per­tinent information. The interrogator should then consult the senior interrogator for a final determination of the information's value.
Hot and Cold Leads

Leads are signs which tell an interrogator that the source has additional pertinent information that can he obtained through further questioning. Leads are provided by a source's response to the interrogator's questions. There are two types of leads that concern interrogators—hot and cold. A hot lead, when exploited, may obtain informa­tion that is SALUTE reportable. A cold lead, when exploited, may obtain informa­tion that is not SALUTE reportable but is still of intelligence value. The use of follow-up questions to fully exploit hot and cold leads may require an interrogator to cover topics that he did not list in his inter­rogation plan. An interrogator must exploit hot leads as soon as he identifies them. Once the interrogator is sure that he has obtained and recorded all the details known -to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. The interrogator then resumes his question­ing of the source at the same point where the hot lead was obtained. An interrogator should note cold leads as they are obtained and exploit them fully during his question­ing on the topics to which the cold leads apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may indicate that the source possesses pertinent informa­tion in areas not previously selected for questioning. If the interrogator does not fully exploit all of the cold leads he obtains, he must include information on all the leads he did not exploit in his interrogation report.
Hearsay Information

Hearsay information must include the most precise information possible of its source. This will include the name, duty position, full unit designation of the person who provided the information, and the date time group of when the source obtained the information.
Questioning Sequence

An interrogator begins his questioning phase with the first topic in the sequence he

tentatively established as part of his inter­rogation plan. He obtains all of the source's pertinent knowledge in this topical area before moving on to the next topic in his sequence. He maintains his established sequence of questioning to ensure that no topics are missed. The only exception is to exploit a hot lead immediately. Even then, however, he must resume his questioning at the same point in the same area at which the hot lead was first identified.
Map Tracking
The interrogator obtains informationconcerning the location of enemy activities
through the use of map tracking. Maptracking is performed in the order in which they are described. By following the sequence below, an interrogator ensures that all required details are obtained for each disposition known to the source:
Establish an initial common point of reference (ICPR). The first location theinterrogator should try to establish as the ICPR is the source's point of cap­ture (POC), because it is the most recent in his memory.

Establish a destination common pointof reference (DCPR). The DCPR can be the reference point furthest back in time, distance, or higher echelon. This could be forward or to the rear of the ICPR. In any case, you must establish a route using the procedures, in thesequence shown, in the following illustration.


Obtain the direction in which the source would travel when leaving the ICPR.

Obtain a description of the surface on which the source would be traveling.

Obtain the distance the source would travel in this direction.

Obtain a description of the prominent terrain features the source would remember while traveling in this direction.

Repeat the questions and plot the responses until the entire route between the ICPR and the DCPR has been plotted.

The interrogator can follow the same sequence when establishing the route actually traveled by the source by beginning with the DCPR. Each sequence establishes a CPR.

. Exploit the DCPR. Upon determining route of travel. what of military signifi­the DCPR, the interrogator must cance do you know or have seen or obtain the exact location and decrip-heard?" The interrogator will continue
Lion of each enemy disposition the from segment to segment, fully exploit-
source knew about at the DCPR. ing each, until he has exploited the
Methods of obtaining this information entire route traveled.
are shown in the following illustration.

Exploit dispositions not on route. If theUntil he obtains all dispositions interrogator obtains a dispositionknown by the source in the vicinity of which is not located on the establishedthe DCPR, the interrogator must route, he must establish the route therepeat these questions and plot or source would have taken to that dispo­record the information as it is provided sition. The interrogator then treats thisby the source.
new route the same way he does any

. Segment and exploit the route seg-other route segment, -exploiting it fully
ments. The interrogator begins exploit-before moving on to the next segment ing the source's route with the segment of the original route. closest to either the ICPR or the DCPR. The sequence, above, organizes map The preferred segment is the segment tracking so that information obtained from closest to the DCPR, but either can be the source can be plotted and recorded accu­used. The interrogator will exploit each rately. Correct performance of this task segment of the route by asking the results in the map used by the interrogator. question "From (description of com-The description of each disposition must be mon point of reference (CPR)) to (de-recorded preferably near the site of the dis­scription of next CPR) back along your position on the map.

Identify and describe items of military significance belonging to his forces which are located at each disposition.

Provide the full unit designation of the enemy units to which these items belong.

Describe the security measures deployed at each identified disposition.

Identify the source of his information.

Provide the date and time when he obtained his information.

Provide the name, rank, duty position and full unit designation of each person who
provided hearsay information to the source.


Recording Information
There are several reasons for recording information obtained during interrogations.The most important of these is to ensure that all information can be reported com­pletely and accurately. Recorded informa­tion may also be used to-
Refresh the interrogator's memory on a topic covered earlier, such as when returning to a topic after exploiting a hot lead.

Check responses to repeated questions.

Point out inconsistencies to the source.

Gain the cooperation of other sources.

Compare with information received
from other sources.

There are several methods of recording information that can be used during inter­rogations. Two are listed below and their advantages and disadvantages are de­scribed. These methods may be used sepa­rately or in combination with each other:
Taking Notes. The interrogator's own
notes are the primary method of recording information. When the interrogator takes his own notes, he has a ready reference to
verify responses to repeated questions or to
refresh his memory. They also provide him
with the means to record cold leads for later
Using his own notes expedites the inter­rogator's accurate transferral of informa­tion into a report format. When taking his own notes, however, he cannot observe the source continually. This may cause him to miss leads or fail to detect losses in rapport or control that are detectable only through clues provided by the source's behavior.
It is possible to lose control and the source's willing cooperation by devoting too much of his concentration to note taking.The interrogator must avoid distracting thesource while taking notes. Notes should be taken in such a way that the maximum amount of eye-to-eye contact with the sourceis maintained.
The interrogator will not have enoughtime to record every word that the source says. He must be able to condense or sum­marize information into a few words. He must use his past experiences to decide
which items of information should be
recorded. He should organize his materials
to avoid having to flip back and forth
between references.
The only information that should berecorded during the approach phase is that required by part 1 of the interrogation report (format is shown in Appendix G). All other information should not be recorded until after the source's cooperation has been obtained.
All notes must be complete, accurate, andlegible. Notes should be organized by topi­cal areas. A separate piece of paper shouldbe used to record cold leads. The interroga­tor should make maximum use of author­ized military abbreviations and brevity codes. Notes should be in recognizable for­mat and complete enough for any otherinterrogator to use. Situations may arise that require one interrogator to finish another interrogator's interrogation.
Using a Sound Recorder. The use of a sound recorder allows the interrogator to continually observe the source. When com­pared with note taking, this method allowsmore information to be obtained in less time. However, more time is required for report writing because the entire tape must be replayed to transfer information to the report. Place names, numbers, and otherpertinent, detailed information may be unclear on the recording. Sound recorders cannot provide a ready reference that can be used to compare answers to a repeated question, and the equipment maymalfunction.

Although the termination phase is only the fourth phase of the five phases, it is the last phase in which the interrogator will actually deal with the source. The interro­gator must leave the source ready to con­tinue answering questions in the future if necessary. The termination of the interro­gation must be conducted properly. If the interrogator mishandles the termination phase and he later finds that the source haslied or he needs to question the source further, he must start again from scratch.

Need to Terminate

A number of circumstances can cause an interrogation to be terminated. An interro­gator must be able to identify such circum­stances as soon as they occur. Some cir-cumstances that require an interrogation tobe terminated are-
The source remains uncooperative
throughout the approach phase.

Either the source or the interrogator becomes physically or mentally unable to continue.

All pertinent information has been
obtained from the source.

O The source possesses too much perti­nent information for all of it to be
exploited during the interrogation

. Information possessed by the source isof such value that his immediate evacu­ation to the next echelon is required.
O The interrogator's presence is requiredelsewhere.
• The interrogator loses control of the
interrogation and cannot recover it.

Termination Procedures

Whatever the reason for terminating the interrogation, the interrogator must remember that there is a possibility that someone may want to question the source at a later date. For that reason, he should ter­minate the interrogation without any loss of rapport whenever possible. The interro­gator reinforces his successful approach techniques to facilitate future interroga­tions. He tells the source that he may betalked to again. When appropriate, he tellsthe source that the information he provided will be checked for truthfulness and accu­racy. He offers the opportunity for thesource to change or add to any information he has given.
During termination, the interrogator must make proper disposition of any docu­ments captured with the source. A source'smilitary identity document must bereturned to him. If a source does not hold an identity card issued by his government, thesource will be issued a completed DA Form 2662-R (see Appendix C) by the military police. The identity card will be in the pos­session of the source at all times. Some cap­tured documents will contain information that must be exploited at higher echelons. Any such documents may be impounded by the interrogator and evacuated through intelligence channels. The interrogator must issue a receipt to the source for any personal documents he decides to impound. He must comply with the accounting proce­dures established for captured documents by the military police, according to AR 190-8. The accounting procedures required for impounding documents captured with a source are time-consuming but necessary. The interrogator can save time by prepar­ing receipts and document tags during the planning and preparation phase. He com­pletes the termination phase by instructingthe escort guard to return the source to the holding compound and to keep him away from any sources who have not yet beeninterrogated.

Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value that is obtained. Initialreports are submitted electronically when­ever possible to ensure that the information reaches the intelligence analysts in the least amount of time. Written reports are prepared to document electronic reports. They are used as the initial means of report­ing only when electronic reporting is impossible. Any information of intelligence value that will diminish with the passage of time must be SALUTE reported. Electronic SALUTE reports are formatted and submit­ted according to the procedures establishedduring the senior interrogator's initial coor­dination. Written SALUTE reports are pre­pared according to the format in Appendix
E. Information that is not SALUTE report­able is electronically reported with a lowerpriority. The aim of any interrogation is toobtain information which will help satisfy a commander's intelligence requirements.Since these requirements will differ in scopeat each level, when conducting PIR or IRinterrogations, nonapplicable paragraphsmay be deleted. Part 1 must always be


included and distribution made according
to STANAG 2033 (see Appendix A).

Interrogating through an interpreter is more time consuming because the interpre­ter must repeat everything said by both the interrogator and the source, and the inter­preter must be briefed by the interrogator before the interrogation can begin. Aninterrogation with an interpreter will go through all five phases of the interrogation process. After the interrogation is over, theinterrogator will evaluate the interpreter.
Methods of Interpretation
During the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator selects a method ofinterpretation. There are two methods: the simultaneous and the alternate. The inter­rogator obtains information about his interpreter from the senior interrogator. Heanalyzes this information and talks to the interpreter before deciding which method to use. With the simultaneous method, the interpreter listens and translates at the same time as the person for whom he is interpreting, usually just a phrase or a few words behind. With the alternate method, the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph. He then translates it during natural pauses in the interroga­tion. The simultaneous method should only be selected if all of the following criteria are met:
• The sentence structure of the target
language is parallel to English.

The interpreter can understand and speak both English and the target lan­guage with ease.

The interpreter has any required spe­

cial vocabulary skills for the topics to be covered.
. The interpreter can easily imitate the
interrogator's tone of voice and atti-
tude for the approaches selected.

. Neither the interrogator nor the inter­preter tends to get confused when using the simultaneous method of interpretation.
If any of the criteria listed above cannot be met, the interrogator must use the alter­nate method. The alternate method should also be used whenever a high degree of pre­cision is required.
Interpreter Briefing
Once the interrogator has chosen a method of interpretation, he must brief hisinterpreter. This briefing must cover the-
. Current tactical situation.
Background information obtained on the source.

Specific interrogation objectives.

Method of interpretation to be used.

Conduct of the interrogation in that statements made by the interpreterand the source should be interpreted in

the first person, using the same con­tent, tone of voice, inflection, and intent. The interpreter must not inject any of his own personality, ideas, or questions into the interrogation.
Selected approach techniques and how they are to be applied.

Conduct of interrogation in that the interpreter should inform the interro­gator if there are any inconsistenciesin the language used by the source. The interrogator will use this informa­tion in his assessment of the source. One example is a source who claims tobe an officer but who uses excessive slang and profanity.

Physical arrangements of the interro­gation site. The best layout is to havethe interrogator and the source facing each other with the interpreter behindthe source. This enhances the interro­gator's control by allowing him to simultaneously observe the source andthe interpreter.

Need for the interpreter to assist withreport preparation.


Throughout the briefing, the interrogator must answer all questions that the interpre­ter may have as fully and clearly as possi­ble. This helps ensure that the interpreter completely understands his role in theinterrogation.
Conduct the Interrogation

During the interrogation, the interrogatorcorrects the interpreter if he violates any ofthe standards on which he was briefed. For example, if. the interpreter injects his own
;do.o into bhc i•b.a.-roscal.I.v.., Is,. be col -
rected. Corrections should be made in a low-key manner. At no time should theinterrogator rebuke his interpreter sternlyor loudly while they are with the source.The interrogator should never argue withthe interpreter in the presence of the source.If a major correction must be made, andonly when it is necessary, the interrogatorand interpreter should leave the interroga­tion site temporarily.
When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogatorand the source is especially important. Thequestioning phase is conducted in the sameway that it would be if no interpreter wasused.
During the termination phase, the inter­preter's ability to closely imitate the inter­rogator and the source is again very impor­tant. The approaches used are reinforced here, and the necessary sincerity and con­viction must be conveyed to the source.
The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to fill ingaps and unclear areas in the interrogator'snotes. He may also assist in transliterating,translating, and explaining foreign terms.
Following the submission of all reports,the interrogator evaluates the performance
of his interpreter. The evaluation must cover the same points of information thatthe interrogator received from the senior interrogator. The interrogator submits theresults of his evaluation to the senior inter­rogator. The senior interrogator uses thisevaluation to update the information he hasabout the interpreter. This evaluation mayalso be used in developing training pro­grams for interpreters.

Processing Captured Enemy Documents
The information contained in CEDs can prove to be of intelligence value to com­manders at all levels. CEDs are important because they can provide information directly from the enemy. Only on rare occa­sions will a single document or group of documents provide vitally important infor­mation. Usually, each document provides a small bit of a larger body of information. Each CED, much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to their tactical intelligence value, technical data and political indicators can be extracted from CEDs that are important to strategic and national-level agencies. CEDs can also be helpful in exploiting sources.
STANAG 2084 defines a document as any piece of recorded information, regardless of form, obtained from the enemy and that subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force. CEDs can be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. Types of CEDs are typed, handwritten, printed, painted, engraved or drawn materials; sound or voice recordings; imagery such as videotapes, movies, or pho­tographs; computer storage media includ­ing, but not limited to floppy disks; and reproductions of any of the items listedabove.
CEDs are mainly acquired two ways. Some are taken from sources. Most docu­ments, however, are captured on the battle­field from former enemy locations and fromenemy dead.
Generally, CEDs are of two types: official and personal. Official documents are of government or military origin. Examples of official documents are, but are not limited to, overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field manuals, identification cards, reports,sketches, photographs, log books, mainte nance records, shipping and packing slips, war and field diaries, and written commu­nications between commands. Personal documents are of a private or nongovern­ment origin. Examples of personal docu­ments are letters, personal diaries, news­papers, photographs, books, magazines, union dues payment books, and political party dues payment books.
Interrogators are, from time-to-time, re­quired to handle and translate a wide vari­ety of noninission-related documents. Some include identity and other documents asso­ciated with working and residing in a for­eign country.

The accountability phase begins at thetime the document is captured. Documents must be clearly tagged. The capturing unit attaches a captured document tag to each document. The capture data is always writ­ten on a captured document tag (see the fol­lowing illustration of a captured document tag). When a captured tag is not available, the same information recorded on any piece of paper is acceptable. Nothing is to be writ­ten directly on the CED. The captured docu­ment tag should be assigned a sequential number at the first formal exploitation point, showing the nationality of the cap­turing force by national letters prescribed in STANAG 1059. Furthermore, the capturingunit will report the following information:
• Time the document was captured, recorded as a date-time group (DTG).
. Place the document was captured, including the six- or eight-digit coordi­nate and a description of the locationof capture.
O Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if applicable.
Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.

Identity of the capturing unit.







At each echelon, starting with the captur­ing unit, steps are taken to ensure that CED accountability is maintained during docu­ment evacuation. To establish account­ability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs. Thorough account­ability procedures at each echelon ensure that CEDs are not lost. To record each pro­cessing step as it occurs helps correct mis­takes in CED processing. Accountability is accomplished by anyone who captures,evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs. AllCEDs should have captured document tags,and all captured document tags should becompletely filled out. An incoming hatch of documents includes a transmittal document (see the illustration on page 4-10). When abatch is received without a transmittal, the interrogation element contacts the forward­ing unit and obtains a list of document serial numbers. The interrogation elementrecords all trace actions in its journal. Accountability includes inventorying the CEDs as they arrive, initiating any neces­sary trace actions, and maintaining thecaptured document log. Whenever intelli­gence derived from a CED is included in a unit or information intelligence reports, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are quoted to avoidfalse confirmation. All CEDs are shipped with any associated documents.



An inventory of incoming CEDs is con­ducted initially by comparing the CED tothe captured document tag and to accom­panying transmittal documents. This com­parison identifies any-
. Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
. Document tags not attached to CEDs.
CEDs not attached to document tags.

CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.

Trace Actions

When necessary, the receiving unit initiates a CED trace action. Trace actions are initiated on all missing CEDs, captured document tags, and on all information missing from the captured document tag. Trace actions are initiated by first contact­ing the element from which the documents were received. This corrective action can be completed swiftly if that unit's captured document log was filled out completely. Ifnecessary the trace action continues to other elements that have handled the docu­ment. If a captured document tag is unavailable from elements that have pre­viously handled the CED, the document examiner fills out a captured document tag for the document using whatever informa­tion is available. Attempts to obtain miss­ing CEDs are critical because of the infor­mation those CEDs might contain.

The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about a CED (see the following illustration of a captured docu­ment log). After trace actions are initiated, the CEDs are entered in the captured docu­ment log. The captured document log, ingeneral, must contain the entries listed below:
File number (a sequential number to
identify the order of entry).

DTG the CED was received at this

. Document serial number of the cap­tured document tag.

O Identification number of the transmit­tal document accompanying the CED.
Full designation of the unit that for­warded the CED.

Name and rank of individual that
received the CED.

L.J DTG and place of capture (as listed onthe captured document tag).
. Identity of the capturing units (as
listed on the captured document tag).

o Document category (after screening).
Description of the CED (at a minimumthe description includes the originallanguage; number of pages; type ofdocument such as map, letter, photo­graph, and so forth; and the enemy's identification number for the CED, if available).

Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.

O Remarks (other information that canassist the unit in identifying the CEDto include processing codes. These areset up by local SOP to denote all actions taken with the document while at the element, including SALUTEreports, translations, reproductions, or return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken).
Accountability for the CED should beestablished at each echelon once the actions described above have been accomplished.

0011N3Lilf1300 1:131ffi1dif3


Technical Documents
A technical document (TECHDOC) is a document that pertains to equipment of any type. A captured TECHDOC should beevacuated with the equipment with which itwas captured. If this is not possible, a cover sheet should be attached, with the word "TECHDOC" written in large letters across the top. The capture data is listed the same as other CEDs, and the TECHDOC cover
A h At A hnulti enntnin A rintnilpel riegerintinn
of the equipment captured with the docu­ment. If possible, photographs of theequipment should be taken, including ameasurement guide, and evacuated with the TECHDOC.
Communications and

CEDs containing communications orcryptographic information are handled assecret material and are evacuated through secure channels to the technical control and analysis element (TCAE).
As incoming CEDs are accounted for, the exploitation phase for intelligence informa­tion begins. Exploitation includes-
CED screening to determine potentialintelligence value.

Extracting pertinent information fromthe CED.

Reporting the extracted information.

CEDs are processed and exploited as soonas possible within the constraints of theunit's mission. The main mission of some units is the exploitation of human sourcesrather than the translation of CEDs; there­fore, manpower constraints may limit thetime that can be devoted to translation. However, the translation of CEDs is neces­sary at any echelon where interrogatorsand translators are assigned. It is impor­tant, therefore, that interrogation elements

possess qualified personnel to provide thetranslation support required. Intelligenceunits ensure that there is no delay in the exploitation of CEDs. Qualified personnel or document copying facilities should be available to handle CEDs, and personnel should be available to exploit the volume ortype of documents concerned. If not, the documents are forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon. Copying avail­ability is determined by the echelon in ques­tion, as well as mission and mobility considerations.
Document exploitation begins when per­sonnel are available for document exploita­tion operations. CEDs are screened forinformation of immediate intelligence inter­est; and as each document is screened, it is assigned one of the four following categorydesignations. The category assigned deter­mines the document's priority for exploita­tion and evacuation.
Document Categories
Category A. Category A documents con­tain SALUTE-reportable information, are time sensitive, contain significant intelli­gence information, and may be critical tothe successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. Significant intelligence topics include the enemy's OB, new weap­ons or equipment on the battlefield, and may contain information that indicates a significant change in the enemy's capabili­ties or intentions. When a document is iden­tified as category A, the document examiner immediately ceases screening operationsand submits a SALUTE report of the criti­cal information from the document. The
examiner then resumes screening
Category B. Category B documents con­tain information pertaining to enemy cryp­tographic or communications systems.Once a document is identified as categoryB, it is considered to be classified secret. This is done to limit the number of peoplehaving knowledge of either the capture or its contents. A category B document maycontain SALUTE-reportable information,thereby requiring immediate exploitation.


In every case, category B documents will betransferred through secure channels to the TCAE as soon as possible.
Category C. Category C documents con­
tain no SALUTE-reportable or time­
sensitive information but do contain infor­
mation that is of general intelligence value
that does not indicate significant changes
in the enemy's capabilities or intentions. A
category C document may be of interest or
of value to other agencies. When identified
as category C, it requires exploitation,
regardless of the content.
Category D. Category D documents
appear to contain only information that is
of no intelligence value. Documents are not
identified as category D until after a
thorough examination by document trans­
lation specialists at the highest command
interested. This is accomplished at EAC.
Category D documents are to be disposed of
as directed by the appropriate authority.
Special Document Handling

Technical Documents. TECHDOCs, con­
taining information associated with specific
items of enemy equipment, are given special
handling to expedite their exploitation and
evacuation. TECHDOCs are handled as
category A CEDs until screened by techni­
cal intelligence personnel. Generally,
TECHDOCs accompany the captured
equipment until the intelligence exploita-. tion is completed. TECHDOCs include
maintenance handbooks, operational manu­
als, and drawings.
Air Force-Related Documents. Docu­ments of any category that are capturedfrom crashed enemy aircraft, particularly if they are related to enemy antiaircraftdefense or enemy air control and reportingsystems, are transmitted to the nearest AirForce headquarters without delay.
Maps and Charts of Enemy Forces.
Captured maps and charts, containing anyoperational graphics, are evacuated imme­diately to the supporting all-source analysiscenter. Captured maps and charts without graphics may be transmitted to the topo­graphical intelligence section attached to corps.
Navy-Related Documents. Documents taken from ships (code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, and so forth) are forwarded without delay tothe nearest Navy headquarters.
Recording Document Category

The category assigned to each CED is recorded as part of the captured document log entry for that CED. The entry includes abrief description of the CED. This description-
Identifies the CED by type (sound recording, written material, painting,engraving, imagery, and so forth).

Identifies the language used in the

Specifies the physical construction ofthe CED (typed, printed, handwritten,tape cassette, photographs, film, andso forth).

Gives some indication of the size
(number of pages, rolls of film,
cassette, and so forth).

Screening at Higher Echelons

CEDs can be recategorized during screen­ing conducted at higher echelons. Theinformation may have become outdated, orthe echelon currently exploiting the docu­ment may have different intelligencerequirements.

Once a CED has been screened, the docu­ment must be exploited. The translatormust be able to translate the document. For anyone else to gain benefit from the docu­ment translation, it must be clearly andaccurately written (typed or handwritten).Also, as part of interrogation duties, theinterrogator may have previously trans­lated a document by sight to help gain a source's cooperation.
Types of Translations

Full Translation. A full translation is one in which the entire document is translated. It is very manpower- and time-intensive,

especially for lengthy or technical docu­ments. It is unlikely that many full transla­tions will be performed at corps or below.Even when dealing with category A docu­ments, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document to gain the information it contains.
Extract Translation. An extract transla­tion is one in which only a portion of thedocument is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may decide that a few paragraphs in the middle of a600-page helicopter maintenance manual
merit translation and a full translation of the manual is not necessary. Therefore, hewould request an extract translation of theportion of the text in which he has an interest.
Summary Translation. A translator be­gins a summary translation by reading theentire document. The translator then sum­marizes the main points of information instead of rendering a full translation or anextract translation. This type of translationrequires that a translator have more analy­tical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the document against the time available in combat operations. A summary translationmay also be used by translators working in languages in which they have not been formally trained. For instance, a Russianlinguist may not be able to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarianlanguage document. However, he can proba­bly render a usable summary of the infor­mation it contains.
Translation Reports

Except for SALUTE reports, all informa­tion resulting from document exploitationactivities will be reported in a translationreport (see the following illustration for a sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports have been sub­mitted, the translator will prepare any required translation reports. CEDs that contain information of intelligence value that was not SALUTE reported are the sub­ject of translation reports. Translation reports are prepared on all category CCEDs and include portions of category A, TECHDOCs, and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported.

DATE: 231500ZAug85 TO: G2, V Corps

FROM: Team 1, IPW Section, REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (Armd), V Corps

2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten, mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school teachers and elderly people working In factories





CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP.




My dear Serezhen'ka: It has been a long time since I received a letter from you. How are and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me alot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, des­pite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. I would be more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can. Your KATHY.

Priorities. The priority for the preparation of translation reports is-
. Category A.
Category B.

Category C.

Format. A translation report should con­tain the following information:

Destination. The element to which the report will be forwarded.

O Originator. The element which pre­pared the report.

Date of preparation.

Report number as designated by local SOP.

• Document number taken from the cap­tured document tag.
O Document description including number of pages, type of document, and enemy identification number.
ID Original language of the CED.
. DTG document was received at the element preparing the report.
o DTG document was captured.
O Place document was captured.

Circumstances under which the docu­ment was captured.

O Identity of capturing unit.

Rank and full name of the translator.

Remarks for clarification or explana­tion, including the identification of the portions of the document translated in an extract translation.

O Classification and downgrading instructions, according to AR 380-5.
Dissemination and Records

Recording in Captured Document Log.
The translator records each exploitation step taken in the captured document log. Transmission of SALUTE and translation reports is entered in the element's journal.
Reports Dissemination and Records.
At least two copies are prepared for each SALUTE and translation report. One copy is placed in the interrogation element's files. The other accompanies the CED when it is evacuated. When the CED cannot be fully exploited, a copy of the CED should be made and retained. The original CED isforwarded through evacuation channels. Even when copies of an unexploited CED cannot be made, the original CED is still forwarded through evacuation channels without delay.
For friendly forces to benefit from a docu­ment to the greatest extent possible, send CEDs to the element most qualified to exploit them as quickly as possible. Infor­mation gained from a CED is frequently time sensitive. If a document is not sent to the element most capable of exploiting it, time will be lost. Any time lost in exploiting the document may reduce or even negate the value of the information. The CED evacuation procedures in use at any ele­ment must ensure that documents are shipped to their proper destinations in a timely manner.

CEDs are normally evacuated from echelon to echelon through the intelligence organizational chain. The capturing unitevacuates the CEDs to the first intelligence section, usually the battalion S2. The bat­talion evacuates them to brigade, brigade to division, division to corps, and then, to EAC. Depending on the type of documents they may, then, be evacuated to the National Center for Document Exploitation. Take care to protect the document from weather, soil, and wear. Interrogators and translators can exploit CEDs at every echelon and will make an attempt to exploit CEDs within their expertise and technical support constraints.

Some CEDs are evacuated to different elements based upon the information con-tained and the type of document concerned.

Direct evacuation to an element outside the chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon. The previous guidelines, discussed in evacuation procedures, are fol­lowed when dealing with documents requir­ing special handling.

When transportation assets are limited, CEDs are evacuated according to priority. The priority is the category assigned to the CED. All category A CEDs will be evacu­ated first, TECHDOCs will be considered category A CEDs until examined by the captured material exploitation center (CMEC), followed in order by categories B, C, and D.
Category B documents are evacuated to the TCAE, which maintains a signals intel­ligence (SIGINT) and EW data base. Cate­gory B documents, pertaining to communi­cations equipment, are duplicated if possible, and the duplicate documents are sent to the CMEC.
CEDs that are not evacuated are held until the next transportation arrives. These remaining CEDs are combined with anyother CEDs of the same category that have arrived and have been processed in the meantime. When determining evacuation priorities, interrogators consider all CEDs that are ready for evacuation. Lower pri­ority CEDs, no matter how old, are never evacuated ahead of those with higher pri­ority. A package of documents contains documents of only one category. All unscreened CEDs are handled as category C documents, but they are not packaged with screened category C documents. CEDs in a single package must have the samedestination.

When CEDs are evacuated from any eche­lon, a document transmittal is used (see the following illustration for a sample CED transmittal). A separate document trans­mittal is prepared for each group of CEDs to be evacuated. When second copies of category B CEDs are being sent to a techni­cal intelligence element, a separate docu­ment transmittal is required. The transmit­tal identification number is recorded in the captured document log as part of the entry for each CED. The exact format for a docu-ment transmittal is a matter of local SOP, ---but it should contain the information listed below:
C The identity of the element to which
the CEDs are to be evacuated.

The identity of the unit forwarding the

Whether or not the CEDs in the pack­age have been screened and the screen­ing category. (If not screened, NA is circled.)

The identification number of the docu­ment transmittal.

O A list of the document serial numbers
of the CEDs in the package.





All CEDs being evacuated must be accompanied with the appropriate-
TECHDOC cover sheet.

SECRET cover sheet on category B

Translation reports and hard-copy SALUTE reports accompanying trans­lated documents.

Captured document tags.

The preparations for further CED evacua­tion begin with verifying the document serial numbers by comparing the entry in the captured document log with the entry on the captured document tag attached to each CED. Once all CEDs are present, copies of all reports derived from the CEDs are assembled. A copy of all SALUTE and translation reports is placed with the CEDs that were the sources of those reports. When­ever possible, all category B CEDs and their captured document tags should be copied.
CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening code. Personnel must be careful when sorting the CEDs to ensure that no CED is separated from its asso­ciated documents. These large groupings can then be broken down into smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that were-
Captured by the same unit.

Captured in the same place.

Captured on the same day at the same time.

Received at the interrogation element at the same time.


The documents captured with a sourceplay a very important role in the interroga-tion process and can contain reportable

information the same as with a CED
obtained on the battlefield. During source
screening operations, for instance, docu­
ments can indicate that a specific source
may have information pertaining to the commander's intelligence requirements. The interrogator uses various pieces of
information in forming his interrogationplan. Documents captured with the source
may provide the key to the approach neces­
sary to gain the source's cooperation.
Guidelines for the disposition of thesource's documents and valuables are set by international agreement and discussed inmore detail in AR 190-8 and FM 19-40. Additionally, one way the source's trust andcontinued cooperation can be gained is through fair and equitable handling of hispersonal possessions. In some instances,such treatment can make it more likely thatthe source will cooperate during interroga­tion questioning. Furthermore, fair treat­ment by the interrogator and the holdingarea personnel can ease tensions in the con­finement facility.

The disposition of documents captured with a source is normally a function of the military police and other holding area per­sonnel. Because of their language capabili­ties, the interrogators at the compound willprobably be required to provide assistanceand guidance. The military police sign for all documents taken from sources; and to ensure proper handling and most expedi­tious disposition of these documents, theinterrogation element should sign for anydocuments captured with a source. Whenthe interrogation element assumes controlof documents, they process them accordingto established procedures.
When documents are captured with a source, the immediate reaction is to take

them away from him so that he cannot de­stroy them. In general, this is good, but there is one major exception. Under no cir­cumstances is a source's identification card to be taken from him.
When documents are taken from a source, it is necessary to ensure the source from whom they were taken can be identified. The easiest way to accomplish this is with the source's captive tag (see standardized captive tag in Appendix D). The bottom portion of the tag is designed to be used for marking equipment or documents. Three possible actions may be taken with docu­ments captured with a source. The docu­ments may be confiscated, impounded, orreturned to the source.
Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention of returning them. Official documents, except identifica­tion documents, are confiscated and appro­priately evacuated. The intelligence value of the document should be weighed against the document's support in the interrogation of the source. Category A documents require exploitation and should be copied. One copy should be translated and exploited sepa­rately, and the other copy should be evacu­ated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision should be made on whether to evacuate the document with the source or evacuate it separately. Cate­gory B CEDs should be evacuated to the TCAE for appropriate exploitation. Cate­gory C official documents can best be usedin the interrogation of the source. Therefore, these CEDs and category D official docu­ments should be evacuated with the source.
Impounded CEDs are taken away with the intention of returning them at a later time. When a document is impounded, the source must be given a receipt. The receipt must contain a list of the items impounded and the legible name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. All personal
effects, including monies and other valu­ables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of personal effects that have been impounded will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appen­dix B). Also, DA Form 1132 will be com­pleted and signed by the officer in charge or authorized representative. A copy will beprovided the source. Further procedures forthe handling of personal effects are nro­vided in AR 190-8.
Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and information of interest, and immediately given back to the source. Personal docu­ments belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination in accor­dance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of such papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned to the source.
In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible that documents captured withsources will not be handled expediously. Final disposition of these documents maynot he made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps holding area. Some documents captured with a source will aidin the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, shouldhe copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately. This makes it particularly important for the cap­turing unit to correctly identify the docu­ments captured with the source. This ismore easily done when the interrogation

element rather than the military police ele­ment signs for the documents captured with sources.

For more efficient exploitation of CEDsand sources, documents captured with a source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significancemay be evacuated ahead of the source, but areproduction should be made and kept withthe source. If reproduction is not possible,the captured document tags should beannotated as to where the document was sent. Significant documents such as cate­gory A documents and TECHDOCs, Cate­gory B documents, maps, charts, and AirForce- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.
The evacuation of documents capturedwith a source follows the same account­ability procedures as with documents foundon the battlefield. The capturing unit pre­pares a captive tag listing details pertain­ing to the source and the place and circum­stances of capture. The bottom portion isused to list documents captured with the source.
Documents captured with a source aresubject to the same screening and exploita­tion procedures as those found on the bat­tlefield. These documents are categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A docu­ments have SALUTE reportable informa­tion extracted and are copied, if possible. Acopy can then be used to aid in the exploita­tion of the source, and the other copy is sentforward for prompt exploitation and trans­lation. Category B documents should betreated as secret and evacuated to the TCAE. Category C documents are exploited.A category C document may also requirecopying and evacuation. Official documentsshould be evacuated through document evacuation channels. If they would aid inthe interrogation of a source, personaldocuments may require similar copying.