Army Field Manual No. 3-06: FM 3-06 Urban Operations

Army Field Manual No. 3-06: FM 3-06 Urban Operations. Provides the Army soldier with guidance and understanding of the urban warfare environment and the proper manner to conduct themselves and participate in operations.

Sunday, June 1, 2003
Thursday, December 30, 2004

FM 3-06 Table of Contents Page 1 of 3
*FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)
Field Manual HEADQUARTERS No. 3-06 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 1 June 2003
FM 3-06

The Prospect of Urban Operations
Urban Perspective
Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare
Modern Army Urban Operations

A Complex Environment
Urban Terrain
Urban Society
Urban Infrastructure

Weapons of Mass Destruction
Threat Operational Principles
Urban Threat Tactics
Negative Effects ofUrbanization

Necessity of Urban Operations
Characteristics of Major Urban Operations

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Integration into Land Operations
Urban Operational Framework
Fundamentals of Urban Operations
General Effects on Operations

Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations
Characteristics of Urban Offensive Operations
Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization
Forms and Types of Urban Offense
Urban Offensive Considerations

Purpose of Urban Defensive Operations
Characteristics of Urban Defensive Operations
Urban Defensive Operations and Battlefield Organization
Types of Urban Defense
Urban Defensive Considerations

Purpose of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations Characteristics of Urban Stability_Operations and Support Operations Urban Stability Operations, Support Operations, and Battlefield Organization Types and Forms of Stability Operations and Support Operations Considerations of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations
Urban CSS Characteristics
Logistics Preparation of the Theater
CSS Functions
General Engineer Support
Civil-Military Operations


Overall Strategic Situation
Israeli Military Position
PLO Military Position
Role of Civilians
Information Operations
Conduct of the Urban Operations

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Urbanization of IPB
Significant Characteristics
Threat Considerations
Urban IPB Tools and Products

General Situation
Somali Operations

Appendix D JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL. URBAN OPERATIONS Purpose Service Urban Capabilities Urban Functional Combatant Command Capabilities Multinational Considerations

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 90-10, 15 August 1979.

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FM 3-06 Cover Page 1 of 2
FM 3-06 AFM 90-10)


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JUNE 2003

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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FM 3-06 List of Figures Page 1 of 3
1-1 Full Spectrum Urban Operations 1-2 UO and the Army Imperatives 2-1 Keys to Understanding the Urban Environment 2-2 The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield 2-3 Broad Urban Patterns 7-4 Basic Internal Street Patterns 2-5 An Urban Model
Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Their Industrial or Commercial Uses 2-7 Key Aspects of the Urban Society 2-8 Urban Areas by Population Size 279 Simplified Analysis of Urban Society 2-
UO—Society Cycle of Effects
Urban Infrastructure
11 3-1 Threat Operational Principles 3-2 Urban Threat Tactics 3-3 Favored Threat Weapons 3-4 Negative Effects of Urbanization 3-5 Worldwide Population Projections 4-1 Risk Management and the Risks Associated with Urban Operations 4-2 Organization of Historic Joint Urban Operations 4-3 Urban ISR Considerations 4-4 IO Elements and Related Activities 4-5 Public Affairs Principles 5-1 The Urban Operational Framework and Battle Command
5-2 Urban Isolation
5-3 Panama
5-4 The Fundamentals of Urban Operations
5-5 Battlefield Operating Systems
5-6 Urban Maneuver Challenges and Means to Overcome Them
5-7 Urban Effects on Fire Support Systems
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FM 3-06 List of Figures
5-9 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 6-7 6-8 6-9 6-
18 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 81
8-2 8-3 9-1
Page 2 of 3
Methods to Overcome Urban Communications Challenges Compressed Tactical Factors Initial Attack in Brittany Subsequent Disposition of Forces in Brittany Envelopment Isolates an Urban Area Turning Movement Infiltration Penetration Frontal Attack Metz Envelopment Metz Final Assault
Required Urban Reconnaissance Capabilities
Shaping Through Isolation
Critical Sensor-to-Shooter Links
Reactions to Isolation
Initial Attack to Isolate Hue
Subsequent Attack to Isolate Hue
Final Attack to Isolate Hue
Coordination of SOF and Conventional Capabilities
Inchon-Seoul Campaign, September 1950
An Urban Area Incorporated Into a Larger Mobile Defense German Attacks to Seize Stalingrad German Attacks to Seize Stalingad, September 1942 Soviet Attacks Trap German 6th Army Retrograde Through an Urban Area Characteristics of Stability Operations and Support Operations Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations Adaptability CSS Characteristics
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9-2 The Urban Environment and Essential Elements of Logistic Information
9-3 CSS Functions
9-4 General Principles of the Law of War
9-5 General Engineer Support
9-6 Civil Affairs Functional Skills
A-1 The City of Beirut
A-2 Initial Conduct of the Urban Operation
A-3 Israeli Probe of PLO Defenses
A-4 Initial Israeli Attack
A-5 Final Israeli Attack
B-1 The Steps of IPB
B-2 Relevance of Key Urban Environment Elements
B-3 Significant Urban Terrain Characteristics
B-4 Significant Urban Societal Characteristics
B-5 Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics
B-6 Continuum of Relative Interests
B-7 Urban IPB Tools and Products
C-1 Phases of US Involvement in Somalia
C-2 Map of Somalia
D-1 USAF E-8 JSTARS Platform
D-? USN MK45 Lightweight Gun System
D-3 USN MK V Special Operations Craft
D-4 USAF AC-130 Gunship


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FM 3-06 Historical Vignettes Page 1 of 1
Historical Vignettes

Rome: A Microcosm of Urban Warfare Seeing the Urban Area and Its. Parts Tempo Identifying Soldiers from Civilians Information and the Media Cultural and Religious Instability Food and Water Shortages Urban Insurgencies Crime and Criminal Organizations Applying the Urban Operational Framework: Panama — December 1989 Example of Simple Communications Innovation: Israel's Six Day War —
The 0_perational Context of Urban Operations: Brittany Ports — August to September 1944 Forms of Attack in the Urban Offense: Metz — 1944 Isolating the Urban Area: Hue City — January to February 1968 Creative Task Organization: Using Artillery in the Direct Fire Role Bold Operational Maneuver to Seize an Urban Area: Inchon and
S_ eoul, Korea — September 1950
Urban Defense in a Major Operation: Stalingrad — August 1942 to January 1943 Defensive Combat Power: Suez — October 1973 Assessment of Security and Force Protection: Belfast, Northern Ireland Support of and Coordination with Civilian Authorities: The 1992 Los Angeles
Riots Base Security: Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam — Tet 1968 Combat Stress: Chechnya — 1994 to 1996 Siege of Beirut: An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban Operations Analysis of an Urban Area's Underlying Terrain: Mitrovica, Kosovo Shifting Civilian Interests and Intent Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to
Support an. d Stability
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Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation will be distinct from any other—any other urban operation as well as similar types of operations in other environments. Each operation will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geo-political considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders are responsible to strike the proper balance between preparing for future challenges and maintaining the capability to respond to current threats.
This manual provides the analytical tools for evaluating an urban operation to determine if the operation is necessary for overall mission success. It also provides the means to understanding and determining the impacts of the urban environment on military operations and provides information on managing, taking advantage of, and mitigating the effects of those impacts as appropriate. As such, this manual demonstrates how to apply the doctrinal principles in FM 3-0 to this unique environment.
Chapter 1 introduces theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations that serve as the underlying basis for the rest of the manual. Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on operations. It is unlikely that Army forces will ever operate in a benign urban environment; therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the varied nature of potential urban threats. An understanding of the complexities of the urban environment and the nature of the enemy is essential to sound decisionmaking. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the potential costs of urban operations as well as the effects on each battlefield operating system that the commander and his staff consider early in their planning. These chapters also outline an urban operational framework and specific urban considerations that create the foundations necessary for successfully applying operational doctrine to an urban environment.
The second half of the manual (Chapters 6 – 9) discusses how urban operations
are conducted and resourced. Urban operations include major offensive and
defensive operations in urban environments as well as stability operations and
support operations ranging from peace operations and combatting terrorism to
domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. For the
different types of operations—offense, defense, stability, and support—the
purpose, characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed.
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However, commanders consider that most urban operations will involve some aspect of all four types of operations (although one may dominate) and plan accordingly.
This manual is intended for commanders and their staffs at the brigade through corps level. It addresses the range of operations (both violent and nonviolent) throughout the spectrum of conflict that Army units will execute in urban settings. However, users should also consult JP 3-06 for specific joint information. Additionally, users should be familiar with FM 3-06.11, TC 90-1, and urban operations chapters, appendices, or sections found in other infantry, armor, combined arms, and proponent field manuals for the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and appropriate proponent information necessary to conduct tactical urban operations at the brigade level and below.
Chapter 2 defines "city" according to a the population size. However, in historical vignettes and accounts, the term "city" is applied in its common usage without specific regard .to size to maintain conformity with most other historical reports.
In this manual, the term "threat" is applied broadly to include an enemy force (conventional or unconventional), an armed belligerent in a peace operation, antagonistic or unfriendly elements of the civilian population, or some other . hazardous condition in the urban environment that negatively influences mission accomplishment. The term "hostile" is used as a subset of the threat and denotes a particular element of the urban population (individual, group, or organization) or one or more opposing armed factions in a peacekeeping operation. Both an enemy and a hostile have the intent to exploit Army vulnerabilities and negatively affect the urban operation. A hostile, however, is not engaging Army forces in protracted combat operations.
The term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is replaced by urban operations (UO). MOUT is an acronym from FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urban Terrain that is superseded by this manual.
Otherwise, the glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-06 that have joint or Army definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
The manual attempts to incorporate historical vignettes into each chapter where the account supports the doctrinal line of reasoning. Two historical vignettes, however, were included as appendices (A and C) because of their longer lengths.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not
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FM 3-06 Preface Page 3 of 3
refer exclusively to men.
This publication contains copyrighted material.
The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommended changes directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD, Futures Development and Integration Center, 1 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.
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FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook Page 1 of 10
Chapter 1
Urban Outlook
1-The ambiguous nature of the operational environment
requires Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self­
aware leaders understand their operational environment, can
assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths
and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their
weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then
have the additional ability to recognize change in their
operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how
to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
FM 1
Given the prevalence of large cities throughout the world, Army forces, division size and
larger, will likely be required to conduct operations in and around large urban areas. These
operations will be in support of a joint force commander (JFC) conducting military
operations pursuant to United States (US) national security policy. This manual is designed
to facilitate the planning and conduct of the full range and spectrum of land operations in a
complex urban environment. Each urban environment and urban operation is unique;
prescribing specific doctrinal "solutions" for situations is impossible. Instead, this manual
provides a framework to commanders and their staffs for understanding the urban
environment, for analyzing and deciding whether urban operations (UO) are necessary or
feasible, and for applying operational doctrine to this complex environment. It also provides
historical vignettes to help develop a refined analytical perspective and some planning
points and tactics and techniques to assist in preparing for and conducting UO. Together,
this information provides a foundation for approaching major UO, which, combined with
other joint and Army doctrine, will help commanders and their staffs learn to adapt and
succeed in this challenging environment.

The Prospect of Urban Operations
Urban Perspective
Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare
Strategic Importance , of Urban Areas
US Army's Experience in Urban Operations
1-1. The world is in a period of massive urbanization. A trend of migration from
rural to urban areas is occurring throughout the globe. This trend is especially
evident in developing nations. Combined with the exponential growth of the 12/29/2004
FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook Page 2 of 10
global population in the last quarter century, this migration has created massive urban areas that hold the centers of population, government, and economics in their respective regions. In Western Europe, for example, over 50 percent of the land area is urbanized. Just over 30 years ago, only three urban areas in Asia contained at least eight million people. By 2015, estimates show that Asia will have 17 urban areas over ten million, and three of those will top 20 million residents. Almost half of today's population resides in urban areas. Trends also indicate that less developed nations have more centralized societies in a few urban areas. Developed nations spread their centralized societies in several urban areas. In many cases, rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructures, scarce resources, and a fragile economic base. Given the global population,. Army forces will likely conduct operations in and around urban areas—not as a matter of fate but as a deliberate choice linked to national objectives and strategy and at a time, place, and method of the commander's choosing.
Army Urban Operations
Army forces conduct UO either as one component of a larger operation or as a single operation focused totally on a specific urban environment. Major Army UO are often part of a joint and multinational effort requiring interagency and civil-military coordination that may include the full spectrum of Army operations. Commanders of Army major operations must determine if UO are essential to mission accomplishment. If so, commanders must carefully integrate the operations into campaign planning to support the operational objectives of the JFC.
Army leaders conducting UO must—

Assess the urban area to determine decisive points.

Shape the operation to set the conditions for success.

Precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area.

Then transition the urban area to the control of another agency or back to legitimate civilian control.

1-2. As a subset of all Army operations, UO are operations focused on an urban
environment. UO include the full range of Army operations—offensive, defensive,
stability, and support—that may be executed, either sequentially or
simultaneously, during the conduct of a single urban operation. Depending on the
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
civil considerations (METT-TC), urban operations may—or may not—be
conducted predominantly within the urban area (see Figure 1-1). Furthermore, UO
may be the sole mission of the commander or one of several tasks nested in a
larger operation. Regardless of the types of operations conducted or whether the
urban area is the single focus of the operation or only one component of a larger
operation, the complex urban environment significantly affects the overall conduct
of the mission.
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Political ObjeCtives and AETT- 7C Make All UO Urri que
yy .. ......... ......

..... •••••••••••••••••
Control of the
U than Area
Comte t Sersice Sipprel UO May 0:onlnue Under Type of adllan a,ntol °TIM Inan Area
UO are often full
spectrum and
therefore MDT
focused only on
urban combat

Duration of UO Can Be Pleasured in Days orTim e Years Depending on Factors of NETT. 7C
Figure 1-1. Full Spectrum Urban Operations
1-3. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders understand two important terms: urban area and urban environment. The first is a subset of the second. An urban area is a topographical complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature. Focusing on urban areas means concentrating on the physical aspects of the area and their effects on tactics, techniques, and procedures. The urban environment includes the physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships between its key components—the terrain (natural and man-made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure— as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems. Critical elements of the infrastructure may lie far beyond the area's physical confines. For example, the generating source providing power to the urban energy system is part of that system but may be located well outside of the urban area. Similarly, effects of the interaction between components of the infrastructure, located both inside and outside the urban area, extend well into smaller, neighboring urban areas and surrounding rural areas and often form their political, economic, and cultural focus. Understanding the total urban environment is essential to planning and conducting the full range of Army urban operations across the spectrum of conflict.
1-4. Urban areas always have been central to, or have significantly influenced,
military operations. One of the first urban-centered battles was the siege of Troy at
the beginning of Greek history. Moreover, much of the history of early Greece
revolved around wars between its city-states or with Persia and centered on the
conquest, siege, or blockade of cities. Five hundred years later, the Roman Empire
replaced Greece as the dominant world power although urban areas remained
central to Roman warfare. Even Rome's history can be viewed as a microcosm of 12/29/2004
FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook Page 4 of 10
urban warfare over the past two thousand years. Though military operations within
the physical confines of many of these historic urban areas were not the norm, the
focus of these operations was their conquest or control.
A Microcosm of Urban Warfare
During two millennia, Rome has been the center of at least 12 battles. The
Gauls lay siege to Rome first in 387 BC. That first siege lasted six months and
ended after the barbarians burnt much of the city. The surviving patrician
families paid a ransom for the withdrawal of Brennus' army. From 408 to 410
AD, the Goth leader, Alaric, successfully besieged Rome no less than three
times. The Byzantine General Belisarius captured Rome twice from the Goths
and withstood siege inside the city once between 536 and 549. Five hundred
years later in 1084, Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard captured medieval
Rome and sacked the city during a dispute between the Pope and the Holy
Roman Empire. Forces of the Holy Roman Empire again stormed and captured
the city to punish the Pope in 1527. During the Italian Revolution in 1849, a
French army supporting the Pope captured the city from the Italian
revolutionary army under Garibaldi. In 1944, the last military action took place
in and around Rome when the US Fifth Army captured the city from the
retreating German army. Rome's turbulent history—fought over ethnic and
religious differences, prestige, and military necessity—demonstrates the
importance of urban areas in warfare and the various causes and combatants
within this complex environment.
1-5. Although Rome last saw combat in 1944, urban areas have been no less prominent in warfare since that time. Beirut in Lebanon, Grozny in Chechnya, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been centers of conflict in the last 50 years. Urban areas, now more pervasive than ever before, will continue to be essential to successful operational and strategic warfighting. Today, armies cannot execute major military operations without the influence of surrounding urban environments (with the possible exception of the open desert).
1-6. Several reasons have attracted (and continue to attract) armies to combat in urban areas:

A military force chooses to position itself in an urban area to capitalize on the perceived advantages offered by the environment. In contrast, an opposing force, by analyzing the factors of the situation, determines that it must enter the urban area to attack and destroy its enemy (or devote essential combat power to their isolation).

The urban area's infrastructure, capabilities, or other resources have significant operational or strategic value.

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FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook

The urban area has significant symbolic importance.

The urban area's geographical location dominates a region or avenue of approach.

1-7. Russia's 1994 experience in Chechnya illustrates an increasingly important
motivation for conducting urban operations. The Chechen rebels, after failing to
engage Russian forces outside the city, chose to turn Grozny into the battlefield.
Leaders of the defeated Chechen conventional forces recognized that fighting in
the urban area provided them their best chance for success. The complexities of
urban combat and the perceived advantages of defending an urban area mitigated
their numerical and technological inferiority. The urban area provided the
Chechens protection from fires, resources, interior lines, and covered and
concealed-positions and movement. Given such advantages offered by the
environment, smaller or less-sophisticated military forces have similarly chosen to
fight in urban areas.
1-8. Such advantages of operating in an urban environment also prompt forces to conduct an urban operation to facilitate a larger campaign plan and decisive battle in another location. The urban operation can focus the enemy on the urban area and allow other forces to • conduct operations elsewhere. From a defensive perspective, an urban defense may gain time and space to reorganize forces in new defensive positions, to divert enemy forces from other critical tasks, or to prepare to conduct offensive operations. To some extent, these reasons motivated Soviet forces defending Leningrad and Stalingrad from the Germans in World War II. The stubborn defense permitted the Soviets to reorganize for later offensive operations. From an offensive perspective, an attack on an urban area may be a shaping operation used to divert resources from the decisive operation that will follow.
1-9. Armies also fight in an urban area to obtain some critical feature or resource in the area, such as a port facility. The desire to control an important seaport and access to the Persian Gulf largely motivated the Iranian and Iraqi struggle for Basra in the 1980s. Earlier, in 1944, British forces fought German units in Arnhem for control of the Rhine River Bridge. Other infrastructure of the urban environment may have operational or strategic significance and can compel military forces to attack or defend the area. As urban areas account for an increasing share of a country's national income, often generating over 50 percent of gross national product, the strategic implications for their control or influence become even greater.
1-10. Urban areas are often located on terrain that dominates a region or an avenue of approach. In these cases, offensive armies capture these areas to proceed with security to another objective. Conversely, defensive forces commonly defend the area to deny the area of operations. To illustrate, Cassino, Italy stood astride the critical highway approach up the Liri valley to Rome. The allies had to attack and capture the monastery to facilitate the allied offensive north. Cassino's location made bypassing virtually impossible. Likewise, Israeli army urban operations in Beirut were (and have continued to be) a result of its strategic location near the Israeli security zone; various Arab insurgent and terrorist groups used Beirut as a
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base for attacks against Israel. Beirut evolved as the major base of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, a major opponent of Israel. Beirut's location made it a
security threat to Israel and thus compelled several major Israeli operations in the
urban area (see Appendix A).
1-11. Another reason for engaging in urban operations is the symbolic—historical, cultural, political, and even economic—importance of many urban areas. Often, capital cities—such as Rome, Paris, Seoul, and Berlin—are identified as the strategic centers of gravity of their respective nations. Possessing or threatening these urban areas may impact directly on the outcome of a conflict. The objective of Germany's wars with France in 1870 and 1914 was ultimately Paris. Napoleon's 1812 campaign had as its objective Moscow, as did Hitler's 1941 offensive into Russia. The objective of the Soviet 1945 offensive was Berlin, and the North Vietnamese 1975 offensive had as its objective the South's capital of Saigon. Still, history also reminds us that commanders assess the sustainability and decisiveness of operations directed toward these "prestige" objectives. For example, in 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow but had to evacuate it within 30 days. He lacked supplies and shelter, failed to destroy the Russian Army, and failed to defeat the political will of the Czar and the people. Similarly, the North Korean occupation of Seoul during the Korean War was equally indecisive.
1-12. The US Army has a varied history of conducting operations to attack or
defend larger urban areas. The American Revolution saw the Army conduct
several urban operations. These operations included the unsuccessful defense of
New York, the successful attack on Trenton, and the decisive siege and attack on
British forces at Yorktown. The Mexican War also had a successful assault on the
fortified city of Monterey and the decisive siege of Mexico City. During the
American Civil War, the armies, in the tradition of Napoleonic maneuver warfare,
avoided urban areas and fought in the open. However, the opposing armies
frequently made urban areas their objective because of their importance as
railheads. Success in the siege of several key urban areas—Vicksburg, Atlanta,
and Petersburg—contributed to the Northern victory.
1-13. Following the Civil War, the US Army faced no large-scale urban combat for several generations. The Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and even World War I did not require the Army to fight in large urban areas. Between the Civil War and World War II, the US Army fought in several urban areas worldwide supporting US commitments. These limited urban combat operations were small but essential parts of what were urban stability operations. From 1900 to 1901, the Army provided public security for a sector of Peking, China of around 50,000 inhabitants. The Army conducted UO and, in the course of the operation, the 9th US Infantry suffered 20-percent casualties while fighting in Tientsin. Punitive expeditions to places such as Siberia, Cuba, Philippines, Central America, and Mexico put the Army in various urban situations that required using military power, notably, the occupation and security of Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914. In the context of these smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), UO became a staple of US Army employment. 12/29/2004
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1-14. World War II forced the Army to grapple with the issues of large-scale urban
combat almost immediately. In his 1941 defense of the Philippines, General
MacArthur examined how to defend Manila. Manila represented a large, modern,
friendly urban area, which was the capital city of a close US ally. Defending the
urban area posed numerous challenges. Ultimately General MacArthur determined
that he could best conduct its defense outside the city by defeating the enemy
forces in combat on the invasion beaches or shortly after they landed. When
Japanese forces defeated MacArthur's Philippine Army in a series of engagements,
MacArthur had to decide how best to protect the friendly populace of Manila. He
had two choices: abandoning the city or waging a costly defense that would likely
result in the city's destruction, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and no
operational advantage. He had little choice but to declare Manila an open city and
move his forces to Bataan to wage an operational defense in the vain hope that a
counteroffensive could relieve his isolated force. On 2 January 1942, Japanese
forces entered Manila unopposed.
1-15. Had General MacArthur decided to defend Manila, his forces would have found scant doctrine in the Army regarding how to fight in an urban area. Doctrine for urban operations did not appear until early 1944, when faced with the possibility of fighting through the larger urban areas of Western Europe. At his time the US Army published FM 31-50, Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns. This manual had the first formal discussion of how the Army viewed urban combat. It was based on the Army's limited experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the study of German and Soviet experiences on the Eastern front.
1-16. FM 31-50 emphasized a deliberate pace, individual and small unit initiative,
the liberal use of direct and indirect firepower, and decentralized command and
execution. It focused on the urban area (as opposed to the environment); however,
it did include policies towards the noncombatants. The manual was also focused at
the regimental combat team level. Complementing the doctrine of FM 31-50 was
the 1944 operations manual, FM 100-5. This latter manual emphasized the
importance of combined arms actions and the need for extensive reconnaissance of
prepared and defended cities. The Army successfully implemented this doctrine in
several major instances of urban combat, most notably the capture of the first
German city, Aachen, and hundreds of small-scale urban assaults on cities, towns,
and villages across France, the Benelux, and Germany. Army forces also
successfully employed this urban combat doctrine during the liberation of Manila
in 1945.
1-17. The legacy of this era of Army operations was an effective tactical solution
to urban offensive combat: isolate the urban area, seize a foothold, and expand the
foothold block by block until occupying the entire urban area and destroying the
enemy. The doctrine's emphasis on firepower kept friendly casualties to a
minimum. Unfortunately, when enemy forces stoutly defended the urban area, the
emphasis on firepower resulted in its virtual destruction and high casualties among
1-18. The doctrinal approach honed in World War II remained the accepted Army approach to urban combat to the century's end. The last successful implementation
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occurred when liberating Seoul during the Korean War. The Vietnam conflict did not offer the Army opportunities or the requirement to practice urban combat or test and refine doctrine on a large scale. The largest urban battle, Hue, was a chaotic tactical battle that validated most of the historical lessons of urban combat without generating any new doctrinal insights for large-scale urban warfare.
1-19. From the mid-1950s through the 1990s, the Army conducted UO in the United States in support of civil authorities during civil unrest and anti-Vietnam protests. Some operations involved numerous active and reserve component forces engaged in restoring public order. The Detroit riots of 1967 and the Los Angeles riots of 1992 required the commitments of active and National Guard units. In 1968, the Army deployed over 35,000 troops to Washington D.C., Chicago, and
Baltimore following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
1-20. In the 1970s and 1980s, Army doctrine predominantly focused on urban areas and successfully fighting a conventional ground war against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The 1979 FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), described how to conduct urban operations against Soviet forces in Germany. Its concepts were never tested other than in simulation, and its approach to urban combat was not substantially different from that practiced by the Army since World War II. Despite previous doctrine's admonition to avoid cities, the Army has had to fight in them in diverse circumstances.
1-21. Modern urban operations span the full range of possible applications of
military power. At the high end of the spectrum of conflict is major theater war
(MTW) dominated by offensive and defensive operations that, when undertaken,
will commonly include urban operations. At the lowest level are a multitude of
urban peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. These activities foster and
strengthen alliances and coalitions as well as deter aggression on the part of
potential threats. At mid-level between MTW and PME are SSC urban operations.
As a result of being mid-range, any type of operation may potentially dominate an
SSC; however, the various urban stability operations form the majority. At higher
echelons, these separations are often viewed as levels of intensity. For the tactical
units conducting urban operations, these divisions appear indistinct, as the
intensity is often high despite where the operation falls within the level of conflict.
1-22. While UO in a MTW can encompass the full range of Army operations, the
offense and defense will be central and decisive to success. Although mindful of
collateral damage and noncombatants, urban operations in a MTW (compared to
urban operations in SSCs or as part of PME activities) will be the least constrained
because vital national interests will be at stake. UO in a MTW, therefore, will
require a significant investment of resources of all types. Specialized units such as
psychological operations, civil affairs, and other special operations forces (SOF)
will likely be in high demand. UO in a MTW will require an abundance of 12/29/2004 FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook Page 9 of 10
infantry and may require significant casualty replacements and medical support. Logistics to support the distinctive urban environment includes large amounts of lethal and nonlethal specialty munitions, such as smoke, precision field artillery rounds, demolitions, and hand grenades.
1-23. Of potential urban scenarios confronting the future Army, urban offensive and defensive operations in an MTW are the most dangerous and challenging. They will take one of two principal forms: fluid or siege. In a fluid urban combat operation, both sides may contend for position and advantage in the urban battlespace. The attacker will seek to quickly seize decisive points before the enemy is able to establish a cohesive defense. This will likely require the attacker to bypass enemy defensive positions whose occupation or reduction are not critical to mission success. Conversely, the defender may use interior lines to shift forces in a fluid defense. In a siege, one side clearly has the initiative as the attacker, and the other side has the advantages of the defense. A siege situation can develop as a result of an initial fluid urban battle, or it may be a function of previous military operations that occurred outside the urban area. The Army doctrine's emphasis on initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility generally supports the fluid form of urban combat; however, commanders also understand that the factors of METT-TC may support a longer-term, siege approach.
1-24. SSCs encompass a wide range of military operations that fall between MTW and PME and frequently involve urban operations. SSCs are conducted to facilitate diplomacy and support political initiatives, protect American lives and interests, and disrupt illegal activities. Joint task forces (JTFs) typically conduct SSCs although one service may provide the bulk of the force. During these urban contingencies, resources are often more limited and the restraints on applying combat power are greater as the need to maintain legitimacy will grow in importance. Typically, Army forces will need the assistance of multinational partners, other agencies, local noncombatants, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to successfully complete the mission.
1-25. UO, at the lowest level of conflict, may also take many forms. They serve to
strengthen alliances and coalitions, discourage arms races, combat terrorism, and
generally reduce the potential for instability and conflict. Combat in PME
activities is not the norm. They are least likely to involve the use of force (when
necessary, nonlethal is preferred). The presence of Army forces performing PME
activities in foreign urban areas provides a visible sign of US commitment to
peace and stability in that region. In many of these lower-intensity UO, Army
forces often support other agencies. These other agencies actually plan and lead
the operation. Army forces provide military capabilities (to include organization
and leadership), manpower, equipment, and other resources not readily available.
As with UO in SSCs, proactive and aggressive interaction and coordination with
multinational partners, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the
urban populace will be vital to success.
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FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook
1-26. To operate successfully in a complex urban environment requires rigorous,
realistic UO training. Training is conducted by the complete combined arms team
and covers the full range of Army operations. It also replicates-

The psychological impact of intense, close combat against a well-trained enemy.

The effects of noncombatants in close proximity to Army forces.

The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an urban area.

It recognizes the constraints of collateral damage and, therefore, emphasizes the development of flexible, effective, and understandable rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE help preclude soldiers from randomly using deadly force while allowing them sufficient latitude to accomplish the mission and defend themselves. Training in ROE also includes significant and periodic changes that test and develop flexibility in and adaptability to a fluid environment. Additionally, force preparedness mandates integrating simulations, exercises at urban training sites, and the actual use of urban terrain into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training. Concurrent training extends from the individual soldier to the joint level. Additionally, preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in regards to urban multinational and interagency operations.
1-27. Realistic UO training (as well as the conduct of real world operations) has the added benefit of identifying operational requirements and resultant changes necessary in our doctrine, organizations, materiel design, leadership, and soldier support (see Figure 1-2). While technology (material) and organizational changes are critical, soldiers remain the decisive Figure 1-2 U0 and the Army Imperatives means for success. The technology and organizational changes will be a critical enabler to achieve the agile, simultaneous, and precise lethality required in urban operations. In the future, technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to urban operations. Still, competent leaders and well-trained and disciplined soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to succeed in this complex, multidimensional, and noncontiguous urban environment.
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FM 3-06, Chapter 2, Urban Environment Page 1 of 27
Chapter 2
Urban Environment
3From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population.
FM 3-0
Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment confronts
Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found elsewhere. Its distinct
characteristics result from an intricate topography and high population density. The
topography's complexity stems from the man-made features and supporting infrastructure
superimposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds, thousands, or millions of civilians may be
near or intermingled with soldiers—friendly and enemy. This second factor, and the human
dimension it represents, is potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders
and their staffs to understand and evaluate. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) process remains unaffected by urban areas (see FM 34-130 and Appendix B); this
chapter provides information essential to the conduct of the IPB for an urban environment.

Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is distinct and will
react to and affect the presence and operations of Army forces differently. A tactical
technique effective in one area may not be effective in another area due to physical
differences, such as street patterns or the type of building construction. An Army policy
popular with one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in another due to diverse
cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, but they increase the complexity for
Army forces operating in urban areas. These difficulties range from conventional military
forces to disease and starvation (see Chapter 3) to a pervasive media—often acutely present
in intricate combinations. Thus, commanders at all levels make extraordinary efforts to
assess and understand their particular urban environment to plan, prepare for, and execute
effective urban operations (UO).

A Cycle of EffectsA Complex Environment Urban InfrastructureUrban Terrain InterdependenceMultidimensional Battlefield Separate Parts of a WholeBroad Urban Patterns Structures and People
Leser Street Patterns
Impact on Future OperationsAn Urban Model Resource IntensiveUrban Society Communications and Information
Potential Center of Gravity
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General Population Size Transportation andDistribution
Group Size,Location, and Composition Energy Leadership and Organization Economics and Commerce Interests and Actions Administration and Human Services Interaction, Influence, or Control
2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate, availab;e building materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not only among urban areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural and man-made features in urban areas present commanders with some of the most difficult terrain in which to conduct military operations.
2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are identical. The sprawl of Los Angeles, for example, bears little physical resemblance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most significantly affect each area's uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the terrain, its potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be determined with some degree of certainty. However, the human dimension is much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its effects on military operations. Like any environment,
the side that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban environment
has the best chance of success.
2-3. Whether a large metropolis or a
small village, each urban environment
has an identifiable system of
components that constantly change and
interact. This "system of systems"
consists of the terrain, the society, and the infrastructure that links the two (see Figure 2-1). (These categories highlight the key aspects to understanding the
Figure 2-1. Keys to Understanding
urban environment and will be used
the Urban Environment
throughout the manual; however, the civil-military operations (CMO) discussion in Chapter 9 provides an alternate method for categorizing and assessing the effects of civil considerations in any operational environment.)
2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories but rather overlapping and interdependent. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along with the other factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support available, time, and civil considerations-
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FM 3-06, Chapter 2, Urban Environment Page 3 of 27

Contributes to commanders' situational understanding.

Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements.

Allows them to develop courses of action that apply appropriate resources against decisive points.

2-5. In stability operations and support operations, this understanding allows commanders to engage and dominate the decisive points critical to maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment. Although each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, commanders often "step back" and visualize each system, the complex urban environment, and their area of operations (AO). This "systems thinking" aids commanders in uncovering key relationships and intersections that can help reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points.
2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest extent possible, commanders carefully integrate and employ special operations forces (SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units—and a myriad of other human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and regional, language, and cultural experts. The societal aspects and integrating infrastructure will challenge commanders' assessment and understanding. These aspects will also require greater dependence on nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for their information, knowledge, and expertise. This last consideration requires commanders to develop effective techniques and procedures for coordinating and interacting with these agencies.
2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however, requires comprehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and man-made features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis considers both. Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns, forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine make it difficult to describe a "typical" urban area. However, these elements provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area. Furthermore, man-made features significantly affect military systems and soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban operations are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on battlefield operating systems (BOS) (see Chapters _.5 and 9) and the range of operations (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8) are interwoven throughout the manual.
2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior,
exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and
vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on a map by the surrounding 12/29/2004 FM 3-06, Chapter 2, Urban Environment . Page 4 of 27
countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban battlespace is many times that of a similarly sized portion of natural terrain. The sheer volume and density created by urban geometry can make UO resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.
2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can radically alter the physical character of the urban terrain in ways not experienced in other environments. They may cause (either intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires or the loss of electricity. A power outage can cause flooding (especially in subsurface areas) by shutting down pumping stations. Entire buildings may be destroyed, eliminating reference points and leaving large piles of rubble. Additionally, buildings and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can still be effective obstacles and possible booby traps. Their weakened construction and unstable structure increase the risk of injury to soldiers and civilians moving within them. (Engineers often determine whether the buildings can support occupation by Army forces or civilians.) The likely presence of toxic industrial materials (TIM) can create additional obstacles.
2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth, breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: airspace and surface. In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include supersurface and subsurface areas (see Figure 2-2). Although spatially separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, line of communications (LOC), and engagement area.
Figure 2-2. The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield DODD0A-011686
2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban
physical environment. Commanders consider activities that occur outside
buildings and subterranean areas (the external space) as well as the activities that
occur unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the internal space). The
internal space further challenges command, control, and intelligence collection
activities and increases the combat power required to conduct UO. Commanders
develop methods to help themselves, their staffs, and their subordinate
commanders and staffs to represent and visualize the multiple dimensions. Such .in/3 -06/chap2.htm.12/29/2004