Army Field Manual No. 3-06: FM 3-06 Urban Operations

<p>Field Manual for urban operations. Overview of offensive &amp; defensive operations in urban areas and stability &amp; support ops (i.e. peacekeeping ops &amp; humanitarian assistance support). Information is strategic &amp; tactical in nature; no information relevant to POWs or torture.</p>

Doc_type: 
Other
Doc_date: 
Sunday, June 1, 2003
Doc_rel_date: 
Thursday, December 30, 2004
Doc_text: 

Page 1 of 3 FM 3-06 Table of Contents *FM 3-06 (FM 90-10) HEADQUARTERS Field Manuall DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 3-06l Washington, DC, 1 June 2003 Contents COVER FIGURES HISTORICAL VIGNETTES PREFACE Chapter 1 URBAN OUTLOOK The Prospect of Urban Operations Urban Perspective Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare Modern Army Urban Operations Chapter 2 URBAN ENVIRONMENT A Complex Environment Urban Terrain Urban Society Urban Infrastructure Chapter 3 URBAN THREAT Asymmetry Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Operational Principles Urban Threat Tactics Negative Effects of Urbanization Chapter 4 CONTEMPLATING URBAN OPERATIONS Necessi of Urban Operations Characteristics of Major Urban Operations DODDOA-004415 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 12/27/2004 Integration.into Land Operations Chapter 5 FOUNDATIONS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS Urban Operational Framework Fundamentals of Urban Operations General Effects on Operations Chapter 6 URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations Characteristics of Urban Offensive Operations Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization Forms and Types of Urban Offense Urban Offensive Considerations Chapter 7 URBAN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Purpose of Urban Defensive Operations . Characteristics of Urban Defensive Operations Urban_ Defensive Operations and Battlefield Organization Types of Urban Defense Urban Defensive Considerations Chapter 8 URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS Purpose of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations Characteristics of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations Urban Stability Operations, Support Operations; and Battlefield Organization Types and Forms of Stability Operations and Support Operations Considerations of Urban Stability_ Operations and Support Operations Chapter 9 URBAN COMBAT. SERVICE SUPPORT Urban CSS Characteristics Logistics Preparation of the Theater CSS Functions General Engineer Support Civil-Military Operations Appendix A SIEGE OF BEIRUT: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF URBAN OPERATIONS Overall Strategic Situation Israeli Military Position PLO Military Position Role of Civilians Information Operations Conduct of the Urban Operations Lessons Summary DODDOA-004416 http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 12/27/2004 FM 3-06 Table of Contents Appendix_ B URBAN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD Urbanization of IPB Significant Characteristics Threat Considerations Urban IPB Tools and Products Appendix C OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA: APPLYING THE URBAN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT AND STABILITY General Situation Somali Operations Assess Shape Dominate Transition Summary Appendix D JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL URBAN OPERATIONS Purpose Service Urban Capabilities Urban Functional Combatant Command Capabilities Multinational Considerations SOURCE NOTES GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY AUTHENTICATION Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 90-10, 15 August 1979. DODDOA-004417 12/27/2004 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... FM 3-06 Cover FM 3-06 (FM 9o-10) URBAN OPERATIONS DODDOA-004418 12/27/2004 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... JUNE 2003 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DODDOA-004419 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 FM 3-06 List of Figures Page 1 of 3 Figures Figure 1-1 1-2 2-1 2-2 2 7 3 Full Spectrum Urban Operations UO and the Army Imperatives Keys to Understanding the Urban Environment The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield Broad Urban Patterns 2-4 Basic Internal Street Patterns 2-5 2-6 2-L7 2_8 2-9 An Urban Model Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Their Industrial or Commercial Uses Key Aspects of the Urban Society Urban Areas by Population Size Simplified Analysis of Urban Society 10 2-11 3-1 3-2 3-3 3:4 4-I 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7 UO—Society Cycle of Effects Urban Infrastructure Threat Operational Principles Urban Threat Tactics Favored Threat Weapons Negative Effects of Urbanization Worldwide Population Projections Risk Management and the Risks Associated with Urban Operations Organization of Historic Joint Urban Operations Urban ISR Considerations JO Elements and Related Activities Public Affairs Principles The Urban Operational Framework and Battle Command Urban Isolation Panama The Fundamentals of Urban Operations Battlefield Operating Systems Urban Maneuver Challenges and Means to Overcome Them Urban Effects on Fire Support Systems DODDOA-004420 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adIsciview/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 FM 3-06 List of Figures Page 2 of 3 5-8 Methods to Overcome Urban Communications Challenges 5-9 Compressed Tactical Factors 6-1 Initial Attack in Brittany 6-2 Subsequent Disposition of Forces in Brittany 6-3 Envelopment Isolates an Urban Area 6-4 Turning Movement 6-5 Infiltration 6-6 Penetration 6-7 Frontal Attack 6-8 Metz Envelopment 6-9 Metz Final Assault 6-10 Required Urban Reconnaissance Capabilities 6-11 Shaping Through Isolation 6-12 Critical Sensor-to-Shooter Links 6-13 Reactions to Isolation 6-14 Initial Attack to Isolate Hue 6-15 Subsequent Attack to Isolate Hue 6-16 Final Attack to Isolate Hue 6-17 Coordination of SOF and Conventional Capabilities 67 18 Inchon-Seoul Campaign, September 1950 71 An Urban Area Incorporated Into a Larger Mobile Defense 7-2 German Attacks to Seize Stalingrad 7-3 German Attacks to Seize Stalingad, September 1942 7-4 Soviet Attacks Trap German 6th Army 7-5 Retrograde Through an Urban Area 8-1 Characteristics of Stability Operations and Support Operations Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations 8-3 Adaptability 9-1 CSS Characteristics DODDOA-004421 12/27/2004 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atiatadlsciview/public/296784-1/fm/3-... FM 3-06 List of Figures Page 3 of 3 9-2 The Urban Environment and Essential Elements of Logistic Information 9-3 CSS Functions 9-4 General Principles of the Law of War 9-5 General Engineer Support 9-6 Civil Affairs Functional Skills A-1 The City of Beirut A-2 Initial Conduct of the Urban Operation A:3 Israeli Probe of PLO Defenses A-4 Initial Israeli Attack A-5 Final Israeli Attack B-1 The Steps of IPB B-2 Relevance of Key Urban Environment Elements B-3 Significant Urban Terrain Characteristics B-4 Significant Urban Societal Characteristics B-5 Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics B-6 Continuum of Relative Interests B-7 Urban IPB Tools and Products C-1 Phases of US Involvement in Somalia C-2 Map of Somalia D-1 USAF E-8 JSTARS Platform D-2 USN MK45 Lightweight Gun System D-3 USN MK V Special Operations Craft D-4 USAF AC-130 Gunship DODDOA-0 04422 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 Historical Vignettes Rome: A Microcosm of Urban Warfare Seeing the Urban Area and Its Parts Tempo Identifying Soldiers from Civilians Information and the Media Cultural and Religious Instability Food and Water Shortages Urban Insurgencies Crime and Criminal Organizations Applying the Urban Operational Framework: Panama — December 1989 Example of Simple Communications Innovation: Israel's Six-Day War — 1967 The Operational Context of Urban Operations: Brittany Ports — August to September 1944 Forms of Attack in the Urban Offense: Metz — 1944 Isolating the Urban Area: Hue City — _January to February 1968 Creative Task Organization: Using Artillery in the Direct Fire Role Bold Operational Maneuver to Seize an Urban Area: Inchon and Seoul, Korea — September 1950 Urban Defense in a Major Operation: Stalingrad — August 1942 to January 1943 Defensive Combat Power: Suez — October 1973 Assessment of Security and Force Protection: Belfast, Northern Ireland Support of and Coordination with Civilian Authorities: The 1992 Los Angeles Riots Base Security: Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam — Tet 1968 Combat Stress: Chechnya — 1994 to 1996 Siege of Beirut: An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban Operations Analysis of an Urban Area's Underlying Terrain: Mitrovica, Kosovo Shifting Civilian Interests and Intent Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to Support and Stability DODDOA-004423 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/frn/3... 12/27/2004 FM 3-06 Preface Preface Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation will be distinct from any other—any other urban operation as well as similar types of operations in other environments. Each operation will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geo-political considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tensiyn between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders are responsible to strike the proper balance between preparing for future challenges and maintaining the capability to respond to current threats. PURPOSE This manual provides the analytical tools for evaluating an urban operation to determine if the operation is necessary for overall mission success. It also provides the means to understanding and determining the impacts of the urban environment on military operations and provides information on managing, taking advantage of, and mitigating the effects of those impacts as appropriate. As such, this manual demonstrates how to apply the doctrinal principles in FM 3-0 to this unique environment. SCOPE Chapter 1 introduces theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations that serve as the underlying basis for the rest of the manual. Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on operations. It is unlikely that Army forces will ever operate in a benign urban environment; therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the varied nature of potential urban threats. An understanding of the complexities of the urban environment and the nature of the enemy is essential to sound decisionmaking. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the potential costs of urban operations as well as the effects on each battlefield operating system that the commander and his staff consider early in their planning. These chapters also outline an urban operational framework and specific urban considerations that create the foundations necessary for successfully applying operational doctrine to an urban environment. The second half of the manual (Chapters 6 – 9) discusses how urban operations are conducted and resourced. Urban operations include major offensive and defensive operations in urban environments as well as stability operations and support operations ranging from peace operations and combatting terrorism to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. For the different types of operations—offense, defense, stability, and support—the purpose, characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed. DODDOA-004424 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/ati a/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3-06/pref. htm 12/27/2004 FM 3-06 Preface However, commanders consider that most urban operations will involve some aspect of all four types of operations (although one may dominate) and plan accordingly. APPLICABILITY This manual is intended for commanders and their staffs at the brigade through corps level. It addresses the range of operations (both violent and nonviolent) throughout the spectrum of conflict that Army units will execute in urban settings. However, users should also consult JP 3-06 for specific joint information. Additionally, users should be familiar with FM 3-06.11, TC 90-1, and urban operations chapters, appendices, or sections found in other infantry, armor, combined arms, and proponent field manuals for the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and appropriate proponent information necessary to conduct tactical urban operations at tile brigade level and below. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS Chapter 2 defines "city" according to a the population size. However, in historical vignettes and accounts, the term "city" is applied in its common usage without specific regard to size to maintain conformity with most other historical reports. In this manual, the term "threat" is applied broadly to include an enemy force (conventional or unconventional), an armed belligerent in a peace operation, antagonistic or unfriendly elements of the civilian population, or some other hazardous condition in the urban environment that negatively influences mission accomplishment. The term "hostile" is used as a subset of the threat and denotes a particular element of the urban population (individual, group, or organization) or one or more opposing armed factions in a peacekeeping operation. Both an enemy and a hostile have the intent to exploit Army vulnerabilities and negatively affect the urban operation. A hostile, however, is not engaging Army forces in protracted combat operations. The term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is replaced by urban operations (UO). MOUT is an acronym from FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urban Terrain that is superseded by this manual. Otherwise, the glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-06 that have joint or Army definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. The manual attempts to incorporate historical vignettes into each chapter where the account supports the doctrinal line of reasoning. Two historical vignettes, however, were included as appendices (A and C) because of their longer lengths. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... DODDOA-004425 12/27/2004 refer exclusively to men. This publication contains copyrighted material. The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommended changes directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD, Futures Development and Integration Center, 1 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352. DODDOA-004426 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portallatia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 12/27/2004 Chapter 1 Urban Outlook 'The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self­ aware leaders understand their operational environment, can assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware--then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment. FM 1 Given the prevalence of large cities throughout the world, Army forces, division size and larger, will likely be required to conduct operations in and around large urban areas. These operations will be in support of a joint force commander (JFC) conducting military operations pursuant to United States (US) national security policy. This manual is designed to facilitate the planning and conduct of the full range and spectrum of land operations in a complex urban environment. Each urban environment and urban operation is unique; prescribing specific doctrinal "solutions" for situations is impossible. Instead, this manual provides a framework to commanders and their staffs for understanding the urban environment, for analyzing and deciding whether urban operations (UO) are necessary or feasible, and for applying operational doctrine to this complex environment. It also provides historical vignettes to help develop a refined analytical perspective and some planning points and tactics and techniques to assist in preparing for and conducting UO. Together, this information provides a foundation for approaching major UO, which, combined with other joint and Army doctrine, will help commanders and their staffs learn to adapt and succeed in this challenging environment. Contents The Prospect of Urban Operations Urban Perspective Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare Strategic Importance of Urban Areas US Army's Experience in Urban Operations l DODDOA-004427 THE PROSPECT OF URBAN OPERATIONS 1-1. The world is in a period of massive urbanization. A trend of migration from rural to urban areas is occurring throughout the globe. This trend is especially evident in developing nations. Combined with the exponential growth of the http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlseview/public/296784-1/fin/3-... l12/27/2004 global population in the last quarter century, this migration has created massive urban areas that hold the centers of population, government, and economics in their respective regions. In Western Europe, for example, over 50 percent of the land area is urbanized. Just over 30 years ago, only three urban areas in Asia contained at least eight million people. By 2015, estimates show that Asia will have 17 urban areas over ten million, and three of those will top 20 million residents. Almost half of today's population resides in urban areas. Trends also indicate that less developed nations have more centralized societies in a few urban areas. Developed nations spread their centralized societies in several urban areas. In many cases, rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructures, scarce resources, and a fragile economic base. Given the global population, Army forces will likely conduct operations in and around urban areas—not as a matter of fate but as a deliberate choice linked to national objectives and strategy and at a time, place, and method of the commander's choosing. Army Urban Operations Army forces conduct UO either as one component of a larger operation or as a single operation focused totally on a specific urban environment. Major Army UO are often part of a joint and multinational effort requiring interagency and civil-military coordination that may include the full spectrum of Army operations. Commanders of Army major operations must determine if UO are essential to mission accomplishment. If so, commanders must carefully integrate the operations into campaign planning to support the operational objectives of the JFC. Army leaders conducting UO must— • Assess the urban area to determine decisive points. • Shape the operation to set the conditions for success. • Precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area. • Then transition the urban area to the control of another agency or back to legitimate civilian control. URBAN PERSPECTIVE 1-2. As a subset of all Army operations, UO are operations focused on an urban environment. UO include the full range of Army operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—that may be executed, either sequentially or simultaneously, during the conduct of a single urban operation. Depending on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), urban operations may—or may not—be conducted predominantly within the urban area (see Figure 1-1). Furthermore, UO may be the sole mission of the commander or one of several tasks nested in a larger operation. Regardless of the types of operations conducted or whether the urban area is the single focus of the operation or only one component of a larger operation, the complex urban environment significantly affects the overall conduct of the mission. DODDOA-004428 http://atiam.train.amly.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 12/27/2004 URBAN OPERATIONS Objectires and NETT-TC Make All U0 Unique Control of the Urban Area ENEMY CIVIL . 11 CumbotSor4c. Swpert Type of Operation Offense Defense UO Mai Conlnu. Under avl Han a,ntui oft* Urtan Ana i.10 are often full spectrum and therefore NO T necessarily focused ordy on urban combat l ASSESS (.0 ' SHAPE — DOMINATE — TRANSITION Framework &Ration cf U0 Can Be Measured in Days orTim e Y ears Depending on Factors of frETT-TC Figure 1-1. Full Spectrum Urban Operations 1-3. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders understand two important terms: urban area and urban environment. The first is a subset of the second. An urban area is a topographical complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature. Focusing on urban areas means concentrating on the physical aspects of the area and their effects on tactics, techniques, and procedures. The urban environment includes the physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships between its key components—the terrain (natural and man-made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure— as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems. Critical elements of the infrastructure may lie far beyond the area's physical confines. For example, the generating source providing power to the urban energy system is part of that system but may be located well outside of the urban area. Similarly, effects of the interaction between components of the infrastructure, located both inside and outside the urban area, extend well into smaller, neighboring urban areas and surrounding rural areas and often form their political, economic, and cultural focus. Understanding the total urban environment is essential to planning and conducting the full range of Army urban operations across the spectrum of conflict. DODDOA-004429 HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN AREAS IN WARFARE 1-4. Urban areas always have been central to, or have significantly influenced, military operations. One of the first urban-centered battles was the siege of Troy at the beginning of Greek history. Moreover, much of the history of early Greece revolved around wars between its city-states or with Persia and centered on the conquest, siege, or blockade of cities. Five hundred years later, the Roman Empire replaced Greece as the dominant world power although urban areas remained central to Roman warfare. Even Rome's history can be viewed as a microcosm of http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/206784-1/fin/3... 12/27/2004 urban warfare over the past two thousand years. Though military operations within the physical confines of many of these historic urban areas were not the norm, the focus of these operations was their conquest or control. 2Rome A Microcosm of Urban Warfare During two millennia, Rome has been the center of at least 12 battles. The Gauls lay siege to Rome first in 387 BC. That first siege lasted six months and ended after the barbarians burnt much of the city. The surviving patrician families paid a ransom for the withdrawal of Brennus' army. From 408 to 410 AD, the Goth leader, Alaric, successfully besieged Rome no less than three times. The Byzantine General Belisarius captured Rome twice from the Goths and withstood siege inside the city once between 536 and 549. Five hundred years later in 1084, Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard captured medieval Rome and sacked the city during a dispute between the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. Forces of the Holy Roman Empire again stormed and captured the city to punish the Pope in 1527. During the Italian Revolution in 1849, a French army supporting the Pope captured the city from the Italian revolutionary army under Garibaldi. In 1944, the last military action took place in and around Rome when the US Fifth Army captured the city from the retreating German army. Rome's turbulent history—fought over ethnic and religious differences, prestige, and military necessity—demonstrates the importance of urban areas in warfare and the various causes and combatants within this complex environment. 1-5. Although Rome last saw combat in 1944, urban areas have been no less prominent in warfare since that time. Beirut in Lebanon, Grozny in Chechnya, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been centers of conflict in the last 50 years. Urban areas, now more pervasive than ever before, will continue to be essential to successful operational and strategic warfighting. Today, armies cannot execute major military operations without the influence of surrounding urban environments (with the possible exception of the open desert). STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS 1-6. Several reasons have attracted (and continue to attract) armies to combat in urban areas: • A military force chooses to position itself in an urban area to capitalize on the perceived advantages offered by the environment. In contrast, an opposing force, by analyzing the factors of the situation, determines that it must enter the urban area to attack and destroy its enemy (or devote essential combat power to their isolation). • The urban area's infrastructure, capabilities, or other resources have significant operational or strategic value. DODDOA-004430 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 • The urban area has significant symbolic importance. • The urban area's geographical location dominates a region or avenue of approach. 1-7. Russia's 1994 experience in Chechnya illustrates an increasingly important motivation for conducting urban operations. The Chechen rebels, after failing to engage Russian forces outside the city, chose to turn Grozny into the battlefield. Leaders of the defeated Chechen conventional forces recognized that fighting in the urban area provided them their best chance for success. The complexities of urban combat and the perceived advantages of defending an urban area mitigated their numerical and technological inferiority. The urban area provided the Chechens protection from fires, resources, interior lines, and covered and concealed positions and movement. Given such advantages offered by the environment, smaller or less-sophisticated military forces have similarly chosen to fight in urban areas. 1-8. Such advantages of operating in an urban environment also prompt forces to conduct an urban operation to facilitate a larger campaign plan and decisive battle in another location. The urban operation can focus the enemy on the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere. From a defensive perspective, an urban defense may gain time and space to reorganize forces in new defensive positions, to divert enemy forces from other critical tasks, or to prepare to conduct offensive operations. To some extent, these reasons motivated Soviet forces defending Leningrad and Stalingrad from the Germans in World War II. The stubborn defense permitted the Soviets to reorganize for later offensive operations. From an offensive perspective, an attack on an urban area may be a shaping operation used to divert resources from the decisive operation that will follow. 1-9. Armies also fight in an urban area to obtain some critical feature or resource in the area, such as a port facility. The desire to control an important seaport and access to the Persian Gulf largely motivated the Iranian and Iraqi struggle for Basra in the 1980s. Earlier, in 1944, British forces fought German units in Arnhem for control of the Rhine River Bridge. Other infrastructure of the urban environment may have operational or strategic significance and can compel military forces to attack or defend the area. As urban areas account for an increasing share of a country's national income, often generating over 50 percent of gross national product, the strategic implications for their control or influence become even greater. 1-10. Urban areas are often located on terrain that dominates a region or an avenue of approach. In these cases, offensive armies capture these areas to proceed with security to another objective. Conversely, defensive forces commonly defend the area to deny the area of operations. To illustrate, Cassino, Italy stood astride the critical highway approach up the Liri valley to Rome. The allies had to attack and capture the monastery to facilitate the allied offensive north. Cassino's location made bypassing virtually impossible. Likewise, Israeli army urban operations in Beirut were (and have continued to be) a result of its strategic location near the Israeli security zone; various Arab insurgent and terrorist groups used Beirut as a DODDOA-004431 http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 base for attacks against Israel. Beirut evolved as the major base of the Palestine Liberation Organization, a major opponent of Israel. Beirut's location made it a security threat to Israel and thus compelled several major Israeli operations in the urban area (see Appendix A). 1-11. Another reason for engaging in urban operations is the symbolic—historical, cultural, political, and even economic—importance of many urban areas. Often, capital cities—such as Rome, Paris, Seoul, and Berlin—are identified as the strategic centers of gravity of their respective nations. Possessing or threatening these urban areas may impact directly on the outcome of a conflict. The objective of Germany's wars with France in 1870 and 1914 was ultimately Paris. Napoleon's 1812 campaign had as its objective Moscow, as did Hitler's 1941 offensive into Russia. The objective of the Soviet 1945 offensive was Berlin, and the North Vietnamese 1975 offensive had as its objective the South's capital of Saigon. Still, history also reminds us that commanders assess the sustainability and decisiveness of operations directed toward these "prestige" objectives. For example, in 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow but had to evacuate it within 30 days. He lacked supplies and shelter, failed to destroy the Russian Army, and failed to defeat the political will of the Czar and the people. Similarly, the North Korean occupation of Seoul during the Korean War was equally indecisive. US ARMY'S EXPERIENCE IN URBAN OPERATIONS 1 12. The US Army has a varied history of conducting operations to attack or - defend larger urban areas. The American Revolution saw the Army conduct several urban operations. These operations included the unsuccessful defense of New York, the successful attack on Trenton, and the decisive siege and attack on British forces at Yorktown. The Mexican War also had a successful assault on the fortified city of Monterey and the decisive siege of Mexico City. During the American Civil War, the armies, in the tradition of Napoleonic maneuver warfare, avoided urban areas and fought in the open. However, the opposing armies frequently made urban areas their objective because of their importance as railheads. Success in the siege of several key urban areas—Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Petersburg—contributed to the Northern victory. 1-13. Following the Civil War, the US Army faced no large-scale urban combat for several generations. The Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and even World War I did not require the Army to fight in large urban areas. Between the Civil War and World War II, the US Army fought in several urban areas worldwide supporting US commitments. These limited urban combat operations were small but essential parts of what were urban stability operations. From 1900 to 1901, the Army provided public security for a sector of Peking, China of around 50,000 inhabitants. The Army conducted UO and, in the course of the operation, the 9th US Infantry suffered 20-percent casualties while fighting in Tientsin. Punitive expeditions to places such as Siberia, Cuba, Philippines, Central America, and Mexico put the Army in various urban situations that required using military power, notably, the occupation and security of Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914. In the context of these smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), UO became a staple of US Army employment. DODDOA-004432 http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 1-14. World War II forced the Army to grapple with the issues of large-scale urban combat almost immediately. In his 1941 defense of the Philippines, General MacArthur examined how to defend Manila. Manila represented a large, modern, friendly urban area, which was the capital city of a close US ally. Defending the urban area posed numerous challenges. Ultimately General MacArthur determined that he could best conduct its defense outside the city by defeating the enemy forces in combat on the invasion beaches or shortly after they landed. When Japanese forces defeated MacArthur's Philippine Army in a series of engagements, MacArthur had to decide how best to protect the friendly populace of Manila. He had two choices: abandoning the city or waging a costly defense that would likely result in the city's destruction, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and no operational advantage. He had little choice but to declare Manila an open city and move his forces to Bataan to wage an operational defense in the vain hope that a counteroffensive could relieve his isolated force. On 2 January 1942, Japanese forces entered Manila unopposed. 1-15. Had General MacArthur decided to defend Manila, his forces would have found scant doctrine in the Army regarding how to fight in an urban area. Doctrine for urban operations did not appear until early 1944, when faced with the possibility of fighting through the larger urban areas of Western Europe. At his time the US Army published FM 31-50, Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns. This manual had the first formal discussion of how the Army viewed urban combat. It was based on the Army's limited experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the study of German and Soviet experiences on the Eastern front. 1-16. FM 31-50 emphasized a deliberate pace, individual and small unit initiative, the liberal use of direct and indirect firepower, and decentralized command and execution. It focused on the urban area (as opposed to the environment); however, it did include policies towards the noncombatants. The manual was also focused at the regimental combat team level. Complementing the doctrine of FM 31-50 was the 1944 operations manual, FM 100-5. This latter manual emphasized the importance of combined arms actions and the need for extensive reconnaissance of prepared and defended cities. The Army successfully implemented this doctrine in several major instances of urban combat, most notably the capture of the first German city, Aachen, and hundreds of small-scale urban assaults on cities, towns, and villages across France, the Benelux, and Germany. Army forces also successfully employed this urban combat doctrine during the liberation of Manila in 1945. 1-17. The legacy of this era of Army operations was qn effective tactical solution to urban offensive combat: isolate the urban area, seize a foothold, and expand the foothold block by block until occupying the entire urban area and destroying the enemy. The doctrine's emphasis on firepower kept friendly casualties to a minimum. Unfortunately, when enemy forces stoutly defended the urban area, the emphasis on firepower resulted in its virtual destruction and high casualties among noncombatants. 1-18. The doctrinal approach honed in World War II remained the accepted Army approach to urban combat to the century's end. The last successful implementation DODDOA-004433 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 occurred when liberating Seoul during the Korean War. The Vietnam conflict did not offer the Army opportunities or the requirement to practice urban combat or test and refine doctrine on a large scale. The largest urban battle, Hue, was a chaotic tactical battle that validated most of the historical lessons of urban combat without generating any new doctrinal insights for large-scale urban warfare. 1-19. From the mid-1950s through the 1990s, the Army conducted UO in the United States in support of civil authorities during civil unrest and anti-Vietnam protests. Some operations involved numerous active and reserve component forces engaged in restoring public order. The Detroit riots of 1967 and the Los Angeles riots of 1992 required the commitments of active and National Guard units. In 1968, the Army deployed over 35,000 troops to Washington D.C., Chicago, and Baltimore following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 1-20. In the 1970s and 1980s, Army doctrine predominantly focused on urban areas and successfully fighting a conventional ground war against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The 1979 FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), described how to conduct urban operations against Soviet forces in Germany. Its concepts were never tested other than in simulation, and its approach to urban combat was not substantially different from that practiced by the Army since World War II. Despite previous doctrine's admonition to avoid cities, the Army has had to fight in them in diverse circumstances. MODERN ARMY URBAN OPERATIONS 1-21. Modern urban operations span the full range of possible applications of military power. At the high end of the spectrum of conflict is major theater war (MTW) dominated by offensive and defensive operations that, when undertaken, will commonly include urban operations. At the lowest level are a multitude of urban peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. These activities foster and strengthen alliances and coalitions as well as deter aggression on the part of potential threats. At mid-level between MTW and PME are SSC urban operations. As a result of being mid-range, any type of operation may potentially dominate an SSC; however, the various urban stability operations form the majority. At higher echelons, these separations are often viewed as levels of intensity. For the tactical units conducting urban operations, these divisions appear indistinct, as the intensity is often high despite where the operation falls within the level of conflict. MAJOR THEATER WAR DODDOA-004434 1-22. While UO in a MTW can encompass the full range of Army operations, the offense and defense will be central and decisive to success. Although mindful of collateral damage and noncombatants, urban operations in a MTW (compared to urban operations in SSCs or as part of PME activities) will be the least constrained because vital national interests will be at stake. UO in a MTW, therefore, will require a significant investment of resources of all types. Specialized units such as psychological operations, civil affairs, and other special operations forces (SOF) will likely be in high demand. UO in a MTW will require an abundance of http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 infantry and may require significant casualty replacements and medical support. Logistics to support the distinctive urban environment includes large amounts of lethal and nonlethal specialty munitions, such as smoke, precision field artillery rounds, demolitions, and hand grenades. 1-23. Of potential urban scenarios confronting the future Army, urban offensive and defensive operations in an MTW are the most dangerous and challenging. They will take one of two principal forms: fluid or siege. In a fluid urban combat operation, both sides may contend for position and advantage in the urban battlespace. The attacker will seek to quickly seize decisive points before the enemy is able to establish a cohesive defense. This will likely require the attacker to bypass enemy defensive positions whose occupation or reduction are not critical to mission success. Conversely, the defender may use interior lines to shift forces in a fluid defense. In a siege, one side clearly has the initiative as the attacker, and the other side has the advantages of the defense. A siege situation can develop as a result of an initial fluid urban battle, or it may be a function of previous military operations that occurred outside the urban area. The Army doctrine's emphasis on initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility generally supports the fluid form of urban combat; however, commanders also understand that the factors of METT-TC may support a longer-term, siege approach. SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES 1-24. SSCs encompass a wide range of military operations that fall between MTW and PME and frequently involve urban operations. SSCs are conducted to facilitate diplomacy and support political initiatives, protect American lives and interests, and disrupt illegal activities. Joint task forces (JTFs) typically conduct SSCs although one service may provide the bulk of the force. During these urban contingencies, resources are often more limited and the restraints on applying combat power are greater as the need to maintain legitimacy will grow in importance. Typically, Army forces will need the assistance of multinational partners, other agencies, local noncombatants, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to successfully complete the mission. PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS 1-25. UO, at the lowest level of conflict, may also take many forms. They serve to strengthen alliances and coalitions, discourage arms races, combat terrorism, and generally reduce the potential for instability and conflict. Combat in PME activities is not the norm. They are least likely to involve the use of force (when necessary, nonlethal is preferred). The presence of Army forces performing PME activities in foreign urban areas provides a visible sign of US commitment to peace and stability in that region. In many of these lower-intensity UO, Army forces often support other agencies. These other agencies actually plan and lead the operation. Army forces provide military capabilities (to include organization and leadership), manpower, equipment, and other resources not readily available. As with UO in SSCs, proactive and aggressive interaction and coordination with multinational partners, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the urban populace will be vital.to success. DODDOA-004435 http://atiam.train.arm .mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-06/chapl.htin 12/27/2004 PREPARING FOR FUTURE URBAN OPERATIONS 1-26. To operate successfully in a complex urban environment requires rigorous, realistic UO training. Training is conducted by the complete combined arms team and covers the full range of Army operations. It also replicates- • The psychological impact of intense, close combat against a well-trained enemy. • The effects of noncombatants in close proximity to Army forces. • The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an urban area. It recognizes the constraints of collateral damage and, therefore, emphasizes the development of flexible, effective, and understandable rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE help preclude soldiers from randomly using deadly force while allowing them sufficient latitude to accomplish the mission and defend themselves. Training in ROE also includes significant and periodic changes that test and develop flexibility in and adaptability to a fluid environment. Additionally, force preparedness mandates integrating simulations, exercises at urban training sites, and the actual use of urban terrain into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training. Concurrent training extends from the individual soldier to the joint level. Additionally, preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in regards to urban multinational and interagency operations. 1-27. Realistic UO training (as well as the conduct of real world operations) has the added benefit of identifying operational requirements and resultant changes necessary in our doctrine, organizations, materiel design, leadership, and soldier support (see Figure 1-2). While technology (material) and organizational changes are critical, soldiers remain the decisive Figure 1-2. UO and the Army Imperatives means for success. The technology and organizational changes will be a critical enabler to achieve the agile, simultaneous, and precise lethality, required in urban operations. In the future, technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to urban operations. Still, competent leaders and well-trained and disciplined soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to succeed in this complex, multidimensional, and noncontiguous urban environment. DODDOA-004436 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 Chapter 2 Urban Environment 3From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population. FM 3-0 Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found elsewhere. Its distinct characteristics result from an intricate topography and high population density. The topography's complexity stems from the man-made features and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds, thousands, or millions of civilians may be near or intermingled with soldiers—friendly and enemy. This second factor, and the human dimension it represents, is potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders and their staffs to understand and evaluate. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process remains unaffected by urban areas (see FM 34-130 and Appendix B); this chapter provides information essential to the conduct of the IPB for an urban environment. Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is distinct and will react to and affect the presence and operations of Army forces differently. A tactical technique effective in one area may not be effective in another area due to physical differences, such as street patterns or the type of building construction. An Army policy popular with one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in another due to diverse cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, but they increase the complexity for Army forces operating in urban areas. These difficulties range from conventional military forces to disease and starvation (see Chapter 3) to a pervasive media—often acutely present in intricate combinations. Thus, commanders at all levels make extraordinary efforts to assess and understand their particular urban environment to plan, prepare for, and execute effective urban operations (UO). Contents A Cycle of EffectsA Complex Environment Urban InfrastructureUrban Terrain InterdependenceMultidimensional Battlefield Separate Parts of a WholeBroad Urban Patterns Structures and PeopleLesser Street Patterns Impact on Future OperationsAn Urban Model Resource IntensiveUrban Society Communications and InformationPotential. Center of Gravity DODDOA-004437 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atiaJadlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 General Population Size Transportation and Distribution Group Size, Location, and Composition Energy Leadership and Organization Economics and Commerce Interests and Actions Administration and Human Services Interaction, Influence, or Control A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT 2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate, available building materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not only among urban areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural and man-made features in urban areas present commanders with some of the most difficult terrain in which to conduct military operations. 2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are identical. The sprawl of Los Angeles, for example, bears little physical resemblance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most significantly affect each area's uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the terrain, its potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be determined with some degree of certainty. However, the human dimension is much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its effects on military operations. Like any environment, the side that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban environment has the best chance of success. 2-3. Whether a large metropolis or a small village, each urban environment has an identifiable system of components that constantly change and interact. This "system of systems" consists of the terrain, the society, and the infrastructure that links the two (see Figure 2-1). (These categories highlight the key aspects to understanding the Figure 2-1. Keys to Understanding urban environment and will be used the Urban Environment throughout the manual; however, the civil-military operations (CMO) discussion in Chapter 9 provides an alternate method for categorizing and assessing the effects of civil considerations in any operational environment.) 2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories but rather overlapping and interdependent. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along with the other factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support available, time, and civil considerations- DODDOA-004438 http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 • Contributes to commanders' situational understanding. • Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements. • Allows them to develop courses of action that apply appropriate resources against decisive points. 2-5. In stability operations and support operations, this understanding allows commanders to engage and dominate the decisive points critical to maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment. Although each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, commanders often "step back" and visualize each system, the complex urban environment, and their area of operations (AO). This "systems thinking" aids commanders in uncovering key relationships and intersections that can help reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points. 2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest extent possible, commanders carefully integrate and employ special operations forces (SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units—and a myriad of other human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and regional, language, and cultural experts. The societal aspects and integrating infrastructure will challenge commanders' assessment and understanding. These aspects will also require greater dependence on nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for their information, knowledge, and expertise. This last consideration requires commanders to develop effective techniques and procedures for coordinating and interacting with these agencies. URBAN TERRAIN 2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however, requires comprehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and man-made features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis considers both. Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns, forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine make it difficult to describe a "typical" urban area. However, these elements provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area. Furthermore, man-made features significantly affect military systems and soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban operations are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on battlefield operating systems (BOS) (see Chapters 5 and 9) and the range of operations (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8) are interwoven throughout the manual. MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD l DODDOA-004439 2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on a map by the surrounding http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 12/27/2004 countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban battlespace is many times that of a similarly sized portion of natural terrain. The sheer volume and density created by urban geometry can make UO resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel. 2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can radically alter the physical character of the urban terrain in ways not experienced in other environments. They may cause (either intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires or the loss of electricity. A power outage can cause flooding (especially in subsurface areas) by shutting down pumping stations. Entire buildings may be destroyed, eliminating reference points and leaving large piles of rubble. Additionally, buildings and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can still be effective obstacles and possible booby traps. Their weakened construction and unstable structure increase the risk of injury to soldiers and civilians moving within them. (Engineers often determine whether the buildings can support occupation by Army forces or civilians.) The likely presence of toxic industrial materials (TIM) can create additional obstacles. 2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth, breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: airspace and surface. In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include supersurface and subsurface areas (see Figure 2-2). Although spatially separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, line of communications (LOC), and engagement area. Figure 2-2. The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield DODD0A-004440 2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban physical environment. Commanders consider activities that occur outside buildings and subterranean areas (the external space) as well as the activities that occur unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the internal space). The internal space further challenges command, control, and intelligence collection activities and increases the combat power required to conduct UO. Commanders develop methods to help themselves, their staffs, and their subordinate commanders and staffs to represent and visualize the multiple dimensions. Such http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... .12/27/2004 dimensions can change rapidly simply due to continued urban growth or, as described earlier, the effects of nature and UO themselves. Airspace 2-12. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of approach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and extraction of soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect aviation assets. However, buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other urban constructions create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking). These obstacles can limit low­altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increase s aviation vulnerability to small arms and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), particularly when supporting ground forces. Surface 2-13. Surface areas apply to exterior ground level areas, such as parking lots, airfields, highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. They often proyide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However, buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat avenues of approach or essential LOCs and, therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such, amphibious and river­crossing operations may be an integral part of the overall urban operation. 2-14. Larger open areas—such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots—are often critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation centers, and prisoner of war holding facilities. These areas also can afford suitable aircraft landing and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide logistic support areas and aerial resupp DODDOA-004441 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 Chapter 3 Urban Threat 7 [T]he United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against . . . opponents with a wide range of capabilities. Moreover, these interventions may take place in distant regions where urban environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic conditions present major operational challenges. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001 As the strategic environment has become less stable, more uncertain, and more dangerous, Army forces are trained and ready to address urban threats. These threats range from regional conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas, and insurgents to terrorists, criminal groups, and angry crowds. Although uncertain about events, Army forces can be clear about trends. Increasingly, the Army will face threats that severely differ in doctrine, organization, and equipment, yet can fully interact with the three other components of the urban battlefield—terrain, society, and infrastructure. In stability operations and support operations, commanders broaden their concept of the threat to include natural disasters, hunger and starvation, and rampant disease. Further, commanders plan to contend with many passive urban threats, such as psychological illnesses and toxic industrial materials (TIM). These threats may be found in isolation, but most likely commanders will encounter them in various combinations. Moreover, each new threat will pose a different combination and likely have new capabilities that previous opponents lacked. Contents Use the Population to AdvantageAsymmetry Win the Information War Weapons of Mass Destruction-Manipulate Key FacilitiesThreat Operational Principles Use All Dimensions Deny Access Employ Urban-Oriented WeaponsNeutralize Technology Overmatch Engage Entire Enemy ForceControl the Tempo Focus Attacks on Support Areas,Change the Nature of the Conflict Isolated Groups, and IndividualsCause Politically Unacceptable Casualties Negative Effects of UrbinizationAllow No Sanctuary General InstabilityConduct Dispersed and Decentralized Food and Water ShortageOperations Disease and PollutionUrban Threat Tactics Competing Power Structures ASYMMETRY DODDOA-004442 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portallatia/adlseview/public/296784-1/fin/3-... .12/27/2004 3-1. An emphasis on asymmetric means to offset United States (US) military capability has emerged as a significant trend among potential threats and become an integral part of the threat principles and tactics discussed below. Asymmetry results when one opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values, organization, training, or equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not a new concept. It naturally evolves from a sound mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis by an intelligent, freethinking, and adaptive threat. These asymmetric approaches will include the most advanced, commercially-available technology innovatively applied and mixed with crude, simple, and unsophisticated weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3-2. A chief asymmetric means of engaging the national power of the US is to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US or its allies. These weapons can be used against military forces by military forces and include high­yield explosives as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Operations in urban areas may require concentrating forces and may create a lucrative target for a threat that possesses fewer numbers and less equipment. 3-3. A threat's WMD use will adversely affect the Army's abilities to conduct urban operations (UO) to various degrees. For example, the intervening structures and the effects of urban microclimates complicate the ability to detect and identify radiological, chemical, or biological attacks from a standoff distance. Also, the individual soldier's ability to recognize his leaders, understand oral and visual commands, and operate increasingly sophisticated equipment is difficult when wearing protective clothing and equipment—particularly if his training proficiency is low. Despite the increased challenges and complexity, Army forces have the training and equipment necessary to respond to such an attack compared to most armies around the world, but certainly when compared to the civilian sector. 3-4. Although initial casualties could be high, the public can accept military casualties before those of civilians. Therefore, threats may gain an initial tactical advantage but would achieve less asymmetric benefit by directly attacking Army forces. They may attempt to achieve an extraordinary asymmetric strategic advantage by employing WMD against US or allied civilian populations. In doing so, threats hope to use political sensitivity to high civilian casualties to reduce popular support for the US or its allies. The chance of these attacks occurring in an urban area increases because- • The area facilitates weapons' effects and camouflages delivery means. • The dense civilian population ensures a high casualty rate. • The attack (or even the threat of attack) often will receive more publicity and public attention. • The urban area's infrastructure is especially vulnerable to WMD' DODDOA-004443 http://atiam.train. army.mil/portal/atia/adl sc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-06/chap3 .htm 112/27/2004 1 Page 3 of 4 FM 3-06, Chapter 3, Urban Threat particularly the systems of the economics and commerce infrastructure located in large urban areas, and may have far-reaching national and global effects. THREAT OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 3-5. The threat may apply several key operational principles to oppose Army forces operating in an urban environment (see Figure 3-1). These principles focus more on how a threat might fight in an urban area rather than specifically whom the threat might be or in what region of the world the conflict might occur. They are more effective in an urban environment due to- • The high costs in time, material, and manpower involved in UO. Figure 3-1. Threat Operational Principles • The limiting effects of urban areas on many technological advantages. • The proximity of airfields and ports to urban areas. • The potential moral dilemmas created by exposing numerous civilians to harm or injury. These principles complement and overlap each other; however, at their core is the need to defeat an enemy of superior numbers, technology, or both. DENY ACCESS 3-6. The Army may not be located where future conflicts are fought. Thus, the Army maintains the ability to rapidly project and sustain combat power over long distances and time spans. This capability demands that Army forces quickly gain and maintain control of seaports or aerial ports of embarkation or debarkation, particularly where the density of US basing and en route infrastructure is low. Commanders gain control of these ports by unopposed (assisted or unassisted) or forcible entry operations. In either case, these phased-entry operations may present potential vulnerabilities, particularly- • Unsuitable composition of initial or early entry forces lacking necessary combat power for immediate decisive operations. • Initial command and control difficulties and an immature situational understanding.1 DODD0A-004444 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 • Lack of developed theater support. 3-7. Consequently, threats may attack during initial force projection operations to oppose, disrupt, or prevent the build-Up of essential combat power into a theater of operations. These attacks may occur anywhere deploying Army forces are located, at overseas bases, at home stations, and even in military communities. Increasingly, deployment facilities such as airfields and ports exist as integral components of urban areas. Threats will invariably use the complex and concealing nature of these urban areas, coupled with the vulnerabilities, to create favorable conditions for their attacks. DODDOA-004445 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 Chapter 4 Contemplating Urban Operations 16We based all our further calculations on the most unfavorable assumptions: the inevitability of heavy and prolonged fighting in the streets of Berlin, the possibility of German counter-attacks from outside the ring of encirclement from the west and south-west, restoration of the enemy's defence to the west of Berlin and the consequent need to continue the offensive. General of the Army, S. M. Shtemenko describing the operational level planning for taking Berlin The Soviet General Staff at War In any potential situation and in any area, Army A major operation is a series of commanders will likely need to assess the tactical actions (battles. en­ relevance and impact of one or more urban areas on gagements. strikes) conducted their operations. They will also need to determine by various combat forces of a single or several services. co­ whether full spectrum urban operations (UO) will ordinated in time and place. to be essential to mission accomplishment. UO may accomplish operational. and be the commander's sole focus or only one of sometimes strategic objectivesseveral tasks nested in an even larger operation. in an operational area. Although UO potentially can be conducted as a single battle, engagement, or strike, they will more often be conducted as a major operation requiring joint resources. Such actions result from the increasing sizes of urban areas. Army commanders of a major urban operation then ensure that UO clearly support the operational objectives of the joint force commander (JFC), requesting and appropriately integrating critical joint resources. Whether the urban operation is the major operation itself or one of many tasks in a larger operation, Army commanders assess and thoroughly shape the conditions so subordinate tactical commanders can dominate in the complex urban environment. Contents Necessity of Urban Operations JointForce Strength Full SpectrumType of Forces Integration into Land Operations Casualties Concept of the OperationMunitions and Equipment Rules of EngagementCollateral Damage Resource Allocation Time and Momentum Urban ISR Vulnerabilities Information OperationsEscalation Integration of Conventinal and Consider Alternatives and Risk, . Special Operations ForcesReduction Measures Coordination with Other AgenciesCharacteristics of Major Urban Operations DODDOA-004446 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/29678 4-1/fm/3-06/chap4.htrn.12/27/2004 NECESSITY OF URBAN OPERATIONS 4-1.1Early in. planning, commanders of a major operation address the necessity of conducting operations in urban areas located throughout their areas of operations (AOs). Chapter 1 discussed strategic and operational considerations that compel forces to operate in urban areas. These reasons include the location of the threat force; critical infrastructure or capabilities that are operationally or strategically Forty.Type of Strength.Forces 'sk management is the Escalation process of identifying, Casualties I assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making an Munibons VinarabMtiss I informed decision that.and balances risk cost with Equipment mission benefits. Time and.Collateral Moniantum.Damage Figure 4-1. Risk Management and the Risks Associated With Urban Operations valuable; the geographic location of an urban area; and the area's political, economic, or cultural significance. Several considerations exist, that may make UO unnecessary, unwarranted, or inefficient. When determining whether to operate in an urban environment, commanders consider the operational (and accidental) risks and balance them with mission benefits. The factors shown in Figure 4-1 highlight some measures to evaluate the risks associated with UO. FORCE STRENGTH 4-2. When facing prospective UO, commanders consider if they have troops available to conduct the operation properly and with acceptable risk. Under normal circumstances, large urban areas require many forces merely to establish control. New York City police department has over thirty thousand officers simply to conduct peacetime law enforcement. Major UO, particularly those that are opposed, will often require a significant number of forces. If commanders lack sufficient force to conduct effective operations, they may postpone or consider not initiating those operations until they have the necessary strength. Commanders add to their analysis the requirements for troop strength elsewhere in the AO. TYPE OF FORCES1 DODDOA-004447 4-3. Along with force strength, commanders consider the type of forces available. This consideration includes an assessment of their level of training in urban operations. All UO put a premium on well-trained, dismounted infant?) , units. Therefore, Army forces conducting UO should be force tailored to include a large infantry component. In addition, special operations forces (SOF) are invaluable in UO. SOF include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces. They should always be considered as part of the task organization. 4-4. UO include combined arms to ensure tactical success in combat. Although http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3 -06/chap4.htm 112/27/2004 masses of heavy forces are not normally required, successful UO require all the combined arms capabilities of all Army forces. Even if an urban operation is unlikely to involve offensive and defensive operations, field artillery may be essential to force protection. In urban stability operations and support operations, successful mission accomplishment requires more robust CA organizations. They are also valuable in urban offensive and defensive operations. While commanders may have sufficient combat and combat support forces, they may lack enough combat service support forces to provide the logistic support to maintain the tempo. Commanders without balanced types of forces, to include their proficiency in operating in urban environments, should consider alternatives to UO or delaying UO until proper force types are trained and available in sufficient numbers. CASUALTIES 4-5. Casualties in UO are more likely than in operations in other environments. In urban offense and defense, friendly and threat forces often engage at close range with little space to maneuver. The urban terrain provides numerous advantages to the urban defender; higher casualties occur among troops on the offensive, where frontal assaults may be the only tactical option. Conversely, defenders with limited ability to withdraw can also suffer high casualties when isolated and attacked. Casualties can be more difficult to prevent in urban stability operations and support operations because of the dense complex terrain, the close proximity of the urban population, and the possible difficulty in distinguishing friend from foe. The potential for high casualties and the subsequent need for casualty evacuation under difficult circumstances make the positioning and availability of adequate medical resources another important consideration. 4-6. Though casualties occur in all operations, commanders recognize the likelihood of more casualties during large-scale or high-intensity UO. During the battle for Hue in 1968, for example, many company-size units suffered more than 60 percent casualties in only a few days of offensive operations. Commanders conducting urban stability operations and support operations know the casualty risk and how it relates to national and strategic objectives. While a lower risk normally exists in stability operations and support operations than in offensive and defensive operations, just one casualty may adversely impact the success of the stability or support mission. A realistic understanding of the risk and the nature of casualties resulting from UO critically affect the decision-making process. If commanders assess the casualty risk as high, they ensure that their higher headquarters understands their assessment and that the objectives sought within the urban area are commensurate with the anticipated risk. MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT 4-7. Offensive and defensive operations in an urban environment put a premium on certain types of munitions and equipment. Forces may want to use vast amounts of precision munitions in the urban environment. At the tactical level, they will likely use more munitions than during operations in other environments. These munitions include— DODDOA-004448 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adIsc/view/public/296784-1/ftn/3... 112/27/2004 • Grenades (fragmentation, concussion, stun, riot control, and smoke). • Mortar ammunition (due to its rate of fire, responsiveness, and high-angle fire characteristic). • Explosives. • Small arms. Soldiers need access to special equipment necessary to execute small-unit tactics effectively. In urban stability operations and support operations, this equipment may include antiriot gear, such as batons, protective clothing, and other nonlethal crowd control devices. In urban offensive and defensive operations, special equipment can include sniper rifles, scaling ladders, knee and elbow pads, and door busters. Soldiers can conduct UO with standard clothing and military equipment. However, failure to equip them with the right types and quantities of munitions and special equipment will make mission success more difficult and costly. When commanders consider whether to conduct UO, they evaluate the ability of combat service support to provide the resources (see Chapter 9). COLLATERAL DAMAGE 4-8. UO require an expanded view of risk assessment. When considering risk to Army, joint, and multinational forces, commanders analyze the risk to the area's population and infrastructure. This comprehensive analysis includes the second­and third-order e DODDOA-004449 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 112/27/2004 Chapter 5 Foundations for Urban Operations 18Utilities such as electricity and water are as much weapons of war as rifles, artillery pieces or fighter aircraft. . . . In the case of Manila, where there was a noncombatant, civilian population of one million in place, it was the attacker's aim to capture the utilities which the defender planned to destroy. The Battle for Manila Commanders conducting major urban operations (UO) use their ability to visualize how doctrine and military capabilities are applied within the context of the urban environment. An operational framework is the basic foundation for this visualization. In turn, this visualization forms the basis of operational design and decisionmaking. To accurately visualize, describe, and direct the conduct of UO, commanders and their staffs understand the basic fundamentals applicable to most UO. They also understand how the urban environment affects the battlefield operating systems (BOS) and the tactical urban battle. Contents Urban Operational Framework Minimize Collateral Damage Separate Noncombatants from Combatants Assess Shape Restore Essential Services Preserve Critical Infrastructure Dominate Understand the Human Dimension Tranistion Fundamentals of Urban Operations Tranistion Control Perform Focused Information Operations General Effects on Operations Conduct Close Combat Battlefield Operating Systems Avoid the Attrition Approach Tactical Considerations Control the Essential . URBAN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK DODDOA-004450 5-1. Army leaders who have an urban area in their area of operations (AO) or are assigned missions in an urban area follow an urban operational framework. They identify the portion of the urban area essential to mission success, shape the area, precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area, and then transition control of the area to another agency. This framework divides into four essentials: assess, shape, dominate, and transition. These four components provide a means for conceptualizing the application of Army combat power and capabilities in the urban environment. The Army framework modifies the joint urban operations framework (understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition) to further clarify the JUO concepts within the context of Army capstone http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 doctrine found in FM 3-0. The framework for joint urban operations (JUO) provides the joint force commander a framework for planning and conducting JUO. FM 3-0 provides Army commanders with the operations process that provides a framework for planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. Army capstone doctrine, supported with the Army UO framework, is fully compatible with the concepts and purpose of the JUO framework. 5-2. The urban operational framework assists commanders in visualizing urban operations. This framework is simply an aid to the commander. Commanders combine the framework with- • The principles of war. • The tenets of Army operations. • The components of operational design. • Considerations for stability operations and support operations. • Characteristics of combat service support (CSS). • Staff estimates. • Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). • Each commander's experience. The framework contributes to the visualizing, describing, and directing aspects of leadership that make commanders the catalysts of the operational process (see Figure 5-1). In the same manner, the urban operational framework contributes to the overall operations process (see FM 3-0). DODDOA-004451 http://atiam.train.artny.mil/portallatia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3... 112/27/2004 URBAN OPERATIONAL • The urban operational frame FRAMEWORK vorkkhighlightskcritical aspect s of conducting U O. Considerations for 8 ements of zbi lity Operations • Co rrbined v,ith other analy-Operational Design and Support tical tools, the U 0 f ramevsor k Operations assists the commander in visualizing his mission and mission requirements. The f ramevsork also provides a mews for describing and directing subordinates. • The commander's vision of the U0 is then translated Characteristics Principles of Wa of Combat through planning guidance and intent into plans and Tenets of Army Senjce orders. SuPPort Operations UO FRAMEWORK Assess Shape Dominate Transition Figure 5-1. The Urban Operational Framework and Battle Command ASSESS 5-3. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments (FM 3-0). Commanders use visualization as their assessment method, staff officers use staff estimates, and all use the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. Commanders and staffs begin the assessment process by observing and then collecting information about the situation. They observe and learn about the urban environment, and factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. They use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means; information systems (INFOSYS); and reports from other headquarters, services, organizations, and agencies. Then they orient themselves to the situation and achieve situational understanding based on a common operational picture (COP) and continuously updated CCIR. Largely, the ability to rapidly and accurately assess the situation contributes to the commanders' abilities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during UO. Disproportionately Critical 5-4. The Army operations process requires continuous assessment; it precedes and guides every activity. In UO, however, assessment is disproportionately critical for several reasons. First, each urban environment is unique. Other environments can be studied and their characteristics quantified in a general manner with accuracy. This is fundamentally not true of different urban areas. The characteristics and experience in one urban area often have limited value and application to an urban area elsewhere. This characteristic sets UO apart from operations in other environments. DODDOA-004452 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 Extremely Dynamic 5-5. The urban environment is also extremely dynamic. Either deliberate destruction or collateral damage can quickly alter physical aspects of the urban environment. The human aspect is even more dynamic and potentially volatile. A friendly civil population, for example, can become hostile almost instantaneously. These dynamics (combined with initial difficulty of understanding and describing this unique environment) make it difficult for commanders and staffs to initially develop and maintain a COP and establish situational understanding. Furthermore, public reaction to media coverage of the urban operation and political changes influence national objectives and overall strategy. Such changes can affect the basic nature of an operation, especially after it has commenced. Anticipating these potential effects and developing appropriate branches and sequels based on an accurate assessment often determines how quickly commanders can achieve the desired end state. Risk Assessment 5-6. As in any environment, UO pose both tactical and accident risks. However, the level of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction can often be higher than that of many other environments. Such challenges increase the probability and severity of a potential loss due to the presence of the enemy, a hostile civilian group, or some other hazardous condition within the urban environment (see Necessity of Urban Operations in Chapter 4). Therefore, commanders- • Identify and assess hazards that may be encountered in executing their missions. • Develop and implement clear and practical control measures to eliminate unnecessary risk. • Continuously supervise and assess to ensure measures are properly executed and remain appropriate as the situation changes. Risk decisions are commanders' business. Staffs, subordinate leaders, and even individual soldiers also understand the risk management process and continuously look for hazards at their level or within their area of expertise. Any risks identified (with recommended risk reduction measures) are quickly elevated to the appropriate level within the chain of command (see FM 100-14). . Complex and Resource Intensive DODDOA-004453 5-7. The urban environment is the most complex of all the environments in which the Army conducts operations. It is comprised of a diverse civil population and complex, ill-defined physical components. A sophisticated net of functional, social, cultural, economic, and political institutions unites it. Thus, the analysis to understand the environment is also complex and time and resource intensive. The nuances of the urban environment can take years to uncover. Hence, constant analysis of the environment requires greater command attention and resources. http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adl se/view/pub lic/296784-1/fm/3-06/chap5 .htm 112/27/2004 Accurately assessing the environment is a prerequisite to shaping it, and both are critical to achieve domination. SHAPE 5-8. Shaping operations, part of all Army operations, are essential to successful UO. They set the conditions for decisive operations at the tactical level in the urban area. Rapid action, minimum friendly casualties, and acceptable collateral damage distinguish this success when the AO is properly shaped. Failure to adequately shape the urban AO creates unacceptable risk. The commander of a major urban operation has several resources with which to begin shaping the AO. Important capabilities include- • Fires. • Information operations. • Special operations capabilities. • The maneuver of major subordinate units. Isolation DODDOA-004454 5-9. Isolation of an urban environment is often the most critical component of shaping operations. Commanders whose AO includes operationally significant urban areas often conduct many shaping operations to isolate, or prevent isolation of, those areas from other parts of the AO. Likewise, commanders operating in the urban area focus on isolating decisive points and objectives in the urban area or from being isolated. Isolation is usually the key shaping action that affects UO. It applies Figure 5-2. Urban isolation across the range of Army operations. Most successful UO have effectively isolated the urban area. Failure to do so often contributed to a difficult or failed UO. In fact, the relationship between successful isolation and successful UO is so great that the threat often opposes isolation actions more strongly than operations executed in the urban area. In some situations, the success of isolation efforts has been decisive. This occurs when the isolation or imminent isolation of the urban area compels a defending enemy to withdraw or to surrender before beginning or completing decisive operations. In UO that are opposed, Army forces attempt to isolate the threat three ways: physically, electronically, and psychologically (see Figure 5-2). 5-10. Physical Isolation. In offensive UO, physical isolation keeps the threat from receiving information, supplies, and reinforcement while preventing him from withdrawing or breaking out. Conversely, a defending Army force attempts to avoid its own physical isolation. Simultaneously, this force conducts operations to http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 112/27/2004 isolate the threat outside, as they enter, or at selected locations in the urban area. Physical isolation can occur at all levels. In many situations, particularly major theater war (MTW), the commander of a major operation may attempt to isolate the entire urban area and all enemy forces defending or attacking it. At the tactical level, forces isolate and attack individual decisive points. In stability operations, physical isolation may be more subtly focused on isolating less obvious decisive points, such as a hostile civilian group's individual leaders. In many operations, isolation may be temporary and synchronized to facilitate a decisive operation elsewhere. To effectively isolate an urban area, air, space, and sea forces are necessary in addition to the capabilities of ground forces. 5-11. Electronic Isolation. Electronic isolation is achieved through offensive information operations (10). Electronic warfare (particularly two of its components: electronic warfare support and electronic attack) and computer network attack are critical to electronic isolation (see FM 100-6 and Information Operations in Chapter 4). At the operational level, offensive I0 aims to quickly and effectively control the information flow into and out of an urban area. This isolation separates the threat's comma DODDOA-004455 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adIsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/3... 112/27/2004 Chapter 6 Urban Offensive Operations . . . 23 Capture Suez City "provided it does not become a Stalingrad situation." Order to the Adan Armored Division prior to its 1973 attack on Suez City On the Banks of the Suez Offensive urban operations (UO) are one of the most challenging operations that military forces can undertake. Campaigns and wars have sometimes hinged on their success or failure. Costly in resources, even when successful, they are not 'ightly entered into. Once engaged, they are executed rapidly and decisively. For reasons already discussed, threat forces defending in UO may gain advantages from the environment while Army force capabilities may diminish. Despite the challenges, Army forces conduct successful urban offensive operations by combining the Army's existing offensive doctrine with a thorough understanding of the environment. Contents Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations Decisive Operations Characteristics of Urban Offensive Operations Forms and Types of Urban Offense Surprise Forms of Offensive Maneuver Concentration Types of Offensive Operations Tempo Urban Offensive Considerations Audacity Assess Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization Shape Sustaining Operations Dominate Shaping Operations Transition PURPOSE OF URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 6-1. Like all offensive operations, urban offensive operations are designed to impose the will of commanders on the threat. The urban offense often aims to destroy, defeat, or neutralize a threat force. However, the purpose may be to achieve some effect relating to the population or infrastructure of the urban area. Army forces may conduct offensive operations to secure a port or a communications center, to eliminate a threat to a friendly government or the urban population, or to deny the threat use of urban infrastructure. No matter the purpose, commanders use a combined arms approach for successful urban offensive operations. CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DODDOA-004456 http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... .12/27/2004 6-2. All offensive operations contain the characteristics of surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity (see FM 3-0). These characteristics also apply to urban offensive operations. SURPRISE 6-3. Army forces can achieve offensive surprise at two levels: operational and tactical. In urban offensive operations, operational surprise can be decisive. The goal is to attack the urban area before the threat expects it, from a direction he doesn't expect, or in a manner he doesn't expect. In major operations, this requires an attack against an area that appears to the threat to be safe from attack. Urban areas that meet this criterion are not easily accessible. Army forces launch such an attack in different ways: through a vertical assault using airborne or air assault forces, through an amphibious assault, or through a penetration followed by a rapid and deep advance. All three attacks aim to achieve surprise and to deny the threat time to prepare and establish a defense. Surprise in a major urban operation prevents a threat from falling back to occupy prepared positions in and around an urban area. 6-4. At lower tactical levels, forces achieve surprise by attacking asymmetrically. An asymmetric method attacks the threat so he cannot respond effectively. This may be achieved by using special operations forces (SOF) against a threat prepared for a conventional attack, by attacking decisively with heavy forces when the threat expects an effort by light forces or SOF, or by leveraging Army forces' extensive information operations (JO) capability. Offensive IO—primarily using IO elements of deception, electronic warfare, and operations security (OPSEC)--can help achieve surprise at all levels (see Chapter 4). Attacking at night surprises the threat and maximizes the Army forces' training, command and control (C2), and technological advantages. Attacking from unexpected or multiple directions achieves surprise by leveraging Army information systems (INFOSYS) and superior synchronization of combat power and capabilities. CONCENTRATION 6-5. In UO, the attacking force creates a major advantage by concentrating the effects of combat power at the point and time of its choosing. The area and its compartmented effects naturally disperse and dissipate combat capability. The environment also hinders repositioning forces rapidly. Such effects can work equally against defending and attacking forces. However, in a well-prepared defense, the defender often has the advantage of interior lines. The defender can reinforce or reposition forces more quickly using covered and concealed routes (such as, sewers, tunnels, or prepared holes made in walls). Successful U0 need synchronized air and ground maneuver with overwhelming effects from fires at decisive points on the urban battlefield. To achieve proper synchronization and precise effects, commanders consider the unique time and distance relationships set by the environment. TEMPO DODDOA-004457 http://atiarn.train.army.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fin/... 112/27/2004 6-6. Tempo is the rate of military action. Commanders understand that the tempo of urban operations differs from operations in more open terrain. The complexity and the potential risk of the urban environment may invoke a cautious and methodical response on the part of commanders and their staffs. While preparing and planning urban operations, commanders conducting major operations that include urban areas strive to maintain an active tempo in offensive operations. Often, the primary purpose of the threat's urban defense is to disrupt the rapid tempo of Army offensive operations. The synchronized application of combat power and anticipation of threat reactions achieve tempo. The rapid tempo of events places Army forces in positions of advantage and helps achieve surprise. Controlling operational tempo and not allowing the different tempo of urban operations to adversely affect other operations is a challenge for commanders of major operations. 24The Operational Context of Urban Operations Brittany Ports – August to September 1944 The plan for the invasion of Normandy, France, in June 1944 was meticulously developed. The plan not only addressed the invasion itself, but also contained detailed planning for the campaign to follow. A major concern of the detailed campaign planning was logistics. To address this critical concern, and specifically the problem of ports to supply the allied armies once ashore, the pre-invasion planning called for the major ports of the French province of Brittany—Brest, Lorient, and Saint Nazaire—to be objectives of General Patton's Third Army, once it was activated. Early August 1944, almost two months after the successful Normandy invasion, the operational situation significantly differed from that envisioned by the D-Day planners. General Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group was still fighting in the Bocage of Normandy. In contrast, General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group had just achieved a major breakthrough at Saint Lo, secured the Cotentin Peninsula, and reached the city of Avranches. Here was a decision point. Bradley and Eisenhower had to decide whether to adhere to the original plan and turn west with Patton's forces to secure the peninsula or to take advantage of the breakout at Saint Lo and turn east to exploit the disruption of the German defenses. Ultimately they reached a compromise. General Middleton's VIII Corps was tasked to secure the peninsula, and the bulk of Patton's Army, three Army corps, was turned northeast to exploit the operational collapse of the main German defenses. See Figure 61. - DODDOA-004458 http://atiam.train.anny.mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/296784-1/fm/3-... 112/27/2004 Figure 6-1. Initial Attack in Brittany Middleton's corps sprinted into the peninsula with the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions leading the way. However, poor communications, disagreements between commands, and contradictory orders caused the corps to hesitate before pushing the two divisions to continue to exploit toward the ports. The result: the 6th Armored Division missed an opportunity to seize Brest against light resistance by one day. The 4th Armored Division, after capturing the smaller port of Vannes, was also frustrated on the approaches to Lorient. The American reaction to the inability to rapidly seize the ports demonstrated an understanding of changing circumstances. The 6th Armored Division turned the attack at Brest to the 8th Infantry Division and then relieved the 4th Armored Division at Lorient. The 4th Armored was moved to rejoin the rest of Third Army exploiting to the east and north. Ultimately Brest fell to VIII Corps on 19 September after a 43-day siege by three infantry divisions. The victory yielded 36,000 German prisoners of war (POWs). However, the German defense and demolitions of the port left the port without an impact on the logistic situation of the allies. Brest cost the US Army almost 10,000 casualties and the commitment of significant supplies. The experience convinced commanders to surround and bypass the other major Brittany ports. Lorient and Saint Nazaire remained under German

Doc_nid: 
2609
Doc_type_num: 
75