Army Field Manual: Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Army Field Manual: Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. This manual is a joint publication of the armed forces. This publication provides military forces, civilians, and volunteer organizations with information pertaining to humanitarian assistance (HA) operations where the size or extent of the assistance requires the formulation of a US military joint task force UTF).

Saturday, October 1, 1994
Thursday, December 30, 2004





FM 100-23-1
FMFRP 7-16
ACCP 50-56
PACAFP 50-56
USAFEP 50-56


Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

FM 100-23-1 FMFRP 7-16 NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 ACCP 50-56 USAFEP 50-56 PACAFP -50-56

FM 100-23-1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

FMFRP 7-16 Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 Naval Doctrine Command
Norfolk, Virginia

ACCP 50-56 US Air Force Air Combat Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
USAFEP 50-56 US Air Forces Europe
Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany

PACAFP 50-56 Pacific Air Forces
Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii

31 October 1994


Multiservice Procedures
Humanitarian Assistance Operations


Preface . iv
Executive Summary . vi

Chapter 1 Overview . 1 1
Terminology . 1 -1 Types of Operations . 1 -2 Range of Operations . 1 -3 Environments of Operations .Principles of Operations . 1 -8 Other Considerations . 1 -9

Chapter 2 Strategic-Level Roles and Coordination .
2-0 Strategic-Level Authorities
2-0 International Authorities

Chapter 3 Operational-Level Roles and Responsibilities .
3-0 The Unified Command
3-0 Other Key Organizations
3-8 Areas for Cooperation of Effort

Chapter 4 Tactical-Level Organization and Coordination .
4-0 Joint Task Force Tailoring 4-0 Predeployment 4-2 Deployment 4-9 Employment
4-10 Redeployment 4-19 Transition and/or Termination 4-20
Chapter 5 Domestic Operations . 5-0 Legal Authority
5-1 Responsibilities
5-3 Disaster Assistance
5-6 Appendix A JTF Humanitarian Assistance Operations from 1983 through 1993 . A-1 Appendix B Legal Issues .

Appendix C Listing of Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations .

Appendix D United Nations Organizations for Humanitarian Assistance .
D-1 Appendix E Situation and Needs Assessment . E-1 Appendix F DOD and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Support .
F-1 Appendix G Disaster Assistance Response Team .
G-0 Appendix H Liaison Officers' Procedures and Checks . H-1 Appendix I Insignia of the United States Armed Forces . 1-1
Appendix J Lessons Learned from Recent HA Operations . J-1 Glossary .
Glossary-0 References .
References-1 Index .


This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.
FREDERICK M. FRANKS, JR. CHARLES C. KRULAK General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC Commander Commanding General Training and Doctrine Command Marine Corps Combat
Development Command

FREDERICK L. LEWIS JOHN M. LOH Rear Admiral, USN General, USAF Commander Commander Naval Doctrine Command Air Combat Command
FM 100-23-1/FMFRP 7-16/NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 ACCP 50-56/PACAFP 50-56/USAFEP 50-56
The procedures in this publication are authorized for use throughout the Combat Air Forces as indicated below.
US Air Forces Europe

General, USAF Commander

Colonel, USAF Director of Information Management
Pacific Air Forces

General, USAF

Colonel, USAF Director of Information Management
This publication is available through service publication systems.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
MARINE CORPS: PCN 140 071600 00

This publication provides military forces, civilians, and volunteer organizations with information pertaining to humanitarian assistance (HA) operations where the size or extent of the assistance requires the formulation of a US military joint task force UTF).

This publication provides common definitions, principles, and types of operations associated with HA. It describes the roles and functions of the military, civilian agencies. private voluntary organizations, and international organizations involved with HA at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This publication provides techniques for operational coordination between a JTF and
other organizations at the operational and tactical levels. It suggests connectivity between
the military and civilians involved with foreign humanitarian operations. HA provides the
JTF commander, his staff, and supporting components with information to assist in
planning and executing HA operations. It provides nonmilitary agencies supporting HA
operations with information regarding military HA operations.

All units supporting a humanitarian assistance JTF should use this publication for
planning and training purposes. This publication applies to operations conducted by
multiservice forces in a joint, interagency, or multinational environment. It can be useful
to nonmilitary agencies or foreign military units participating in coalition HA operations.
The techniques and procedures presented are generic and apply worldwide.

Participating major service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will
review this publication for joint procedural information. Once they validate the
information, OPRs should reference and incorporate it in the following service manuals,
regulations, and curricula.

The Army will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Army doctrine and
training publications as directed by the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine

The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine
Corps doctrinal and training publications as directed by the commanding general, US
Marine Corps Combat Development Command.



The Navy will validate and incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Navy doctrinal and training publications as directed by the commander, Naval Doctrine Command.

The Air Combat Command will incorporate the procedures according to Air Force Regulation 5-8 and HQ ACC/XPJ 01 5-1 (OPR: HQ ACC/XPJ). USAFE and PACAF will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures in accordance with applicable major command and other governing directives.

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the participation of the approving service commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000
DSN 680-3153, COMM (804) 727-3153


Commanding General
US Marine Corps Combat Development
2042 Broadway Street, Suite 214 BSIIN C18:3\4608,2&31¦12(1103) 640-3608


Naval Doctrine Command
1540 Gilbert Street
Norfolk, VA 23511-2785
DSN 565-0565, COMM (804) 445-0565

Commander Air Combat Command ATTN: XPJ 204 Dodd Boulevard. Suite 202 Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2778DSN 574-2985, COMM (804) 764-2985


Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceUS Agency for-International DevelopmentRoom 1262A 320 21st Street NW Washington, DC 20523-0008
(202) 647-7435

Director Air Land Sea Application Center114 Andrews Street, Suite 101 Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2785DSN 574-5934, (804) 764-5934
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do notrefer exclusively to men.

Multiservice Procedures
Humanitarian Assistance Operations

This tactics, techniques, and procedures manual describes US military JTF involvement in HA operations. Military and civilian after-action reports identify the need for expanded joint and interagency procedures to enhance military and civilianinteroperability. For a mission to conclude effectively, HA teams must understand the mission and the partners involved in the effort; that is the theme of this manual. This TTP describes the interaction among military and civilian agencies in terms of three main levels of effort: strategic, operational, and tactical.

Military involvement in humanitarian assistance is not new. In fact, military
humanitarian civil assistance operations are conducted on a regular basis. This manual,
however, pertains to large-scale situations requiring a military response in the form of a
joint task force. JTF response would be necessary because of the need for a quick response
reaction or the need for military logistics, security, or transportation capabilities. For HA,
a JTF must work and coordinate with a number of national and international agencies and
organizations who are also involved in the effort. Military members need to understand
that organizations may have been operating in the area before the JTF arrived. Civilian
organizations need to understand the nature of the responding military force as well. The
bottom line is that military commanders are likely to work with and depend heavily on
civilian organizations to complete their HA taskings. A JTF's HA mission cannot
successfully conclude unless in-place organizations operate effectively. Successful
interaction among organizations is key.

At the strategic level, national authorities and cabinet-level authorities determine broad
policy and forms of response. This chapter discusses coordination considerations at the policy
level, to include coordination with the United Nations (UN), other international organizations
(I0s), and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PV0S).

Regional commands and organizations finalize plans, determine the phases and timing of
efforts, and pull resources together at the operational level. This chapter addresses central
coordination that take place at the operational level and introduces the JTF level of response.

DODD0A-01 0029
TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION Tactical-level units execute the mission, which is the main thrust of this publication. This chapter provides detailedprocedures and considerations for HA operations. Itincludes a discussion of the CMOC. It includes a discussion of JTF organization and planning responsibilities for predeployment, deployment, employment, redeployment, and transition and/or termination.
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS The final chapter presents an overview of domestic HA operations as prescribed by Army Field Manual 100-19/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-10. 1 It provides comparative examples to foreign operations.
'Domestic Support Operations, 1 July 1993.

Chapter 1

Humanitarian assistance (HA) is different things to different audiences. It may be confused with peace operations, given thedevelopment of crises in Somalia, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, and Northern Iraq. Although HA operations may be conducted simultaneously with peace operations, they are different in natureand purpose.
This chapter discusses the terminology and types of operations, range of operations, environments of operations, and principles of operations peculiar to HA. United States (US) military forces tasked for HA operations include all active and reserve components of theUS Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and, when applicable, the Coast Guard. The objective of these military forces is to execute humanitarian missions when directed by cognizant legal authority.

HA includes programs conducted to relieve Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or reduce the results of natural or man-made are predominantly European national or
international, nonprofit citizen's voluntary

disasters or other endemic conditions such as
organizations. They are involved in such

human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that
diverse activities as education, technical

might present a serious threat to life or result
projects, relief, and refugee and development

in great damage or loss of property. HA
programs. Examples of NGOs include, but are

provided by US forces is limited in scope and
not limited to, religious; peace, disarmament,

duration. The assistance is designed to
environmental, development, and human

supplement or complement the efforts of the
rights groups.

host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for ' Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and providing HA'. Associated Terms. 8 September 1993.

Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are private, US-based, nonprofit organizations involved in humanitarian efforts including, but not limited to, relief, development, refugee assistance, environment, public policy, or global education.
International organizations (I0s) are organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with global influence.
Peace operations is the umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities—activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).
Peacekeeping (PK) operations are neutral military or paramilitary operations that areundertaken with the consent of all majorbelligerents. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truceand support diplomatic efforts to reach a long­term political settlement.
Peace-enforcement (PE) is the applicationof military force, or the threat of its use,normally pursuant to internationalauthorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctionsdesigned to maintain or restore peace andsupport diplomatic efforts to reach a long-termpolitical settlement. The primary purpose of PE is the restoration of peace under conditionsbroadly defined by the international community.


A chief purpose of military forces conducting foreign HA operations is to provide a secure environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to progress. As such, HA missions for US military may cover a broad range of taskings. In every case, the specific requirements placed on US soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will be situation­dependent. HA means vastly different thingsto different people, based on their specificperspective. HA. operations can encompassboth reactive programs, such as disaster relief, and proactive programs, such as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) or civil support.
DISASTER RELIEF Disaster relief operations can be conducted across the entire range of military operations and can range from domestic natural -disasters to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. HA missions- in the area of disaster relief include efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, and civil conflicts. Potential roles for US forces include the construction of basic sanitation facilities, repair of public
facilities, construction of shelters, provision offood and medical care, and immediate responseto relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property.

Refugee programs are specific programsdesigned to support the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. UN classifications ofpersons in these two categories are importantbecause of certain legal-ramifications and sanctions associated with these designations.Department of Defense (DOD), in JointPublication 1-02, defines these categories. Refugees are civilians who, by reason of real orimagined danger, have left home to seek safety across an international border. The UN definition of refugee is similar but specifies theperson is "outside his country of origin."Displaced persons are civilians who are involuntarily outside the natural boundaries of their country. Programs include-

Administration of camps.

Care (food, supplies, medical care, andprotection).

Placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations).

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The UN coordinates international refugee and displaced person programs as directed by the secretary general of the UN.

HCA is a component of the Nation Assistance Program, under purview of the foreign internal defense and development concept. HCA is normally a long-term proactive program coordinated by reg'_onal unified commands. Deployed military units conduct these activities, which include medical, dental, and veterinary care and some local infrastructure construction and repair.
Nation assistance furthers the establishment of an effective local government supporting the goal of crisis prevention. Nation assistance therefore includes those actions that assist in and support legitimate governments of host nations and counter attempts by destabilizing forces from within the affected nation. HCA is governed by Title 10, US Code, Section 401, which states that HCA-
• Must be carried out in conjunction withhost nation military and/or civilian personnel.

Shall complement and may not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided to the host nation by another department or agency of the US.

May not be provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

May not be provided unless the Department of State (DOS) specifically approves such assistance.

Civil supportis another long-term effort to assist local governments in domestic support areas such as repairs to infrastructures and actions that enable the existing government to govern. Civil support can also include environmental assistance-restoration, conservation, and protection of the environment. Civil support should not be considered a direct responsibility of HA operations; however, civil support-type activities invariably occur during HA and should be closely monitored to prevent expansion of the originally intended HA operation (see paragraph on Mission Creep in Chapter 3).


US military forces participate in three basic types of HA operations:
• Those coordinated by the UN.

Those where the US acts in concert with
other coalition forces.
Those where the US responds unilaterally.

The international process to conduct HA operations has been undergoing a period of rapid and fundamental change associated with the end of the Cold War. The UN has become more actively involved in worldwide HA missions. These include not only UN coordination of certain HA operations but in some cases the commitment of dedicated UN forces to the area of operations (AO).
UN-coordinated operations that involve military forces normally take the form of specifically designated peace operations. However, these operations can also be purely HA operations. In Somalia, for example, the UN agreed to provide security for relief efforts on the part oINGOs and PVOs. This support included the tasking of UN observers to monitor relief operations, making it the first occasion to use military observers for humanitarian relief.
Certain HA operations may begin as amultinational or unilateral US response and later become UN-sanctioned. The UN often experiences significant time delays as the organization works through the process of achieving international consensus. A unilateral or multinational response to a crisis situationmay be faster than a parallel UN response.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinationaloperations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. A coalition is a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Multinational operations are likely to occur in large-scale HA operations. The development of clearly defined command relationships for each coalition is an essential ingredient for successful HA operations. Tie relationship depends on two factors.
The first factor is the HA mission requirements and the duration of the HA operation.
The second factor is the political sensitivity exerted by the coalition partners involved in the HA operation.
During Operation Restore Hope, more than 40 countries offered initial assistance to participate in the HA effort. The types offorces, size of personnel commitments, dedication of supplies, and other contributions had to be carefully managedto match the requirements of the mission. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) developed a force data questionnaire and used it to gather information on each country's HA forces. This data was used to plan lift and support requirements and assist in the effective use of the forces once they reached Somalia. In addition, USCENTCOM organized a coalition working group andmet frequently to review the current status of nations participating in the HAoperation. These two techniques proved essential to managing the diversecontributions of coalition partners.
Based on USCENTCOM staff interviews
Foreign military forces receive guidance from their pi olitical leadership on how to interact with other members of the coalition and how to interact with specific agencies. Thediverse political goals of contributing nations affect military and nonmilitary coordinationand impact the command and control (C 2) structure.
Multinational HA operations provide unique and difficult challenges to coordination, which include language translation, cross-cultural sensitivities, and national per3pectives. Early detailed planning stresses establishment of essential liaison requirements.
In specific HA operations, the US Government may direct US military forces to act in concert with other US Government
departments without direct involvement of other nations. Such would normally occur in situations where the US decides to act on its own—for expediency or self interest—to rapidly respond to a crisis.
A joint force operation is a military operation in which more than one serviceparticipates. Virtually every large-scale HA operation will be a joint force operation
organized as a joint task force (JTF). The need for a joint response is based on the complementary nature of US armed forces for actions in the theater of operations.
Each service brings to the HA mission certain unique capabilities such as Air Force airlift, Navy sealift and construction (Seabees), Army civil affairs (CA), and Marinecombat service support (CSS), shipboard helicopters, and so forth. The JTF is thecentral focal point for coordinating all US military actions with other agencies, forces, and nations.
US military forces tasked to participate ina foreign HA operation will be part of a JTF, and, in all likelihood, that JTF will be part of alarger coalition response or multinational task force (MTF). The JTF is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. An example of a recent JTF to support HA was Operation Able
Manner/Safe Harbor, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1991 and 1992. A multiservice response was required when large numbers of Haitian immigrants were intercepted by US Coast Guard cutters in the Windward Passage and brought to Cuba. The commander of the joint task force (CJTF) was a US Marine Corps brigadier general who directed the joint service operation.
Initially, the USS Tortuga (LSD 46) provided temporary messing, berthing, and medical support for up to LOGO immigrants. As the JTF came on line, Army CA units, Navy Seabees, and Army engineer units established five holding camps to process and administer the Haitian immigrants. While their legal status was being determined, the JTF continued to provide security, food, medical care, and all aspects of public administration for the camps. (For additional examples of JTF responses, see Appendix A.)
Based on an interview with a participant of JTF Guantanamo
Individual services are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces that conduct HA operations. These forces must be capable of operating as individual units, with
other services in a joint or multinational environment, or, as is expected in HA
operations, within the context of an interagency scenario.

SMALL-UNIT OPERATIONS Small-unit operations include tasking of
individual units to provide tailored or specialized services. Such services, for example, would include tasking company-size medical units to provide emergency medical support in remote areas or short-term detachments of aircraft and personnel to provide quick-reaction transportation capabilities. Small-unit operations may be the
Chapter 1
precursor to large-scale HA missions or may be specifically designed to meet limited HA objectives.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) represent a wide range of operations occurring in both domestic and foreig n environments and include combat and noncombat operations. Specific operations include, but are not limited to— -

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).

Strikes and raids.

Arms control, enforcement of exclusion
zones, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Nation assistance.

Protection of shipping.

Humanitarian assistance.

Operations Urgent Fury, Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and Sea Angel and JTF Andrew are examples of MOOTW. As compared to war, MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations because of the overriding objective to limit potential hostilities. When conducted in foreign environments, MOOTW support the diplomatic instrument of national power, which highlights the criticality of both the military's supporting role and interagency operations for successful mission accomplishment.
HA operations are often conducted
simultaneously with other military missions. In most short-term, foreign HA operations, neutrality is an important aspect. Military forces should be aware that some nonmilitary agencies involved in HA operations, especially non-US agencies, do not see the US military as neutral. However, when they conn prehend the tremendous capabilities of the US military, with its unique warfighting and humanitarian
abilities, they become more receptive to increased interagency operations.
Peace operations—especially peace­enforcement—goals and objectives may differfrom HA goals and objectives both in scope and duration. Attitudes of host nationals or conflict belligerents may vary from helpful cooperation to forceful opposition, depending on whether

the military force is or is not perceived to be an HA force or a peace operations force. Many peace operations include HA considerations, even when not expressed in the peace operation mandate and mission. HA-type missions that could occur in conjunction with peace operations include-

Providing food, potable water, shelter, transportation, and engineer support to the resident population.

Assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, especially to isolated communities.

Providing emergency medical treatment and medical assistance programs for the prevention of disease.

Providing extraction and evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded civilians.

HA is an important MOOTW mission that the US military is uniquely qualified to plan and execute. Unlike any other single organization, the military has the organizational structure, educated and trained personnel, essential equipment, rapid


The US force commander, in collaboration with other responding organizations, should assess the environment in which US forces will conduct HA operations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest climate for HA operations.
Once the operational environment is confirmed, the US force commander determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the assigned tasking. The environment determines the rules of engagement (ROE) to be used within the AOs. For HA, the more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission. Environments that military forces can expect to encounter in the conduct of HA operations may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
worldwide deployability, and ability to operate in austere physical environments.
Examples of MOOTW range fromdomestic, support to combat operations.They i.nclude .JTF Andrew, 'OperationDesert Shield, Operation Urgent Fury, and Operation Provide Comfort. MOOTWinclude a wide range of' operations occurring in both domestic and kreienvironments, which include both tom at and noncornbat operations. HA employs
military assets to support as part of MOOTW. SinceMOOTW normally occur to support thepolitical/diplomatic instrument, the militarymay not be m the lead. This highlights the.criticality of interagency anaiNGO andPVO cooperation and coordination formission success.
Based on input from
the Center for Low-Intensity Conflict

A permissive environment is conducive to HA operations. Little or no opposition or resistance to HA forces is expected. A permissive environment is normally associated with pure relief operations following a natural disaster or economic collapse, with assistance provided at the request of the host government. Nonhostile, anti-US interests maattempt to disrupt US military activities. The physical security environment may be permissive; however, other nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be employed to impair credibility or reduce effectiveness of US military activities.
The distinction between HA in a permissive environment and in a hostile environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction will result in inadequate planning and unrealistic
Chapter 1

expectations. HA operations in a permissive environment are characterized by-

Commonality of purpose for all parties.

A quantifiable problem, often a single, natural disaster.

Clear objectives, provision of support until normalcy returns.

Host nation cooperation.

An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host government forces,whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended AO.

Hostile conditions, circumstances, and influences in the operational environment range from civil disorder or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. Forces conducting HA must be prepared for a full range ofcontingencies. Commanders can employ their forces to ensure the safety of the populace—defend the perimeter, provide escort convoys, screen the local populace, assist in personnel recovery operations, and
so forth. HA operations in a nonpermissive environment are often characterized by-

Multiple conflicting parties.

Imminent danger to all parties.

Relief used as a significant weapon that can be manipulated by combatants for political gain.

Relief efforts that take on the overtones of CSS.

The more hostile the environment in which HA is conducted, the less predictable the force actions will be toward meeting defined mission objectives. HA forces must be prepared to counter actions by hostile guerrillas attempting to disrupt friendly forces and to counter mass actions by a previously friendly populace. Commanders should not depend on their humanitarian mission to shield them from hostile acts. HA commanders, in conjunction with higher authority, must determine the appropriateness of the use of force. The effects of the environment on humanitarian activities are depicted in Figure 1-1. As the environment becomesprogressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security increases, while the capability for humanitarian activities, such as food distribution and medical assistance, decreases.

43 ,..10 .CP('

„Ne _es.4.1060` G N

vScr CP
1 I

Figure 1-1. Effects of Operational Environment on Humanitarian Activities

HA commanders, in conjunction with higher authority, must determine the appropriateness of the use of force. An unarmed HA force is acceptable only in a permissive environment. This kind of environment would normally be found only when HA forces are called to respond to a natural disaster, such as in Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh. In most HA situations, the force is armed. The CJTF must determine the proper level and types of armament, to
include riot control agents (RCA) or cayenne pepper spray (CPS), when applicable.
In a region with diverse ethnic, racial, or clique components, warring factions may be present. Consent of these factions makes relief efforts easier. In the absence of consent, a political or diplomatic decision is made if the situation demands armed intervention as a preliminary to render HA. The risks associated with forcible action have to be anticipated.


The major contributions that the US military provides to any HA operation is a responsible, self-contained force that assists other agencies in accomplishing humanitarian relief. Military forces are normally tasked to provide some sort of short-term response in an HA crisis situation, while civilian agencies supporting the same HA operation have a long­term perspective toward providing aid and assistance. Planners must consider the differing perspectives of assistance providers when coordinating an HA operation.
Military commanders and planners tasked to support HA should consider a few broad and enduring principles to maximize the effectiveness of force employment. Such consideration minimizes situational reactions, improves efficiency, and encourages interagency cooperation when US military forces initiate HA operations.

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
To achieve the objective, military commanders and planners should-
-Know that HA operations have different objectives than combat operations. Military units engaged in HA are tasked to supply a level of assets appropriate to the mission. Military units tasked with HA use a level of force appropriate to the mission.

Know that clarity in HA tasking and the military role in support of HA is essential.

Establish attainable and realistic HA goals.

Develop clear HA mission-termination end state standards and ensure that all involved military and civil agencies understand them.

Inform HA forces of the parameters and terms of reference within which they function.


Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
To attain unity of effort, US military commanders conducting HA operations-

Support, cooperate with, and take direction from US civil governmental authorities.

Establish clear lines of authority for HA forces.

Appreciate political/diplomatic factors affecting the chain of command.

Anticipate problems in focusing unity of command.


Prepare for the measured, protractedapplication of military capabilities to support strategic aims.
Commanders should balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for long-term objectives. They must be assured of the resources required topreserve and accomplish HA goals. The forces must be prepared to support the assigned HA objectivesand provide the necessary resources to accomplish the mission.

Never permit hostile factions to acquire anunexpected advantage.
To ensure security, US military commanders
Provide HA force protection against
virtually any person, element, or group.

Know that HA success is proportional to the secure environment of the operation.

Not underestimate the security risks to the force in either permissive or hostile environments. An inherent responsibility is the transition from a peaceful to combat posture, if needed.


Apply appropriate military capabilityprudently.
US military commanders will-

Be constrained in the conduct of operations.

Be advised of, promulgate, and understand detailed ROE. The inappropriate use of force may adversely affect legitimacy and neutrality.

Chapter 1

Establish appropriate channels to modify the ROE for unforeseen contingencies.

Adhere to established procedures, particularly in dealing with the civilian populace.

Understand that restraint is essential because a single act could cause critical political consequences.

Promote the willing acceptance by the
people of the right of the government to govern
or of a group or agency to make and carry out
US military commanders and planners should-

Ensure that HA operations adhere to internationally sanctioned standards.

Know that host nation governmental authority should remain genuine.

Know that neutrality is critical in gaining legitimacy. The purpose, delivery, or distribution of assistance should not be tied to the embracing or acceptance of any particular political, ethnic, social, economic, or religious creed by the intended beneficiaries.


Other areas a commander must consider when conducting HA operations include organizational preparedness, force tailorin g,cultural respect, funding authority, Title authority, legal authority, media coverage, and mission termination.
ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS A commander must anticipate requirements for C 2 structures. The C 2 structure that directs the overall HA operation (UN, JTF) must be organized and have sufficient resources to meet its responsibilities. The C2 structure must also be prepared to coordinate with nonmilitary groups, such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is part of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); mission donor coordination groups; UN agencies; and PVOs, NGOs, and I0s. Information/intelligence is essential to successful HA operations. HA commanders must be prepared to deal with the difficulties of
gathering, processing, and disseminating information in an HA environment. They must prepare forces for unique HA operations and anticipate equipping and training pipelines. Operational effectiveness can be directly enhanced and in-theater precrisis training minimized by periodic command post exercises.
Commanders must consider types, numbers, education and training, and equipment of HA forces in relation to the required HA tasks. They must tailor forces to meet specific HA objectives and requirements as well as potential threats.
US forces tasked with HA missions should be aware of the cultural diversity integral to international HA. US cultural perspectives may not be relevant to many foreign HA recipients or to some NGOs, PVDs, and I0s.


Military forces should avoid imposing ethnocentric standards on a group that resiststhose standards. For example, some cultures have clearly established guidelines for the consumption or avoidance of certain foods, the sanctity of religious structures, the appropriateness of certain types of behavior, and so on. Because of their beliefs, those cultures may refuse some forms of assistance.
Operations with a multinational task force present unicue cross-cultural challenges for HA forces. Nations that are traditional military rivals may, in a disaster situation, support the same HA operation. Extensive and effective liaison reduces cultural barriers.
The financial aspect of any HA operation is one of the biggest problems the CJTF faces. Logistics support can quickly accrue asi nificant level of expense. The longer the
A operation lasts, the greater the commitment of resources. Every HA operation must address the legal authority and mechanisms that allow US forces to acquire and disburse supplies and services. All parties participating in the HA mission must understand the fiscal constraints imposed on military forces.
Normally, US military forces participating in HA missions are reimbursed for expenses if certain criteria are met. USAID/OFDA coordinates payment of expenses for actions it requests DOD to perform. However, DOD must coordinate with USAID/OFDA before it expends the funds. Costs incurred or funds expended without prior USAID/OFDA coordination, or costs exceeding available USAID/OFDA resources, are not normally reimbursedwithout congressional action.
The President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as the National Command Authorities (NCA), approve HA missions. DOS requests DOD capabilities. The CJCS, by the authority and at the direction of the SECDEF, orders overseas deployments. The HA commander should be
aware of appropriate national and international directives, mandates, resolutions, or other documents related to the HA mission.
A military force is a legal, effective, and appropriate means for conducting an HA mission. To be legitimate, that force must exercise its authority for reasonable purposes and in accordance with international and domestic laws. HA forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. US military forces conducting HA must know the legitimate interests, prerogatives, and authority of various levels of civil government and agencies involved in HA and-act accordingly (see Appendix B).

Commanders at all levels should anticipate extensive media coverage of HA activities. News media representatives aremost likely on the scene or will soon arrive. Their interest in such operations is natural and should be facilitated to the maximum extent possible. Media coverage can assist the HA mission and support US nationalobjectives. The importance of understanding the media is not so that commanders can control it but so they can anticipate its impact on HA operations and plans. The NCA and others may also use media coverage to measure the success of the mission.
The CJTF and his staff should develop a detailed public affairs (PA) strategy for the HA operation. This strategy should incorporate SECDEF, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the supported commander in chiefs (CINC's) guidance. The CJTF and his staff maintain close coordination with the senior DOS representative in the AOR, as well as with other government agencies such as USAID and the US Information Service (USIS).
Commanders should initiate planning for mission completion at the earliest possibleopportunity. Although determining the parameters of the mission is part of the initial tasking, commanders should anticipate elusive, ill-defined mission completion criteria.
Chapter 1

Commanders should engage civil agencies in ensure that clear guidelines are established developing mission completion criteria and with host nation agencies.
Chapter 2


This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of the principal governmental, civil, and military organizations involved in formulating HA responses in foreign nations. It includes an example of an interagency coordination process at the strategic level based on recent activities associated with presidential review. Interagency coordination requirements at the operational and tactical levels are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The information in this and subsequent chapters provides joint force commanders (JFCs), their staffs, and supporting unit commanders a basic understanding of governmental and civilian organizations and how they relate to the overall HA scheme. A basic understanding of these organizations should enhance the coordination process during HA operations.

Rarely can the resources and expertise of Such coordination is difficult because of one US Government agency or department differing budgetary authorities and the relative address the problems of all the participants in experience and competencies of the agenciesan HA operation. Therefore, true interagency involved. The complexity is compounded due tocoordination is essential for the effective the imperative for intensive coordination at all development and implementation of policy. levels of military engagement-strategic,
Chapter 2

operational, and tactical. While the armed forces have developed doctrinal techniques and procedures to facilitate coordination within their structures, they often do not match or harmonize with the techniques and procedures used by other governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations.
At the strategic level, the US authority begins with the NCA and continues through senior DOS and DOD representatives, with cooperation from other cabinet authorities and the total involvement of the supported and supporting combatant commanders. In UN operations, strategic-level planning is not as clearly defined. One of the challenges for US military planners at strategic levels is to determine when and with what other organizations to begin the coordination process.
NATIONAL AUTHORITIES Authorities on the US national level include the NCA the US Congress, DOS, DOD, other cabinet-level departments, and USAID. The NCA is supported in its decision-making process by the National Security Council (NSC) and in interagency coordination by the Administrator for USAID, who is the President's Special Coordinatorfor International Disaster Assistance.
National Command Authorities The President and SECDEF form the NCA. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the armed forces to execute military action. Only the NCA can authorize movement of troops and execution of military action. By law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action. The NCA may direct relief operations when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region of interest to the US, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation by itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of the armed forces. The issues its orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commanders.
National Security Council
The NSC is the principal forum to consider national security issues requiring presidential
decision. Its membership includes four statutory
members—the President, Vice-President,
Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.
The CJCS and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency serve as statutory advisors
to the NSC. The President may appoint other
advisors. By directive of 15 September 1993, the
NSC designated the USAID Administrator as
the Special Coordinator for International
Disaster Assistance. The special coordinator
(SC) performs his interagency coordination
functions for the US in complex international
emergencies through the interagency working
group (IWG) which he chairs or cochairs with a
representative of the NSC.


Cabinet-level authorities consist of DOS,
DOD, USAID, and other cabinet-level authorities.

Department of State
DOS or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA. Usually, the ambassador declares a disaster based upon a request for assistance from the host country government and input from the US country team. The US ambassador in a given country has authority to declare a disaster in order to provide immediate relief assistance and start the process that may lead to increased US assistance.
To determine the policy for a particular relief operation, DOS may also lead an IWG in those cases not convened by the SC or NSC. DOS is organized in functional and regional bureaus. The key participating bureau is the regional bureau of the affected country and may include the bureaus of Refugee Programs, International Organizational Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (see Figure 2-1).
Department of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal officer for policy coordination within DOD. He is responsible for developing the military policy for international HA and foreign relief operations. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs proposes

Humanitarian Assistance
Office of the SecretaryUSAID
Secretary Deputy Secretary
Executive Secretary
Political Economic, Business, and Affairs Agricultural Affairs
Economic andAfrican Affairs Business Affairs

East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
European and

Canadian Affairs
Near East Affairs
Inter-American Affairs
South Asian Affairs
Organization Affairs

Arms Control and
International Security

Political-Military Affairs.•
Human Rights &

and Migration
Oceans and International
Environmental and
Scientific Affairs

Coordination Management
and Policy


Foreign Service



Figure 2-1. Department of State Organization
the policy and oversees the administration of existing statutory programs (see Figure 2-2). DOD officials participate in IWGs that the SC or NSC normally chair or cochair. DOD is represented in other IWGs on humanitarian emergencies that either it, DOS, or USAID may chair -(see Figure 2-3).
Joint Staff
The primary joint staff-level proponent for HA policy is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5. In addition, the Director for Logistics, J4, through the logistics readiness center (LRC), oversees the execution of logistics support for HA operations that the servicesnormally carry out.
The Director for Operations, J3, gets involved when a military force is to be inserted into the AO as a part of the US response to the crisis. Figure 2-4 depicts the organization of the
joint staff and illustrates those directorates that interface to support HA.
Enthusiastic cooperation by supportingunified commands was also critical to success. The Transportation Command'sresident liaison officer effected much of the coordination for the strategic movement of coalition forces into the theater. Security assistance officers fromUS European Command and US PacificCommand, as well as defense attaches worldwide, received and responded to aUSCENTCOM-developed questionnairerequesting critical posture and supportrequirements data.
Operation Restore Hope—A USCENTCOM


The joint staff is responsible for designating Agency for International Development the supported and supporting commands for USAID plays an important role in providing
any operation, including HA missions. Once the HA Although not directly under the control ofrelationships of supported and supporting DOS, USAID coordinates activities at cabinet and CINCs have been established, detailed country team levels. Its efforts are executed in three coordination at the staff level will progress. phases—relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
Chairman Vice-Chairman

The Joint Staff
J1 J2 J3 J4
Manpower Personnel JS Support (DIA) Operations Logistics

J5 J6 J7.I J8
Strategic Plans C3 Operations Plans & Force Structure Resource &
& Policy Systems Interoperability Assessment

DJS — Director, Joint Staff VDJS — Vice-Director, Joint Staff

Figure 2-4. Joint Staff Interface for HA
Chapter 2

The USAID organization for HA is shown in Figure 2-5. Relief is usually coordinated under the auspices of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response. The bureau coordinates its efforts through OFDA. This office, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, participates in planning at the operational level.
Other Cabinet-Level Authorities
NSC and DOS have the authority to augment the IWG by requesting required expertise from cabinet-level offices. Cabinet-level representation depends on the nature of the operation under consideration. The Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation (DOT); the Office of Management and Budget; and the US Information Agency may play a role in the development of the strategic plan. For example, the Coast Guard, as an agent for DOT, has capabilities that can significantly enhance joint HA efforts. These include maritime search and rescue, port safety and security, marine environmental response, maritime refugee processing, maritime interception force operations, and law enforcement on navigable waters.

Interagency coordination parameters begin at the strategic level. For greatest effectiveness, coordination must begin at the first signs of a developing complex emergency. Above all, successful coordination involves comprehensively engaging all the organizational and functional tools at the appropriate points and places on the disaster time line in order to deal with the crisis.

Response Triad
Each HA situation is unique and requires a unique response. Three essential elements— political, military, and humanitarian—are present whenever HA is provided. The critical coordination of these elements can be portrayed as a response triad, as illustrated in Figure 2-6.

USAID Administrator
Deputy Administrator


Food for Peace
Private Voluntary Cooperation
Disaster Response

Regional Advisors
Office of American Schools and Foreign Disaster Hospitals Abroad Assistance
Mitigation and

Figure 2-5. USAID Organization for HA

USCENTCOM had to overcome the challenges of coordinating_with a variety of civilian agencies. The Department of State formed the Government Interagency Task Force, Somalia to coordinate the US Government response to the crisis. Near­continuous communication between the joint staff and USCENTCOM sewed asthe primary means of ensuring the unified commander s position receivedconsideration in interagency policy discussions.
Operation Restore Hope-A USCENTCOM

Commanders of a large-scale HA must carefully balance these essential elements to ensure success. Each element complements the other two and each must be represented at every level of HA, from policy making to distribution of relief supplies in the field.
US governmental, civil, and military authorities; other governments; the UN; and NGO, PVO, and I0relief agencies share
responsibilities for the conduct of humanitarian relief operations. With so many organizations involved, planners at the strategic and operational levels may encounter problems because the strategic plans and goals of these organizations may not be compatible with military objectives.
An effective response can be described as a triad at both national and international organizational levels. The components of such a triad are humanitarian, political, and security organizations. Effective US action in such an environment necessitates strong central coordination and leadership and should include interface with NGOs, PVOs, and 10s. The diverse participants compound the complexity of an operation. Appendix C discusses organizations that may be found in an AO conducting HA operations.
Special Coordinator for International DisasterAssistance
Through theNNSCNdirective of 15 September 1993, the USAID Administrator plays the major interagency coordinating function for the US Government in his designated capacity as the President's Special Coordinator forInternational Disaster Assistance. The principal
Political Military

Figure 2-6. Elements of the Response Triad
Chapter 2

staff backup for discharging this central coordinating function is OFDA.
When the NCA determines that a US response to a complex emergency may be required, the SC may be directed to convene an appropriate IWG to recommend the policy and actions that should be followed. The IWG merges information received from all appropriate cabinet-level representatives, to include the US ambassador to the UN, regional organizations, and the US ambassador or chief of the mission. The ambassador or chief of mission will usually gather input by consulting with the country team.
The IWG immediately develops an information collection plan and tasks all sources to implement the plan. The unified commander is an important source who will modify his own collection plan to support the requirement created by the complex emergency. This information is usually communicated through the country team but also follows channels throug,h the CJCS to the DOD representative on the IWG. Another potential source is the political advisor assigned to the CINC who can link directly with the DOS representative on theIWG. Figure 2-3 depicts the interagency coordination process at the strategic level.
Interagency Planning
Concurrently, the IWG develops a comprehensive strategy and plan of operations

Integration of strategic, operational, and tactical-level planning with other organizations involved in the HA operation is difficult. The main reason for this difficulty is that other organizational structures are not as defined as those in the military. As a result, no comparable match exists to that of the US military system.
This does not mean these organizations do not have a chain of command. Planning follows the concepts contained in each of their charters and often takes place on all levels. Further, some UN agency charters can be interpreted to have overlapping mandates. The organizations also tend to tailor their support to the crisis and, as a
with tasks for each of the key participants. Key to the development of a sound strategic plan is the inclusion of all elements that should be involved in .the crisis. The SC must ensure the integrity of this comprehensive process. In addition, to ensure a coordinated approach, the unified commander needs to consider how to integrate ongoing in­country programs under Title 10 authorities.
Key to the development of sound recommendations is including other elements that may be involved in the crisis. For example, DOS should consider the involvement of USAID, UN organizations, and NGOs, PVOs, and lOs that may be operating in the country. Various organizations may establish a crisis task force or crisis action team to manage the situation.
The difficulties in integrating strategic, operational, and tactical-level planning with the diverse mixture of other organizations involved can be minimized through an active interface role of the SC. The SC needs to facilitate the links between the military and those organizations whose structures and procedures are not as formally defined as those of the military. The SC is responsible for coordinating these planning and operational interfaces throughout the life cycle of a complex humanitarian emergency.

result, their network is more ad hoc than that found in a traditional military organization. For this reason, experience shows that relationships with organizations mature as an operation develops, and these relationships and linkages require constant nurturing. The roles and responsibilities of the organizations discussed below should provide military planners with the requisite knowledge to develop the interagency linkages needed to assure the success of an operation.
UNITED NATIONS The UN is involved in the entire spectrum of operations, ranging from prevention to relief,

through reconstruction and rehabilitation, to development. Usually, UN relief agencies establish independent networks to execute their humanitarian relief operations. Although the UN system seems to delegate as much as possible to the agency elements located in the field, a supervisory and support network can be traced from the UN headquarters to field officers.
A relief operation may occur due to man­made or natural causes. Although the UN may be involved in HA operations without a resolution from the Security Council or the General Assembly, the type of operations envisioned will probably be launched under the auspices of an approved UN resolution.
The UN organization for complex emergencies normally includes headquarters and field-components. The UN Under Secretary General for the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), as the UN emergency coordinator, normally serves as the headquarters component. Field-level organization currently relies on the resident coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP). The resident coordinator mobilizes and manages the UN country team and provides direction for the field relief effort. In most serious emergencies, the UN Secretary -General may appoint a special representative who reports directly to the Secretary General on all matters but also to the UN emergency coordinator (UNDHA) on humanitarian matters.
Many UN staff elements may get involved in the provision of humanitarian relief. Planners must understand the differences between the two major arms of the UN that participate in HA. The UN organization in New York deals with issues of policy and international security. Additionally, this arm maintains the command and control center that coordinates UN peace operations around the globe.
The UN organization in Geneva, on the other hand, deals specifically with HA. Although the involvement of UN staff elements isgoverned by
Uthe specifics of the situation, UNDHA is generally held responsible for coordinating HA at the equivalent US military strategic level. Strategic and operational planners should
consult representatives of this UN department when developing. recommendations for the involvement of-US military forces. This consultation may take place through USAID/ OFDA rather than through direct -UN-DOD/ unified command interface.
United Nations Objectives Military commanders of HA forces must have a working knowledge of the aims and objectives pursued by the UN organizations in the AO. This knowledge is essential during the planning process to reconcile the objectives of the military plan with UN HA objectives. These broad objectives are-
To keep the emergency from happening, or when an emergency threatens, to mitigate its effects.
To minimize human casualties and destruction of property by ensuring the survival of the maximum number of victims through effective relief actions.
• To reestablish self-sufficiency and essential services as soon as possible for all affected populations, with special attention to the most vulnerable segments such as children, the disabled, and the elderly.
To ensure that relief action promotes and does not impede rehabilitation and longer­term development efforts. Activities should contribute to long-term development goals.

To protect the main effort and humanitarian relief implementers through judicious use of the security component of the triad.

To find durable solutions as quickly as possible, with special attention to displaced and affected populations, while assuring protection and assistance in the process.

United Nations Peacekeeping Traditional UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) take place around the globe, where over 70 nations have contributed more than 75,000 troops. US military forces may conduct HA simultaneously or in coordination with a UN PKO. Therefore, commanders and staffs should understand success factors for UN PKOs and apply them to HA, particularly in the mission-
planning stages. Analysis indicates that for UN PKO to be successful-

Peacekeeping forces must have the support of all belligerent parties.

Presence of the peacekeeping force must be tied to ongoing efforts for a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

Hostile parties must be separated and substantially disarmed.

In addition, operations that do not meet these PKO success factors will have an even higher probability of failure when the following conditions exist:

The mandate is ambiguous or unclear.

The terrain is poor.

A clear cease-fire line does not exist.

Troops are deployed to cities.

Weapons are readily available.

The UN PKO chain of command is poorly disciplined.

United Nations Response The UN system is often called upon to assist the affected governments with large-scale relief operations. -The level of assistance and its effectiveness depend largely on the coordination efforts at both the international and country levels. The nature of the emergency also plays a large role in determining the specific support required. UN prevention and response can also be categorized as a triad of humanitarian, political, and security components analogous to the US triad mentioned earlier. See Appendix D for more detailed descriptions of UN agenciesthat support HA.

Outside of the UN, the primary international organizations participating in HA involve groupings of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. It is critical to point out that these groups are distinctly different and have separate mandates and staff organizations. They should not be considered as one organization.
Chapter 2
International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Three Red Cross organizations make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, and the individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations. The objective of the movement is to coordinate their entire range of activities. For example the statutes of the movement give the ICRC some flexibility in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions. Figure 2-7 depicts the relationships within the movement.
Neutrality is a vital aspect in the involvement of any Red Cross or Red Crescent organization in HA. Their objective is to protect their neutrality in reality and in perception. The protection of this neutrality is a key consideration for joint military planners and operators.
International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC is international only in the sense of its worldwide operations; it is essentially all Swiss. The ICRC works for the application of the provisions of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts and undertakes tasks incumbent upon it under this law. Founded in 1863, this international organization is based in Geneva and derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977.
The ICRC is distinct from the rest of the movement in that it has a protection mandate in addition to its relief assistance work. It acts principally in cases of conflict, ensuring legal protection for victims and acting as a neutral, independent humanitarian player in the most complex emergency situations. At times the ICRC may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, but its mandate is to function duringarmed conflict.

International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies. This organization was formed in 1919 and consists of the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their own countries. The mandate of the federation is to provide humanitarian relief during

States Party to the Geneva Conventions
of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent



International Committee
of Red Cross and

of the Red Cross Red Crescent Societies Geneva, founded 1919Geneva, founded 1863

National Red Cross
Red Crescent

International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement


International Red Cross
Figure 2-7. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Relationships
disasters. Red Cross and Red Crescent • The processing and movement of refugees organizations may provide assistance to other to countries offering them resettlement federation members through their opportunities. international alliance provisions. • The provision of orderly and planned
migration to meet emigration and immigration requirements of losing and
National Red Cross and Red Crescent
gaining countries.
Societies. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are created by countries to • The transfer of technology through the provide for humanitarian relief within their movement of qualified human resources to
own borders. promote economic, educational, and social advancement of developing countries.

International Organization for Migration The IOM has demonstrated a strong
competence in capacity-building for indigenousThe International Organization for Migration governments and NGOs. Namely, it conducts(IOM) performs three primary missions: interactive training workshops to increase
knowledge of disaster management and build teamwork for interagency preparation and response for complex emergencies.
The JTF may find many NGOs and PVOs in the AO. Over 350 agencies, many of which are capable of responcmg-in HA operations, are registered with USA=D. Some foreign-based organizations are not required to register in the US. USAID publishes a yearly report'that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organizations. This report should be part of the combatant commander's library. Appendix C contains a description of NGOs and PVDs thathave disaster-relief field experience. Disaster assistance evolution will likely expand the number of NGOs and PVOs in the future.
NGOs and PVOs, as they are known in North America, are organizations, both national and international, that are constituted separately from the ,government of the country in which they are fouked. They range from multimillion dollar organizations with decades of worldwide experience in disaster relief to newly created small organizations, dedicated to the particular disaster in question.
Military commanders and other decision makers should understand the following key elements about the NGO and PVO community:
• Military interactions with the NGO and PVO community should be coordinated with
' Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs. 1999.
Chapter 2
the US country team, particularly OFDA
disaster assistance response team (DART)

TheNcharacteristics, Nmissions.Nand capabilities of individual NGOs and PVOs are diverse. All are involved in direct humanitarian aid with host populations. Each organization operates individually.

NGOs and PVOs provide the bulk of HA at the grassroots level. The military structure can provide logistics and security assistance to remote and unsecured areas.

NGOs and PVOs may operate in areas of high risk, where other organizations are hesitant to go.

NGO and PVO assessments are often an excellent source of information on the HA situation,

NGOs and PVOs are funded primarily by donations from the public as well as governments and the UN. They may have scarce resources, both at the donor level and in the field.

NGOs and PVOs will probably operate in the affected area long after the military leaves. Therefore, military commanders should consider the implications of any US military HA projects they initiate in the field.


Chapter 3


This chapter describes military and nonmilitary agencies involved at the operational level of HA operations. Notional coordination frameworks are provided to illustrate potential connectivity at the operational level. Additionally, the strategic elements the CINC considers to organize his HA joint task force are presented as linkages to operational focus.
Readers will develop an understanding of how policy guidance
leads to mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action for
both military and civilian agencies. With better understanding of
these matters, action agencies and staffs can improve
interoperability at their level Military planners must be aware of
the interagency operations associated with HA relationships and
their impact on policy formulation.

The military's operational-level organization SHAPING THE MISSION is the unified command, which is responsible for
Developing the HA military mission
a region known as a theater of operations. The
statement is a difficult but critical task for the
CINC establishes the operational objectives
CINC and his staff. The strategic mission
needed to transform national-level policy and
statement should aim for an understandable
guidance into effective HA operations. The CINC
and achievable strategic end state, even for a
provides authoritative direction, initiates
short-duration operation. The mission
actions, sequences events, and applies resources
statement is normally coordinated through an
to bring about and sustain the military interagency process that the CINC formulates
contribution to HA. with the assistance of USAID/OFDA.
Chapter 3

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance andarranged support and resources for theoperational commander. The commanderof the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force

(1 MEF) commanded a JTFCTFcomposed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF)components, in addition to the forcesprovided by countries contributing to theUS-led, combined coalition.
As the responsible unified command,USCENTCOM performed numeroustasks contributing to the success ofOperation Restore Hope. Key areasincluded shaping a clear, achievablemission statement for the operational commander, shaping an internationalcoalition, and orchestrating the transitionto eventual UN control.
Based on Operation Restore Hope—A USCENTCOM Perspective
Mission Statement
Some key considerations in developing a mission statement include-

Higher strategic direction.

The desired end state.

Security of the operation.

Military assistance to USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.

Use of CA units.

The military command must have a clear and achievable statement so that the many participating military units can be tasked. The USCENTCOM mission statement for Operation Restore Hope is one example.
When directed by the NCA, the commander in chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT) conducts joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major airports and seaports,
key installations, and food distribution points; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

Desired End State
The HA mission should produce a desired, end state collaborated by strategic-level political, military, and humanitarian ((response triad) participants. Whenever possible, the desired end state should be known before US forces are committed. However, this may not be possible. If the desired end state is not known and US forces have deployed, the unified commander may be required to formulate one. The concept of. operations may include the desired end state and be used to develop the following:

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

Phases of the operation.

• Information used to transition JTF responsibilities to other forces, organizations, or governing bodies.

Mission Creep
Military forces will undoubtedly receive numerous requests to perform additional tasks, as was the case in Somalia. The UN, for example, wanted the multinational force to
expand its operation beyond the area of
greatest need to establish a presence in the northern part of the country. The UN also pressed the force to begin disarming factional militia.
These tasks represented the'phenomenon labeled mission creep. In essence, due to political agendas, key participants in the operation sought to expand the unified task force(UNI TAF) activities and AOs beyond the initial,
carefully limited scope of securing theenvironment for humanitarian relief operations.USCENTCOM had to work through the

interagency coordination process to respond to the mission creep tendencies.
The mission creep phenomenonunderscores the importance of developinga definitive mission statement early on—astatement that ensures parties involvedunderstand the limits of the commander's charter. The phenomenon also points outthe difficulty of achieving consensus whenother agencies with key roles in theoperation have differing_views of thedesired end state .. . .CINCCENT exercised patience and pragmatism in overcomingthese attempts to change his mission without NCA directive.
Operation Restore Hope—A USCENTCOMPerspective
The unified CINC for the affected region is responsible for developing the military response to HA operations. In addition to the Title 10 responsibilities (see Chapter 1), the CINC may create a JTF to accomplish the HA mission. Once the CINC decides to organize a task force to execute an HA operation, he may organize and send a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area to acquire information necessary to develop a clear mission statement and plan for the operation. He may also opt to establish offices at his headquarters to administer the unique requirements of HA. These could include a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) or similar crisis action organization to assist the CINC in planning and executing_ the operation, a logistics operations center (LOC), and a liaison section.
Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team Assessment is a fundamental task for providing effective disaster relief and HA. The HAST deploys to the area of responsibility (AOR) to assess the existing conditions and the need for follow-on forces. Normally, the CINC deploys the HAST, which is made up ofpersonnel from staff sections appropriate to
the mission. If possible, the HAST leader coordinates with other staff sections prior todeployment to determine relationships andresponsibilities. Additional details on situationand needs assessments is provided inAppendix E. The HAST should-

Conduct reconnaissance to determine the nature and extent of the food and water supply; loss of life, injury, and illness;numbers of displaced persons; disruptionof the government; presence of medicalrepresentatives; status of communicationsand facilities; and destruction of propertyand infrastructure.

Formulate recommendations on HA missions and desired capabilities.

Establish liaison and coordinate assessments with host nation agencies, supportedcommanders or their representatives, USdiplomatic personnel, and other relief

• Arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment in concert with the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
In emergency cases, to relieve suffering and life-threatening situations, the CINC can direct the HAST to begin HA-type missions. In suchcases, the CINC and his staff identifyrelationships and authority with the host nation, embassy, and USAID personnel. Such emergencies require specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medicalsupplies (NGO, PVO, and I0 materials or military supplies). Prior to deployment, the CINC and his staff provide the HAST with the following

Current HA operations.

A threat assessment, to include anymedical threats.

Mapping, charting, and geodesy support.

Terms of reference for HA operations.

Persons to contact at embassies and DOS before contacting relief agencies.

PA guidance.

Logistics Operations Center
Logistics support requirements vary,depending on the magnitude of the operation
and the type and amount of relief the host country requests. The LOC is the point of contact for implementing a timely and flexible logistics response for the CINC. This response includes alerting key logistics agencies, locating and releasing required supplies, moving supplies to departure airfields and seaports of embarkation, and delivering supplies to the required area.
Movement of initial relief supplies and equipment is, in most cases, accomplished by airlift resources. These movements should include the coordination of types of supplies and arrival times with other US and foreign agencies involved in the effort. The LOC is also responsible for planning and coordinating aspects of force deployment and sustainment operations.
Coalition Unit Liaison Elements
In conjunction with US operations, other nations might deploy military forces to operate with the JTF. Some coalition units may provide liaison elements at the CINC as well as the JTF level.
Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Center
The CINC may establish an HACC to assist with interagency planning and coordination. Staffing for the HACC should include a USAID and OFDA advisor/liaison officer who serves as the HACC director, an NCO/PVO advisor, a CA officer, a legal advisor, a PA officer, and other augmentation as required. The HACC provides the link among the CINC, USAID and OFDA, NGOs and PVOs, and other agencies that might participate.
Each CINC will establish an organizational structure to meet the humanitarian needs of that particular theater and operation. USCENTCOM established an HACC within the J5 Politico Military Division at the headquarters level to support Operation Restore Hope.
Chapter 3
An example of an operational-level unified
command, with appropriate sections unique to
HA, is shown in Figure 3-1.

The HACC's mission was to provide
tion Restore Hope_coordination and
liaison between HQ, USCENTCOM arid
NGOs, PV0s, and TOs..The HACC
assisted with US interagency planning and
implementation of humanitarian assistance
activities in Somalia, including the transition
to UN control. The HACC helped facilitate
the-timely interagency_staffing of actions
regarding NGO, PVO, and 10 (UN)
concerns that were elevated -to -the
international headquarters # level. - The
HACC also served a unique advocacy..role,.
supported by its interagency staffing, by
being able to represent both milit
specific as well as NGO- and PVO-spe
issues and concerns.

Based on the size and nature of HA operations, a CINC may designate a JTF to conduct the military's operation. Creating a JTF is one option available to a CINC. This paragraph provides an overview of a typical JTF headquarters staff and addresses CINC­level considerations in organizing the JTF and in selecting specialized forces for an HA response.
The CINC develops the HA mission statement and concept of operations based upon the direction of the NCA. Input—including requests from USAID/OFDA, situational factors (crises caused by man, weather, volcanic, or seismic activity), and the time military forces enter the disaster area-affects the mission statement. The CINC develops a list of requisite capabilities, based upon analysis of the foregoing, and tasks his components to identify forces for a specified set of capabilities. The components establish a force list (personnel, equipment, and supplies) with associated movement requirements. The CINC approves or disapproves the components' force lists,

NCA .UN SecurityCouncil
CJCS — — — —
Unified Command d UN Units




Command and control JTF Coordination
Figure 3-1. Unified Command Structure
establishes the JTF headquarters, and assigns Joint Pub 3-0 1 providesgeneral guidance approved forces to the JTF. relating to joint operations and Joint Pub 5-00.2 discusses the JTF. Joint
Where one commander may choose to use
Pub 4-0 provides general guidance for
a JTF to accomplish a given mission, another
logistics support of joint operations.
may choose an alternate course of action; however, JTFs are ideally suited to perform To enhance coordination and execution, the the HA mission. They are successful due to the JTF commander may define variousadaptive nature of their command and control geographical AOs under the operational controlorganization, the unique capabilities of service of a component commander or a particularcomponents, and the ability to quickly deploy nation's forces as in the case of multinational personnel and equipment to execute any operations. Chapter 4 contains detailsnumber of diverse HA missions. concerning administration and operation of
geographic areas.
The JTF may be a two-tier command, which simplifies the chain of command Organizationbetween the CINC and JTF commander and
The JTF organization resembles traditional
minimizes potential confusion and logistics military organizations with a commander,
problems that could surface during joint force
command element, and forces required to execute
operations. The CINC determines the
the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF
command relationships for the JTF. This
headquarters is command, control, and
command relationship may include a
administration of the JTF. During HA operations,
subunified commander or a service component the JTF headquarters must provide the basis for
commander who, based on CINC guidance, a unified effort, centralized direction, and
establishes a JTF.
decentralized execution. Unique aspects of the The CINC establishes the JTF when the HA mission compel the JTF headquarters to beespecially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of
mission has a specific limited objective and
the capabilities and limitations of the components
does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF requires
Doctrine for Joint Operations. September 1993.
execution of responsibilities and close
Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,
integration of effort involving two or more
September 1991.
services. The JTF is dissolved when the ' Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, purpose for which it was created is achieved. September 1992.
Chapter 3

of the JTF. Additional and specific functional • Government and international laws and
areas may be added to the JTF headquarters as Nagreements.
necessary. See Figure 3-2 for a typical HQ JTF • Military-political liaison.
staff organization. Areas that may e augmented • Claims and contingency contracting.
by additional personnel include—

• Humanitarian operations center (HOC)

Staff judge advocate (SJA).

and civil-military operations center

PA. (CMOC) operations.

Health services. Consistence of legal advice is imperative. Attorneys from coalition forces should be


integrated into the planning and relief effort

Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC).

at alliohases of the operation. See Appendix B

Meteorology and oceanography (METOC). for additional information on legal issues.

Communications. Public Affairs. In most HA operations, theStaff Judge Advocate. HA operations present JTF establishes a joint information bureauunique requirements in regard to international and (JIB) to coordinate the release of informationoperational law. SJAs may be required to have and news media requests for information. JIB

expertise regarding- personnel provide command information (internal information) on the activities of US
• Refugees.
military personnel engaged in HA operations

• Displaced and detained civilians.
and facilitate civilian news media

Rules of engagement.

representatives in their coverage of JTF

Psychological operations (PSYOP). activities. Additionally, JIB personnel offer

Medical support. training in media relations for commanders, staffs, and other JTF personnel. The JIB

Laws of war.

prepares and executes the JTF PA strate

• Civil affairs.
This strategy serves the public's right to e

• Local cultures and customs.
informed while minimizing risks of disclosing

Personal DEPCJTF



J1 J2 J3 J5 J6
Personnel Intelligence Operations Logistics Plans

HO Comdt/ Public

I Admin
Support Affairs Chaplain surgeon SJA 1 Comptroller
I Fi
Command and control

1 Special advisor Coordination
or to CJTF

Figure 3-2. Typical HO JTF Staff Organization

unauthorized information through effective
security at the source.
PA supports the policies of maximum disclosure with minimum delay; open and independent reporting; and full and balanced coverage of operations. PA provides factual information on all aspects of the operation. A good PA plan fulfills the military's obligation to keep the public informed, minimizing the risk through security at the source and operational security awareness.
Staff Surgeon. The surgeon is a critical JTF staff member during HA efforts. HA missions are often conducted inareas where the biggest enemy is disease. The JTF surgeon's advice is critical for the commander to protect the force and determine relief requirements.
Special Staff Sections. The JTF commander may establish additional sections within the JTF to emphasize important functions such as coordination, logistics, security, and liaison. Chapter 4 elaborates on the tasks and functions of these sections. Sections tailored for HA include the coalition liaison section, the CMOC, and the LOC.
Coalition Liaison Section. This section is developed within the JTF. Its primary purpose is to coordinate and manage the high volume of military contributions offered by various countries. This responsibility may be assigned as an additional duty within the J3 section.
Civil-Military Operations Center. This section is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Logistics Operations Center. If formed, the LOC has the additional duty of tracking and managing coalition forces logistics needs and coordinating logistics management and flowwith other agencies in the operation.
Special Operations Forces..SOF have capabilities well suited to the requirements of HA operations. However, their capabilities are often misunderstood. Certain SOF are well qualified to assist in US Government-sponsored HA activities in remote areas, especially in a conflict environment. SOF teams are adaptable and capable of operating effectively in remote areas and urban areas isolated by disaster events. The teams may be able to provide detailed reports and assessments on conditions in the area. They deploy rapidly, have excellent radio communications capabilities, and work well with indigenous ethnic groups.
If SOF are assigned to the JTF, the CINC must clearly delineate their roles, missions, and functions. SOF have two inherent disciplines that can best be applied toward HArequirements: CA and PSYOP. CA units, PSYOP forces, and Army Special Forces operational detachments-A (SF ODA) comprise the SOF team.
Civil Affairs Units. Army CA units are special operations forces. They are designed to perform a variety of functional area skills to support HA. Most CA units are in the reserve components and thus require a presidential call-up. These units are organized to provide support to all levels of government. ReserveCA personnel routinely perform theirfunctional area skills as part of their civilian
jobs. This working knowledge is especially
useful in assisting civil governments and their
citizens in disasters.
The units' functional specialty capabilities are normally tailored to particular situations. They assess the damage to the civilinfrastructure, assist in the operation oftemporary shelters, and manage a CMOC. CAunits also serve as liaison between the military and local relief organizations; PVOs,NGOs, and 10s; the UN; and OFDA DART.
CA units are usually attached to thevarious maneuver commanders assigned to the JTF. When the JTF is employed, CA units establish and maintain relations between the JTF and host nation _populace and authorities, as well as with NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied, and indigenous security forces; the host nation; and NGOs and PVOs.
CA units can provide the JTF with expertise on factors that directly affectmilitary operations in foreign HA. These factors include-

Host nation agencies and other civil centers.

Ethnic differences and resentments.

Linguistic regions and subregions.

Social structures (familial, regional,generational).

Religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors).

Political structures (power distribution and entrenchment).

Economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth).

Linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics.

A cultural history of the area.

Historic relations with the west.

Attitudes toward the west/military forces.

CA units may include military forces carrying out activities that are normally the responsibility of the local or indigenous government. Selection of CA units must be based on a clear concept of the CA mission requirements for HA. Joint Pub 3-57 4 providesspecific guidance. The CINC should consider the following when employing CA units-

Most CA units and personnel need to be activated from the reserve establishment.

If the JTF conducts civic action programs, CA units should be assigned as a primary staff element.

CA units support the unified commander, other JFCs or subordinate components of the JTF, and the CMOC.

Psychological Operations Forces. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected foreign groups. These messages are intended to promote particular themes that can result in
Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, Novemmber 1993.
Chapter 3
Both the UN and relief agencies were
proponents of UNITAF conducting civic
actions projects. USCINCCENT supported
the field commander's position of limiting
this activity to short-term pAects that did
not compromise the UNITAF primary
mission. A specific issue that surfaced
during the initial stages of force
developthent was the requirement for a

large CA contingent
USCENTCOM, in coordination with the
interagency and UNITAF commander,
determined that deployment of large
numbers of CA personnel was unwarranted,
given the limited scope of the operation.
Future operations may involve mission
tasks related to rehabilitation and
reconstruction of civil administration. In such
cases, a larger.CA force may be appropriate

for inclusion in the;force list
Operation Restore Hope—A USCENTCOM
desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. Such information may include safety, health, and public service messages, as well as messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forcesand operations.
PSYOP units are equipped with portable printing presses, loudspeakers, radio broadcasting stations, and other equipment that enables them to deliver messages in many diverse media. PSYOP personnel can provide a commander with real-time analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and the effectiveness of theinformation being disseminated.
PSYOP can play a significant role in HA operations. US and/or coalition forces may have to overcome hostile attitudes of the local populace. Forces involved in HA operations must avoid any hint of favoritism. The image to be projected is that of sympathetic competence; military forces are there to reduce the suffering of the indigenous people. The CJTF determines the requirements for a joint PSYOP task force to


support a JTF in the earliest stages of planning for the operation. PSYOP forces can begin to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences prior to the introduction of forces. Their early introduction into the theater can reduce hostile attitudes and increase the acceptance of US forces supporting the HA operation. Joint Pub 3-53' provides general guidance.
Army Special Forces OperationalDetachments-A. Because only one active duty CA battalion exists for short-notice commitment worldwide, planners must have contingency options to have other forces fulfill critical functions based on the limited availability of these active duty and reserve personnel. SF ODAs are a possible alternative and can contribute to the HA effort in the following manner:

By identifying HA needs (areas and specific requirements) during the conduct of reconnaissance or advance force operations.

By being cross-trained to perform CA liaison functions.

By serving as coalition support teams (CSTs)to provide liaison with coalition units.

It may be beneficial to augment the CJTF's staff with a group of experts from the regional CINC's staff. For example, the commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) would deploy his staff to the forward area and work directly with the CJTF for the duration of the HA operation.
The deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) consists of designated experts in communications, coordination, logistics, planning, and PA. The DJTFAC is equipped with the necessary Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer terminals and communications equipment to enter movement data and transportation requirements into the system or database. The DJTFAC is tailored to complement the normal staff of the CJTF.
Another augmentation example is the HAST employed by USCENTCOM. The HAST is made up of representatives from various sections of the CENTCOM staff. This advance team is normally temporal and may be subsumed into the JTF. Augmentation by the HAST can provide critical continuity between the advanced party and the main task force.


Coordination of the military and civil aspects of HA operations is imperative. Interagency cooperation, planning, and connectivity are essential for success of the operation. Interagency frameworks introduced at the operational level better enable the key organizations to orchestrate the total HA effort within the theater. An array of civilian agencies coordinates with military forces conducting HA. Some of these agencies represent concerns of their respective governments, while others represent high-profile international organizations. Essential interactions take place at the operational level. Key organizations may include—
Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 30 July 1993.

US Government agencies (USAID/OFDA).

NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.

Country team.

Unified commander (CINC).

Joint task force.

UN agencies and multinational forces.

NGOs, PVOs, and lOs.

Host nation.


USAID/OFDA administers the President's authority to coordinate the provision of assistance in response to disasters, as declared by the ambassador within the country or higher DOS authority. USAID/OFDA has the authority to provide assistance, notwithstanding any other provision of law. This authority allows USAID/ DFDA to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of NGOs and PVOs and other sources of relief. USAID/OFDA is responsible for-

Organizing and coordinating the total US Government disaster relief response.

Responding to mission requests for disaster assistance.

Initiating the necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.

Coordinating assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs and PVOs.

The authority to provide foreign disaster relief comes from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides for assistance to-
• Preserve life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events that cause disasters.
Preserve life and minimize suffering by
responding to natural and man-made

Foster self-sufficiency among disaster­prone nations by helping them achievesome measure of preparedness.

Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate responses to requests for aid.

Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs.

USAID /OFDA can coordinate directly with DOD for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected nation and for arranging DOD transportation. DOD Directive 5100.46 6 establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (DASD HRA) is the primary point of contact. When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift),
' Foreign Disaster Relief 4 December 1992
Chapter 3
USAID/OFDA pays for those services/ commodities. The CINC should have a coordination linkage with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID/ OFDA provides an excellent means for military and civilian operational-level coordination. Fordetails on OFDA and coordination with DOD, see Appendix F.
USAID/OFDA has the capability to deploy a DART into the AOR to manage the US Government humanitarian relief effort. For details on the OFDA DART, see Appendix G. Once committed to an operation, USAID/ OFDA should establish liaison with an HAST assembled by the appropriate CINC.
USAID/OFDA has operational links and grant relationships with many NGOs and PVOs that have relief programs outside the US. Other frequent USAID/OFDA collaborators include ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UNDHA,United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP).OFDA also coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational orpolitical problems. Figure 3-3 depicts operational-level connectivity.
As the President's representative, the senior US diplomat in country is responsible for the overall coordination of USforeign HA. OFDA assists the embassy and USAID in coordinating and conducting operational assessments. These assessments vary in their results from provision of funding to the provision of supplies and services and/or the deployment of an OFDA DART. Also, depending on the nature of the situation, OFDA may request logistics support fromDOD. If the SECDEF, through the CJCS, supports the OFDA request, a CINC can provide military assistance.

Relationships with nonmilitary agencies should be based on an appreciation of missions, lines of communication, and standardization of

DOD DOS 1 Crisis Task Force I
UN Special

Representative MD

Figure 3-3. Operational

support. Not all NGOs, PVOs, and IOs appreciate military involvement in HA operations. Because of fundamental mandates or human rights beliefs, some NGO, PVO, and IO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces.
Cooperation among military and civilian activities is imperative for a successful operation. When joint operations occur, military and civilian leaders must outline clear roles and

Action Group



Command and control
Level Connectivity
responsibilities. Cooperation can be gained and maintained if agencies understand one anothers' missions. Commanders may find it beneficial to employ third parties for liaison and coordination with those NGOs and PVOs that are reluctant to establish direct contact. OFDA representatives have proven invaluable in providing coordination and linkages among NGOs, PVOs, I0s, and the military at the operational level.


PlannersNmayNobtainNinformation concerning relationships with government agencies, NGOs, and PVOs through lessons learned .documents published byjoint and individual service agencies. Logistics data bases. legal requirements, communications, existing support agreements, and desired end-state conditions provide basic areas for cooperation to ensure unity of effort in HA operations.
Military forces and NGOs and PVOs may gain some benefits from sharing automated data bases while executing the HA mission. Three tracking systems used in HA include the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information
System (DAMS), the Commodity Tracking System (CTS), and a Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) computer tracking system designated SUMA. One method of accessing these data bases is through the OFDA DART.
Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System
DALIS was developed during Operation Provide Comfort by a joint team comprised of US Army Reserve (USAR) personnel, who worked closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and OFDA DART inconceptualizing and developing an easy-to-use, automated logistics management information
system. Subsequently, the USAR team, at OFDA's request and funding assistance, upgraded the software program.
DALIS is a comprehensive crisis­management tool that can be used to plan, track, identify, and locate resources: identify requirements; reduce redundancies; facilitate coordination; and produce reports. It tracks all aspects of UNHCR, governmental, and NGO and PVO logistics-including commodities-by source. type, quantity and cost; human resources; donor; location; status; required-by and due dates;and destination. It also automatically converts measurements to the metric system and costs intoUS dollars. Many of the DALIS capabilities have been incorporated into the systems of disaster­relief organizations in western nations. However, DOD has not completed its review of this prototype system for tielding.
Commodity Tracking System OFDA developed CTS for UNHCR as a total commodity tracking, warehouse management, lo istics data base c esigned to support the relief effort in the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. CTS is written in FoxPro and uses DALIS for its initial design. CTS has networkingcapabilities, which DALE lacks.
SUMA System PAHONdesignedNSUMA—an initial commodity-sorting and inventory system—to sort the initial distribution of sorted and unsorted in-kind donations. PAHO has taken a different approach to distribution of an emergency relief system. PAHO trains and supports local government ministries and local PVOs on the useof the SUMA system.
Legal Requirements

A mutual understanding, of governing regulations and other legal requirements applicable to military forces and NGOs and PVOs is essential to promoting harmonious relations and preventing undesirable incidents. For more discussion on legal issues, see Appendix B.

Support Requirements and Agreements
Clarifying support requirements will reduce misconceptions between the military and outside agencies. The JTF is usually tasked to support

Chapter 3
otherNagencies.NStandardizedNsupport agreements and memorandums of understanding should address finding considerations. The JTF may need to establish a cost center for each supported agency. Appropriate authorities should negotiate support agreements through proper channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products and fuel, telecommunications, labor. security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

Public Affairs Operations
The global visibility of HA operations, the presence of large numbers of civilian media representatives, and the intense interest of the media in covering HA operations requires careful coordination among military PA elements. The JIB, Combined Information Bureau (CIB), or Allied Press Information Center (APIC) coordinate information policies and procedures to ensure a synchronized PA effort, to prevent misunderstandings, and to facilitate HA operations.

Donation Assistance
A donation assistance program addresses the receipt and distribution of donations such as gifts and foodstuffs made by US civilians and organizations in response to the humanitarian effort for the country receiving HA. Donation programs are best coordinated at office of the secretary of defense (OSD) level through the unified command, which provides guidance to the JTF.
At the JTF level, any donation program should stress that donations be sent to NGOs and PVOs that are better suited to determining the priority of providing
donations to the affected area. The executive agent for the JTF donation program has typically been the command chaplain. Donations should only be accepted against identified needs, with an identified receiver, and with plans for the storage, transport, and distribution of the donated goods provided.

Chapter 4


This chapter addresses key factors in planning and executing an HA mission—from forming the JTF through terminating it.Phases of the operation include predeployment planning, deployment, employment. redeployment, and transition and/or termination. This chapter identifies unique or critical considerations for HA operations that differ from standard military operations. Lessons learned from recent operationsprovide the basis for this chapter. Appendix A provides a list of past humanitarian assistance JTFs.

In addition to the JTF headquarters have an equal orgreater role than other discussed in the previous chapter, special staff assigned units. JTF organization and elements and functional commands mold the composition specific to HA are addressed in force to the particular nature of each HA terms of special staff sections, consolidated mission. The JTF is tailored during the unified functions, and areas of operations. Figure 4-1
command's predeployment planning phase; presents a model of notional JTF organization
therefore, all of these organizations are not for HA.
required for a given situation.

Coordinating and managing special
The nature of HA may require a JTF to be functions in a unified manner may be oftailored so that combat support (CS) and CSS benefit to the JTF and the mission. Through
forces (CA, engineer, medical, logistics) may proper integration of support methods, the
Chapter 4

NSpecial Functional Areas

MAGTF Bde Units Units
Support Task Bn

Air Base
Medical Group Amphib

H H . H
Support TF

Sec Pol
Task HN
CoEalestmGeunat rd

Figure 4-1. Notional HA JTF Organization
JTF can eliminate duplication of effort and logistics priorities and allowing certainconserve scarce resources. Examples of unified efficiencies and economies of scale to be functions may include-achieved in logistics operations. Additionally,the Army CSS units in the JTFSC contribute
-A__joint task force support command
to the theater's line haul and water production


• A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB).
A joint movement center UMC). JOINT FACILITIES

A coalition forces support team (CFST).
The J4 forms the JFUB. In a situation JOINT TASK FORCE where a large number of coalition forces existSUPPORT COMMAND or US military forces operate within the same
During Operation Restore Hope (Somalia geographic area, allocation of facilities to 1992-1993), the JTF organized a JTFSC. The accommodate all parties is necessary. The JTFSC was a functional component command JFUB acts as the executive agent to deconflict of the JTF. The mission of the JTFSC was to real estate issues arising from multiple-user "provide logistics and medical support for US demands on limited facilities and recommends forces and as directed/required coalition forces courses of action on unresolved issues. The deployed in support of Operation Restore JFUB can address coalition force Hope. . . provide common item support, accommodations, ammunition storage points, interservice support, inland distribution of POL joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit and dry cargo, and common used port facilities, and so forth. operations as directed by the commander of the
joint task force (CJTF)."

As a separate JTF component and coequal The combatant commander establishes the to other JTF service components, the JTFSC JMC to provide support to HA operations. The serves as an honest broker for setting theater JMC coordinates strategic movements with

USTRANSCOM. In addition, it oversees the execution of transportation priorities. The JMC is responsible for planning movement operations and for monitoring the overall performance of the transportation system. It expedites action and coordination for immediate movements requirements to ensure effective and efficient use of transportation resources. The JMC is normally under the staff supervision of the senior logistics staff officer.

In a multinational HA operation, a CFST coordinates actions with coalition units. Duties of the CFST may include-
• Welcoming and orienting arriving forces.

Providing initial staging sites, water, rations, and other support.

Assessing the capabilities of coalition forces and their potential for prospective JTF missions and employment.

Determining political sensitivities (historic hostilities or assistance) between coalition countries and the area of HA operations.

Receiving, processing, and providing intelligence to arriving coalition forces.

Briefing ROE to arriving coalition forces.

Conducting ongoing assessments of coalition capabilities and recommending appropriate missions.

Briefing C Z relationships and relationships with NG0s, PVOs, and UN agencies.


The supported CINC commences formal planning on receipt of the CJCS warning order. Initial planning might begin earlier, based on intelligence reports that alert the CINC of a possible HA support mission.Normally, the CINC's J2 or J3 has the lead on interpreting warning signals (such as starvation patterns, seismic or volcanit activity, civil war, or weather trends). Contingency plans for the affected area may already exist to support a HA-type operation.
The CINC determines whether the HA operation is a supporting operation or the main operation. The CINC's intent and the desired end state form the foundation for the mission. In many situations, the CINC will have plans or predesignated JTFs to conduct an HA-type mission. However, the CINC might use a standing JTF, a predesignated contingency JTF, or a newly designated JTF task-organized for the specific HA mission. The CINC organizes the JTF according to joint doctrine and established standing operating procedures (SOPs). Joint Pub 5-00.2' provides specific guidance for the JTF.
'Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, September 1991.
During planning, the JTF organization and staff must be tailored to meet the requirements of the HA mission. Planners determine whether military units will operate under neutral humanitarian aid authorities and, where possible, from neutral bases. Clarity of command, control, andcommunications (C 3) relationships among the JTF, DOS, USAID/OFDA, the UN, ICRC, the host nation, and NGOs and PVOs reduces organizational conflicts and duplicative reliefefforts.
The eventual transition of HA operations must be an integral part of predeployment planning. Transition activities must begin assoon as the JTF arrives in theater. To ensure that everyone understands and agrees to the transition plan, it should be part of the operations order (OPORD). Transition is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Readiness—often NtheNsuccessNof humanitarian missions to reduce suffering and save lives-hinges on the timeliness of responding units. Predeployment plans should account for streamlined deployment procedures that may be critical in disaster scenarios where time is crucial. Plans should also provide for rapid deployment joint readiness exercises so that coordination and interagency relationships can be tested and refined.
As discussed in Chapter 1, HA operations might involve coalition forces. In such a case the JTF might form the core of a larger CTF. JTF planners should consider coalition operations. The new draft Joint Pub 3-163 provides additional considerations. A key question of the JTF is what role the military force will provide to the relief effort. Will the JTF provide the actual relief (food, logistics, medicine, transport relief suppliesi and provide security for the UN, ICRC, and NGOs and PVDs?
Upon being assigned a mission, the CINC organizes the appropriate JTF or a single component command to accomplish the mission. As in all military operations, a JTF requires a clear mission statement. The CJTF may have to develop and submit his own mission criteria up the chain of command. For example, the mission statement for OperationProvide Comfort (Northern Iraq) included:
Provide medical care.

• Provide clothing and shelter. Move into the refugee camps. Provide assistance for the aerial supply
Organize the refugee camps.
Build a distribution system.

Provide transportation and/or supervise
the distribution of food and water.

• Improve sanitation.
Provide site and convoy security.

Planners dictate the JTF's composition, which depends on the mission, initial estimates of the situation, and guidance from higher headquarters. As in all operations, major mission areas, such as force security, sustainment, and HA requirements, compete for limited time and assets. Planners should consider the possible need to augment HA JTFs with expertise not typically resident inmost commands.
'Throughout this chapter, JTF and CTF are used
'Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.
Chapter 4
The CJTF should realize that the JTF will encounter NGOs, PVOs, and IOs in the operation. Often, these organizations are in the area before the force arrives, remain while the force accomplishes its mission, and stay in place once the force departs. These organizations are staffed with competent and knowledgeable people who are fully cognizant of the political and cultural traditions of the area. Coordination and cooperation with these organizations can be paramount to the success of the HA operation.
COMMANDER'S CAMPAIGN PLAN During planning, the JTF develops a subordinate campaign plan in order to outline the commander's intent. The phases of the plan for Operation Restore Hope are shown in Figure 4-2.
AREA ASSESSMENTS Area estimates or studies are key elements during planning. Current or complete area assessments or studies may or may not exist for the country or area in which the mission takesjolace. The CA direct support team is capable of updating area assessments. These studies should provide political, cultural,economic, military, geographic, PA, weather, and other information on the area.
HA mission assessments should focus on the factors that led to the HA mission and current situation. These assessments should identify the causes of the HA crisis and not just the symptoms. Tasking may involve the causes or may only address relief of the symptoms of the crisis. The military force must understand that its support to the HA mission may not solve the underlying causes requiring the HA.
Studies also assist planners in identifyinginformation gaps for further intelligence­gathering such as on-

Host nation capability.
Food capacity.
Security risks.

Support assets.

Storage facilities and requirements.


Roads, air, and port capabilities. sources for all classes of supply must be

Numbers of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs on the

ground. • Identification of support methods and
procedures req_uired to meet the air, land,

Assessments can answer some of these
and sea lines of communication.
questions. IPB is tailored and expanded in
• Provisions for coordinating and controlling
scope to deal with the ambiguities of HA
movements in the HA area of operations to
operations and is critical for planning, force adjust the materiel flow commensuratedesign, and time-phased force deployment
with the throughput capability.
data (TPFDD) development. Additionally,
USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs in • A description of the interrelationship the area have experience and knowledge that between theater and strategic LOCs, to can supplement traditional information include the need for airfields capable of
sources. supporting strategic and theater airlift aircraft. LOGISTICS
• Development of a country or theater
HA missions require integrated logistics concept of support. assessments. Assessments should include
Development of applan to provide food,host nation and theater support capabilities.
equipment, and medical supplies to relieveRemote and austere sites place a high priority
the sufferingin the absence of NGOs,on early deployment of materials handling
PVDs, and IOs.
equipment and pre-positioned stocks. Detailed logistics planning should include-The J4 should consider contracting for support capabilities to augment critical
• Identification of time-phased materiel supplies, services, and real estate concerns.
requirements,Nfacilities,NandNother Contracting support can come from within theresources necessary to support the current
host nation or from outside the country. If
support is contracted from inside the country,
Determination of logistics planning factors the country logistical resources should be able
to be used for this operation and to support the country first and then the
development of logistics requirements. military requirements. Contracted supplies,
Additionally, the method to determine transportation, labor, and services can aid the

Phase I. Secure Lodgment and Establish Joint Task Force. Establish lodgment, gain
control of the humanitarian relief supplies, and introduce follow on forces.


Phase II. Expand Security Operations Out to Relief Distribution Sites. JTF expands
lodgment by securing several inland bases to facilitate relief supply distribution.

Phase Ill. Expand Security Operations. Expand inland bases and security operations.
Expand security of the humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs) deterring criminal activity

and provide security for NGOs and PVOs.
Phase IV. Transition to UN Peacekeeping Forces and Redeploy. Active transition
phase of standing down the JTF headquarters and forces. Phase IV ends when the JTF
is relieved of responsibilities for military operations.
Figure 4-2. Campaign Plan for Operation Restore Hope
Chapter 4

host nation's economy and facilitate the transfer of responsibilities back to the nation or NGOs and PVOs. Contracting customs vary by country or region, and contracted services and goods from one country may not be acceptable in the host country for a variety of legitimate reasons.
Logistics support to coalition countries can become a critical issue. Such support burdens US logistics forces but may help bring about the participation of other countries in the HA effort and hasten the departure of US forces. The JTF must establish movement priorities among JTF support requirements, US Government-furnished HA materiel, coalition or UN requirements, and possible NGO and PVO HA materiel. The JTF must work with coalition or UN forces and NGOs and PVOs to ensure their movement requirements are known. The primary means for originating and validating movement requests is the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The effective movement of materiel requires close coordination among the JTF service components, UN or coalition forces, NGOs and PVOs, the regional CINC, and USTRANSCOM.
Some JTF commanders have successfully developed a multinational logistics command to coordinate the vast array of logistical responsibilities that support a coalition mission. This useful and viable option can be considered but should be focused toward certain common-use consumables such as fuel or rations. Other areas, such as medical and health service support, may require a more narrow national perspective when planning— for example, the provision of blood supply. For UN operations, the JTF commander should obtain specific guidance regarding procedures to be followed for seeking possible reimbursement for supplies and equipment associated with the operation.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT The supported CINC establishes ROE, which are critical for force protection, for HA operations. Based on the CINC's guidance and the evolving situation on scene, the CJTF should be prepared to request changes to the
ROE and forward them up the chain of command for approval.
All units in the theater must disseminate, understand, and rehearse ROE. Coalition forces must understand the ROE and reduce any discrepancies between the ROE and instructions from their military headquarters. Not all countries have the same ROE or
. interpret them the same. The CJTF should communicate ROE to other participants, such as NGOs and PVOs, as much as possible without compromising security.
Once the JTF finalizes the ROE, unit commanders must train the force to reinforce the rules. In a perfect situation, trainin g would commence before deployment. Since H operations may be time-sensitive, training in ROE is continuous. It may be beneficial to condense ROE into ROE cards and rehearse likely situations through HA exercises. Appendix B provides sample ROE for HA operations.
CODE OF BEHAVIOR TheNinternationalNcommunityNhas developed a proposed Code of Behavior for Military and Civil Defense Personnel inInternational Humanitarian Aid;however, this code is not approved. The JTF commander should know that-

The code exists.

The code has not been endorsed by any
international organization and is not binding.

Some countries with forces and personnel
involved in HA may use the code as a
guide to behavior.

A copy of the code and other military and
civil defense assets (MCDA) documents
may be available through the UN or some
other international organization involved
in a large-scale HA operation.

If available, appropriate JTF staff personnel
should review the code.


During HA operations commanders face the difficult challenge of determining whether or not the force is meeting mission objectives.

Commanders need to understand the progress of the mission to make informed decisions about resource allocations and develop or modify military operations. The JTF may develop various MOEs, whether quantitative or qualitative. No single, all-encompassing MOE checklist exists for HA operations. MOEs change with different missions. MOEs cannot cover every aspect of a mission; therefore, commanders should resist heavy reliance on them. A discussion of MOEs for domestic responses is presented in Chapter 5.
Commanders need some means to evaluate operations. Based on past experience, staffs should keep several factors in mind while developing and using MOEs in HA operations. Commanders should ensure that MOEs are
appropriate, mission-related, measurable,reasonable in number, sensitive, and useful.
The MOEs should be appropriate to the objective of the MOE effort. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOEs should be broad and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scenecommanders in making decisions, MOEs should be more specific and detailed.
MOEs should relate to the mission. If the mission is security, for example, MOEs should help commanders judge improvements in or
problems in improving security. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help commanders judge improvements in living standards. If the mission expands. so should the MOEs.

MOEs should vary with changes in the command's performance in relation to the mission and opponents. Quantitative MOEs are likely to be measured more consistently than nonquantitative ones and thus, when appropriate, are preferable. When using nonquantitative MOEs, the command should establish clear criteria for their measurement and disseminate the criteria to prevent accidental mismeasurement or misinterpretation of the results.

Reasonable. in Number
The number of MOEs should be neither so few that they are insufficient to fully portray the situation nor so numerous that they become unmanageable or not worth the effort expended.
Sensitive MOEs should change when the performance of the command or actions of opponents change; extraneous factors shouldnot greatly influence them.
Useful MOEs should respond to changes in the situation soon enough for a command to detect and act on them. Commanders should meet,
Security and Level of Violence

Percentage of relief supplies (in tons) reachingdistribution centers

Distribution centers to distribution points

Distribution points to feeding centers


Number of violent acts against JTF forces

Individual Acts

Organized Acts

Source: JTF (J2)

Number of violent acts against NGOs andPVOs


Individual Acts.

Organized Acts.

Source: NGOs and PVOs

Checkpoints and roadblocks manned by

factions or bandits

Number and location

Number of overt acts where tolls are extorted

Source: NGOs. PVOs, JTF 02)

Decreasing NGO convoy security requirements

Number of security guards used

Source: NGOs and PVDs

but not be limited to, the above criteria. Accurate and measurable MOEs can contribute to mission effectiveness in many ways. MOEs can help the CJTF answer the following questions:
Airfield capacity:

Number of airfields evaluated as
transport aircraft-capable

Day-night capabilit)
Source: Joint special operations task
force (JSOTF), JTF (13)

Water sources: number of gallons of potable
water per day.

Source: JTF (J4), NGOs, and PVOs
Main supply routes (MSRs): Percent
trafficabilitv for key MSR lines of
communication to relief sites

Source: JTF 04), NGOs, and PVOs

Medical and Public Health

Crude mortality rates
Under-five mortality rates
Cause-specific mortality rates



Acute respiratory infections

Other diseases
Severe malnutrition measurements (less
than 70 percent of height and weight

Source: NGOs and PVOs


Market price of foods
Market price of animals
Household surveys (for example, how much

food is available in the home?)
Food production (cultivation) and animal
Source: NGOs and PVOs, JTF

Chapter 4

What tactics and/or strategies are or are not working?

Should the CJTF shift the mission emphasis or shift resource allocations?

Can the operation shift from one mission phase to another?

When is the mission complete?

Involvement of I0s, NGOs, and PVOs is critical in the development of MOEs. Such involvement encourages communication among the major participants, assists in data collection, clarifies mission priorities, and expedites transition and redeployment of military forces. To develop appropriate MOEs, the JTF should coordinate with military commanders and decision makers representing 10, NGO, and PVO activities. As they are identified, MOEs can then be organized into four main categories.

Security and level of violence.


Medical and public health.


For each category, a graphic identifies specific measures and potential information sources. The JTF assigns the section that coordinates these inputs and measures trends over time. Because these trends affect future plans, the J5 should coordinate this analysis. The frequency with which this data is collected and measured may vary by campaign phase.

Provisions should be made for CJTF input to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network (WIN) and the POPES data base. The HA mission requires constant monitoring and updating to ensure timely decisions and allocation of assets to meet the emergency. See Joint Pubs 5-00.2' and 5-03.1.' During predeployment planning, countless questions require answers.
' Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,Appendix
A, September 1991.
'Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume 1,
4 August 1993.

Predeployment Planning Considerations

What is the mission?

What is the status of hostile military/paramilitary forces in the area?

Who are the key civilian leaders, community elders, and their supporters?

What is the status of existing public services, such as water, electricity. communications, sewage
collection, transportation systems and assets, and relief agencies already in place?

What is the status of doctors, firemen. and police and their availability and levels of expertise?

What is the medical and nutritional condition of civilian personnel and the physical locations of
medical facilities?

What are the unique shelter/food needs and host nation support availability (construction assets,
food storage, materials handling equipment, and transportation capacity)?

What is the status of sanitation conditions within the AO?

What operational facilities and host nation resources are available to support HA forces?

What unique social. ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?

What relief organizations are present and what functions are they performing?

What is the international community's goal and plan for addressing the humanitarian crisis?

What is the communications security plan regarding communicating with NGOs, PVOs, UN
agencies, and coalition forces? Do these agencies or forces require equipment augmentation?

What are the information-gathering and dissemination requirements? What information can be
obtained from host nation, -UN/codlition forces, and NGOs and PVOs?

What is the legal authority for the mission? What agreements or mandates apply to this operation?
Are SJA personnel and assets planned for?

Have the appropriate ROE been prepared and published prior to deployment?

Has the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) been alerted and a request for a
medical intelligence report on the area identified?

What is the priority of HA capability for the mission: medical, logistics, command and control, force
security, and so foith?

What, if any, coordination systems are in place among PVOs, NGOs. and IOs in the host nation?

What coordination is required with the CINC, supporting_CINCs, subordinate JTF commands, NGOs
and PVOs based in the US, UN organizations. and DOS'?

What are the liaison requirements?

Are interpreters available from the JTF, CINC. US agencies?

What are weather and terrain limiting factors?

What is the media presence and the public interest (global visibility) of the HA mission and situation?

What is the health service support (HSS) mission? Is it clearly stated in the operational
commander's mission statement?

What medical intelligence is available for the AO? AFMIC provides information on factors that affect
human performance capability and well-being such as infectious diseases, sanitation, venomous
insects and animals, toxic plants, the environment, and military and civilian health care capabilities.

What is the mission's target patient population? Military only or are civilians also treated?

What is the local standard of care? Can it be continued after forces redeploy?

How do HSS systems receive logistics support? HSS logistics planning is an essential element of
the overall planning process for a successful health care delivery system and should include
supplies. equipment. medical equipment maintenance and repair. optical fabrication, blood
management, transportation, and contracting.

Who provides medical laboratory support during assessments and the initial phases of the

Chapter 4

The employment of thejoint forward laboratory (JFL) in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope was invaluable to the JTF surgeons in directing preventive medicine efforts, and the laboratory's contributions were directly credited with helping minimize morbidity due to infectious diseases among US personnel.
Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned

Deployment of the JTF is based on the severity of the situation, political considerations, and mobility assets. Requirements and decisions made during planning affect deployment. The JTF should be structured to deploy in force packages. Rapid response, austere conditions, and lack of infrastructure often place unique demands on the JTF. Initialphases of deployment require only the critical command, control, communications, security, and logistics capabilities. Follow-on forces deploy as capabilities expand to support the forces and conduct the HA mission.
PLANNING Deployment planning and execution considerations for HA missions are fundamentally the same as in any military operation. Close coordination between the staffsections of the JTF is critical.
COORDINATION Coordination during the deployment phase is based on guidance developed during the planning phase and conditions as they change regarding the situation. The CJTF must continue to keep the lines of communication open with higher headquarters (CINC); service components of the CINC; subordinate and supporting commands; NGOs, PVOs, and 10s; the UN; and OFDA DART.
USTRANSCOM consists of the Military Traffic Management Command of the Air Mobility Command and the Military Sealift Command. These components provide movement schedules for requirements in the sequence requested by the CJTF. The JTF needs to update subordinate commands on changes to the deployment schedule or changes in the mission. Changes in the mission, such as HA to peace enforcement, may require a shift in force deployment. NGOs, PV0s, 10s, and UN agencies may require JTF support during
Deployment Planning Considerations
Are command and control assets more crucial than immediate provisions of HA supplies?

Are the requirements of the JTF components
being met.

Are these requirements complementary or
contradictory to the mission?

Do the units being airlifted match up with the
equipment (for example, is the JTF sending
engineers to the area when their heavy
equipment and construction material are not
scheduled to arrive by ship for another two

What are the NCO and PVO requirements fortransportation, and has the military committed totransporting their supplies (funding andauthority)?

Have preventive medicine units been scheduled

for ear y deployment?

Will media coverage of the initial deploymentfocus on the JTF'sTirst actions that alleviate the conditions requiring HA?

Will conflicting interests for mobility assetsstrain the JTF s deployment?

Will command and control assets, food and medical supplies, security forces, equipmentassets, and foreign government restrictionsaffect the deployment?

How do planners ensure the CJTF'S guidanceand focus of effort is followed?

How will accurate and timely submission ofinformation into WWMCCS and JOPES be maintained to schedule movements and keephigher and lower commands abreast of thedeployment schedule, particularly deployment.coordination of coalition forces?

How will the JTF account for personnel in orderto report casualties, provide essential servicessuch as mail, and determine the total numbers of personnel for the purpose of national/servicereimbursement?


Two disparate types of operations were being conducted simultaneously duringOperation Provide Comfort. One was the humanitarian effort and the other the security operation. In many ways they competed and conflicted with one another. The staff ran these as concurrent operations and often had to set aside
specific times to focus totally on oneoperation or the other. Because of conflictng priorities, movement of relief supplies and humanitarian forces competed with the movement of security equipment, ammunition, materiel, andforces. Security operations had to precede humanitarian operations to dear areas ofmines and potential hostile forces. Whilemost civilian relief agendas grew more comfortable working alongside military forces performing humanitarian tasks, they were not comfortable around gun-toting security forces.
Operation Provide ComfortAfter-Action Report

deployment not already identified during predeployment planning.

Liaison teams or personnel (military and civilian) assigned up and down the chain of command ensure the JTF can identify concerns and issues. These teams are critical during the deployment phase. Liaison teams in the mission area are critical to keeping the JTF informed of changing, conditions and events. They assist the JTF in determining how the HA operation is progressing and whether emphasis needs to shift to avoid further human suffering. The HAST (previously discussed in Chapter 3) can accomplish this critical liaison function if assigned to support or augment the JTF. Liaison procedures extracted from Joint Pub 5-00.2'are provided in Appendix H.
Liaison personnel should be exchanged among major contributors to the force. Their functions include the identification of political and legal constraints, transportation capabilities, logistics requirements, and other factors affecting the employment of coalition units.


CJTF responsibilities during employment include force and resource monitoring and management, planning for current and future operations, execution, and reporting. The employment of a JTF for HA missions has some unique considerations.
EXECUTION HA is something most military forces have not normally trained to accomplish. Security concerns, global visibility, politicalconsiderations, acceptance, logistics, health factors, and unknown length of mission can affect the force and the mission. integratingthe coalition forces impacts on how the JTF assigns missions and organizes the area.
The mission of the JTF, although consistent in its overall direction to relieve the plight of the populace, may undergo major
Employment Considerations

What is the JTF's actual role in the HA mission?

Does the JTF provide support to the UN, ICRC, NGOs, PVOs, the actual HA?

Does the JTF conduct HA and then transition functions to the UN, ICRC, NGOs, and PVOs?

What is the relationship with an OFDA DART?

Is the HA operation part of a largermission?

What are the force objectives?

How will the objectives of the mission be evaluated to determine success (quantitative or nonquantitative)?

What is the personal code of conduct for the HA operation?

Chapter 4

evolutions in its specific taskings during the early stages of the operation. This can be a positive development in that each new estimate of the situation leads to a necessary refinement or modification of the mission and tasks. Continuing on-scene estimates of the situation and rapid adjustment of the mission and tasks are appropriate. This is sometimes referred to as mission creep.
Military coordination with the UN; NGOs, PVDs, and I0s; and OFDA DART and its on­scene representative is critical during the execution of the mission. In some cases, 50 or more NGOs and PVOs may be working in the AOR. These NGOs and PVDs may coordinate their efforts, but in some cases, they may operate independently of one another. Military concerns may not be compatible with the concerns of the NGOs and PVOs (security, mission priorities, support requirements, expectations).
Early in the operation, the JTF should establish a dialogue with OFDA DART, NGOs, PVDs, and IOs to ascertain capabilities and limitations and to facilitate future cooperation. This dialogue can be accomplished with a clear mission statement involving OFDA DART and NGOs and PVOs in mission planning— disseminating the view that OFDA DART and NGOs and PVOs are allies and partners.
Employment considerations and factors affecting the outcome of the HA mission depend on decisions made during planning and deployment. These factors include-

Getting minimum equipment on the ground to provide the basic service required.

Having sufficient equipment on hand for austere jump capabilities responsive to new missions and critical outages.

Transitioningokeyostaffopositions depending on the emphasis of the phase of the operation (air-to-ground operations).

Having each staff establish a continuity file..

Providing interpreters for PSYOP and CA teams when dealing with large crowds.

Preparing specialized briefing formats to dealowithocivil-militaryooperations; briefings should emphasize the condition, activities, and especially the needs of the supported population; briefing UN, ICRC, NGOs and PVOs, and OFDA.

Establishing preventive medicine strategies to take precedence over therapeutic medicine in the initial stages of an HA situation; emphasizing sanitation and vaccinations.

Deploying PA elements early.

Avoiding basing mission success on US or western standards; working toward building back the local infrastructure and health care system to the level in place before the disaster.

Encouraging civilian groups to step forward and coordinate their valuable expertise and assistance.

Coordinating use of transportation assets to ensure that urgent needs are met.

Ensuring coordination is conducted between transportation elements and the military police who may provide security and traffic control.

Developing plans for recovery operations of transportation assets, including contingency plans for replacement of vehicles.

Avoiding black market activity by controlling distribution of food by ration cards; using local trucks and drivers for distribution (to stimulate the economy) and monitoring frequently.

Determining requirements to repair MSRs.

Determining legal and fiscal authority to conduct civic action projects.

One consideration for organizing the AO is to designate HRSs. Geographic boundaries for such sectors should include ethnic or tribal boundaries, political affiliation, relief agency AO, political acceptance of certain coalition countries, and contiguous sectors with forces assigned (components assigned multiple sectors are connected).


Security is the CJTF's responsibility. JTF planners must specifically address security for NGOs and PVOs in ROE, the mission statement, or both. Depending on the environment, security forces may be necessary. ROE should contain guidance regarding which people JTF forces may protect. Hostile crowds, starving people, armed resistors, or bandits require appropriate responses. It may be necessary to first establish the environment for HA operations to commence peace enforcement. This requirement can adversely affect the speed and effectiveness with which assistance is provided to the area. Security of the JTF is a primary concern. Some concerns include-

Ports and airfields.

NGO and PVO requests.

US Government activities such as OFDA DART.

Host nation agencies.

HA recipients.

HA supplies, convoys, and MSRs.

HA distribution centers.

Convoy security for HA follows the same set of tactics for any military convoy operation. If the JTF is tasked to provide convoy security or security for the NGOs and PVOs, then it should plan such with input from all forces and agencies involved. The organization of the AO into component or HRS can causeproblems for convoy operations. A movement control center (MCC) established to coordinate transportation coordinates all cross-boundary travel and security responsibilities for convoy operations.
In a hostile environment the JTF may have the added responsibility of weapons confiscation. JTF planners must develop specific plans and procedures and disseminatethem to all forces. In addition, the ROE should address the use of force during weapons confiscation operations. Special consideration must be given to the security forces employed by the NGOs and PVDs.
INTELLIGENCE HA operations require intelligence information because they are politically sensitive, conducted in the midst of civilian populations during times of crisis, and employ forces with substantial capabilities. The commander must continuously and clearly identify information requirements to provide the necessary resources to conduct intelligence operations.
Even more than with other types of military operations, successful HA operations are dependent upon timely and actionable intelligence. As in other MOOTW, intelligence in HA operations must deal with all aspects of the AO, to include personnel and organizations therein. In this environment, military intelligence requirements include such subjects as political, ethnic, religious, and economic factors. Some supporting intelligence publications are listed in the References section.
Host nation populations hold the key as to whether an HA mission succeeds. While US and/or friendly armed forces are tasked to support humanitarian goals, each and every thing has a potential political, economic, military, social, or religious impact on the population or segments of the population. The primary intelligence effort should be to assess the agenda of every faction and determine how it may affect friendly operations. Open sources are employed to determine patterns or methods of operation, factional-associated geography, and factional-associated agendas. The resulting analysis is employed to-

Avoid obvious hostilities.

Prepareoforononobviousohostilities (ambushes and deliberate attacks on the HA force).

Employ appropriate force in order to accomplish the mission.

Human intelligence (people talking to or about people) is a significant portion of any HA intelligence support program. However, it must be accomplishedproperly. Formal contact with NGOs and PV0s should be directed through CMOC personnel. The result

Chapter 4

of increased focus on intelligence is units and of available commercial and host nation military personnel with a greater situational communications net works. As military awareness. This enhances the ability of US communications assets are phased in for the forces to make informed judgments about operation, NGOs, PVOs, and others can be which areas to avoid, where to take extra expected to increasingly request access to those precautions, and so forth, based upon their communications. Any supporting plans must specific mission and the overall HA mission. initially allow for very limited military communications and emphasize reliance on COMMUNICATIONS commercial and host nation communications assets. In addition, these plans must closely
The ability to communicate with all of the address needs for secure communications andmilitary forces, NGO, PVDs, UN agencies, host requirements to control cryptographic materials
nation agencies, and other organizations
(secure telephones, keymat, and so forth) andinvolved in the HA operation is imperative.

releasability of cryptographic and/or classifiedSee Figure 4-3. Communications with coalition

information to others.

forces, OFDA DART; NGOs, PVOs, and I0s; and other agencies should be established early
JTF planners must identify and plan

in the operation.
frequency management for the operation. Most likely, nonmilitary agencies will have Regulations and orders for integrating coalition communications networks established for their forces into the frequency management program
own uses. These networks may include have to be deconflicted with security commercially leased circuits (from the host requirements. The use of nonmilitary radios and nation communications agencies and communications equipment by OFDA DART,
companies), commercially leased satellite NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC can create
services (such as INMARSAT), and high-deconfliction problems. Planners must also frequency (ham, long distance) and very high consider host nation requirements and
frequency (intravehicular convoy control type) restrictions. radios. As robust military communications most likely will not be available, close cooperation PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONS
between nonmilitary agencies and military PA considerations are important forforces will be required to maximize efficient use several reasons. First, the public and the
I HN Government I US Embassy I HN Military.I 1k o

I _ _
I OFDAUN Special Rep
• It los *4,.
NGOs and PVOs.1*-" UN Agencies I I
HN Agencies I
Command - • - -11, Coordination
Figure 4-3. JTF Coordinations
media have an intense level of interest in JTF operations; second, the members of the JTFneed PA services; third, commanders and soldiers of the JTF must be able to communicate their intentions and actions to interested audiences. These considerations can be met through planning for establishment of radio and television broadcast stations and a JIB in the theater.
MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS Medical considerations for the JTF in an HA environment are significant. The two areas to consider are medical care for the JTF and coalition forces and medical care for the local populace. In general, JTF medical assets support JTF personnel, while host nation facilities, NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC health organizations support themselves and the civilianpopulation. In most cases the AO is austere and environmentally hostile. This can cause the JTF to suffer many medical and sanitation problems. Good medical estimates and preventive medicine planned early in theoperation can pay significant dividends. These include immunizations for all personnel, prevention of insect-borne diseases, and prevention of fly, water, and food-borne illnesses.
The JTF should use its preventive medicine assets. Intensive epidemiological monitoring, coupled with sophisticated diagnostic capabilities (serology, bacteriology, parasitology) can help prevent development of epidemics among deployed forces.
Title 10, US Code, prohibits use of military medical assets for treatment of civilians except when specially authorized by the appropriate authority. This can cause problems for the JTF regarding the perception that the US cannot and will not assist the area with medical care. The highly visible nature of US cantonment areas naturally leads civilians to seek medical treatment from these facilities. Because this issue is above CJTF level, he must plan early in the operation how to deal with civilian medical requests.
Medical planners should attempt to coordinate with NGO, PVO, UN, and ICRC medical facilities immediately upon commencing the operation. The JTF should create some type of central point or organization for coordinating medical requirements. However, the differing policies and positions of individual NGOs, PVOs, and I0s; military capabilities and policies; and host nation requirements can create friction. A medical coordination agency formed at the HOC or CMOC can provide a viable solution for medical requirements. Formation of this coordination agency by the JTF and early cooperation by the parties involved in the operation increases efficiency and reduces redundancy. The JTF must establish policies for treating civilians injured by JTF actions and provide air search and rescue and/or medical evacuation assets for civilians.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE The military often provides technical assistance in the form of advice, assessments, manpower, and equipment to host nations or civilian agencies. NGOs, PVOs, and IOs may seek the advice of military personnel to conduct projects necessary to accomplish their mission. Early in the operation, the CJTF should determine policy regarding technical assistance to be provided to NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. Use of military equipment and supplies to conduct civil action-type missions may be limited or forbidden. Early in the operation, the CJTF should establish criteria to provide technical assistance to NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. The JTF may conduct projects to build or improve infrastructure needed to complete the military portion of the HA mission, once approved and funded.
NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC normally distribute food and other supplies by using their own or contract transportation assets. Use of military assets to conduct the actual delivery of supplies is usually discouraged unless the situation is life threatening. Plans to overcome problems or obstacles should be solicited from NGOs, PVOs, I0s, indigenouspersonnel, and the military.
Coordination for air operations follow normal airspace coordination procedures for any joint or coalition operation. The additional
Chapter 4
A good example of technical assistance occurred during Operation Restore Hopeduring the flooding of the lower ShabelleRiver. Through the CMOC, a PVOproposed a solution to contain theShabelle river. The CMOC referred the PVO to the JTF engineer officer foradvice. Followingconsultation, the PVOrequested technical assistance in theform of equipment and operators toassist in building dikes. The CMOC andOFDA dispatched a team to the floodregion, conducted an assessment, andvalidated the requirement for JTFsupport. Based on a need identified bythe PVO, technical assistance in the form of advice, assessment, equipment,and personnel was provided by the JTF.
Operation Restore Hope
CMOC Operations Officer
burden on coordination involves the HA cargoflights conducted by NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.During a large relief operation. increased
numbers of arriving and departing flights mayoverwhelm the host nation airspace controlsystem. In cases where no airspace controlfacilities exist, the JTF may have to establishan interim airspace coordination system, toinclude-

Broad policies and procedures.

Strategic and theater airlift requirements.

Airspace management procedures.

Procedures to coordinate both military andcivilian sorties.

The JTF may or may not have air control authority over incoming NGO, PVO, and 10flights. Close coordination and agreementswith NGOs and PVOs over control of NGO, PVO, and 10 cargo flights reduce airspacesafety concerns and add to the efficiency ofdelivering HA supplies.
COORDINATION WITH RELIEF AGENCIES Coordination with the host nation and a wide variety of relief organizations lies at
the core of HA operations. Mission successdepends on the US military turnover of HAresponsibilities, including security, to the host nation or relief organization. Closecoordination improves this process. Figure 4-3 does not attempt to illustrate alllevels of liaison and coordination amongparticipating agencies. It does, however,illustrate the many sources of input to the JTF in HA situations. CJTF options for thiscoordination use the HAST, the HOC, and the CMOC, which fall under the cognizance
of the J3 and J5 staff sections.
Humanitarian Operations Center To coordinate military operations with the requirements of the host nation or NGOs, PVOs, and 10s, the CJTF can requestthat a HOC be created. The HOC, if created, is usually collocated with the appropriateheadquarters, such as the UN, conductingthe operation. HOC functions include-

Developing an overall relief strategy.

Identifying and prioritizing HA needs to
the JTF.

Identifying logistics requirements for
NGOs, PVOs, and lOs.

The HOC is not as much a location or cell as it is a policy-making and_governingbody. In the military sense, the HOC does not command and control but attempts tobuild a consensus for team-building andunity of effort.
The HOC should consist of decision makers from the military forces command (JTF), UN agencies, DOS
DART)), regional NGU and PVOrepresentatives, ICRC, and host nation authorities. The HOC coordinates activities and does not necessarily control. Theorganization of the HOC appears inFigure 4-4.
The HOC normally has a UN directorand deput
y directors from the JTF andOFDA DART. Within the HOC the policy­making body is the standing liaisoncommittee, which is comprised of UN, JTF,
OFDA DART, and NGO and PVO representatives. HOC core groups and

HOC Core
Director Groups
DeputyDirector DeputyDirector Civilian Military (DART) (JTF)
Civil-Military RegionalInformation Operations Liaison Liaison
Center JTF
Figure 4-4. Humanitarian Operations Center Organizations
Civil-Military Operations Center
During Exercise Emerald Express

At the tactical level, the CJTF can form
conducted in January 1994 the
a CMOC as the action team to carry out the
1st Marine Division used personnel and
guidance and decisions of the HOC. The
equipment from its artillery regiment to
CMOC is a group of service members that
coordinate HA operations. This
serve as the military's presence at the HOC,innovative concept was explored first
as well as the military liaison to the
because the mission-essential task list
community of relief organizations.
(METL) paralleled the requirements for
Normally, the CMOC director is also the
HA coordination (for example, the skills
HOC's military deputy director. Figure 4-5
matched); second, the artillery regiment
chows the organization of a CMOC.
was under-utilized during previous HAmissions; and third, much of the artillery The CMOC performs the liaison and
unit equipment (transportation and coordination among the military support communications) was extremely useful capabilities and the needs of the HA during HA operations. organizations. The CMOC, in coordination
with OFDA DART, receives, validates, and
The liaison and coordination skills
coordinates requests from NGOs, PVOs, andessential to fire support teams applied I0s. The CMOC usually consists of 8 to 12
directly to HA. At the same time the
persons; however, its size is mission­
supporting perspective possessed by
dependent. The commander may add
every artillery officer, transferred directly
elements as appropriate.
to a military role in support of NGO andPVO food distribution. Additionally, it A proposed layout for an effectivelywas unnecessary to establish ad hoc organized CMOC is included as Figure 4-6.teams to meet coordination and liaison This configuration is based on lessons learnedrequirements because these units from previous large-scale HA operations andalready existed. can be modified as the situation requires.
Communications capabilities are an essentialBased on discussions with component of the CMOC and should becarefully prioritized. The CMOC supportscommittees meet to discuss and resolve NGOs, PV0s, and IOs by responding toissues related to topics such as medical validated logistical and security supportsupport, agriculture, water, health, and requirements. During CMOC meetings education. (usually daily), the C 4OC identifies JTF

components that are capable of fulfilling the requests to support the NGOs, PVOs, and 10s. Validated requests go to the JTF operations cell and then to the component or coalition force LNO for action. The CMOC may—
Validate the support request in the absence of the OFDA DART representative.
Coordinate military requests for military support with various military components and NGOs and PVDs.
Convene and host ad hoc mission planninggroups involving complicated military support, numerous military units, and numerous NGOs and PVOs,

Promulgate and explain JTF policies to NGOs and PVOs.

Provide information on JTF operations and general security operations.

Serve as a focal point for weapons policies.

Administer and issue NGO and PVO

identification cards. Validate NGO, PVO, UN, and ICRC personnel required for JTF aircraft tarmacspace, space availability (seats on military aircraft), and access-related issues.

Coordinate medical requirements.

Chair port, rail, and airfield committee meetings for space and access-related issues.

Maintain 24-hour operations.

Maintain contact with regional and sector CMOCs.

Support CA teams, as required.

Facilitate creation and organization of a food logistics system for food relief efforts.

Normally, NGO and PVO requests come to the CMOC for action. The proposed NGO and PVO support request flow is based on operational lessons learned.

During many HA scenarios, shelter or housing may need to be provided to displaced individuals. A good reference for administration
Support Request Flow NGOs and PV0s-

Prepare complete support request

Submit request to DART/CMOC

Monitor DART-

Validates requests

Submits requests to the CMOC CMOC-

Logs requests

Assigns project number


Prepares project folder

Submits project folder to joint operations center


Monitors JTF JOC-

Receives project folder and logs request

Approves request (uses the attached CA teamto analyze the project and apportion theresources to complete the project)

Prepares detailed tasking order (file in folder)

Publishes detailed tasking order

Retains folder and monitor Individual unit providing support-

Receives mission

Analyzes the requirements

Commits the resources

Annotates resources expended

Completes the mission

Prepares after-action reports with all


Submits after-action reports to the JOC JOC-

Receives after-action report from the unit andfiles in folder

Closes out folder

Returns folder to CMOC CMOC-

Receives folder

Sends completed report to the NGO or PVOthat requested the project. The forms used inthe CMUC may include DA 1594 (Staff DutyJournal, Conversation Record) and the locallyproduced NGO/PVO Support Request Form.

Chapter 4
of camps is found in the UN HCR Handbook for Emergencies. The UN designates several categories of affected and displaced person programs. These include externally displaced refugees, displaced _populations within a country, and affected populations within a country. CA personnel are trained to establish and administer displaced person and refugee camps.
The requirements for dealing with refugees and displaced persons are extensive. The key UN agency, when dealing with agencies, is the UNHCR. Cultural and religious requirements, acceptable food, medical support, proper registration, categories of refugees and displaced persons, security, camp locations, sanitation, and funding sources constitute some of the concerns. The ultimate goal is to return the refugee population to its home.
POLITICAL-MILITARY ADVISORS The JTF should work closely with embassies of coalition nations as well as with US embassies in the region. In multinational operations, coalition forces may providepolitical advisors to their national headquarters. US forces may have a foreign service officer assigned to support operations. The assignment of political advisors provides a direct 1M ( to US embassies, DOS, and the political representatives of coalition nations.
LIAISON Liaison requires extensive personnel and equipment assets in an HA operation. Liaison personnel and teams must be able to communicate with their parent command as well as make certain decisions or commit to carrying out assigned tasks. Liaison personnel should have direct access to their parent command, be kept informed of events and intentions, and be able to brief capabilities and limitations of their commands.
In coalition operations, liaison personnel should be exchanged with the larger contingents of military forces assisting in the operation. The CMOC provides the primary liaison for the JTF with NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and ICRC; although liaison throughout the AO is critical. Due to the presence of ICRC and NGOs and PVOs, liaison may be established with selected NGOs and PVOs, ICRC, and UN agencies. A reference chart of the US military rank structure and insignia is provided in Appendix I.
The need to provide quality personnel onliaison teams cannot be overemphasized.This lesson learned echoed at every levelof the CTF. It is critical in joint andcombined fmtiltinationall operations to ensure an effective liaison system is inplace. Liaison personnel must be highlycompetent have direct access to theirparent command, and be kept informed of events and intentions:
The teams with initiative; the trust and confidence of their commands; solid
access and communications; and knowledgeable, bright personnel greatlyenhanced the functioning of the entireorganization. Extensive positioning ofliaison personnel throughout Turkey andin the provinces along the Iraq-Turkeyborder permitted the CU to coordinateefforts, which made for more efficient operations and a closer sense ofcooperation, especially on a numberofpolitically sensitive issues. Quality liaison -personnel paid dividends in this role.
Report on Operation Provide Comfort


Redeployment decisions are based on political and military considerations. The JTF provides assessments for the military. The DOS representative provides the political considerations. The CINC uses this information to recommend redeployment plans to the JCS and NCA
Simultaneous to JTF deployment, the CJTF should begin planning redeployment. Redeployment considerations depend on whether the JTF has accomplished all or some of its objectives. Redeployment of JTF forces begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for
military forces diminishes. Forces not needed to accomplish certain objectives should be redeployed as soon as possible. For extended operations, the CJTF should establish a rotation policy.
The JTF should transfer its HA functions to host nation NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and/ or ICRC as soon as possible. As this is
accomplished, forces are freed to redeploy. As the operation progresses, political and military guidance will identify functions and units that need to remain in order to accomplish objectives not achieved. The requirement for the JTF to continue supporting HA operations must be identified earlier. This identification affects how the JTF plans for redeployment.


Transition in HA operations involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions to another organization. Transition can occurbetween service components within the JTF or from the JTF to the UN or host nation. Transition and/or termination is initiated onceobjectives have been met and authority has been received from national decision makers.
In HA operations, transition presents complex problems. If forces within the JTF are transitioning functions between servicecomponents, then the requirements follow standard military handover. If transition involves the JTF transitioning functions orareas back to the host nation, coalition forces, or a UN command, then the requirements maybecome less clear. •
A transition plan is useful. It helps the staff identify transition issues. It is especially
Military operations end wham theobjectives have been attained. The NCAdefine conflict termination objectives anddirect the cessation of operations.Termination plans are designed to securethe major policy objectives that may beattained as the result of militaryoperations. Termination plans must coverthe transition to postconflict activities andconditions as well as disposition ofmilitary forces. Operation plans andtermination plans should normally beprepared together, with the terminationplan included as a supporting plan to theoperation plan.
Extract from Joint Pub 5-0
important to identify those parties or agencies that will receive functional responsibilities from the JTF. Considerations include which staff sections will write annexes, based on what the UN or transitioning organization will do. The transition plan should identify task forceorganization, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. In implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise, without military
One method of transitioning is by function.Another method is by locale. if possible, thetransition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Functions or areas would transfer only when a similar capabilitybecomes available or is no longer needed. Procedures for transfer of equipment or supplies, either between components of the JTF or with the UN or host nation, must be determined.
JTF planners must identify fiscal guidance, reconstitution of assets, and availability and use of operations and maintenance funds. Several functional areas identified for transition include logistics, medical services, communications, local security, and engineer services. The JTF should develop a series of criteria on transition to be able to track the progress being made. This process may be measured by a statistical analysis of trends; for example, a reduction in infant mortality rates.Figure 4-7 is an example of transitioncategories and indicators from OperationRestore Hope.
Chapter 4
Humanitarian relief

Unescorted convoys

Relief warehouse security


Civil-military coordination

Establishment of local councils

Marketplace food shortages

Local security force

Transition actions

Identification of sector force

Establishment of liaison

Conduct of multi-national operation

Conduct of relief in place




Public health

• Water sources
• Main supply routes


Breaches of agree­merits

Crew-served weapons

Weapons visibility

Figure 4-7. Operation Restore Hope Transition Indicators
The important part of choosing indicators is choosing the right ones and having a consistent method of measuring them. Some indicators may be weighted more than others, and their importance may shift due to political, military, or HA considerations. The transition plan phases are shown in Figure 4-8.
After conducting a major HA mission, the HA team should address two areas: documentation of lessons learned and what can be termed after­operation follow-up. Lessons learned should be collected in whatever format applies for the specific operation. That may mean collection under the joint system through the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (DULLS) or through individual service systems such as the Army s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Whenever possible, commanders should specify which system is to be used early in the operation, so that data can be collected in the required format. Appendix J provides lessons learned from four HA operations compiled by
USAID/OFDA from the perspective of participating civilian agencies.
The after-operation follow-up would include any action by US military forces that return to the affected area to measure the long-term successes of the mission. For example, three to six months after a large quantity of medical supplies and equipment had been transferred to host nationals in a disaster area, the geographic CINC might direct a medical survey team to return to the area. The team could determine the extent of the usefulness of particular medicines, the appropriateness of the training provided on particular pieces of equipment, and the requirement for additional actions. JTF planners should incorporate lessons learned during the after-operation follow-up in the same lessons-learned system that was used for the original HA mission.

Phase I. UN command or host nation established. A UN command is established or the host nation government is prepared to begin assuming responsibility for HRSs.

Phase II. UN headquarters or host nation assumes C 2. Staff elements of UN or host nation familiarize themselves with the mission, HRSs, the relief effort, and general situation. The UN begins assuming duties and responsibilities of the JTF. C 2 is established and functioning.

Phase III. Change of command; nonessential US forces withdrawn. Commander of UN forces or host nation government able to assume functions of the JTF. All nonessential US forces are withdrawn from the area.

Figure 4-8. Transition Plan Phases


Chapter 5

Domestic HA operations include military support to civilauthorities (MSCA) in the event of a disaster or emergency. This chapter offers insight into the differences between Foreign HA support operations and MSCA. The NCA direct both MSCA andinternational HA operations. The primary difference between these operations is that during MSC A operations military support supplements rather than replaces civil agency operations. Local civilauthorities are primarily responsible for the security and welfare of their citizens. They request assistance from county, state, or federal agencies when their resources are insufficient. MSCA support is organized on the unmet needs philosophy.
A disaster or domestic emergency that requires MSCA is any event that threatens to or actually inflicts damage to property or people. An example of a natural disaster might be a hurricane, earthquake, flood, or fire. An example of a man-made disaster might be a hazardous chemical spill, radiological accident, or massiveelectrical power disruption. Domestic emergencies include civil defense emergencies, environmental disasters, and massimmigration emergencies. A disaster or domestic emergency may overwhelm the capabilities of a state and its local governments.
Chapter 5

A sigtlificant difference between foreign HA and IV1SCA involves laws. During foreign operations commanders must be concernedwith international laws, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions and applicable agreements, customs, and plans.
POSSE COMITATUS ACT While conducting MSCA operations,commanders must be aware of and follow the tenets of the Posse Comitatus Act ('18 US Code, Section 1385), as well as the directives, statutes, and regulations that support thecivilian agencies and law enforcementorganizations. The Posse Comitatus Act prescribes criminal penalties for use by the US Army or Air Force to execute the laws orperform civilian law enforcement functions within the US. DOD policy extends this philosophy to the US Navy and Marine Corps. Exceptions to the act are discussed in FM 100-19', AFP 110-3 z, and AFR
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Congress and the NCA have directed thatthe military should become more engaged in supporting domestic needs. In addition, theNational Security Strategy affirms that national security must be viewed in the context of the nation's well-being, acknowledging the inherent capabilities the military possesses forsupporting federal, state, and localgovernments. The fundamental tenet for employing military resources is the recognition that civil authorities have the primary authority and responsibility for disaster assistance. The National Guard, in state active duty status (Title 32 of the US Code), has primary responsibility to provide military disaster assistance in its state.
STAFFORD ACT Under the authority and provisions of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the Federal
' Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993. Civil Law, December 1987. ' Air Force Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Official.
December 1986.
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
coordinates the federal government's response to
state and local authorities for disasters and civil
emergencies. The support that DOD provides
under the provisions of the Stafford Act is on a
reimbursable basis. Commanders must properly
manage incremental costs associated with
disaster assistance and expend resources

FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN DOD most often provides disaster assistance to other agencies in accordancewith the Federal Response Plan (FRP). This plan describes how the federal government responds to a declared disaster in order to savelives and safeguard property. Along with DOD, 26 other federal agencies provide support when the FRP is fully implemented. The -FRP groups the types of disaster assistance into 12functional areas called emergency support functions (ESFs). During disaster response operations, some or all of these ESFs may be activated. The FRP assigns responsibility for each of the 12 ESFs to a lead agency, based on that agency's authority or capability. EachESF also has assigned supporting agencies. DOD is the lead federal agency for one ESF: public works and engineering. DOD is asupporting agency in the remaining ESFs.Consequently, DOD may have resources committed in all 12 ESFs. See Figure 5-1.
The FRP is designed to address theconsequences of any disaster or emergency situation in which a need exists for federal response assistance under the authorities ofthe Stafford Act. The plan describes basic mechanisms and structures by which the federal government mobilizes resources andconducts activities to augment state and local response efforts. Federal assistance is provided to the affected state or area under themanagement of FEMA and the overall coordination of a federal coordinating officer (FCO) appointed by the director of FEMA on
behalf of fhe President.
Public Works and Engineering Support
Public works and engineering supportincludes technical advice and evaluations,
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Public Works &
Information &

Mass Care
Health &
Med Services

Urban Search & Rescue
[ Hazardous Materiels








S S S S. P S S







P -Primary agency -responsibile for management of the ESF
S - Support agency - responsible for supporting the primary agency
Figure 5-1 Emergency Support Assignment Matrix

Chapter 5
engineering services, potable water, construction management and inspection, emergency contracting, emergency repair of waste water and solid waste facilities, and real estate support as required. Activities within the scope of this ESF include emergency clearance of debris, temporary construction of emergency access routes, emergency restoration of critical public services and facilities, emergency demolition or stabilization of damaged structures and facilities, technical assistance and damage assessment, and support to other ESFs. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the operating agent for planning, preparedness, and response operations on behalf of DOD for this ESF.
Other Emergency Support Functions
DOD support to other ESFs under the FRP may come from one of two sources. First, when the primary agency for an ESF determines that it requires support or resources from outside its own agency, that agency may coordinate with FEMA through its regional and national headquarters for the required support or resources. FEMA then determines how to provide the required support or resources from any source nationwide. DOD, as a designated supporting agency. may be tasked. Second, the FCO may task DOD to provide the required support or resources from military assets already within the disaster area or available through DOD channels. The FCO gets this support through coordination with the defense coordinating officer (DCO).

The Secretary of the Army (as the DOD executive agent), the DOD director of military support (DOI MS), and the unified commands coordinate military support for domestic operations.
EXECUTIVE AGENT The DOD executive agent is defined by DOD Directive 3025.1, 4 which states that the Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for the provision of DOD resources to civil authorities. The DOD executive agent has the authority of the SECDEF to task DOD
components to plan for and commit DOD resources in response to requests for MSCA.
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT The DOMS and his supporting staff ensure the performance of allplanning and executionresponsibilities of the DOD executive agent for domestic emergency preparedness. DOMS is the DOD primary contact for all federal departments and agencies during periods of domestic civil emergencies or disaster response. The chain of command is depicted in Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2. Domestic Chain of Command
' Military Support to Civil Authority, January 1993.

The following selected commands have domestic support responsibilities: Atlantic Command (USACOM), Pacific Command (USPACOM), and USTRANSCOM. Inaddition, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) may be tasked as a supportingCINC.
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command CINCUSACOM serves as the DOD principal MSCA planning and operating agent for all DOD components in the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, and Al US territories and administrative possessions (Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico) within theAtlantic Command AOR. Commander, US Army Forces Command serves as USACOMlead operational authority.
Commander in Chief, Pacific Command USCINCPAC serves as the DOD principal planning and operating agent for military support to civil authorities for all DODcomponents in Hawaii, Alaska, and Pacific territories within the Pacific Command AOR.
Commander in Chief, Transportation

USCINCTRANS serves as the DOD single manager for transportation, providing air,land, and sea transportation to meet national security objectives.
In the event of a disaster, relief assistance
is first provided by local emergency
organizations. The next level of disaster
assistance is provided by state organizations,
including the state National Guard. States
prepare plans to respond to disasters within

their jurisdictions. Each state has an office of emergency services (OES) or a similar agency responsible to its governor for coordinating thestate's efforts in disaster response situations.
State Organizations
Prior to ar immediately following adisaster, the state activates an emergency operations center (EOC) to begin gatheringinformation, assessing damage, and advising the governor of the disaster situation. The state OES, through its EOC, coordinates the local and state disaster response operations. In every case, the state's adjutant general and National Guard have a key role in disaster assistance. If local and state capabilities are insufficient, then the state governor can request a Presidential declaration of major disaster or emergency for commitment of federal resources. At that time, FEMA takes the lead as the coordinator of federal disaster assistance.
Federal Organizations
While FEMA is the lead federal agency in most disaster scenarios (hurricanes,earthquakes, floods), the Department of Energy (DOE) has the lead for civil radiological emergencies. In accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan,the Environmental Protection Agency and US Coast Guard share the federal lead for hazardous chemical spill response that includes oil spills.
Following a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency under theprovisions of the FRP, the President appoints an FCO to manage the federal assistance efforts. The DCO, appointed by the supported CINC, serves as the principal DOD point ofcontact at the disaster field office for providing military support in disaster assistance. The decision sequence for disaster support isillustrated at figure 5-3.
Regardless, of the disaster scenario,
however, DOD should be prepared to provideits resources to support the lead federal agency. As an example, the US ArmyChemical Corps is trained to deal withradiological and chemical disasters. The Secretary of the Army, as the DOD executive agent, coordinates with CJCS and the jointstaff and issues an execute order, through DOMS, to the appropriate CINCs, services,and agencies.
Imminently serious conditions resultingfrom a disaster or domestic emergency may
Chapter 5
. Pr. President I Governor!
FEMA DOMS F-- CJCS/ Joint Staff
'I CING dependent 111
.. Requests (JTF Cdr) 1
- 110' Taskings
— — Coordination FCO DCO I

Figure 5-3. Decision Sequence for Disaster Support
require immediateoaction by military commanders to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions occur and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, military commanders are authorized to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to as immediate response.
Immediate response is a short-term emergency supplement to government authorities. These actions do not supplant established DOD plans for providing support to civil authorities. Commanders may use immediate response authority to assist in the rescue, evacuation, and emergency treatment of casualties; in the restoration of emergency medical capabilities; and in the safeguarding of public health. Commanders may also elect to assist in the provision of essential public services and utilities. Commanders use their assessment of mission requirements and the capabilities oftheir commands to judge the extent of immediate assistance they choose to provide.
Immediate response by commanders does not take precedence over their primary mission. Commanders notify their senior commander and seek guidance for continuing assistance whenever DOD resources are committed under immediate response circumstances. Although immediate assistance is given with the
understanding that its costs will be reimbursed, it should not be delayed or denied when the requester is unable to make a commitment to reimburse. When the President determines that federal assistance will be provided in response to a natural or man-made disaster, the military commander continues to provide immediate response assistance, adjusting his operations to conform with the tasks assigned by his higher headquarters and/or within the FRP.
The supported CINC appoints the DCO. The DCO serves as the central point of contact in the field to the FCO and ESF managers regarding requests for military support. The Commander, US Army Forces Command—as USACOM lead operational authority—usually tasks the continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) to conduct planning and coordination for disasters and domestic emergencies as well as to appoint DCOs following a disaster declaration. The DCO supervises the defense coordination element, a staff that can support both the administrative and ESF functional areas (1 through 12) for all coordination and decisions. At the discretion of the CINC, the DCO may assume control of all federal military units involved in the disaster.
STATE COORDINATING OFFICER The state coordinating officer (SCO) represents the governor and is responsible foremergency management, disaster response, and recovery activities. The state coordinating officer is the primary point of contact for the FCO in facilitating disaster assistance. The state area command (STARC) has developed disaster emergency plans in coordination with other state and local agencies. The STARC and DCO establish liaison so that local, state, and federal activities can be coordinated and managedeffectively. The STARC can assist the federal forces with contracting support as well as logistical support from National Guard resources not otherwise committed.
The severity of the disaster may warrant the establishment of a JTF to provide comprehensive support. The DCO continues to serve as DOD's central point of contact for all requests for military support from the FCO and ESF managers. The DCO's expertise and constant liaison with the FCO, local officials, and other ESF managers become critical to the effective coordination and integration of the federal and state disaster assistance efforts. The CINC may designate the DCO as the CJTF. If the size of the JTF expands and the CINC designates another, more senior, officer as the CJTF, then the DCO becomes a special staff officer for the CJTF.

The military role in domestic emergencies is well defined and by law is limited in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment, but do not replace local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primaryauthority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. Command relationships for disasterrelief response are depicted in Figure 5-4.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Commanders can best prepare for disaster assistance operations by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives that govern employing the military in domestic emergencies. The military does not stockpileresources intended solely for domestic disaster assistance. Also, special authorization must be granted to use military medical assets to treat civilians. In summary, disaster planning andcoordination must occur between appropriate agencies at the appropriate level, such as between DOMS and FEMA, and between CINCs and regional federal agencies or states.
DISASTER RELIEF STAGES Domestic disaster operations are normally conducted in three stages: response, recovery, and restoration. The role of the military is most intense in the response stage, decreasing steadily as the operation moves into the recovery and restoration stages.
Response Response operations focus on those life­sustaining functions required by the population in the disaster area. Immediateresponse is discussed previously in this chapter.
Recovery Recovery operations begin the process of returning the community infrastructure and services (both municipal and commercial) to a status that satisfies the needs of the population.
Restoration Restoration is a long-term process that returns the community to predisaster normalcy. While the military has an important role in the relief and recovery stages,restoration is primarily a civilian responsibility. Military forces will redeploy as operations transition from the response and/or recovery stage to the restoration stage.
ASSESSMENT When a disaster is imminent or has occurred, the assessment of the potential or real damage and the anticipated militarysupport requirements must precede the commitment of military resources. This ensures both the efficient use of limited
Secretary of Army

DOD Forces
1 JTF commander and DCO may be the same individual.
- — — Coordination - - - - FEMA mission
SPecial I.Representative
I ----- r -
FEMA Director
Chapter 5

National Guard Forces
CINC - Commander in chief
DCO - Defense coordinating officer
000 -Department of Defense

DOMS - Director of military support FCO - Federal coordinating officer
FEMA -Federal Emergency Management Agency SCO - State coordinating officer TAG -The Adjutant General
Figure 5-4. MSCA Command Relationship
deployment assets and that the resources/ forces deployed are appropriate for the mission. This assessment responsibility is shared by federal, state, and local agenciesand military services.
The earliest information requirements for the assessment process must include the impact on the population, available critical infrastructure facilities, and any serious environmental hazards, The status of the road/ rail systems, airports, and ports must be determined. Identifying major fires, hazardous chemical spills, ruptured petroleum/natural gas pipelines, and downed electrical powerlines, especially in populated areas, is a priority. Determining the status of localemergency services, police, firefighters, andhealth service providers is essential.
As the federal relief effort escalates, including the deployment/employment of
federal military resources in the disaster area, critical relief facilities must be made operational and accessible. These facilitiesinclude municipal offices, hospitals, watertreatment plants, sanitary waste disposal facilities, ice manufacturing and storage plants, electrical power stations and lines, and telecommunications nodes. Sites for the emergency shelter, feeding, and medicaltreatment of displaced civilians must be identified and prepared. These life support centers are required within the first few days after a disaster. Sites for the reception,storage, and distribution of supplies in theaffected area must be identified.
Assessment is a fundamental task for providing effective disaster assistance. Theassessment process requires the integrationand analysis of information from manydifferent sources. This process is not
exclusively a DOD responsibility. It is first and foremost a local and state agency task. Federal agencies, including DOD, assist and cooperatein the information-gathering and assessment process.
Laws limit the types and ways military agencies can gather information in domestic situations. Commanders must ensure that all requests for information, both before andduring a domestic emergency, comply with theapplicable laws . and are handled in the appropriate military channels.
TERMINATION The military's role in disaster assistance must end as soon as practical. The objective of the federal disaster response effort is to assist the local community to return to a self­sustaining status. Consequently, the military should expect to be heavily committed during the response phase of the operation. The military s involvement decreases progressively during the recovery phase. As a principle, the military does not compete with civilian commercial enterprises. As commercial enterprises become more available in thecommunity, the military's provision of supportand services must diminish.
Disaster assistance operations require theestabliShmeat of end states or conditions to be achieved in determining the completion of disaster assistance missions. Conditions must be definable and attainable.
End states must be developed from the highest (national) perspective down to the lowest county and municipal levels. They provide a road map that all government and nongovernment agencies involved in disaster assistance can follow. The affected local population must know when military operations will terminate or transition to local supporting organizations. Mission success istied directly to the military's ability to accomplish specific end state objectives.
In conjunction with federal, state, and local officials, commanders at all levels must understand the desired community objectives or goals, which affect the termination standards for the military's involvement, as well as other federal agencies. The return to normalcy requires a progressive downsizing ofthe military's role.
Militaryocommandersoestablish termination standards in coordination with the FCO and state and local authorities. Standards must be clearly stated and understood by all. Standards can usually be expressed in terms of percentage ofpredisaster capability by specific function; for example, 70 percent of electrical_power restored. In an operation such as disaster support, redeployment of forces becomes a sensitive issue since it may create misperceptions and anxiety in the population with respect to needed sustained support and the ability of local government and contractors to handle the support as federal forces areredeployed.
The criteria for mission success and completion must be defined, articulated, and disseminated as soon as possible. Civil authorities and military personnel must know when the operation has reached completion and when DOD assets will be withdrawn. Mission success should be directlyproportional to the military's ability to accomplish specific milestones. Planners need to identify these milestones in their functional areas and use them to reduce further military support requirements. All parties must understand that even though the mission may not be fully complete from the civilian authorities' perspective, DOD support may have to be replaced by civilian assets and local support organizations to continue the restoration mission.
Appendix A
FROM 1923 THROUGH 1993

This appendix provides a brief overview of HA-associated JTF operations from 1983 through 1993. Classification issues limit several discussions. These discussions do not encompass all JTF HA operations.
On 24 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran JTF-AOS staff virtually duplicated that of JTF­
aground. The next day, military support to AK, the Alaskan command's planned cleanup operations began. On 6 April, JTF contingency JTF. All four services, as well as the Alaska Oil Spill (AOS) was established under Coast -Guard participated in the cleanup before the command of Lt Gen McInerney, USAF, the JTF disestablished.
commander of the Alaskan Air Command. The
In early 1991, the NCA directed US involving supplies and military efforts of over
military forces to augment private relief 30 nations and 21,000 troops (7,000 from the efforts in support of Kurdish civilians fleeing US). Through January 1994, coalition forces northern Iraq into Turkey. The operation have delivered 27,000 tons of relief supplies began on 5 April 1991 and quickly evolved into and aid to approximately 850,000 Kurdish a combined humanitarian intervention effort people. The operations are ongoing.
Following a.devastating.cyclone contribution to relief operations in Bangladesh. (29-30 April 1991), the Amphibious Group Three The III MEF provided the command element. task force carrying 5th Marine Expeditionary Operation Sea Angel began on 10 May and Brigade (MEB) elements returning from involved over 7,000 US soldiers, sailors, marines, Operation Desert Storm provided the major US and airmen.
Following the 12 June 1991 eruption of Bay Naval Base. The commanding general, Mount Pinatubo, US forces evacuated Clark .13th USAF, was in command of theJTF. Air Force Base and most personnel from Subic
(NOVEMBER 1991 - MAY 1993)
USMC.forces.assumed.primary responsibilityfor emergency HA to Haitian refugees at Naval Base Guantanamo. The commanding general, 2d Force Service Support Group (FSSG) (I3G G.H. Walls, Jr., USMC) was the CJTF. The 2d FSSG provided the nucleus for the JTF HQ, and the total force exceeded 1,200 personnel (300 Marines, over 700 Army, 150 Air Force, and local personnel from the Navy Base and Marine Barracks). With interdiction by the US Navy and with Coast Guard assistance, Haitians began to flow into Guantanamo Bay and were housed in a tent city. On 16 December 1991, 300 Marines from the 8th Marine Regiment deployed from Camp LeJeune to Guantanamo to join 400 other military personnel. At peak, the temporary camps at Guantanamo held over 12,500 Haitians.


The Commander in Chief, Europe airlifts to provide relief in the nations formed from (CINCEUR) formed a JTF to command US the former Soviet Union.

(AUGUST 1992 - FEBRUARY 1993)
In late August 1992, the Operation Provide Marine Expeditionary Unit (special-operations-
Relief JTF under the command of BG Libutti capable) IMEU(SOC)] aboard Phibron One) off (USMC) arrived in Mombasa, Kenya. Besides the coast of Mogadishu to provide assistance tothe command element, Provide Relief involved the 500-man Pakistani UN contingent. OnUS Army SOF and USAF transport aircraft 15 September, the ships (including LHA-1 airlifting relief supplies in remote areas of Tarawa) arrived off Mogadishu. In
Kenya and into some Somali towns. In February 1993, Operation Provide ReliefSeptember, the CJCS positioned the 11th became part of Operation Restore Hope.


Hurricane Andrew hit on 16 August 1992, to aid disaster-relief operations. Units causing extensive damage in both Florida and provided shelter, food, and water and assisted Louisiana. On C-Day, 18 August 1992, JTF in relief operations. The commandin general, Miami began deploying forces from all services 2d Continental US Army, was the C F.
Appendix A
On 28 August 1992, Typhoon Omar hit thenorth end of Guam. That day, CINCPACestablished JTF Marianas to support disasterrelief with the commanding general, 13thUSAF, as CJTF. The following day, 1st MEB Marines departed Hickam APB, Hawaii, to assist the JTF. The Marines off-loaded maritime pre-positioned equipment to aid inthe relief operations. Initial relief effortsconcentrated on power restoration and water services. Navy and Marine engineersconstructed a tent city, repaired schools, and assisted in the general cleanup of Guam. Theoperations ended on 19 September.

Typhoon Iniki hit Kauai on 12 September and damaged an estimated 30 to 90 percent ofthe island's housing. That day, CINCPACformed JTF Hawaii, with LTG Corns, commanding general, 25th Light InfantryDivision, in command, to assist with relief operations. Army forces from the 25th LightInfantry Division provided most of the militarysupport. 1st MEB prepared generators, bulldozers, forklifts, trucks, water purifiers, meals ready-to-eat (MREs), and Marines fordeployment. The USS Belleau Wbod transported Marine and Army heavy equipment from Oahu to Kauai and provided command and control capability and medical augmentation to the relief effort. CINCPAC ended the JTF on 6 October.


(DECEMBER 1992 - MAY 1993)
On 2 December 1992, an amphibious task 10,000 coalition forces from 24 nations force arrived off Mogadishu. Marines from the participating in this operation to create a15th MEU landed on 9 December 1992 to secure environment for relief operations. On
initiate Operation Restore Hope. Restore Hope 4 May 1993, CJTF, Lt Gen Johnston, USMC,involved more than 28,000 US servicemen and formally ended Restore Hope with thewomen from all the services, with more than transition to a UN operation.

USCINCEUR activated Joint Task Force Provide Promise (JTF PP) on 23 February 1993 to support the execution of humanitarian airdrop operations in Former Yugoslavia as directed by the UNHCR. On 26 February 1993, emergency supplies were airdropped in Bosnia-
Hercegovina (central Yugoslavia). As 1993 progressed, USCINCEUR expanded the mission of JTF PP to include other tasks such as humanitarian airlift and peacekeeping missions. A forward-deployed task force was established using personnel and equipment
assigned to 502D Mobile Army SurgicalHospital (MASH). USCINCEUR further directed peacekeeping missions in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYRM)known as operation Able Sentry, as well asenforcement of a no-fly zone known as
Operation Deny Flight. As of January 1994, USand allied forces performed over 2,000 airdrop sorties, including over 12K metric tons of food and 170 metric tons of medical supplies.Airland operations delivered another 83K metric tons of humanitarian aid.
Appendix B

The legal issues that surround an HA operation are bothsignificant and complicated. This appendix provides legal lessonslearned from previous HA missions.
The JTF commander must be aware of any existing international agreements that may limit the flexibility of the HA mission. Existing agreements may not be shaped to support HA operations. Such was the case during Operation Provide Relief, when third-
country staging and forwarding of reliefsupplies was a major issue. Military HA commanders dealing with host nations and international organizations should anticipatethe difficulties that international agreements can impose on HA.

Normally, the law of armed conflict does not apply to HA operations. However, it is used in conjunction with the Geneva and Hague Conventions, protocols, and custom laws that may provide the CJTF guidance concerning his operations. Guidelines for forces have to be developed from fundamental concepts of international humanitarian law.Mission imperatives and taskings must have a sound legal basis, and commanders must ensure that personnel under their control conform to internationally accepted standards of behavior and action.
The law of armed conflict applies only to combat actions. Specific legal responsibilities associated with armed conflict that also concern HA operations include-

Care for civilians in an occupied territory.

Issues concerning civilians and private property.

• Responsibilities concerning criminal acts.
While these specitic legal tenets apply only if HA actions progress to open hostilities, JTF commanders may still use them as a basis for determining what is permissive and appropriate concerning civilians, private property, and handling. of criminal acts. Air Force Pamphlet 110-311 provides details onthe law of armed conflict.
Similarly, other legal issues that arise in an HA situation are not governed by other aspects of the law of armed conflict. Somalia was not an occupied territory under the terms of the Geneva Convention, for example.However commanders should attempt to address such issues using international laws, including the law of armed conflict, as a guide whenever possible. AFP 110-31 and FM 27-10 provide guidance to the JTF commander.

Naval commanders must always render assistance to those in distress on the high seas. For HA operations, naval commanders may be tasked to provide assistance outside the bounds of existing guidelines. For example, in cases where no government or civil authority exists, naval units may be asked to establish a local
coastal guard or patrol or take on the responsibilities of harbormaster or harbor control. NWP 9/FMFM 1-10 provides guidance concerning maritime issues that may confront the CJTF.
' Intmnationnl Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. November 1976.
Humanitarian Assistance
The development of ROE for use by the national ROE will respond differently to the
forces assigned to an HA mission is essential same situation. Certain precepts are essential
to the success of the mission. ROE for HA to the concept of ROE for US military forces:
operations are characterized by restraint.

• The right of self-defense must never be
Levels of force, tactics, and, when approved,
weaponry, will all be carefully contained. The sensitive political and international nature of • A unit commander will defend against aHA operations means that the CINC must hostile act or hostile intent. coordinate the details of HA ROE with the CJTF, which may change as the operation The two elements of self-defense are evolves. Under normal circumstances, JCS necessity and proportionality. In necessity, a peacetime ROE apply to all military hostile act must occur or there must be hostile operations. The CINC, in coordination with intent. Proportionality—the use of force— the CJTF, must request supplemental must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and measures to deal with specifics of the mission. magnitude to ensure the safety of forces. Actual ROE established for each HA mission
Figure B-1 is a sample ROE Card. These
will depend on the individual situation and
notional ROE are based on the ROE
operational environment.
established for the US task force in Somalia.
For coalition operations, all participating These sample ROE would be appropriate onlymilitary forces should establish common HA after a decision is made to arm the forces ROE to provide consistency within the conducting HA. ROE for an unarmed HAcoalition. Individual nations using separate mission will differ.
Sample Rules of Engagement Card for US Forces Conducting Armed Foreign HA Missions
Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and
your unit.

You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.

Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts.

When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters,
US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and
proportional to the threat.

You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.

Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.


The United States is not at war.

Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation.

Use minimum force to carry out the mission.

Always be prepared to act in self-defense

Figure 8-1. Sample Rules of Engagement Card
Appendix B

In some HA operations, military forces are authorized to use all necessary means to facilitate the flow of relief supplies. The lack of restraint under these guidelines may cause tension to escalate in the HA environment.
In an HA situation, commanders may need a strategy to disarm the populace to enhance security and reduce crime. Authority to confiscate private property, such as individual privately owned weapons, will have to be addressed. Normally that authority resides with the mandate that established the HA task force.
The objective of the weapons policy may be to disarm segments of the civilian population. Potential methods to accomplish this goal are to-

Confiscate weapons.

Ask that weapons be turned in voluntarily.

Trade weapons for cash or other commodities through weapons incentive programs.

International and national military forces may require public or private property to perform assigned tasks. Use, or even seizure, of private property may be required for specific HA operations.
Use of a weapons policy card similar to the unclassified version of the ROE card was particularly effective in Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF provided the card to relief agencies that had security forces or employed Somali nationals for security purposes. Its purpose was to highlight what was permitted and prohibited by the weapons policy enforced by UNITAF. Troops were trained on the identification of those persons entitled to carry weapons. In addition, identification cards were issued that permitted designated persons to carry weapons for self-defense. Commanders should decide what types of weapons to confiscate and how to disseminate the policy.

Detention of civilians is normally an issue only in those cases where no local, state, or host nation government exists. However, HA commanders must plan to address the handling of civilian 'cletainees. Key issues include-
• • What authority permits detention?
• What conduct warrants detention?

Who has legal jurisdiction to conduct criminal trials?

Who will operate the detention facility?

How will detainees be handledlprocessed?

How long will criminals be detained?

At what point can detainees be transferred to some recognized security police force?


US environmental laws are very strict and apply to all DOD personnel in the performance of their duties throughout the world. Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), stipulates that military personnel are civilly and criminally liable for violations of EPA regulations. Past experiences with UNHCR and the Federal Yugoslav/Republican Serbian governments provide an interesting dilemma where US military forces were directed to handle and dispose of hazardous (chemical) and biological wastes not in accord with EPA and OSHA regulations. However, these wastes were not unlawful under UN regulations and Yugoslav/Serbian law. US forces operating in HA must follow EPA and OSHA regulations.
Appendix C
This appendix briefly describes a cross section of NGOs and PVOs the JTF may encounter during HA operations. While not inclusive, this list provides the JTF a sample of participating organizations.

The American Council for Voluntary the private and voluntary agency as a whole. AInternational Action (INTERACTION) is a grant from OFDA has helped this organizationbroadly based coalition of 152 American PVOs establish a professional forum for cooperation,that work in international development, joint planning, and exchange of informationrefugee assistance, public policy, and when a disaster occurs. However, it is unlikelyeducation of Americans about third world that INTERACTION will operate within thenations. Since 1984, INTERACTION has also country in need of assistance. Its work isplayed a significant role in disaster executed in the US and is organized to
preparedness and response to disasters. It maintain an effective liaison with USAID/exists to complement and enhance the OFDA. It acts as a coordinator at the staff
effectiveness of its member organizations and level in meeting within the country in need.
AMERICAN FRIENDS OF ACTION INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA FAIM American Friends of Action International environmental sanitation, and agricultural-Contre La Faire (AICF) promote development. based, income-generating projects. Its mostefforts and provide emergency assistance in
basic commitment is to enhance local capacitiesAfrica, Asia, and the Caribbean. AICF focuses at both community and central levels.
on primary health care, potable water,
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) operates distribution of food and clothing and therelief, welfare, and self-help programs in 74 provision of primary health care. Its capabilitycountries to assist refugees, war victims, and to provide technical assistance and socialother needy people. CRS emphasizes the services has steadily increased in recent years.

The Cooperative for American Relief three-way partnership contracts among CARE,Everywhere, Incorporated (CARE) conducts private or national government agencies, andrelief and development programs in over 40 local communities in the areas of health, countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and nutrition, AIDS education, populationthe Caribbean. Programs are carried out under management, natural resources management,
Appendix C
agriculture, small economic activities, and appropriate to local needs and priorities. Itsemergency assistance. CARE provides technical particular strength is in food distribution,assistance, training, food, other material emergency transport, and general logistics.
resources, and management in combinations
MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERS Medicins Saris Frontiers (MSF) provides yearly to areas of conflict, refugee camps, medical assistance to victims of disasters, national disaster sites, and areas lacking accidents, and wars. The US organization is adequate health care facilities. Its particularclosely associated with hs counterparts in area of expertise is emergency medicine,Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France. Medical vaccinations, and basic hygiene services.relief teams respond to more than 700 missions
The International Medical Corps (IMC) operate. IMC 's goal is to promote self­provides health care and establishes health sufficiency through health education andtraining programs in developing countries and training. Its particular areas of expertise aredistressed areas worldwide. IMC specializes in immunizations and primary health care.areas where few other relief organizations
The International Rescue Committee United States. IRC monitors human services, (IRC) assists refugees and internally displaced delivery, and refugee processing for USvictims of war and civil strife. Services range resettlement. IRC can provide emergencyfrom emergency relief and assistance medical support, public health, and small­programs to refugee resettlement in the scale water and sanitation capabilities.
Irish Concern is one of the foreign NGOs .primary area of expertise is supplementarythat receives funding from USAID/OFDA. Its .and therapeutic feeding and sanitation.
Lutheran World Relief, Incorporated areas of disaster relief, refugee assistance, and(LWR) provides financial, material, and social and economic development. LWR is also
personnel support, usually through
a provider of health care.
counterpart church-related agencies in the
Save the Children Federation/United help, and using available resources. ThisKingdom (SCF/UK) programs are guided by a organization is more relief oriented than itsSet of principles, which include identifying US counterpart. It concentrates on providingproject goals and implementing projects, supplementary feeding, seeds and tools, and
transferring necessary skills, encouraging self-general infrastructure.

World Vision Relief and Development, over 90 countries throughout the world.Incorporated (WVRD or World Vision) Development programs include child survival,provides cash, gifts in-kind, services in-kind, vitamin A distribution, prostheticslhandicapand technical resources for large-scale relief/ rehabilitation, child development, and AIDSrehabilitation and development projects in prevention and education.
Appendix D..

This appendix briefly describes the UN organizations that support humanitarianassistance.

UNDHA was established by the secretary-general early in 1992 with a mission to coordinate international HA efforts. UNDHA is intended to mobilize and coordinate international disaster relief, promote disaster mitigation (through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promote awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related matters. UNDHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management entities and emergency services worldwide and mobilizing specialized resources. The appointed UNDHA emergency coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at the country level. UNDHA also coordinates with locally represented NGOs, PVOs, and I0s, as required. The emergency coordinator convenes the UN disaster management team (DMT) at country level, seeking unity of effort among all relief agencies.

The following UN agencies can be expected in the area of operations. They help form the UNDMT when the UN system has been mobilized to assist in the emergency.

A high probability exists that UNDP representatives will be in country prior to the crisis. UNDP promotes the incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all aspects of disaster management. A UNDP senior member is the coordinator for UN agencies, much as an ambassador is the coordinator for all US agencies in a country during a humanitarian crisis. The UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the UNDHA coordinator and to the UNDMT.
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES Responsibility for coordinating the response of the UN system to a refugee emergency
normally rests with the UNHCR. In certain cases, the secretary-general may make special arrangements. Upon request of the secretary­general, UNHCR provides assistance to internally displaced persons. Governments are responsible for the security and safety of, assistance to, and law and order among refugees on their territory. UNHCR provides material assistance to refugees at the request of governments.
The World Food Program (WFP) is the operational relief-oriented UN organization. It provides general food rations, feeding programs, and supplemental feeding activities to support rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is directed toward special segments of the population. WFP mobilizes and coordinates the delivery of food aid from bilateral and other sources.

UNICEF is a relief-oriented organization. It attends to the well-being of children and pregnant and lactating mothers, especially child health, nutrition, and water. The activities of this organization may include social programs, child feeding (in collaboration with WFP), potable water, sanitation, and direct health intervention (in coordination with the World Health Organization [WHO]) . UNICEF providesmaterial assistance, related management, logistical support and technical assistance.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION WHO is an organization involved more in long-range programs. It provides advice and
assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance includes the preparedness of health services for rapidresponse to disasters.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is an organization also involved in lon­ran e programs. It provides technical advice inreducing vulnerability and helps in therehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, andfisheries. The organization emphasizes local foodproduction. It also monitors food production, exports, and imports and forecasts any requirements for exceptional food assistance.
Appendix E

This appendix provides a list of considerations to be addressed by field units conducting HA.
The assessment process encompasses four activities: data collection, problem analysis, reporting, and follow-up activities. This process is divided into eight steps or modules. The steps are adapted from the Department of State, Bureau of Refugee Programs, Assessment Manual. More detail on individual steps can be found therein. Another useful assessment checklist is found in Appendix B, Army FM 41-10'.
Step 1. Preliminary data collection (includes research prior to going to the field).
Step 2. Observations (made as the survey team approaches the scene of the emergency).
Step 3. On-site interviews (especially critical are observations of relief personnel).
Step 4. Visual mspectlon (vertilcatlon of first impressions).
Step 5. Household survey (provides data to confirm, or reject, impressions gathered from interviews and visual inspections).
Step 6. Preparation for later surveillance (sets the stage for detailed monitoring in the future).
Step 7. Prehminary analysis (describes problems or systems to be analyzed and sets standards and procedures for analyzing the problem).
Step 8. Reports (consider all aspects of reporting requirements).

Assessment of HA requirements for a particular area must address a myriad of questions and problem areas. Some of these include-

Where are the villagers originally from? What is the size of the original population of the village, including the surrounding countryside? What is the size of the refugee population? Why did they come here? What is the relationship of the village with the surrounding villages? Are they related? Do they support each other? Are they hostile toward one another? Is any portion of the village population discriminated against?

What is the food and water status of the village? Where do they get their food? What

' Civil Affairs Operations. I I January 1993.
other means of subsistence are available?
Are the villagers farmers or herders? What
is the quality of the water source?

What is the health status of the village? What services are available in the village? What is the location of the nearest medical facility? Is there evidence of illness and/or starvation? What portion of the population is affected? What is the death rate? What diseases are reported in the village? Refer to FM 8-42 for an in-depth checklist, for a medical mission checklist, and a medical reconnaissance checklist.

What clans exist in the village? Who are their leaders?

What civil/military organizations exist in the village? Who are their leaders?

What organizationfleadership element does the general population seem to support or

trust the most? Which organization seems to have the most control in the village?
• What NGOs and PVOs operate in the village? Who are their representatives? What services do they provide? What portion of the population do they service? Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside?
What is the security situation in the village? What elements are the source of the problems? Who are the bandit leaders and where are they located? What is being done to curb these activities? What types and quantities of weapons are in thevillager.? What are the locations of minefield?

What commercial or business activities are present in the village? What services or products do they produce?

Determine the groups in the village that are in the most need. What are their

numbers? Where did they come from? How long have they been there? What are their specific needs?

What civic employment projects would the village leaders like to see started?

Determine the number of families in the village. What are their names? How many are in each family?

What food items are available in the local market? What is the cost of these items? Are relief supplies being sold in the market? If so, what items are available, what is their source, and what is the price?

What indigenous labor or services are available in the village?

What is the size of any transient populations in the village? Where did they come from and how long have they beenthere?

Appendix F

This appendix describes JCS procedures for DOD support toforeign disaster relief. It is based on a joint staff memorandum dated 29 July 1987 and has been updated by the joint working group toreflect organizational changes within DOD. It includes-

The interagency procedures by which DOD and its components assist in foreign disaster relief.

DOD and interagency coordination, approval, finding, and billing procedures for foreign disaster relief.

Internal DOD procedures for providing military support for foreign disaster relief.

DOD components support or participate in Approval authority for commitment offoreign disaster relief operations only after DOS DOD component resources or services todetermines that foreign disaster relief will be foreign disaster relief operations rests with the
provided to the requesting country. However, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracymilitary commanders at the immediate scene of and Peacekeeping. The DOD coordinator fora foreign disaster may undertake prompt relief foreign disaster relief is the DASD HRAoperations to preserve lives and prevent
(Global Affairs). The joint staff point of contact
injuries when time is of the essence and when for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief/humanitarian considerations make it advisable
Humanitarian Assistance Program is the
to do so. Commanders taking such action will
Chief of the Logistics Directorate U4).
immediately report such operations in
accoraance with the provisions of DOD
Directive 5100.46.'
DOD supplies and services are provided for and services. The military departments anddisaster and humanitarian purposes only after joint staff support the designated commanderapproval by Assistant Secretary of Defense for of a unified command as required, principallyInternational Security Affairs (ASD [ISAJ) on by coordinating interdepartmental approvalbehalf of the Secretary of Defense. DOD and funding processes as herein described
provides supplies and services from the most through the DASD HRA (Global Affairs).expedient source, which is normally the unified
When a foreign disaster or humanitarian
command from whose theater the foreign
assistance request emanates from a countrydisaster or humanitarian assistance request not assigned to a unified command under the
Unified Command Plan, the joint staff/J4
The commander of a unified command, assumes the primary coordinating role inwhen directed, assumes the primary conjunction with DASD HRA.coordinating role for provision of DOD supplies
' Foreign Disaster Relief 4 December 1992.
Requests for DOD assistance come from DOS or USAID through OFDA. Upon receipt—
Step 1. OFDA routes the requests to ASD (ISA).
Step 2. When DOD approves the request, it then sends it to the joint staff/J4 for action.
Step 3. Upon receipt of the approved request, the joint stafflJ4, if necessary, activates a 24-hour response team in the LRC and effects appropriate coordination among unified and specified commands, services, and defense agency staffs.
Step 4. The J4 /LRC then determines the appropriate time to promulgate the requests for activation of comparable service or agency response cells.
Step 5. The LRC is augmented as necessary by USTRANSCOM and DLA liaison elements and coordinates with other joint staff directorates, as required.
The OFDA request will contain a list of items to be procured and provided by DOD. If items are unavailable in the unified command, or if the foreign disaster or humanitarian assistance request emanates from a country not assigned to a unified command, the J4/ LRC will locate the requested items through
DLA, a service, or a supporting CINC; calculate the cost, plus shipment, by the Defense Transportation System; and advise OFDA. Costs for disaster assistance are computed at the DOD rate.
Step 6. If OFDA accepts the costs, the 14/1-RC requests DASD HRA approval for the commitment of DOD resources.
Step 7. If OSD approves the request as outlined above, the J4 /LRC-obtains funding and billing information and resource disposition instructions from OFDA coordinates shipmenti and notifies all concerned.
Step 8. The J41LRC ensures that support of OFDA requests are rendered with highest priority_
Step 9. If deployment of military medical, communications, engineer, or transport units or personnel requires other than routine use of transportation port support personnel, the J4 /LRC obtains per diem, operational, and transportation costs from the appropriate CINC or service. After obtaining OFDA funding and OSD approval, the ,joint staff director of operations publishes a CJCS deployment order.

The J4 /LRC receives fund cites from USAID/OFDA for each item and/or service required from DOD elements. The J4 /LRC provides the fund cite to the service, agency supplier, USTRANSCOM, or transportation component commands for each action at the time the action is directed. USAID/OFDA only reimburses for those items and/or services it has requested.
Even though a CINC or on-scene military commander may act to preserve or save lives on his own initiative if urgency or timeliness requires, reimbursement of expended component service funds is not assured. CINCs and services will not be reimbursed if the President or the Secretary of Defense exercises drawdown authority. Each DOD element submits billings for reimbursement of costs incurred for supplies and/or services to DASD HRA in accordance with guidelines in DOD Directive 5100.46.
Appendix F
Tasking messages from the J4/LRC will Contain the USAID/OFDA fund cite
and funding limit and advise the
tasked element of the proper billing
address and the joint staff point of
• Require tasked units to provide clear text, itemized billing information, and the tasked unit point of contact.
• Advise tasked units that approval must be obtained before exceeding the funding limit and that all bills will be submitted in the next monthly billing cycle following completion of the activity.
Appendix G
This appendix describes a response capability called the disaster assistance response team, which OFDA has developed as a method of providing rapid response assistance to international disasters, asmandated by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, that assist US embassies and USAID missions in managingthe US Government response to disasters.
The activities of a DART vary, depending on the type, size, and complexity of disaster towhich it deploys. During either type of disaster response, DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country; PVOs, NGOs, and lOs; the UN; other assisting countries; and US military assets deployed to the disaster.
RAPID-ONSET DISASTERS During rapid-onset disasters, the focus of aDART is to-

Coordinate the assessment of needs.

Recommend US Government responseactions.

Manage US Government on-site relief activities such as search and rescue and air operations.

• Manage the receipt, distribution, and monitoring of US Government-providedrelief supplies.
During long-term, complex disasters, thefocus of a DART is to-

Gather information on the general disastersituation.

Monitor the effectiveness of current US Government-funded relief activities.

Review proposals of relief activities forpossible future funding.

Recommend follow-on strategies and actions to OFDA Washington.


The structure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster and the needs of the USAID/embassy and affected country. The number of individuals assigned to a DART is determinedby how many people are required to perform the necessary activities to meet the strategy and objectives. A DART is composed of fivefunctional areas: management, operations, planning, logistics, and administration.
Management includes overall DARTactivities, including liaison with the affected country; PVDs, NGOs, and I0s; the UN; other assisting countries; and the US military.Additionally, it includes the development and implementation of plans to meet strategicobjectives.
OPERATIONS Operations.include.all.operationalactivities carried out by the DART such as search and rescue activities, technical support to an affected country, medical and health response, and aerial operations coordination. This function is most active during rapid onset disasters.
PLANNING Planning includes collection, evaluation, tracking, and dissemination of informationabout the disaster. Also included are reviews of activities, recommendations for future actions,
Appendix G
and development of the DART's operational (tactical) plan.
Logistics includes proyiding support to OFDA/DART personnel by managing supplies, equipment, and services and ordering, receiving, distributing, and tracking people and US Government-providdd relief supplies.
ADMINISTRATION Administration includes the management of fiscal activities of the team, contracts, and procurement of goods and services required by OFDA/DART. Also included are cost accounting of DART activities. A DART team leader selected by OFDA organizes and supervises the DART. The team leader receives a delegation of
Administrative/ LogisticsContract CoordinatorOfficer
Procurement Suppy Officer Officer
Administrative/ ransponation Support Officer Officer
Communications Officer
Ayiation Officer
authority from and works directly for the OFDA assistant director for disaster response or his designee. The delegation lists the objectives, priorities, constraints, and reporting requirements for the DART. See Figure G-1. Based on this information, the team leader, in conjunction with the assistant directors for disaster response and operations support, identifies the other needed positions. The decisions on a DART's activation, composition, and mission are made at a disaster response planning meeting held in OFDA.
Prior to departure, the team leader attempts to contact the USAID/embassy (if present in the affected country) to discuss the situation; review the DART's structure, size, objectives, and capabilities; and identify the areas of support needed by the DART horn USAID/embassy.
Safety Officer
Press Officer
Operations Planning Coordinator Coordinator
-1 Medical Officer Information Officer Jr
-1 TechnicaV Scientific Operations Specialist Field Assessment Officer

..1 Search ag Rescue Task Force

Figure G-1. DART Organization Chart
Upon arrival in an affected country, the team leader reports to the senior US official or to appropriate affected country officials, to discuss the DART's objectives and capabilities and to receive additiond instructions and/or authority. While in the affected country, the team leader advises and may receive periodic instructions from the USAID/embassy. Those instructions are followed to the extent that they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains a direct
line of communications with OFDA Washingtonthroughout the operation.
USAID/embassy and OFDA Washington determine the duration of a DART operation after reviewing the disaster situation and the progress in meeting its objectives.The DART is designed as a highly flexible and mobile organization capable of adjusting size and mission as may be required to satisfy changing disaster situation needs.
Appendix H
This appendix describes general responsibilities of liaison officers (LNOs) before, during, and after a tour of duty with a JTF. It also applies
to liaison personnel between adjacent units, supporting or assigned forcesand CJTF, and CJTF and higher command. Procedures come from JointPub 5-00.2; therefore, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs may not be familiar with thesestandard procedures.
Operational success is always influenced by a commander's knowledgeand use of his forces. As representatives of theirparent command to CJTF,LNOs frequently provide the critical link to effectively coordinate andexecute JTF operations. The responsibilities discussed herein provideguidance for the conduct of LNOs.
Before departure for the gaining • Obtain.necessary.credentials.for headquarters, a LNO should-identification and appropriate security
• Be thoroughly briefed on the current clearances.
situation of his unit and his commander's • If conducting liaison with a coalition unit,
intent, including details of the concept of check language and interpreter requirements.

operations, for example, unit locations,
• Become familiar with the potential issues,
factors such as personnel strength and capabilities, employment doctrine, and
logistics considerations, a map with overlays.
operational procedures of his unit and, as
• Obtain specific information and/or liaison much as possible, those of the unit to which
requirements from each staff section. he is being sent.

Clearly understand his mission and • Become.familiar.with.command

relationships among all major commands

Ensure that arrangements for communica-participating in the operation.
tion and transportation meet mission

On arrival at the headquarters to which • Visit.each.staff section,.providesent, the LNO should— information as required, and obtain allinformation required to be transmitted to
Report to the supported commander or
his unit.
section representative Q3 or chief of staff),
state his mission and exhibit orders or • Establish communication with his unit
credentials (if in writing), offer assistance,
and exchange updated information asand be prepared to brief on his unit's
During the liaison tour, the LNO should-• Find out how his parent command will be
• Keep informed of the situation of his own employed, for example, mission, unit
unit and make that information available location, future locations, future operations,

to the commander and staff of the unit to commanders intent.
which he is sent.


Accomplish the mission without interfering
with the operations of the headquarters to
which he is sent.

Report promptly to his own headquarters
if he is unable to accomplish the liaison

Report to his parent command on those
matters within the scope of the LNO

As permitted by official order, inform the visited unit commander of the contents of reports dispatched to the LNO's parent headquarters.

Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about significant problems being experienced by the LNO'sparent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa and LNO suggestions to enhance the effective

Upon return to his own headquarters, the LNO should-

Brief the commander or section
representative on all pertinent information
received during the his visit, for example,
detailed information concerning the mission
of the higher headquarters, unit locations,
future locations, and commander's intent.

Transmit promptly any request of thevisited commander.

effectiveness of the LNO's parent

Ensure that the LNO's location at the headquarters is known at all times, forexample, inform the tactical operations

center (TOC) duty officer of daily

Advise his parent unit, if possible, ofdeparture from the liaison location.

Attend CJTF's daily situation updatebriefing and other meetings as required.

Keep an appropriate record of his actionsand reports.

Report to the visited unit commander prior
to departing at the completion of his


Transmit mission requirements andrequests for information from the visited


Transmit information required by higher
headquarters in each staff area of

Keep abreast of the situation and be
prepared to respond to future liaison

Appendix I
This appendix provides a pictorial view of the rank structure and insig­nia of the -US armed forces for both officers and enlisted members. This ap­pendix is included to aid NG0s, PV0s, and other nonmilitary personnel that work with US military forces in HA operations.
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OFFICER (W-3) OFFICER (W-3) OFFICER (W-3) „yly:IgariaE4444as
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CHIEF WARRANT uniform Owe recesses the Navy OFFICER (W-5)
Appendix J
Lessons Learned from Recent HA Operations
This appendix is a compilation of lessons learned from four recent HA operations: Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Provide Relief, the Mombasa Airlift for relief supplies to Somalia, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and the UN HA operation in Bosnia. This material was provided by OFDA and represents an overview of specific problem areas encountered in each case. Military commands should understand that this appendix is presented from the perspective of civilian agencies working with military forces.
Objectives Problems Problems Addressed by Planning Process Constraints
1. Save lives 1.a. 400,000 1.a. Deputies 1.a. Iraqi Govt
(reduce death Kurdish refu- Committee hostility to the
rates) gees fled to Turk- Kurds
ish border, 800,000 refu-gees went to northern Iran • Isolated area • Weakness of the UN • Returning
1.b. Turkish home or per-
Govt refused manent camps
entry, forcing ref- were not
ugees to survive acceptable
in mountains options
2. Provide post- 2.a. Coalition 2.a. USAID
war relief forces began air- formed posthos­
drops of excess tility contingency
Desert Storm planning during
supplies from war
Incidik AFB

3.a. Deployment3. Complete US
of US militaryintervention and civil affairs, USwithdrawal
embassy liaison teams, and OFDA DART
Humanitarian Assistance
SUBSEQUENT (2 weeks)
Establish secure zone in northern Iraq so that refugees would feel safe to return

Set up camps in secure zone

Begin repatria-tion of Kurds to secure zone

SUBSEQUENT (2 months)
Withdrawal of coalition military forces

UN manage-ment of relief operations

Prepare long-term relief through winter and beyond

1.a. Presence, threats, and harassment by Iraqi military, police, and secret police
3.a. Reluctance of Kurds to return to northern Iraq
3.b. Kurds fearful of loss of protec­tion
1.a. MOU with GOI permitted Iraqi interference
1.b. Continued 601 harassment
3.a. Wheat har-vest sold outside area
3.b. No effective economic man­agement
Problems Addressed by
1.a. Deployment of coalition mili-tary to establish secure zone, set up camps
Establish no-fly zone above 36th Par­allel

DART initi-ated grants to PVOs to manage camps and tran­sit to UN

1.a. Retained no-fly zone and "over-the-hori-zon" protection
Coalition members devel­oped cross­border, bilateral relief programs

UN negotia-tion with 601 under terms of MOU


1.a. Deputies Committee
1..b. EUCOM transition
tran planning
2.a. DART/JTF camp construc­tion design
1.a. EUCOM relief and transi-tion planning
DART transi-tion planning

UN transi-tion planning

1.a. Initial secure zone did not include Dahuk, origin of most refugees
1.b. Pace of UN mobilization
1.c..PV0 man­date in secure zone needed expansion
PVO protec-tion required

UN facilita-tion of PVO relief efforts

Sanctions prevent develop-ment of self­sufficiency


Appendix J
(6 months and on)
UN relief efforts main-tained

Coalition relief efforts main-tained

Reduce relief requirements over time

Resettle refugees to self-sufficient locations

Expand sanc-tions to permit infrastructure rehabilitation

Develop agri­cultural self-suffi­ciency

Develop inter-nal wheat pur-chase program

Reconstruc-tion limited by sanction restric-tions

601 embargo prohib-iting trade between north and south Iraq

2.b. Turkey pro-hibits fuel corn-merce cross-bonier, reducing most normal commerce
Conflict also halts cross-bor-der trucking, fur-ther isolating Kurds

Kurds not organized to manage econ-omy effectively

7.a. GOI cur-rency manipula-tions
Problems Addressed by
Effort in UNSC to reduce sanction con­straints

Local pur-chase program for wheat estab-lished, managed by WFP

2.b. Turkey engaged as par­ticipant in relief efforts
5.a. Funded road repair program to transport relief goods to south Kurd areas
7.a. Use of Turk-ish lira in Kurd areas found acceptable
7.b. Stockpiling of relief commod­ities


IWG (DOS/ NEA led)


Sanctions limitations

Continued 601 noncooper-ation

4.a. Limited pro-Lection of PVOs
4.b. Isolation of Kurds


A. Airlift food and emergency relief supplies to Somalia/north-em Kenya
Confusion of OFDA/DART and US military roles

US military did not under-stand UN, NGO, ICRC mandates

Military did not understand the food distribu-tion system

Problems Addressed by
1.a. Assignment of liaison officers
C di.
tion on policy and operations between OFDA/ DART and mili­tary command-ers
1.c. Regular communication between DART and military corn-manders
Extending TDY time for DART personnel to ensure conti-nuity

OFDA/ DART served as intermediary

OFDA/ DART briefings

OFDA/ DART validated food requests and require-ments and coor-dinated delivery by the military to UN agencies, NGOs, ICRC


la, Create an "emergency action group" with the author-ity to convene an IWG of agen-cies to_

Make planning recommenda-tions

Delineate and assign agency

• Identify the lead agency
1.b. Develop SOPS and inter­
agency agree -ments to formal­ize the planning process
2.a. USAID should assist with training of military person-net. Recon-
mend military
include HA in senior officer training pro­grams
Recom-mend NGO input into training and mission sim­ulations

USAID should have lead responsibili­ties in a military­supported food distribution pro­gram

Lack of a ¦ formal mecha­nism/proce-dures for joint planning

Military lacks formal training on civilian resources and organizational mandates


Appendix J
Objectives Problems Problems Addressed by Planning Process Constraints
A. Airlift food 4. Classified 4.a. OFDA/ 4.a. Address 4.a. Classified
and emergency material DART security security clear- material
relief supplies to clearances pro- ance proce- requiring dif-
Somalia/north- vided to JTF dures in inter- ferent levels
em Kenya (continued) 4.b. Using milk tary liaison agency/ SOPs of security clearances
officers and
late resources to
5. Personal security of civil-ians (e.g., travel on military air-craft) 5.a. Command and policy clarifi-cations 5.b. DART vali-dated travel 5.a. Address in initial planning process and refine in contin-gency planning 5.a. Military/ legal proce-dural require-ments
6. Incompatibil- 6.a. Standardiz- 6.a. Dissemi- 6.a. Radios
ity in communi-cation equipment ing on possible radio frequencies nate radio frequency that can be programmed
and establishing information
HF radio commu­
nication times
7. Lack of clarity 7.a. Establishing 7.a. Insuffi-
of overall roles working relation- 7.a. Fully irate- dent planning
ships between grate planning
military and process involving
OFDA/DART key agencies


DODD0A-01 01 25

To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under UN resolu-tion
Confusion over military and OFDA/DART roles

Military priori-ties were deter-mined without participation of humanitarian relief organiza-tions

Lack of infor-mation before intervention cre-ated security risk for relief workers

Problems Addressed by
1.a. Assignment of a DART to Mogadishu
1.b. Establish-ment of the civil-military opera­tions center
1.c. Appoint-ment of Ambas-sador in Somalia to coordinate the HA/military/politi-cal strategies
1.d. Working experience gained by mili­tary command­ers who had earlier worked in the Mombasa airlift
Assignment of liaison officers

OFDA/ DART became intermediary for input by relief organizations

v-military operations cen­ter provided a forum for NGOs
3.a..Not addressed

USAID should be an integral part of the mili-tary/political planning process

USAID should be designated to represent the humanitarian relief community in key USG/UN agencies

3.a. USAID representation in all phases of military/civilian planning
3.b. Use of OFDA as a com­munication ave­nue to NGO consortium
1.a. Lack of familiarity by the military on the functions/ responsibilities of OFDAand DART
Restrictions or reluctance on the part of senior military commanders to use nonmilitary resources

Assumption that HA can be planned and executed as a traditional political-military intervention

Lack of knowledge on NGO operations and locations

DODD0A-01 0126

Appendix J

To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under UN resolu-tion (continued)
Uncoordi-nated assess-ments

Lack of mili-tary briefings for civilians

US military presence raised local expects-tions of what might be achieved

Problems Addressed by
Civil-military operations cen-ter

Addressed by DART sched-uling regular meetings and including military representatives

5.b. Civil-military operations cen­ter held daily briefings in Mog­adishu
5.c. DART estab­lished regional networks in Somalia
OFDA issued situation reports and USAID handled press and media inquiries

DART and military corn-manders estab-lished communications with regional leaders


3.c. Establish as SOP a civil­military opera­tions center prior to intervention
Use UN communication networks

Coordina-tion by lead agency

Schedule regular briefings as an SOP

Communi-sate to NGOs and indigenous leadership the scope of activi-ties planned

Tendency of different. NGOs and organiza­tions to do assessments without sharing information

Need for a forum and coor-dination

Define objectives and the need for inclusion of local leaders



Objectives Problems Problems Addressed by Planning Process Constraints
To ensure the 7. Impact of 7.a. USAID pro- 7.a. No banking
delivery of intervention on vided economic system
humanitarian assistance under UN resolu-tion (continued) local economy was not fully analyzed and currency analysis 7.b. Payment in local currency 7.b. No UN poli-des established
7.c. Use of food
for work pro­
7.d. Donor con­
sensus on pro­
8. Security prob- 8.a. Coordina- 8.a. Contin- 8.a. UN mandate
lem was tion in multi- gency planning
*pushed" from national troop
Mogadishu to deployment
other areas strategy
9. Different agen- 9.a. Coordina- 9.a. Appoint lead 9.a. Different
das for NGOs, tion by US agency mandates and
UN, and military ambassador operational per-
commanders 9.b. Civil-military operations cen-ter attempted to 9.b. Create train-ing programs for US military spectives
create consen- 9.c. Second US
sus personnel to UN
10. Lack of NGO/ 10.a. Not ade- 10.a. Contin- 10.a. Security
UN field staff quately gency planning conditions
addressed 10.b. Lack of UN
personnel sys­
tem responsive
to emergency
11. Civilians 11.a. DART/ 11.a. Training for 11.a. Lack of
lacked an under- CMOC briefings NGOs familiarity and
standing of mili- working relation­
tary ranks and ships
12. Frequent mil- 12.a.Assignment 12.a. Planning
itary and civilian of DART person- with assignment
rotations nel for long-term of personnel for
TDYs 3-month rota­


Appendix J

Objectives Problems Problems Addressed by Planning Process Constraints
A. Deliver food 1. Serbian Govt 1.a. UNHCR tries 1.a. Creation of 1.a. Serbia tight-
and relief sup- obstruction of to reach agree- UN Sanctions ens resolve
plies to Muslim UNHCR con- ments with Bel- Committee to against UN sanc-
enclaves to voys from Bel- grade on access: monitor impact tions, elects
stem population grade movements .1.b. UN imposes (reinforce Vance-Owen plan) spring 1992 until spring 1993 cooperation on stiffer sanctions on Serbia to get access and enforce-ment of sanc-tions on Serbia hard-line govern-ment
2. Bosnian Serb 2.a. UNPROFOR 2.a. Coordinated 2.a. Coordina-
military attacks peacekeeping UNHCR Logis- tion complicated
on Muslim areas forces deployed tics Operation by uncertain
and ethnic to escort UNHCR out of Geneva, command struc­
cleansing of cap- convoys Rhein-Main, ture, separated
tured areas 2.b. UN desig-nates 'safe havens" and pro-nounces "no-fly zone" Zagreb, Metk-ovic, Belgrade, Ancona 2.b. Designation of General management points (Geneva, Belgrade, Zagreb, Washington)
Monition as 2.b. Unclear
UNPROFOR authorities, man­
commander date, and objec-
2.c. UN decrees "by any means tives given to UNPROFOR
necessary" pot- 2.c. Rules of
icy and "no-fly Engagement not
zone" given or fol-
lowed by
3. Bosnian Serbs 3.a. UNHCR 3. OFDA consult-
deny access of negotiates with ants (Brennan,
UNHCR con- Bosnian Serb Stuebner, May-
voys to Muslim militia to permit nard, Libby)
areas diversions (23%) conduct assess­
of relief cargo, ments in former
inspections of Yugoslavia
convoys, harass­
ment of drivers,
3.b. UNHCR
commences air­
lifts into Sarajevo
once road deliv­
eries are dis­
rupted (June



Problems Planning
Objectives Problems Constraints
Addressed by Process
B. Prevent mass 1. Winter 1. OFDA dis-1. DOS Hamil-1. Transition in death from star-obstructs patches Bailey ton Working US administra-vation, expo-access (blocked bridge experts to Group formed; tion led to sure, disease, roads, blizzards) plan, design, interagency tele-unclear US­during winter oversee con-conferences Bosnia policy 1992-93 struction of started
Bailey bridges near Mostar
2. Food, heating 2. OFDA pro-2. OFDA dis-2. European fuel, supply vides stoves, patches DART allies back shortages fuel, and plastic to Zagreb to Vance-Owen throughout sheeting to coordinate USG plan and limited Bosnia UNHCR. Grants relief assistance UNPROFOR
to UNHCR, IRC, (Dec 92) mandate and UNICEF for winterization programs
C. Provide assis-1. Bosnian Ser-1.a. Following 1. Hamilton Inter-1. Mixed signals
tance to remain-bian capture of fall of eastern agency Humani-on US adminis-ing Muslim Cerska, Zepa, Bosnian Muslim tartan tration policy enclaves in east-and Srebrenica; enclaves, regu-Assessment toward Bosnia em Bosnia, Mus-mass exodus to lar UNHCR con-Teams conduct lims displaced in Tuzla voys to Tuzla (DOS, OFDA, Tuzla, and Mus-and other safe USAID, DOD, lim pockets in havens were CDC) assess-
south/central permitted ments through-Bosnia (spring through Serb— out Bosnia 1993) controlled areas (Feb-Mar 1993);
produce survey
1.b. OFDA-
report 19 Apr 93funded NGO pro-grams (IRC, Soli­darities, AICF, IMC, CRS, etc) address needs to Bosnian popula­tion
1.c. US begins airdrops of MREs and medical sup­plies on eastern enclaves in March; Germany and France join airdrops

Appendix J

Objectives Problems Problems Addressed by Planning Process Constraints
C. Provide assis- 2.a. Breakout of 2.a. Pressure 2. DART 2. Vance-Owen
tance to remain- fighting between applied to Croat- increases plan discarded.
ing Muslim Bosnian Croat ian Govt and assessments of Bosnian Serb
enclaves in east- forces (HVO) HVO to permit south/central and Croat forces
em Bosnia, Mus- and Bosnian access Bosnia; DART intensify land-
firns displaced in Muslim forces in field rep sta- grabbing attacks
Tuzla, and Mus- south Bosnia tioned in Split on Muslim terri-
lirn pockets in south/central Bosnia (spring 1993) (contin-ued) 2..b. HVO obstruction of convoys from Metkovic to south/central tory in anticipa-tion of partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines

D. Restore food 1. Bosnian Serb 1. UNHCR air-1. DART 1. Convoys to deliveries, forces cut off lifts to Sarajevo increases Sarajevo from water, power electricity, water increase; inter-assessments in Metkovic supply to Sara-to Muslim areas; national pressure Sarajevo. Writes obstructed by jevo; reduce mal-Bosnian Serbs put on Serbs; cable on 'Tall of HVO nutrition and capture Mount threat of NATO Sarajevo" in threat of typhoid Igman, increase airstrikes early July and hepatitis artillery and causes Serbs to (summer 1993) sniper fire on relieve strangle­
civilians; food hold on and supplies dif-Sarajevo and ficult to transport redeploy off inside city Mount Igman
2. Emergency 2. Internationally 2. DART pro-2. Fighting in medical cases sponsored cures water puri-south Bosnia receive intema-MEDEVACS fication tablets intensifies; Mus-tional attention increase out of for Sarajevo; lira section of
Sarajevo CDC starts Mostar cut off assessments in south/central Bosnia
J - 1 1


bn C2 C3


Air Combat Command pamphlet administration air force forces (a component of a joint force) Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faire Air Land Sea Application Center amphibious area of operations area of responsibility Alaska Oil Spill Allied Press Information Center American Red Cross Army Forces (a component of a joint force) amphibious ready group Assistant Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs brigade battalion command and control command, control, and communications civil affairs Center for Army Lessons Learned Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. crisis action team commander Code of Federal Regulations coalition forces support team Combined Information Bureau commander in chief commander in chief, US Central Command commander in chief, Europe
commander in chief of the Pacific Command commander in chief, Transportation Command CJCS.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF.commander of the joint task force
CMOC.civil-military operations center
comdt commandant

COMFOR commander, Forces Command comm communications
CONUSA continental United States Army CPS.cayenne pepper spray CRS.Catholic Relief Services
CS.combat support
CSS.combat service support
CST.coalition support team
CTF.combined task force
CTS.commodity tracking systems

DALIS.Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System DART.disaster assistance response team DAS.Deputy Assistant Secretary
DASD.Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCE.defense coordination element
DCO.defense coordinating officer
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DHUD Department Housing and Urban Development DJS.director, joint staff
DJTFAC.deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DMT disaster management team
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy

DOEd Department of Education
DOI.Department of Interior
DOJ.Department of Justice
DOL Department of Labor

DOMS.director of military support
DOS.Department of State
DOT.Department of Transportation

DUSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
EOC.emergency operations center EPA.Environmental Protection Agency ESF.emergency support functions FAO.Food and Agriculture Organization
FAST.fleet antiterrorist support team
fax.facsimile FCC.Federal Communications Commission FCO.federal coordinating officer FDC.Bureau for Food, Disaster Assistance and Crisis
Management FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FM.field manual FMFRP.fleet marine force reference publication FRP.Federal Response Plan FSSG.force service support group FYRM.Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia GP.general purpose GSA.General Services Administration
HA humanitarian assistance HAcc.humanitarian assistance coordination center HAST.humanitarian assistance survey team
HCA.humanitarian and civic assistance HCR.high commissioner for refugees HHS.Health and Human Services Department nation HOC.humanitarian operation center
HQ.headquarters HRA.Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs HRS.humanitarian relief sectors service support
ICC.Interstate Commerce Commission ICRC.International Committee of the Red Cross IFRC.International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies IMC.International Medical Corps INTERACTION American Council for Voluntary International Action organization IOM.International Organization for Migration
IRC.International Rescue Committee
IWG.interagency working group
J5.plans and policy
J7.operations, plans, and interoperability
J8.force structure resource and assessment
JCS.Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC joint force commander
JFL joint forward laboratory
JFUB.joint facilities utilization board
JIB joint information bureau
JLOC.joint logistics operations center
JMC joint movements center
JOC.joint operations center
JOPES.Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPOTF.joint psychological operations task force
JS.joint staff
JSOTF.joint special operations task force
JTF.joint task force
JTF PP Joint Task Force Provide Promise
JTFSC joint task force support command
JULLS.Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
LF.landing force officers
LOA.lead operational authority
LOC.logistics operations center
LRC.logistics readiness center
LWR.Lutheran World Relief, Incorporated
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR.marine forces (service component of a joint force) army surgical hospital

MCC.movement control center MCDA.military and civil defense assets
med medium MEB.Marine expeditionary brigade MEF Marine expeditionary force
METL.mission-essential task list
METOC.meteorology and oceanography MEU Marine expeditionary unit MOE.measures of effectiveness
MOOTW military operations other than war MRE.meals ready-to-eat MRO.medical regulating office
MSCA.military support to civil authorities MSF.Medicins Saris Frontiers MSR main supply route MTF.multinational task force
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVFOR.naval forces (service component of a joint force) NBC.nuclear, biological, chemical NCA National Command Authorities NCO.noncommissioned officer NCS National Communications System NDC Naval Doctrine Command NEO.noncombatant evacuation operations NGO.nongovernment organizations NRC.Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSC.National Security Council of emergency services
OFDA.Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance off.officer OPM Office of Personnel Management
OPORD operations order OPR.offices of primary responsibility OSD.Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAFP Pacific Air Forces pamphlet PAHO Pan American Health Organization PE.peace enforcement
PKO.peacekeeping operations
PSYOP.psychological operations
PVO.private voluntary organization
ROE.rules of engagement
RCA.riot control agents
SC.special coordinator
SCF.Save the Children Federation
SCO.state coordinating officer
Seabees.Navy construction battalions
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
sec police
SF ODA.Special Forces operational detachments-A
SJA.staff judge advocate
SOFOR.special operations forces (a component of a JTF)
SOF.special operations forces
SOP.standing operating procedure
STARC state area command
TACNOTE tactical note
TAG The Adjutant General
TF.task force
TOC.tactical operations center
TPFDD.time-phased force deployment data
TTP.tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF.United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF.unified task force
UNWFP United Nations World Food Program
US.United States

United States Air Forces Europe pamphlet United States Agency for International Development United States Central Command commander-in-chief, United States Central Command United States Coast Guard United States Department of Agriculture United States Army Corps of Engineers United States Atlantic Command United States Agency for International Development United States Army Reserve Under Secretary of Defense United States Information Service United States Marine Corps United States Pacific Command United States Postal Service US Special Operations Command United States Transportation Command Veterans Administration vice-director, joint staff World Food Program World Health Organization Worldwide Military Command and Control System
intercomputer network
Worldwide Military Command and Control System
World Vision Relief and Development, Incorporated
18 USC §1385. The Posse Comitatus Act.
22 USC §2151. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
32 USC §502,3500. Mobilization Statutes (Army and Air National Guard).
42 USC, §5121, et seq, as amended. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act.

Assessment Manual. Department of State, Bureau of Refugee Programs. undated.
DALE - Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System Program and Users
Handbook. OFDA, Washington, DC. 1993. Federal Response Plan. April 1992. Guide to Field Operations for Disaster Response. Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency forInternational Development, Version 1.0. Undated. National Security Strategy. 1994. 1994 Report of American Voluntary Asencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and
Development with the A_gency for International Development (Voluntary
Foreign Aid Programs).Sureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency for International Development, Washington, DC.
Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs. US Agency for International Development. 1994.
CINCUSACOM Functional Plan 2500-96. Foreign Disaster Relief. Draft. DOD Directive 3025.1. Military Support to Civil Authority. January 1993. DOD Directive 5100.46. Foreign Disaster Relief. 4 December 1992.
(S) Emergency Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (U). USCINCCENT.
January 1992. Joint Pub 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
8 September 1993. Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 9 September 1993. Joint Pub 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Draft
Final Pub). April 1993.
Joint Ppub 3-07.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping
eration 993.
Os. June 1
Joint Pub 3-08. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Draft).
December 1994. Joint Pub 3-16. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations (Draft).
October 1994.
Joint Pub 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.30 July 1993.
Joint Pub 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. November 1993.
Joint Pub 4-01.1. Airlift Support to Joint Operations. October 1991.
Joint Pub 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Undated.
Joint Pub 5.00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

September 1991. Joint Pub 5.03.1. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. 4 August 1991. Joint Task Force Commanders' Handbook for Peace Operations. Joint Warfighting
Center, 28 February 1995.
Strawman TTP for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian
Assistance for Joint /Combined/Interagency Operations. Army-Air Force
Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, VA.
21 December 1992. USCINCCENT SOP. Standing Operating Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance
Survey Team (HAST).
USSOUTHCOM PLAN 95. Foreign Disaster Relief 1994.

FM 5-114. Engineer Operations Short of War. 13 July 1992.
FM 8-42. Medical Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict. 4 December 1990.
FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. 18 February 1993.
FM 34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict
Operations. 2 July 1987. FM 34-2-1. Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter
Reconnaissance. 19 June 1991. FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990. FM 34-36. Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Operations. 30 September 1991. FM 34-130. Intelligence-Preparation-of-the-Battlefield. 23 May 1989. FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 11 January 1993. FM 63-6. Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict. 21 January 1992. FM 100-8. Multinational Army Operations (Final Draft). Spring 1993. FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993. FM 100-23. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994. After Action Report, US Army Forces, Somalia-10th Mountain Division. 10th
Mountain Division. June 1993. Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance, Newsletter 926.
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS.
December 1992. Operations Other Than War, Volume II, Disaster Assistance, Newsletter 93-6.
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS.
October 1993.
AFP 110-3. Civil Law. December 1987.
AFP 110-31. International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air

Operations. November 1976. AFR 55-35. Air Force Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
December 1986.
COMSURFWARDEVGRU TACMEMO XZ0021-X-93. Expeditionary Forces
conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions (Draft).
1993. Dworken, Jonathan T. Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Operations:
Restore Hope and Beyond. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA (Draft). Dworken, Jonathan T. Research Memorandum 93-140. Military Relations with
Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope. Center
for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. October 1993. Dworken, Jonathan T. Research Memorandum 93-148. Operation Restore Hope:
Preparing and Planning the Transition to UN Operations. Center for Naval
Analyses, Alexandria, VA. March 1994. Dworken, Jonathan T., Research Memorandum 93-120. Rules of Engagement
LROE) for Humanitarian Intervention and Low-Intensity Conflict: Lessons from
Restore Hope. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. October 1993. Jareg, Anthony M. Logistics in Operation Restore Hope. Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, VA. January 1994. McGrady, Katherine A. W. Research Memorandum 93-114, The Joint Task Force
in Ope
ration Restore Hope. Center for Naval Analyses. March 1994. McGrady, Katherine A. W. and David Zvijac. Research Memorandum 93-152,
Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report. Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, VA. March 1994. Siegel and Fabbri. FTC Interim Report 93-7, Overview of Selected Joint Task

Forces (For Official Use Only). center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
September 1993.
Burkle, F.M. Jr., MD. Liaison in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, The Federal
Disaster Response Conference. November 1993. Cleveland, Harlan, Editor, American Refugee Committee. New Strategies for a
Restless World. Minneapolis, MN. January 1993. Cuny, Frederick C. Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief,
' Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters," pp 52-81.1993. Freeman, Lambert and Mims. "Operation Restore Hope - A USCENTCOM
Perspective." Military Review. September 1993. Miller, Paul E, Admiral. National Security Paper 11, The Interagency Process.Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington DC. 1993. UN HCR Handbook for Emergencies. December 1982.
AIDS prevention and education
C-2 after-operation follow-up 4-21 Agency for International
Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. See USAID OFDA
agriculture 4-7 air and port capabilities 4-4 air control authority 4-15 air search and rescue 4-14 airfields 4-4 airspace
control facilities for 4-15
coordination of 4-15 Alaska oil spill A-1 Allied Press Information Center.
See APIC ambassador. See US .ambassador American Council for Voluntary International Action C-0 American Friends of Action Internationale Contra La Faim
C-0 ammunition storage points 4-1 AO 1-3, 1-6, 1-7, 2-2, 2-6, 4-11,
4-14 AOR 3-2 APIC 3-11 area
assessments 4-3 of operations. See AO of responsibility. See AOR
armed forces insignia 1-1-1-2 arms control 1-5 Army engineer units 1-5 Army Special Forces Operational
Detachments-A. See SF ODA
assessments area 4-3 of damage 5-6 process 5-7 of situations and needs 3-2,

Atlantic Command. See USACOM augmentation 3-8
C2 1-4
relationships 4-2
structure 1-9

C3 4-2
CA 3-1, 3-5, 3-7, 4-0, 4-11
officer 3-3
units 1-5, 3-6, 3-7

cabinet-level authorities vi, 2-1,
2-5 CALL 4-21 campaign plan
of commander 4-3 of subordinate 4-3 cantonment areas 4-14 casualties, emergency treatment of 2-8, 5-5
Catholic Relief Services CM cayenne pepper spray 1-8 Center for Army Lessons
Learned. See CALL CENTCOM 3-8. See also CINCCENT Central Command. See
CENTCOM CFST 4-1, 4-2 chain of command 2-1, 5-3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. See CJCS chemical spills 5-0, 5-7 CIB 3-11 CINC 2-4, 2-7, 3-0, 3-2, 3-3, 3-8,
3-9, 4-9, 4-19, 5-5, 5-6
geographic 4-21

responsibilities of 3-0, 3-2
supported 4-2, 5-5 CINCCENT 3-1, 3-2, 3-7 CINCUSACOM 5-4 CINCPAC 3-8, 5-4 CINCTRANS 5-4 civic action programs 3-7
authorities 5-5, 5-8
conflicts 1-2
disorder 1-7
support 1-3

civil affairs. See CA
civil defense emergencies 5-0
civil-military operations center.

See CMOC civilian detainee procedures B-3 civilian organizations. See NGOs,
PVOs, and lOs
CJCS 2-1, 2-7, 3-9, 5-4 and NCA 2-1 warning order 4-2
CJTF 1-5, 1-10, 3-8, 4-1, 4.3, 4-9, 4-20, 5-6 and civilian medical requests
4-14 and MOEs 4-7 and ROE 4-5 and technical assistance 4-14 options for coordination 4-15
clique components 1-8 CMOC 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17
coalition liaison section 3-6 forces 2-2, 4-3 operations and liaison
personnel 4-19
partners 1-4 response 1-4 support teams. See CSTs units 3-3
code of behavior for military and
civil defense personnel 4-5 Code of Federal Regulations B-3 Cold War, end of 1-3 combat service support See CSS combat support See CS combatant commanders 2-1 combined information bureau.
See CIB combined military operations. See multinational operations


information 3-5
relationships 1-4, 3-4, 5-6

command and control. See C2 command, control, and communications. See C3 commander of the joint task force. See CJTF of US Army Forces Command 5-5 commander in chief. See also CINC of Pacific Command. See CINCPAC of Transportation Command. See CINCTRANS of Central Command. See
CINCCENT commercial enterprises 5-8 Commodity Tracking System.
See CTS communications 3-5, 4-13, 4-16,
5-7 components' force lists 3-4 concept of operations 3-1 Congressional authority 2-1 connectivity iv, 3-0, 3-8, 3-9 construction
and repair of local
infrastructures 1-3 of sanitation facilities 1-2 of shelters 1-2
continental United States Armies.
See CONUSAs contracting 4-5, 5-8 CONUSAs 5-5 convoy
escorts 1-7 security 4-3 cooperation, among military and civilian activities 3-10 Cooperative for American Relief
Everywhere C-0-C-1 coordinating authority 2-5 coordination
for disasters and domestic emergencies 5-5
process 2-1 country team 3-8 cross-cultural sensitivities 1-4 cryptographic materials.
See communications CS 4-0 CSS 1-7, 4-0 CSTs 3-8 CTF. See multinational task force
CTS 3-11
cultural respect 1-9, 1-10

DALIS 3-10, 3-11 damage or loss of property 1-1 DART 3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 4-11, 4-12,
4-13, 4-15, 4-18, G-0-G-2. See
also USAID OFDA DART DASD HRA 2-1, 3-9 DCO 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6 deconfliction problems 4-13 defense coordinating officer.
See DCO dental care 1-3 Department
of Agriculture 2-5
of Defense.See DOD
of State.See DOS
of Transportation 2-5
of Treasury 2-5

deployable joint task force augmentation cell. See DJTFAC
deployment assets 5-7 coordination 4-9 of the JTF 4-9 planning considerations 4-9
desired end state. See end state destruction of property and
infrastructure 3-2 diplomatic efforts 1-2 Director of Central Intelligence
Agency 2-1
disaster assistance 5-1, 5-6, 5-8 man-made 1-1, 1-2 and MSCA 5-0 relief 1-2, 3-2 relief response 3-9
Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System. See DALIS disaster assistance response
team. See DART disease 1-1 displaced persons. See refugees distribution of relief supplies 2-6 DJTFAC 3-8 Doctors Without Borders/Medicins
Sans Frontiers C-1
DOD 1-2, 1-10, 2-1,3-9, 5-1, 5-3 assets, withdrawal of 5-8 Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Humanitarian.and Refugee Affairs. See DASD HRA director of military support
See DOMS executive agent 5-3, 5-4 organization 2-3 representative on the IWG 2-7 Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy 2-1
chain of command. See chain

of command
emergencies 5-0, 5-4, 5-6
operations 5-0
support 1-3

DOMS 5-3, 5-4, 5-6
donation assistance 3-11
DOS 1-3, 1-10. 2-1, 2-5, 2-7, 3-2,

4-2, 4-19
organizatiorrof 2-2
representation on the IWG 2-7

earthquakes 1-2
electrical power 5-8 disruption of 5-0 stations and lines for 5-7
emergency shelters 5-7 support assignment matrix 5-2 support functions. See ESFs
emigration 2-10
employment of a JTF 4-10 considerations 4-10, 4-11
end state 3-1, 5-8
engineer services 4-20 support 5-1
environment iv, 1-6 concerns about B-3 hostile 1-6, 1-7 interagency iv joint iv multinational iv nonpermissive 1.7 operational 1-6, 1-7 permissive 1-6, 1-8 uncertain 1-7
ESFs 5-1, 5-3, 5-5 ethnic components 1-8 evacuation
and immediate response
authority 5-5
of sick, injured, or wounded

civilians 1-6 execution 4-10 Exercise Emerald Express 4-16
famine 1-2 FCO 5-1, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6 federal
agencies 5-1, 5-3, 5-6 coordinating officer. See FCO relief efforts 5-7 and state disaster assistance
5-5, 5-6 Federal Emergency Management
Agency. See FEMA Federal Response Plan. See FRP feeding sites 5-7 FEMA 5-1, 5-3, 5-6 firefighters. See local emergency
services fiscal constraints 1-10 floods 1-2 food
capacity 4-3 distribution 1-8 and medical care 1-2 and water distribution 4-3
Food and Agriculture Organization D-2 force tailoring 1-9
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
foreign conflict 1-2 HA operations 1-2 internal defense and
development concept 1-3
military forces iv, 1-4 former republic of Yugoslavia 1-1 frequency management 4-13 FRP 5-1, 5-3 funding authority 1-9, 1-10
Geneva Conventions of 1949 2-9 guerrillas, countering actions of 1-7
HA operations A-1-A-4 lessons learned J-1-J-11 NGOs and PVOs C 0 C-2 teams vi UN organizations for D-1­
0-2 HACC 3-2, 3-3 HAST 3-2, 3-8, 4-15 HCA 1-3
health service providers. See HSS service support. See HSS services. See HSS
HOC 3-5, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16 hospitals 5-7 host government 1-10 host nation
capability 4-3
civil authorities 1-1
coordination 4-15
support 4-4

HRSs 4-4, 4-11
HSS 3-5, 4-5, 4-8, 4-14 diagnostic capabilities 4-14 epidemiological monitoring
4-14 health service providers 5-7 logistics planning 4-8 medical facilities 4-14 preventive medicine 4-14 treatment of civilians 4-14
humanitarian assistance coordination center. See HACC humanitarian assistance survey team. See HAST humanitarian and civic assistance. See HCA humanitarian operations center.
See HOC humanitarian organizations. See NGOs, PVOs, and lOs humanitarian relief sectors. See
HRSs hunger 1-1. See also food hurricanes 1-2. See also typhoons
Andrew A-2
ice manufacturing and storage plants 5-7 ICRC 1-2, 2-9, 2-10, 4-2, 4-11, 4-
14, 4-15, 4-18, 4-20 IFRC 2-9, 2-10, 3-9 immediate response 5-5 immigration 2-11 individual national Red Cross and
Red Crescent organizations.
See Red Cross information, requests for 5-8 information-gathering process 5-8 infrastructure, gathering
intelligence on 4-3, 4-7 INMARSAT 4-13 in-place organizations vi insignia of United States armed
forces 1-1-1-2 integration of planning 2-7 intelligence 4-3, 4-7, 4-12 interaction among military and
civilian agencies vi
coordination 2-0, 2-1, 2-7
operations 3-0
planning 2-7
procedures vi
woridng group. See IWG

international agencies vi agreements B-1 authorities 2-7 organizations. See lOs
International Committee of the
Red Cross. See ICRC
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. See IFRC
International Medical Corps C-1 International Organization for Migration. See lOM International Rescue Committee
C-1 interoperability vi 10M 2-10, 2-11 lOs 1-2, 1-9, 1-10, 2-6, 2-7, 3-1,
3-2, 3-3, 3-6, 3-8, 3-10, 4-3, 4-4,
4-11, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15 and MOEs 4-7 logistics requirements for 4-15
Irish Concern C-1 IWG 2-1, 2-5, 2-7
J3 2-2, 3-6 J4 4-1, 4-4 JCS 1-10, 4-19 JFC 2-0, 3-7 JFUB 4-1 JIB 3-5, 3-11 JMC 4-1 JOC 4-18
joint doctrine 4-2 force operations 1-4, 3-1
forward laboratory 4-9 readiness exercises 4.2 staff 2-2, 2-4 visitors bureau 4-1
Joint Chiefs of Staff. See JCS joint facilities utilization board.

joint force commander. See JFC joint information bureau. See JIB Joint Operations Planning and
Execution System. See JOPES JOPES 4-5, 4-7, 4-9 joint task force iv, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4,
3-6, 3-8, 4-15 Alaska Oil Spill A-1 Andrew 1-5, 1-6 CINC's responsibilities for 3-3 commander of iv, 3-4, 4-5 composition of 4-3 deployment of 4-9 for domestic emergencies and
disasters 5-6 employment of 4-10 establishment of 4-4 as focal point for coordination
1-4 formation of 3-3 headquarters of 3-4, 3-5 notional organization of 4-0,

responsibilities of 3-0 PSYOP for 3-8 response vi special staff sections of 4-0 support command 4-1 transitioning functions of 4-20 two-tier command of 3-4
Joint Universal Lessons Learned
Systems 4-21

language translation 1-4
laws of armed conflict B-1 civilian detainee procedures
B-3 enforcement on navigable
waters 2-5 of the sea B-1 and property, 8-3 and rules of engagement B-2
legal advisor 3-3 authority 1-9, 1-10, 5-1 issues B-1-B-3 requirements 3-11 legitimacy 1 -9 lessons learned 3-10, J-1-J-11
liaison 3-2, 4-10, 4-19 officer 4-18, H-1-H-2 requirements 1-4
teams 4-10
emergency services 5-7
government support 5-8
responsibilities 5-8

logistics vi, 4-4 data base 3.10 operations center 3-2, 3-3,
3-6, 4-4 readiness center 2-2 support to coalition countries
of life, prevention of 1-2
of property 1-1

Lutheran World Relief C-1
mandate 2-9
combat service support 1-4
expeditionary forces A-1

MCC 4-12
measures of effectiveness 3-1,
4-6, 4-7

coverage 1-9, 1-10
representatives 3-11

medical support. See also health
service support
assistance 1-8
care 1-3
public health 4-7
survey team 4-21
treatment of displaced

civilians 5-7 meteorology and oceanography
3-5 METL 4-16 military
and civil defense assets 4-5 humanitarian civil assistance operations vi involvement in domestic operations 5-8 military operations other than war. See MOOTW
military support to civil authorities command relationships 5-7 and domestic operations 5-0
Military Sealift Command. See USTRANSCOM Military Traffic Management Command. See USTRANSCOM
mission assessment of 4-3 creep 3-1, 4-11 requirements, assessment of
5-5 success, criteria for 5-8 termination of 1-9, 1-10
mission-essential task list. See METL mission statement, development
of 3-0, 3-1, 3-2 MOOTW 1-5, 1-6, 4-12 movement control center. See
movements 3-3

forces 3-8 operations 1-3, 1-4, 4-19 logistics command 4-5 task force 4-3
multiservice forces iv
nation assistance 1-3, 1-5
Nation Assistance Program 1-3

agencies vi
authorities vi, 2-1
National Command Authorities.

National Guard 5-1
National Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies 2-10
National Security Council. See

NSC National Security Strategy 5-1 natural disasters 1-1, 1-2 Navy sealift and construction.
See Seabees NBC 3-5 NCA 1-10, 2-1, 2-7, 3-3, 4-19
and domestic operations 5-0
NGOs vi, 1-1, 1-3, 1-9, 1-10, 2-6, 2-7, 2-11, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-6, 3-8, 3-10, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 411, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15
cooperation of 1-6 listing of C-O-C-2 logistics requirements for 4-15 and MOEs 4-7 and ROE 4-5 security for 4-12
NGO/PVO advisor 3-3 noncombatant evacuation operations 1.5 nongovernmental organizations. See NGOs nonmilitary agencies iv

nonprofit organizations. See PVO Northern Iraq 1-1 NSC 2-1, 2-2, 2-5 nuclear, biological, chemical. See NBC
objective 1-8 OFDA. See USAID OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. See USAID OFDA Office of Management and Budget 2-5 oil spills 1-2 Operations Able Manner/Safe Harbor 1-5 Deny Flight A-4 Desert Shield 1-6 Fiery Vigil A-1 Haiti A-2 Hurricane Andrew large-scale 1-4 Provide Comfort 1-5, 1-6, 3-10, 4-3, 4-10, 4-19, A-1 Provide Hope A-2 Provide Promise A-3 and A-4 Provide Relief A-2 Restore Hope 1-4, 1-5, 2-2, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-7, 4-1, 4-4, 4-9, 4-15, 4-20, A-3 Sea Angel 1-5, A-1 Typhoon Iniki A-3 Typhoon Omar A-2 types of 1-2 Urgent Fury 1-5, 1-6 operational assessments 3-9 coordination iv phases 3-1 security awareness 3-6 -level coordination 3-9 -level unified command 3-3 operations order. See OPORD OPORD 4-2 organizational preparedness 1-9
PA 1-10, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-11, 4-3, 4-11, 4-14 PAO 3-3 Pacific Command. See USPACOM PAHO 3-10, 3-11
Pan American Health Organization. See PAHO PE 1-2, 1-6 peace building 1-2 enforcement. See PE operations 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-6 peacekeeping operations. See PKO peacemaking 1-2 perseverance 1-8 personnel recovery operations 1-7 PKO 1-2, 2-9 planning for disasters and domestic emergencies 5-5, 5-6 integration, of strategic, operational, and tactical-level planning 2-7 and regional federal agencies 5-6 state responsibilities for 5-6 police 5-7 political-military advisors 4-19 Posse Comitatus Act 5-1 postal facilities 4-1 predeployment 3-2 planning 4-2, 4-7, 4-8 plans 4-2 President of the United States 2-1 Presidents Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance 2-1, 2-7 preventive diplomacy 1-2 principles of operations legitimacy 1 -9 objective 1 -8 perseverance 1 -8 restraint 1 -9 security 1 -9 unity of effort 1-8 private voluntary organizations. See PVOs proactive programs 1-2 property destruction of 2-8 protection of 1-2 psychological operations. See PSYOP PSYOP 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 4-11 and coalition forces 3-7 public facilities, repair of 1-2 services 5-5 works 5-1 public affairs. See PA public affairs officer. See PAO
PVOs vi, 1-2, 1-3, 1-9, 1-10, 2-6, 2-7, 2-11, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-6, 3-8, 3-10, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 4-11, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15 cooperation of 1-6 listing of C-0-C-2 logistics requirements for 4-15 and MOEs 4-7 and NGO advisors 3-3 and ROE 4-5 security for 4-12
racial components 1-8 radiological accidents 5-0 range of operations 1-3 reactive programs 1-2 readiness 4-2 reconnaissance 3-2 reconstitution of assets 4-20 reconstruction phase 2-4 recovery 5-6 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement 2-9. See also National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies redeployment 4-4, 4-19-4 20 refugees 2-10, 4-18, 4-19 assistance for 1-2 camps for 1-2, 4-3, 4-19 definition of 1-2 regional unified commands 1-3 rehabilitation phase 2-4, 2-8 relief phase2-4 religious structures 1-10 requests for information 5-8 respect, cultural 1-9, 1-10 response 5-6 response triad 2-6, 2-9, 3-1 restoration 5-6 mission 5-8 operations 5-6 restraint 1-9 riot control agents 1-8 roads 4-4
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. See Stafford Act ROE 1-6, 1-9, 4-2, 4-5, 4-12 cards 4-5, B-2, B-3 sample B-2 rules of engagement. See ROE


sanctions 1-2
Save the Children Federation/

United Kingdom C-1
SCO 5-5
Seabees 1-4, 1-5
search and rescue 4-14

of the Army 5-3, 5-4 of Defense 1-10, 2-1, 3-9, 5-3 of State 2-1
secure telephones.See

security vi, 1-7, 1-9, 2-8, 4-5, 4-12 for convoys 3-1 of the JTF 4-12 and level of violence 4-6, 4-7 of lodgment 4-4 operations 4-4 risks 4-3
service component commander
3-4 SF ODA 3-8 shipping, protection of 1-5 single-service operations 1-5 situation and needs assessments
3-2, E-1-E-2 situational awareness 4-13 SJA 3-5 small-unit operations 1-5 SOF 3-1, 3-6 Somalia 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 3-1, 3-3.
See also Operation Restore Hope
special coordinator for international disaster assistance 2-1, 2-7
special operations forces.
See SOF staff judge advocate. See SJA staff surgeon 3-6 Stafford Act 5-1 STARC 5-6 state agencies, responsibilities of
5-8 state area command. See STARC state coordinating officer. See
SCO storage facilities 4-4 strategic-level
coordination 2-0 interagency coordination
process vi, 2-3
planning 2-1
roles 2-0

strikes and raids 1-5 subordinate commands 4-9
subunified commander 3-4
SUMA system 3-10, 3-11

reception, storage, and distribution of 5-7 and services 1-10
agreements 3-11
assets 4-4
request flow 4-18

supported CINC 4-2, 5-5
supporting commands 4-9

tactics, techniques, and
procedures vi
technical assistance 4-14
telecommunications nodes.

See communications
of disaster assistance 5-8
standards for 5-8

terrain 2-9 terrorist actions 1-7 theater of operations 3-0 threat assessments 3-2 time-phased force deployment
data. See TPFDD Title 10 authority 1-9, 2-7 TPFDD 4-4 training 4-5 transit facilities 4-1 transition 4-2
plan 4-20, 4-21 to UN peacekeeping forces
4-4 transportation vi, 4-3 Transportation Command. See
typhoons lniki, A-2 Omar, A-2
UNDHA 2-8, 3-9, D-1---D-2 UNDP 2-8, D-1 UNHCR 3-10, 3-11, D-1 UNICEF 3-9, D-2 unified CINC 3-2 unified task force. See UNITAF unified commander 2-6, 2-7, 3-8
operational-level responsibilities 3-1 unified commands 3-0, 3-1, 5-4
predeployment planning for

structure of 3-4
unilateral US operations 1-3
UNITAF 3-1, 3-7, B-3
United Nations 1-2, 1-3, 2-8, 2-9 .

agencies 1-9, 3-8, 4-2, 4-13
coordinated operations 1-3
country team 2-8
Department of Humanitarian

Affairs. See UNDHA
Development Program. See
emergency coordinator. See

forces 4-5
General Assembly 2-8
High Commissioner for

Refugees. See UNHCR
objectives 2-8
observers 1-3
operations 2-1, 4-5
organization for complex

emergencies 2-8
organizations for HA 2-7, 2-8,

response 2-9
resolution 2-8
Secretary General 2-8
security 4-3
Security Council 2-8
Under Secretary General for

the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs. See

United Nations Children' Fund. See UNICEF
United Nations World Food Program. See World Food Program
United States 1-1 Air Force 1-1 ambassadors 2-1, 2-7 armed forces, insignia of 1-1­
Atlantic Command 5-4, 5-5
Coast Guard 1-1, 1-5, 2-5, A-1
country team 2-1
forces 1-1
Government agencies 3-8
Government-furnished HA

materiel 4-5
Marine Corps 1-1
Navy 1-1
unilateral operations 1-4

United States Agency for International Development. See USAID
United States Army 1-1 Chemical Corps 5-4 Corps of Engineers 5-3 Forces Command 5-4 Secretary 5-3, 5-4
unity of effort 1-8
USAID 1-9, 1-10, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 2-7, 2-11, 3-0, 3-3, 4-15 administrator 2-1 Bureau for Humanitarian Response 2-5 OFDA 1-9, 1-10, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 3-0, 3-3, 3-8, 3-9, 4-2, 4-11, 4-15, 4-21, F-1-F-3 OFDA DART 3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-15, 4-18 organization of 2-5
USCENTCOM 2-2, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2,
CINCTRANS US Central Command. See USCENTCOM US chief of mission. See US
ambassador US Information Agency 2-5 US Information Service. See USIS US Transportation Command.
See USTRANSCOM use of force 1-7 USIS 1-10 USPACOM 5-4 USTRANSCOM 3.2, 4-5, 4-9, 5-4 utilities 5-5
V veterinary care 1-3 Vice President of the United
States 2-1
waste disposal facilities 5-7 water treatment plants 5-7 weapons policy 2-9, B-3 World Food Program 3-9, D-1 World Health Organization D-2 World Vision Relief and
Development C-2 Worldwide Military Command and Control System 3-8, 4-9
Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network 4-7


FM 100-23-1 FMFRP 7-16 NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 ACCP 50-56 PACAFP 50-56 USAFEP 50-56 31 OCTOBER 1994
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
General, United States ArmyChief of Staff
JOEL B. HUD SON Acting Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Arm
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for FM 100-23-1, Muitiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. (Qty rqr block no. 5354)