Army Field Manual FM 100-7: FM 100-7 Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations

Manual guiding armed forces functioning at the operational level of war in concert with joint, multinational and/or interagency organizations. Outlines link between overall strategy/campaign and tactical operations, command structure (national & multinational).

Wednesday, May 31, 1995
Thursday, December 30, 2004

FM 100-7
Headquarters Department of Army Washington, DC, 31 May 1995
FM 100-7
The Army In
Theater Operations

Table of Contents

III. CHAPTER 1. Decisive Victory
IV.. CHAPTER 2. The Theater

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V. CHAPTER 3. Theater Strategic and Operational-Level Perspective

VI. CHAPTER 4. Planning Framework
VII. CHAPTER 5. Execution
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VIII. CHAPTER 6. Force Projection
IX. CHAPTER 7. Army Operations in War
X. CHAPTER 8. Military Operations Other Than War
XI. APPENDIX A. Army Service Component Command Responsibilities and Organization
XII. APPENDIX B. Subordinate Campaign Plan Mode
XIII. APPENDIX C. Major Operations Plan Model Operational-Level
XIV. APPENDIX D. Digitization of the Battlefield


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This manual guides US Army forces (ARFOR) functioning at the operational level of war in concert
with joint, multinational, and/or interagency organizations. It describes how the Army service
component commander (ASCC), previously known as the theater army commander, applies the FM
100-51 fundamentals to ARFOR operating within a theater of operations. This is the Army's manual on
operational artfocused at the operational level of war: the link among theater strategy, campaign plans,
and tactics and the bridge between theaterwide campaigns and localized battles and engagements.
This manual delineates the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, joint doctrine, and
Army doctrine--that is, FM 100-5. It applies to the conduct of operations across the range of military
operations and fills a doctrinal void. This is the first operational-level-of-war doctrinal manual to
address the roles and functions of the Army service component and how the ASCC relates to the
commander in chief (CINC), peers, and subordinat -.ts within the theater structure of the unified
command. Additionally, this manual describes the ARFOR in a combatant commander's theater strategic
and operational environments. It clarifies the various roles and responsibilities of senior army
commanders in theater.
The manual outlines principles and functions for planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and
major operations that require the integration of Army combat capabilities and support activities within a
joint, multinational, or interagency framework. The manual describes Army operations, including force
projection, throughout the full range of military operations—war and military operations other than war
FM 100-7 is designed to assist ASCCs, ARFOR commanders, and other senior army commanders and
their staffs to develop a framework necessary to translate strategic guidance into operational and tactical
execution in joint, multinational, and interagency environments. This manual implements relevant joint
doctrine, incorporates lessons learned from recent operations, and conforms with the Army's keystone
doctrine. Additionally, it links FM 100-15, 2 FM 100-16, FM 100-20,4 FM 100-25,5 and other tactical
and logistics doctrinal manuals with joint and Army capstone manuals.
The proponent of this manual is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form
2028 directly to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATTN: ATDO-A, Fort
Monroe, VA 23651-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively
to men.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approval for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Operations, 14 June 1993.

Corps Operations, September 1989.

3. Army Operational Support (final draft), 4 April 1994.
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, December 1990.

Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 1 January 1991.

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The nation needs an Army to defeat our enemies, and it also needs an Army to deter potential foes,
reassure and lend stability to our allies, and in times of emergency lend support to our communities at
Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States Army

Decisive Victory: America's Projection Army, A White Paper

October 1994

The nation's force for conducting prompt and sustained land combat is the Army. This has been the
Army's mission throughout history. Its unique contribution to the joint team is its ability to dominate the
land, including populations and resources. Army in-theater operations must support the nation's and
theater commander's strategic intent and be synchronized with his strategic concept of operation.
The Army conducts operations as part of or in support of a joint and multinational force or with a US­
only joint force to protect American vital national interests. The Army is the strategic component of the
nation's military power that performs contingency force projection and sustained land operations to
protect and further national interests. In response to the needs of America's national security interests,
the Army is prepared to fight and win. The Army also assists the nation by conducting MOOTW.

As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to influence the international environment and ultimately force a decision. To do this, the Army must be ready, deployable, and versatile.

It must be able to deploy throughout the world in a timely manner--a requirement that touches
every aspect of the force.

It must be lethal. Lethality is essential to the ability to win with minimum casualties, ensuring the rapid conclusion of hostilities and conflict resolution.

It must be robust--structured, tailored, trained, and sustained to meet our nation's requirements.

It must be expansible. Deterrence and rapid conflict resolution require the generation of superior combat power. Expansibility provides the required combat power at the required time---positioned on the battlefield and prepared to accomplish its purpose. The total Army (active and reserve components) must be expansible. The norm must be efficient and rapid mobilization and transition of reserve component personnel and organizations to active component status to reinforce or expand the active component to meet operational requirements across the range of military operations.

The senior army commander in a theater of operations performs three basic tasks:
• Establishes and maintains linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, nongovernment
organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVDs).

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Provides logistical support to ARFOR and, when directed, to other services, allies, or
multinational forces.

Conducts major land operations to support the campaign or subordinate campaigns when assigned by the CINC as an operational-level commander to accomplish the joint commander's theater strategic and operational objectives.

With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the President-­through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)--establishes the chain of command to the military departments for service functions and to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and
forces assigned to their commands. 6 The senior army leader in unified or subunified commands beneath the combatant commander is designated the ASCC. 7 The senior army commander in the theater operates within the chain of command. He answers to the theater commander--known as the CINC—for operations and receives logistics and administration from his service. He prosecutes the logistics a-id administration responsibilities through administrative control (ADCON) authorized by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff.
ADCON is subject to the CINC's command authority (COCOM). The services operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF through the secretary of the military departments. This traditional service branch of the chain of command--for purposes of organizing, training, and equipping forces to fulfill specific combat functions and for administering and supporting such forces--runs from the President, through the SECDEF, to the Secretary of the Army, to the Department of the Army for ARFOR not assigned to a combatant commander. This service branch of the chain of command is separate and distinct from the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.
The CINC practices operational art. When the CINC assigns the senior army commander a warfighting mission, he also practices operational art. The joint force commander (JFC)--a term applied to a commander authorized to exercise COCOM or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force--plans, conducts, and supports theater campaigns, subordinate campaigns, major operations, and battles. His success is measured by the accomplishment of theater strategic objectives. Army commanders in joint and multinational operations function at the operational level of war, thus requiring a broad perspective. They link theater strategy and campaigns to tactical execution. ASCCs and senior army commanders use operational art--the skillful planning, conduct, and support of theater strategy, campaigns, major operations, and battles by ARFOR to attain strategic or operational objectives.
In a joint environment, when the Army is the dominant land force conducting major operations requiring
decisive force, the CINC may assign the ARFOR commander as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). 8 As the JFLCC, he must integrate and synchronize all available assets to accomplish the mission with minimum casualties in terms favorable to the US and its alliance or coalition partners.
The commander of a unified or specified command.

The commander in chief and members of his staff are precluded from being a service component commander.

Joint Pub 0 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 11 August 1994.

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Commanders employ forces within the three states (peacetime, conflict, and war) of the theater strategic environment. Army commanders, particularly at the operational level, operate with other services, government agencies, United Nations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVDs), and multinational partners. These unified operations--joint, multinational, and interagency efforts--require a thorough understanding of Army capabilities as they contribute to the unified structure. Combatant commands and theaters form the unified structure for this organizational environment. A combatant command is one of the unified or specified commands established by the President. A theater is the geographical area outside the continental United States (CONUS) for which a commander of a unified command has been assigned military responsibility. Combatant commanders conduct unified operations.
To discuss the US Army in theater operations at the operational level of war, commanders must understand the theater strategic and operational environment. To do that, they must understand the fundamentals that define that strategic environment and how the application of those fundamentals affects Army operations. Chapter 1 discusses planning and execution of major operations, operational art, operations in war, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Chapter 2 describes the national and theater strategic environments and provides a means to assess Army operations at the operational level. Chapter 3 examines how the commander in chief (C1NC) and the Army service component commander (ASCC) apply operational art and design. Operational art and design are the linkage between execution of tactical operations and campaign plans to obtain strategic objectives in theater. These chapters provide the basis necessary for understanding Army operations at the operational level.

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Decisive Victory
In peacetime, conflict, and war, the Army is the nation's predominant decisive land force. Whenever the
Army is called upon, it fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimum cost to life and
treasure. Army forces (ARFOR) in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy. In MOOTW, they
seek to create, set, or control conditions to achieve their purpose. The standard is to achieve the military
commander's end state within the strategic end state articulated by the National Command Authorities

In today's global-based, force-projection Army, planning and executing major operations to support a
theater campaign is a formidable task. The theater strategic environment is uncertain and dynamic, with
ever-increasing threats and instabilities. Still, the opportunities for peace, growth, and stability are
evident. Army capabilities to succeed in leveraging the environment consistent with national policy and
strategy is the key. Commanders at all levels must organize, resource, train, and employ their forces to
be the decisive force when and where required. The Army operational-level commander's challenge -is
to shape the military environment and set the conditions for decisive results or victory--unqualified
success in all major operations, whether in peacetime, conflict, or war. This chapter is synchronized with
Joint Pubs 1, 0-2, 3-0, 4-0, and 5-0; multiservice publications (FMFM 1, NDP 1, AFM 1); and Army
FMs 100-1 and 100-5.

The theater campaign is the focus of army operations in war, conflict, or peacetime. It is linked to a
theater strategy. The campaign is a series of related and integrated major operations with strategic,
operational, and tactical complementary actions simultaneously and sequentially arranged to accomplish
national strategic, theater strategic, and operational objectives within a given time and space. The
campaign plan describes the conduct of air, land, sea, space, and special operations. If appropriate, it
also includes interagency operations, NGOs and PVDs, and multinational operations, often in relation to
UN actions. To win rapidly and decisively, both combat and noncombat operations occur
simultaneously throughout the combatant commander's campaign space and the operational-level
commander's battle space and against the enemy's theater depths.
In wartime, a broadly conceived theater campaign plan normally involves the employment of large
unified and joint forces. A single, unifying strategic concept of operations synchronizes the actions taken
at each level of war against the enemy's depth. The intent is to concentrate strategically the decisive
force, simultaneously destroying and disrupting key enemy capabilities and functions, and exploiting the
resultant strategic advantage and initiative before the enemy can react. Achieving the theater strategic
objectives, while striving to incur minimum casualties, is the measure of success.
Other campaigns may also be broad in scope but usually call for smaller forces and may include UN
forces as well as other international agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and US Government agencies. Also based
on theater strategies, these campaigns involve a series of integrated operations with strategic aims at international, national, and theater levels. The intent is to establish and maintain the desired military conditions while employing a wide range of military and nonmilitary capabilities to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives.

DODDOA-011031 12/29/2004 Campaigns covering the full range of military operations demand plans with sound linkages between theater strategy, the campaign plan, and major operations plans. The theater campaign must include forward-deployed forces and force-projection forces involved in peacetime engagement--for example, the Partnership for Peace Program, multilateral training, meetings--all part of the CINC's strategy.
The vital linkage between national and theater strategic direction and the tactical employment of forces
on the battlefield takes place in major operational-level planning. The theater strategy and campaign
relate the ends, ways, and means of national strategy to ,the outcomes, methods, and resources for
operational activities. Translating national, alliance, or coalition guidance, the theater commander
devises theater strategic objectives, concepts, and resource implications for a broad range of activities in
the theater, including provisions for both war and MOOTW. The theater strategy is the foundation for
the campaign plan and forms the framework for the employment of forces.
With the outbreak of crisis or, more optimally, in anticipation of an outbreak, the CINC modifies
portions of his strategy and campaign and, when necessary, develops a new campaign plan. His critical
tasks are to identify the military operations that will achieve the desired military end state, thereby
contributing to conditions for achieving the strategic end state. The military end state normally
represents the conditions the CINC wants the campaign to achieve and is reflected in his mission
statement, concept, and intent. The NCA normally directs the military to support other elements of
national power to achieve a strategic end state that may be broader in scope than the necessary military
end state. The intent of the CINC to meet the necessary military end state must be nested inside the
broader intent of the NCA. Within the theater of war and theaters of operations, the CINC's campaign
plan supports the strategic intent, concepts, and objectives.
Operational-level commanders set the conditions for tactical plans and support the campaign with
operational intents, concepts, and objectives. Commanders at the tactical level ensure their intents,
concepts, and objectives are nested within those of the operational-level commander. Regardless of
level, Army commanders consider the objective factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time available
(METT:r) in their battle space to achieve dominance over the enemy and to protect the force.
Commanders of major operations require a fundamental understanding of the principles of planning.
Operational and tactical planning share the same basic, self-evident requirements--a complete definition
of the mission, clarity of the commander's intent, thoroughness of estimates, and sound concepts of
operations. At the operational level, the imperative is to remain capable of responding to continually
changing conditions. These principles assist operational-level planners significantly.
To the Army operational-level commander, a mission is more than expressing what the unit must
accomplish and for what purpose. In analyzing the mission, he considers his superiors' intent and the
battle space and anticipates the missions that could logically follow from the mission in the campaign
plan. Anticipating and staying ahead of change requires the operational-level commander to
continuously reassess the stated mission in light of changing strategic and operational conditions.
Subordinates still require clear, understandable statements of mission and intent before and during
battle. In assigning missions, commanders consider that nested concepts contribute to the unified effort
and dominance of the enemy.
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Just as at the tactical level, the operational-level commander's continuous estimate assists commanders
in choosing the best course of action (COA) and in making adjustments to changing situations during
execution. Commanders first consider the enemy's capabilities, his likely intent and COA, and wargame
friendly alternatives to get from the current friendly state to the desired military end state. Once a
commander selects a COA, he articulates the operational concept--a description of his vision for the
operation. He also begins to formulate ways to support the CINC's plan to keep the public informed of
the campaign, thereby gaining its understanding and support. The result of the estimate is an accurate
assessment of the current enemy and friendly situation, a refined understanding of the mission, and a
clear expression of alternatives, which is the basis for the rest of the plan.
Estimates never stop. Operational-level commanders continually review the situation by--

Visiting subordinates and getting their estimates

Observing operations.

Meeting with higher and adjacent commanders.

Receiving updated intelligence and information about support efforts.

Commanders revise their concepts accordingly. During the execution of the plan, they may adjust the
operation. Estimates include changes in military and strategic conditions as a basis for future missions.
Further consideration of estimates is important for resource allocation changes, particularly in support
Commander's Intent
After mission analysis, the operational-level commander clearly describes the operation's purpose, the
desired end state, the degree of acceptable risk, and the method of unifying focus for all subordinate
elements. The operational-level commander's intent contains the intent statement of the next senior
commander in the chain of command. The commander's intent is meant to be a constant reference point
for subordinates to discipline their efforts. It helps them focus on what they have to do to achieve
success, even under changed conditions when plans and concepts no longer apply. For major operations,
a clear statement of intent is essential to successful integration and synchronization of effort, including
support operations throughout the depth of the battle space.
Concept of Operations
The concept of operations describes how a commander visualizes the major operation unfolding. The
concept is based on the selected COA to accomplish the mission, expressing what, where, and how the
various subordinate operations will affect the enemy. The concept addresses the sequence and timing of
events most likely to produce the desired end state. Support, in particular, can be a dominant factor in
the determination of the nature and tempo of operations. Operational-levels commanders answer these
questions--what, where, and how--in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to
understand what they are to do, how they are to fight, and how they are to provide support for the fight.
In the concept of operations, subordinate commanders describe how they see the actions of each unit
fitting together to accomplish the mission. They describe their view of probable enemy actions and how
they plan to defeat the enemy. The operational-level commander ensures that his concept is consistent
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Historical Perspective
The commander of VII Corps had received his order to attack into Iraq. En route to his headquarters he wrote out his intent for the operation: I intend to conduct a swift, violent series of attacks to destroy RGFC (Republican Guard Forces Command) and minimize our own casualties. Speed, tempo, and a coordinated air-land campaign are key. I want Iraqi forces to move so we can attack them throughout the depth of their formations by fire, maneuver, and air. The first phases of our operation will be • deliberate and rehearsed. The latter will be more METT-T-dependent. We will conduct a deliberate breach with precision and synchronization resulting from precise targeting and continuous rehearsals. Once through the breach, I intend to defeat forces to the east rapidly, with one division as an economy offorce, and pass three divisions and the ACR (armored cavalry regiment) as the point of main ejort to the west of that action to destroy RGFC in a fast-moving battle with zones of action and agile forces attacking by fire, maneuver, and air. CSS must keep up because I intend no pauses. We must strike hard and continually and finish rapidly.
The subordinate commanders' application of operational art begins with understanding the theater strategic concept and guidance about the military end state. As strategic realities tend to constrain the strategic possibilities, the guidance also limits operational-level possibilities. Directly stated, strategic guidance allows the operational-level commander to proceed along clear lines in planning an operational concept to support a desired military end state.
Every subordinate campaign or operation plan (OPLAN) requires an overarching operational concept.
The subordinate joint force commander (JFC) is normally responsible for the concept--an idea that is
initially a product of the higher commander's intent, mission analysis, personal estimate of the situation,
and creative imagination and intuitive judgment. Initially, it exists only in his mind. Yet, the operational
concept must be clearly articulated relative to the conditions in which it will apply. No finite set of
principles exists to help in formulating an operational concept, but history has validated the application
of several key military notions or concepts.
Three commonly used concepts are center of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive points. Center of gravity usually relates to the main enemy force or capability. The concept of center of gravity is useful as a tool to analyze enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By identifying and controlling decisive points, commanders gain a marked advantage over the enemy and can influence the outcome of an action. A line of operation connecting a force with its base of operations is useful for focusing the effects of combat power toward a desired outcome. A commander who uses more than one line of operation produces flexibility and creates opportunities for success. By applying all three concepts, either separately or in concert, the commander forms a concept to set conditions for operations and battles with conclusive, and sometimes, decisive results. Other useful theoretical concepts include culminating point, c cg synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, leverage, tempo, direct versus indirect approach, and termination.
In developing the concept, operational level commanders should consider alternatives that lead to 0 decisive operations and battles. These operations are key to determining the outcome of engagements,
O 007_4.htm 12/29/2004
battles, and major operations. Many other operations support decisive operations. For example, two
supporting ground battles, an interdiction operation, and a deception operation all could support a
separate, decisive ground battle during a single phase of a campaign.
Commanders at all levels provide focus by designating the main effort and supporting efforts, which
help set priorities, determine risks, and unify the effort. The operational level commander focuses by
applying structure to the theater of war and his area of responsibility (AOR). Structure is a product of
the strategic objectives, forces allocated for the theater, a concept for their employment, the factors of
METT-T, and the presence of alliance or coalition structures.
Thinking more broadly and outside the structure, the commander synchronizes major actions within his
battle space. The operational-level operating systems--movement and maneuver, fires, protection,
battlecommand, intelligence, and combat service support (CSS)--are logical ways for commanders to
describe systematically the integration of functions that occurs in each phase of the campaign plan
within a given battle space.
The Army operational-level commander dominates land combat to provide decisive results for the
CINC. He recommends force projection into theaters; links strategy and campaigns to major operations
and tactics through battle dynamics (described later in this chapter); integrates assigned and supporting
joint capabilities effectively; and transitions smoothly from crisis back to peacetime. The Army
operational-level commander also understands all aspects of the CINC's intent. More than merely
comprehending the Army or land force role in the joint operation, he understands the planning
considerations of the other service operational-level commanders and ensures a mutual understanding
and contribution to the accomplishment of all subordinate missions. He also realizes that the joint team
shares limited resources. The CINC's vision for the campaign provides direction for the allocation of
these limited resources. Most significantly, the Army operational-level commander recognizes that
theater success requires more than the success of a single service component; it requires unified success
of the joint team, as directed by the CINC.
Power projection is the ability of the US to apply any combination of economic, diplomatic,
informational, or military instruments of national power. An effective power-projection capability serves
to deter potential adversaries, demonstrates US resolve, and carries out military operations anywhere in
the world.
Historical Perspective
Operation Just Cause began in the early hours of 20 December 1989, as a United States (US) joint force conducted multiple, simultaneous strikes in the Republic of Panama. Elements of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps formed the core of the US Southern Command's Joint Task Force (JTF) South in this force projectionoperation. Forward presence forces, special operations forces (SOF), parachute assault forces, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked or secured 27 critical objectives throughout the depth of the JFC's and enemy's battle space The synchronized attack of enemy command and control [C2] facilities and troop concentrations paralyzed and crushed the Panamanian Defense Force. The objectives included US family housing areas and critical US facilities, which JTF South secured during the attack on Panamanian forces. American forces established effective control of 007_4.htm 12/29/2004
most Panamanian military targets and much of the infrastructure within 24 hours, with limited casualties.
The redeployment of conventional forces to CONUS began before the joint staff terminated Operation Just Cause. Limited military police and elements of the 82d Airborne Division departed Panama as
other forces continued efforts to secure outlying regions of the country. These critical Army crisis­
response forces returned to home stations to reestablish quickly their peacetime readiness posture.
Historians may declare Operation Just Cause as the first war of the twenty-first century. The speed and
scope of the force projection, the simultaneity and depth of attacks at all levels of war, the integration of
combat and MOOTW, and the rapid reconstitution of national strategic capabilities provide a model for
future conflicts.
Force projection is the Army's contribution to the joint effort to project power to secure the interests and
objectives of the US. Force projection is the demonstrated ability to alert rapidly, mobilize, and deploy
ARFOR and to conduct joint, multinational, and interagency operations anywhere in the world from
CONUS or forward-deployed locations.
Ensuring the projection of lethal force worldwide represents the operational-level commander's most
critical and difficult task. This task is essential because power projection forms a central element of the
US National Security Strategy. This task is challenging because it requires the operational-level
commander to deploy limited forces thousands of miles and conduct a high-stakes, come-as-you-are
operation. The importance of the anticipation, balance, and timing of offensive operations represents
three critical force-projection considerations.
The operational-level commander improves his ability to project decisive force through anticipation.
Predeployment and deployment decisions are crucial. Made under conditions of great uncertainty and
friction, these decisions influence the success of entry, combat, and postconflict operations. Once made,
the decisions are most often irretrievable. The operational-level commander improves these early
decisions by anticipating alert and deployment. Anticipation also plays a key role throughout the
deployment. Time remains a critical resource, while ambiguity and uncertainty continue to cloud the
environment. Continuous force tracking, total asset visibility, and continuous intelligence-preparation­
of-the-theater enable the operational-level commander to anticipate changes and maximize his freedom
of action.
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The most difficult predeployment decisions in support of the campaign plan concern force mix and
balance. The operational-level commander must resolve requirements for quick, decisive victory with
strategic constraints and uncertainty. Initially, he must seek a balance in joint capabilities instead of a
balanced ARFOR. He will want to deploy credible, lethal forces early, but limited strategic lift,
undeveloped theater infrastructure, and time constraints may prevent him from doing so. Conversely, he
may require the maximum amount of combat power at the cost of logistical support. Either way, the
CINC can seldom afford duplicate capabilities among elements of the joint team. Maritime air and
amphibious capabilities, naval gunfire, and fleet ballistic missiles represent lethal force often available
to support early entry operations. These or other forward-presence forces may protect the lodgment,
deter enemy attack, or initiate limited offensive operations if conditions limit the early entry of fully 12/29/2004 balanced Army combat power. The operational-level commander must exploit forward-presence forces; split-based operations; and host nation, coalition, and joint assets to balance early entry capabilities.
The operational-level commander also faces a critical decision as he plans the transition to offensive
operations. Early entry units may initially secure the lodgment as additional forces arrive. However,
American operations doctrine and the situation will prevent long-term defensive operations. The
operational-level commander must decide when he has sufficient combat capability to transition to
offensive operations. He must also consider other joint capabilities that complement Army force
projection characteristics. He must apply the CINC's intent and guidance to evaluate trade-offs between
the time required to assemble overwhelming combat force and the benefits of early offensive action
against an enemy that is consolidating gains or preparing for offensive action. The preferred model
remains Operation Just Cause, which emphasized overwhelming and paralyzing the enemy through
decisive, simultaneous strikes throughout the depth of the battle space. This action resulted in minimal
losses and rapid strategic conclusion.
Operational art links success in tactical engagements and battles with strategic aims. The aspects of
battle dynamics establish this relationship: battle command; battle space; depth and simultaneous
attack; early entry, lethality, and survivability; and CSS. Although FM 100-5 describes each of these
dynamics, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is the first document that codifies the elements of battle dynamics.
Battle Command
Battle command describes one dimension of the linkage among strategy, operations, and tactics. Battle
command is a commander's mental decision-making framework. The attributes of battle command-­
assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, assessing and taking risks, guiding and
motivating the organization--contribute to positive impact on commanders at critical points in the battle
or on the battlefield. Commanders visualize current and future states of friendly and enemy forces and
then formulate concepts of operation to accomplish the mission. The Army operational-level
commander faces unique responsibilities in this area. Time constraints and requirements during force
projection strain the process of translating theater strategy and design into operational design and tactical
objectives. The Army operational-level commander may proceed through the first iteration of the
estimate process concurrently with the CINC and subordinate Army commanders. Consequently, the
CINC may not fully develop and communicate his strategy in military terms early enough to support
parallel planning. The Army operational-level commander must translate nonmilitary theater end states
into clear military objectives to support the planning of his staff and subordinate commands.
Battle Space
Battle space characterizes another facet of the linkage among the levels of war. It represents the domain
in which commanders conduct their operations at the tactical, operational, and theater strategic levels.
The Army operational-level commander's battle space forms a subset of the CINC's and contains the
battle space of all subordinate commanders. Its physical volume expands or contracts in relation to the
Army operational level commander's ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth,
depth, and height in which he positions and moves assets over time. It also reflects the capabilities of the
intelligence systems that support him and the deep operations capabilities of the units and systems that
support his command. The Army operational level commander's battle space may extend beyond his
DODDOA-011037 007_4.htm 12/29/2004 operations area, and it may not be contiguous. It also extends back to CONUS, to include the deployment and logistical systems that support Army operations in theater.
Depth and Simultaneous Attack
Depth and simultaneous attack reinforce the linkage among strategy, operations, and tactics. The
operational-level commander supports the CINC's aims by dominating the opponent in his battle space
through depth and simultaneous attack. The operational-level commander cannot maximize depth
through unilateral action. To achieve it, he must link the levels of war by augmenting his intelligence
and deep operations systems with joint capabilities. The operational-level commander also joins the
levels; of war through simultaneous attack. His efforts to achieve simultaneity concentrate the effects of
engagements, battles, and major operations in the dimension of time. Resulting concurrent operations at
all levels of war increase the requirement for tightly integrated activities. Application of depth and
simultaneous attack blurs the boundaries among tactics, operations, and strategy.
Early Entry, Lethality, and Survivability
Early entry forces are those operational deploying forces required to support the CINC or other JFC
concepts of operations in a precrisis or crisis situation. Early entry forces must be able to deploy rapidly,
enter the operational area, and secure the lodgment. They must either immediately have a decisive effect
or create conditions for the arrival of substantial follow-on forces that can then conduct decisive
operations. Early entry forces must consist of lethal and survivable units tailored to support or carry out
the operational intent of the JFC.
Combat Service Support
The functions of CSS have not changed in many centuries. Logisticians have and will continue to have
similar requirements to arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and their systems. The primary
differences are in the execution of the support provided. These differences are a result of diplomatic,
economic, social, and technological changes. Successful armies recognize and adapt to this change,
harness it to their benefit, and are ultimately victorious.
Rapid force projection from CONUS, extended lines of communication (LOCs), and potential forcible
entry into logistically bare-based areas of operations (AOs) require Army development of a CSS system
that is versatile, deployable, and expansible. The CSS system must be as capable as the joint and
multinational forces, to include the SOF, it supports. The CSS system must include both the deployed
force and the sustainment base. Its purpose must be to maintain readiness and sustain ARFOR in all
operations across the range of military operations and at all levels of war--strategic, operational and
tactical. The focus of the CSS system must continue to be soldiers and their weapons systems.
The operational-level commander plays a critical role in integrating joint capabilities. He understands all
aspects of the CINC's intent and recognizes the importance of unity of effort. These two abilities
underpin the concept of integrated joint capabilities. The operational-level commander integrates joint
capabilities during the land phase of joint operations and as a service component commander reinforcing
other members of the joint team.
The operational-level commander is the primary coordinator and integrator of joint capabilities during decisive land operations. The CINC seeks combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration
DODD0A-1111038 12/29/2004
in various dimensions throughout all phases of the campaign. During the decisive phase of joint operations, the operational-level commander becomes the integrator of joint capabilities within his battle
space. During this phase, the CINC coordinates the availability of resources and integrates supporting joint force operations elsewhere in the theater. The operational-level commander synchronizes the
actions of theater intelligence assets, naval gunfire and fleet ballistic missiles, air interdiction, close air
support (CAS), joint electronic warfare assets, SOF, and other joint and national assets. He and his staff
must exploit the capabilities of these resources.
The operational-level commander also integrates joint operations indirectly through the support of other
services. He contributes to the integration of operations in which the CINC assigns him support
missions. The attack of enemy air defenses to support air operations and the attack of small enemy naval
vessels in support of maritime operations during the Gulf War are two examples of this. The
operational-level commander also seeks opportunities to integrate his capabilities into the operations of
the other members of the joint force. He understands the planning considerations of air, maritime, and
SOF and seeks opportunities to contribute to unity of effort and the accomplishment of other service

The operational-level commander considers postconflict operations early in the planning process. They
fall in two broad categories:

Actions to restore order and normal social activities following armed conflict.

Operations to reestablish precrisis readiness levels.

Early decisions concerning mobilization and deployment establish conditions for critical postconflict
operations. Long-term solutions to regional crises usually require more than the defeat of the enemy's
military. The operational level commander develops plans for conflict termination and postconflict
operations early. He reviews them as branches and sequels to deployment and combat operations and
plans for simultaneous combat. ARFOR assist the JFC in supporting the host nation with operations to
handle refugees, clear minefields for immediate tactical purposes, control prisoners of war, provide
humanitarian assistance, and provide other forms of support. Nonmilitary considerations often require
the initiation of these MOOTW before the completion of combat operations.
Once the conflict ends, forces may deploy to their home stations or to another theater. The operational­
level commander must plan for this possibility. He must expect the NCA to alert his forces, as in
precrisis operations. His forces must be versatile enough to transition rapidly from one regional conflict
to another. Once forces return to their home stations, they rapidly reestablish premobilization levels of
readiness in anticipation of future operations.
The Army operational-level commander's role in MOOTW is critical to achieving strategic success.
Like the decisive phase of combat, most of these operations are land-based. Consequently, the Army
operational-level commander functions as the central integrator of a joint and multinational team. He
faces ambiguous threats, unpredictable conflicts, ad hoc staffs, and force packages, as well as a
multitude of nonmilitary participants. The operational-level commander prepares for a mission of
unknown duration and anticipates changes in its nature and scope. To ensure success, he applies
DODDOA-011039 12/29/2004 operational art executed within the framework of battle dynamics. He achieves his desired end state by carefully planning, integrating complementary capabilities, and using versatile forces. Transitions may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, may lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and may be conducted in a fluid, increasingly diplomatic environment.
JTF Andrew coordinated with many federal, state, and private organizations. These included the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services
Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy
Scouts of America, and many religious relief organizations. The commander of JTF Andrew determined
that victory would be achieved when the local schools reopened. This had a significant focusing effect
on the efforts of DOD and non-DOD participants and answered the question, "How do I know when I
am done?"
Historical Perspective
At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew devastated south Florida. The Governor of Florida
requested federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent, directed
initiation of disaster-relief operations in support of the Federal Response Plan. As part of those
operations, the commander in chief of Forces Command directed Second US Army to form JTF Andrew
and begin humanitarian* relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all services and both
active and reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.
JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage
and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and
other logistics support to the populace in affected areas. The commander of JTF Andrew defined
success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until nor-Department
of Defense (DOD) federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations
were conducted in three phases.

Phase I provided immediate relief through life support systems--food, water, shelter, medical
supplies and services. information, sanitation, and transportation.

Phase II was a recovery phase that ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase 1 while
assisting federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services.

Phase III was a reconstitution phase that continued to reestablish services under federal, state, and local control while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support
materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were
moved into the area by sea and over land. Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000
patients received medical treatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected A mobile radio station was
established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route
information to assist convoys as they arrived. Four life support centers were constructed,
providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for approximately two months. Over six million
cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired.
DODDOA-011040 12/29/2004 This disaster-relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the IJS armed forces. The training for war that developed initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in the conduct of operations served the nation well in a noncombat situation. The alert of the 10th Mountain Division for Somalia less than six weeks after
sending more than 6,000 soldiers and their equipment to south Florida further highlights their versatility.

Military decision making and planning processes also apply to MOOTW. The operational-level
commander faces unique planning considerations because of the nature of MOOTW. Areas that require
special planning considerations include interagency cooperation, parallel and continuous planning,
intelligence, and constraints and restraints placed on the operation.
Gaining cooperation among the multitude of participants is a formidable task. The operational-level
commander unifies the efforts of all participants operating within his battle space by attempting to reach
agreement on common goals and objectives. Consensus on goals and objectives requires an
understanding of the roles, missions, and capabilities of each participating member. Additionally, both
national and international representatives of the media will likely cover the operation. Facilitating their
mission keeps the service member, the local populace, and the international community apprised of the
situation and may contribute to the achievement of national aims and objectives.
Parallel planning is essential. Ideally, this begins with the NCA decision to commit military forces. The
uncertainty surrounding the mission requires commanders to simultaneously begin planning at all levels.
Parallel planning provides planners with the ability to influence task organizations, mission statements,
and force caps and obtain access to critical strategic intelligence early in the planning process. The
operational-level commander must participate in the development of end states, conditions, and
measures of effectiveness (MOEs). He must understand the diplomatic, economic, and social objectives
of the operation before determining the military end state and sequencing operations to achieve it.
Clarity of mission and desired end state-is critical.
Intelligence is the key to force protection. The Army operational-level commander acquires and
disseminates information on the country, the people, and the diplomatic, economic, and military
situations. Key items of information are shared with members of participating civilian organizations,
who in turn can be vital sources of intelligence. Continuous access to strategic intelligence and reliable
low-level sources is paramount to situational awareness. The viability of the rules of engagement (ROE)
are assessed continuously with the current mission, friendly force capability, threat conditions, and
environment within which operations are conducted. ROE protect the force and also provide a
framework within which hostile acts are controlled.
The Army operational-level commander must conduct a continuous estimate process. He operates in a
dynamic environment. Changes in strategic objectives, operational constraints, or the nature of the threat
are three examples that may invalidate the initial mission analysis. Operations, intelligence, deployment,
engineer, and logistics estimates are constantly updated as new information becomes available. The
commander's continuous estimate process serves to integrate the parallel planning and estimate
processes ongoing in each functional area.
The operational-level commander obtains clear, strategic guidance on constraints and restraints early in
the planning phase. He determines his authority and capability to enforce local laws and assesses
restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence. Excessive force could impede the attainment of
operational goals and hamper the efforts to maintain legitimacy and obtain international acceptance.
Disciplined forces, measured responses, and patience are essential to successful outcomes.
DODDOA-011041 12/29/2004


The operational-level commander integrates and synchronizes complementary capabilities within his battle space. Establishing cooperation among many participants is demanding; integrating their capabilities is even more so. The simultaneous application of complementary strengths, concurrently conducted at all levels, provides the necessary leverage to achieve the desired end state. The key to developing this leverage is the ability to establish unity of military and civilian efforts. Without a formal interagency command structure, commanders ensure unity of effort through leadership. They must demonstrate the logic and soundness of their solutions and the competence of their execution. Robust
liaison is critical in this role. Providing assistance to other participants promotes integration of their unique capabilities. Operational-level commanders enhance their integration efforts by--

Collocating their headquarters with local and regional governments.

Establishing a civil-military operations centers.

Aligning military and diplomatic boundaries.

By planning, implementing, and continuously updating a complementary joint and interagency concept, operational-level commanders integrate diplomatic, military, and economic power across all dimensions of the environment.

The operational-level commander plans MOOTW anticipating the requirement to transition to another, similar operation or even war. The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) during 1992 and 1993 set the precedent. MOOTW require flexible leaders with versatile forces. The operational level commander must be able to address a wide array of missions against a multitude of diverse threats. His versatile force must be capable of fighting and winning our nation's wars, yet it must be fully capable of transitioning from warfighting to other operations. Rapid changes in the strategic situation may force sequential commitment from one theater to another; while changes within the same theater may require a transition from one type of operation to another. Activities such as nation assistance, humanitarian support, and disaster-relief operations may continue when higher levels of violence arise. Commitments to MOOTW may precede combat, follow combat, or flow readily back and forth between the two.

Throughout history, military operations have been conducted with armed forces of several nations in
pursuit of common objectives. The changing world environment dictates that future operations will most
likely require multinational involvement.
An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations is termed a multinational operation. An
operation conducted by forces of two or more .nations in a formal arrangement is called and alliance
operation. An operation where the military action is temporary or informal is called a coalition
operation. Campaigns and major operations may be conducted within the context of an alliance,
coalition, or other international arrangement. Such operations, whether or not they involve combat, are
planned through both international and US channels. In practice, each coalition operation is unique.
Planning and conduct of the operations vary with the international situation and the composition of the
forces. Alliance or coalition members may not have identical strategic perspectives, but there should be
DODDOA-011042 12/29/2004
sufficient harmony of interests to ensure a common purpose for the campaign. The need to maintain consensus within the alliance or coalition is paramount to preserve a unified effort.
Multinational operations require close cooperation among all forces. Capabilities will often differ
substantially among national forces, but higher considerations of national prestige will often be as
important to the final success as the contributions to the overall effort. Seemingly small decisions, such
as national composition of the main effort, may have significant consequences for the outcome of the
operation. Members should be consulted on their recommendations for COA development, ROE, and
assignment of missions.
To assure unity of effort, all plans require detailed coordination with essential supporting plans for
liaison and the provision of mutual support. Host nation support and the capabilities of coalition partners
in particular may dictate the tempo of the attack and its form. The commander must focus on lateral
coordination across national and interagency boundaries, in particular the effective sharing of
information. Though unity of command promotes unified effort, American commanders should be prepared to operate within the alliance or coalition under command of other than a senior US

DODDOA-011043 12/29/2004

The Theater
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes criteria for a unified theater based on National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, geography, and history. The President approves the UCP, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geogaphical AOR for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. A key consideration is strategic objectives. National strategic direction and evolution of geopolitical circumstances shape the theater's geographic boundaries.
Theater commanders provide strategic direction and operational focus to subordinate commanders. They develop a theater strategy and campaign plan, organize their theaters, and establish command relationships for effective unified (joint and multinational) operations. Through this process, theater commanders plan and conduct unified operations that ensure a united effort within the command.
The military instrument of national security policy requires synchronization with the diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. Circumstances determine the extent of the synchronization required. The national synchronization effort is referred to as unified action; the theater level is referred to as unified operations. Interagency operations are another consideration for Army commanders in the
The US Constitution requires civilian control (the NCA) of US military forces. Consequently, subsequent legislation has molded today's defense establishment and produced the concept of the unified theater. Unity of command requires that one responsible commander focus resources toward obtaining defined objectives and strategic end states. Across the range of military operations, unity of command gives a single, unified commander responsibility for all military operations within a designated theater strategic environment (see Figure 2-1). Command lines within the unified theater are established to designate one responsible commander.

Section I
The Strategic Hierarchy
The first round of the first battle is a strategic-level decision.
GEN William W. Hartzog

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

To accomplish unity of effort within the unified theater, the CINC devises a theater strategy for that
geographic portion of the globe. This military strategy is a combination of the art and science of
employing armed forces or the potential threat posed by the presence and capabilities of that force to
secure national security objectives through the application of force. The CINC derives his military
strategy for a geographic region from a hierarchy of guidance and manifests it in the unified theater
campaign plan and theater contingency plans.
The theater strategic environment is shaped by the special conditions, circumstances and influences in the theater that affect the employment of military forces and the decisions of the chain of command. The
DODDOA-011044 12/29/2004 theater strategic direction is expressed through hierarchical levels of strategy. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and theater strategy all provide the basis for each theater's strategic direction. These strategies integrate national security and military objectives (ends), national security policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces (means) to achieve national security objectives. The Army's planning and conduct of major operations or MOOTW is the operational-level link between the tactical level force's actions and the strategic hierarchy discussed above. This operational-level link is discussed later in this chapter and in the Chapter 3 discussion of operational art and design.
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended, created the Department of Defense and the positions of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The National Security Act of 1947, and subsequent implementing memorandums, authorized the formation of unified and specified
combatant commands. Commanders of these combatant commands are called CINCs.
• Large-scat e combat operations
War.• Attack
and Win
• Defend
• Strikes and raids
`) N
a ,.. • Peace enforcement
Deter War
Operations t `' • support to insurgenciesand
other — n • Antiterrorism
Conflict c
than o • Pea oekeep ingConflict war • Noncombatant evacuation
m operations (r4E0)
a • Counterdrug
t • Disaster relief
Pro mote other
• Ow support
Peace than
war • Peace building
• Nation assistance
The states of peacetime, conflict. and war could at exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respord lo requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some MOOTW might require combat.
Figure 2-1. The Range of Military Operations.
The NCA establish the National Security Strategy and appropriate strategic end states. The National
Security Strategy announces US interests and objectives. This strategy is the art and science of
developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power--diplomatic, economic,
military, and informational--to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. National values
and principles form the foundation of US interests and objectives. The Army's keystone doctrine (FM
100 5) reflects these values as the American view of war. US interests and objectives outlined in the
1994 version of National Security Strategy include--
• Enhancing our security. The survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its basic
values; intact and its institutions and people secure.

DODDOA-011045 12/29/2004

Promoting prosperity at home. A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for
individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

Promoting democracy. Healthy, cooperative, and diplomatically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. A stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

The 1995 National Military Strategy describes two fundamental strategic military objectives derived
from the National Security Strategy.

Promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction.

Thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities.

To achieve these strategic objectives, US military forces must perform three tasks:

One, remain constructively engaged in peacetime.

Two, attempt to prevent the eruption of conflict.

Three, should conflict prevention fail, fight and win our nation's wars.

The overlapping and interrelated strategic concepts that allow the military to execute these three tasks
are overseas presence and power projection. Figure 2-2 depicts the relationships between the strategic
concepts of overseas presence and power projection and the national military objectives.
Achieving National Military Objectives
PROMOTE STABItFIY THWART AGGRESSION Through Regional Cooperation Through Credbla Deterrence and and Constructive Interaction Robust Iltrartghling Capabilities

Nave Clear Objectives
Nuclear Deterrence Mil ite ry-to-Military contacts Use Decisive Force
Regional Alliances Nation Assistance Use Wartime Power Projection
Crisis Flespon seSecurity Assistance Fight Multinational and Joint
Arms Control Humanitarian Operations Win the Infonratico War
Confidence-Building Measures
Countordrug and Countarlomatm Counter Weapons

Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations of Mass Destruction
Operations Peacekeeping Focus on Two Major Regional
Sanctions Enforcement
Crises at Once Peace Enforcernent
Win the Pesos
Overseas Presence Power Projection
Figure 2-2. Achieving National Military Objectives.
DODDOA-011 046
http://atiam. train. ew/public/296714-1/fm/100-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004
The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to help the NCA in providing strategic direction for the armed services. The National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) are the methods the CJCS uses for
providing that assistance.
The National Military Strategy and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of
military forces. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides planning guidance to the CINCs
and chiefs of the services to accomplish their missions based on current military capabilities.
The CINC translates the national level strategic directives into a theater strategy. This strategy is the
basis for developing a campaign plan and leads to operations plans for execution. Joint or multinational
forces implement these plans in theater to achieve theater strategic objectives that, in turn, achieve
national objectives.
The CINC's strategy has several components. First, it expresses his vision and intent (military
objectives)--the theater ends to which operations are conducted. Next, it provides integrated strategic
concepts, COAs, and guidance--the theater ways designed to secure national objectives, using the
theater's wide-ranging military capabilities. Finally, it gives the service and functional component
commanders guidance for planning and employing nuclear, conventional, and SOF theater means.
The plan's process allocates the theater means. Forces are allocated based on theater missions as they
compete with requirements in other theaters. Means are expected to fall short of what would ideally be
available. The theater campaign plan sequences unified activities over time and space to compensate for
these shortcomings.
METT-T analysis is a traditional assessment method for tactical-level leaders. Under deliberate planning
circumstances, tactical-level commanders and staffs should use the Army's deliberate decision making
procedures in FM 105-5. As part of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (DOPES)
procedures, strategic and operational level leaders use more formal methods, such as strategic estimates
or commander's estimates, as they analyze military and diplomatic situations (see Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and
At the strategic level, METT-T analysis focuses on conditions, circumstances, and influences of the
theater strategic environment. At the operational level, it includes the mission analysis and the
assessment of the operational-level environment discussed in Section VI of this chapter. At the theater
strategic level, the CINC develops his theater strategy by first identifying specified and implied missions
and tasks for his theater. He derives these from many sources, including the national security and
military strategies, policies, directives, the JSCP, the UCP, Joint Pub 0-2, and other directives and
While identifying theater missions, the CINC analyzes his theater strategic environment. Using the
strategic estimate, which includes the factors of METT-T, he considers the potential instabilities or
threats, the limitations, and the nature of anticipated operations. Assessment factors include the
integration of capabilities by diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power
provided to the military. In addition, the CINC must consider international security agreements. This
analysis leads to formulation of a strategic estimate that defines the strategic situation in the theater.
Thus, the estimate produces broad, strategic concepts of what must be done in theater. Then, the CINC
integrates these concepts into the theater strategy.
DODDOA-011047 12/29/2004 The CINC's staff and subordinates, to include his service and functional component commanders, contribute to the development of the theater strategy. The functional component commander is the commander in charge of a service or functional component command, which consists of all individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the' command assigned to the unified CINC. The development of the multiple theater strategic concepts leads to a specific strategic COA for
implementation in the theater campaign. Once the CINC selects the desired course, his staff and
subordinate joint commands use the theater strategy to develop and integrate OPLANs, including
Section II

The Chain of Command
The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 prescribes the chain of command. The NCA
exercises authority and control of the armed forces through the chain of command with two distinct
branches. The first branch runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant commanders for
missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch runs from the NCA to the
secretaries of the military departments to the chiefs of the service forces for execution of service
Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of their
commands and execution and accomplishment of assigned missions. The secretaries of the military
departments are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. The authority
exercised by the military departments is subject by law to the authority provided to the combatant
The DOD Reorganization Act placed the CJCS within the chain of command to communicate the
directions of the NCA. Though he does not exercise military command over any combatant forces, all
communications between the NCA and combatant commanders pass through the CJCS. Figure 2-3
displays the chain of command.
This portion of the chain of command begins with the President and SECDEF, who make up the NCA.
They alone have the constitutional authority to direct US armed forces into military action. Once the
NCA makes the decision, authorization for military action is passed to combatant commanders. The
President, with the advice of the SECDEF and CJCS, establishes combatant commands and appoints
combatant commanders under the authority of the National Security Act of 1947. The JSCP apportions
forces for each combatant command for planning.
While the CJCS does not exercise command over military forces, the SECDEF may assign oversight
responsibilities to the CJCS to assist in controlling and coordinating the combatant commanders. The
CJCS functions within the chain of command by conveying to the CINCs the orders of the President and
The CJCS coordinates all communications on matters of joint interest addressed to the CINCs by other
authority. The CJCS acts as the spokesperson for the CINCs, especially on the operational requirements
of their commands. The CJCS monitors the geographic regions of the world not assigned to a combatant 12/29/2004
A combatant commander is a commander of a unified or specified command. A combatant commander is called the CINC. A combatant commander is the only military leader with statutory authority (combatant command) to organize and task all services under his control to accomplish military missions. Combatant commanders are key links in the chain of command.
National Command Authorities
• Prosidcrt Chain of -Secretary of Defense Army Service
Comm and Branch of Chain of Command
JCS Secretary of !he Army
Departrnert of the Army
I Comrnendera of Uniied
Army Chief
of Staff
Joint Task Force F Jr1 ctor. al Army and Component Forces Si I be on ate Unified Com•ande
Navy & Ma .i i e Air Fore. Special Operatans Army
Comp or: en -aP s C.onpore ntf Fe rces Co riven iir din., ices Co mponentiFo roes
. Direct command
ARMY . Chan ro I of oommunIcat .on
Aorninstrative contra; (AMON)
Figure 2-3. Chain of Command. DODDOA-011049

The chain of command for the military departments runs from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments. The secretaries exercise authority, direction, and control through the service chiefs of their forces not assigned to combatant commands. This chain of command includes all military forces within the respective service. This branch of the chain of command is separate and distinct from the branch that
exists within a combatant command.
The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of their forces, to include those assigned or attached to combatant commands. The secretaries fulfill their 12/29/2004
responsibilities for forces apportioned to combatant commands by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands. ADCON is subject to the command authority of the combatant commander.
The ASCC, using ADCON authority, is responsible for preparing, maintaining, training, equipping,
administering, and supporting ARFOR assigned to the unified and specified commands. The emphasis
of the service branch of the chain of command is administrative (legal, personnel, finance) and logistical
support to respective service forces. Training during peacetime, in preparation for war, and before
commitment of forces is also a key element and task for the ASCC.
The CINC provides the channel for strategic and operational guidance in theater and ensures the US
unity of command. The service administrative and support channel provides administrative, training, and
logistics support, ensuring that the CINC receives organized, equipped, and trained US military forces.
Figure 2-3 illustrates this branch of the chain of command.
Within the parameters set by the CINC's organization of the theater and the command relationships he
establishes, the ASCC organizes the ARFOR to best accomplish the assigned missions. The CINC has
the authority to direct certain Army organizational options but normally leaves internal Army
organization and command relationships to the ASCC.
Command is central to all military actions. Unity of command is central to unity of effort. The authority
vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. Commanders in the
chain of command exercise authority as prescribed by law or a superior commander. Commanders of US
military forces use various levels of authority, which are described as command relationships and other
authorities. Within the seven levels of authority, four are command relationships--combatant command
(COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. The other three are
coordinating authority, ADCON, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).
COCOM is the command authority authorized by Title 10, US Code, Section 164, or as directed by the
President in the UCP to combatant command commanders (unified or specified). COCOM provides full
authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. This authority enables the CINC to organize and employ his
commands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects
of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned missions. The
CINC normally exercises COCOM through his service component commanders. COCOM is not
Commanders at or below the combatant commander exercise OPCON as their command authority.
OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform the functions of command over
subordinate forces.
The CINC may delegate OPCON to his subordinates. OPCON is the most authority with which
subordinates can direct all aspects of military operations and joint training needed to accomplish any
assigned mission. A commander with OPCON may control forces from one or more services. OPCON 12/29/2004 does not normally include the authority to direct logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. The service component commander retains his service responsibility and authority for forces under OPCON of another command. Commanders must be aware of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terms of OPCON and not interchange the two. The NATO term OPCON more closely resembles the US definition of TACON.
The CINC uses TACON to limit the authority to direct the tactical use of combat forces. TACON is authority normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and maneuver of the tactical force to accomplish an assigned task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or administrative and support responsibilities. The service component continues to exercise these authorities.
The C1NC identifies support relationships for one force to aid, assist, protect, or logistically support another force. The supporting force gives the needed support to the supported force. Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. This concept applies equally to all dimensions of the joint force organized by the C1NC.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the NATO terminology for subordinate command
relationships caused some problems. The NATO terms operational command and tactical command
are similar to the Army terms OPCON and TACON. With NATO forces working for a C1NC outside
the NATO structure, some confusion resulted.

OPCOM is a NATO term used to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy
units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or TACON as necessary. OPCOM
does not include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may indicate the forces
assigned to a commander.

OPCON, as discussed in joint doctrine, is a slightly broader authority than OPCOM. OPCON, besides
the authorities stated above, includes the authority to prescribe the chain of command; organize
commands and forces; suspend or reassign officers; delineate functional responsibilities; and
delineate geographic AORs.

Operational control is also a defined NATO term. In NATO, operational control is the authority
delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific
missions or tasks that are limited usually by function, time, or location. It further includes the
deployment of units concerned and the retention or delegation of TACON to those units. It does not
include authority to assign separate employment of components of concerned units. Neither does it,
of itself, include administrative or logistical control.

TACOM, the NATO term, is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under
his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. This differs from
TACON in that TACON involves only the necessary control of movements and maneuvers to
accomplish a previously assigned mission. Both NATO and joint doctrine share the same definition

DODDOA-011051 12/29/2004 for TACON.
These definitions demonstrate the complexity of multinational operations. The subtle differences in
terms were a source of confusion among allies with a long history of multinational operations.
Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. Normally an
establishing directive is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and
the scope of the action to be taken. Joint Pub 0-2 states, "Unless limited by the establishing directive, the
commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting
effort." The execution of general direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or
objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for
coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander is responsible for ascertaining the needs of the
supported commander. The supporting commander must fulfill those needs from within the existing
capabilities, priorities, and requirements of other assigned tasks. The categories of support are general,
mutual, direct, and close.
General Support
General support provides designated support to an entire supported force and not to any particular
subdivision. General support is the most centralized support relationship. For combat units, this
relationship provides the most flexibility for influencing the battle during conduct of operations and is
used when the enemy situation is unclear. It is more commonly used in the defense than the offense.
Mutual Support
Mutual support describes actions that units provide one another against an enemy because of their
assigned tasks, their positions relative to one another and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
Direct Support
Direct support provides designated support to a specific force and authorizes the supported force to seek
this support directly. The supporting force provides support on a priority basis to the supported force.
Also, the supporting force may provide support to other forces when it does not jeopardize the mission
or put the supported force at risk. The authority to accomplish support of other than directly supported
forces rests with the higher tactical or operational commander but also may be delegated. An example of
this support is when the elements of a general support artillery brigade assigned a direct support mission
are diverted temporarily to support a force other than the designated force.
Close Support
The fourth alternative, close support, is that action of the supporting force against targets or objectives
that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the
supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.
Other authorities granted outside the command relations delineated above are coordinating authority,

DODDOA-011052 12/29/2004
Coordinating Authority
Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, but not an authority to exercise control. The CINC and other subordinate commanders designate coordinating authority to assist during planning and preparation for actual operations. The CINC specifies coordinating authority to
foster effective coordination; however, coordinating authority does not compel any agreements.
Administrative Control
ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory
responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by service
commanders at any echelon at or below the service component command. The secretaries of military
departments are responsible for the administration and support of their forces assigned or attached to
unified commands. The secretaries fulfill this responsibility by exercising ADCON through the service
component commander of the unified command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of the
combatant commander.
Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRLAUTH is the authority granted by a commander at any level to a subordinate commander to
coordinate an action directly with a command or agency within or outside the command. DIRLAUTH is
a coordination relationship, not a command relationship.
Section III
Joint Force Commands
The NCA, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes combatant commands (unified and
specified) on a regional or functional basis. Regionally oriented unified commands are called theater
combatant commands. The CINC, using the COCOM options, establishes the theater command
structure. He may establish subordinate JFCs (subunified commands and JTFs). These subordinate JFCs
may be established on a regional or functional basis.
With the advice and assistance of the CJCS, the NCA establishes combatant commands (unified and
specified) to perform military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands.
Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of their
commands to execute assigned missions and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to
A specified command is a command that has broad, continuing missions. The NCA, with advice and
assistance of the CJCS, establishes a specified command. A specified command is composed normally
of forces from a single military department. Still, it may include units and staffs from other services.
Currently, no specified commands exist.
DODDOA-011053 12/29/2004
Unified commands are those combatant commands with significant forces from two or more services. Unified commands may be functionally or regionally oriented.
Functionally Oriented (Global) Unified Commands
Functionally oriented unified commands are the US Space Command (SPACECOM), the US
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the US
Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Functionally oriented unified commands operate globally across all
geographic regions. The UCP provides missions, geographical areas, and forces assigned to unified
commands. The UCP is normally reviewed biennially during an odd year. Suggested changes are
submitted for consideration. Those that receive support are subsequently implemented.
Regionally Oriented (Theater) Unified Commands
Unified commands with regional responsibilities are the US Atlantic Command (ACOM), the US
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the US European Command (EUCOM), the US Central Command
(CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command (PACOM). Each regional combatant command has a
specific geographic AOR or theater that includes the land, sea, and airspace in the strategic region. UCP­
designated AORs provide military focus and a basis for coordination worldwide.
A theater combatant commander has the flexibility to organize and employ forces wherever required to
accomplish his assigned responsibilities in coordination with other supporting combatant commanders.
Effective use of the nation's military power requires close integration of the separate services. Unity of
effort is required for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized direction provides for unified action by
forces. Decentralized execution is essential because of the enormity of the command and control (C 2)
The theater combatant commander, referred to as the CINC, is a strategic-level commander of a unified
command, who provides strategic direction and operational focus to his subordinate commands. CINCs
serve as the vital link between national military strategy and theater strategy. They provide the strategic
and operational direction required for major unified and joint land, air, and maritime operations. The
CINC is not simply a planner and allocator of resources; he has a broad range of responsibilities
established by public law and described in joint publications.
The CINC organizes his forces, assigns tasks, designates objectives, provides authoritative direction, and
employs his forces. He designs and executes theater campaigns and unified operations, supports the
operations of other theater CINCs, and continually assesses the environment, anticipating the need for
theater operations where his forces may play a supporting or supported role.
A CINC is assigned a myriad of responsibilities to fulfill his unique command role. Joint Pub 0-2
discusses the CINC's responsibilities at length. It specifies that the CINC is responsible for maintaining
the security of his command and protecting the interests of the US, its possessions, and its bases against
direct and indirect hostile threats. The CINC ensures that his command is prepared to carry out missions
assigned by the NCA. The CINC assigns responsibilities and missions to his component forces and
maintains unity of command.
The CINC executes his strategic planning responsibilities for developing a theater strategy and theater campaigns (war plans to achieve national strategic objectives). He uses operational art and theater
DODDOA-011054 12/29/2004
design while performing the following critical tasks:

Prepares the estimates (strategic and commander's) of the situation.

Establishes a theater strategic end state.

Determines strategic center of gravity.

States his strategic vision and intent in his strategic concept of operations.

Organizes the theater.

Identifies subordinate commands and determining specific forces required to execute campaign

Establishes command relationships and delegating authority.

States readiness shortfalls and developing programs to correct those shortfalls.

Concentrates his forces and supplies strategically.

Conducts strategic maneuver to destroy, dislocate, or neutralize the strategic center of gravity.

Seeks strategic advantage and the initiative.

Directs the development of theater contingency plans and concept plans leading to the conduct of operations in war or MOOTW.

Achieves a theater strategic end state.

The CINC's campaign plan provides a common frame of reference within which operations of land, air,
maritime, special operations, and space forces, as well as interagency, multinational, or UN forces, are
unified, integrated, and harmonized. Joint campaign doctrine is found in Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0, 5-00.1.
The services provide forces to operate within a subordinate JFC in the operational areas that the theater
commander organizes. They further subdivide these areas among their forces. The SECDEF directs the
Secretary of the Army to assign ARFOR to the CINCs. Operating within national budget constraints, the
NCA cannot satisfy all of the CINC's requirements. Therefore, during deliberate planning, CINCs
identify their force shortfalls. The CJCS, through the military department chiefs, identifies forces to fill
these shortfalls. The JSCP apportions forces to each CINC for planning purposes. This apportionment
may not equal the current forces assigned. The NCA assigns additional forces when a CINC is required
to implement a specific plan requiring more forces than assigned or apportioned for planning.
The CINC, by exercising COCOM authority, performs the following legal functions of command over assigned forces:

Determines forces required to achieve the military end state, organizes available forces, allocates
resources, and commands forces.

Employs commands and forces.

DODDOA-011055 12/29/2004
Assigns tasks.

Designates objectives.

Exercises authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, signal support, logistics, and joint training to accomplish missions assigned to his command.

Combatant commanders alone exercise COCOM authority by establishing command relationships with
subordinates, delegating appropriate authorities, and assigning responsibilities to their subordinates (see
Figure 2-4). The CINC strives for centralized direction and decentralized planning and execution. The
CINC has the following six options, including combining options, through which he may exercise
COCOM authority (Joint Pub 0-2):

Service component command.

Functional component command.

Subordinate unified command.

Joint task force.

Single-service force.

Direct command.

A service component command consists of those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and
installations of a single military service assigned to the unified command. Except for the CINC and
members of his joint staff, the senior officer of the service component assigned to a unified command
and qualified for command by the regulations of that service is designated the service component
commander. His assignment is subject to the concurrence of the CINC. The service component
commander is responsible for all command aspects of his force, to include logistics within the unified
The ASCC serves as the principal advisor to the CINC for supporting and employing ARFOR in theater
and ARFOR outside the theater tasked to support theater operations. The ASCC may delegate part of
this responsibility as the theater becomes more complex, and it may become necessary to establish an
intermediate headquarters, based on the complexity of the operational environment. This alternative is
discussed further in Section VI of this chapter.
DODD0A-011056 12/29/2004

FM 100-7 chptr 2 - The Theater Page 14 of 35
Combatant Commander i0INC) Speci al
Navy Air Force Marine Corps
Army OperationsComponent Component Component Component Cornponen1
Joint Task Unified Force Command
Army I N.vy I
I Amy I Navy I Air Force I Air Force I Marine Carps I


Figure 2-4. Command Relationships.
Based on his mission analysis, the CINC may form a functional component composed of like functional forces from more than one service. Functional component commands may be established for MOOTW or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over time and involve forces from two or more services. The functional component commanders are as Command (ALCOM), US Forces Japan (USFJ), follows:

Joint force land component commander (JFLCC).

Joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).

Joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC).

Each focuses on operational responsibilities, leaving logistical support to the respective service component commander. See Figure 2-5. Functional component commanders may serve simultaneously as service component commanders. For example, an Army JFLCC could direct Marine forces and serve as the ASCC commander.
DODDOA-011057 12/29/2004
Unified commanders, with approval from the NCA, may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands). C1NCs establish subunified commands to conduct operations on a
continuing basis according to the criteria that established the unified command.
The CINC may exercise COCOM through a subunified commander for operations on a continuing basis.
The subunified commander exercises functions, authority, and responsibilities similar to those of a
unified command CINC, except for COCOM. He exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces
within the assigned AOR or functional area. The CINC PACOM, for example, has three subordinate
unified commands: Alaskan Command (ALCOM), US Forces Japan (USFJ), and US Forces Korea
The ASCC of subunified commands operates in the chain of command within the subordinate unified
command. The ASCC of the subunified command normally communicates directly with the unified
command ASCC on matters that relate specifically to that service and informs the subunified
commander as that commander directs.
The SECDEF, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, a functional component commander,
or an existing commander of a joint task force (CJTF) may establish a JTF. A JTF is established
normally on a geographical area or functional basis to execute missions with specific limited objectives
that do not require centralized control of joint logistics. A JTF is composed of elements of two or more
services and exists until mission completion.
The CJTF exercises OPCON over forces assigned to the JTF. The unified command's ASCC places an
ARFOR under OPCON of the CJTF for the conduct of operations and retains responsibility to provide
service-specific support to the ARFOR. The JTF established in the Persian Gulf in 1988 to protect
shipping and the JTF established in Panama in 1989 to conduct Operation Just Cause illustrate this type
of organization.

Figure 2-6. Functional Component Commands.
Normally, the Army will not be involved in this COCOM option due to its operational interdependence with the other services. Still, on occasion, such as the support to Charleston, SC, by FORSCOM units in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, the Army may conduct a single-service operation.
DODDOA-011058 12/29/2004

The CINC can retain direct command of specific operational forces. The direct command option is used when the circumstances of the mission require urgency and the forces must remain immediately responsive to the CINC. Direct command of specific SOF is a prime example of this COCOM option. Such forces could be composed of forces from one or more services. This option would likely be employed for short, sensitive, and small-scale operations. Special operations often fall under this organizational option.
Section IV
Multinational Commands
Operations in a multinational environment have both similarities and differences to normal joint
operations. This section highlights some of the differences found in a multinational environment. It
details the differences between alliance and coalition operations. It discusses the need for mutual understanding and respect, for capitalizing on inherent operational strengths of a particular nation, and
for obtaining unity of effort.
Multinational operations can be categorized in one of two major groups: coalitions and alliances.
Coalitions and alliances must create a structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints,
and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command structure fits the needs of all
alliances and coalitions, several different models could evolve.
Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises and are ad hoc arrangements between
two or more nations for common action. During the early stages of such a contingency, nations rely
upon their military command systems to control the activities of their forces. Therefore, the initial
coalition arrangement will most likely involve a parallelcommand structure.
Under a parallel command, no single multinational army commander is designated. Usually, member
nations retain control of their national forces. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort
among the participants. A coordination center can be established to facilitate exchange of intelligence
and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a
forum for resolving routine issues among staff sections. During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition
coordination, communications, and integration center (C 3IC) was established to effect command
relationships. Fivre2-6 depicts a parallel command.
As a coalition matures, the members may choose to centralize their efforts through establishing a lead
nation command structure. A lead nation command is one of the less common command structures in an
ad hoc coalition. A coalition of this makeup sees all coalition members subordinating their forces to a
single partner, usually, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources. Still, subordinate
national commands maintain national integrity. The lead nation command establishes integrated staff
sections, with the composition determined by the coalition leadership. Figure 2-7 provides a model for a
lead nation command structure in a coalition.
DODDOA-011059 12/29/2004
US Army Allied Army Component Component Commander Commander

US Army Allied Army
Forces Forces

11¦ EM ¦¦•=11111 11¦
Coordination Command
Figure 2-6. Coalition Parallel Command Structure (Forces Under National Control).
DODDOA-011060 12/29/2004
Lead Nation
Army I Augmented
Component Staff
Corn mander
National National National Component Corn ponent Component Commander Commander Commander
National National National Forces Forces Forces
LEGEND LOlson/coordination Command and control
Figure 2-7. Lead Nation Command Structure
(Augmented Staff and Multinational Subordinate Formations).

Typically, alliances are formed because of formal agreements among two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. Alliances are characterized by years of cooperation among nations. In alliances--

Agreed-upon objectives exist.

Standard operating procedures have been established.


Appropriate plans have been developed and exercised among participants.

A developed theater of operations exists, some equipment interoperability exists, and command relationships have been firmly established.

Cooperation among members of an alliance, such as NATO, is advantageous, since mutually developed procedures for making and executing decisions exist. Often, when members of such an alliance cooperate in'operations outside of their alliance sphere, such as in naval operations in the Persian Gulf, procedures worked out within the alliance are adapted quickly.
As in a coalition, a lead nation command structure may exist in a developing alliance when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. This means that the lead nation's procedures 12/29/2004 and doctrine form the basis for planning for and coordinating the conduct of operations. Though this type of arrangement is unusual in a formal alliance, such a command structure may have advantages under certain treaty circumstances existing with Latin America, Southwest Asia, or Japan that may
evolve into alliance arrangements.
A lead nation command in an alliance may be characterized by a staff that is integrated to the degree
necessary to ensure cooperation among multinational or national subordinate Army formations. Usually,
alliances are organized under an integrated command structure that provides unity of command in a
multinational setting. The key ingredients in an integrated alliance command are that a single
commander will be designated, that his staff will be composed of representatives from all member
nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs will be integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to
accomplish the missions. Figure 2-8 represents a typical multinational army force organized under an
integrated command structure in an alliance.
If multinational formations exist below the multinational army component headquarters, the alliance
membership will determine the command of those subordinate organizations. Multinational army force
headquarters staffs will be integrated. Accordingly, heavy reliance will be placed on liaison between
Alliance Multinational Army Component Commander IntegratedStaff
Multinational Allied Army US Army Allied ArmyComponent Corn ponenl
Forces Component
Commander Corn rnander
Allied Army
Allied Army US Army
Forces Forces
Figure 2-8. Alliance Multinational Army Command Structure (National Subordinate Formations).
International agreements should set forth the degree of authority for multinational commanders and
procedures that ensure unity of effort. Ideally, the coalition/alliance will designate a single military
commander to direct the combined efforts of the participating forces. The US contingent of a
multinational command may be a unified command, a specified command, a subordinate unified
DODDOA011062 12/29/2004
command, a functional component command, a JTF, or a force of a single service.
A common understanding of C 2 relationships facilitates the required unity of effort. The US chain of command, from the President to the lowest US commander in the field, remains inviolate. US forces in a multinational force will continue to recognize their COCOM relationship to a US unified or specified commander. Subject to NCA prior approval, a multinational force commander may exercise appropriate and negotiated OPCON over IJS units in specific operations authorized by a legitimizing authority such
as the UN Security Council.
The multinational force commander and the US theater CINC providing the US forces to the multinational force must coordinate and agree to the command relationships. This agreement must be in
consonance with the NCA criteria for C 2 within multinational operations, which may establish limits of
OPCON. For example, within these limits, a foreign UN commander cannot--

Change the mission or deploy US forces outside the AOR agreed to by the NCA.

Separate units.

Redirect logistics and supplies.

Administer discipline.

Promote individuals.

Change the internal organization of the US units.

Other national forces will likely remain aligned to their national command authority.
International agreements will specify when and how the transfer of authority from national command to
multinational command takes place. At lower echelons, command relationships will be identical to US
joint relationships (OPCON, TACON, support, coordinating authority) or at least similar (OPCOM,
tactical command [TACOM]). Definitions of these terms differ slightly between US and NATO.
Commanders of operating forces must clarify how each is applied. FM 100-8 describes the doctrine for
multinational army operations.
Section V
Theater Organizations
A theater is an assigned geographic area outside CONUS and under the command of a regional
combatant commander (unified command) (Joint Pub 0-2). Under the UCP, a theater or AOR is viewed
from the strategic context, the level of international military cooperation required, or the degree of
dedicated US military resources necessary in the theater. These perspectives influence how the Army
conducts operations in each theater.
Military strategists often describe theaters as maritime, continental, or littoral, based on their dominant
geographic and strategic characteristics. This description influences the predominant type of military forces used, the strategic missions assigned, and the strategic and operational objectives pursued in the 12/29/2004
Continental theaters primarily involve control of land and associated airspace. Maritime theaters focus
on ensuring control of the seas and associated airspace. While continental and maritime theaters are
different, both demand the synchronized efforts of all services, both within and between theaters.
Littoral theaters combine aspects of both continental and maritime theaters.
Continental theaters are established to control the land and associated airspace vital to the sustenance of
a nation or nations or to destroy an opponent's means to exercise such control. EUCOM, CENTCOM,
and SOUTHCOM are continental theaters. Military action in continental theaters may vary in purpose
and scope from participation in the internal defense of another nation against subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency to major operations and campaigns to destroy enemy land forces. The focus of
continental campaigns is on the combination and sequencing of air, space, land, sea, and SOF
Maritime theaters are established both for the forward defense of the nation and for strategic access to
US resource needs, friends, and potential adversaries. ACOM and PACOM are maritime theaters The
focus of maritime campaigns is very similar to that of continental campaigns. Campaigns in maritime
theaters may be composed of one or more of the following types of operations:

Fleet operations to seize or maintain unobstructed access to ocean areas by destroying or blocking enemy forces.

Joint operations to control key land areas.

Limited operations with limited objectives such as peacekeeping or nation assistance.

Operations in a littoral region require integration and synchronization of naval, air, and land forces.
World political changes and affordability have reduced US access to land bases in forward areas near the
most likely crisis regions. This has increased the importance of military operations that can capitalize on
sea bases and land lodgments that, once synchronized, project land and air combat power deep into the
region. Littoral theaters are not as predominant as the other two theaters but have been seen in previous
campaigns along peninsulas or coastlines.
The deployment of US forces to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 was
accomplished for the most part by sealift. However, maritime support and the maritime interdiction
operations required synchronization forces operating within the CENTCOM continental theater, thus
forming a littoral region.
When considering the requirements of the many active theaters, national planners establish the priorities
by providing planning guidance, allocating forces, and apportioning limited resources. Theaters are
described as theaters of focus, economy-of-force theaters, or deferred theaters. This description /fm/100-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004
corresponds to the relative prioritization of resources for the specific theaters.
A theater of focus is the theater of main military effort because it has the highest risk level and potential
for conflict. NCA and CJCS provide guidance, forces, and resources accordingly. CENTCOM was the
theater of focus during Operations Desert Shield/Storm.
An economy-of-force theater receives a lesser level of forces and resources than the theater of focus
because the associated risk and potential for conflict are lower. SOUTHCOM during the early 1980s
illustrates this type of theater. Forces and resource requests are filled after those of the theater of focus.
Those that cannot be filled are then identified and tagged for filling when the economy-of-force theater
is upgraded to a theater of focus.
A deferred theater receives the least priority for assigned forces and resources, based on its associated
risk level and potential for conflict. CENTCOM during the early 1980s was an example of a deferred
theater. Forces and resources are identified and tagged for deployment but not deployed other than
during exercises.
Theater combatant commanders develop a theater strategy and then organize the theater. Considerations
for multinational operations should always be prominent as the commander considers his theater
structure and command relationships. The Army, besides operating as part of a joint force, must be
prepared to conduct multinational operations with land, air, and naval forces of other nations, as well as
interagency operations. While unity of command may not be possible in multinational operations, unity
of effort is essential.
Each CINC may assign associated areas within his theater to subordinate commanders. CINCs may
designate joint areas or zones during war and MOOTW, while theaters of war and operations are
designated only in time of war. Combat zones (CZs) and communications zones (COMMZs) may be
established as needed. The CZ is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations. The COMMZ
contains LOCs and those theater organizations and other agencies required to support forces in the field.
The CINC organizes his theater to enable him to synchronize his unified operations or integrate single­
service, joint, special, and supporting operations with allied and interagency activities and NGOs and
In war, the CINC may use many of the structures identified above or others as required to subdivide the
theater. When the NCA authorizes combat operations, the theater commander, with NCA and CJCS
approval, delineates a theater of war.
Theater of War
A theater of war is defined as the air, land, sea, and space area which is or may become directly involved nil 1 00-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004
in the.operations of war. Operations within a theater of war are invariably joint and usually multinational. The theater of war should be operationally self-sufficient, with a sustaining base adequate to support contemplated operations. The theater of war should encompass only that part of the areas or
countries to be involved in the war. While part of the theater is in a state of war, it may be possible that
all nations within the theater are not at war. See Figure 2-9.
Figure 29. Theater Organization During War.
Theater of Operation
If the CINC determines that he should subdivide his theater of war to contend with more than one major threat, he may designate subordinate theaters or AOs for each major threat. Still, the theater commander must ensure that such divisions do not violate the principle of unity of effort. The theaters of operation refer to that portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations for extended periods. The theater of operations commander often has responsibilities similar to the theater CINC, but not of the same scope. During World War II, the Atlantic, European, Mediterranean, and Russian theater of strategic direction was divided into four similar subordinate theaters of operation. These theaters of operation were integrated geographically and focused upon enemy Axis forces.
The range of military operations also may require designating several geographic subareas of responsibility such as a joint operations area (JOA) or joint zone (JZ), a joint special operations area (JSOA), or a joint rear area (JRA). A subordinate theater also could be used in a larger theater for decentralizing the effort to a subunified commander. Subareas of responsibility are portions of a theater CINC's AOR and are delegated usually for a long term and often over large areas. See Figure 2-10.
Joint Operations Area. DODDOA-011066
JOAs are geographic areas the CINC creates to conduct specific military missions and their supporting activities. JOAs are usually established for short-term operations. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. The JOA commander's authority is limited to that required to accomplish specific tasks. US operations in Panama during Operation Just
http://atiam. train. ew/publi c/296714-1/fm/100-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004 Cause in 1989 offer an example of a JOA.
Joint Zone
A joint zone is a term for an area established to permit friendly surface, air, and subsurface forces to
operate simultaneously. ARFOR transit but do not normally operate in a JZ.
Joint Special Operations Area
JSOAs are restricted areas of land, sea, and airspace that the CINC assigns to a JFSOCC to conduct
special operations. JSOAs may be established for short or long duration special operations efforts,
normally when they are independent of conventional operations. If conventional operations in the JSOA
are required, coordination with forces operating within the JSOA must be effected prior to initiation of
operations. The CINC may delineate a JSOA to facilitate simultaneous conventional and special
operations in the same general operating area. The capture of the hijacking terrorists of the Achilles
Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1987 was in a JSOA.
Figure 2-10. Theater Organization for Military Operations Other Than War.
Joint Rear Area
In war, as in peacetime and conflict, the CINC may designate a JRA. The JRA is designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces that provide logistics and/or support to combat operations. The joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) is the officer given responsibility for the overall
security of the JRA and for furnishing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support
(HNS), infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force.
The size of the JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the theater, logistics
support requirements, the threat, or the scope of the joint operation. The JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or CZ, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the CZ. With split-based operations, much of the JRA could be in CONUS. AJRA can also be adapted to a modern, high-intensity, nonlinear battlefield. A JRA may be segmented and contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that collectively make up a JRA.
http :Nati am.train. ew/publi c/296714-1/fm/100-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004
Combat Zone, Communications Zone, and Theater Base
The CINC may additionally organize his theater of war into a CZ, a COMMZ, and a theater base. The
CZ is that area required by combat forces to conduct operations. CINCs may further subdivide the CZ
into forward and rear combat zones. They are normally forward of the Army rear boundary.
The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies in the JRA required to
support forces in the field. Usually, the COMMZ is in the rear portion of the theater of operations,
reaching back to the CONUS base or perhaps to another combatant commander's AOR. The theater
CINC may establish these areas for long-term, continuing requirements or for short durations to meet a
specific situation.
The theater base is a sizable portion of the JRA. It has logistics facilities such as ports of debarkation,
marshaling areas, logistics stockage areas, movement control points, logistics headquarters and units, the
rear portion of the intratheater communications zone, airfields and air bases, transitioning land forces,
theater missile defense forces, the theater rear headquarters, and strategic reserves. See Figure 2-11.
Subordinate Areas of Operations
Subordinate army commanders organize their assigned AOs for tactical operations. This organization is
based on terrain orientation, security orientation, or a threat orientation. Subordinate army commanders
establish necessary control measures to delineate responsibilities for zones of action or sectors of
defense to coordinate fires and direct maneuver. These measures may include lateral boundaries, axes,
objectives, phase lines, and special areas, for example, airspace control area or air defense area. If the
enemy situation is known, a threat orientation is more appropriate. Accordingly, the subordinate army
commanders would organize their AOs to accommodate all of the air, land, and sea forces necessary to
impose their tactical battle space to defeat the enemy. For example, the main battle area (MBA) is the
portion of the battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought to defeat the enemy. Only those control
measures necessary for operations against the enemy should be imposed upon subordinate commanders,
minimizing the use of lateral boundaries except where necessary to separate friendly forces or provide
flank and rear security against an enemy situation.
The theater of war does not normally encompass the CINC's entire theater. In the remainder of his
theater, the CINC may be conducting MOOTW. CINCs designate a theater structure that achieves
strategic and theater focus in both MOOTW and war. This structure allows synchronization and
integration of all instruments of power within the theater. At times, this synchronization requirement
may extend to UN operations.
If hostilities are imminent, the CINC may designate an area of conflict--an area of land, sea, and air
designated for the conduct of hostile MOOTW. However, if an MOOTW is required that does not
include response to hostilities, such as a natural disaster or humanitarian assistance, the CINC may
establish an area of assistance within his theater. The area of conflict or area of assistance may be
further subdivided into several geographic subareas of responsibility such as a JOA, JSOA, AO, or
COMMZ or JRA. Establishment of these subareas is to provide the same functions and control measures
as required for conducting wartime operations. See Figure 2-10.
DODDOA-011068 .htm 12/29/2004
Figure 2-11. Combat Zone and Communications Zone Organization.
Section VI
The Army in Theater
This section discusses the three tasks of the operational-level commander and how they influence theater organization, the environment, and the echelons of command within the Army. It discusses the A SCC and the Army commander as a subordinate JFC. Senior army leaders, using an operational level perspective, task-organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in the theater. The Army's theater organization provides the means to execute the designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations.
The ASCC supports the theater combatant CINC by conducting Army operations to support or attain the CINC's established objectives. The Army contributes forces to perform combat, logistics, and support activities in theater. The Army organizes, trains, and equips these land forces to accomplish all assigned missions.
Unified C2 results in assigning forces for employment, apportioning forces for planning, and allocating them for execution to combatant commanders. In support of the CINC, the ASCC organizes the assigned forces to accomplish the three operational-level tasks of the senior army commander:

Establishing the link among joint, multinational, interagency, NGO, PVO, or UN operations.

Executing functions to support continuous operations by subordinate army forces.,

DODDOA-011069 12/29/2004
• Planning and executing operations to support the joint campaign when designated as an
operational commander by the CINC.

Other subordinate army commanders may perform the tasks; still, they remain the responsibility of the
The first task of the senior army commander in theater is to establish linkages to joint, multinational, and
interagency organizations. These linkages include--

Receiving joint, multinational, and interagency or UN direction.

Advising the CINC on Army capabilities.

Establishing liaison with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations and NGOs and PVOs.

Augmenting the joint, multinational, and interagency staff as required.

Linking with specific joint, multinational, NGO, PVO, and interagency systems.

Coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.

The commander's guidance includes the subordinate commander's missions and tasks that are expected
to contribute to the higher echelon's plan. The guidance should include the assignment of forces and
sequencing of subordinates' assigned mission and tasks. The guidance will include any delegated
authority, other information pertinent to the situation, and any changes that modify subordinate missions
and tasks.
The ASCC of the unified or subunified command or the ARFOR commander of the JTF advises the
CINC or CJTF, respectively, on employment of US Army organizations and their capabilities. The
ASCC must ensure that his subordinate commanders and staffs are trained, agile, and versatile to meet
this requirement. The CINC looks to his ASCC for the nomination and selection of specifically Army­
apportioned or assigned units for assignment to subordinate joint commands.
The Army conducts liaison with joint, multinational, NGO, PVO, and interagency organizations in
theater. This liaison includes lateral liaison with other services, as well as higher and lower liaison with
the appropriate joint or multinational force staff and any subordinate joint or multinational organizations
as required. The ASCC must understand the capabilities that the other services bring to the theater. Such
understanding enhances the opportunity for synergy within the joint force.
Similar to the exchange of liaison teams is the requirement of ARFOR to augment a joint force staff or
receive augmentation from joint forces when the Army forms the core of a joint staff headquarters. The
ASCC must interface with joint information and control systems such as intelligence and
communications. These systems require specific hardware that may be unique to the joint force
headquarters and may require special Army efforts for effective joint coordination.
Army intelligence elements closely coordinate with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations
to establish the mutual supporting intelligence structure required to support the joint commander's
operations. The intelligence structure should assign collection capabilities consistent with available
DODDOA-011070 12/29/2004 assets, conduct timely all-source analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of available intelligence information.
The second task of the ASCC in theater is to execute his Title 10 responsibility by supporting
operations. At theater level, the preponderance of operational considerations are logistical but may
include significant engineer efforts, depending upon existing infrastructure. In the force-projection
mode, decisions made early will be highly significant as the time for combat operations approaches.
Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving forces and equipment will often not be reversible.
The answers to such questions as what is needed first--construction engineers or infantrymen, tanks or
trucks--may sow the seeds of success or failure. The commander and his staff should analyze these kinds
of questions, being careful not to eliminate any option before the need for such a decision is clear.
These analyses require a full assessment of the factors of METT-T and an understanding of where and
how risks are taken. Army commanders retain responsibilities to support Army units through the service
chain of command, regardless of the joint and multinational arrangements. The ground transportation
system, common classes of supply, and construction of the infrastructure are examples of the Army's
contribution to the overall theater effort.
Each joint or multinational organization with Army forces has an ARFOR commander who ensures
Army support requirements are met. These support requirements, which include logistics, personnel
services, and health services, are service-specific and flow through the service chain of command.
Support functions at the operational level are addressed in FM 100-16, FM 100-10, and FM 63-4.
The third task of the ASCC in theater is to conduct operations. When designated by the CINC as an
operational-level commander, the senior army commander, in this role, serves in the chain of command,
planning and executing major operations that support the joint campaign. He designates, sustains, and
shifts the main effort of subordinate ground forces to support the joint or multinational plan. His
understanding of operational art(see Chapter 3) is essential to his performance of this role.
Each unified and subordinate unified command has an Army service component command. The CINC's
Army service component command consists of the ASCC and all those elements under his command.
The ASCC is responsible for--

Recommending to the CINC or subunified commander the proper employment of Army
component forces.

Accomplishing assigned operational missions.

Selecting and nominating specific units of the Army for assignment to theater forces.

Conducting joint training, including training other service components as directed.

Informing the CINC of Army logistics support effects on operational capabilities.,

http :Nati arn.train. 12/29/2004

'Supporting operational and exercise plans as requested.

Developing Army program and budget requests for the CINC.

Informing the CINC of program and budget decisions that may affect planning and operations.

Conducting Army-specific functions such as internal administration and discipline, training,
normal logistics functions, and Army intelligence matters.

Informing the CINC of joint nonstrategic nuclear support required by the Army.

Ensuring signal interoperability.

Providing logistical and administrative support to. the ARFOR participating in a JTF.

The Army service chain expects the ASCC to monitor and support all ARFOR in its geographic area.
The ASCC, exercising ADCON, may communicate through the Army Chief of Staff to the Secretary of
the Army for service-specific matters. The ASCC is responsible for command logistical support unless a
higher command directs otherwise.
Sometimes, the CINC may direct the ASCC to provide common items to other services within his AOR.
Additionally, the ASCC may support allied or coalition forces. Army commanders in joint organizations
use the channel from the ASCC to the Department of the Army for service-specific requirements. This
channel forms a hierarchy for Army support in theater but does not imply a superior-subordinate
relationship. Army elements within subordinate joint organizations perform functions similar to the
ASCC. An illustration of this concept is the organization of the service channel in PACOM with a
notional JTF (Figure 2-12).
In Figure 2-12, the ARFOR within the notional JTF coordinate logistics through US Army, Japan
(USAR-J). USAR-J is the Army service component command of USFJ, a subunified command. USAR-J
is responsible for coordinating support services through US Army, Pacific (USARPAC). Within
PACOM, a unified command, USARPAC is the Army service component command and coordinates
directly with the Department of the Army. The purpose of the service channel is the efficient use of
Army resources within a theater. The JTF establishing authority's Army service component command is
responsible for providing logistical and administrative support to ARFOR participating in a JTF.
During conditions of peacetime, each regional CINC has an Army service component command through
which he normally exercises COCOM of ARFOR assigned by the NCA to the CINC. In conflict and
war, the CINC may transfer OPCON to the designated headquarters. The organizational design of a
headquarters to support C 2 tasks of the Army service component command, the JTF, the operational­
level headquarters (numbered army), and corps must be versatile, agile, flexible, and modular in
structure. Such a design provides the Army service component command the flexibility to establish the
required C2 capability, using assigned assets or preestablished functional and modular augmentation
packages from other component forces or other Army assets.
The ASCC must determine the degree of participation within the AOR required by ARFOR. That
DODDOA-011072 in/100-7/f1007_5.htm 12/29/2004 participation can range from Army contributions to a JTF, to total involvement of the Army component in theater, to reinforcements from CONUS or other theaters. The assessment of the operational environment will determine how the Army organizes within the AOR.
The first option is for the ASCC to provide an operational-level C 2 capability. The Army contribution to
a subunified command is an example of this option. This subunified command's ASCC has responsibilities within the designated AO similar to those of the unified command's ASCC. The
deployment of Army units to operate within a JTF requires the ASCC to establish an ARFOR
operational level headquarters to command and control those units. This headquarters may require
augmentation from the ARFOR not assigned to the CINC or from other services. Another alternative is
to augment the JTF headquarters. The complexity of the environment and the degree of Army
participation determines the option selected.
I Any Service Branch -
„Joint Operational.
Char of CommandC'iain Corrynand
National Command

of the Army.
Unman der in
Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) United States
Army Se nil ce
Army, Pacific
Component Commander
{USARPAC) Subo'clinale Unifier; rr
United States
Cur ri rriarcl I
Forces, Japan United States (LISFJ) Service Component Command Army, Japan (USAR-J)
Join: Task Force ARFOR (-)

CommandARFOR I Adninistrative Control
Figure 2-12. ASCC Support to ARFOR in a JTF.
A second option is the formation and deployment of an operational-level headquarters (for example, a
numbered army) to control the conduct of operations. The ASCC makes this decision in consultation
with the CINC. This presupposes a highly complex operational environment with the involvement of
multiple ARFOR (usually more than one Army corps). The ASCC remains the senior army commander
within the unified command and may or may not be physically located within the AO. If the ASCC is
not located in the AO and does not deploy, he may constitute and deploy a requisite headquarters to
perform C 2 for the ASCC's Title 10 support responsibilities therein. This requisite headquarters would
be in addition to the operational-level headquarters conducting operations.
The first two options require coordination with the CINC. The third option . is internal to the ASCC and
concerns the. organization of the Army operational-level component. The ASCC may determine a need
to consolidate functions under a deputy commanding general responsible for operations and a deputy
commanding general responsible for support and logistics. The DCG for Support would serve as the
senior logistician responsible for battle command of all logistics and support forces and coordination of
all logistics support. If designated as the executive agent, the DCG for Support would also be
DODD0A-011073 12/29/2004 responsible for coordinating logistics support for joint and/or multinational forces in the theater of operations.
The DCG for Operations would serve as the senior operator responsible for battle command of all
maneuver forces, conducting major operations, battles, and engagements. In this arrangement, the ASCC
would continue his service responsibilities and establish required linkages among joint, multinational,
interagency, NGO, PVO, or UN. This option reduces the span of control required of the commander. As
with the first option, complexity of the environment determines the selection of this organizational
These options provide an orderly means for the Army to accomplish the operational-level
responsibilities in theater. The options also provide a means to evolve the Army theater structure as the
complexity of the theater evolves.
Another set of circumstances in which the Army could be divided into separate elements is when the
CINC requires a sense of urgency and direct responsiveness of an Army force to him. Under such
exceptional circumstances, the theater organization may have two or more independent ARFOR
operating directly under the theater CINC. These separate ARFOR would focus on specific missions, as
determined by the CINC and ASCC. The ASCC continues to focus on the task of supporting the
operations of all ARFOR within the theater. However, commanders of the ARFOR under COCOM
(working directly for the CINC) focus primarily on operations and the establishment and maintenance of
joint and multinational linkages. Thus, the three tasks of the operationallevel commander would be
conducted by both Army commanders. The structure of the ASCC is adaptable enough to meet the three
crucial tasks in any theater situation. The ASCC's responsibility is to advise the CINC of a structure that
meets the dictates of operational design.
Both the ASCC and numbered army commanders would be responsible for establishing linkages
with joint, multinational, government, nongovernment, private voluntary, and interagency
organizations. However, the ASCC would focus on support operations, and the numbered army
commander would focus on the conduct of operations and the requirements of a joint force land
component, if designated by the CINC.
The CINC may designate an ARFOR commander as a subordinate JFC. The designation may be as a
subunified commander, a JFLCC, or a CJTF. Based on the ASCC structure, the Army JFC must
reexamine his responsibilities and capabilities to perform the three tasks of the operational level
commander. Establishing a joint headquarters under these circumstances will be a unique extension of
the joint linkage task.
As a JFLCC, the ARFOR commander retains the responsibility, through the service branch of the chain
of command, to support subordinate Army forces. Because of the complexity of the two tasks--­
operations and support--the ASCC may delegate the authority for performing the support task to a
subordinate Army headquarters. The ASCC, when delegating this responsibility, must ensure his
subordinate commander is aware and understands the CINC's intent and concept of operations. This
delegation allows the ASCC, as the JFLCC, to focus on conducting operations.
As a subunified or CJTF, the ARFOR commander would normally expect to focus on the conduct of .12/29/2004
joint operations. Support of the ARFOR under control of the subunified command or JTF will flow through the CINC's ASCC. Depending on the method in which the CINC employs the Army component, the ASCC may appoint a single subordinate commander responsible for executing typical logistics and administrative functions. Chapter 6 has details on Army component operations.
The requirement to assess the environment in which operations are to be conducted exists at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The factors of MET"T-T provide a structure for the conduct of those analyses. In preparing and conducting major operations to support joint campaigns, the ARFOR commander and the CJTF must examine the operational environment, using the factors of METT-T and
a regional analysis. The results of that examination serve as a means for assessing relative strengths and weaknesses of the theater and are used to guide and temper actions.
The ARFOR commander and the CJTF view the operational-level environment in much the same manner as the CINC views the larger theater strategic environment. Both commanders consider the
factors peculiar to the area in which they will operate. The environment is determined by the
circumstances, influences, and conditions that affect the employment of military force and the decisions
of the operational levels of command.
The assessment of the strategic environment is based upon the circumstances, conditions, and influences
of the theater. The operational environment within that theater is assessed in a similar manner. The .
commander's three operational-level tasks provide the structure for the METT-T assessment and
correspond to the three elements in the strategic assessment. Within these three tasks, eight components
further define the operational METT-T assessment. Figure 2-13 is a model for the conduct of the
operational-level assessment.
Four components make up an assessment of joint, multinational, and interagency linkages.
Interoperability is the ability of forces to provide a capability or service, to accept services from other
forces or agencies, and to use those capabilities and services to operate effectively together. The presence of government agencies is an aspect of operations in a joint environment. The degree of required Army interoperability with these agencies will be determined by the circumstances of the
operational environment.
Alliances and Agreements
Alliances and agreements are the formal means that guide multinational operations. The degree of
formality is a dynamic state determined by mutual needs. Where need exists, the degree of formality
increases with time. This same principle applies to interagency operations. These arrangements are
initiated when a requirement for more formal arrangements exists.
DODD0A-01 1075 .12/29/2004
Joint, Multinational, and tomnigendy Linkages -Cirdurnarances
:fuerocerabllicy.• Forward Presence

.Alliances and/or Agreements • Objective
Unformed — Developing — Mature .
Operations -CanditiOnS S
T 6 Threat
• ciecgrapety.TccographylCimaipingy Complex — Neutral — Ben Ign/Favo rable A
Support • Inftuonous S
• Intrastrictura E
.Foreign Nation Support Austere — Restrictive — Developed
Figure 2-13. Operational TaskslEnvironment.
Where arrangements are yet unformed or in early development, operations may be based on very
informal agreements by representatives of the army and the agency. Initially, participants may have only
general principles from public law, presidential instructions, and agency policy or doctrine to guide their
actions. As time permits and requirements demand, the arrangements are formalized in memorandums
of understanding that outline specific responsibilities.
Forward Presence
US forces, in modest numbers, are forward deployed to sustain alliance commitments and to contribute
to regional stability. Forward presence is accomplished also through the periodic deployment of
CONUS-based forces for participation in training exercises, nation assistance activities, or counterdrug
operations. Pre-positioning of forces and sustainment to include Army pre-positioned afloat (APA)
contribute to mobility and flexibility of US forces. This supports the force projection military strategy
and provides for rapid response to a crisis or reinforcement and sustainment of forward-presence forces.
The operational-level commander derives the objective from the theater campaign plan developed from
the theater military strategy. That plan and strategy is subject to modification by allies/coalition leaders,
which may have a subsequent impact on the operational objective. The time available is also a factor
that must be addressed when considering the objective.
The components of the operations task are the threat and the geography, topography, and climatology.
Threat. DODDOA-011076
The threat is based on the ability of an enemy or potential enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the
effectiveness of a current or projected mission, organization, or equipment item. The threat may be
indirect by having the potential to adversely impact on US interests or the attainment of US objectives.
The world remains extremely dangerous. Many nations can acquire technologically advanced, highly lethal weapons that could threaten US and allied forces. For example, third-dimension platforms, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, armed helicopters, and weapons-carrying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined with accurate guidance and mass casualty warheads, present a significant threat to a .in/100-7/f1007_5.htm .12/29/2004
warfighting C1NC's assets.
A variety of factors challenges the stability of various countries and regions. These instabilities can lead
to increased levels of competition, regional conflicts, and civil war. Additionally, regional factions,
some possessing forces and equipment equivalent to the US, may seek to expand their influence by
coercion or direct force. These regional challenges will often involve an adversary whose system of
beliefs interprets differently such fundamental ideas as right or wrong, the value of human life, and the
concept of victory and defeat.
Geography, Topography, and Climatology
The geography describes the land, sea, air, and the distribution of plant and animal life, including man
and his industries. The topography describes the configuration of a surface, including its relief and the
position of its natural and man-made features. Climatology describes the prevailing weather conditions
of a region.
Two components of the support task are the infrastructure and foreign nation support.
Infrastructure is a term that applies to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications (road, rail,
communications networks, water networks, air networks, or utility systems), or facilities for the support
and control of military forces.
Foreign Nation Support
Foreign nation supportincludes all civil or military assistance provided by a nation to foreign forces
within its territory during peacetime, conflict, or war. Foreign nation support is based upon agreements
mutually concluded between nations. The coalition participants establish similar support arrangements at
the theater strategic level. An additional concern, especially in alliances, is to determine the type of
support that the US forces, when directed, may have to provide to the alliance partners or host nation.
As the commander examines the operational environment, he begins to make judgments about the
operational impact on his three tasks. These judgments are the subjective and objective measurements of
the components of each task as they affect the employment of the Army force. They correspond to a
range of options that describes the commander's ability to accomplish the three tasks in the operational
environment. Figure 2-13 lists the three tasks, the operational environment components, and the broad
values that describe the range over which these tasks and components may be measured.
The commander assesses the operational environment and assigns a cumulative assessment describing it
as austere, restrictive, or developed. This perspective permits the comprehensive analysis of the
operational environment through the examination of each task and the environmental components that
align with each task of the operational commander. This analysis helps identify the areas that require
more or less effort. The analysis also influences the Commander's skillful synchronization of the
• DODDOA-011077 .12/29/2004
DODDOA-011078 .12/29/2004
Theater Strategic and Operational-Level Perspective
A major concept essential to understanding Army theater operations at the operational level is operational artand design. Key elements of operational art and design apply across the range of military operations. Commanders must understand these elements when they plan and conduct Army operations in theater. This chapter discusses the Army operational-level commander's employment of ways and means to obtain ends established by theater strategy and campaign plans.
No particular echelon of command functions solely at the operational level. Command echelons may vary with the nature of the campaign or major operation, strategic and military objectives, organizational structure, or size of the joint force. The intended purpose--not the level of command--is the primary determinant of whether a force functions at the operational level.
FM 100-5 describes operational artas "... the skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives in a theater of operations through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates theater strategy and design into operational design which links and integrates the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won, achieve the strategic aim."
Operational art links tactical events to strategic objectives. Using operational art, the CINC envisions the theater strategic and operational design. To achieve theater strategic design and objectives, the CINC arranges unified operations, joint operations, major operations, and tactical-level battles. Operational art at the operational level uses major operations in support of joint campaigns to sequence these events over time and space. Senior army commanders and their staffs practicing operational art may operate in a joint and possibly combined arena. They sequence Army operations to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives.
The theater strategic and operational concepts that explain operational art and design include center of
gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, culminating point, indirect approach, positional advantage
and strategic concentration of forces, and deception. The CINC and his principal subordinates should
agree on what design features are most important to accomplishing the mission. The CINC establishes
the first use and priority of these concepts. Subordinates' use and priority is a subset of the CINC's. For
example, the CINC selects the strategic center of gravity, and subordinates select decisive points on the
path to attacking the center of gravity.
Center of Gravity
The essence of operational art is concentrating friendly military forces and resources against the enemy's
main sources of strength (strategic center of gravity) in a manner that provides the JFC with the strategic
and operational advantage and the initiative. The destruction, dislocation, or neutralization of the enemy
center of gravity should prove decisive in achieving strategic objectives. Similarly, the JFC must
identify the theater friendly center of gravity and protect it.
DODDOA-011079 .12/29/2004 The enemy center of gravity exists at all levels of war. A center of gravity is the foundation of capability--what von Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed."(On War, 1976) The center of gravity may be seen in more complex components or abstract terms, such as the enemy's alliance, solidarity, or
national will and in actual examples such as strategic reserves, C2, logistics, industrial base, and so
forth. The center of gravity is most useful at the operational level of war as an analytical tool to focus
the effort against the enemy's strength.
In MOOTW such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance the enemy's center of gravity is the
threat of hunger or the elements of the environment. The uniqueness of these operations requires the
commander and his staff to understand the military's role in relation to the total efforts of national power
being used to resolve the situation. The military's role supports the other elements of national power.
Decisive Points
Decisive points provide commanders with a significant advantage. They are the keys to defeating or
protecting the center of gravity. Normally, there are more decisive points in a theater than there are
resources to attack them. The commander designates the most critical points and objectives as a means •
of gaining freedom of maneuver to gain and maintain momentum. By correctly identifying and then
attacking (or protecting) decisive points, the commander is able to defeat the enemy's center of gravity.
Decisive points serve as trigger points for friendly force actions that sustain the initiative. The AO will
have more decisive points than available resources to commit against them. The commander and his
staff must conduct a risk analysis to prioritize the friendly force efforts.
A stand-alone, individual information war action can be decisive. Winning the information battle before
the war can be even more decisive than winning it during hostilities. Winning the information war
before the war may preclude combat operations. The ability to get inside an adversary's decision-making
cycle (his operational ability to react) is critical to attacking his centers of gravity, exploiting his
weaknesses, and effectively concentrating our own combat power. An area that must not be overlooked
is using, and even driving, emerging technologies to access the tactical situation on the ground.
Lines of Operation
Lines of operation define the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy. They connect the
force with its base of operations--from which it receives reinforcements and resupply--and its forward
units--where it operates against the enemy. This concept is linked to the interior or exterior (or
combination) directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy. Lines of operation are used to
focus combat power effects toward a desired end.
Culminating Point . DODDOA-011080
The culminating point is the point in time and space at which the offensive becomes overextended, and
offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender to allow continuation of the
offense. While this point may not be precisely determined, the commander and his staff should consider
it in the design concept.
A defensive culminating point is that point at which the defender's capability is reduced to such a degree
that continued pursuit could result in the defender's defeat in detail. If the defender's aim is to transition
to the attack, then the culminating point is where the defender must revert to a holding action and await
reinforcement; If the defender's aim is to retain terrain, then the culminating point is where the defender /fm/100-7/f1007_6.htm.12/29/2004 must withdraw, delay, and so forth.
Indirect Approach
An indirect approach is a scheme that attacks the enemy center of gravity from unexpected directions or
at unexpected times. The indirect approach seeks enemy vulnerabilities and avoids enemy strengths. The
application of techniques to win the information war is one area that leads itself to the indirect approach.
When possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into
an opponent's strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. Examples include attacks of flanks, rear
areas, or C2 capabilities. Vulnerabilities are boundaries or seams between forces, the relative weaknesses
of unprotected flanks or rear areas, or unhardened command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C31) facilities.
Positional Advantage ani Strategic Concentration of Forces
Strategic realities indicate that force ratios may not favor friendly forces across the theater. Therefore,
the JFC determines where to strategically concentrate force and in what areas to accept risk. Clearly, this
aspect ties in with the center of gravity, indirect approach, positional advantage, and deception. Joint
forces seek to obtain positional advantage relative to enemy forces. Such advantage includes control of
territory--air, land, sea, subsea, and space--from which to better operate and attack. Having positional
advantage includes denying this territory and freedom of movement to the enemy. Attaining this
advantage involves combat operations.

Deception manipulates enemy perceptions about friendly force intentions, positions, and timing.
Deception has strategic, operational, and tactical aspects, and its planning is as complex and detailed as
the overall plan. Deception relies heavily on intelligence information, which helps commanders identify
appropriate targets, develop a credible story, and determine the effectiveness of the effort.
The key elements of theater and operational design reinforce the concepts of operational art and design.
The elements consist of the--


Sequence of operations and use of resources.


Branches and sequels.

Sequential and simultaneous warfare.

• Logistics.
The senior army commander's effective use of operational art and design elements translates theater
strategy and the campaign into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. No specific level of command
is concerned solely with operational art and design. The level of command that has the responsibility to .12/29/2004
link strategic aims with tactical execution varies in military operations.
The theater commander and subordinate operational-level commanders may control large military formations over great geographic distances while sequencing tactical military operations in pursuit of
strategic or operational objectives. Conversely, operational-level commanders may control relatively
small military formations conducting specific, short-term operations for the same purpose. Senior army
commanders practice operational art across the range of military operations. Whatever the environment
(peacetime, conflict, or war), the operational-level commander links theater strategy and campaigns to
tactical execution by effectively sequencing operations over time.
The objective is the central element of operational design because it establishes the condition necessary
to achieve the strategic aim. While the CINC initially keys on national or alliance strategic objectives, he
also supplements them with theater strategic and operational objectives. To ensure clarity of strategic
and operational intent when conducting subordinate campaigns, JFCs may identify and carefully
describe operational objectives from the CINC's specified and implied tasks.
Sequence of Operations and Use of Resources
The sequence of operations and use of resources are closely related elements of theater and operational
design. The operational-level commander links theater strategy and campaigns to tactical execution by
effectively sequencing major operations and battles over time. As described in FM 100-5, tempo and battle command contribute significantly to the effective sequencing of events.
The JFC visualizes the sequence of operations necessary to achieve the desired conditions of the
strategic end state. Without this linkage, operations are apt to become a series of disjointed events less
likely to achieve the desired theater objectives. The visualization includes identifying the enemy center
of gravity and culminating points and protecting the friendly center of gravity. This process is useful
when determining phases of a campaign, applying resources against these phases, and enabling the JFC
to envision requirements for branches or sequels.
Generally, the campaign is divided into phases that focus on major changes in the nature of the total
effort, such as defensive to offensive, decisive maritime action, and decisive continental action. Some
campaigns are naturally progressive in their phasing (establish sea control, gain a lodgment, initiate a major continental campaign), while others are more complex. The latter may be the case when the
opponent has initiated hostilities and the theater commander must transition from an initial defense, to
seizure of the initiative, and eventually to offensive operations to achieve the strategic goal. The main
effort is to attack the centers of gravity simultaneously throughout the depth of the battle space. Often that effort is phased.
Each phase in the campaign should lay the groundwork for its successor until a final decisive effort can be joined. A phase may orient on a physical objective or on establishing a certain advantageous
condition. The description of each phase should identify the strategic tasks to be accomplished, together with the ultimate purpose--the why--of the strategic tasks. The description should include a narrative of the theater commander's strategic concept of how and when these strategic tasks are to be accomplished. It should also include an estimate of force requirements, as, well as major supporting operations necessary for the effort.
DODDOA-011082 .th/100-7/f1 007_6itm.12/29/2004 These concepts and force estimates should be continually refined up to the time the operation order
implementing that phase is required. Prior to terminating the phase or meeting the necessary conditions
for moving to the next phase, planning will have begun and the refinement process to facilitate the
transition will continue.
The phasing and sequencing of operations should not be slow or methodical. However, as soon as
conditions permit, the JFC strives to overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth of the battle space. He
conducts simultaneous attacks throughout the depth to paralyze the enemy and force an early
Branches and Sequels
Besides phases, the JFC visualizes requirements over the full range of operations for branches to
preserve freedom of action. Branches are contingency plans for changing disposition, orientation, or
direction of movement and for accepting or declining battle. Sequels are actions taken after an event or
battle and are based on possible outcomes--victory, defeat, or stalemate.
Sequels, for example, might reflect a potential transition from the strategic defense to a
counteroffensive, to a withdrawal, or to an occupation. The visualization of branches and sequels is not
simply a thought process of events. This visualization is a parallel planning process that provides the
command a valuable resource--time.
Sequential and Simultaneous Warfare
In considering phasing, the JFC addresses the problem of deployment to ensure that forces arrive at
times and places that support the campaign. Because of limited resources, geographic considerations,
and our system for organizing the force, the US may go to war in sequential phases.
At the strategic level, sequential actions include mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of the
sequential employment of forces. Because the US is strategically insular, plans are driven to exterior
LOCs, and, with limited resources, the campaign is phased to achieve strategic ends.
At the operational-level, sequencing may be seen more in terms of employment. Additionally,
sustainment is a critical consideration in sequencing campaigns. The campaign establishes requirements
for the procurement and apportionment of national resources from CONUS-sustaining bases. Forward
bases must be established, LOCs must be opened and maintained, intermediate bases of operations must
be established to support new phases, and priorities for services and support must be established by
phase. Logistics considerations, then, become key to sequencing the campaign plan.
Notwithstanding the generally sequential nature of campaign phases, some phases are conducted
simultaneously--particularly in depth. Deployment may continue well after employment begins.
Sustainment is conducted throughout. Redeployment may begin during posthostility operations. Defense
and offense operations are always interrelated. Also, sequential operations may be conducted in a single
operation, for example, the raid into Libya.
Logistics is one of the combat functions that helps commanders build, sustain, and project combat power. It is also a major operating system at each level of war. Combat operations and logistics increasingly merge at higher levels of war. Neither can be conceived without consideration of the other. .12/29/2004 Strategic and operational logistics support wars, campaigns, and major operations; tactical logistics supports battles and engagements. Strategic and operational logistics interface in the theater. The combatant commander provides strategic guidance and priorities for operations, while the service component commanders identify operational requirements to the national industrial logistics base.
Deployment and integration of forces and logistics in the theater are based on the combatant
commander's theater strategic design in his campaign plan. Centralized management and distribution of
supplies and materiel at the strategic level facilitate decentralized execution of logistics at the
operational and tactical levels. Further discussion of operational art and its corresponding components
can be found in FM 100-5.
The resources provided to the operational commander are the means. The authoritative direction that
governs the conduct of operations are the ways.
The means allocated to the operational commander influence the selection of the operational objectives.
Tangible resources include military forces and supplies made available to the commander. These may
include other nonmilitary assets such as US civilian agencies or HNS and direct augmentation, for
example, civilian reserve air, land, or maritime fleet transportation assets.
Intangible resources include the commander's authority over forces not under his direct command;
authority over certain nonmilitary aspects of theater operations, for example, refugees; and public and
diplomatic support of military operations.
The allocation of resources provides capabilities and constraints on the conduct of operations. The
concept for operations emerges from these capabilities and constraints. The concept is tempered by
contingency plans (branches) that include deception. The authoritative guidance for the operational
concept is the ways of the operation.
The nature of the strategic direction may require that the use of military force be limited such as by
ROE. Limiting: factors dictate how the Army operational-level commander uses resources to attain a
particular operational objective. The Army commander articulates these limiting factors in the form of
restrictions and constraints.
Restrictions prohibit the operational-level commander from performing specific actions or categories of
actions. The laws and treaties of the US embody some restrictions such as those on the treatment of
noncombatants imposed by the Geneva Conventions. Others will be unique to the circumstances and
locale of the particular conflict. Some restrictions may prohibit the use of certain weapons, preclude
operations in certain geographical areas, or limit certain tactical methods such as the mining of harbors.
Such restrictions may influence the achievement of operational-level objectives.
DODDOA-011084 007_6.htm.12/29/2004
Constraints shape operational alternatives. In contrast to restrictions, constraints denote actions that the commander must take or methods he must employ. Limits of advance and control measures in general are examples of constraints. The imperative to minimize casualties also may shape alternatives.
Methods may include objectives unrelated to operational military aims but which have inherent strategic
significance. For example, the JFC may require the Army commander to employ combined forces even though their use would make operations more complex from the Army perspective. Frequently,
constraints require retaining or protecting areas deemed diplomatically or psychologically important but
tactically insignificant. The retention of Verdun in 1916 constituted such a constraint on French
operations, though it resulted in no military gain and cost nearly a million lives.
The Army may act as a service component functional component, subunified command, or JTF
subordinate to the JFC during the conduct of operational-level activities. The ASCC, or ARFOR
commander, acting in one or more of these roles at the operational level, plans and conducts subordinate
campaigns, major operations, and operations to attain theater strategic and/or operational objectives to
support the joint force mission.
The JFC translates strategic guidance to operational terms in the form of an OPLAN or operations order
(OPORD). This OPLAN/OPORD includes•a clear mission and specific tasks to which the traditional military decision-making cycle is applied. The JFC provides a clear definition of the conditions that
constitute the strategic and military end states. The conditions for the end states must exist before planning and execution of military operations can be effective. The Army operational-level commander may translate these conditions into a single military objective or phased military objectives expressed in major operations that support joint campaigns.
The Army commander participates in the joint concurrent (parallel) planning process to help the JFC translate strategic direction and aims into a clearly defined and achievable end state and objective.
Usually, the more intense the conflict and the more predominant the military factors, the easier it is to translate strategic direction into operational-level objectives. When the nonmilitary elements of national power dominate, the full use of military capability may be limited. Joint Pub 3-0 states that adaptive planning provides a range of options encompassing all the elements of national power (diplomatic,
economic, informational, and military). The selection of military operational-level objectives tends to be more complex in MOOTW.
DODDOA-011085 .12/29/2004
Planning and Execution
The two chapters in this part discuss the planning considerations for Army operations and the operating systems at the operational level in theaters. Chapter 4 presents planning considerations for Army participants at the operational level in theaters in the joint operations of subordinate joint campaigns. Chapter 5 discusses operational art requiring the synchronization of the six operational-level operating systems.
http://atiam.train. a/adl sc/view/public/296714-1/fin/100-7/f1007_7.htm .12/29/2004
Planning Framework
While the planning process is essentially the same at most levels of command, subordinate planning at the operational level demands a broader perspective over the whole range of military operations. Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.1 describe the conditions under which subunified and JTF commanders write campaign plans to support the theater campaign plan. Functional and service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations--not independent campaigns.
Operational-level Army planners use major operations as tools to synchronize ends, ways, and means to support the joint operations of a subordinate joint campaign. These major operations sequence tactical battles or activities to attain theater strategic and supporting operational-level objectives and guidance from the unified theater campaign. Theater strategic planners use unified operations to synchronize the ends, ways, and means of the theater combatant commander's theater strategic purposes.
Though commanders traditionally apply campaigns to conflict and war, they can also design them to accomplish theater strategic objectives in peacetime. A subordinate joint campaign plan serves as the key employment plan to be implemented in subordinate operating areas such as a theater of operation or other JOA. This plan is the basis for planning among the staff and various subordinate service component commands.
This campaign plan provides the subordinate commander's vision and intent. It does this through broad, operational concepts for operations and sustainment throughout the time frame necessary to achieve the theater commander's assigned strategic concept and objectives.
The subordinate JFC, in his campaign plan, considers an orderly schedule of theater strategic decisions
and directions and the supporting operational focus of the theater campaign plan. He then provides a
series of related joint operations within the joint campaign. The plan comprises subordinate forces and
designates command relationships, subordinate tasks, and objectives.
The subordinate plan ensures synchronization and integration of joint and single-service forces but can
integrate, when delegated, specific (special operations) and other supporting forces. The subordinate
JFC might consider relationships, also delegated, with multinational, interagency, international, and UN
forces. However, normally the theater commander first integrates these types of forces into his unified
operations to achieve unity of effort in the theater. Integrating these forces to achieve designated
objectives, either directly or indirectly, contributes to obtaining the CINC's strategic objectives.
Theater-level or subordinate campaign planning is a dynamic and continuous process that occurs in peacetime, conflict, or war. It guides the development of supporting operations or campaign plans and
facilitates the implementation of national strategic direction, priorities, and resources allocations.
Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process during peacetime conditions. Deliberate planning
allows the opportunity to develop and refine plans (OPLANs, concept plans [CONPLANs], and concept
summaries) to be used in wartime. Crisis action planning (CAP) procedures provide for the transition from peacetime to hostilities or war. Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potential crises and developing the contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during a crisis. The deliberate theater and supporting plans are based on evolving
DODDOA-011 087 .12/29/2004 assumptions and/or an intelligence buildup.
The intelligence buildup is continuous throughout the range of military operations. Intelligence readiness begins in peacetime, before any crisis. The commander establishes intelligence requirements that direct peacetime intelligence operations supporting contingency planning. Two specific elements-­staying out front in intelligence planning and understanding how to get intelligence support--are key
components to contingency planning. As contingency plans are activated, the commander focuses
intelligence and targeting to support specific mission decision and planning requirements. In addition,
the commander begins planning for the crossover point in intelligence when initial reliance on higher
echelon intelligence is augmented by tactical intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets within the
Intelligence readiness means that intelligence organizations must develop broad knowledge of priority
contingency areas, update those data bases daily, and be prepared to surge in support of emerging
missions. Commanders and J2s must direct the intelligence effort daily to ensure data bases are available
if alerted to support contingency planning and execution. The intelligence staff must provide
commanders routine, direct, and habitual links into the intelligence system. These links provide an early
focus on the commander's tactical and operational intelligence needs. When a regional crisis occurs, the
intelligence system focuses on pushing intelligence and tailored products to the users and prepares for
the unit to pull needed intelligence.
When a crisis develops, the CJCS issues a warning order. The supported CINC, subordinate force
commanders, and supporting commanders adjust their plans as time permits and the probability of
conducting operations increases. The supported commander develops COAs and recommends a specific
COA to the NCA. The NCA selects a COA and the CJCS issues an alert order. During the execution
planning phase, the supported CINC and his staff prepare the campaign plan and an OPORD, normally
by modifying an existing OPLAN, to initiate the first phase of the theater campaign. Execution begins
with the NCA decision, via the CJCS execute order, to execute the campaign plan and continues until
the campaign reaches an end state favorable to the US and its allies.
Campaign planning can be directed by the NCA, assigned in the JSCP, undertaken by the theater
commander, or undertaken to support the sequential requirements of subordinate JFCs. Existing
OPLANs or CONPLANs may provide the basis for development of campaign plans.
The campaign plan is the basis for action within a hierarchy of decision making and guidance. That
guidance links national security strategy and policy directives to tactical-level battles and engagements.
Both levels of campaign plans ensure the linkage of those battles and engagements toward the
accomplishment of the desired strategic end state. See Figure 4-1.
Upon approval by the NCA of a proposed military option with alternatives, the CJCS designates the
supported and supporting combatant commanders and issues further planning guidance. The supported
CINC has primary responsibility for all aspects of theater campaign plan development. The supported
CINC develops his strategic estimate and intent, then prepares the recommended strategic concept as the
preferred COA, which, upon approval, becomes the basis of his campaign plan.
DODDOA-011088 .12/29/2004
National Command Authorities
Guidance to CINGs

subordinate Joint Force Campaign Plans
Figure 4-1. Hierarchy of Guidance and Implementing Operations.
When the CJCS approves the campaign plan, the supported CINC provides a copy of the plan to
supporting CINCs and subordinates for their use as a basis for developing their supporting plans. In
practice, the process is sequential only in meeting formal approval dates. All parties conduct concurrent
planning throughout the process, via-working papers, informal and formal drafts, liaison efforts, and
action officer and commanders' conferences.
The supported CINC ensures that his theater organizational staffs can coordinate effectively with
supporting CINCs. The CJCS outlines to all involved CINCs the degree of coordination and cooperation required.
DODDOA-011089 .12/29/2004 Unles's limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander exercises general direction over the supporting effort. General direction includes--

The designation of targets or objectives.


Duration of the supporting action.

Other instructions as necessary for coordination and efficiency with the unity of effort between
supported and supporting efforts and plans.

The supported commander should consider the accepted operational and tactical practices of the services
of the supporting forces.
The supporting commander is responsible for ascertaining the needs of the supported force. He fulfills
those needs with existing capabilities and in keeping with the priorities and requirements of other
assigned tasks. Normally, the supporting commander is permitted to prescribe the operations, tactics,
methods, communications, and procedures the supporting force employs.
Occasionally, the NCA or CINC requires more rapid translation of strategic aims into direct, tactical
execution, with an abbreviated operational-level link. This typically occurs during specific incidents or
sensitive situations requiring NCA control. These direct actions of special operations are usually of short
duration, requiring nearly simultaneous operations. The 1986 US raid on Libya is an example. As
conventional operations become longer in duration or more complex in execution, they are likely to
require an expanded operational-level link between the strategic aim and tactical execution.
The theater strategic environment significantly affects campaign design at the theater strategic or
operational levels. Alliance and coalition requirements are obviously key factors to consider. The
availability and capabilities of forward-presence forces--to include allied and international forces,
interagency organizations, and NGOs and PVOs--influence force apportionment decisions.
Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and force-generation capabilities influence the type and timing
of operations. ROE may impose limitations, constraints, or restraints.
Campaign plans are designed to conduct a series of related military operations to achieve strategic
objectives in a given time and space. Theater campaigns achieve national strategic objectives, whereas
subordinate campaigns achieve the CINC's theater strategic objectives. Campaign plans are the theater
strategic and operational extensions of the CINC's theater strategy. They translate theater strategic or
operational concepts into theater or subordinate campaign plans for military action by specifying how intelligence, operations, logistics, and C 2 is used over time to attain national or theater strategic
The key to designing the theater campaign plan is understanding the desired strategic end state,
determining the military end state, identifying the enemy's strategic center of gravity, and--having
achieved the strategic advantage by strategic concentrations and subsequent strategic maneuver-­
attacking the center of gravity to achieve the end state. Though theater and subordinate campaigns have different levels of scope, purpose, and perspective, they share common fundamentals.
DODDOA-011090 .12/29/2004

They describe the situation affecting the conduct of military operations.

They describe the strategic end state and conditions that constitute that end state.

They orient on the enemy's strategic center of gravity and/or successive decisive points at all

levels of war and levels of depth.

They provide an orderly schedule of theater strategic or operational decisions--the commander's vision and intent.

They provide concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve national or theater strategic
objectives within a theater organization--the basis for all other planning.

They describe the series of related unified or joint operations and major operations that lead to the campaign end state, to include objectives and conditions necessary to begin each subsequent sequence of operations.

They phase the levels of campaigns to clearly define or focus sequential activities. Phases often
correspond to changes in the purposes of unified or joint major operations.

They identify the strategic center of gravity and/or key decisive points during the campaign. Key decisions are often based on attainment of conditions identified as necessary to begin phases or shift operations. Other key decisions involve shifting priorities and resources.

They provide the CINC's or subordinate's design for synchronizing efforts.

They describe the terms of priority of effort and resources by phase or subsequent operation. This aspect includes a description of the supporting capabilities and their intended affect on operations.

They provide the organization of the unified or joint force and designate command relationships between the theater CINC and his subordinates.

They identify specific objectives and assign tasks and concepts for each subordinate that are
sufficient to serve as the basis for subordinate planning.

They synchronize and integrate joint, single-service, supporting, and special operations forces in conjunction with multinational and UN forces; international and interagency organizations; and NGOs and PVOs into a cohesive and synergistic whole that is unified in nature.

Campaign planning is the primary means by which the CINC provides for strategic unity of effort and
through which he guides the planning of unified and joint operations within his theater and its
subordinate operating areas.
Theater Campaign Plan
Through the theater campaign plan, the CINC--

Defines theater strategic objectives.

Describes a strategic concept of operations and sustainment. -

DODD0A011091 .12/29/2004

Sequences unified operations.

Allocates subordinate forces.

Establishes command relationships and delegates authority.

Assigns objectives and tasks.

Synchronizes joint, single-service, supporting, and special operations forces with allied, UN,
NGO, PVO, and interagency or international efforts.

A theater campaign plan includes the CINC's strategic vision of the unified operations sequence necessary to attain the national strategic objectives assigned by higher authority. It orients on the enemy's strategic center of gravity; achieves unity of effort with the armed forces allocated by the nation; clearly describes the strategic end state; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronization of forces in operations and the concept for their sustainment.
Integration and Synchronization of Forces and Operations
The campaign plan integrates and synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational/coalition operations by serving as the unifying focus for the conduct of operations. The CINC coordinates from among the total US, allied, or interagency and international capabilities and applies or focuses those necessary to prosecute the campaign. He orchestrates this application of force so that a variety of supporting capabilities is complementary and reinforcing--all oriented on achieving campaign objectives.
Concept for Sustainment
The campaign plan integrates and synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational logistics and support operations. It ensures that logistics and support planning are centralized, comprehensive, and continuous. Although implementation and execution of logistics functions and support are normally a national and, specifically, a service responsibility, the CINC coordinates from among the total US, allied, or interagency or international capabilities and applies or focuses those necessary to prosecute the campaign. Logistics and support considerations are vital to the successful execution of the campaign plan.
Gaining the initiative at the operational-level has a momentum of its own that multiplies the
value of tactical victories and ultimately leads to theater strategic advantage and conflict
termination. The German victory in France during 1940 illustrates this phenomenon. Though
they fought relatively few major engagements, the Germans sequenced and synchronized their
tactical operations in such a manner that the operational-level result was much greater than the
sum of these tactical battles. The momentum gained by the Germans during these operations led
the French to believe their situation was hopeless, despite having major uncommitted combat

Supporting Campaign Plans
DODDOA-011092 .12/29/2004 Theater combatant commanders and their staffs prepare campaign plans. In addition, principal subordinate JFCs prepare subordinate or supporting campaign plans as required against multiple
strategic threats. These include subunified and JTF commanders and their staffs.
The theater commander may decentralize the joint force by establishing theaters of operation or JOAs
for subordinate JFCs who directly command the warfighting service forces. Subunified or JTF
commanders, when assigned a strategic mission, prepare subordinate campaign plans that support the
higher CINC's concept and contribute to the unified effort in the theater.
A JTF is established usually for different levels of command to achieve specific objectives of limited
scope. The JTF mission may be of sufficient scope to achieve a strategic objective. In such a case, under
direction of the theater CINC or, in certain circumstances, under direction of the NCA (through the
CJCS), the commander of the JTF may be responsible for establishing a subordinate campaign plan.
Strategic decision making that affects campaign planning occurs at three levels: national security level,
national military level, and theater level.
National SecurityLevel Planning
At the national security level, the NCA uses the national security system to design national security
objectives and guidance reflecting a strategic end state.
National MilitaryLevel Planning
At the national military level, the CJCS uses sequential planning systems, such as JSPS and JOPES, to
provide further national strategic direction affecting the theater campaign plan process.
Joint Strategic Planning System
The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the
JCS and CINCs, assists the NCA in providing national strategic direction. The JSPS is used to assess the
strategic security and specific theater environments, evaluate the threat, and propose the national
military objectives, strategic concepts and guidance, and force capabilities to support the achievement of
national security objectives. It provides strategic rationale for the initiation of joint operations planning.
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
Campaign planning occurs within the established deliberate or execution processes of JOPES. Campaign
logic, sequence, and fundamentals go into the OPLAN format within JOPES. JOPES provides
procedures to translate strategic direction into a plan of operations. A CINC can use JOPES to develop
and select appropriate COAs. This COA development process can be also applied to campaign plan
Theater-Level Planning
At the theater level, within JOPES guidelines, the CINC employs a theater design process to develop the theater campaign plan. This design process--
DODDOA-011093 .12/29/2004

Begins with receipt of current national strategic direction.

Follows with evaluation of the theater strategy and strategic estimate.

Continues with specified planning considerations of operational art and a series of related
sequential planning actions.

Leads back to the national strategic guidance and end state to ensure that it can be successfully

Subordinate JFCs receive guidance through the JOPES-related, theater-level campaign planning process.
They formulate supporting plans based on the theater CINC's strategic guidance and intent. While
campaign planning is a responsibility of the theater CINC and subordinate JFCs, it has a specific
relationship to JSPS and JOPES. These systems provide a process for the theater commander to receive
strategic guidance from and provide input to the NCA and CJCS, as well as a methodology for
developing the campaign plan.
Theater campaign planning (Figure 4-2) portrays an orderly series of related actions and operations that occur in the campaign design considerations within JOPES. The broad process begins when the CINC receives current strategic guidance and then systematically considers--

Derived mission.

Revised theater strategy and estimate.

Commander's estimate.

Commander's concept.

Objectives, tasks, and concepts for subordinates.

Command relationships.

Theater organization.

Requirements for supporting plans.

The final link in the process is a determination of plan feasibility and requests for change or augmentation. Planning may be self-regenerating, depending on changing conditions of the above actions or events.
Derived Mission
Specified and implied strategic tasks are determined from specific NCA guidance; from national or
alliance documents, such as the JSCP, the UCP, or Joint Pub 0-2, or from CINC initiatives. The national
military objectives form the basis of the campaign's mission statement. Using these guides, the CINC
derives his theater campaign mission--a strategic mission that accomplishes the purpose of national
strategic direction.
DODDOA-011094 .12/29/2004

Figure 4 2. Theater Campaign Planning.
Initially, the mission may be a general statement of the theater strategic objectives and their purposes,
but it may later be refined after specific tasks and phases have been developed and delineated as a result
of the commander's estimate. The mission evolves.
From the derived mission, the CINC determines what is to be done, what resources are available, and
what obstacles or actions may prevent mission accomplishment. The CINC states this derived mission in
succinct terms that are understandable to superiors and subordinates alike. The CINC provides guidance
to subordinate commanders through his application of operational art and the description of his strategic
The commander's intent is a concise expression of the purpose of the unit's activities, the desired results,
and how operations progress toward that end. In his intent, the commander clarifies the why element of
the mission statement for his subordinates. This helps them pursue the desired strategic end state without
further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.
Revised Theater Strategy and Estimate . DODDOA-011095
The national and multinational strategic guidance the C][NC receives from higher authority, whether
explicit or implicit, drives the campaign planning process. Guidance is expressed through national security strategy and national military strategy relative to the deliberate or crisis-action attainment of strategic objectives and guidance. During CAP, assumptions change and plans are adjusted. .12/29/2004
The theater campaign plan must be flexible. It must be able to accomplish its designed purpose and adapt to changing assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting the desired outcome. The plan should be subjected to continued, detailed review and revised as required so that it does not become outdated, is not overcome by critical events, or does not become unworkable. Major components of the CINC's
strategic estimate are strategic direction, the theater strategic situation, strategic concepts, specific
COAs, and decisions. Joint Pub 5-00.1 describes these in detail.
Commander's Estimate
The CINC's study of the situation, coupled with his review of existing theater strategy and strategic
estimate, is a continuous process from which strategic concepts are formulated and COAs are derived to become the basis of the theater campaign plan. In practice, the commander's views, as expressed in the
commander's estimate during deliberate or CAP, contribute to NCA deliberations in forming strategic
guidance. As a minimum, the commander's estimate will include--

The mission, situation, and COAs.

Considerations that affect the COAs.

Enemy capabilities.

Analysis of enemy capabilities.

Comparison of own COAs.

Recommended COA. For each COA, the estimate should address--

Combat forces required; for example, airborne brigade, tank battalion. Identify types of units.

The force provider.

The destination.

Required delivery dates.

A coordinated deployment estimate.

An employment estimate.

Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

Concepts of Operation .
The CINC's strategic concepts of operation and sustainment in the theater campaign plan are linked closely and derived from his strategic intent. They accomplish the following:

Describe the strategic end state and requirements and conditions that constitute that end state.

Design the theater strategic concept, objectives, and tasks and supporting operational direction,
objectives, tasks, and concepts for subordinates to carry out their campaigns or operations.

Organize joint, single-service, supporting, and special operation forces, in conjunction with
multinational or UN forces, interagency organizations and NGOs and PVOs into a cohesive,
unified force designed to plan and execute subordinate campaigns and operations.

Retain strategic reserves.

Establish command relationships.

Integrate the nations's mobilization, deployment, and sustainment efforts into the CINC's
employment and logistics concepts.

Concentrate forces and materiel resources strategically so that the right force is available at the
designated times and places to conduct decisive, winning operations.

Seek to gain the strategic advantage over the enemy that affords an opportunity to take the
strategic initiative through offensive operations.

Defeat or destroy the enemy's strategic center of gravity to achieve the strategic end state. a/adlsc/view/public/296714-1/fm/100-7/f10078.htm .12/29/2004
In his strategic concept, the commander describes how he visualizes subordinates conducting
campaigns, major operations, and the decisive battle, focusing on the employment of his force as a
whole. This description includes conditions to be achieved, sequence of events, and expected enemy reactions to friendly forces as the battle progresses. Above all, the commander should specify the
desired military end state--the results he expects the battle to achieve, including effects on the enemy
and the desired posture of friendly forces after the fight. The commander should describe how this posture will facilitate transition to future operations or postconflict operations.
Objectives and Subordinate Tasks
The theater strategic and supporting operational objectives assigned to subordinates are critical elements
of the theater strategic design of the theater campaign. These objectives establish the conditions
necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. The CINC focuses
on national military or alliance strategic objectives to select his theater strategic and supporting
operational objectives. Subordinate JFCs, in turn, are assigned specific theater strategic and supporting
operational objectives for subordinate campaigns. The CINC carefully defines the objectives to ensure
clarity of theater strategic and operational intent and to identify specific tasks required to achieve those
Command Relationships and Organization
The CINC organizes the subordinate operating areas within the theater and establishes the command relationships for these areas to support the campaign. Organizations and relationships are based on the
campaign design, complexity of the campaign, and degree of control required. Within the campaign planning process, the CINC determines the organization and command relationships before assigning
tasks to subordinates.
To establish command relationships the CINC must determine the types of subordinate commands and
- .12/29/2004
the degree of authority to be delegated to each. This further clarifies the intent of the CINC and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The CINC selects the types of subordinate commands from the six doctrinal options, for example, service components, subordinate joint commands, and so forth. The options for delegating authority emanate from COCOM and range from OPCON to support.
Requirements for Supporting Plans
The CINC considers a total resource support concept that is integrated both vertically and horizontally
into supporting plans for theater and subordinate campaigns or operations. The CINC and subordinate
JFCs and their staffs develop these plans based on unified support that can be provided from national­
level assets, supporting CINCs, services, alliance or coalition partners, other government agencies, NGOs and PVDs, international agencies, UN agencies, and host nations. Supporting plans may--

Address tasks and support requirements during mobilization, predeployment, deployment, entry, operations, postconflict operations, redeployment, and demobilization.

Address requirements for diplomatic, informational, and economic coordination and support.

Detail support during the various phases of the theater campaign.

Supporting commanders synchronize their plans with the theater campaign plan. They time-sequence
mobilization to support deployment, deployment with execution, execution with sustainment, and vice
versa. They identify resources and necessary liaison early--as the plan is being developed. Supporting
plans provide for liaison from the supporting C1NC to the supported CINC, who has control over all
support in the theater.
Coordination is required with allies, coalition forces, and host nations on intratheater movements. Plans
to effect intratheater movement should provide the CINC maximum control of the movement and
concentration of forces and materiel, which will permit rapid response to changing situations as the
campaign develops.
The CINC identifies intelligence support requirements for the campaign through the development or
revalidation of a supporting intelligence plan. This plan identifies requirements for national-level
support from DOD intelligence agencies and military services.
Supporting and subordinate commanders and supporting US departments and agencies use the C1NC's
strategic concepts of operation and tasks for subordinates as the basis for determining the necessary
support for each phase of the campaign plan. Supporting and subordinate commanders respond to the
identified tasks by preparing supporting plans and by submitting them for approval to the supported
National Agencies and Industrial Resources
National-level intelligence organizations are essential to campaign planning and execution because of
the need for access to different data bases, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, and finished
intelligence. During the development of the theater campaign plan, the CINC should identify
intelligence and mapping support requirements and request support from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and other national-level intelligence agencies.
Such other federal agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security
http://atiam.train. se/view/pub c/296714-1/fm/100-7/f1007_8.htm .12/29/2004
Agency (NSA), and the intelligence staffs of the Department of State (DOS) and military services.
The list of agencies with which the Army may find it necessary to establish linkage varies based on the mission. FM 100-19 discusses MOOTW conducted to support US civil authorities and identifies the US
agencies that must be considered. These agencies can determine foreign counterpart organizations with which the Army may need to establish linkages.
The capacity of the nation to expand its industrial base may ultimately have a constraining effect on the
campaign plan. The CINC must compare the expected consumption rates with the projected availability
of critical supplies to ensure that the campaign plan is logistically feasible. To manage projected
shortages, the CINC may plan to restrict or control the use of critical assets. The CINC may recommend
that DOD implement industrial production and repair surge for specific shortfall systems.
Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA is responsible for coordinating national-level support to the
unified efforts of the CINC. DIA is also responsible for deploying national intelligence support teams to
the theater to facilitate the flow of quality intelligence to the CINC. When actual operations commence,
increased strategic intelligence support may be provided by a DOD joint intelligence center (JIC) to
furnish an integrated defense intelligence position to the CINC.
Defense Information System Agency. The Defense Information System Agency (DISA) is responsible
to the CINC for the employment of communication resources at designated defense communication
system (DCS) entry stations and gateways to terminate long-haul trunks and circuits from the JOA. .
DISA ensures that the required entry station, gateways, and switching centers have appropriate
equipment and cryptographic devices to assure worldwide interoperability of the CINC's command,
control, communications, and computers (C 4) assets.
Department of State. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation at the highest level to mission
execution at the host nation and country team levels. At the country team level, the US ambassador is
responsible for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements, except those under
the command of an established US theater commander.
At the theater level, the CINC may use his diplomatic advisor to coordinate with US ambassadors and
their country teams to plan and conduct campaigns. Throughout the range of military operations, the
ambassador remains an important player in the conduct of unified operations. The role of establishing
and maintaining interagency linkage to this representative of the President is vital for accomplishing the
strategic objectives.
United States Information Agency. The United States Information Agency (USIA) is responsible for
supporting US foreign policy objectives by informing the public in other nations about US programs and
policies. The USIA can advise the CINC on the implications of foreign opinion on the execution of
present and future campaigns.
Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the CINC's link to the national
industrial base. DLA provides supplies to the military services and supports their acquisition of weapons
and other materiel. Support begins with joint planning among the services for weapons systems' parts,
extends through production, and concludes with the disposal of materiel that is obsolete, worn out, or no
longer needed. DLA provides supply support, contract administration services, and technical and
logistics services to all military services.
US Army Materiel Command. The U S Army Materiel Command (USAMC) operates the Army's
DODDOA-011099 007_8.htm 12/29/2004 national logistics system through its major subordinate commands and separated reporting activities (SRAs) to fulfill the Army's need for logistics support. USAMC--

Performs assigned materiel functions and related functions for research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDTE).

Provides acquisition, logistics support, and technical assistance for materiel systems.

Performs other materiel acquisition management functions.

Provides the Army's national logistics system-level maintenance support for items of materiel
used by the Army.

Serves as the DOD single manager for conventional ammunition.

Provides management of operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources associated with
its worldwide Logistics Assistance Program.

Additionally, USAMC accounts for and manages Army Reserve and operational projects (OP)
worldwide. These functions and capabilities may be provided to the Army component command through
the logistics support element (LSE).
Logistics Support Element. LSE is a flexible, deployable multifunctional unit. It commands and
controls forward elements of the strategic base. These forward elements are composed primarily of
DOD civilians and contractors. The LSE is structured to link the industrial base with the operational­
level units and, through the logistics assistance representatives, with tactical logistics. The CINC and
ASCC require a tailorable logistics C 2 element for forward elements of the national base. The LSE
supports these needs by using a flexible combination of military, DOD civilian, and contractor personnel
that allows it to alter its mission and size based on ME'TT-T. The objective of the LSE is to sustain
readiness, by operating as far forward as feasible, minimizing the evacuation of critical reparables from
the theater of operations and thus reducing the flow of replacement materiel.
Military Resources
CJCS considers theater strategies and plans when prioritizing and apportioning forces and resources
among the combatant commanders. National strategic planning for mobilization, predeployment,
deployment, entry operations, postconflict operations, redeployment, and demobilization is based on the
planned employment and sustainment of forces by the various combatant CINCs.
The strategic concept of operations of the theater campaign plan imposes requirements on mobilization
timing and generation of necessary force capabilities. Campaign planners and mobilization planners
must coordinate and integrate closely. Strategic deployment planning focuses on intertheater movement
of forces and sustainment of the theater for intratheater deployment, concentration, and employment to
support the theater campaign plan. The CINC's priorities are the basis for either movement.
The NCA may direct the use of strategic forces or reserves to support the CINC's employment concept.
The CINC considers that these forces may be apportioned to generate decisive combat power and
provide protection and security for deploying theater forces or be used against external threats that could
affect the outcome of the campaign.
DODDOA-011100 12/29/2004 Additionally, national-level assets may support the CINC's employment concept for conducting operations security (OPSEC), deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), SOF, civil affairs (CA) operations, and other operations as unique operations within unified operations.
Each service is responsible for providing personnel, administrative, and logistical support to its forces.
The ASCC, in conjunction with his subordinate senior army commanders assigned to the unified or
subunified command, develops supporting plans to provide and maintain adequate logistical support to
Army service forces and other forces as directed throughout all phases of the campaign.
As a rule, the JTF does not have an ASCC. However, the CINC may designate the ASCC as the
subunified commander or CJTF. The JTF has an ARFOR headquarters that provides requisite support to
ARFOR within the JTF and requests additional support from the controlling unified or subunified
command ASCC. Based on the supporting plans developed by the controlling unified, subunified, or
JTF command, the ARFOR headquarters develop its logistical plan.
In the event that national mobilization of forces accompanies campaign plan execution, special plans
and management may be required to ensure available supplies to meet campaign priorities. In addition,
as these mobilized forces deploy, planners develop theater distribution plans to eliminate bottlenecks at
arrival and intratheater movement points. The CINC coordinates and effects support agreements with the
host nation and allies for logistics, facilities acquisition, transportation, and other operations support.
A major operation is the ARFOR's coordinated execution of land operations of a joint operation that is
part of a particular phase of a subordinates or CINC's campaign. A major operation sequences Army
activities, battles, and engagements to attain operational-level objectives. Senior army commanders, as
subordinates to a subordinate JFC, and their senior staff officers execute operational art through the
design and conduct of major operations, including contingency operations.
Often the ASCC/ARFOR is the supported commander planning and executing a major operation. Then,
the execution of the operation's general direction is exercised by the ASCC/ ARFOR. This impacts in
particular on the planning of deep operations; deep fires; interdiction; Army airspace command and
control (A2C2); and reconnaissance, intelligence surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) within the
senior army commander's AO.
Sometimes, the ARFOR commander is a supporting commander who plans and executes major
operations of the campaign. For example, the ARFOR may be the supporting commander to the JFACC
and the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.
Operational-level planners develop major operations to support the series of related joint operations of
the joint campaign plan. These major operations also support the unified operations of the theater
campaign when subordinate missions require a phased, related series of joint operations to achieve
theater strategic objectives. Major operations that support joint campaigns occur under certain

First, a CINC assigns theater strategic objectives and provides strategic guidance and operational
focus to an immediate subordinate.

Second, the CINC may establish multiple operating areas within a theater. Under both sets of
circumstances, the strategic importance of the objectives, the guidance, and the complexity of the

DODDOA-01110 1 12/29/2004
joint operations require the development of joint, single-service, supporting, and special
operations forces that complement both the subordinates' joint campaign and the CINC's theater
Operational-level plans can include subordinate campaign plans and plans for major operations. These
plans support the theater strategic objectives by linking those objectives to tactical-level operations.
Subordinate Campaign Plans
The combatant commander may opt to divide the theater of war into theaters of operations. When
directed, principal subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans or OPLANs that accomplish or
contribute to the accomplishment of theater strategic objectives. These plans support and extend the
theater CINC's concept of operations in a sequence or set of joint operations composed of integrated
major operations and battles. These plans support the theater campaign plan by achieving specific
strategic objectives or by establishing conditions for further operations that lead to the specified end
The principal CINC reviews subordinate campaign plans, along with the necessary supporting plans, to
ensure they are valid synchronized, and support the concept and objective of the theater campaign plan.
Appendix B provides an example of a subordinate campaign plan.
Major Operations Plans
ARFOR with employment roles that support JFCs develop major operations plans to support the theater
or subordinate campaign plans. Plans are objective-driven and, when applied collectively to the joint
force, provide the integrated and mutually supported effort to generate and concentrate combat power at
the operational level of war. Appendixes C, D, and E provide examples of major operations plans for
peacetime, conflict, and war, respectively.
The ASCC's planning responsibilities are contingent on the Army's role in supporting theater-level
unified operations. These responsibilities can range from planning, to participating in joint operations
with other components, to participating in major operations, to planning only for the service support of
Army forces of the subordinate joint commands.
Major Operations Plans
The ASCC's responsibilities for planning and conducting major operations depend on how the
combatant commander exercises his COCOM options. If the combatant commander elects to exercise
COCOM through the ASCC by delegating OPCON to him, then the ASCC conducts major operations in
conjunction with the other service components and also provides logistical support for all ARFOR
assigned to the theater and to other services as required. The ASCC plans and conducts major operations
as directed by the CINC. In those instances where the CINC elects not to use the ASCC to plan and
execute major operations, the ASCC, while providing logistical support for the Army forces, also
recommends to the CINC the proper Army force composition and employment as part of the
operational-level commander's delineated requirements.
DODDOA-0111 02 12/29/2004
Sustainment or Reinforcement Plans
The capability to sustain the campaign from beginning to end sets the tempo of operations. Sustainment
or reinforcement planning--part of logistics-preparation-of-the-theater (LPT) process--identifies and provides the available supplies, equipment, materiel, replacement personnel, and HNS infrastructure to
sustain the involved forces according to the CINC's concept of operations. LPT plans, developed by
logisticians at all echelons, must include provisions for infrastructure development and defense and be
consistent with the strategic aims and CINC's intent. FM 100-16 describes the LPT process in detail.
Achieving unity of effort in multinational operations is critical for success. Multinational operations
planners ensure success by determining how US campaigns integrate with alliance or coalition forces
and how intelligence and logistics resources are shared. Understanding the personalities and sensitivities
of the senior commanders and the national character of each of the allied armies is the key to successful
leadership in multinational army operations. In addition, understanding their capabilities, personal and
professional habits, and training background is important.
Commanders must establish effective working relationships among themselves. They must establish
rapport, mutual respect, and unity of effort; use liaison officers; develop standardization agreements; and
overcome language barriers. History has shown that it is possible for military leaders having a wide
divergence of cultural backgrounds to cooperate effectively while conducting multinational military
Military capabilities of nations differ based on doctrine, training, and equipment. Even in the US Army,
differences exist among commands concerning interpretation and execution of doctrine. Some doctrines
may emphasize offensive operations; others defensive. Some nations prepare for highly mobile,
mechanized operations, while others concern themselves with insurgent or other forms of warfare.
The multinational commander must recognize the relative strengths and differences of the multinational
force cultures. Decisions on employment must include the capabilities of the multinational force. They
must be made in consultation with the military leadership of those forces.
The multinational commander must carefully balance the allocation of capabilities. Subordinate
commanders may have a tendency to request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to
that nation's forces. The guiding principle is not to hold assets that are needed by others, while at the
same time not diluting the concentration of critical capabilities.
Relationship to Campaigns
Campaigns may be conducted within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement. Planning is accomplished through US, multinational, or international channels. Coordinated planning on such matters as operations, logistics (including infrastructure), intelligence, deception, electronic warfare [EW], communications (including infrastructure), ROE, and diplomatic ends is essential for unity of effort. The preparation of supporting plans addressing coordination and liaison, FINS, and the provision of mutual support are examples of essential tasks that the theater CINC _ must accomplish.
DODDOA-011103 12/29/2004 During multinational operations, the multinational chain of command performs detailed employment
planning, to include employment of national and international agencies. These multinational plans may
serve as the basis for the US campaign plan and supporting plans, or the US campaign plan might
provide the basis for employment planning of multinational or coalition forces. Subordinate commands,
such as service and functional component commands, subunified commands, and JTFs, prepare the
necessary supporting plans for the conduct of joint operations that support multinational objectives.
Logistics Support
Traditionally, the responsibility for logistics support to national component forces remained with the
responsible authorities of the nations concerned. In a multinational environment, logistics support must
be the collective responsibility of the nations involved. The logistical objective in a multinational
environment is to achieve the greatest degree of logistical standardization that is realistically achievable,
given operational Constraints, diplomatic and legal demands, and the existing capabilities of the
multinational participants. Logistical standardization is affected by such factors as compatibility and
interoperability of equipment, interchangeability of combat supplies, and commonality of procedures.
Also, planners must develop methods to prevent competition for resources, particularly infrastructure
and LOCs, that could adversely affect operations.
Planners should consider options for contracting, acquiring HNS, obtaining support from other national
forces, and integrating such support within the multinational force. These options can furnish critical
support and resources that are not available through normal organizational means. Planners should
understand and consider rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) during planning.
Multinational commands include national and alliance intelligence systems. In keeping with the NCA
guidance the CINC receives, intelligence information should be integrated and shared with the
multinational command. If possible, the multinational command and other involved national forces must
agree on these procedures well in advance of commencement of the campaign. Supporting plans should
addresS such matters as information-sharing, complementary intelligence operations, and liaison. These
plans also should address interaction with the multinational intelligence center (when established).
Information Operations
The Army applies information war/operations technology to support the CINC to enhance his battle
command, improve battlefield agility, and make split-based operations possible. Effective use of
information operations can prevent the initiation of hostilities by imposing the perception that taking
hostile actions against the US or its allies would not be in the best interest of the potential adversary.
Space-based systems offer an unrestricted environment to affect these operations.
Commanders must be able to access the global grid of worldwide information resources at any time and
at any location in the world. The Army often takes the lead among service components for the entire
joint and multinational theater signal support infrastructure. Essential planning considerations must

Wide area network planning/management.

Frequency management.

DODDOA-011104 12/29/2004

Communications security (COMSEC) key management/distribution.

Interfaces from theater systems to sustaining base.

Integration of signal support assets in theater among joint and multinational forces.

The joint signal support architecture provides vertical and horizontal integration for army battlefield
operating systems, as well as the interfaces that provide interoperability with joint and multinational
forces' systems and the sustaining base. The key to future success is a seamless communications
architecture that ties the many distributed communications and automation elements into an integrated,
interoperable, and cohesive C 4 network.
Interagency operations facilitate the implementation of all elements of national power. Interagency
operations are critical to achieving the strategic end state, especially in MOOTW. The Army often
operates in an interagency environment alongside other institutions of the US Government. This occurs
when the military is the prime strategic option, as it is in war, but also when other instruments of
national power are the preferred option and the military assists with forces.
Army forces must be prepared to conduct a variety of operations that integrate warfighting and
MOOTW with a variety of government agencies, other services, and forces of other nations. These
operations could include stability operations, NEO, counterterrorism, security, or arms control and
Interagency operations facilitate unity and consistency of effort, maximize use of national resources, and
reinforce primacy of the diplomatic element. DOD and CJCS coordinate interagency operations at the
strategic level. This coordination establishes the framework for coordination by commanders at the
operational and tactical levels. In some cases--such as peacekeeping---DOS is the lead agency and DOD
provides support. In others--such as peace enforcement--DOD is the lead agency.
The CINC is the central point for planning and implementing theater and regional strategies that require
interagency coordination. The CINC may establish an advisory committee to link his theater strategy to
national policy goals and the objectives of DOS and concerned ambassadors. The CINC establishes a
joint headquarters to conduct interagency coordination and planning. Military personnel may coordinate
with other US Government agencies while operating directly under an ambassador's authority, while
working for a security assistance organization or while assigned to a regional CINC.
Coordination among DOD and other US Government agencies may occur in a country team or within a
unified command. Military personnel working in interagency organizations must ensure that the
ambassador and CINC know and approve all programs. Legitimizing authorities determine specific
command relationships for each operation. The command arrangement must clearly establish
responsibility for the planning and execution of each phase of the operation.
Besides extensive US Government agency coordination, commanders also must fully integrate
operations into local efforts when appropriate. Such integration requires close coordination with local
government agencies and bureaus; local military, paramilitary, or police forces, and multinational partners. A structure such as a mixed military working group comprised of senior officials of the military and other agencies may assist such an effort and include belligerent parties as appropriate.
DODDOA-011105 12/29/2004 As relationships among interagency participants mature, increased effectiveness can result. Interagency operations do not necessarily lend themselves to the joint geographic subarea of responsibility previously discussed. Overlapping operational and interagency boundaries can be a source of confusion.
DODDOA-011106 12/29/2004
The Army commander executes major operations to support joint campaigns. He practices operational
art requiring the synchronization of the six operational-level operating systems. (Minor differences exist
between TRADOC Pam 11-9 and the Universal Joint Task List.)

Operational movement and maneuver.

Operational fires.

Operational protection.

Operational battle command. (FM 100-5 defines battle command and its impacts.

Operational intelligence.

Operational logistics. (TRADOC Pam 11-9 calls this "support." Joint Pub 4-0 expands the
definition of logistics to incorporate health services, engineer services, and current supply,
maintenance, and distribution services.)

This functional approach is by no means the only way to look at the roles and responsibilities of the
Army operational-level commander. The operational-level commander must successfully accomplish
several complex operations that may not be easy to analyze. He should consider the operational-level
operating systems as aids to identifying tasks that must be accomplished at the operational level. These
systems provide a structure for the discussion in Part Three. They are a catalog of battlefield and support
activities that place functions into logical--not procedural-- relationships.
Operational movement and maneuver is the disposition of forces to create a decisive impact on the
conduct of a campaign or major operation. The commander achieves this decisive impact either by
securing the operational advantages of position before battle or by exploiting tactical success to achieve
operational results. Simply put, operational movement and maneuver involves positioning the needed
Army forces and resources at the critical time and place.
The theater CINC designs, organizes, and conducts campaigns. He sets the tempo and direction for the
conduct of operations. He centralizes mobility planning, to include supporting CINCs' plans. His senior
commanders consider mobility requirements from initial planning, or prehostilities, through mission
accomplishment, or accomplishment of posthostility activities.
The CINC's theater strategic concept is the framework the senior army commander uses to develop his
supporting plan. The essence of the Army commander's plan is the distribution of his available force to
support the CINC's strategic concept. Operational movement and maneuver produces dedisive impact on
the campaign or major operation. All other operational-level operating systems seek to maximize the
effect of movement and maneuver. They are synchronized to produce a series of operational maneuvers that provide subordinate commanders with the necessary leverage to gain, retain, or sustain the
DODDOA-011107 12/29/2004 At the operational-level, the scope and complexity of movement and maneuver usually involve joint and multinational operations. Still, scale alone does not make movement or maneuver operational. Rather,
operational movement and maneuver creates operational advantage; this can be achieved at various
Operational movement is the regrouping, deploying, shifting, or moving of service, joint, or
multinational operational formations to and within the theater from less threatened or less promising
areas to more decisive positions. From the Army commander's perspective, movement involves forces
deployed into his area by the CINC and forces under his control that he moves within his AOR.
Strategic Deployment
Strategic deployment, specifically the time-phased arrival of forces in the theater, may be among the
most challenging problems at the operational-level. An error in determining the proper sequencing of
forces may be difficult, if not possible, to correct. The Army operational-level commander must ensure
the correct mix of combat and support forces are sequenced to arrive in the theater to support the CINC's
concept. He does this by influencing the development of the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL)
to ensure. Army units and sustainment are sequenced into his operational area to support the planned
sequence of operations. Forces required for port opening, reception, and onward movement must be
sequenced early in the TPFDL to flow into the AO once the lodgment area is established.
The senior army commander is responsible for moving forces allocated by the CINC from ports of
debarkation to specific locations within the Army's objective area. This responsibility includes the actual
relocation or movement of operational forces by any means or mode of transportation. Prior to
deploying the forces into combat formation, the senior army commander directs movement from
positions within the operational area to a forward staging area or position.
Ground Combat Operations
Ground combat operations require coordinated movement and effective concentration of combat power
against the enemy in spite of enemy interdiction efforts. Air defense, air and ground transportation,
reconnaissance and security, service support, and traffic control are among the chief concerns as these
large movements occur. Ground combat operations have the best chance of success when they are
synchronized with air superiority and air interdiction operations. Senior army commanders direct the
movement of subordinate forces, ensuring that by the end of a distinct phase of the major operation,
forces are positioned in a way that enables rapid transition to subsequent phases.
Maneuver is the means by which combat power is concentrated at the critical point to achieve the surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance that enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. Operational maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle, declines battle, or acts to take advantage of tactical actions. Throughout a combat operations area, attack, defense, and retrograde operations often take place simultaneously as each combatant attempts to mass, economize locally, and maneuver against his opponent.
Maneuver Operations
DODDOA-01 1108 /fm/100 7/f1007_9.htm 12/29/2004
Prior to the conduct of offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations, senior army commanders, in conjunction with the JFC, posture their operational forces to influence the enemy. As the army commander postures his forces, he visualizes the depth of the campaign. Although initial deployment is important, army commanders posture for initial and subsequent operations, based upon their visualization of the operational end state.
Offensive Operations
The offensive is the decisive form of war and must be exercised in a coherent and cohesive manner. The key to success in an offensive operation is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Offensive
operations seek--

To secure decisive terrain.

To deprive the enemy of resources.

To gain information.

To deceive, divert, and hold the enemy in position.

To disrupt the enemy's attack.

To set up the conditions for future operations.

The goal is to mass effects, and not necessarily our forces, as we pursue of offensive operations.
At the operational level, offensive operations may be directed against an element of the field force--the mass of enemy forces, the boundary between two of its major combat formations a vital C 2 center, a
logistical base, or LOCs. It also could be more abstract--the cohesion among allied forces, for example,
or the mental and psychological balance of a key enemy commander. Operational-level commanders
execute offensive maneuver simultaneously through operational envelopments, turning movements,
infiltrations, penetrations, and frontal attacks--all of which must be integrated with air operations
throughout the depth of their battle space to ensure the best chance for success.
Defensive Operations
Army leaders conduct defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, concentrate forces
elsewhere, control key terrain, wear down enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations, or retain
operational objectives. The defender must counter the attacker's initiative. At the operational-level, the
defender may disrupt the enemy attack with spoiling, special deception, psychological, and interdiction
operations. A successful defense has reactive and offensive air and ground elements working closely
together to deprive the enemy of the initiative.
Army forces may either conduct a mobile defense that focuses on the destruction of the attacking force
or an area defense that focuses on the retention of terrain. The mobile defense orients on the destruction
of the enemy force by employing a combination of fire, maneuver, offense, defense, and delay to defeat
its attack. The area defense absorbs, the enemy into an interlocked series of positions from which the
army commander destroys the enemy largely by fires.
Senior army commanders normally hold operational reserves in depth to seize the operational initiative 12/29/2004
during a defensive operation. These reserves may include dedicated forces, designated operating forces, generated forces from reconstitution, or incoming newly arrived forces.
Retrograde Operations
Retrograde operations are movements to the rear or away from the enemy. They gain time, preserve
forces, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or draw the enemy into an unfavorable position.
Control of the airspace is the key to their success. The underlying reasons for retrograde operations are
to improve an operational situation or prevent a worse one from occurring.
Peacetime Stationing Requirements
The CINC addresses peacetime stationing requirements in light of his potential warfighting needs and
availability of forward deployed forces. The ASCC controls trained and ready Army forces based
overseas for CINC employment. Those forces are backed by rapid reinforcement by Army forces from the US or from other theaters. An evident mobilization capability and a demonstrated determination to respond effectively to crises can have significant deterrent value.
Operational mobility is linked closely to the concept of movement and maneuver. Operational movement and maneuver include the functions of providing mobility for operational forces and
countering the mobility of enemy operational forces.
Facilitating maneuver of major formations without delays includes counteracting the effects of operationally significant obstacles. It also includes enhancing operational movement by preparing and improving facilities and routes critical to major operations.
Operational countermobility delays or otherwise hinders the movement of enemy operational
formations, to include selecting and emplacing systems of obstacles for operational effect.
Terrain, both natural and man-made, significantly influences operational mobility. Terrain consists of coastal plains, mountain ranges, forests, jungles, deserts, rivers, river deltas, built-up areas, railroad embankments, pipelines, and so forth. Terrain affects the ability to sustain forces, often dictating the capacity of LOCs. This effect, in turn, can limit the size and composition of supported forces. In war, the operational-level commander considers the effect of terrain features upon ground movement and the ability of air power to influence that movementby detecting ground forces and subsequently delaying, disrupting, and destroying the forces. In peacetime, the army commander may consider how these features affect accomplishment of missions supporting peacekeeping or humanitarian operations.
The commander must consider the effects of weather and be cognizant of its effects in the theater. Key terrain considerations for the operational-level commander are linked to an understanding of battle space. The commander seeks to preserve freedom of operational movement by countering the effects of natural or man-made, operationally significant obstacles. He must be prepared to counter enemy movements by delaying, channeling, or blocking operational formations. The commander achieves this through the use of countermobility.

DODD0A-011 110
The term operational fires refers to a commander's application of nonlethal and lethal firepower to 12/29/2004
achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation. Operational fires are a
separate element of the commander's concept of operations (addressed separately from maneuver) but
must be closely integrated and synchronized with the commander's concept of maneuver. Operational
fires are joint, and potentially multinational, activities and are a vital component of any operational plan.
Operational maneuver and operational fires may occur simultaneously within a commander's battle
space but may have very different objectives. In general terms, operational fires are not fire support, and
operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on operational fires. However, operational maneuver
can be affected by such fires and can exploit opportunities created or developed by the JFC's operational
firepower (Joint Pub 3-09). Operational fires are normally furnished by assets other than those required
for the routine support of tactical maneuver. However, as the range of assets used to support tactical
maneuver increases, those same assets will play a more significant role in the delivery of operational
fires. The Army has significant capabilities for contributing to the joint, deep fight or planning and
conducting its own deep operations, when necessary, using operational maneuver and/or organic
operational fires.
Operational fires include targeting and attacking land and sea targets whose destruction or neutralization
would have a significant impact on a campaign or major operation. Operational fires include the
allocation of joint and multinational' air, land, sea, and space means. In a war involving weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), fires could become the predominant operational instrument.
A synchronized, systematic, and persistent plan of attack among air and land and, when applicable, sea
and space commanders is essential. Air superiority enables the ARFOR to execute operations without
interference from enemy air forces and maintains tactical flexibility. Air component missions that
contribute most directly to land operations are counterair, close air support (CAS), air interdiction,
special operations, airlift, and surveillance and reconnaissance. An example is air interdiction operations
flown against an enemy heavy division maneuvering to counterattack friendly forces during friendly
offensive operations. The land forces contribute to air operations by fire--suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD), land-based air defense, ground defense of air bases--and by maneuver through attack
helicopter operations or seizure of air bases and air defense sites by ground forces.
The supported CINC must effectively employ the air capabilities provided by the assigned or supporting
service or functional component forces within his AOR. Each component within the unified command
structure may conduct a variety of air operations in the CINC's AOR. Additionally, supporting CINCs
may also fly missions to support the supported CINC's objectives. The supported CINC must integrate
assigned and supporting forces into his theaterwide air operations and ensure component direct support
air operations are coordinated with his theaterwide operations. The A 2C2 process integrates the
maneuver of Army aviation into the overall scheme of maneuver. Users of Army airspace achieve
operational influence through the synchronization of air maneuver, using all battlefield operating
systems focused throughout the depth of the AO. All Army airspace users fire and maneuver within the
third dimension of the ground commander's AO. The A 2C2 process is used to synchronize these Army
assets in the area above the ground commander's AO.
To ensure this integration, the CINC may choose to establish a functional component--the JFACC. This
responsibility is normally assigned to the service that has the preponderance of air assets and the best
capability to command and control joint air operations. Responsibilities of the JFACC are described in Joint Pubs 3 01.2 and 3 66.1. If the JFACC is not established, the air component commander (ACC) is
responsible for providing fixed-wing tactical air support to United States Army (USA) forces. Circumstances may require that the US Navy (USN) or US Marine Corps (USMC) provide all or part of 12/29/2004
the tactical air support for the ARFOR. Under such circumstances, the Naval component commander is
responsible for providing the tactical air support. FM 100-103-1 describes multiservice tactics,
techniques and procedures for integrating airspace C 2 in a CZ. Figure 5-1 describes a notional C 2
structure for integration and coordination of joint fires.
The theater air control system (TACS) is not a formal system in itself but the actual sum of various
component air-ground systems. The TACS includes the organizations, personnel, equipment,
procedures, and techniques comprising the Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) and the Air Force
component commander's (AFCC's) TACS-related responsibilities and missions. The AAGS is the
system necessary for providing the land component commander or ARFOR with the means for
receiving, processing, and forwarding the requests of subordinate commands for air support missions
and for the rapid dissemination of information and intelligence produced by air means.
.1 .......1.====== .

I 1 i 1
I .
Subordinate Subordinate LSubordinate
units units


AOC sir operations center
ARSOCC —Army special operations component commander

BCE battlefield coordination element
CoordinationJFLCC —joirt force land component oornrnander Command SOCCE — special operations commard and control element
TOO —tactical operations center
Figure 5-1. National Joint Fires Command and Control Structure.
TACS provides the same type of system for the AFCC. A similar system exists within the USN and
provides the USN-USMC naval aviation C 2 system for naval aviation. FM 31-12 contains a detailed
discussion of the USN-USMC C2 system and the additional agencies included therein. Although
components and agencies of the TACS belong to different services and sometimes to different nations,
they function as a single entity in planning, coordinating, and integrating air support operations with
ground operations.
The AAGS begins at the highest echelon in the theater and extends through all echelons down to maneuver battalions. This system is used for coordinating and integrating tactical air support with 12/29/2004 ARFOR ground operations. The AAGS is composed of operations, fire support, air defense, Army
airspace C2, and liaison elements. Each Army component of the system is designed to operate with an
element of the US Air Force (USAF) TACS but is also compatible with both USN and USMC air
control systems. Figure 5-2 illustrates the components of a typical TACS and the locations of the liaison
elements within the AFCC.
Technology is improving extended-range acquisition and attack systems such as the multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS), the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), and the Apache attack helicopter.
These systems allow the Army to extend battle space and play a larger role in decisive deep operations.
Senior army commanders must orchestrate available Army, joint, and multinational lethal delivery
systems to disrupt, delay, destroy, or degrade enemy operational forces or critical functions and
facilities. They must ensure that systems designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy
operational forces, functions, and facilities are coordinated with fires. The extended range and flexibility
of attack helicopters and fire support systems make it possible to shift the focus and concentration of
fires rapidly over the width and depth of the operational commander's battle space. EW, PSYOP, special
reconnaissance, and SOF must be synchronized with operational fires in war, or they may be used by
themselves in MOOTW.
In the past, theater air forces have provided operational fires; however, the increasing range and
accuracy of projectile, rocket, and missile systems, combined with maneuver and attack capabilities
from attack helicopters and light forces, now provide the Army commander with his own organic
operational-fires capability. The ability of each service to engage targets at operational depths
demonstrates the inherent joint and potentially combined nature of operational fires.
The senior army commander, in supporting the CINC's campaign plan, plans operational fires within his
AO. His major role is to synchronize ground and air operational fires in his AO to achieve operational
and tactical objectives. The army commander applies operational fires in depth to achieve operational
objectives quickly with minimum casualties.
The army commander plans operational fires from the top down (the operational commander establishes
objectives and designates and integrates targets, then passes them to the subordinate joint or allied units
for execution). The Army commander executes those fires with organic and allocated assets and by
nominating targets that he cannot strike with these assets to the JTCB. He uses the targeting process to
shape the battle space and synchronize fire support, interdiction, and maneuver. He does this using the
decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D 3A) methodology and participating in the JFC's joint targeting
The D3A methodology enables commanders to respond rapidly with synchronized operations to events
vital to establishing favorable conditions for mission accomplishment. The D 3A methodology is a
process that helps a commander's structured attack of critical targets and creates a favorable battle tempo
for friendly forces, particularly at decisive points and times during the operation.
II_ DODD0A-011113 12/29/2004
During the air and artillery preparation of the Operation Desert Storm battlefield, the coalition forces
delivered large numbers of cluster-type munitions and scatterable mines on the enemy. Due to several
factors, including faster-than-anticipated rates of advance and a higher-than-expected dud rate
coalition, ground forces operated in terrain heavily seeded with unexploded ordnance.
This methodology requires extensive lateral and horizontal coordination, which the staff does, based on
the commander's intent. In planning operational fires, both ground and air component commanders
consider the effects that all fires, especially scatterable mines and cluster-type munitions, may have on
future ground operations. FMs 101-5 and 6-20-10 discuss the targeting process in detail.
Commanders concentrate the effects of their fires rather than massing the weapons themselves.
Extended-range acquisition and attack systems allow the commander to reduce the vulnerability of his
forces by dispersing the friendly forces and massing effects on the enemy. However, fires alone are
unlikely to achieve completely operational objectives. Integrated properly with operational maneuver,
fires can help achieve a decisive impact on the operation.
Operational fires help the Army commander accomplish his mission and protect the force. Operational
fires achieve both operational and tactical objectives while holding enemy critical functions at risk

throughout the depth of the battle space. Operational fires are more than deep fires. They achieve
operational objectives by extending the battlefield in both space and time. Targets critical to the success
of friendly operations exist throughout the depth of the battlefield. Current and emerging capabilities
permit their acquisition and attack at increasing ranges and with faster response times. Operational fires
expose or attack enemy centers of gravity. Attack of key operational targets helps to set the conditions
for operational maneuver. Disrupting, delaying, or limiting critical enemy functions helps the
commander dictate the terms for the close fight. Operational fires may hold or deny terrain in support of
both operational and tactical objectives.
Tactical objectives are supported by the ability of operational fires to disrupt, delay, or limit enemy
capabilities that would impact immediately on the current battle. Tactical objectives support the attack
of committed enemy formations throughout their depth. This support helps the commander seize and
retain the initiative, alter the tempo of operations, and set the conditions for decisive close combat.
Support of both operational and tactical objectives through operational fires is based on the ability of
operational fires to hold all critical enemy functions at risk throughout the depth of the battle space.
Operational fires neither leave the enemy a place to hide nor time to rest critically limiting his freedom
of action. As such, operational fires hasten the physical destruction of the enemy force and the
disintegration of cohesive operations and demoralize the enemy's will to fight. In MOOTW, the
availability of operational fires to the commander acts as a deterrent to escalation of conflict and, when
necessary, provides him additional means to accomplish the mission and protect the force.
Also, the enemy may possess a sophisticated operational fires capability. The Army commander must
consider enemy capabilities and establish measures to protect the force. Operational fires may be used to
disrupt enemy capabilities before they can be used against friendly forces. Examples include theater
missile defense, counterreconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, counterfire, and joint
suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD). Operational fires focus largely on one or more of three general tasks: facilitating maneuver, isolating the battlefield, or destroying critical enemy functions and facilities.
DODD0A-011114 12/29/2004
Facilitating Maneuver
Operational fires can facilitate maneuver in depth by suppressing the enemy's deep-strike systems,
disrupting the enemy's operational maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in tactical
defenses. Interdiction and maneuver are inseparable operations against a common enemy. Interdiction
directs, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used
effectively against friendly forces (Joint Pub 1-02). Effective interdiction and maneuver are
complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives. Together they present the
greatest dilemma to the enemy. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and
maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.
When the campaign calls for ground operations to be decisive operations or defeat mechanisms,
planning for the interdiction operations and target prioritization must be based on the ground
commander's concept of operations. Just as air commanders (Naval and Air Force) know and understand
the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of opposing air forces, ground force commanders must know
and understand the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of opposing ground forces.
Proper interdiction planning requires both air and ground expertise. The interdiction and maneuver
planning responsibilities of the operational-level commander fall into two areas: influencing joint air
interdiction operations and ensuring that ARFOR and JFLCC target nominations are struck according to
available assets. To ensure integration of interdiction and maneuver, the Army operational-level
commander must--

Define Army interdiction objectives and priorities and provide them to the JFACC.

Establish allocation of CAS effort between subordinate Army forces and the operational

Ensure the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) determines high-payoff and high-value

Ensure that consolidated target nominations reflect ARFOR priorities.

Recognize that Army targets do not automatically get higher priority.

Facilitate notification to subordinate unit commanders when the JFC determines that the
circumstances have changed and therefore alter asset allocation priorities.

If designated as an appropriate ground forces commander, establish a fire support coordination
line (FSCL) within boundaries and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and
affected commanders.

Isolating the Battlefield
Isolating the battlefield is another major task of operational fires. Operational-level commanders isolate
the battlefield by interdicting enemy military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly
forces. Commanders usually combine this isolation with other operations in a simultaneous attack
designed to use superior combat power to achieve quick, decisive outcomes.
While interdiction destroys enemy forces, its primary contribution to the operation is curtailing the
DODD0A-011115'in 12/29/2004 enemy's freedom of movement and information flow and influencing the enemy's battle tempo by diverting, delaying, and disrupting enemy forces. Interdiction can slow the action of enemy reserves and obstruct the redeployment or movement of forces.
Interdiction of the logistical support system disrupts enemy operations by choking off the enemy's
combat power. Friendly ground and air forces must exploit the enemy's reduced freedom to maneuver
and synchronize this reduction with other operations to achieve the desired tempo of operations.
Destroying Critical Enemy Functions and Facilities
Operational-level commanders may use operational fires to destroy critical enemy functions and
facilities. Critical targets may include high-value C 2 systems, mobility assets such as fixed and mobile
bridging, air defense sites, and enemy long-range delivery systems such as surface-to-surface missiles,
theater ballistic and cruise missiles, airfields, and aircraft.
The objective in such cases is the deliberate elimination or substantial degradation of critical enemy
operational capabilities, for example, attaining air superiority by destroying enemy air operations and air
defense capabilities. Operational fires do not necessarily depend on other concurrent operations for
success; however, they may be employed with other systems and maneuver in a simultaneous attack of
enemy operational capabilities. Operational fires are particularly attractive in a theater where lack of
resources may preclude major ground offensive operations.
The senior army commander ensures unity of effort and purpose by organizing fires in his operational
battle space. He is a major planner of operational fires and a major allocator of fire support resources.
He closely coordinates joint and multinational assets. He allocates or controls resources and designates
missions to subordinates. They attach forces, establish support relationships, or control usage; specify
the degree of risk and retain systems control. A primary consideration for the Army commander is the
allocation of scarce operational fires resources, especially air assets.
The senior army commander and his staff play a major part in coordinating joint and multinational
assets. Under the guidance of the JFC, land, air, and maritime components execute major operations
designed to attain strategic objectives. The JFC synchronizes operational-level fires as part of the joint
planning process. This process entails component coordination and cooperation in the employment of all
Deep Operations Coordination Cell
The DOCC 1 is a proposed fire support element at the operational-level headquarters that plans,
coordinates, and executes employment of operational fires. Chapter 7 discusses the DOCC in detail. J-
SEAD is an example of this type of coordination and cooperation.
Battlefield Coordination Element
The Army DOCC effects coordination with other services through the battlefield coordination element
(BCE). The ASCC provides the BCE and collocates it either ashore or afloat with the ACC's air
operations center (AOC) or theater equivalent. The BCE expedites the exchange of information through 007_9 .htm 12/29/2004
face-to-face coordination with elements of the AOC established by the ACC. The AOC is the operational facility in .which the ACC centralizes the planning, direction, and controlling functions over all tactical air (TACAIR) resources.
The BCE's basic mission is to facilitate the synchronization of air support for Army operations. The
BCE is responsible to the ASCC/ARFOR commander and coordinates with and receives objectives,
guidance, and priorities from his operations officer (G3). Specific missions include processing land
forces' requests for TACAIR support, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation for the AOC,
providing the necessary interface for the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, and
coordinating air defense and airspace control matters.
Historically, the BCE has worked with the Air Force in this coordination role, but with the changes in
world environment and joint doctrine, the Army BCE can expect to work in contingency operations with
USMC and maritime air component commanders. Planners must identify and resolve problems that
result from these less-practiced and less-refined linkages. If the BCE collocates with an AOC, it is
organized into sections corresponding to the AOC's. Figure 5-3 illustrates the organization of the BCE
and its interface with tactical air control. For more information on the BCE, consult FM 100-103, FM
100-15, and 71-100 series FMs.
Operational protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at the decisive
time and place. Operational protection includes actions taken to counter the enemy's firepower and
maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and operational formations difficult to detect, strike, and destroy.
Operational protection pertains to forces everywhere in the theater of war or operations. Operational
protection includes, but is not limited to--

Providing operational air defense.

Conducting deception.

Protecting operational forces and means.

Employing OPSEC.

Providing security for forces and means.

Conducting rear operations, which includes combatting terrorism.

Conducting risk assessments.

Planning for possible response or use of WMD.

DODDOA-011117 12/29/2004
=MI= MI=_r .=.11• ¦
r ---
Combat Cforbal
ENSCE Operatiols Pie ns GOID
Div Div
ADA Fusion Upns I Airspace I Plans
LEGEND AOC Corps Fighter Recce Airlift BCE LNO GLO AFILO GLO
Figure 5-3. BCE/Tactical Air Control Interface.
All members of the combined arms team perform air defense operations; however, ground-based air
defense artillery (ADA) units execute the bulk of the force protection mission. Army ADA provides
protection to forces and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance.
Significant considerations for employment of ADA in theater operations include its role in joint and
multinational counterair operations, theater, missile defense, the threat, available assets, and
Air Threats DODDOA-0111 18
The entire spectrum of threat air operations can be flown with theater-level assets. Enemy air operations
may include tactical ballistic missile (TBM), air-to-surface missile (ASM), and cruise missile (CM)
attacks. The full spectrum of enemy air threat includes UAVs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and
airborne and air assault operations. The current approach to theater missile and air defense places
emphasis on leveraging the synergy of joint capabilities to the maximum extent possible to counter the
threat. Each joint force component addresses the target sets that they are best equipped to engage and
The first target set is ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles can be strategic, operational, or tactical. They
may also have guided munitions. Because of detection difficulties and inadequate kill potential, manned
aircraft are inappropriate platforms to counter TBMs in the terminal phase. The TBM target set is best
engaged by ground-based systems as demonstrated by Patriot ADA during Operation Desert Storm.
Manned aircraft are best suited by design for air-to-air engagements of other manned fixed-wing
A second target set committed against theater assets is cruise missiles, UAVs, and fighter/bomber aircraft that evade the defense counterair operations of the joint air forces. Ground-based air defense 12/29/2004 systems are best equipped to engage these targets. UAVs and helicopter platforms typically operate at altitudes where fixed wing air-to-air combat is not employed. These targets are destroyed through ground-based systems, thereby contributing to protection of forces and geopolitical assets and denying the enemy surveillance of friendly force activities.
The contribution of all services to theater missile and air defense offensive and defensive tactics engages
all applicable target sets. These offensive and defensive tactics cover all aspects of active and passive
defense measures throughout the theater.
Joint and Multinational Counterair Operations
Joint and multinational counterair operations are conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air
superiority by destroying or neutralizing enemy forces. Joint and multinational counterair operations
include both offensive and defensive measures taken against enemy air threats. Offensive counterair
(OCA) operations destroy, disrupt, or limit enemy air threats as close to their source as possible,
whereas defensive counterair (DCA) operations are conducted primarily to counteract enemy air
offensive actions to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air attacks.
Air defense forces conduct DCA operations using both active and passive measures. Active DCA
operations use ADA; EW; Army aviation; and chemical (smoke), combined arms, and air elements to
disrupt or destroy airborne enemy aircraft, missiles, and other aerial vehicles that pose attack and
surveillance threats. Passive DCA measures such as cover, concealment, signature reduction, smoke
operations, and deception frustrate enemy targeting efforts and minimize the effects of enemy attacks.
Theater Missile Defense
FM 44-100 states that the objectives of theater missile defense (TMD) are--

To reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by a theater ballistic missile attack.

To detect and target theater missile platforms.

To detect, warn of, and report theater missile launch.

To coordinate a multifaceted response to a theater missile attack.

• To integrate TMD with other combat operations.
TMD has four operational elements--passive defense, active defens, attack operations, and command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The Army contributes to all four. Passive
measures reduce the vulnerability of critical forces and assets to theater missile attack. Active defenses
engage missiles and enemy aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles in flight. Attack operations are
conducted to prevent the launch of theater missiles. C 4I is required to Coordinate and integrate the
defense against the theater missile capability.
The senior Army air defense command in theater executes a key portion of the TMD concept. Air defense forces are task-organized to defend in a TMD task force. The TMD task force protects a mix of force organizations and geopolitical assets that represent a high priority for protection by the TMD. It is composed of two overlapping tiers. The upper tier is defended by theater high-altitude air defense
http :// 12/29/2004
(THAAD). The lower tier is defended by the Patriot. Through TMD, both OCA and DCA actions are taken against theater missiles. Simultaneous with the active defense operations to destroy inbound theater missiles are the attack operations to facilitate counterfires using the flight data of the threat TBM to locate the launch point. This is .an operational action that can extend air defense activities far beyond the corps deep battle area. For additional details on TMD, refer to FM 44-100.
The conduct of deception contributes greatly to the protection and survivability of operational forces.
Operational deception consists of those operations that purposely mislead enemy decision makers by
distorting, concealing, and falsifying friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions. Deception
includes protecting the commander's own intentions, disseminating misinformation to deceive the
enemy about those intentions, obscuring areas of the theater, and determining the effect of the deception.
The ultimate goal of deception is to mislead the opposing military commander, prompting him to plan
and conduct his activities in a manner that unwittingly serves the friendly force's objectives. Deception
operations are planned and executed at the operational level of war and synchronized with strategic
objectives. They can support theater objectives by deterring the escalation of conflict, destroying the
enemy's warfighting means, gaining and maintaining the initiative, and shaping the enemy's scheme of
The operational-level commander participates in the deception process at two levels. He may plan and
execute deception operations within his mission purview, or he may be asked to provide planning and
operational-level support for deception activities planned and executed by subordinate, adjacent, or
higher command echelons. Deception operations at the operational level must complement or reinforce
the theater deception plan effort. The operational-level commander reconciles operational and tactical
deception plans to ensure they complement but do not contradict the strategic (theater) plan.
The operational-level commander safeguards his operational force by reducing the effects of enemy
operational-level actions (movement, radio electronic combat, and so forth). He does this by preparing
operationally significant fortifications, removing operationally significant hazards, and protecting the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The operational commander provides protective construction hardening for operational forces and key
facilities, for example, C 2, logistics, and rear area positions. However, even hardened facilities are
vulnerable to a determined attack. The operational commander eliminates hazards that may adversely
affect the execution of his plan. Additionally, he ensures that actions are taken to ensure friendly,
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, despite the enemy's use of EW.
The operational-level commander attempts to hide friendly force indicators associated with planning and
conducting major operations. He does so by employing signal security (SIGSEC) and concealment
techniques and avoiding operational patterns.
The operational-level commander protects emitters and information transmitted through friendly C 2 communications-electronic systems from enemy exploitation. He also hides operational forces and facilities from enemy observation and surveillance sensors. He ensures units vary activities and ways of
DODDOA-011120 12/29/2004
conducting operations to avoid predictable patterns that are vulnerable to enemy interception.
By identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise, the operational­
level commander enhances the force's freedom of action. Enhancement consists of measures to protect
the force from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, and sabotage. It includes
protecting and securing the flanks of operational formations, critical installations, facilities, and systems.
The operational-level commander is responsible for rear operations subject to applicable host nation
laws and agreements. Rear operations include those activities that allow freedom of maneuver in the
COMMZ, continuity of sustainment, and uninterrupted battle command. The combatant CINC is
ultimately responsible for all rear operations in the theater of operations. He normally assigns
subordinate commanders the responsibility for operations in a JRA according to mission requirements,
force capabilities, the strategic environment, and the threat. The CINC may assign the overall mission of
rear operations to one commander--the JRAC. The JRAC must ensure integration of all rear operations
missions and forces and synchronization with the CINC campaign plan.
The potential magnitude of the threat to the theater base and COMMZ dictates that US forces be trained
to cope with threat forces when and where they attempt to interrupt COMMZ operations. The
operational-level commander uses every appropriate active and passive measure for defense against
detection from the air, attack from the ground, and compromise of friendly defense systems.
Successful rear security operations are critical in the rear area since it contains the LOCs, establishments
for supply and evacuation, and agencies required for immediate support and maintenance of field forces.
The key tasks of successful rear security operations are--

Coordinating base/base cluster defense plans.

Collecting, integrating, analyzing, and disseminating timely and accurate intelligence.

Patrolling aggressively in coordination with the host nation, to intercept and defeat small threat
forces before they close on their objective.

Deploying forces sufficient to counter the enemy intrusion.

Also integral to force protection is the conduct of risk assessments. Risk assessments identify hazards
and examine the resulting risks associated with the mission. Special risk considerations must be made
where the threat of WMD exists. Risk assessment is dynamic. As circumstances change and the
command's experience level increases, risk assessments confirm and reconfirm critical information that
affects decisions.
US policy concerning nuclear warfare is to deter it, and, if deterrence fails, to terminate the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence consistent with national and allied policy objectives. This policy 007_9.htm 12/29/2004 does not preclude US first use of nuclear munitions. Nuclear weapons may only be used following the specific directives of the President.
Since the Army no longer has an organic nuclear capability, it must rely on other services for delivery of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to support its operational warfare requirements. Nuclear weapons should be integrated with other fire support systems to achieve the greatest operational advantage. The potential
employment of WMD can have an enormous impact on the conduct of all operations. These strategic,
operational, psychological, and political impacts affect campaign designs. The sheer killing and
destructive power of these weapons create an illusionary battlefield effect. Further, the proliferation of
WMD dramatically alters the nature of regional conflict.
As these weapons proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces or in response to an
enemy's first use increases. The effects of these weapons on a campaign or major operation--either
through use or the threat of use--can cause large-scale shifts in tactical objectives, phases, and/or COAs.
Thus, planning for the possibility of their use against friendly forces is critical to campaign design.
Commanders must be aware of the political as well as public sensitivities to the use of WMD and be prepared to respond to the possibilities of postuse public relations problems.
From the combatant commander's perspective, a swift end to a conflict will partially negate the
escalatory potential of these weapons. A combination of conventional offensive and defensive measures
can help deter or reduce the likelihood of an enemy's use of these weapons. Offensive preventive measures may include raids, surgical air strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the
threat of such weapons. Commanders implement the defensive nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination. They also plan for effective air and ballistic missile defense with different systems. US military policy attempts to deter enemy use of WMD through
a defense posture that allows US forces to survive, fight, and win under conditions produced by these
Commanders must assess an enemy's willingness to employ these weapons and the conditions that would prompt him to do so. However, commanders should never assume rationality in the mind of the
enemy. A virtually defeated enemy may resort tc unrestricted warfare by any means at hand.
Army forces may support use of WMD with SEAD or with the reconnaissance and selection of targets. More importantly, however, Army officers must participate in drafting and executing campaign plans that envision friendly use of WMD. The campaign plan must identify the requirement for strikes with WMD that support campaigns and major operations. Additionally, Army planners should identify appropriate WMD targets and ensure integration of WMD into the campaign plan and/or major operation plan.
The Mass Destruction Environment
When WMD are used, extensive destruction and mass casualties can result. Only cohesive, disciplined, physically fit, and well-trained units can function in this environment. But long-term operations in this environment degrade even the best individual and unit performance as a result of wearing protective equipment. Commanders must train and equip soldiers and civilians alike to endure these conditions. By being better prepared than the enemy for continuous operations under conditions produced by WMD, US forces can maintain an advantage over the enemy that deters him from using these weapons.
Force protection is an imperative in this environment. Units can survive the use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways. These include training
DODD0A-011122 12/29/2004
OPSEC, dispersion of forces, and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects.
In an NBC environment, battle command becomes more difficult. Command posts and headquarters at
all levels are likely targets. Control is difficult even within the smallest unit. Personnel in protective
clothing are slow to respond to rapid changes in mission. The employment of these weapons greatly
alters the tempo of combat. So, commanders must never assume that they are immune to attack but
consider ways of decreasing their risk.
Contamination avoidance is essential for successful operation when faced with an NBC threat. Avoiding
contamination allows units to maintain tactical momentum and preserves combat power by keeping
soldiers out of increased NBC protective postures. It also removes or lessens the need for
decontamination. Detailed information on NBC contamination avoidance is found in FM 3-3.
Multinational operations become more risky with the threat of NBC use. Countries that cannot protect
themselves against these weapons may become the primary target of an enemy whose aim is to
disintegrate the coalition. The likelihood that an enemy will use WMD against other coalition members
will increase as US forces demonstrate the ability to defend effectively against their effects.
Commanders should consider that possibility in all strategic, operational, and tactical planning.
Nuclear Weapons
As a force that now lacks organic nuclear capability, the Army must rely on Air Force and Navy nuclear
capabilities to deter regional threats from using WMD and, should it be necessary, to respond to regional
use of these weapons. The integration of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile systems
expands the scope of regional conflict. Ballistic missiles significantly reduce reaction times and create
complex planning and decision criteria. The ability of some nations to employ nuclear weapons at
extended ranges, using ballistic or cruise missiles and high-speed aircraft, will significantly enhance
their effectiveness as instruments of terror. With the ability comes the possibility of conflict escalation
beyond the boundaries of the region.
Using intelligence estimates, planners advise the commander of the enemy's capability to employ
nuclear weapons and under what conditions he is most likely to do so. A significant intelligence task is
locating these weapons and assessing the probability of their employment. Accordingly, the integration
of national, joint, and multinational intelligence means is vital to this effort.
The immediate effects of a nuclear detonation are blast, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP). These effects can cause significant personnel and materiel losses.
Secondary effects include urban devastation, fires, and radiological contamination. The EMP from a
nuclear detonation can affect unshielded electronic equipment and degrade C 3I systems. Residual
radiation can also have long-term effects on personnel, equipment, facilities, terrain, and water sources.
Therefore, ensuring that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for nuclear weapons
is important.
Biological Weapons
While the US has renounced the use of biological weapons, many nations have not. The availability of
biological weapons to possible enemies requires that commanders prepare for operations in a biological
environment. Defensive measures are necessary to mitigate the effects of a biological attack. Both military and civilian populations require information and psychological and medical preparation.
DODD0A-011123 12/29/2004
Chemical Weapons
All current and future operations have the potential to occur in a chemical environment. US policy does
not condone or authorize first use of chemical weapons. However, preparedness to operate in this
environment negates many possible advantages for an enemy to employ these weapons. This
preparedness is itself a deterrent.
Chemical weapons produce immediate and delayed effects that can hamper operations through the
contamination of equipment, supplies, and critical terrain features. Commanders can reduce the effects
of chemical employment by applying the fundamentals of contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination. Chemical reconnaissance and decontamination are two planning imperatives for all
future missions; training is the key. Detailed information on providing NBC protection to the force, as
well as risk analysis and assessment, is found in FM 3-4.
Initially described in FM 100-5, operational battle command is the exercise of authority and direction
by a commander to accomplish operational objectives. The control mechanisms support the exercise of
battle command. The commander's vision and his stated intent guide the organization toward the
accomplishment of their mission or assigned tasks. Battle command focuses efforts, establishes limits,
and provides structure to operational functions. Battle command supports the organization in the conduct
of current operations while planning and preparing for future operations.
Visualizing the battlefield is a continuing requirement for commanders. Battle command at the
operational level includes the collection and protection of information, the assessment of that
information, the selection of appropriate actions, and the establishment of direction for the leaders of
subordinate operational forces. In exercising battle command, the operational level commander
considers those assets available from higher headquarters as well as from other service components and
allies. He then organizes his command and delegates responsibilities.
Operational-level battle command requires longer lead times, involves a greater span of control, and is
inherently joint and often multinational. It includes tactical-level principles such as issuing mission
orders, anticipating requirements, and using initiative. The senior army commander translates these
principles, the CINC's strategic direction, and the operational-level objectives into a clear statement of
The concept of battle space was developed to help the commander visualize and organize the projection
of combat power to gain physical dominance over the enemy. Battle space is the three-dimensional
physical environment--that is not constrained by boundaries--in which commanders visualize conducting
combat operations over time. Commanders use the concept of battle space to help determine how the
terrain and all available combat power can be used to dominate the enemy and protect the force.
Eventually, this vision becomes the battlefield framework from which the commander's intent and
concept of operation are derived. Understanding of this concept contributes to the synchronization of
full-dimensional operations.
Understanding also allows commanders to synchronize combat power against the enemy and keep the
enemy from extending his battle space to its greatest range. This helps commanders determine how they might task-organize and position their units. By understanding how to visualize operations to disrupt the
DODDOA-011124 .12/29/2004
enemy in depth, commanders can synchronize operations to disrupt the enemy in depth to throw him off balance, to attack his functions, and to set the conditions for decisive victory. Synchronization,
sequencing, and phasing of the battle within the battle space is critical to success. New technology in digitization has provided opportunities for improved battlefield situational awareness and increased weapons systems lethality. Digitization efforts include ground maneuver battle space as well as the
airspace above the theater. Digitization increases operational tempo and protects friendly forces. Battle
space is discussed in detail in FM 100-5 and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5.
The senior army commander maintains clear unity of command during changes of operational phases.
This unity includes relationships with joint and multinational organizations. Significant changes in
command relationships require phasing plans to avoid confusion. Any major organizational changes
require a review of the existing battle command process.
A senior army commander performs four functions to implement his vision and achieve proper
operational battle command. First, he decides upon and communicates his intent and provides direction
so that others can understand and respond. Next, he establishes the structure to focus effort. Then, he
plans and organizes the activities necessary to get results. Finally, he motivates, influences, and
supervises the force to develop and sustain the organizational purpose required to accomplish the
Communicating the Commander's Intent
The commander's intent is a concise expression of the commander's expected outcome of an operation.
The commander's intent funnels an organization's collective activities to achieve the commander's
desired outcome. The commander's intent is the central goal and stand-alone reference that enables
subordinates to gain the required flexibility in planning and executing. It is the standard reference point
from which all present and future subordinates' actions evolve.
Commanders and leaders--guided by their commander's intent--who can make decisions can better
ensure the success of the force as a whole when conditions are vague and confusing and communication
is limited or impossible. The design of commander's intent is not to restrain but to empower
subordinates by giving them freedom of action to accomplish a mission.
Structuring to Focus Effort
Structure is critical for implementing the commander's vision. At the operational level, the complexity
and scope of the mission contribute to uncertainty. Leaders cannot always draw upon experience or
previous solutions to problems that may be entirely different. An important component is establishing
the rules and defining the limits. ROE, control measures, degree of risk, success criteria, report formats,
and other tools contribute to the function of establishing structure. Many of these matters are standard
procedures in smaller units. However, at echelons above corps (EAC), the inherent joint and
multinational nature of operations, along with the peculiarities of each theater, compel the senior army
commander to specify certain elements.
Structuring focuses effort. Structure is a characteristic of the control function of leadership. The senior army commander applies structure when he assigns missions and communicates his vision. Structure is accomplished formally through orders and directives and informally in communicating with subordinate
DODD0A-011125 007_9.htm.12/29/2004
Planning and Organizing
Operational planning begins with the assignment of a mission or with the commander's recognition of a requirement; it continues until the mission is accomplished. The staff uses the commander's intent to develop and coordinate the supporting operation plan. Once the commander develops the plan, he organizes his command and designates command relationships to accomplish the mission.
An operational-level commander keeps his eye on long-range objectives throughout any operation. He
views tactical outcomes and task accomplishments from the perspective of how they contribute to the
major operation. While tactical setbacks might cause adjustments to the operation, they should not
unduly divert attention away from the operational objective.
In the plan development process, the commander and his staff interact continuously during the
commander's analysis, the restated mission, guidance to the staff, estimates, and development of COAs.
This interaction continues through the commander's decision to publish an order. Continuous feedback
and coordination ensures that the staff and commander focus on the objective.
Motivating and Influencing the Force
At the operational level, leadership and command is no longer simply a direct influence process. It also
includes a well-formed ability to exercise indirect, organizational leadership. Success depends on
creating and maintaining cohesive teams, units, and organizations, using both direct and indirect modes
of leadership. FM 22-103 discusses these modes of leadership.
The senior army commander must be able to sustain the appropriate command climate--a climate that
fosters free communication--in order to generate the motivation to maintain cohesive teams. Free
communication permits the senior commander to assess how well his vision is understood. It also assists
him in influencing every level of his command.
Operational intelligence is that intelligence required for the planning and conduct of major operations
within a theater of operations. At the operational level of war, the joint and multinational intelligence
system does not concentrate just on the collection identification, location, and analysis of the center of
gravity and operational objectives. It also must focus its production effort downward and concentrate
efforts on warfighting priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Basic (or finished) intelligence.

Strategic indications and warnings.

Tactical warnings.

Current intelligence reporting.

Intelligence-preparation of-the-battlefield (IPB) on an operational or theater basis.

Targeting intelligence.

Battle damage assessment (BDA) and poststrike assessment. .

DODD0A-011126 .in/100-7/f1007_9.htm.12/29/2004 • Collection requirements management of intelligence product reports).
The operational-level intelligence organizations also provide unique counterintelligence (CI), signals
intelligence SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence
(MASINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), security
countermeasures services, and force protection. These capabilities are found within the units of the
operational-level military intelligence (MI) organization. An example of a typical theater MI structure is
discussed in detail in Appendix A.
Military leaders normally rely on DOD or other government agencies to monitor and assess operational­
level information applicable to nonhostile situations that could require military support. MI efforts focus
normally on potentially hostile threats. This intelligence leads to the identification and location of high-
payoff targets that, if successfully attacked, help achieve the assigned operational-level objective.
During hostilities, the focus of the operational-level intelligence effort is to analyze the enemy's
operational capabilities and estimate his intent. Many elements of analysis that underwrite war or
conflict tactical intelligence apply at the operational level, for example, enemy order-of-battle, enemy
capabilities, WMD, doctrinal norms, and characteristics of the AOR.
Commanders and their intelligence and chemical officers should evaluate these elements and other
products and reports in a broad context. They should also establish Army force collection requirements
and allocate organic and supporting collection assets.
A key role for the Army service component is to expedite access to and facilitate dissemination of
theater and national-level intelligence through the JIC. Intelligence at the operational-level requires
information broader than that normally associated with the tactical echelons. Political, economic, and
social factors affect the enemy decision-making process and the corresponding friendly collection plan.
Intelligence at the operational level must project well into the future. The senior army commander drives
the intelligence effort by articulating PIR and information requirements needed in his decision-making
process. For intelligence to be timely, this commander must plan and control the intelligence effort with
the same level of interest and personal involvement he devotes to other functions. In particular, he must
assure that his intelligence system distributes products and intelligence information that meet the needs
of his staff and the requirements of his staff and the requirements of his subordinate commanders.
Intelligence is vital to the design of a successful operation. The senior army commander must integrate
intelligence with all the other operational-level functions. Tactical commanders must react quickly to
unanticipated shifts in the flow of battle with forces reserved for that purpose. Operational-level
commanders, however, must determine their lines of operations and lines of support much further in
advance. Deployment of intelligence collection personnel as part of the force establishing a forward
presence in a contingency area contributes to this capability. Commanders should consider both permanent stationing and periodic deployment of CONUS-based resources.
DODD0A-011127 .12/29/2004
Synchronization is the arrangement of operations and battlefield activities in time, space, resources, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive point. It focuses the vast arsenal of intelligence resources available from national to division levels to accomplish the desired result-­
synchronized intelligence operations at each level that satisfy and deliver PIR to theater and combat
Synchronization ensures IEW operations are linked to the commander's requirements and respond in
time to influence decisions and operations. In the synchronization process, the intelligence officer takes
the commander's PIR and backward plans to orchestrate the collection and production efforts with the
operation and deliver intelligence when required. Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process
that ensures the intelligence system answers the commander's intelligence requirements in time to
influence his decisions.
Operational-level commanders must clearly understand both enemy and friendly capabilities and
vulnerabilities. This understanding focuses on hostile situations but includes information applicable in
nation assistance, disaster relief, and other nonhostile situations.
Potential threat operational doctrine and force capabilities across the range of military operations remain
the largest part of military collection requirements. As collectors probe, the critical focus must be on the
nature of the enemy's battle command structure.
Collectors must seek the identity and personal characteristics of opposing operational commanders, their
relationships with their superiors and subordinates, and the effects of these relationships on the mechanisms through which the enemy makes operational decisions. Questions that may be asked

What freedom of action does the opposing commander have?

How aggressively is he likely to exercise it?

What degree of compliance can he expect from his subordinates?

How effective is his battle command system?

Such questions are more critical at the operational-level than at the tactical level, particularly for those
military forces in which initiative is reserved at relatively high levels of command. A vital operational­
level intelligence task is to discover who commands and how he exercises command in a given_situation
The senior army commander requires a risk assessment concerning friendly susceptibilities and
vulnerabilities an enemy may exploit. This assessment is part of predictive products that support the
commander's battle planning. Intelligence agencies also must obtain information concerning the nature
and characteristics of the AOR, to include significant hazards. The commander needs to know the enemy's total capability, the area's basic physical features, climatological characteristics, and topography. Information should include significant military, technical, scientific, diplomatic, economic, .12/29/2004
industrial, geographic, demographic, topographic, hydrographic, climatic, cultural, and psychological features of the area. This information contributes to hostile and nonhostile military preparations.
The operational-level intelligence collection process has some unique characteristics. No analytical
method or mechanism completely eliminates the problems of uncertainty, volume, and security.
The products of intelligence at this level are sometimes imperfect guides to action; therefore, senior
army commanders may be required to take risks. Commanders can mitigate these risks by clearly
articulating the PIR. and information requirements the y need for their decision making. The senior
intelligence officer mitigates risk by ensuring that facts are distinguished clearly from assumptions and
not by constraining intelligence estimates by preconceived expectations of preferences.
Another concern is the sheer volume of intelligence that can overwhelm the commander and his staff.
The senior intelligence officer must manage this volume and clearly separate the key intelligence reports
the commander and his staff need from the background intelligence-supporting analysis. A coordinated
push mechanism that alerts senior army commanders of significant changes in the situation must be
complemented by a pull mechanism that keeps theater, departmental, and national activities focused on
support to military operations.
Operational-level commanders must always consider security when working with sensitive intelligence
information, especially in the multinational operational environment. Operational-level commanders
normally have access to national strategic intelligence means. Often, these systems can provide valuable
insights into probable enemy intentions. By their very nature, these national collection means are among
the most sensitive of intelligence assets, especially those sources most likely to reveal probable enemy
intentions. Commanders must therefore carefully balance their desire to act on information derived from
these sources, with the realization that such action could risk exposing the source and compromising the
national defense capability. The operational level commander must make the decision on the
information to be shared. In nonhostile situations, revealing information gained from national assets
could compromise US defense capabilities. In multinational operations, the problem is compounded by
questions concerning allied internal security.
Senior commanders require free and timely exchange of intelligence to make decisions with confidence.
Intelligence is timely if it allows the commander to act at the appropriate time. The dissemination means
and the form employed affect the timeliness of the dissemination of intelligence. The timely
dissemination of usable and pertinent intelligence is the most important intelligence problem that must
be solved on the battlefield.
Operational logistics consists of logistical and other support activities required to support the force
http .12/29/2004
during campaigns and major operations within a theater of operations. Using the LPT process, logisticians at all echelons determine the logistics requirements to support the CINC's campaign plan. Logistics plays a dominant role in maintaining force readiness for operations, mobilizing critical human and materiel resources, moving the force to its intended AO, sustaining the force throughout the duration of operations, redeploying the force to its peacetime base or next contingency area, restoring the Army's total capability, and demobilizing resources.
A force-projection army requires a logistics system that anticipates requirements and makes use of all
available resources, improvising when required. The Army logistics system relies on local resources,
when possible, whether they are those of host nations or those contracted or purchased. The system
recognizes constraints of time and limits of strategic transportation systems and compensates by pre­
positioning materiel, either afloat or ashore, in or near likely future AOs. It makes use of all resources
available, to include DA and those of other government agencies, as well as contractor personnel.
Operational support of the force extends from the theater of operations logistics bases to the forward
CSS units and facilities. Early in an operation, logistics planning and management cells within the
ASCC structure are used to ensure rapid establishment of battle command of logistics and to determine
future support requirements.
As the theater matures, a requirement for separate, more formal logistical battle command organizations
may exist. Based on the CINC's campaign plan and the operations to be conducted, the ASCC
determines the nature and scope of the logistical force structure. See FM 100-16 for a detailed
description of the logistics function at the operational level of war.
Logisticians concentrate on providing capabilities, not organizations, to fulfill whatever support
requirements exist. Logisticians use logistics support bases to fulfill support requirements as far forward
as possible. They tailor logistics forces so that the required capability, and nothing more, is deployed
and employed. Although local resources are used, logisticians rely on a CONUS-based support source
through communications and reliable transportation and distribution systems.
The theater of operations logistics base, in performing its theater of operations logistics functions, links
strategic sustainment to tactical CSS. At the operational level of activity, the familiar distinction between operations and logistics begins to blur. Logistics is synonymous with operations and becomes a
significant undertaking of the ASCC and his staff Commanders conducting operations across the range
of military operations must concern themselves with operational support.
Operational logistics is the link between the strategic and tactical levels. It encompasses support
required to sustain joint and multinational campaigns, other military activities, US forces, and forces of
friendly countries or groups within an AO. Military units, augmented by DOD civilians, contractor
personnel, and available host nation resources, make up the organizational structure found at this level.
Operational-level logistics support may be complemented by the deployment of USAMC's LSE. The
LSE, largely a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) activity, performs any logistics function not
normally performed by table of organization and equipment (TOE) units. It is a self-contained
organization that may be staffed with any combination of civilian and military personnel required to perform specialized tasks. Civilians may be DA or DOD, or they may be contractors who agree to deploy to support highly sophisticated equipment. Military personnel are battle-rostered from other duty assignments or brought in to fulfill special requirements of the LSE. The LSE's unique skills include
DOEM0A-011130 .12/29/2004
depot maintenance, oil analysis, calibration of test equipment, ammunition surveillance, release of prepositioned strategic stocks, materiel fielding, technology insertion, and BDA.
The primary focus of the operational logistician is on--


Position of facilities.

Materiel management.

Movement control.

Distribution management.

Reconstitution and regeneration.


As the CINC develops his strategic concept of operation, he concurrently develops a concept of support
in coordination with his service component commanders. They and their staffs consider a myriad of
logistics factors that affect the ability of the operational forces to conduct operations. Among the most
conspicuous, tangible resources are equipment and other materials of war. When resources are limited,
the CINC/ARFOR must prioritize the allocation of materiel among his commands, giving the
preponderance of support to forces making the main effort and sometimes shifting priorities as the
campaign unfolds.
At the campaign- and major-operation-planning levels, logistics is a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations. Sound logistics planning and analysis are factors that allow for rapid changes to operations plans. Logistics cannot win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can cause defeat. Operational-level activities are characterized by--

High consumption of military materiel.

A great diversity of equipment types.

Expansion of the battle area, resulting from the employment of sophisticated weapons,
communications, and sensors by both sides.

Extended lines of operation.

Constrained resources.

Senior army commanders must effectively apply the five CSS characteristics: anticipation, integration,
continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation in planning and conducting the tactical CSS functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
DODD0A-011131 .12/29/2004
Anticipation ensures CSS operations are agile and characterized by the demonstration of initiative.
Requirements must be accurately projected to provide resources at the necessary time and place. The
synchronization of logistics with operations is also a part of anticipation. This synchronization requires a
versatile and mobile organization structure that maintains an operational perspective.
Integration recognizes that CSS is integral to the conduct of operations and the two are mutually
supportive. It ensures the agility and versatility of an operation by providing the maximum operational
freedom. Standardization and interoperability agreements contribute to integration in the joint and
multinational environment.
Continuity provides for the continued flow of CSS that is essential to successful operations. It exploits
operational lulls to restore logistics capabilities depleted during past operations. Alternative approaches
are sought to avoid total reliance on any single source.
Responsiveness provides for rapid reaction during a crisis. The CSS challenge is to make required
adjustments as the crisis response is refined and the situation evolves. Forces must be tailorable to meet
force-projection requirements that restrict the deployment of entire CSS organizations. A split-based
logistics concept complements this capability. Units must compensate for partial organizations deployed
in tailored packages and for operating losses through the formation of provisional units. These units
must be able to surge support at critical times and locations. The concept of modularity must be built
into unit design to facilitate this process.
Improvisation helps units meet CSS needs with available resources and may call for nonstandard
solutions. Improvisation permits solutions to anticipated and real problems where no solution has been
identified previously.
An operational perspective on logistics requires the translation of the five CSS characteristics into
tactical-level applications as described by the CSS functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving
the force, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
The manning function provides for unit and individual replacements. In addition, it provides for
personnel readiness management and casualty management.
The arming function replenishes arms, munitions, and equipment in an environment characterized by high consumption rates, the demands of which are controlled by throughput distribution and the establishment of controlled supply rates.
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The fueling function ensures the availability of fuels and packaged POL products for a highly mobile force with the potential for high consumption rates demanding a dependable fueling system.
The fixing function provides for preserving availability of equipment. This function is performed as far
forward as possible and in minimum time. Expedited means of recovery, repair, and return are
characteristic of the function.
Moving the Force
This function involves transportation operations of units and materiel. Often, this function may be dcne on short notice for large forces involved in major shifts of direction. Total asset visibility, in-transit visibility, and contracting support are critical to the performance of this function.
Sustaining Soldiers and Their Systems
This function has five elements: personnel service support, health service support, field services, quality of life, and general supply support. Public affairs (PA), religious support, and legal support operations are elements of personnel service support. These areas are described in Appendix A of this manual, in FM 100-10, in FM 100-16, and in branch-specific manuals.
Historical Perspective
During the deployment stage of Operation Desert Shield, US forces were faced with the task of conducting operations in an austere theater. Having anticipated the difficulty of operations in this environment, plans had been made and resources put in place for this eventuality.
On 22 August 1990, the first Army prepositioned ship, the USS Green Harbor, completed its 2,700-mile trip from Diego Garcia to discharge its cargo at ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia. During the mid-eighties, the Army had stocked the Green Harbor and three similar vessels with enough tentage. food, ammunition, and water purification and refrigeration equipment to provide a logistical jump-start to any Gulf operation until seaborne transport could arrive from the United States. After the Green Harbor arrived, the logistics was well under way and the theater in Saudi Arabia continued to build at an extraordinary rate. (Certain Victory, 2 August 1993)
Adaptability, innovation, and ingenuity worked to fill voids in the logistics system. Soldiers' and leaders' individual initiative and determination to get the job done made the logistical system work. As an example, convoy support centers were established to increase road network efficiency. These centers resembled huge truck stops in the desert, and, like all truck stops, operated 24 hours a day, providing fuel, latrines, food, sleeping tents, and limited vehicle repair facilities. The convoy support centers became welcome oases for exhausted long-haul transporters.
Upon initiation of the ground war, logistics support was even more critical. During the planning stages, logisticians realized that as the LOCs extended, resupply efforts would become increasingly difficult.
DODDOA-011133 .12/29/2004
Therefore, moving as quickly as possible, yet stealthfully, to retain secrecy, the 22d Support Command began to establish forward logistics bases to counter the extended LOCs. Vast quantities of supplies were shifted also to the west by the 22d Support Command. These supply bases contained enough materiel to support combat operations for up to 60 days. Some supply bases were moved several times, to the west and then northward, once the ground operation commenced. (Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991)
1. To accomplish this mission, the 3d US Army formed a deep operations targeting cell during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
DODD0A-011134 .12/29/2004
PART THREE Army Component Operations
This part includes three chapters that discuss Army service component operations during force projection, operations in war, and MOOTW.
DODDOA-011135 12/29/2004
Force Projection
Codified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1994 and further developed by the SECDEF, the US
military strategy , is built upon the central components of engagement and enlargement... "to enhance our
security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; work
to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and promote democracy abroad."
The Army represents a portion of the potential military power of the nation. That power translates
directly to influence the international system. The US uses military power to compel an adversary to
accede to US will. That potential power deters opponents from taking actions hostile to US interests.
Peaceful employment of military forces reassures our allies, demonstrates our capabilities, promotes
stability, and contributes to ou ability to influence international outcomes.
A crisis is an incident or situation involving either an internal or external threat to the US, its territories,
citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests. A crisis develops rapidly and creates a
condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of US forces and
resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.
During deliberate planning or CAP, commanders prescribe, in TPFDD format, who, what, when, and
where forces will be deployed. Based on these initiatives and a unit's ability to accurately identify its
movement requirements, USTRANSCOM then identifies how the unit will move to meet National
Military Strategy objectives.
With the knowledge that extended force closure times may directly increase the domestic and coalition
support risks for a particular crisis, commanders rigorously discipline their strategic lift requirements to
that needed for the operation. During the deployment process. US forces are most vulnerable to
significant casualties. Conversely, as closure times extend, the duration of a crisis extends, increasing
the risk of casualties.
A crisis can occur in peacetime, conflict, and war. In peacetime, a crisis can be precipitated by a natural
disaster or civil disturbance, resulting in a threat to civil authority. In war, the threat focus can be
directed at the sovereignty of a nation. The extent to which the Army is prepared to respond to a crisis
can significantly influence the eventual outcome.
Adaptive planning is required to ensure favorable outcomes. At the theater level, the CINC is
responsible for developing a range of response options. These response options are not limited to the
military instrument of national power but include economic, diplomatic, and informational alternatives.
The requirement for interagency cooperation and multinational considerations is evident.
The Army Strategic Mobility Program
The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) was initiated to address the conclusions of the
Mobility Requirement Study (MRS). The MRS concluded that the military can only increase its
deployability through an expanded investment in sealift and airlift, pre-positioning, and transportation 12/29/2004
infrastructure. The ASMP Action Plan was published on 2 March 1993.
The Army develops the capability to provide a crisis-response force of up to corps size with the
following mobility standards:

A light or airborne, brigade-sized force to be inserted into a theater by C+4, with the remainder of that division to close not later than C+12. This force, including its personnel and equipment and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.

An afloat heavy combat brigade with support APA to close into the theater and be ready to fight not later than C+15. The APA brigade force would be a 2x2 heavy brigade (two armored and two mechanized battalions, plus support). This force would be organized into force modules, tailoring them to meet the C1NC's needs.

By C+30 two heavy divisions (a mix of mechanized infantry, armor, or air assault forces, depending on the theater commander's priorities), to include the logistical support structure, would close in theater. The equipment for the heavy force would transit by sea.

The remaining force (two divisions and support) would close by C+75.

Air transport would be the preferred mode of travel for all contingency force personnel.

For this program to be successful, three key mobility initiatives are critical. The first is the acquisition of fast sealift shipping. The second is the creation of the APA capability. The third is the infrastructure and procedures necessary to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces from their location through CONUS ports.
Deterrence is preferable to war. Effective deterrence can prevent escalation of a crisis. Deterrent action
can resolve a crisis on favorable terms. When the opportunity exists, the use of a deterrent action, such
as a show of force, can send a clear signal of US resolve to intervene should the threat of unfavorable
crisis resolution continue.
Sometimes, deterrent actions do not prevent the continued escalation of a crisis. The CINC requires an
Army capability to rapidly project combat-ready forces. The goal of these forces is to deter conflict or,
should deterrence fail, to win quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties. This Army requirement
demands a deployable, lethal, versatile, expansible, and sustainable force.
A contingency is the employment of military forces in response to a crisis caused by natural disaster,
terrorists, subversives, or required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation,
contingencies require rapid planning, response, and development of special procedures to ensure the
safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. Like crises, contingency operations can
occur in the environments of peacetime, conflict, and war.
A contingency may be a unique, stand-alone event in response to a natural disaster or a man-made event
or change in the direction (branch) of an evolving campaign or major operation. Within a campaign or major operation, a branch is a contingency plan for the deviation of operations from the planned line. It is a result of chance or uncertain events that are identified as crisis triggers.
DODD0A-011137 12/29/2004 Senior army commanders assess their operations. During this assessment, they anticipate the probability of an occurrence of a particular contingency, and they develop plans (OPLAN or CONPLAN) to respond to that contingency. If a crisis occurs, the commander updates the OPLAN or CONPLAN and converts it into an OPORD for execution. The characteristics of a contingency operation include crisis situations, NCA involvement with US national interests at stake, and operations that require a rapid military response.
Army commanders must understand and address additional requirements that are unique to contingencies. Rapid deployment, crisis action, and time-sensitivity make contingency operations unique. Contingency operations are usually joint undertakings conducted within the framework of the
UCP. Once forces are deployed, the execution of specific missions remains similar to normal military operations in the peacetime, conflict, or war environments. Successful contingency operations, as in all military operations, require detailed planning and aggressive, synchronized execution.
Some particularly important characteristics of this type of operation include--

Early response.

Rapid projection of military power.

Forcible-entry capability.

Forces tailored to the situation.

Unambiguous command relationships.

Thorough coordination among all forces (joint and multinational) and interagency organizations.

Timely, detailed intelligence.

Lethality for early entry forces--hold enemy forces at risk, protect the force, deter.

Strict OPSEC.

Sensitivity to the diplomatic implications of the military operation.

Quick resolution (win early with minimal casualties).

Major impact of national and international news coverage.

Effective instant communications with attendant interest by the NCA and senior service leadership in any operation.

Effective theater air and missile defenses to provide force protection and ensure the security of
lodgment areas and protection of US and multinational forces and interests.

DODD0A-011138 12/29/2004
• Under the national strategy, the requirement for possible redeployment with subsequent
employment in another theater.

The Army has a major responsibility to execute a variety of contingency operations. This responsibility requires the commander and his staff to exercise operational art in applying joint and Army doctrine in a highly charged, time-sensitive environment. This ability is of particular importance to the ASCC in theater.
While the tactical combat operation may be somewhat limited in duration, scope, and intensity, the ASCC, in conjunction with the CINC and the other component commanders, sequences military operations that are not necessarily combat operations to achieve the desired end state. This sequencing includes close coordination with DOS to ensure that military operations support diplomatic objectives after completion of tactical combat operations.
The ASCC in theater has the following responsibilities relating to contingency operations:

Training and sustaining the force to conduct operations required by the CINC.

Installing, operating, and maintaining signal capabilities that are interoperable with joint,
multinational, and/or interagency systems. To ensure interoperability, the ASCC may have to
provide signal capabilities to the allies within the multinational force.

Exercising OPCON of assigned and attached forces and exercising operational direction of
supporting forces.

Coordinating with other component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of

Monitoring the operational situation and passing information to the CJTF (JFC).

Planning and conducting operations according to JFC guidance and detailed plans.

Ensuring.administrative and logistics support as required and as directed by the JFC.

Establishing liaison with the JFC and other joint organizations, multinational organizations, NGOs and PVDs, or government agencies.

Coordinating with supporting commanders to redeploy the force effectively to home stations or to another theater.

Planning and coordinating with supporting organizations to reconstitute effectively the force. This may require the use of operational project stocks.

Coordinating effective support of the media and use of PA assets.

Ensuring the units comply with federal, state, and local (to include host nation) environmental and pollution abatement requirements.

DOEMOA-011 139 12/29/2004
The NCA tasks a combatant commander with the responsibilities in a particular crisis as outlined in Chapter 2. Based upon the required tasks, the NCA, CJCS, and CINC choose an appropriate command structure. They may select any of the six COCOM options (discussed previously in Chapter 2) for the organization of forces. Having selected the command structure, they select a commander. In this chapter, the JTF option is used for illustrative purposes. The CINC and ASCC determine the composition of the ARFOR of the JTF. Several options exist for the Army structure in a JTF. The commander of the ARFOR OPCON to the JTF determines the best option based upon an assessment of the operational environment.
Single Army Headquarters to a Joint Task Force
The commander of ARFOR, in conjunction with the JFC, may organize them under a single Army headquarters responsible for the three Army tasks: joint, multinational, NGO and PVO, and interagency linkage; operations; and internal support. He selects this option when the mission is simple, limited ARFOR are involved, and/or the threat is relatively small. (See Figure 6-1). The three tasks include joint and multinational coordination. In this example, we have omitted the multinational coordination requirement because we assume that the JTF is composed of US forces.
Army Forces Navy Forces Air Force Forces Marine Forces SpecialOperationsForces PYSOP Forces
Figure 6-1. Single Army Headquarters in a Joint Task Force.

. Division as an ARFOR to a JTF DODDOA-011140
Precedent has been established designating a division as the ARFOR headquarters subordinate to a
JTF. The 10th Mountain Division (L) was designated as the ARFOR HQ for Operation Restore Hope.
The division worked for a JTF commanded by the commanding general of the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force (IMEF). While this is not a typical relationship, in the future it may very well be.
US Army divisions may be required to perform operational-level missions during force-projection
This single Army headquarters may be a corps headquarters or smaller echelon of command. While the
corps and division, as organizations, may be able to accomplish these missions, they are not currently
staffed or trained to assume these and other operational level missions. Therefore, both would require
substantial additional training, personnel, and C 2 resources to be effective. Once the corps is designated as the ARFOR to a JTF, the corps commander is subordinated to the CJTF or the establishing headquarters and must look to him for guidance, strategic direction, and missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or attached forces. This includes the responsibility 12/29/2004
to train the joint force if the JTF was developed during a deliberate planning process to support existing
OPLANs. Although the ARFOR of the JTF is responsible for operations and the direct support of his
forces, the ASCC retains responsibility to provide overall support to all ARFOR, to include the forces in
the JTF. As the ARFOR to the JTF, the corps and division staffs require training on--


Management of TPFDD.

Operational-level functions.

Theater movement control.

As the ARFOR, the corps or division may be tasked to assume specific operational-level Army responsibilities within its AO. Under such circumstances, the corps or division would not only be responsible for all Army units but could also be responsible for providing support to all services for--

Mortuary affairs.

Casualty operations.

Postal operations.


Signal support.

Environmental protection and cleanup.

NBC decontamination.

Rear area protection.

Base security.

Transportation and distribution of Class I, III, V, and VIII supplies.

Real estate and contract support.

Theater topography support.

General engineering and real property maintenance activities (RPMA).

The corps/division would assume this support responsibility as the Army executive agency under
agreements and memorandums of understanding previously established between services.
External augmentation of staff sections, to include equipment, is required to properly perform the ARFOR C2 tasks. Augmentation is required for--
DODDOA-011141 12/29/2004 • *Operational planning and control.

Establishment of a JOPES cell.

Diplomatic military planning activities.

Signal support.

Intelligence support.

Liaison teams.

PA support.

Historical data collection of lessons learned.

The ARFOR's intelligence connection to theater and national assets must be deployed early into a theater. The deployable intelligence support element (DISE) accomplishes this. The DISE is a small,
scalable, deployable element. It is the initial forward intelligence team of split-based operations. The
DISE is tailored tactically from MI units according to the factors of METT-T, lift, and pre-positioned
The mission of the DISE is to provide the deployed commander accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence to support the rapid entry of US forces across the range of military operations. Its
communications processing and downlink assets are linked to a national and theater intelligence support base located in CONUS or outside the AO. The two types of tailorable DISE configurations are mini-
DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular). Together these DISE configurations provide the commander a robust intelligence capability to support deploying forces. The DISE provides split-based
communications, broadcast intelligence, and intelligence processing.
The 10th Mountain Division's (L) initial experience in planning Operation Restore Hope provides
insight into the required augmentation packages and increased responsibilities when assigned the
mission as ARFOR to a JTF. The 10th Mountain Division (L) expanded its division signal element
into the ARFOR G6 (Communications) Section. The G6 controlled 10 different nondivisional signal
units and over 300 added personnel during Operation Restore Hope. The G6 had staff responsibilities
on a much greater scale than the normal division signal officer.
After-Action Report Executive Summary

US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (L), May 1993 (Draft).

Additionally, the ARFOR must plan and operate effectively with the media. The impact of the media on
the conduct of operations is substantially greater today than in any previous time. The capability of the
news media to transmit ongoing operations activities to news networks globally cannot be discounted.
This new technology requires the JFC/ARFOR to establish points of contact and procedures for releasing information regarding ongoing operations. The ARFOR's public affairs officer (PAO) should manage all media and public requests for information. The JFC/ARFOR must develop procedures and guidelines that provide releasable information to the media within security, accuracy, propriety, privacy, and safety considerations of the ongoing operation.
DODD0A-011142 12/29/2004
Two or More Army Forces to a Joint Task Force
The JFC may desire direct control of several separate Army ground operations. He establishes, with the advice of the ASCC in theater, two or more separate ARFOR headquarters that are directly subordinate to the JTF (see Figure 6-2). Each of these separate Army headquarters would maintain the three Army tasks of joint, multinational, and, perhaps, interagency coordination; operations; and internal support. The JFC might use this particular option when--
The operation is relatively simple.

Several large Army organizations are involved.

Two or more line s of operation exist.

The threat is located in two or more different geographic areas.

The situation allows the JFC to focus on several dispersed ground operations without diffusing his joint responsibilities.

Joint Task Force
Navy AI T Force Marine
Fortes Forces Forces Fortes
1 Joint, rnugtinati onal, and
interagency 600 rdinatbn;
Figure 6-2. A Joint Task Force with Two or More Army Forces.
Separate Support and Army Forces Headquarters DODD0A-011143
As the situation grows more complex, the JFC and the ASCC may organize ARFOR to resemble a miniature theater organization. In this organization, one headquarters would focus on operations, while a
separate headquarters would focus on support responsibilities (see Figure 6-3). These circumstances
align with the chain of command discussed in Chapter 2.
The performance of the three tasks is a constant requirement within the operational level environment. Under these circumstances, multiple commanders could share the tasks. The ASCC would retain traditional responsibilities as discussed previously. The responsibility for the conduct of operations at the operational-level could then be taken on by the ARFOR commander within the task force, assuming that the operation is of sufficient size and scope to require an operational and not solely tactical perspective. The requirement for joint, multinational, and, perhaps, interagency linkage would become a 12/29/2004
FM 100-7 chptr 6 - Force Projection Page 9 of 25 task that must be performed by both commanders.
CNC Joint Task Force
I I.

Navy Air Force Marine
Service ." Forces
Forces Forces Forces
Component 1 Forces
.r i
1 Joi• nt, multinational,
and :nteragency

coordinatior ; •

. Direct commandsupport; and --.Provides supportoperations
Figure 6-3. Separate Support and Army Combat Force Headquarters.
This alignment of the responsibilities, though not expected to be a normal structuring, shows the
flexibility of the design to meet a wide range of potential operational conditions. The Army might
organize under this option when--

The operation is extremely complex.

More than one Army combat force headquarters exists.

The Army has a significant support responsibility to other services/multinational forces.

Two or more lines of support exist.

Additional theater support organizations make a forward support element too large to control
effectively without dedicated command effort.

The JTF requires a significant support effort that exceeds normal corps support capabilities.

Army Commander as a Joint Force Functional Component Commander
The JFC may organize forces functionally under a single headquarters. As a norm, the service
commander with the predominant number of forces is tasked to provide the controlling headquarters.
The JFLCC may build his organization from an existing structure and augment it with joint staff billets
for needed expertise. The Army force commander, as the functional component commander, would
retain his responsibilities for joint, multinational, and interagency linkage operations and internal
support of ARFOR. See Figure 6-4. In those cases where the Army force commander is not designated
as the functional component commander, he still retains responsibility for internal support.
Army Commander as the Commander of a Joint Task Force. DODD0A-011144
When the contingency is predominately a land operation, the CINC may designate an Army commander 12/29/2004
as the JFC. This JFC has considerable requirements placed upon him in addition to his three Army tasks
of joint, multinational, and interagency coordination; operations; and support. Under these
circumstances, the multinational and interagency coordination task could require a significant resource
increase. He may consider delegating some of the authority for his Army tasks to subordinate
This JFC may build his joint organization from an existing Army organization--a corps headquarters or a
numbered army. Today's corps will most likely find itself conducting force-projection operations as part
of a tailored joint force and may be assigned the role of serving as a JTF headquarters. The unit can be
designated as the JTF headquarters at any time during either the deliberate planning process or during
CAP if the nature of the mission so warrants. The Army JFC may organize his subordinate Army units
based upon the three options presented in Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.

Once the corps is designated as a JTF, the corps commander, as the CJTF, is subordinated to the
combatant commander (or the establishing headquarters) and must look to him for guidance, strategic
direction, and missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or
attached forces. This includes the responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF was developed during a
deliberate planning process to support existing OPLANs.
The CJTF must determine what augmentation requirements are needed for the task at hand and
coordinate support through the establishing headquarters. Augmentation of the corps staff is essential in
transitioning the corps to a JTF structure. Augmentation can be organized using a modular concept to
address the various staff entities such as--

Command and staff (joint staff and special staff).

Headquarters support and sustainment (life support functions).

Signal support.

Security support for the JTF headquarters.

Augmentation in technical areas such as CA, PSYOP, and so on (Joint Pub 5-00.2).

Although augmentation must be tailored for the specific situation and is different for every mission,
some augmentation is almost always required in---

Intelligence collection.

Joint planning procedures.


Logistics planning.

Signal support, especially Army Global Command and Control System (AGCCS) access.

Medical planning.

Augmentation in these areas assists in ensuring linkage between the JTF staff and the combatant command joint staff, especially concerning access to information and capabilities available at the 12/29/2004
combatant command level.
The corps cannot function simultaneously at both the tactical and operational levels. The corps, as a JTF, can conduct either tactical- or operational-level planning and missions. The mission, not the size of the force, determines the level at which the JTF functions. Once fully engaged at one level, the corps cannot be expected to assume the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the other. Still, the corps commander must fully understand both tactical- and operational-level environments to ensure a supportive relationship exists between his plans and operations and those of subordinate and higher headquarters.
The commander thinks not only in terms of military resources but also considers those interagency, diplomatic, economic, and other resources that may be available and appropriate for the task at hand. The CJTF must understand the strategic and regional environments, to include US policies, treaty commitments, status of forces agreements (SOFA), coalition parties' interests, and so on. These influences affect campaign and operational planning and the establishment of ROE for the force.
The Army JFC must have the additional flexibility to assume the joint coordination role and may choose to augment organic support units with additional divisional, corps, or operational-level support organizations. As such, subordinate Army combat force commanders would concentrate on operations while the JFC conducts a large portion of the joint, multinational, and interagency coordination and operations support tasks (internal and external). See Figure 6-5.
Joint 1 Task Force
SpecialArmy 2 Naval Air Force Marine OperationsForces Forces Farces Forces Forces
1 Joi nt, mulli national,
and interagency

coordination; suppo rt
2 Opera ions

Figure 6-5. An Army Commander as the Commander of a JTF.
The Army JFC could retain these coordination and support tasks when the operation is largely an Army ground operation, the other services play a support role to the Army, or the Army JFC has sufficient resources in his organization to accomplish these additional missions.
Establishing Authority
The authority. who establishes the JTF designates the JFC, assigns the missions, prescribes the broad concept of operations, allocates the forces, and defines the command relationships. Generally, the establishing authority designates the JFC from within his own headquarters or from the preponderant service within the joint force. The establishing authority may direct formation of a joint staff from his 12/29/2004
own staff, or he may direct the JFC to form the JTF staff from his own resources and augment it as necessary from other service or component headquarters within the designated JTF.
Headquarters Functions
The Army JFC organizes the JTF headquarters to accomplish assigned missions. This headquarters may vary from a small group aboard a ship to a large staff and support personnel at a ground location (see Figure 6-6). The. CJTF and staff--

Plan operations of the JTF in accordance with operational direction from the establishing

Direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned forces.

Coordinate planning activities of subordinate forces.

Under supervision of the joint staff, establish, when required, joint boards and agencies to plan, control, and coordinate the use of joint assets in specific functional areas, for example, the JTCB.

Coordinate with other joint and multinational forces, the UN, other government agencies not assigned, and NGOs and PVOs.

Coordinate with other national forces and/or foreign governments when required by the
establishing authority.

Coordinate signal support.

Personal Staff
.11 J3 J5
Admin PAC Chap Pt
HQ Ocrndti p&A 1
Surg I
Spacial advisor to CJTF
Figure 6-6. Joint Task Force Headquarters of an Army JFC. DODDOA-0 11147 12/29/2004
Planning. During the deliberate planning process, the CINC may designate the ASCC as a JTF or ARFOR planning agent. The ASCC director of plans coordinates the planning effort. The Army staff planners develop JTF and ARFOR plans in each functional area, using Joint Pubs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 as
guides. Each Army staff planner coordinates as required with functional area counterparts in the joint
community. Planners should understand and consider RSI during planning. When agencies outside the
Army must contribute to the planning effort, the Army force's director of operations, or G3, requests
support from the appropriate agency. This planning process develops the base OPLANs and
CONPLANs modified for execution during contingencies.
During CAP, the director of plans directs the planning effort until he receives an execution order. After
he receives the execution order, the G3 completes execution planning and conducts operations. The G3
(plans) begins future planning, normally focusing on the next major operation or phase. The JOPES
publications (Joint Pub 5-03 series) provide planning policies, procedures, formats, and guidance for joint operations.
Operations and Training. When designated as the joint force headquarters, the ASCC deputy chief of
staff for operations (DCSOPS) organizes the J3 section, receives augmentation from other services,
establishes the JOC, and initiates CAP. The J3 assists in planning, coordinating, and executing JTF
operations. The J3 normally organizes a battle staff with representatives of all the directorates within a JOC in order to provide consolidated oversight. When the joint staff does not have a J5 (plans), the J3 performs long-range or future planning. However, the J3 has a plans cell to conduct near-term planning
of branches to the current operation. Besides the JOC, the J3 also may supervise--

A JTCB to coordinate targeting guidance and objectives and to develop the joint target list.

A joint rescue coordination center (JRCC), although the CJTF may task a subordinate service force commander to perform this function.

A joint information warfare staff composed of component representatives and representatives of the J2 and J6.

A joint meteorological forecasting unit (JMFU) to provide weather support.

As a matter of principle, training remains a national responsibility. To ensure the units are able to execute their assigned missions and be operationally ready, the leaders must know and understand the capabilities and limitations of the other nations' units. The enhanced mutual understanding of the capabilities and limitations is to minimize the differences and optimize effectiveness. To that end, all command levels must conduct training, which should include the JFC's ideas and desired outcomes. These concepts, specified by content (basic tasks), scope (condition), and objectives (standard), are an essential basis for effective training. Training should be coordinated and integrated where feasible. Coordination is required among respective participants to ensure mutual understanding and compliance. Although the J3 must monitor and evaluate the training status of all units, the actual evaluation of the training status and operational readiness of the respective units remains a national responsibility. The standards and criteria used for evaluation should be published and understood by all parties.
Special Operations. At the theater level a special operations theater support element (SOTSE) performs special operations staff functions at the Army service component command headquarters. At corps level, a special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) serves as a functional staff element of the G3. The SOCOORD is the mechanism by which a corps plans for and obtains SOF support. As such, it has staff responsibility for SF and ranger integration in each of the battle operating systems' functional areas
DODD0A-011148 -tm 12/29/2004 and serves as a focal point for SF and ranger support to the corps staff.
The SOCOORD develops SOF target nominations and mission requirements for the corps to forward to
the JFC. These developments result in mission taskings from the JTCB to the JFSOCC, who assigns
missions to appropriate SOF units. Service distinctions of SOF are transparent. The nature of the
requirement and the total force capability determines whether Army special operations forces (ARSOF)
or another element of SOF is tasked to meet a given requirement.
Communications. When designated as the joint force headquarters, the ASCC's theater signal officer
organizes a J6 staff, receives augmentation from other services, and establishes a joint communications
control center (JCCC) as required. Joint Pub 6-0 discusses the responsibilities and functions of the J6. A
key function among these responsibilities is network management. The JCCC exercises staff supervision
over C4 control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands. Joint Pub 6-05.1
describes the JCCC and its functions.
Alternate communications means are essential. During planning, the primary means is the Worldwide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). (Once fielded, the Global Command and Control
System (GCCS) replaces WWMCCS.) Communications networks include the four major networks of
the DCS:

Defense Switched Network (DSN).

Secure Voice System (SVS).

Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN--the future defense message system).

Defense Data Network (DDN).

Initially, tactical satellites (TACSAT) may be the only means of secure communication with operational
The Army JFC establishes alternate communication means as soon as possible. The JTF, ASCC, and
ARFOR headquarters establish communications during Phase I of contingency operations. Organic
signal organizations provide signal support and identify and forward shortfalls to the JCCC for
resolution. The JCCC requests JCS-controlled contingency communications assets as required.
Intelligence. When tasked as a joint force headquarters, the ARFOR G2 organizes a JTF J2 section, incorporating other service augmentation and establishing a JIC from organic assets. The other services may augment the JIC as required. The JTF J2 is responsible for determining the requirements and .• direction of the intelligence effort to support the CJTF's objectives. He assists the CJTF in ensuring that intelligence objectives are correct, understood, prioritized, synchronized, and acted upon. The J2 is also responsible for employing joint intelligence resources, identifying and integrating additional intelligence resources such as the JIC, and applying national intelligence capabilities. He works with subordinate service G2s (S2s) to develop complementary intelligence operations that support the CJTF's requirements.
The JTF JIC is the primary J2 organization supporting the JFC and the ARFOR. The JIC facilitates
efficient access to the entire DOD intelligence system. The composition and focus of each JIC varies according to the commander's needs, but each is capable of performing indications and warnings (I&W) and collecting, managing, and disseminating current intelligence. Through the JIC, ARFORs coordinate
DODD0A-011149 12/29/2004 support from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and national, interagency, and multinational sources.

In addition to its other functions (I&W, situation development, target development, BDA, IPB, and force protection intelligence development), the JIC coordinates the acquisition of national intelligence between the JTF and the CINC's staff The CINC posts special intelligence teams to the AOR. These teams are OPCON to the JFC and'under staff supervision of the JTF J2. They may include DIA, the US
Army Intelligence and Security Command, or the National Security Agency. Staff weather
augmentation, as required, is under staff supervision of the JTF J2. The JTF J2, through the JIC,
establishes and supervises required functional intelligence organizations that may include a--

Joint interrogation facility (JIF).

Joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC).

Joint documents exploitation center (JDEC).

Joint imagery processing center (JIPC).

The JTF J2 requests a cryptologic support group (CSG) and an associated mobile cryptological support
facility (MCSF) or equivalent SIGINT communications package from the CINC. The CSG works from
within the JIC.
Successful IEW support during force-projection operations relies on continuous peacetime information
collection and intelligence production. Peacetime IEW operations support contingency planning and
develop baseline knowledge of threats and environments. These operations engage and challenge the
intelligence battlefield operating system to respond effectively to commanders' contingency planning
intelligence requirements. During peacetime operations, commanders closely examine MI force
structures, operations, and training, which ultimately leads to a combat-ready IEW force capable of
successfully supporting force-projection operations.
IEW operations planners must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate potential threats to the force as
a whole throughout force-projection operations. For smooth transition to hostilities, intelligence staffs
must coordinate collection and communications plans before the crisis occurs. MI units continually
update their contingency plans to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crisis situations.
Immediately before deployment, intelligence activities update or top off deploying forces with the most
recent intelligence on the AO. MI units continuously update technical data bases and situation graphics.
Logistics. The J4 (logistics) plans, coordinates, and supervises supply, maintenance, transportation,
general engineering, health services, and other related logistics activities. Each service component of the
combatant command is responsible for the logistics support of its respective forces, except when the
CJTF designates a single-service responsibility for a particular logistics function. The CJTF establishes
logistics priorities for the force, assigns terrain and facilities for use as support bases, and designates and
maintains LOCs.
The J4 supervises the activities of any logistics-related coordinating centers and boards that may be
required. These may include--
• A joint movement center (JMC) that coordinates strategic movement with USTRANSCOM and
ensures effective use of transportation assets.

DODDOA-011150 .100-7/f1007_11.htm 12/29/2004

A subarea petroleum office (SAPO) formed around elements from the combatant command's joint petroleum office (JPO) to augment the JTF in managing petroleum-related logistics.

A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) to manage real estate requirements (unless the JTF engineer is designated a special staff officer and assigned these duties).

A joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB) to provide overall direction for civil-military construction efforts and development of a civil engineering support plan (again, the JTF engineer may manage this activity).

A joint medical regulating office (JMRO) to coordinate the movement of patients in and out of the assigned AOR.

A joint military blood program office (JMBPO) to coordinate the distribution of whole blood within the AOR.

A joint central graves registration office (JCGRO) to handle mortuary affairs (normally tasked to the ARFOR).

Logistical considerations permeate the planning effort. These considerations are essential conditions and
objectives in each phase of a plan or operation. The proper type of service support units must deploy
early for port opening, reception, staging, and onward movement of incoming units; to support initially
arriving forces; and to prepare lodgment for rapid force buildup. The CINC must decide whether to
establish an in-theater COMMZ. In most force-projection contingency operations such a capability is not present. A COMMZ is required if the operational environment assessment identifies a requirement to
stockpile support and logistics in theater.
Logistics planners should anticipate circumstances that could threaten logistics support capabilities. The plan should provide for alternative COAs as external and internal circumstances threaten the support
capability. As circumstances warrant, the Army and JFC plan for operational replenishment to protect or regenerate combat power that has been dissipated in the conduct of operations. See Joint Pub 4-0 and
FM 100-16 for a detailed discussion of theater logistics doctrine.
Influencing Factors
Whatever the organizational option chosen, the Army commander must have the capability to fulfill the tasks assigned him by the Army and the JFC. If assigned both the joint coordination and external
support tasks, in addition to his operations tasks, the ARFOR commander must coordinate directly with
the required joint agencies and those Army logistics organizations that are part of the force-projection
contingency operation.
The resources and capabilities of Army units correspond to their design and the missions they perform.
Units designed for tactical operations do not have an operational capability as an inherent part of that
tactical design. The three operational tasks are predicated upon a unit design that provides the capability
to perform the operational functions described herein. Echelons at division level and below have a
tactical design and no inherent capability to perform the operational-level functions discussed in Chapter
At corps level, more flexibility exists and augmentation can be used to correct specific design shortcomings for conducting operations at the operational level. The ASCC and numbered army are
DODDOA-011151 - 12/29/2004
designed specifically for operational-level operations. The corps, however, when engaged in tactical operations, cannot perform simultaneously at both the tactical and operational levels. Though the corps commander must maintain an operational perspective, full-scale tactical operations preclude the performance of operational functions. As ARFOR are designated to participate in force-projection contingency operations, the commander must consider that resource availability, media impact, US public will, the geopolitical structure/support, and the dynamics of the contingency environment may restrict his selection of optimal organizational structures. The commander selects lesser design options because of restraints, constraints, and the evolving nature of the operational environment.
Logistics units are particularly suitable for modular design so that entire units are not required to perform specified functions. Logistics units are also suitable for performing split-based operations; where only essential cells are deployed while the base organization performs its function in CONUS or
from a forward-presence location elsewhere. Split-based operations are feasible only when
communications and automation are assured.
As circumstances evolve, final design of the Army force must reflect the tactical and operational requirements. Where an operational requirement exists, the CJTF must allocate ARFOR from the
appropriate echelon to perform those functions.
Contingency operations are undertaken in response to a crisis. That crisis can occur in isolation, as would be the expected case in MOOTW. But a crisis also can occur during the conduct of a major
operation during hostilities. Viewing the contingency operation as a series of stages serves to sequence
operations. When the contingency occurs during the conduct of a major operation, the stages assist in both resolving the crisis and in returning the contingency forces back into the ongoing operation as rapidly as possible.
The eight stages of a force projection--mobilization, predeployment activities, deployment, entry, decisive operations, postconflict/postcrisis operations, redeployment, and demobilization--provide the
general structure for a contingency operation and can be adjusted to fit the needs of a particular
contingency (FM 100-5). Execution of these stages may not be distinct. Predeployment activities and deployment, for example, might be so closely followed by forced entry and initial operations as to be indistinct. Operations might begin well before the entire force has closed. At minimum, commanders
and staffs must consider the--

Coordination of sequencing and phasing of forces (combat, CS, and CSS).

Requirement and time frame to establish and build up the theater base.

Protection of forces, to include rear area operations (rear area rapid reaction force).

Preparation time for deployment, operational readiness--types of units and their readiness, and so forth.

CINC's critical items list in the TPFDD flow.

Requirement and level of in-theater stocks.

Host nation capability and availability.

DODDOA-0111 52 12/29/2004 Any particular contingency may not include all of the general stages. For example, a contingency operation may be the first phase of an evolving major operation. Redeployment of all forces may not begin until the end of the subsequent phases of the major operation, of which the contingency was a single phase.
Mobilization is the process that permits augmentation of the active force. The Army Mobilization and
Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) is the guide for planning and participating in the
JOPES. The five levels of mobilization are selective mobilization, Presidential selected reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization. These options need not be executed
sequentially and are part of the graduated mobilization response. Units mobilize through five phases: planning, alert, home station, mobilization station, and port of embarkation. FM 100-17 discusses
mobilization in detail.
This is a critical stage of a contingency force-projection operation for which units throughout the total
force train. The ASCC recommends to the CINC the size and composition of the ARFOR required to
support the mission, including forces that support assembly and deployment of the force. Additionally,
the ASCC identifies the lift requirements to move the ARFOR and requirements for reception and
onward movement upon arrival in the theater of operations. The ASCC's recommendation is based on the assessment of the operational environment. That assessment is revised to reflect the dynamics of the
operational environment.
The JTF ARFOR commander maintains the Army's operational-level perspective within the JTF for the contingency. The attainment of strategic or operational objectives requires sequencing of Army military operations. In force-projection contingency operations, ARFOR commanders must keep this operational perspective, even if they conduct separate tactical operations directly for the JFC. The overall attainment
of the strategic objective may require military operations not limited to combat missions. These
sequenced military operations require an operational-level perspective over time.
The JFC's primary Army advisor for this perspective is the ARFOR commander assigned to the JTF. This commander provides operational level perspective to the JFC during planning, deployment,
employment, and redeployment. During planning, the ARFOR commander must receive a clear
definition of the desired end state from the JFC. Because of the inherent dynamics of the contingency
environment, considerable effort may be involved in gaining clarity on the military end state. The military end state may include those diplomatic considerations that inevitably accompany contingencies
over which the Army commander may have little direct control.
The CINC assigns the ways and means for mission accomplishment. His ASCC advises him on Army requirements to employ effective and efficient Army means. The NCA and the CINC assign the ways, in the form of constraints and restrictions, to the ARFOR commander. For example, the CINC may direct • the seizure of objectives with psychological, rather than military, significance and may establish specific
ROE. Once the ARFOR commander clearly understands the ends, ways, and means for the contingency, he begins the planning process in earnest or adjusts exiting plans.
Based on the CINC's concept of operations, the ASCC reviews all existing OPLANs and CONPLANs
DODDOA-011153 12/29/2004
for suitability. He updates and adjusts these plans to develop an OPORD. Existing CONPLANs and lessons learned from the joint and Army repositories (Joint Universal Lessons Learned System [DULLS] and the Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL]) should be the starting point when conducting crisis planning. If no suitable plan exists, the Army commander OPCON to the JTF develops OPORDs, using the time-sensitive or CAP procedures outlined in Joint Pub 5-03.1.
The ARFOR commander develops his contingency OPORDs based on the maximum capability the enemy can generate. In a crisis caused by a natural disaster, the enemy becomes the threat to human life and safety and the potential for damage to the environment. The ARFOR commander conducts parallel, but more detailed, execution planning with the JFC and normally issues a supporting Army OPORD with detailed instructions to subordinates. The concurrent planning occurs at all Army echelons involved in the contingency.
The ARFOR commander issues immediate warning orders to all subordinate units. Because of the time­sensitive nature of contingency operations and the crisis-action system, information must get to the appropriate unit as rapidly as it becomes available. Subordinate units must recognize that they may not receive complete OPORDs from their higher headquarters until late. Subordinate OPLANs based upon
earlier warning orders must be flexible enough to adapt to the evolving contingency operations. Therefore, horizontal and vertical coordination must occur between staffs so that plans can be made
concurrently. Liberal use of warning orders should be used so subordinate commanders can begin work.
Certain planning considerations are critical during this stage. Anticipatory logistics requires appropriate
commanders to project support requirements and synchronize support actions with tactical
organizations. This action is necessary to ensure combat power can be sustained or reconstituted as required. The ARFOR commander identifies potential consequences to ensure that the JFC makes knowledgeable decisions on lift prioritization. Finally, as with all operations, OPSEC must not be
sacrificed, despite the urgency of the crisis situation.
An important task facing the ARFOR commander is the organization of his staff and the Army
augmentation of the JFC's staff to support the planning and execution of the contingency operation. The makeup of the JTF staff should reflect the composition of the operational forces. If the JFC's mission is
largely an Army mission, Army personnel should predominate the staff. The Army contribution to the JTF may include light, armored, or special operations forces.
The Army augmentation package given to the JTF staff should reflect the proportional balance of the JTF force package. If the joint staff is not sufficiently and appropriately augmented, the ARFOR
commander must spend more effort advising the JFC on the capabilities and limitations of the Army
force. Therefore, ARFOR likely to conduct contingency operations should have designated
augmentation cells (discussed earlier in this chapter) that automatically push forward to support JTFs.
See Figure 6-7.
Considerations During. DODD0A-011154 Predeployment Activities
The senior ARFOR commander tailors the force based upon the mission assigned and the resource
available. He is responsible for informing the JFC when allocated means do not ensure the probability
of success. If he is the land component commander, he also plans for the integration of all land forces
allocated to the operation.
The Army service component command headquarters ensures that it integrates effectively with the
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joint communications plan. The ASCC ensures he has access to the DCS. Some links require specific
heardware when the joint force headquarters and core staff are from another service. This
communications link must be redundant and apply in all of the functional areas, not just in the
maneuver control function.
The Army service component command headquarters must coordinate the use of space assets to
support the operation. Some considerations include optimizing communications and global positioning
systems and receiving current weather satellite data. Additionally, the headquarters must arrange for
requirements for rapid response satellite image maps and terrain analysis products.
Corps and above intelligence organizations are critical to Army intelligence preparation. They provide
the interface among tactical forces and the joint and national agencies that provide supporting
intelligence. These Army organizations must link their intelligence networks into all sources. The
ARFOR commander ensures he receives an intelligence push package and liaison officers for
intelligence products.
Army commanders ensure adequate LNO representation at higher, lower, and adjacent organizations.
These LNOs must be of appropriate rank and experience to be effective. LNOs during contingency
operations are particularly important because each contingency is likely to be unique, and the
organizational requirements are normally ad hoc. This type of situation demands rapid communication
channels between different units and other service elements that have not had the opporunity to train
extensively together. LNOs assist in rapidly establish these important communication channels.
FIGURE 6-7. STAGE II (Predeployment) Considerations

The initial response force is the product of a combination of many factors. It reflects the mission of the
JTF and the Army's corresponding tasks, along with the lift that has been made available to conduct the
necessary strategic and operational movement.
Other factors include the capabilities of the host nation to support ARFOR on either a long-or short-term basis. Finally, the contributions of alliance or coalition forces shape the initial response by ARFOR. The supported CINC's decision on the composition of this force requires the ASCC to project future events.
The Army force commander seeks to maintain versatility, a flexible force mix, and the ability to
generate superior combat power sustainability, and the necessary internal lift capability.
The execution stage--entry operations--encompasses the occupation of the initial lodgments in the
operations area. In this stage the capability for force is generated. Initially, that capability does not go far
beyond self-sustainment. The ARFOR commander sequences his resources into the operations area to
create the conditions for decisive operations. This sequencing includes joint mobility of operational
forces that seek to gain a positional advantage early.
Two alternative approaches exist to establishing positional advantage. The first is a long-term approach that focuses on building the force capability over time. Once sufficient capability is available, the ARFOR commander tries to resolve the cause of the crisis. In the second approach, rapid crisis 007_11.htm 12/29/2004 resolution is sought through the positioning of initially deploying forces into the critical location. By rapidly positioning forces with the requisite capability, the crisis may be resolved earlier. However, the Army might have to conduct forcible entry operations. This approach has a high payoff Risk is the price for such potential.
The ARFOR commander coordinates the movement of intertheater or intratheater forces into the operations area. Opposed-entry combat activities may take place during this stage. The ARFOR commander deploys operations and support forces into the contingency area and establishes C 2 to provide initial lodgments. While the focus during this phase is the deployment of forces, operations may be required to secure simultaneous entry zones that ensure force protection into the contingency area.
An effective air defense should be established in the lodgment area as rapidly as possible. Air defense is critical for the protection of the lodgment area. TBM, CM, ASM, and UAV threats could seriously disrupt or compromise the security of lodgment operations. Based on the threat and availability of joint and/or multinational ADA systems, early entry forces tailor the ADA force packages that are deployed initially. An ADA task force is deployed to protect selected enclaves. This stage ends with the establishment of a secure airhead and/or beachhead. See Figure 6-8.
Considerations During Entry Operations
The ARFOR commander coordinates all joint mobility assets required to deploy his forces and
materiel. He requests support in a mission format to the JFC. He does not specify numbers and types
of transportation.

This mission-type requirement to the USTRANSCOM avoids confusion and allows for a greater
number of options for deployment. Specific requirements may be necessary and should be articulated
by the ARFOR commander to the USTRANSCOM in terms of numbers of personnel, types of
equipment, and required time schedule. The ASCC's staff works closely with the USTRANSCOM to
ensure that the lift provided meets the specifications of the Army force.

The ARFOR commander, in conjunction with the JFC, tailors the entry force to accomplish specific
operations in preparation for follow-on forces during this phase. This force may or may not
participate in the following sages of the contingency. The entry force C 2 structure evolves as the
operation progresses. A need exists early on for an operational-level C 2 element. This headquarters
unburdens tactical-level leaders and permits them to focus on the tactical-level operations for which
they were designed.

FIGURE 6-8. STAGE IV (Entry Operations) Considerations
A rapid buildup of force capability is the focus of this stage. This buildup includes establishing a forward-operating base, closing the remainder of the force, expanding the lodgment, linking up with other joint forces, and establishing multinational and interagency linkages. Decisive combat power is positioned to resolve the crisis rapidly by synchronizing and simultaneously engaging enemy forces throughout the depth and space of the operational area.
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FM 100-7 chptr 6 - Force Projection Page 22 of 25
Force protection becomes increasingly important during the operations stage. Reconnaissance assets are focused to provide the ARFOR commander with an accurate picture of the enemy force actions and intentions. OPSEC ensures the protection of the force in part by preventing the enemy reconnaissance from gaining similar information on friendly forces. Deception operations complement OP SEC by painting a false picture of the friendly force's intentions. Effective air defense and TMD remain a priority during this phase of the operation.
In MOOTW, decisive operations contain similarities and differences from the principles that guide operations in war. The principles of objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security guide actions in MOOTW. Figure 6-9 describes areas for consideration during conduct of operations.
Considerations During Operations
The ARFOR commander adjusts his plan based upon the situation on the ground. Invariably, portions
of the plan are based upon invalid assumptions or inaccurate information. No plan survives intact,but
the flexible one is adjusted quickly to allow for changes. Adjustments to the plan affect other portions
of the operation. This is particularly apparent when adjusting the flow of personnel and equipment
into the area. As an illustration, changing the lift priorities may have extensive impact on employment
operations during a subsequent stage.

The ARFOR commander receives follow-on forces during this stage. He ensures adequate airports
and seaports of debarkation are available and that the force is equipped as required. He marshals and
stages the follow-on forces in preparation for decisive operations.

The ARFOR commander determines if resources are adequate to accomplish the mission. He
recognizes the dynamics of the operational environment and adjusts plans and operations to reflect
those changes. He makes specific recommendations to the JFC within the constraints and restrictions
of the operation.

The ARFOR commander receives administrative and logistics support from his service chain or from
organic assets. The Army commander tasked with the support responsibility stages support resources
forward to support the operation. This support includes directing the efforts of Army organizations
temporarily tailored for the specific operation. The ASCC, in conjunction with the ARFOR
commander, develops intermediate staging basing (ISB), if required. ISB may be located offshore
afloat or in a third country close to the contingency area.

The CINC establishes movement control for the Army assets to the AO. He sets the priority for
ARFOR entry and supervises the operational movement. He works closely with the JFC to enforce
lift priorities. The supervision of lift into the contingency area becomes a critical task for several
reasons: lift into the contingency area may be constrained, planned lift assets may be diverted, or the
lodgment area may have limited reception capability. The sequencing of resources into the AOR
becomes a critical task for the senior army commander during this stage.

FIGURE 6-9. STAGE V (Decisive Operations) Considerations
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During the previous stage. the ARFOR commander completes the Army contribution toward attaining those operational objectives to resolve the crisis that instigated the contingency operation. Postconflict operations secure the strategic objectives. Planning for postconflict operations must be an integral part of the overall Army plan, which is revised continually as the conclusion of hostilities approaches. The objective of this planning is to transition operations with minimum confusion to either the host nation, an international body, or DOS. The Army contribution to postconflict operations may include--

Controlling prisoners.

Handling refugees.

Arranging for civilian contractors to clear minefields and conduct demining operations.

Destroying explosive ordnance.

Conducting civil affairs.

Simultaneously, units prepare for future operations by consolidating, reconstituting, and training. These
future operations can range from the resumption of hostilities to redeployment. See Fig 6-10.
Considerations During Postconflict Operations
The senior ARFOR commander desires overwhelming strength to execute the contingency operation.
The mere presence of overwhelming strength is a force multiplier. At the same time, the reduction of
collateral damage may be a major constraint during this phase. The ARFOR commander tightly
controls the ROW (instructions, artillery position, azimuth-determing system, control measures).
Tehse controls are an important part in determing the complexity of postconflict operations.

Consolidation operations begin during this stage. These operations may be more significant long term
than actual contingency operations for achieving strategic objectives. Restoration operations consist
of a number of activities that have political, economic, or diplomatic impact. Some of these activities
include nation assistance, CA, and infrastructure repair. The ARFOR commander carefully sequences
these operations into the theater CINC's continuing major operation or campaign.

The ARFOR commander may focus on tactical-level operations during the contingency. However, he
must maintain a larger perspective, looking beyond the relatively short-term contingency operation.
The contingency operation alone seldom achieves the desired end state. The ARFOR commander
must recognize how the contingency operation fits into the long-term strategic objectives of the
theater CINC.

During the operations stage, the ARFOR commander responsible for the operational-level perspective
may change. The JTF may have achieved its primary mission and the CINC may disestablish it. The
senior army commander responsible for executing the contingency operation may redeploy with the
main body of forces. A modified C 2 structure may replace the JTF, the CINC may assume direct
control, or the theater may revert to its normal peacetime organization. Regardless, the Army's
operational- level perspective must pass to the new senior ARFOR commander to continue with

DODD0A-011158 12/29/2004
postconflict operations. The new commander continues with postconflict operations and completes
redeployment of the contingency force.

As part of postconflict operations, the ARFOR commander conducts operations to stabilize the
situation. These include internal security, law and order, PSYOP, and CA programs. PSYOP
emphasize the purpose fo the US actions and balance any negative residual effects of the contingency


During this stage, the force prepares for future operations. The force may be redeployed to its home station, to a staging base, or to another theater for subsequent operations. In addition, the ARFOR commander reconstitutes his force, within his capabilities, to ensure flexibility for future operations. (See Figure 6-11).
Reconstitution of the force requires an extensive reallocation of resources and skills. The LSE may play a major role during reconstitution operations. The LSE must be able to receive, identify, and determine disposition; maintain accountability; store, prepare for shipment, and arrange for movement of Class I, II, III (package) IV, V, VI, VII, and IX items to the port or a theater stockage location. Some of these functions can be performed by augmenting LSE personnel with TOE units or contractor personnel. Items requiring repair may be repaired by the LSE or a contractor within the theater or sent out of the theater to a repair facility. The theater materiel management center identifies the items requiring redistribution instructions.
Considerations Dnring Redevelopment and Restitution
The ARFOR commander controls the flow of Army assets out to the operations area. There is a
natural inclination to redeploy all forces out of the areas as quickly as possible upon the completion
of tactical operations. This may be the CINC's stated objective, but it has diplomatic ramifications.
The ARFOR commander must find a way to balance this objective with his requirement to conduct
restoration operations. He does this by gaining additional guidance from the JFC, who in turn
reconciles objectives with the CINC.

The ARFOR commander may change several times as the Army forces are reduced and their
composition changes. However, the ARFOR commander remains the JFC's primary advisor on Army
matters. Once the JTF achieves the CINC's designated objectives, the CINC dissolves it. Then, the
CINC's ASCC assumes the remaining Army missions.

FIGURE 6-11. STAGE VII (Redeployment and Reconstitution) CONSIDERATIONS
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FM 100-7 chptr 6 - Force Projection Page 25 of 25
Demobilization is the process by which units, individuals, and materiel transfer from active to reserve status. Demobilization is accomplished in five phases: planning actions, area of operations actions, transit actions, demobilization station/center actions, and home station/home-of-record actions. As with mobilization, demobilization is discussed in detail in FM 100-17.
DODD0A-0111 60 1 007/f1007_11.htm 12/29/2004
Army Operations in War
The NCA may exhaust its options to achieve vital national interests with the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power. Such would require the NCA to use the military element of national power as a primary instrument for protecting national interests.
When the military element becomes the predominant element for the execution of policy in a particular theater, the Army may enter the third state of the range of military operations--war. This chapter discusses modern warfare and the transition to war from peacetime or conflict. The chapter closes with a
short look at the termination of war.
War is a state of hostile, armed combat. War is characterized by the sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation. War involves regular and irregular forces in operations to achieve vital national security objectives. War may be limited or general in the resources employed and the risks of survival at stake.
Modern warfare may be nonlinear, thereby making air operations increasingly vital to the effectiveness Or ground operations. The commander may, by choice or by lack of maneuver forces, place his force in dispersed noncontiguous areas from which he can operate to destroy enemy forces. Nonlinear operations require commanders to seize the initiative through offensive action, to force the pace of battle, and to retain the flexibility to bring overwhelming force to destroy the enemy at a time and place where he is most vulnerable.
The long-term aim is to regain the initiative and flexibility needed to quickly destroy the enemy force. At the operational-level, this involves an appreciable amount of risk but offers an opportunity for high­payoff success. The Army organizes in war to fight effectively both linear and nonlinear operations.
During peacetime, the Army trains to deter war and, if necessary, to fight the nation's wars. The ASCC must ensure that during realistic training for war his subordinate units consider the effect of training on the environment and the effect of the environment on training. Federal laws require that Army activities conducting training and operations during war and MOOTW comply with all federal, state, and local (to include host nation) environmental and pollution abatement requirements and standards. Environmental pollution standards cover solid waste management and control of pollutants in the air and water and on
terrain. Other legal requirements cover resources such as endangered species and wetlands. Other
environmental areas that must be addressed concern noise, terrain damage, ecological areas, and historical/archeological sites. Still, the environment should be treated as a resource, not a constraint.
The CINC structures the army in theater to transition to war, to receive reinforcements, to conduct major
operations, and to terminate war on favorable terms. The CINC fixes area and organizational
responsibilities for the Army in consonance with the theater strategy, the threat, available forces, and
existing or prospective alliances. These responsibilities evolve significantly during the transition from peacetime to wartime.
Unity of Effort.
DODD0A-011161 007_12.htm 12/29/2004 At the operational level, Army operations in war are always part of unified and joint operations and often part of multinational operations. Therefore, the Army commander must have a unified, joint, and multinational view of operations. Army cooperation with the other components is necessary to produce unity of effort. Military operations are more than just combat operations and do not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities. Some of the military operations that occur during and after combat operations

Processing and return of enemy prisoners of war (EPW).

Return of displaced civilians.

Transfer of responsibilities to peacekeeping forces.

Restoration of basic life support services.

Battlefield policing.

Units conduct these operations until acceptable peacetime conditions are achieved and the force is redeployed.
The Range of Military Operations
All states of the range of military operations may exist within the theater of war. Peacetime activities may characterize a portion of the theater, while other areas may experience conflict. Thus, the principles
and operations that apply to peacetime and conflict discussed in previous chapters may apply to the theater of war. The primary focus of the war environment, however, remains on combat operations and
those activities that ensure success.
Organizational Changes
When the Army in theater transitions to war, significant changes occur in Army organizations. Such
changes require a rapid expansion of the Army in order to introduce large numbers of maneuver and
support forces to reinforce the theater. The ASCC evolves and expands to cope with the increased tempo of operational and support missions. The Army may introduce additional operational-level headquarters to assist the CINC in controlling the increased number of tactical organizations.
Depending on the analysis of METT-T and the extent of global conflict, the CINC may organize several theaters of operation within the theater of war. This has not been done since World War II. The CINC may form JTFs for specific missions in theater, as was done during Operation Desert Storm. Each of these will most likely include ARFOR. In theater, more than one Army commander may have operational-level responsibilities. These operational-level Army commanders sequence operations over
space and time to attain operational or strategic objectives. The principles outlined in Chapter 3 for the design and execution of operational art apply to these commanders.
The desired end state of war is the rapid return to peacetime on terms favorable to the US and its allies.
This end state includes setting the conditions to prevent future war or conflict. Postwar or military consolidation operations may be necessary to ensure that the theater transitions to peacetime and remains there for the foreseeable future. Diplomatic and economic considerations may predominate 12/29/2004 during this process, with military operations supporting these elements of national power.
The ASCC's primary mission is to contribute to the success of the joint or multinational commander's major operation. The ASCC must envision the long-range strategic objective in formulating his initial
plans for positioning forces. Army service component functions during war include movement and
maneuver, fires, protection, deception, C 2, joint information systems interface, IEW, and support.
The CINC requests forces stationed in CONUS or from other theaters. USTRANSCOM has overall
responsibility to move forces into the theater of war via strategic lift. Based upon operational
requirements, the ASCC influen-xs this process through JOPES, AMOPES, and TPFDD. He ensures
that the proper types of Army personnel and materiel flow into the theater to conduct and support major
operations. The CINC sequences this flow to ensure that it supports the concept of operations for current
and future missions. Within the AO, movement and maneuver must be well-coordinated, integrated, and
synchronized to maximize the combat power available to the theater commander. This coordination and
synchronization is conducted on an area basis through maneuver control, movement control, and
battlefield circulation control.
Theater Commander
The CINC may designate the ASCC as a senior support headquarters without responsibilities for
conducting combat operations. This becomes highly probable as the requirements for support increase
and the CINC becomes more involved in directing Army combat operations.
Army Service Component Commander
The reception, preparation, and flow of ARFOR in the theater is a primary function of the ASCC. The
ASCC sets clear movement priorities within the context of the current major operation and in preparation for future major operations. The ASCC uses the senior movement control agency (MCA) to provide the movements program, which allocates transportation support based on these priorities to
support reception and onward movement activities. Execution of the program provides for the movement of units, supplies, and equipment from support areas forward to the deployed forces and
ultimately retrograde of materiel from these forces.
The ASCC concentrates forces and creates economy of force through the use of intratheater movement.
Through intratheater movement, the ASCC develops positional advantage in relation to the enemy to
support the campaign. The ASCC carefully weighs the risks of concentration against the protection of
forces, installations, and the infrastructure on which future operations depend.
The ASCC visualizes maneuver in the operational sense. His visualization is from the perspective of the entire theater army, not just one or several of its elements. Divisions, separate brigades, or regiments are the level of resolution of his perspective. An early decision is imperative. Once initial corps and division positions are selected, the ASCC will find it difficult to change the initial set.
Army Operational-Level Commander
Planning offensive and defensive operations and maneuvers to achieve the CINC's campaign plan is a 12/29/2004
. operations and directs maneuver of subordinate forces.
primaryfunction of the ARFOR operational-level commander. In addition, he plans large-scale
Plans Offensive and Defensive Operations
The ARFOR commander at the operational level plans offensive operations in war to secure or retain the
initiative, to exploit or pursue the enemy, and to prevent the enemy from regrouping and regaining the
combat initiative. He also plans defensive operations to gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive
actions. Even in the defense, the ARFOR commander seizes opportunities and plans for offensive
maneuver, counterattack, and deep operations whenever possible.
Plans Large -Scale Operations
The ARFOR commander at the operational level plans large-scale maneuver of assigned forces to
support the theater campaign, with a view to the theater CINC's ultimate objectives. The CINC
sequences and/or integrates major operations by assigning zones or sectors, boundaries, objectives,
priorities, resources, and phases. He integrates within his battle space resources such as space-based
systems and information warfare assets. Planning responsibilities center on analyzing the assigned
mission, visualizing major combat operations and logistical requirements, and disseminating plans and
directives. The plans generally project future operations and provide details on mission accomplishment
as directed by the CINC.
Directs Maneuver of Subordinate Forces
The Army operational-level commander directs the maneuver of subordinate forces to support the
theater campaign plan. This direction is tied to the overall concept of operations and the estimate of the
situation at key decision points during the operation. The primary emphasis of operational maneuver is
on the concentration of combat power through the exercise of large land formations on broad fronts.
Synchronization of operational movement, fires, and support produces a series of operational maneuvers
that provide the Army operational-level commander and subordinate commanders with the necessary
leverage to shape the battle space to gain, retain, and sustain the initiative. The ARFOR commander
synchronizes attacks on the enemy throughout the battlefield to counter known or anticipated enemy
efforts, to exploit success, and to hasten the total collapse of enemy forces.
Tactical execution focuses on destruction of the enemy throughout his battle space through use of depth
and simultaneity. The Army operational-level commander, while sensitive to these immediate
engagements, cannot allow himself to be preoccupied with the close operations and be distracted from
the larger perspective. He reallocates forces, reprioritizes efforts, and conducts a continuous estimate
throughout the battle space to react to current and future decisive points.
The Army operational-level commander initiates changes designed to facilitate the execution of current
operations, with due consideration to the impact on future operations. He directs the movement of
subordinate forces to ensure that after a distinct phase of the operation they are positioned in a manner
that will enable rapid transition to subsequent phases.
Normally, deciding the specific form of maneuver to be used against tactical or operational objectives is
left to the judgment and discretion of subordinate tactical commanders. Directing a tactical form of maneuver at the operational level reduces the flexibility of subordinates, narrows options, and may unnecessarily restrict subordinate commanders in developing optimum COAs.
DODD0A-011164 12/29/2004 To defeat the enemy's center of gravity, the commander can synchronize maneuver, fires, and operations
simultaneously in depth against enemy forces at all levels. This synchronization is one of the most
dynamic concepts available to a commander. Maneuver and fires should not be considered separate
operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the
commander's objectives. The commander phases the operation against the enemy's decisive points at
successive depths. This phasing helps him determine the most advantageous simultaneous employment
of forces and firepower for decisive engagement to achieve the end state.
JFCs use a variety of firepower means to divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the enemy's air,
surface, and subsurface military potential. This paragraph discusses how the JFC thinks about applying
joint fires to support his concept of operations.
The Firepower Model
Joint firepower can be classified as tactical, operational, or strategic, based on its intended effect.
Tactical Firepower
The primary purpose of tactical firepower is to directly and immediately support tactical operations of
the joint force against appropriate tactical decisive points. Therefore, maneuver commanders exercise
control over tactical firepower that supports their maneuver operations. Tactical firepower includes the
coordinated and collective use of target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, armed aircraft (both
fixed- and rotary-wing), and other means against enemy elements in contact or imminent contact.
Included are artillery, mortars, other nonline-of-sight fires, naval gunfire, CAS, attack aviation assets,
and electronic attack. Tactical firepower also could include the means for surface-to-air and air-to-air
Interdiction operations conducted by all elements of the joint force can also be designed to achieve or
support tactical objectives. Some interdiction missions may therefore be considered as tactical. All
interdiction missions affecting the land battle require coordination between several levels of command,
both within and across service lines (see Figure 5-2).
Operational Firepower
Operational firepower achieves a decisive impact on a subordinate campaign or major operation.
Operational firepower is joint and multinational. It is a separate element of the subordinate JFC's
concept of operations (addressed separately from operational maneuver) but must be closely integrated
and synchronized with his concept for maneuver. In that regard, operational firepower is integrated
normally with operational land maneuver for synergistic effect, staying power, and more rapid
achievement of strategic aims. Operational firepower is not fire support, and operational maneuver is
not necessarily dependent upon operational firepower. Still, operational maneuver can be affected by
such fires and can exploit opportunities created or developed by the JFC's operational firepower.
Today, all services contribute capabilities that can be used for operational firepower. To synchronize
operations, the JFC may task one component to provide fires to support another component's operations.
Still, as service means for operational firepower may be used for tactical firepower, the JFC should preserve that tactical capability as he develops his concept of fires.
DODD0A-011165 12/29/2004
Operational firepower includes targeting and attacking land and sea targets whose destruction or
neutralization will have a major impact on a subordinate campaign or major operation. Operational
firepower includes the allocation of joint and multinational air, land, sea (surface and subsurface), and
space means. In a war involving WMD, fires could be an operational instrument at decisive points that
leads to the enemy's strategic center of gravity. Operational firepower can be designed to achieve a
single, operationally significant objective that could have a decisive impact on the campaign and major
operation. Operational firepower may include the interdiction of a major enemy force or forces to set the
conditions for subsequent, decisive operations.
Operational firepower is planned top down. The operational commander establishes objectives,
identifies targets, and then passes them to subordinate joint or multinational units for execution.
Subordinate nominations contribute to this top-down approach. Operational firepower focuses largely on
one or more of the following:

Destruction of critical functions, facilities, and forces having operational significance.

Isolation of a specific battle within the battle space.

Facilitation of maneuver to operational depths.

Systems capable of providing operational firepower generally include land- and seabased airpower and
surface-to-surface, long-range missiles.
The ASCC has various means with which to execute operational firepower. He may mass fires,
concentrate long-range missile fires, employ attack helicopters, or coordinate the use of air forces with
Army resources. Application of operational firepower is a primary means for concentrating combat
Strategic Firepower
Strategic firepower is intended to achieve a major impact at the strategic level and thus an impact on the
course of the theater campaign or war as a whole. Strategic firepower includes selection and assignment
of strategic targets to attack capable forces. Strategic firepower also makes the forces and resources
available for attacking those targets according to the theater strategy and campaign plan.
Systems capable of providing strategic firepower are generally those also capable of providing
operational firepower. The intended effect or outcome qualifies a system, weapon, or operation as either
strategic or operational. Nuclear munitions, because of the escalation they signal, are normally
categorized as strategic firepower--whether they are delivered by aircraft, missile, or other means--and
are closely controlled through a system the theater commander establishes.
Army Interface
The Army operational-level commander is the critical link for coordination of joint support for Army
operations and Army support for joint operations. The Army operational-level commander has a key
role in ensuring that ground and air operations, as devised by the JFC, complement and reinforce each
other. The Army operational-level commander begins coordination with the JFC and ACC early in the
operational planning process. During the operational planning process, the Army operational-level commander, in coordination with his subordinate commanders and staff, identifies Army requirements for air support (reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, and airlift). He also participates in the targeting 12/29/2004 process by nominating targets for Army and Air Force engagement.
Interdiction contributes substantially to operational firepower, although it also can have tactical and
strategic effects. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface or subsurface
military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Although interdiction can
have tactical effects, it generally applies forward of or beyond units in contact or imminent contact. Its
effects must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose with other supporting or supported operations
of the joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include, but are not limited to--

Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.

Ships and submarines.

Conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces.


Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and

Artillery and naval gunfire.

Attack helicopters.

EW systems.

Antisatellite weapons.

Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver is critical to the successful execution of the campaign or major
operation. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common
enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives.
Moreover, interdiction could be a maneuver itself to gain positional advantage over an enemy.
Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the
enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the friendly maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to
unacceptable losses from interdiction; if the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses,
enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and
synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in gaining the greatest leverage against the
enemy at the operational level.
The ARFOR operates within the theater operational battle space that the JFC establishes for the conduct
of all operations. Strategic, political, and internal boundaries are examples of the further subdivision of
the battle space that must be considered by the operational commander. The JFC establishes operational boundaries to facilitate the synchronization of maneuver and interdiction. Synchronization of efforts within these boundaries is of particular importance.
DOOD0A-011167 12/29/2004
According to Joint Pub 3-0, the operational land commander is the supported commander for air
interdiction in his AO, and he therefore specifies the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction
operations therein. While this may mean specifying individual targets or target sets and the desired
effects to be achieved in attacking them, the often preferred method is for the land commander to specify
the operational-level effects he intends the interdiction to achieve, the target priorities to achieve those
effects, and the date/time by which the effects are required (for example, eliminate the counterattack
capability of X Guard's corps by destroying artillery, armor, and soft-skinned vehicles not later than
Interdiction operations, whether by land, air, or naval forces, complement overall maneuver to destroy
the enemy's center of gravity. The ARFOR commander may choose to use interdiction as a principal
means to achieve the intended objective (with his subordinate forces supporting the component leading
the interdiction effort). For example, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to abandon or
reveal covered positions or attempt rapid resupply. These reactions provide excellent and vulnerable
targets for interdiction.
Targeting by the ARFOR staff follows the same targeting process used at subordinate echelons. This
process is detailed in FM 6-20-10. The targeting process is an important part of the military decision­
making process described by FM 101-5.
At the operational level, the focus of the targeting effort is more on planning and coordination, rather
than on execution of operational firepower. Typically, when the ARFOR staff identifies high-payoff
operational targets, it will coordinate with subordinate units for acquisition and attack by systems
allocated or organic to the corps. There will be some critical targets that subordinate units are not
capable of acquiring or engaging. The critical nature of these targets--and the requirement to coordinate
and synchronize the employment of several joint acquisitions/attacks as quickly as possible--requires the
ARFOR commander to establish a staff section to support the associated targeting effort. This section is
the DOCC.
The DOCC is organized with appropriate joint service, multinational arms, and coalition force
representatives. The primary functions of the DOCC are situational awareness, planning and
coordination, targeting, and control of designated operational firepower. A description of the DOCC
functions is shown in Figure 7-1. The primary mission of the DOCC is to provide centralized
coordination and management of ARFOR deep operations. The DOCC ensures effective and efficient
employment of critical assets and facilitates synchronization of joint operations. The primary functions
of the DOCC apply across the range of military operations.
FIGURE 7-1. Deep Operations Coordination Cell Requirements
Fire Control Measures
JFCs employ various fire support coordination measures to facilitate effective joint operations. Many
maneuver control measures have fire coordination implications. Specific joint fire support coordination
measures and the procedures associated with those measures also assist in preserving the fluidity and
flexibility of successful joint operations.
Fire Support Coordination Line
DODD0A-01 1168 12/29/2004
The ARFOR may establish an FSCL within the AO to support his concept of operation. The ARFOR
must coordinate the FSCL's location with the appropriate ACC and other supporting elements. If an
FSCL is established, its purpose is to allow the ARFOR, its subordinates, and supporting units, such as
Air Force, to swiftly attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Such attacks by Army assets must
be coordinated with all other affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary action to avoid
friendly casualties. This coordination includes informing and/or consulting with affected commanders
(that is, supporting air components). The inability to effect this coordination will not preclude the attack
of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of
friendly casualties and could waste limited resources through duplicate attacks. If the land force
commander desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his lateral boundaries, he must first coordinate with the
appropriate commander. The interface within the DOCC among the various fire support representatives
provides an excellent means of initially coordinating the attack of targets in the area.
The FSCL must complement the ARFOR commander's concept for deep operations and optimize the
synergy between operational maneuver and operational firepower. To achieve this synergy, supported
and supporting commanders must have clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and
coordinated operations. As the supported commander, the ARFOR provides necessary guidance
(restrictions, constraints) for all operations in the area beyond the FSCL and within the designated
ARFOR AO. The ARFOR commander does not necessarily have to control the supporting operations or
joint service activities in this area. Still, supporting commanders must follow the ARFOR commander's
intent and guidance for activities in this area. Control of interdiction provides a functional example.
Interdiction occurs both short of and beyond the FSCL. Attack of planned interdiction targets on either
side requires no further coordination, assuming the attack is proceeding as planned. Deviation from the
plan requires coordination with affected commanders. Attack of interdiction targets of opportunity short
of the FSCL requires coordination with the affected commanders. Before attacking targets of
opportunity beyond the FSCL, supporting commanders should coordinate with the ARFOR commander.
However, if he cannot effect coordination, the supporting commander controlling the attack must follow
the ARFOR commander's guidance for attacking targets in this area. Thus, the ARFOR commander
need not directly control the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but, as the supported commander, he
exercises general direction over interdiction and other activities of supporting commanders in his AO.
Besides the FSCL, other fire support coordination measures may be used to facilitate or restrict
operational firepower. These include restrictive fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs) to protect
friendly elements on either side of the FSCL. If ROE permit, commanders should consider the use of
free-fire areas (FFAs) to expedite fires or the jettisoning of ordinance in specific areas.
Whether attacking or defending, the ARFOR commander usually designates an initial FSCL and plans
for a subsequent series of on-order FSCLs. Execution of on-order FSCLs must be transmitted in
sufficient time to allow higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters time to effect necessary
Warfighting Airspace
Warfighting airspace is the airspace directly above the ground commander's AO that provides for
freedom of maneuver for those forces operating in the third dimension. Commanders in the field use
various means to gain freedom of maneuver in this area, especially in the conduct of deep operations.
Warfighting airspace uses the coordinating altitude to define this area. The coordinating altitude is an airspace permissive control measure designed to coordinate airspace between high performance fixed­wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC has already designated the AO. The warfighting airspace presents a three-dimensional view of the battlefield. In the warfighting airspace, the ground commander 12/29/2004
retains freedom of maneuver without overly restricting any of the other users of airspace.
To coordinate operational-level fires, the DOCC interacts with multiple Army, Air Force, and
sometimes Naval aviation organizations. The DOCC works very closely with the command's MI
organization and the echelons above corps (EAC) analysis and control element (ACE). They are the
DOCC's main source of targeting data.
To ensure that targeting data is developed into target lists the manning of the section must include MI
officers. The DOCC works with the command's subordinate unit's fire support element (FSE) to
deconflict targets and targeting information, to task corps for operational fires support, and to forward
air support requests to the AOC. The DOCC also provides the corps with target feedback, especially
BDA received through the BCE. Assignment of artillery, WMD target analysts, and maneuver arms
(especially aviation) officers to the coordination section is crucial to its effective coordination with the
tactical-level headquarters.
The Army DOCC effects coordination with the US Air Force through the BCE located at the Air Force
AOC, the ground liaison officers at the wings, and the Army liaison officer aboard the airborne
battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). Similar functions are performed within the Navy
Tactical Air Control System, (NTACS) by its tactical air control center. These assets receive information
from and provide feedback directly to the DOCC. An automated targeting support system to transmit
targeting priorities, targeting lists with supporting intelligence data, and targeting damage assessments
are essential to this coordination.
Joint Interface
The DOCC provides the Army members to the JTCB and the joint command, control, and
communications countermeasures (C 3CM) cell.
Joint Targeting Coordination Board
The CINC or JFC may establish a joint targeting coordination board to direct the theater targeting
process, to include special operations targeting. The board consists of members of the joint staff and
representatives of each subordinate command. The JTCB ensures the effective employment of all
theater-level deep surveillance and attack resources, including SOF. It coordinates targeting information,
provides targeting guidance and priorities, prepares or refines joint target lists (JTLs), and deconflicts
lethal and nonlethal assets. The JTCB is usually chaired by the J3 or his representative.
Its organization reflects theater force composition, strategic objectives, geography, and the threat. The
JTCB includes representatives of the land component commander, air component commander, naval
component commander, special operations component commander, AOC, and marine, air, and
electronic planning cells. Input from the joint staff element is used also to prepare the JTL.
The JTCB normally meets daily to ensure that JFC targeting and EW guidance is disseminated, to
monitor the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts, to coordinate and deconflict joint
force operations, to validate fire support coordination measures, and to approve new target nominations
for inclusion in the JTL. JTCB results are provided to the supporting forces. Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-09 discuss the purpose and functions of JTCBs. Joint Pith 3-05.5 contains discussion of SOF mission tasking as part of the JTCB process.
DODDOA-011 170 2.htm 12/29/2004
Joint C3CM Cell
The JFC usually organizes a joint C 3CM cell to coordinate EW targeting information, provide. EW
targeting guidance and priorities, prepare or refine JTLs, and compile a list of crucial friendly assets that
must be protected from joint EW operations. The C 3CM cell is normally chaired by the J3 or his
representative and has representatives of the J2, J6, operational fires coordination section, and other staff
elements and service components as appropriate.
The ASCC establishes a C 3CM plan, in coordination with the CINC's plan, to attack high-value targets.
The EAC C3CM plan, developed from the ASCC's intent, focuses on subordinate unit operations and
complements joint operations with other component commands within the theater.
Operational fires organic to the joint force are key in protecting the rear area from ground threats. A
vital mission of Army ADA is to protect the force and critical theater assets from aerial attack, missile
attack, and surveillance during warfighting operations. The priorities may shift to protecting major
concentrations of combat forces and supplementing protection of maneuver forces. Protection of LOCs
remains critical as they extend to support maneuvering forces.
Army commanders are often responsible for the security and protection of facilities and units that
support joint or multinational commanders conducting close and deep operations. Additionally, Army
commanders may be tasked to provide security for air bases located within their AO. ARFOR
commanders must continuously employ risk-management approaches to effectively preclude
unacceptable risks to personnel and property, including protecting forces preparing for or en route to
Risk management is the recognition that decision making occurs under conditions of uncertainty.
Decisions must remain consistent with the commander's stated intent and offer a good expectation of
success. The risk-taking skill requires competency as a prerequisite. Risks from WMD must be
continually assessed to ensure force protection and deterrence and should be addressed in plan
synchronization and force resourcing. Trained and disciplined organizations lessen risk.
Rear Operations
Rear operations include those activities that allow freedom of maneuver, continuity of support, and uninterrupted C 2. In linear battle terms, these action, occur behind forces engaged in active combat. The rear operations procedures discussed herein focus on operations during war. Similar actions could be required in MOOTW. Joint Pubs 3-10 and 3-10.1 and FMs 90-23 and 90-12 provide additional coverage of rear operations. Rear operations has four functions: sustainment, movement, terrain management, and security. An Army commander may execute these rear operations functions in a COMMZ/JRA or CZ.
Communications Zone/ Joint Rear Area
A JFC normally establishes a theater base communications zone (JRA) and the CZ within the territory of a sovereign host nation. Unlike the CZ, most host nations whose sovereignty remains viable maintain some level of control in a COMMZ.
The host nation may retain overall responsibility for security, movement, and terrain management. In
DODDOA-011171 12/29/2004
such cases commanders of US forces in the COMMZ own only the bases they physically occupy. They
are responsible for the security of bases and coordination with the host nation for additional security
assistance or other rear operations support. HNS agreements, SOFA, or other legal instruments guide the
US and host nation relationship. The US commander in the COMMZ directs and coordinates rear
operations, using a single command headquarters. At this echelon, support is the principal operation.
Several US organizations work with the host nation to execute each rear operation function.
Separate US functional commands and agencies control the movement of US assets in the COMMZ and
coordinate these movements with host nation and US area commanders. The army organization with
responsibility for rear operations is usually responsible for coordinating terrain management and security
with host nation agencies in its AO.

Rear Area Operations Center. A rear area operations center (RAOC) is a subordinate CP within
the ARFOR'S CP. The RAOC is responsible for collecting rear area information, managing
terrain, controlling area damage, determining the impact of weather, and synchronizing the rear
area battle plan to facilitate responses to enemy threats in the rear area. FMs 100-15, 90-12, and
90-23 detail these rear operations activities.

ARFOR Support. The ARFOR designates a support organization (corps support command [COSCOM]) to execute the support function and assist in movement and terrain management. In contingency operations, ARFOR may hand off these rear operations responsibilities as the lodgment or AO expands. EAC organizations assume these responsibilities, thereby allowing the corps to focus on tactical operations.

Combat Zone
In a CZ, the ARFOR commander usually owns all the terrain on which his forces conduct operations and
is responsible for synchronizing all rear operations. This discussion characterizes rear operations at
corps and below in contingency situations with no developed COMMZ and environments with no viable
Chain of Command
Command and control of rear operations is the key to success across the width and depth of the battle
space. To ensure overall security of the rear area, commanders at all levels must clearly understand C 2 ,
C2 responsibilities, and C 2 elements. Each unit in the rear area, regardless of its support function, should
be able to defend itself. Ideally, threats to the rear should be engaged and defeated before they can affect
rear operations. When they must be fought in the rear, a system of incremental responses must be able to
eliminate the threat as quickly as possible.
The chain of command for rear operations is embodied in area commands for security, area damage
control (ADC), and terrain management functions. Any unit in the COMMZ uses this channel to report
information of intelligence value and to request engineer, chemical, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
military police (MP), and host nation assistance.
The COMMZ tactical chain of command for rear operations flows from the theater CINC to the ASCC,
to rear operations centers (ROCS), to base clusters, and to bases. This chain of command is used to
coordinate protection of units and facilities within geographical areas of the COMMZ.
Commander in Chief
DODD0A-011172 12/29/2004
The CINC is responsible for rear operations. He normally designates a JRAC, often the ASCC. 'The ASCC as the JRAC would then assume US responsibility for coordinating rear operations in the COMMZ, which includes coordination with the host nation. The JRAC is responsible to his US superiors for the development and maintenance of US installations, control of US movements, administration of the US support effort, and overall security of all US forces and resources present in or transiting the COMMZ.
Army Service Component Commander
The ASCC would likely delegate the responsibility for rear operations planning to his deputy chief of
staff for operations. At theater, operational-level planning is conducted to sequence future rear operations, coordinate HNS, and synchronize the four rear operations functions (support, movement, terrain management, and security). The ASCC uses a decentralized control system of area commanders
for rear operations covering large areas of the theater COMMZ. The area commander usually designates his deputy commander as the rear operations officer who, in turn, often executes this responsibility through the security, plans, and operations (SPO) officer.
Rear Operations Centers.
The ROC (as depicted in Figure 7-2) collects information and plans and coordinates security, ADC. and terrain management. The ROC is composed of functional sections that work closely with their area command structure. The ROC sections coordinate with host nation liaison elements in addition to NBC, EOD, MP, engineer, and other technical organizations.
Operations and Area Damage Base Defense 1 }I=
Plans Coordination 1 1 1
Intelligence Control
1 1 1
Teams 1 I 1
1 BDCT only in area supper groups.
Figure 7-2. Typical Rear Operations Center.
The ROC maintains multiple communications channels using switched telephone services and combat
net radios (CNRs) with higher and adjacent headquarters and units. The ROC conducts vulnerability and
threat assessments within its AO. It then plans and coordinates protection of designated critical facilities
and resources. It also advises MCAs of security issues, area surveillance responsibilities, response
(combat) operations, positioning of units, and ADC. The ROC reacts to incidents most of the time but
also looks to short-term planning. It has an FSE and mobile base defense coordination teams (BDCTs)
to assist in detailed rear area defense planning.
The ROC's most important contribution to COMMZ/JRA security is the establishment and coordination
of base defense plans. The ROC coordinates base siting with the technical chain of command and then organizes these bases into base clusters to provide mutual support. The rear operations commander, with ROC recommendation, designates base and base cluster commanders to coordinate defensive plans.
DODD0A-011173 - 12/29/2004 Sometimes the ROC identifies single bases that are isolated, such as a specialized fixed facility, or clearly independent, such as an air base, and treats them as separate base clusters.
Base Cluster Commander
The base cluster commander communicates with all bases in his cluster through a base defense operations center (BDOC). Each base and base cluster is responsible for preparing its own defense plans. The ROC sends a BDCT to the base cluster commander's base cluster operations center (BCOC) to assist in consolidating individual base defense plans into a coordinated base cluster defense plan. Assets for forming the BDOC and BCOC are gathered from available base or cluster assets. See Joint Pub 3-10.1 for a detailed discussion of base defense. The BDCT reviews and assists in coordinating all needed US and host nation security and damage control support, to include fire support and ADA
support. It then ensures the completed defense plans are brought to the ROC for record and integration with the total protection concept.
Host Nation
The host nation, when capable, retains responsibility for security and ADC of all areas outside US bases. Despite the status of HNS, US commanders are always responsible for the defense of their base. They take measures to avoid detection by reducing the base signature, most notably through OPSEC, and the use of camouflage and concealment. US commanders take protective measures to withstand enemy attacks and employ measures to speed recovery and return to full mission capability should an attack occur. Measures include the emplacement of protective obstacles, fortification of critical facilities, and installation of NBC defense systems.
US commanders also plan graduated levels of response to enemy attack to defeat Level I threats and to delay and disrupt Level II and III threat forces until outside assistance arrives. See Table 7-1. If the host nation has limited capabilities to fulfill its rear operations responsibilities, or the AOR is hostile; the JFC or ASCC may designate US assets to execute these functions. The commander could require additional US engineer forces for ADC and other sustainment engineering tasks. He might provide more CSS and CS organizations for supply, movement, and terrain management. Without HNS, the ASCC may assume responsibility for overall security of the COMMZ/JRA, addressing all three levels of threat. All US commanders would concern themselves with greater security roles beyond their normal self-defense responsibility.
s..,.6.,.".......,-., ... Table 7-1. Threat Levels
Level Threat Response
I Agents, saboteus, sympathizers, terroists Unit, base, base cluster self-defense
II Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guerrillas Self-defense measures and response forces with supporting fires
III Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations Commitment of tactical combat force

Units in the COMMZ are especially vulnerable to enemy attack because of their focus on support and limited combat capabilities. Combat units located in the COMMZ are usually newly arrived or regenerated and thus have limited combat potential. The ASCC must coordinate responses to all three levels of threat to prevent disruption of support activities, interdiction of LOCs, demoralization of 12/29/2004
forces, and diversion of combat forces.
In the COMMZ, US response forces handle Level II and III threats. Response forces are generally
tactical combat forces (TCFs) and/or host nation forces, depending upon the viability of the host nation
and established host nation agreements. In the COMMZ/JRA, security operations are economy-of-force
operations. US MPs provide security support to all Army operations through execution of their
battlefield mission of area security. MPs are normally designated as the rear operations response force to
defeat Level II threats. The ASCC normally designates a TCF to defeat level III threats. The ASCC may
designate a TCF from any of the following:

Tactical units passing through the rear area to the forward-deployed force.

Units assigned or reconstituted in the rear area. The ASCC may already have units assigned rear security operations (an . MP brigade task force augmented according to the factors of METT-T).

Tactical units of other service components or allies within the theater army under OPCON of the senior army commander.

Tactical units from forward-deployed elements.

A task-organized force from assets disembarking in the theater.

The theater commander's campaign would require significant change should the threat in the rear area
grow to a level that required diverting combat units. The German Army experienced this situation during
World War II on the eastern front. German rear area commanders--confronted with large numbers of
partisan forces--bypassed enemy units and inserted conventional and special operations forces,
disrupting their operations. This threat ultimately required over 25 German divisions dedicated to rear
area security. Table 7-1 lists the three levels of response and typical threats that can trigger the response.
In war, the Army commander integrates Army deception plans with joint force deception plans to ensure
unity of effort. The better the enemy is deceived, the more protection is provided to the friendly force.
Deception operations must be closely coordinated with the JFC's deception staff element (DSE) and
support the JFC's deception plan. The Army commander attaches representatives to the DSE to
participate in deception planning. At the operational level of war, the Army commander uses deception
as one of his major force multipliers. This is particularly important when the relative strength differential
between opposing forces favors the enemy. In war, the Army commander finds deception particularly
attractive as a means to influence the decisions of an opposing commander.
Deception requires planners to view the friendly force from the perspective of its opponent. That
perspective and a notion of how that opposing commander believes the friendly force will act are key to
the deception strategy. The purpose of the deception operation is to cause the enemy to act in a way prejudicial to his best interests. A deception plan seeks to exploit the expectations of the opposing
commander by offering confirming evidence of those expectations. The resultant enemy action must be
to his disadvantage as the actual friendly force plan unfolds. While deception can have a high payoff, it
is difficult to execute successfully.
The Army operational-level commander blends his deception plans into the concept of operation. The deception plan is a viable COA that was considered but not selected. At the operational level of war, the
- 12/29/2004
commander forms a deception cell that includes functional representation from the entire staff. This cell
requires considerable resources to be an effective element of the major operation.
The commander may execute the deception COA as a branch of the major operation. This execution
requires the positioning of forces and the allocation of materiel. If required, the Army operational-level
commander may execute the deception branch of the concept of operation if his selected COA is
compromised. The deception operation must be a viable COA. To be successful, it must cause the
enemy to confirm its preconceived ideas of friendly force actions.
Command relationships in war may evolve during the transition to war to be substantially different from
those exercised during peacetime or conflict. This evolution is the result of several factors, to include
additional ways and means available to the CINC to prosecute the war effort.
Developing the Chain of Command
During the transition from peacetime to wartime, a theater undergoes a process of development. As the
theater expands, the purpose of combat operations grows in complexity and the size and scope of
combat and support force structures increases. This may result in organization of the theater into theaters
of war or theaters of operation as discussed in Chapter 2.
Intermediate Army Headquarters
The requirement to establish an intermediate Army headquarters between the ASCC and the corps
depends on characteristics of the theater environment based on METT-T and the reasons identified in
Section III of Chapter 2. The number of subordinate headquarters that a higher headquarters can control
depends on a number of factors; mission, experience, training, communications abilities, and logistics
are a few. The span of control will be as broad or narrow as the situation dictates.
Numbered Army
The ASCC, with the concurrence of the CINC, establishes a numbered army, designates a numbered
army commander, and provides him with the directive or order that forms his command. This directive
specifies the rationale for establishing the numbered army, the objectives it should meet, and the forces
involved. Numbered armies plan and direct major operations. operations at this level involve the
deployment, movement and maneuver, and fires of land combat power over extended terrain and the
integration of all Army and other service support into the operation. Subordinate tactical commanders
determine the specific tactics in maneuver, fires, intelligence, force protection, C 2, and allocated support.
Primary emphasis at the numbered army level is on planning for future operations.
Exercising Control Through Planning
The Army operational-level commander actively participates in developing the subordinate JFC's theater
of operations campaign plans. He interfaces with the commanders of the other services and directs the preparation of the Army's major operations to support the plan. He issues planning guidance, weighs
various COAs, and develops and coordinates a concept of operations. The Army operational-level
commander ensures that his concept is aligned with that of his superior commander. He coordinates vertically with senior and subordinate commands and horizontally with adjacent and supporting commands and activities. With representatives from the other services, the Army commander
DODDOA-011176 12/29/2004 incorporates sea and airpower in the concept early in the planning process. This power includes fire
support, reconnaissance, sealift, air defense, and airlift.
Planning in wartime at the operational level is continuous and more complex than in other environments
for the following reasons:

The synchronization of functions in large areas over greater periods of time introduces additional variables.

The presence of an enemy with possibly equal or greater capabilities, pursuing actions
independently, causes continuous updating of planning efforts.

The planning process remains relatively the same, while the requirement for joint planning
increases dramatically at nearly all echelons.

The Army operational-level commander must plan for a large number of branches and sequels to help simplify decisions in a time-sensitive war environment.

Establishing Command Relationships
In the directive that creates the Army operational-level echelon, the theater commander establishes
command relationships. These relationships are responsive to the needs of the theater of operation
commander and are unique to the environment in which the echelon is created. This operational-level
echelon may be a numbered army, a designated corps, or any other Army organization that meets the
needs of the JFC. The Army component designs the operational-level echelon to maximize unity of
effort, to allow flexibility in employing subordinate echelons, and to effect a rapid response to changes
in friendly and enemy situations. As the theater expands, the CINC may--

Separate the Army's operations and support functions.

Designate the ASCC as a support headquarter, with OPCON of Army support organizations.

Maintain control of major maneuver forces, or put maneuver forces under OPCON of subordinate joint commanders.

The JFC's staff maintains joint communications interfaces through the JCCC. The ASCC's
communications staff participates in theater joint and multinational communications network planning
and management through its interface with the JCCC. In cases where the ASCC provides the bulk of the
joint force headquarters staffing, the ASCC may be required to operate an integrated JCCC/ASCC
communications management center. Key duties center on network management of voice, data, and
video systems signal interoperability. Frequency and COMSEC management are also key duties. Joint
Pub 6-05.1 provides a detailed description of JCCC organization and functions.
IEW is the commander's key to victory on a battlefield and to success in MOOTW. Intelligence enables commanders to focus, leverage, and protect the combat power and resources at their disposal to win decisively on the modern battlefield and succeed in endeavors short of war.
DODD0A-011177 12/29/2004
Army MI is commander-driven, synchronized, disseminated, split-based, and tactically tailored.
Commander -Driven
The commander drives the intelligence effort. He focuses the intelligence system by clearly designating
his PIR, targeting requirements, and priorities. He ensures that the intelligence efforts are employed
fully and synchronized with maneuver and fire support. He demands that the intelligence battlefield
operating systems provide needed intelligence in the correct form.
The G2/S2 synchronizes intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations to ensure
the commander receives the intelligence he needs, in the form he can use it, in time to influence the
decision-making process. Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps IEW
operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of operatiOns.
Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the simultaneous broadcast of near real-time intelligence from
collectors and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders at all echelons to simultaneously
receive the same intelligence, thereby, providing a common picture of the battlefield. It allows
commanders to skip echelons and pull intelligence directly from the echelon broadcasting it.
Split-based intelligence operations provide deploying tactical commanders with high-resolution
intelligence until their organic intelligence collection assets are employed. These operations augment
organic intelligence production and employ collection and analysis elements from all echelons--national
to tactical--to support bases from which they can operate against the target area.
Tactically Tailored
In force-projection operations, the commander tailors IEW support for each contingency, based on the
mission and availability of resources. He must decide which key intelligence personnel and equipment
to deploy early and when to phase in his remaining MI assets. The ASCC serves as the intelligence
integration headquarters for the Army operational-level commander. The ASCC must have timely
intelligence on the enemy, weather, and terrain; the conditions of the AOR; the civil population; and
related environmental factors. The collection of information and the production and dissemination of
intelligence are continuing processes during peacetime as well as during war.
The ASCC processes and refines intelligence information from many sources to the degree of resolution
necessary to support theater army operations. Sources include the Army, the US command's JIC, DIA,
CIA, NSA, other services, allied forces intelligence agencies, and other federal intelligence investigative
and law enforcement agencies. These sources produce intelligence information on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs of the armed forces of foreign nations and other force, they may sponsor. The ASCC accomplishes his intelligence mission through the ACE.
DODD0A-011178 12/29/2004 The intelligence support elements (ISE) of the MI organization provide 24-hour liaison with the US
Army; with joint, multinational, and allied military organizations with intelligence services; and with US
corps. These liaison elements assist supported organizations in identifying IEW requirements,
establishing priorities, and interfacing directly with the operational-level MI organization. The ISEs
serve as extensions of the ACE and are collocated with the supported organization. These elements
provide a mechanism for US and allied commands to request information on the enemy.
The ISEs facilitate the production and exchange of intelligence, as well as the coordination for EW
support, to include civil broadcast jamming. ISEs also work with unit intelligence officers and assist
with intelligence input to operational planning, situation and target development, and IPB. These
support elements are located at such distances from the ACE that they operate independently. They
respond to the needs of their counterpart agencies and commands at least as often as they respond to the
needs of the ACE.
Operational-level MI organizations support operational planning at ASCC level. This planning provides
predictive intelligence as the ASCC link to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict intelligence support,
intelligence asset management, deep targeting priorities, and SOF operations conducted by subordinate
Direction and Coordination
The CINC provides overall direction and coordination of the intelligence effort of assigned forces.
Through the ACE, the ASCC maintains the means of executing his intelligence function. However, the
theater commander may establish an intelligence organization to perform theater intelligence functions.
When established, this organization also provides the ASCC with the intelligence information required
to supplement the component's organic intelligence capability. In war, Army operational-level
commanders concentrate on several specific areas of intelligence to facilitate military combat
operations. These include--

Identifying enemy capabilities and likely COAs that could affect future major operations.

Targeting specific enemy commanders and echelons for deception.

Determining the best way to protect friendly vulnerabilities and exploit enemy weaknesses.

Updating the PIR.

Using all sources of intelligence efficiently by integrating collection assets to produce
operationally useful products.

Operational Protection
The commander uses the entire intelligence system to support force protection. The intelligence system
is active and proactive, identifying, locating, and targeting an enemy's ability to target and affect
friendly forces. Force protection intelligence products--

Identify and counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities.

Assess friendly vulnerabilities from the enemy's perspective.

DODD0A-01 1179 12/29/2004

Identify the enemy's perception of friendly centers of gravity and how he will attack them or
influence them.

Identify risks to the force.

Identify potential countermeasures to deny enemy access to friendly critical areas.

Contribute to threat avoidance once the risk is identified.

Enable the commander to plan for both passive and active OPSEC, deception, and other security/ measures.

With this intelligence, the commander decides which countermeasures he must use to shield his
intentions, present false images to the enemy commander, and protect his force.
CI operations counteract foreign intelligence and terrorist threats to the friendly force. Their specialty is
support to force protection.
Rear Area Operations
IEW contributes to the rear battle by helping to identify, analyze, wargame, and provide early warning
of potential threats to the friendly rear area. IEW also contributes by identifying terrain that supports
friendly rear area operations.
In war, the CINC may designate the ASCO to have a predominately support focus. In this role, the
ASCC has a number of logistics and support responsibilities. The ASCC may also have support
responsibilities for other US and allied forces as a result of established agreements or as assigned by the
CINC. The ASCC provides primary support within the theater through subordinate groups, brigades,
and commands specifically organized and allocated to accomplish the theater support mission. The
ASCC maintains organizational flexibility by tailoring the type and number of support units to the
mission requirements and by planning for the expansion of the support capability. Some specific support
requirements the ASCC commander executes are base development; engineer support; replacement
training; support; reception, staging, and onward movement; and reconstitution.
Base Development
The ASCC role in base development is key in the operational support capability because it focuses on long-term support. The ASCC is responsible for a portion of the joint sustainment base (LOCs, ports, bases airfields, and units responsible for operating each). The CINC assigns the Army's portion of the sustainment base.
Engineer Support. DODDOA-01 1180
The ASCC supplies engineer support to provide the facilities needed in the COMMZ to receive, stage, move, and support combat forces. The ASCC must ensure that his LOCs remain open. He must either establish or maintain his supporting base and provide engineer support to other services. Engineers in
http://ati am. train. 12/29/2004 the theater give priority to general engineering and survivability functions.
Replacement Training
The ASCC provides the means to train replacements. Normally, he establishes a training center that is
the focal point for regeneration. The center trains replacements and assigns them individually or as
crews, squads, and platoons. Resource constraints may require the commander to delay the training of
Responsiveness and Suitability
The ASCC ensures that support is suitable and responsive to the priorities of the CINC and to subordinate commands. At this level ASCC resource management (prioritizing, stockpiling, and so forth) has a long-range perspective. The ASCC forms a logistics operations cell to orchestrate element', of the support process. This element ensures that current priorities, intentions, and operations support the requirements of the ARFOR in theater. This organization balances the needs for current operations against the needs for future operations and advises the ASCC accordingly.
Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement
The ASCC is normally responsible for reception and onward movement of Army forces. As the ASCC conducts reception operations, he receives forces at aerial ports and seaports and equips, fuels, fixes, arms, moves, decontaminates, if required, and protects these forces as they pass through the support base to their tactical assembly area. Operational-level army logistics commanders, support elements, and advance parties for incoming units must ensure that augmentation forces are equipped rapidly and deployed to designated marshaling areas. Incoming forces are required to perform many of their support functions, receiving only minimum-essential services and support from the ASCC. Reception operations may begin before hostilities start and continue until hostilities cease. Reception operations and support operations are similar and occur concurrently.
The ASCC plans and conducts operational-and tactical-level reconstitution operations. FM 100-9 defines reconstitution as "extraordinary actions taken by commanders to restore combat-attrited units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources." The ASCC is concerned primarily with the regeneration option of reconstitution--the rebuilding of a unit through the large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; the establishment of C 2, and the conduct of mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt unit. The ASCC must ensure time and resources are allotted to conduct reconstitution operations. The ASCC draws from the CONUS base, using intertheater and intratheater assets based upon the mission of the JFC. Reconstitution is normally done in preparation for future operations in the operational sequence. If regeneration of a unit is undertaken, the ASCC must understand the effects those operations may have on established support operations. Reconstitution may adversely affect both support and reception operations.
A reconstitution planning cell is located in the ASCC operations section. Assignment of this task to the G3 (operations) section reveals that reconstitution is first and foremost an operational decision. This cell plans for the reconstitution operations in preparation for future operations. The ASCC employs the cell as part of the reconstitution assessment and evaluation team (AET) that performs liaison functions and assists the ASCC in implementing detailed reconstitution efforts. The reconstitution planning cell may
DODDOA011181 12/29/2004
be eniployed as part of the C 2 of the reconstitution task force.
The ASCC synchronizes reconstitution with all other functions within the theater. Properly planned and executed reconstitution actions do not detract from combat efforts but enhance them. In the offense, well-executed reconstitution efforts maintain the momentum of the attack by prolonging the unit's arrival at its culminating point. In the defense, reconstitution preserves combat power potential and allows the operational-level commander greater freedom of action.
Upon successful termination of combat operations, the deployed forces transition to a period of postconflict operations prior to redeployment. This transition may occur even if residual combat operations are occurring in other parts of the theater of operations. Anticipation and early planning for postconflict operations eases the transition process. The JFC must determine the conditions to which the operations area is to be returned.
According to the CINC's directives, the ASCC must oversee the orderly transition of authority to appropriate US, international, interagency, or host nation agencies. The ASCC and subordinate commanders emphasize those activities that reduce postconflict or postcrisis turmoil and help stabilize the situation. Commanders must also address the decontamination, disposal, and destruction of war materiel; the removal and destruction of unexploded ordnance; and the responsibility for demining operations. The consolidation of friendly and available enemy mine field reports is critical to this mission. Additionally, the ASCC must be prepared to provide health service support (HSS), emergency restoration of utilities, support to social needs of the indigenous population, and other humanitarian activities as required.
The US historical perspective Upon the successful termination of past conflicts has been rapid redeployment and demobilization. Redeployment and demobilization should occur at a pace that does not disrupt the ability of the ASCC to execute continuing missions. The successful termination of war activities leads to transition to the state of peacetime. Still, the possibility always exists that resumption of hostilities may occur. Thus, units must rapidly convert to a wartime posture and be prepared to conduct wartime operations. During this period, force protection is vital in order to prevent undue harm to US forces.
DODD0A-011182 12/29/2004
Military Operations Other Than War
This chapter discusses Army MOOTW--operations in two states of the range of military operations:
peacetime and conflict. Peacetime is a state in which diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
powers of the nation are employed to achieve national objectives. Since peacetime is the preferred state
of affairs (as opposed to conflict or war), how well the Army and other services accomplish their
missions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.
Conflict is a unique environment in which the ARFOR commander works closely with diplomatic
leaders to control hostilities, with the goal of returning to peacetime conditions. In conflict, the military,
as an element of national power, takes on a more prominent role than in peacetime. The Army
participates in conflict as a cor iponent of a joint organization that is usually an element of a
multinational structure. Other US Government agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations
(I0s) often participate.
Army warfighting doctrine is based on well-established principles of war. MOOTW are based on similar
principles that guide the force's actions. The principles of war apply for those actions that involve our
forces in combat. For MOOTW that do not require direct combat, the principles are objective, unity of
effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. FMs 100-5 and 100-23 describe these principles
and their application. These principles are not immutable, but serve as guides for action. Commanders
must balance these principles against the specific missions and nature of the operation.
In planning for military operations in peacetime and conflict, commanders must tailor a force that is
suitable for the mission. Suitability is the measure of a force's capability against possible threats and the
diplomatic acceptability of the chosen force. Acceptability is based on the force's appropriateness, given
diplomatic considerations, and qualities that are consistent with accomplishment of national interests
and objectives. The commander's acceptability of the force includes the perceptions of the indigenous
population, the international community, and the American public. Force capability is the measure of a
unit's ability to counter an expected threat and execute a mission. A force must have the capability to
accomplish a military mission by virtue of its training, equipment, and structure.
The force composition for MOOTW must be proportionate to the stated goals of the sponsoring
authority and provide sufficient capability to complete the mission and protect the force. The perception
that the force employed exceeds the limits of its mandate lessens legitimacy with the international
community, the US public, and the indigenous population. Capability and acceptability are not constants
but vary based upon the threat, the intensity of operations, the missions to be performed, and changing
international perceptions.
The composition of the force should reflect the commander's consideration of the military end state,
METT-T, mission-specific training requirements, strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, joint and
multinational military forces, reserve component forces, nonmilitary US agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and
host nations forces. The nature of MOOTW is such that CS and CSS units may have an equal if not
greater role than combat units.
DODD0A-011183 12/29/2004
The Army's responsibilities in peacetime are as important as its traditional combat roles. During peacetime, senior army commanders are always postured to present a deterrent to internal or external threats to US national interests. They do this by conducting routine peacetime operations and nonhostile
At the direction of national leaders, CINCs may use ARFOR to perform noncombat missions that
support diplomatic initiatives. Army leaders then carry out these activities as part of the overall unified
command plan. These activities may include job training exercises, peace support operations, nation
assistance activities, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security assistance, shows of force, and
support for counterdrug operations.
The commander ofa unified command, such as. PACOM and ACOM, may control and coordinate military support to domestic emergencies in the states of Alaska and Hawaii and territories and possessions of the US. CINCs must continuously assess their regions to identify the strategic situation
and situations requiring military forces for noncombat missions. Armed forces may be tasked with direct responsibility, or they may conduct operations that support other US Government agencies.
The Army's role in peacetime is to support the regional CINC's efforts to prevent unstable situations
from developing into the loss of local control or open conflict. Senior army commanders may do this by
conducting routine activities that maintain the potential of ARFOR to conduct major operations. This potential may serve as a deterrent, or it can enhance the capability to react in emergencies. Army
component forces may turn this potential into actual mission execution to actively control a situation. As ASCCs or other senior army commanders respond to the regional CINC, they may be required to
conduct peacetime operations in one region while simultaneously conducting conflict and/or war
operations in others.
In peacetime, SOF help attain peacetime military objectives and may promote regional stability by
advising, training, and assisting allies. SOF peacetime activities could be the conduct of US humanitarian assistance programs, security assistance programs, and multinational training exercises.
Like conventional forces, SOF are a deterrent. In multinational operations, SOF involvement with allies
worldwide contributes to deterrence and provides a low-visibility means of extending US influence.
Due to extensive unconventional warfare (UW) training, SOF are well-suited to conduct various peacetime operations and provide various types of support. SOF should be considered the force of
choice for peacetime missions. General-purpose forces may also be called for their particular specialties
or when the scope of operations is so vast that conventional forces are required.
The operational-level functions discussed here are used as a starting point to discuss the ASCC in peacetime. Some systems, such as operational fires, may not have extensive peacetime applications.
Still, the operational-level commander and his staff need to analyze each function and its corresponding subfunctions, augmenting or deleting as necessary to ensure the proper integration and synchronization of all peacetime operations and activities.
DODDOA-0111 84 /fm/100-7/f1007_13.htm 12/29/2004

Movement and Maneuver
The CINC may use armored, light, or special operations Army forces and their corresponding CS or
CSS structures available within the region. Some situations require deployment of additional units via
strategic lift. The MCA provides for the orderly flow of these forces and resources. The ASCC receives
and prepares incoming units for operations. Since peacetime operations are normally conducted in a
permissive environment, CS or CSS units may be the predominant elements and deploy early to prepare
to support the arrival of other units.
The CINC may assign operating forces a JOA, but he generally uses few boundaries or other special
control measures. Normally, the ASCC, a subordinate Army commander, or a JFC employs these forces
to execute a specific MOOTW mission. Each operation is discrete in response to a specific situation,
though it may be sequenced with past and future operations. Execution focuses on near-term operations.
Peacetime operations often require special engineer, legal, CA, PSYOP, and PA considerations. Once
the operating force completes its mission, it redeploys to its home station or continues peacetime
activities in theater with little requirement for consolidation operations or other transition efforts.
Protecting forces and resources from a wide range of threats is an important responsibility for all senior
commanders. In force-projection contingency operations, the threat of the use of WMD must be
continually tracked to preclude unacceptable risk to the force. Options for protection from these
weapons encompass the politico-military range and include diplomatic defusing and deterrence through
NBC readiness, active and passive defense, air defense, and WMD reduction. The ASCC directs
measures in peacetime to conserve military potential so that it can be applied at a decisive place and
Protecting the force depends on current, accurate intelligence for I&W of possible obstacles or threats.
Protection includes conducting antiterrorism measures, maintaining discipline and order, and providing
limited deception measures. As part of protecting the force, the ASCC issues the peacetime ROE
established by the regional commander in coordination with JCS, the host nation, and the ambassador.
Through an operational risk assessment, the ASCC ensures the conservation and safety of the force.
Providing air defense of the force and selected geopolitical assets has a deterrent value. It also has an
advantage that it is seen as a nonescalatory measure.
Conducting Antiterrorism Measures
Terrorist acts overseas are a constant threat to US armed forces, civilians, and facilities. The ASCC
presumes civil authorities and host governments will implement counterterrorism procedures to protect
people within their territory. The CINC ensures coordination of all local antiterrorist policies and
measures for protecting DOD facilities, equipment, personnel, and family members abroad. The ASCC
may assist in implementing specific antiterrorist actions called for by terrorist threat conditions
(THREATCONs) discussed later in this chapter. The theater commander's peacetime ROE provide a
flexible self-defense and deterrent posture. These rules deal with terrorist and other threats.
Maintaining Discipline and Order
Good order and discipline are instrumental for conserving military potential. The ASCC establishes a command climate conducive to this end. He ensures the maintenance of proper liaison with DOD police organizations as well as with local or host nation, allied, and interagency police agencies. Within Army
DODDOA-011185 12/29/2004 organizations, the ASCC facilitates Army MP and Criminal Investigation Command elements investigating offenses. In addition, the ASCC enforces the policies of the senior army commanders. The ASCC may provide prisoner confinement facilities for those who violate good order and discipline.
Providing Limited Deception Measures
Peacetime operations usually require little deception beyond normal OPSEC. OPSEC, or the information measures the ASCC uses, must be consistent with established guidelines and may require interagency
A major challenge for any force taking part in peacetime operations is to be organized to accomplish the
goals of the sponsoring authority and provide sufficient capability to protect the force. The committed
ARFOR must be sufficiently lethal and survivable to protect itself, deter possible aggression, and
accomplish its mission. This specialized force must be capable of performing both, hostile and nonhostile
actions simultaneously throughout its AO. The ASCC must always have available and continuously plan
for the employment of a joint or multinational force suite of fire support systems. A credible operational
fires capability deters aggression and increases the options available to the commander to accomplish his
mission and protect the force.
Fire support units provide more than lethal and nonlethal fires during MOOTW. Fire support
coordinators and operational-level planners must establish liaison early to start planning and
coordinating targeting functions (operational IPB, high-payoff target selection, target acquisition and
attack system selection/tasking, and BDA planning) should fires be needed. The organization and
equipment of fire support units can augment the C 3I collection and other capabilities of the joint or
multinational force.
Doctrine for fires and the basic tasks of fire support do not change during MOOTW. Still, the MOOTW
environment presents unique challenges that affect tactics, techniques, and procedures for fires and
require the meticulous attention of planners. Planners must consider the characteristics of the MOOTW
threat and their impact on both operational fires and fire support.
The MOOTW AO typically presents threats that do not conform to linear operations. Threats are diverse
and may manifest themselves anywhere at any time, making them difficult to predict. Threat personnel
and activities may be indistinguishable from friendly until hostilities are initiated. The prevalent threat in
MOOTW is from hostile terrorist, guerilla, or partisan activities. Additionally, environmental factors
(weather, disease) pose a serious threat. In some scenarios, they will be the prevalent threat. Normally,
MOOTW threats do not involve a sophisticated military force unless hostilities have escalated to the
realm of conflict or the threat is capable of rapidly massing and dispersing military or paramilitary force
to achieve its objectives. MOOTW threat activities include hit and run harassing tactics such as attacks
and raids, mining and booby traps, sabotage, deception, and psychological warfare designed to
embarrass and demoralize friendly governments and forces.
External support from other nations for the indigenous MOOTW threat and adaptation of friendly
operations to the local geography compound the problem. External support of the threat extends the
problem to the international diplomatic arena, usually increasing the restrictions and constraints on
military options. The extremes in geography require organizations to prepare for and adapt to variations
in terrain and vegetation and the impact of seasonal weather changes.
- 12/29/2004
All of these aspects of the MOOTW threat impact planning and execution of operational fires. The range
of threats in an MOOTW environment impact both operational fires and fire support. First, all friendly
forces are vulnerable. No rear area enjoys relative security. This vulnerability requires establishment of
integrated base defenses with a mutually supporting fires capability. Fires must first support the
increased security requirements for both position defense and movement. Second, planners must
recognize the restrictions and constraints of ROE on the application of force. Planners must then
consider indirect and nonlethal fires, in addition to direct fire systems, when they write ROE. ROE
should address appropriate responses to various expected threat actions and force protection. The
diversity of available fire support systems, including those of coalition forces, requires that ROE include
weapon system and munition selection as well. At all echelons of command, ROE significantly impact
all aspects of fire planning, target acquisition, and attack. Finally, the nonspecific nature of MOOTW
threats requires continuous planning. Consideration must be given to mutual support between adjacent
units or bases and even AOs.
The fleeting nature of the threat requires near real-time target acquisition and sensor-to-shooter links.
Target acquisition systems must be capable of distinguishing between friendly and threat activity. This
capability increases the importance of HUMINT and IMINT sources, which provide real time eyes on
targets such as patrols, police, SOF, UAV/RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), and J-STARS (joint
surveillance target and attack radar system). Ground surveillance, countermortar, and counterbattery
radars are equally important and have special employment considerations in the MOOTW environment.
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems may provide valuable situation development information, but
the need to verify target descriptions limits ELINT responsiveness and utility as a target acquisition
system for triggering target attack.
These considerations highlight the need for close coordination among joint, multinational, and coalition
force operations; intelligence; and fires representatives at the ASCC headquarters. Although these
considerations are not all-inclusive, they may appear to focus fire support at lower echelons rather than
operational fires. Still, the MOOTW environment forces the ASCC/ARFOR to plan meticulously,
coordinate, and execute application of force.
To expedite fire support coordination, fire planning, and clearance of fires, special arrangements are
required with the host nation military, allied nations, joint services, and national and local civilian
authorities. These arrangements include determining communication requirements, identifying liaison
personnel, and establishing procedures--all focused on the interoperability of the multinational force
effort to support peacekeeping objectives.
Within NATO and the ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australian) quadripartite working group,
special agreements exist which facilitate fire support operations. These are NATO standardization
agreements (STANAGs) and quadripartite standardization agreements (QSTAGs). Many countries that
the US may support have no bilateral fire support agreements. Action may be required, based on the
situation, to establish agreements. Support in these efforts may be arranged through the appropriate DOS
agencies and country teams. This increase in centralized C 2 oft fires is needed for civil-military
cooperation, developing and adhering to ROE, establishing appropriate procedures for clearance of fires,
and establishing an appropriate joint/multinational force staff structure to plan, coordinate, and, when
necessary, control operational fires.
Command and Control
Peacetime operations contribute to stability and conflict prevention in order to complement diplomatic initiatives. The ASCC may conduct a wide range of peacetime operations that directly or indirectly stabilize a situation or contribute to the general welfare. Contingency force-projection operations 12/29/2004
develOp through CAP (see Chapter 6). These actions may evolve into longer-term commitments such as regional peacekeeping operations. Other peacetime operations may begin as long-term commitments that may require deliberate planning. Examples include overt PSYOP programs, nation assistance, and
security assistance.
Command relationships in peacetime are normally based on the in-place theater structure that conducts routine peacetime activities. These peacetime relationships require special sensitivity to and
coordination with nonmilitary organizations. As a result, operational-level command relationships and
unity of command may be clouded.
The Ambassador
The ambassador is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government
interagency activities within a particular country. The ASCC's staff, under the direction of the unified
commander's diplomatic-military staff element, may integrate ARFOR to support the ambassador.
Military commanders must work closely with the ambassador and his country team to assure effective
exchange of information and coordination. Sometimes, the military commander may be a part of the
country team and directly advise the ambassador.
The Commander in Chief
The CINC may use forward-deployed Army units in theater when the NCA directs. In such a case,
command relationships change little from routine peacetime activities. The ASCC controls ARFOR
operations and recommends and coordinates the use of contingency forces and mobilization of reserve
forces from outside the theater. In such a case, the CINC may use existing command relationships, or, if
the mission requires forces of multiple services, he may establish a JTF. The ASCC may advise the
CINC to integrate reserve component forces either in a training status or brought to active duty for an
extended period to assist in executing operations.
The ASCC needs high-quality, timely intelligence to conduct peacetime operations. The ACE serves as
the clearinghouse for all-source intelligence. The ACE maintains lists of I&W that the ASCC uses to
anticipate peacetime operations. The ACE produces intelligence information and disseminates it to
commanders and staff agencies for use. This intelligence effort must address diplomatic and economic
information as well as information related to potential natural disasters. Based on these indicators and
CINC guidance, the. ASCC focuses the collection and processing of information on specific peacetime
Intelligence provides a basis for all US plans and operations in MOOTW. The nature of MOOTW is one
of heavy involvement with the host nation populace, government, and military. Due to this heavy
involvement with the host nation, most activities in MOOTW are HUMINT-intensive. HUMINT
operations provide valuable intelligence, as well as I&W on threat activities and operations. HUMINT
provides timely information on threat capabilities and intentions. HUMINT collects information by
interrogation, observation, elicitation of personnel, and exploitation of documents and material.
HUMINT is also the most effective intelligence discipline available to the threat. Consequently, counter-
HUMINT operations are the key to the success of any activity in MOOTW. Counter-HUMINT
operations are used to degrade or neutralize threat espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities.
Close liaison with a variety of US and host nation military and civil organizations is critical to the
DODD0A-011188 .iu/100-7/fl 007_13 .htm 12/29/2004
success of any MOOTW activity. This liaison is imperative for coordination, intelligence collecting, and information sharing. CI personnel are uniquely suited to this task. As a minimum, CI personnel must coordinate with members of the US country team, US MI units, US MP units, CA units, PSYOP units, HN regional and urban area coordination centers, HN intelligence and security forces, and FIN military, paramilitary, and police.
Battle Space
In MOOTW, commanders seek to counter the threat's effects in a given battle space. The threats in
MOOTW will vary between each MOOTW activity. Battle space is a physical volume that expands or
contracts in relation to the ability to influence and counter the threat. A higher commander does not
assign battle space, which extends beyond the limits of the commander's AO. Battle space is based on
the premise that the commander's thinking expands to develop a vision for countering the threat before
any mental constraints are emplaced, such as boundaries, legal mandates, or terms of reference (TOR).
Battle space includes all friendly assets available to counter the threat. In MOOTW, pure combat power
is only a small portion of the true battle space. Other assets may include the diplomatic efforts of
embassy officials, liaisons with host nation governments and military agencies, as well as the efforts of NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.
Unity of effort is essential to operations within a given battle space. Ownership of assets is less important than application of their effects toward countering the threat. An understanding of battle space
allows commanders to keep their options open, synchronize all friendly assets, and counter the threat. As the commander considers the mission, as well as any perceived mission creep, he can visualize his battle
space throughout the operation and how the battle space may change as he moves to counter the threat.
Area studies provide host nation weather and geographical information, as well as basic intelligence
(seaports, airports, transportation systems, water storage, POL storage, building materials availability) helpful in preparing for natural disasters and other contingency-type operations. Forward presence, both through permanent stationing and periodic deployment of CONUS-based HUMINT resources, is
essential to this effort.
The theater-level MI organization continuously develops and refines indicator lists. These lists allow the
ASCC to monitor diplomatic, military, and economic conditions in the area. Army intelligence sources provide the necessary information and intelligence to identify and predict potential threats. All source
intelligence analysis provides the ASCC with the necessary information to protect his forces,
noncombatants, and resources. It alsb allows him to prepare for future operations while minimizing the
probability of surprise from a potential threat.
The ASCC is responsible for developing and providing the elements of sustainment for ARFOR within a
region and for other services, based on executive agent responsibilities for common servicing. Unless
directed by national authority, NGOs and PV0s will provide their respective support. Strategic logistics
support is projected from CONUS and other OCONUS sites, using all national resources, including
USAMC, DLA, other services, and commercial sources. The ASCC provides logistics, direction, and prioritization. The ASCC staff monitors all support activities to ensure smooth, daily sustainment of the
force. The ASCC seeks to conserve Army resources whenever possible by using contractors, the host nation, or other viable sources of support. In peacetime, the CONUS support base continues to project logistics support from national resources. The ASCC monitors the support of the soldier as well.
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The Army personnel system and training base provide a supply of qualified soldiers into forward­
deployed/forward-presence theaters or to units that may deploy into any region. The following agencies
provide daily support to soldiers and their family members:

Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Legal Services Agency.

Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.

Community and Family Support Center.

Other Army staff field operating agencies.

The ASCC may coordinate augmentation of this support through other services or allies.
Combat health support (CHS) of soldiers includes all services performed, provided, or arranged by the
Army Medical Department to promote, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of
personnel in the Army and, as directed, in other services, agencies, and organizations. The surgeon
general has overall worldwide responsibility for Army health care. Senior army commanders and service
components must ensure their soldiers and their soldiers' family members receive these services
effectively. In theater, the CHS system provides care in Echelons I through IV, ultimately leading to
treatment in the US. Senior commanders ensure that the Army health care system provides preventive
measures, progressive treatment, hospitalization, and evacuation of service members and their families.
In developed theaters the support structure is available to support peacetime operations. This structure
includes host nation, contract, and interservice support agreements. Forces conducting peacetime
operations integrate their operations into this structure.
When operating forces require support not present in theater or operate in an austere theater, the ASCC
plans and coordinates support arrangements either unilaterally or with joint support agencies. Army
commanders develop tailored support packages to provide essential support for the ARFOR. This could
include functional and area army commands to provide large-scale or long-term support. These
considerations provide operational-level commanders with general synchronization requirements
applicable to most peacetime operations.
Training for war is the Army's top priority. The ASCC provides the direction, purpose, and necessary
motivation to his subordinates to successfully accomplish the training mission. The ASCC outlines his
intent and then ensures that his subordinates focus on mission-essential task lists (METLs). Most
missions during peacetime can be accomplished by a disciplined force proficient in METL tasks.
Subordinate METLs must support the CINC's theater strategy.
Historical Perspective
On 5 April 1991,
President Bush announced the beginning of a humanitarian assistance mission in northern Iraq to provide relief to Kurdish refugees who had fled into the mountains to avoid persecution by the Iraqi Government and military. Operation Provide Comfort was a joint and multinational 12/29/2004
operation executed with no formal agreements among agencies and countries.
The threat to be countered was truly a multifaceted one. The immediate threat to the Kurdish people involved their living conditions in the mountains of northern Iraq. Temperatures day and night were below freezing. Food, water, and shelter were unavailable, and disease was running rampant through the refugee population. The secondary threat involved the continued presence of the Iraqi military and secret police. Since Iraqi military units were present in the area, the Kurds were unwilling to leave the perceived safety of the rugged mountains to receive the assistance available in the northern Iraqi cities.
Under the umbrella and battle space of Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort, two distinctly different JTFs were formed. JTF-A was involved with countering the immediate physical threat to the Kurds. This JTF set up and administered the actual humanitarian assistance operation. Battle space for JTF-A was far-reaching and included the supplies and personnel from many NGOs, PVOs, and IDs; logistical assistance and personnel from units that were already in-theater for Operation Desert Storm; and logistics and personnel from Europe and CONUS.
JTF-B was involved with countering the secondary threat, which was the continued presence of the Iraqi military and their effects on the Kurds. This JTF opened a security zone in northern Iraq that facilitated the return of the Kurdish people to northern cities, such as Zakho, where they could be given humanitarian assistance. The baffle space for JTF-B included combat power that was in theater for Operation Desert Storm, units and equipment from all branches of service stationed in Europe and CONUS, and units from multiple nations that had volunteered to participate in the operation. Battle space for CTF Provide Comfort also included the diplomatic efforts of the US and UN to counter the threats to the region.
The ASCC goes beyond these fundamental training considerations. Since much of the operational-level
EAC support structure resides in the reserve components, the ASCC must be involved with active and
reserve component training as well as with joint requirements and potentially multinational training.
Training during peacetime must prepare ARFOR for missions across the range of military operations
and support the national defense policy of strategic deterrence. Training for leaders may be much
broader than the subordinate METL indicate to ensure the leader flexibility required for conducting both
warfighting and MOOTW missions. Peacetime operations take advantage of the established support
structure and capabilities of the support and service support elements that sustain the routine peacetime
ASCC peacetime operations include, but are not limited to, security assistance, nation assistance, search
and rescue, CA, NEO peacekeeping, shows of force, support to counterdrug operations, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The Army conducts security assistance operations to provide military articles, training, and defense­related services authorized by statute law. Security assistance is a key element of US foreign policy, with DOS as the lead agent supported by DOD. These operations are strictly controlled by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals with international military education and training (IMET), or the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which deals with foreign military sales. The US Government provides security assistance on a credit or cash basis to the host nation. Senior army commanders must be careful not to commit the US Government to providing any assistance that could be construed as security
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The in-country security assistance office (SAO) is the military focal point for formulating, planning, and
executing these programs. Theater CINCs make significant contributions, to include supervision,
support, selection, and command of SAOs. The ASCC contributes to developing assistance
requirements. CONUS-based units are usually called on to provide security assistance training teams.
Still, in-theater or OCONUS-based units could also provide the training. Training provides the most
lasting military contribution for security assistance efforts. Security assistance officials, in rare
circumstances, may direct the Army to transfer military hardware or materiel to foreign nations in
response to a crisis requiring a surge of military support.
Nation assistance programs promote stability and orderly progress, thus contributing to the prevention of
conflict. If internal conflict has begun, the goal of nation assistance is to aid in removing its root causes.
Nation assistance becomes a primary means of bringing the conflict to a successful resolution according
to the internal defense and development strategy. Nation assistance consists of general missions such as
assisting with development-related infrastructure projects, training health care workers, and improving
the professionalism of national military forces. Nation assistance missions can generate useful good will
toward the US and assist friendly governments.
Search and rescue operations are sophisticated actions requiring precise execution. They may be
clandestine or overt. They may include the rescue of US or foreign nationals or items critical to US
national security. Rescue operations require timely intelligence and detailed planning. They usually
involve highly trained special units but may be supported by general-purpose forces. Search and rescue
operations may be required in peacetime as well as in conflict and war.
NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate US civilian noncombatants and nonessential US military
personnel from locations in a foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably the US. An NEO is
normally conducted to evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile environment or
natural disaster. NEOs may also, include the selective evacuation of citizens of the host nation and third­
country nationals.
NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancy of an objective, perhaps using temporarily disabling
technologies to minimize casualties and end with planned withdrawals. They may include the use of
force. Under ideal circumstances, little or no opposition to the operation exists. Still, commanders must
anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. If military forces are employed in an NEO, they usually
comprise units from more than one service. The regional CINC, on being ordered to support an NEO,
designates a JFC to exercise overall control of the operations involved in the NEO.
Evacuation operations differ from other military operations, since direction of the operation may remain
with the American ambassador at the time of the evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is a
diplomatic-- rather than a military--decision, with extensive ramifications. FM 90-29 provides details on
NEO operations.
DODD0A-011192 007_13 .htm 12/29/2004 Military peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The single, most important requirement of a peacekeeping operation is consent to the operation by all the parties to the dispute. Such consent represents an explicit agreement, permitting the introduction of a neutral third party.
The US may participate in peacekeeping operations under the sponsorship of the UN or other I0s, such
as the Organization of American States, or in cooperation with other countries. The UN has been the
most frequent sponsor of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations
that require the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a
participant. Based on the peacekeeping mandate and the stationing agreement, specific TOR, follow-on
command directives, and ROE are established.
Shows of force lend credibility to the nation's promises and commitments, increase its regional
influence, and demonstrate resolve. These operations can influence other governments or politico­
military organizations to respect US interests and international law. These operations can take the form
of aircraft and ship visits, multinational training exercises, forward deployment of military forces, and
introduction or buildup of military forces in a region. The appearance of a credible, trained military
force underscores national policy interests and commitment, improves host-nation military readiness and
morale, and provides an insight into US values.
Support to counterdrug operations complies with the national drug control strategy, complements the
efforts of law enforcement agencies, and supports foreign governments. At the level of national strategy,
the NCA places increasing importance on the role of DOD in controlling the flow of drugs across US
borders. The objective of military counterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the US.
Military support is therefore a balanced effort to attack the flow of illegal drugs at the source, while in
transit, and during distribution in the US. Military counterdrug activities may also be used to support
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and to combat terrorism.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are unique peacetime operations because they
could be conducted within CONUS. Recent examples in the US have included assistance rendered in the
northwest states to contain forest fires and relief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and
Andrew in 1992. These operations fall within the category of support to domestic civil authorities.
Examples of in-theater operations include famine relief efforts in Somalia and hurricane relief
operations in Hawaii following Hurricane Iniki.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations provide emergency relief to victims of natural or
man-made disasters. These operations may include refugee assistance, food preparation and distribution
programs, medical treatment and care, damage assessment and control, forensic identification,
maintenance of law and order, reestablishment of communications networks, and sanitation/water
ARFOR are committed to these operations when localities become overwhelmed by the extent of the
situation and can no longer provide basic human needs and protection. The ability to respond on short
notice with a wide array of capabilities is a unique attribute of the Army. The length of commitment is
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normally limited to the time that communities and other government and private agencies can handle
continued operations by themselves. When properly executed, military participation in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations has long-term positive effects. Overseas, such participation
demonstrates good will and engenders mutual respect. At home, it provides soldiers the opportunity to
demonstrate their skills while helping their fellow citizens.
Although not a peacetime operation, CA and PSYOP are critical operations that aid commanders in
accomplishing their peacetime objectives. Commanders at all levels must understand the depth and
capabilities of CA and psychological support found throughout any given command. Commanders must
understand the CA and PSYOP ability to support US and allied armed forces.
Civil Affairs
ARFOR execute CA programs to support the unified commander. During peacetime, CA support is
often provided as an ancillary benefit to deployments for training. CA units are suited to both short-term
and longer-term involvement. To be effective in short-term operations, these programs require
continuous preparation, regional expertise, and consistent coordination between civil and military
authorities. This preparation is best achieved through peacetime involvement in the theater.
Psychological Operations
ARFOR PSYOP forces execute PSYOP to support the unified commander and US national interests.
Throughout the range of military operations, PSYOP is a vital force employed to optimize the influence
of US national policy on foreign target audiences, whether neutral, hostile, or friendly. In MOOTW,
PSYOP provides the commander with the capability to project the purpose and mission of US forces and
to influence target audience behavior to support the commander's mission.
PSYOP is a force multiplier, providing long-range, mid- to long-term support of the unified
commander's intent. While classified as SOF, PSYOP is a general force multiplier. This support exists at
all levels of command and operations--from strategic to tactical. PSYOP units are regionally focused
and maintain extensive historical research and expertise on the sociological, economical, and religious
practices and on the languages of a given AO. ARFOR PSYOP support US Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
Air Force, and allied forces. Except for PSYOP-unique equipment and military occupational specialties
(MOS), the unit of attachment sustains PSYOP elements. For PSYOP to achieve maximum
effectiveness, planners must include it in the planning process early.
Operations conducted in' peacetime are designed to preclude the onset of conflict. Due to factors that
may not be controlled, conflict may evolve. Because the transition to conflict may occur in a gradual or
abrupt manner, the ARFOR commander must prepare for either eventuality. The operational METT-T
assessment provides the mental process for the continuing reevaluation of the operational environment.
That reevaluation aids the identification of needed Army capabilities in the event of conflict. Such
identification assists national-level decision makers in determining mobilization requirements.
The theater CINC organizes his AOR for orderly and rapid transition from a peacetime posture to
different levels of hostility. This process is sequential and sufficiently flexible to respond to any
situation. The transition process must be responsive enough to diplomatic initiatives to be halted or
DODD0A-011194 12/29/2004
reversed once it has begun. The CINC must be sensitive to the fact that a prolonged state of heightened readiness for combat without action may drain resources and adversely affect morale.
The ASCC translates mission orders from the CINC into plans and military operations. If mobilization is
required, AMOPES--the Army system that supports JOPES--provides a disciplined planning procedure
for conducting Army mobilization, deployment, planning, and execution (see also FM 100-17). The
ASCC and appropriate Army commanders review the mobilization requirements established in
AMOPES, CONPLANs, and OPLANs to meet the situation. C 2 relationships are likely to change as
levels of hostility and military involvement increase.
Commanders participate in joint and multinational planning efforts and coordinate and prepare ARFOR
for deployment and employment. Finally, commanders contribute ARFOR ready to meet joint and
multinational operational requirements and to establish a logistical base to support fielded Army units.
The theater CINC, with concurrence from the NCA, determines when all or part of his AOR is in a state
of conflict. Conflict is a state of hostile opposition among organized parties or groups within a nation, or
between or among nations, and usually involves irregular forces to achieve limited diplomatic or
military objectives. Conflict is often protracted, and irregular forces often dominate.
Military actions may be confined to geographic areas. When US Army units are directly engaged in
conflict, they can expect guidelines on weaponry and the degree of force authorized. Diplomatic leaders
will likely limit objectives to those achievable with short, focused, and direct application of military
force. Even though limited in scope, these short applications of force may be part of a campaign or
major operation phased over an extended period. The NCA or the CINC may further limit the conduct of
military operations to a specific geographic area.
The Army's Role
The Army's role in conflict is to assist a JFC in gaining control, deterring escalation, and restoring order.
Conflict operations are challenging because they require a measured application of military force
sufficient to accomplish the designated objectives. Typically, conflict occurs in diplomatically-charged
situations within specific legal boundaries. ARFOR operate in a hostile environment with a high
probability of physical confrontation; though sometimes, combat operations may not occur. Army
leaders may conduct operations very similar to operations during war but execute them with both
restraints and constraints placed on the use of firepower and maneuver.
Senior army commanders must keep four factors in mind when considering operations in conflict:
coordination, balance, planning for uncertainty, and identification of risk.
Coordination is critical to establishing the basis for the operations being conducted. The Army must
cooperate with other government agencies, services, and nations to deal effectively with the
diplomatically sensitive situations present in conflict.
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Commanders must balance the combat posture and readiness of their soldiers against the volatile environment in which they function. A balance must also be struck between diplomatic goals and the
scale, intensity, and nature of Army operations supporting those goals.
Planning for Uncertainty
Commanders must build flexibility into their plans and operations. Conflict situations are full of
uncertainty as presented by both the threat and the diplomatic conditions that limit Army options.
Identification of Risk
Commanders must seek to increase their options while limiting the enemy's options. Successful
commanders do not run out of options. Risks and gambles are part of option decisions. The decision to
take risks is weighed against the mission, probability of success, available intelligence, and as many
other factors as are available to the commander in his decision cycle.
Operations during conflict present a challenge to Army leadership. The military, as one of four elements
of national power, may not dominate events but may adapt its operations to fit those of other lead
agencies. In coalition and interagency operations, the ASCC must achieve unity of effort through
cooperation, liaison, negotiation, and compromise. Where practicable, agreements should be formalized
in writing as TOR, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or similar instruments. Tasks required of
the ARFOR will vary relative to the success of returning the area in conflict to a state of peace. ARFOR
must be flexible enough to meet a wide range of operational requirements. The conflict environment will
challenge the versatility of the force.
Movement and Maneuver
Movement and maneuver in conflict are characterized by planning that reflects the restrictions and
constraints placed on military operations. These restrictions and constraints form a set of requirements
and prohibitions imposed by the NCA. They usually have a diplomatic basis that outweighs militarily
preferred alternatives. The NCA articulates these restrictions and constraints in different manners.
ROE are the translation of circumstances and limitations for the initiation and conduct of engagements
with hostile forces. Personnel ceiling caps restrict the level of forces that can become involved in a
conflict within prescribed geographical boundaries. Designated AOs define restrictions on the
commander's battle space. These factors combine to influence the movement of forces into the AO.
After that movement, maneuver is influenced by these same factors.
Army Force
In conflict, the Army force needed is a key consideration. Often, the presence of overwhelming force in
the conflict area discourages enemy actions. Senior army commanders must forthrightly articulate the
resources required to achieve quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties. Based upon the
diplomatic situation and other competing priorities, the Army commander may have to achieve his goals
with considerably fewer resources than he desires. The sequencing of major operations in this
environment requires patience and a clear understanding of the diplomatic realities that apply to the
particular conflict.
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Forcible Entry
Conditions may require a forcible entry. This capability requires the staging of forces over time and
space. Chapter 6 addresses some considerations for forcible entry. Among the key considerations is the
element of force mix. Combat forces are key to seizing the lodgment area, but support forces become'
immediately critical thereafter. Strategic planners and force commanders must ensure that logistics
forces and sustainment resources are deployed in theater as soon as possible to enable combat forces to
conduct continuous operations.
Reception and Onward Movement
The mission of reception and onward movement is to integrate rapidly arriving forces and supplies into
the theater without disrupting the operation's tempo. This mission must be balanced against support to
current operations, as both are logistically intensive. Accordingly, the ASCC must carefully plan and
execute reception and onward movement to maintain the proper balance to support arriving forces and
the operation's tempo. Early base development efforts are key considerations for the Army commander.
Units and facilities for the reception of forces are critical, especially in the initial phase and in an
undeveloped theater.
DisPosition of Forces
The final consideration for maneuver during conflict is the disposition of forces. Deployment of forces
into their initial positions is critical. This positioning must support both current and subsequent
operations as envisioned by the Army commanders. ARFOR may operate from noncontiguous bases that
require the Army commander to develop lines of operation and support with a minimum amount of
protection. To be able to rapidly mass his forces and prevent the enemy from gaining the initiative, the
commander must have a finely tuned intelligence capability, a detailed understanding of the physical
disposition of friendly forces, and a high degree of operational-level mobility.
Operational-level fires during conflict revolve around two key considerations: ROE and coordination of
joint fires. The types of fires permitted are likely to be limited, and the fires used will require a higher
level of precision and greater reliance on temporary disabling techniques and technology. Collateral
damage is less tolerable in conflict. Failure to control and limit collateral damage can endanger the long­
term effects supporting stability.
The Army may find itself in a supported role in the area of operational fires. For instance, the precision
and depth of the fires required may dictate a predominant Air Force role. To achieve his operational
objectives and complement the JFC's plan, the Army commander selects targets for Arrriy resources to
attack and nominates targets for other resources to attack. The joint coordination process is critical to
ensuring that resources are not wasted and that fires create a synergistic effect.
The Army operational-level commander must have an organic staff capability to plan and coordinate operational-level fires. This staff element is the DOCC. His staff must also have the capability to augment the joint staff for planning and coordinating joint operational fires. Because of potential restraints and constraints caused by concerns over collateral damages, other systems may take on a role of greater utility. Other systems' fires are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities. PSYOP, SOF, EW (jamming), and other C 2 countermeasures are all disabling fire options.
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Protection of the force requires heightened awareness as conditions move toward direct confrontation.
As the likelihood of confrontation increases, so does the vulnerability of the force, unless additional protection measures are implemented. Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force and is every
soldier's responsibility. Protection has four components.

The first component includes OPSEC and deception operations. Successful execution of this
component prevents the enemy from locating and causing harm to friendly forces.

The second component supports keeping soldiers healthy and maintaining their fighting morale. It includes protecting their equipment and supplies and taking care of their basic needs.

The third component is safety. It is a principal element and must be an integral part of all military operations. Soldiers-conducting military operations are placed at risk; still, commanders must ensure that soldiers are not placed in an undue risk situation. Strong command and levels of discipline and training lessen those risks. Training in peacetime must be realistic and equate to requirements for fighting in war.

The fourth component is avoiding fratricide--the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by fire. Commanders must maintain situational awareness of the enemy and their personnel. This situational awareness, along with strong command presence, disciplined operations, and anticipation of future operations helps limit probability and occurrences of fratricide.

Commanders implement the THREATCON system. Table 8-1 briefly describes THREATCONs
Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. The implementation decision is based upon--

The threat assessment.

Personnel and facility criticality and vulnerabilities.

Resource availability.

Operations and morale impacts.

Damage control considerations.

International relations.

• Possible terrorist retaliatory responses.
The comm
. ander must recognize that information on the threat is difficult to obtain prior to an incident. Army Regulation 525-13 discusses the combating terrorism program in detail. The identification of friendly force vulnerabilities and geopolitical assets are key steps in protection. Essential facilities must be identified. Communications must be protected from interference and interception. While the basic principles for deception hold true during conflict, they are often more difficult to apply.
OPSEC is significantly harder to sustain in an open society where national survival is not at stake. Deception is more difficult to achieve when the operational-level objectives have more diplomatic
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content than military significance. The Army commander must ensure that his deception plans support the unified command's plans and are not compromised by information leaks. The environment of conflict often appears peaceful, requiring commanders to remain vigilant to guard against complacency. Terrorism is most effective when the threat is not highly visible and surprise is likely to be achieved.
Table 8-1. THREATCON Levels
Normal . No credible threat of terrorist activity
Alpha Low - general terrorist threat
Bravo Medium - increased and more predictable threat
Charlie High - when an incident occurs or when intelligence indicates an imminent terrorist action
Delta Imminent - when an incident occurs in the immediate area after a terrorist attack or when intelligence indicates a threat against a specific person or location.

Command and Control
During conflict, the ASCC contributes to the CINC's theater strategy of limiting hostilities. These efforts often involve direct use of military power to complement diplomatic initiatives. The principal C 2
problem is how to integrate US military actions with lead agencies of our own or foreign governments. The Army has a variety of operations to select from in supporting conflict situations, all of which have some common C 2 considerations.
Military leaders conduct conflict operations without a declaratior of war. The absence of this declaration restricts the structuring of the theater for operations. In MOOTW, the CINC does not establish a theater of war or theaters of operation unless it is a major conflict. Normally, he establishes smaller areas, such as a JOA, for conducting operations. Diplomatic considerations predominate over purely military requirements and constrain C 2. The senior military leader has a greater level of freedom than in peacetime but must coordinate closely with nonmilitary agencies. Whatever the geographic organization, the ASCC must establish clear C 2 structures for conducting operations in conflict.

Command Relationships DODD0A-011199
Command relationships and structure usually begin with existing peacetime arrangements that require a degree of transition to a state of conflict footing. Conflict planners may have to consider combined relationships. The level of international integration will affect C 2. The unified command structure serves
as the C 2 structure to build upon. C 2 may emanate straight from the national level if operations include
actions of direct strategic importance.
As operations in theater transition to conflict, in-theater forces and existing C 2 relationships may be adequate to accomplish the mission. ARFOR from CONUS or other theaters could increase the complexity, scope, and level of forces executing operations beyond the capabilities of the normal theater structure. This would thereby require augmentation or restructuring. In austere theaters, an Army force may have to arrive in theater prepared to support itself and execute operations unassisted. Later, the
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theater ASCC may control all operations, or the CINC could task the ASCC to support operations while he directly controls the execution of operations through a separate operational chain of command.
Army operational-level commanders are active participants in the development of all conflict plans. They may participate in deliberate planning (JOPES, Volume VI) to prepare for anticipated or potential
actions. Unanticipated or rapidly developing situations may require operational-level commanders to
conduct CAP. Planning for conflict, especially at the operational level, is a continuous process. Rapidly
changing diplomatic conditions may change the desired objective, composition, and sequencing of
conflict operations. Planners must prepare multiple branches and sequels to enhance their ability to
provide timely support. Senior army commanders require a flexible force structure to enable their
organization to achieve the desired strategic end.
Early establishment of an ACE is critical for successful operations. ACE operations should commence
within the theater of operations before hostilities. Intelligence communications established between the
theater intelligence center and the national systems provide the critical intelligence that US military
forces require immediately upon arrival and until tactical intelligence flow is established.
Operational intelligence must support the targeting effort of operational-level fires and/or set the stage
for operational-level maneuver. Success requires sound IPB. In conflict, IPB may follow the process
used for a conventional battlefield or a modified process that focuses on nonmilitary information.
Civilian trends are often as important as operational information. Weather analysis remains an important part of IPB. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas, surrogates, and narcotics traffickers do not exist.
Intelligence personnel need different collection techniques and background information, which may require continuous updating. The process must react to the dynamics of the specific situation it supports,
as well as to the worldwide situation. Intelligence agencies must exploit the full range of both US and host nation intelligence and counterintelligence production capabilities. This includes the collection and
analysis of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT, which are particularly valuable in determining hostile
The ASCC provides theater-specific intelligence integration for the Army operational-level commander.
The Army commander develops his picture of the operational area, based upon the threat he faces and
the information gathered by the intelligence system. Intelligence should be the basis for all action.
During foreign internal defense operations, the Army's intelligence organization works closely with the
host government to develop and improve the intelligence capabilities of all security forces. During
counterinsurgency operations, intelligence provides the basis for all US and host nation plans. Prior to
commitment, US military forces provide specific intelligence requirements to the US national
intelligence community. This ensures that national-level collection focuses on force requirements.
Cooperative or multinational MI activities at the operational level are integral to effective intelligence
collection and production. Army intelligence units provide technical expertise, management, and advice
to develop host nation intelligence capabilities. They help establish objectives and, where desirable and
feasible, develop common procedures.
The Army can provide tactical intelligence support in conflict, situations. ARFOR can contribute experience and expertise to establish and manage all-source intelligence operations and enhance overall
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management of the intelligence effort. This management of intelligence information includes data on internal unrest, on external support for insurgencies, and on host nation military capabilities, including intelligence and counterintelligence.
The threat of sabotage, terrorism, and subversion requires MI staffs to focus their counterintelligence collectionefforts. These efforts require close coordination with host nation police and legal officials. In
countries where cooperative or multinational intelligence systems already exist, newly arrived Army
tactical units normally work with the area intelligence elements on a mutual support basis. When the
situation forces Army units to move frequently, they should not assume responsibility for long-term,
area-oriented intelligence programs. Still, they may contribute significantly to short-term collection and
production efforts. All Army personnel during conflict provide information which, when tied into the
data-gathering system, can produce useful intelligence.
In conflict, the ASCC tailors logistics to provide basic requirements in an austere situation. He stages
logistics and uses intermediate support bases, leading to full base development if necessary. He does this
with the use of HNS. Early deployment of the LSE from USAMC ensures a positive link from the
deploying units to the national logistics system and may be required to fill gaps in the TOE logistics
infrastructure or projected selected elements of the national/industrial base into theater. The LSE could
provide an initial C2 structure to orchestrate USAMC resources and the logistics efforts of contractors
and HNS. The degree of development of the host nation's infrastructure has a significant influence upon
the Army commander's long-range logistics operations. In an austere environment, logistics operations
can take precedence over near-term combat operations.
The Army commander takes a long-range view of the conflict situation and plans his logistics for the
anticipated duration of combat operations, plus a transition period. He is responsible for providing HSS
to ARFOR and, as directed, to other services, agencies, and organizations. These logistics
responsibilities include--

Patient evacuation and medical regulation.


Health service logistics/blood management.

Preventive medicine, dental, veterinary, medical laboratory, and combat stress control services.

Area medical support.

Command, control, and communications (C 3).

Logistics operations may become the primary Army weapon in conflict. Critical logistical skills supplied
by the Army may allow the host nation to focus on combat requirements in the particular conflict, with
little or no US Army participation.
In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of operations that contribute to the achievement of theater­strategic goals. These may include the continuation and expansion of the full range of previously 12/29/2004 discussed operations begun in peacetime, as well as attacks, raids, UW, support of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, peacemaking, security assistance surges, and operations to combat terrorism.
Sometimes operations are in response to a crisis or other rapidly developing situation. At other times operations may call for long-term planning and sequenced execution to support theater goals. Chapter 4 provides Army planning and deployment considerations for crisis situations. FM 100-17 addresses
Army planning and deployment considerations across the range of military operations.
Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear. Terrorism is
intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies pursuing goals that are generally diplomatic,
religious, or ideological. Combating terrorism consists of defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive
(counterterrorism) actions.
Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of their falling victim to a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes those defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. The extent of these defensive measures varies based
on assessment of the local threat. These measures include--

Being personally aware and knowledgeable of personal protection techniques.

Implementing crime and physical security programs to harden the target.

Making installations and personnel less appealing as terrorist targets.

Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. These measures are normally carried out by SOF under the direction of the NCA. Local measures include only those actions taken to terminate an incident or apprehend individuals responsible
for terrorist acts. Other countermeasures--preemption, intervention, or retaliation with specialized forces
operating under the direction of the NCA--have the characteristics of attacks or raids.
The Army commander may conduct actions before, during, or after a terrorist incident. Although DOS has the lead in combating OCONUS terrorism, the Army commander and his staff must understand the threat and its tactics, as well as current US policies, when dealing with terrorists. The Army may be the
lead or a supporting force in an effort to combat terrorism during a specific operation ,
Attacks and raids can support rescue or recovery operations to destroy or seize equipment or facilities
that demonstrably threaten national collective security interests. They can also support counterdrug
operations by destroying narcotics production or transshipment facilities (if authorized by the NCA) or by supporting a host government's actions in this regard. The principles of combat operations directly
Attacks by ground, air, and naval forces damage or destroy high-value targets or demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are usually small-seale.operations involving swift penetration of hostile 12/29/2004
territory to secure information, seize an objective, or destroy targets. Attacks and raids end with a withdrawal. Successful attacks and raids can create situations that permit seizing and maintaining the diplomatic initiative. To be successful, they require the proper focus of planning, organization, training,
and equipment. Attacks and raids may involve conventional forces and SOF. The JFC usually plays a
larger role than the Army operational-level commander in planning and executing these types of
UW is a series of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or
diplomatically sensitive territory. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, evasion and
escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. US
military support to UW operations can include the use of both conventional forces and SOF. UW is
usually a long-term effort.
Techniques and tactics for certain UW operations are similar to those employed in support of
insurgencies. However, support for insurgency differs from that for UW. Insurgency accomplishes
strategic goals directly, whereas UW typically supports conventional operations. The difference affects
the operational and strategic design of the operation. For example, operations in support of insurgencies
give priority to infrastructure and diplomatic development, while UW emphasizes military actions.
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two aspects of the same process. However, they differ in
execution. Insurgents assume that appropriate change within the existing system is not possible or likely.
Insurgency therefore focuses on radical change in diplomatic control and requires extensive use of
covert instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency uses principally overt methods and assumes
appropriate change within the existing system is possible and likely. The US supports selected
insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes which work against US interests. Since support for
insurgencies is often covert, many operations connected with them are special activities. Because of
their extensive UW training, SOF are well-suited to provide such support.
Conventional forces may be called on when the situation requires their functional specialties. Their tasks
may include support and advice. The CINC may direct the ASCC to provide equipment, training, and
services to insurgent forces. In the following types of operations, ARFOR can assist insurgents:

Recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping forces to perform unconventional or guerrilla


Institutional and infrastructure development.


Surreptitious insertion.


Evasion and escape of combatants.

DODDOA-011203 12/29/2004




The US uses its military resources to provide support to a host nation's counterinsurgency operations in
the context of foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies in
any of the action programs another government takes to free its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. The US ambassador, through his country team, provides the focal point for interagency
coordination and supervision of FID.
Military support to FID is provided through the unified CINC. Military resources provide materiel,
advisors, trainers, and security assistance forces to support the host nation government's
counterinsurgency operations through SAOs. ARFOR operations that support a host nation conducting a
counterinsurgency may include, but are not limited to, intelligence-gathering, joint and combined
exercises, civil-military operations, humanitarian or civic assistance, logistical support operations,
populace and resource control operations, drug-interdiction operations, and tactical operations.
When in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and force a return to diplomatic methods, the US
conducts peace enforcement (PE) operations with its military forces. The US typically undertakes PE
operations at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state or to protect US citizens as
part of an international multilateral or unilateral operation. The PE force does not represent a wholly
disinterested power or such a drastic commitment would not be made. However, the interests of the
country or countries that provide forces for these operations are served best by a cessation of violence
and a negotiated settlement.
Conflict within a given area eventually affects adjacent areas. These effects are seldom desirable and can
include refugee movements, arms marketing, proliferation of weapons, and environmental
contamination. A further potential exists for the expansion of the conflict beyond its original boundaries.
The long-range goals of a PE operation are two-fold. The first goal is to contain the conflict to prevent
the destabilization of adjacent areas. The second goal is the agreement to a negotiated settlement by the
parties to the conflict. This settlement must resolve the basis for the conflict and establish the foundation
for the transition to peacekeeping operations and peacetime operations. The diplomatic complexities of
operations to restore order require that available force be sufficient but its use be applied with discretion.
The operation also requires that the forces be appropriate to the environment.
The senior army commander must understand the constraints and diplomatic sensitivities of this
environment and recognize that local law and customs often influence his actions. PE operations require
continuous mission analysis, clear C 2 relationships, effective communications facilities, joint and
multinational force liaison, and effective public diplomacy and PSYOP.
The US accelerates security assistance when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent threat. In these
surges, operations usually focus on logistical support. Geography, the magnitude of the logistics effort,
and time limitations determine airlift and sealift requirements. US support to Israel during the 1973 12/29/2004
Arab-Israeli War illustrates this kind of operation. The Yom Kippur War demonstrates the importance of airlift in the initial stages of conflict and the follow-on strength of sealift. The CINC may direct the senior army commander to provide equipment from his command as part of security assistance surges. The senior army commander may also provide some of the logistical support (port operation and line haul units) needed to transfer surge equipment to the friendly nation.
The successful termination of conflict operations leads to a return to peacetime. The unsuccessful
termination of conflict endangers US interests or threatens a possible transition to war. In either case, the
ASCC must be prepared for these outcomes. The ASCC plans consolidation operations to terminate
combat operations and prepare the way for the use of diplomatic, informational, and economic elements
of power in a peacetime environment. As the level of hostility lessens, the ASCC changes the
composition of his force. He replaces those combat arms forces--essential during combat operations-­
with CS and CSS forces as hostilities subside. Finally, he positions nation assistance forces to complete
the transition to peacetime operations.
The ASCC plans an orderly redeployment of forces. This redeployment includes recovery and
reconstitution of forces, which facilitates a return to peacetime activities. As a part of postoperation
reporting, the commander develops lessons learned for incorporation into training during peacetime
DODD0A-011205 12/29/2004

Army Service Component Command
Responsibilities and Organization

This appendix focuses on the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of those operational-level organizations formerly known as echelons above corps. It addresses the dynamic nature of the theater
strategic and operational requirements in the states of peacetime, conflict, and war. It contains requirements for establishing and designing a theater. It describes responsibilities, functions, and organizations required to conduct major operations and provide logistical support. It pinpoints the
functional, operational, and support responsibilities of the Army service component commander (formerly known as the theater army commander) in the theater.
The Army service component serves as the senior Army echelon in a theater and is the Army service
component command of a unified command. It includes the service component commander and all
Army personnel, organizations, units, and installations that have been assigned to the unified command. The Army's operational-level organizations assist and augment tactical (corps and division) organizations.
During periods of peacetime deployments and training where Army forces pass through the area or operate within a CINC's AOR, but are not assigned to that CINC, the ASCC coordinates with the ASCC
of the appropriate CINC to ensure those forces are supported. However, except as the NCA directs, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or
attached to and under the command of that combatant commander. The architecture of the Army in a theater is flexible enough to meet the needs of combatant commanders. The ASCC has a number of capabilities and options for organization and provides the capabilities that support a force-projection
concept--from an austere to a fully developed theater.
The total capabilities the ASCC provides may not be initially required in theater for the early stages of a force-projection operation. Rather, the ASCC structure represents capabilities that would be task­organized into a selected force based upon the mission, assessment of the operational environment,
constraints, restraints, and the commander's risk assessment. Each theater is unique. The functional requirements of a theater organization remain somewhat constant. The variable is the level of capability required. The ASCC tailors units to provide the specific capabilities the CINC requires and echelons
those capabilities as required into the theater.
Historically, echelons of command at the operational level of war (EAC) have gone through an
evolutionary process. During the Civil War, the Army began evolving toward larger, Army-level units with a single commander directing large forces dispersed in multiple locations. Then, during World War I, the theater commander used an intermediate headquarters--the field army--to control multiple corps. The World War II structure expanded this, using army groups and field armies between the theater and
corps commanders. These Army groups were formed to control two to five field armies. In turn, the field
army could control a like number of corps. Essentially, an army group could control a maximum of 25
With the structuring of the Army around a four-corps base, the requirement for the army group and field 007_14.htm 12/29/2004 army was eliminated. However, the functions performed by the army group and field army were not eliminated, resulting in those functions (Title 10) being performed by a forward-deployed theater army and its requisite subordinate organizations performing specific functions. Additionally, the requirement
for a multiple corps operation required the capability to constitute at least an operational-level
headquarters (a numbered army) for C 2 of the operations.
Should multinational forces be added to a conflict, as we anticipate to be the case, larger formations are
possible. The issue then becomes one of span of control for the theater CINC. Modern forces have a
significant mobility advantage over their World War II counterparts, where the US Army last formed
army groups. That mobility advantage permits smaller formations to operate over larger AOs. Army
echelons reflect the unified command structure, increased span of control capabilities, and improved
weapons technology. Corps serve as the Army centerpiece for structure and are normally the building
blocks upon which the Army organizes. The ASCC, formerly called the theater army commander,
carries out the Title 10 responsibilities within the theater.
Subordinate JFCs may control multiple US Army corps without an intermediate Army headquarters.
Then, the ASCC carries out the Title 10 responsibilities in lieu of the theater army. However, the ASCC
may choose to organize a numbered army as an intermediate headquarters between the corps and the
JFC to command and control operations when required by METT-T. Army organizations are structured to enable them to perform the missions to which they are assigned. At corps and below, those missions
are primarily tactical. Corps and below units must be augmented to perform at the operational level.
Still, units that normally operate at the tactical level may not have the operational perspective necessary
to skillfully link tactical operations to strategic objectives.
When a corps or division is fully engaged at the tactical level, it cannot be expected to assume
responsibility for the additional functions and command responsibilities that correspond to the
operational level. It has neither the personnel nor materiel resources to perform both responsibilities.
Chapter 6 discusses these additional requirements in detail. Under the force-projection concept, a
tactical-level unit may conduct operational level operations. In principle, these operations should be
performed by an echelon not directly responsible for commanding tactical operations. The tactical force
commander must be free to concentrate resources on the tactical mission. Whereas, the operational-level
commander must be free to concentrate resources on the performance of the three operational-level
tasks--joint, multinational, and interagency linkage; conduct of Army operations; and support of Army
The Army contributes operational-level organizations to support joint and multinational operations.
Operational-level units fight and support, as well as make up a support base. Operational-level forces
may be part of a forward presence that serves as a symbol of US national resolve. Other forces remain in
the US to provide rapid force projection to forward-deployed units or to execute contingency operations.
Whatever the case, Army leaders need to be familiar with those Army operational-level forces that
contribute capabilities to joint and multinational operations. US Army levels of command include--

Army service component command.

Numbered army.



DODDOA-011207 12/29/2004

Brigade, regiment, or group.

Battalion or squadron.

Company, battery, or troop.

These echelons of command provide a means for commanders to achieve operational- and tactical-level
objectives. Each of these echelons has its own set of capabilities and considerations.
The Chief of Staff of the Army, with the CJCS and unified command authorities, configures the Army
service component to the unified commands to meet theater requirements.
In peacetime, the CINC normally exercises COCOM through the ASCC. The ASCC must have a
strategic and operational perspective while executing his responsibilities. He serves as the principal
advisor to the CINC for supporting and employing ARFOR in theater. The ASCC participates in mid­
and long-range planning to support the CINC's theater strategy and campaign plan, conducts major
operations that support the CINC's campaign plan, and provides sustainment and support of all ARFOR
assigned or attached to the theater. The ASCC may exercise OPCON of selected forces. He may •
command forces executing combat operations or MOOTW.
The ASCC performs three strategic and operational-level tasks--

Establish linkages and coordinate with the joint force headquarters and other service component

Conduct operations.

Conduct support operations to sustain the ARFOR assigned to the theater.

The ASCC's strategic task in peacetime is to carry out the strategic logistics tasks and priorities for the
CINC. The ASCC's operational role in peacetime is to plan and conduct operations and exercises to
execute the CINC's theater strategy and plans. The ASCC is responsible for sustaining all forces in
theater and maintaining the capability to expand to accommodate ARFOR required for theater
operations plans. For a complete discussion of service component responsibilities, see Joint Pub 0-2,
Chapter 3.
As the theater transitions to conflict or war, the CINC may choose one of several options to exercise
COCOM. Each of these options has different impacts on the employment of ARFOR. The CINC may
choose to continue to exercise COCOM through the ASCC. The ASCC would conduct major operations
and continue to provide sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. The
CINC may assign the ASCC support-related tasks solely or a combination of both support and operational tasks.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM through a JTF for a limited duration mission. The ASCC 12/29/2004 would place ARFOR under OPCON of the CJTF for the conduct of operations. The CINC also could designate the ASCC as the CJTF. The ASCC would focus on all three operational-level tasks. The CJTF may choose to organize his command by service element, functional component, subordinate JTF, or any combination of these. The ASCC, if not the CJTF, would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM directly over specific forces. The ASCC would place ARFOR under the direct OPCON of the CINC for the conduct of operations. The ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater. If the CINC chooses to exercise COCOM through functional component commanders, three scenarios are possible.

The functional component commander might also be the ASCC. The ASCC would conduct major combat operations and support operations for the theater.

The functional component commander might also be an Army commander--but not the ASCC. In this scenario, the ASCC could establish a numbered army, and the numbered army commander could be the functional component commander. The ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON of the numbered army commander for the conduct of operations. Within the functional organization, the numbered army commander would perform the three operational-level tasks. However, the ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.

The functional component commander might also be a commander from another service such as the Marine Corps. In this scenario, the ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON of the functional component commander for the conduct of operations. Within the functional organization, the ARFOR commander would perform the three operational-level tasks. The ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.

As the theater transitions to conflict or war, the probability increases that the CINC will separate the
ASCC's operational responsibilities from its support role. The CINC may designate another commander to focus on conducting combat operations, while the ASCC concentrates on conducting support
The ASCC provides to the CINC a collection of capabilities, functions, and C 2 elements to accomplish the mission. With the initial deployment of forces, the ASCC, based on METT-T, tailors his organization to provide the required support to conduct major operations, battles, and engagements. The ASCC's support function has a major impact on the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations. The ASCC must get the right ARFOR to the right place at the right time to enable the CINC to strategically concentrate forces and logistics to generate decisive combat power. Figure A-1 illustrates the capabilities and functions the ASCC provides.
http :Nati am.train. ew/public/296714-1/fm/100-7/f1007_14.htm 12/29/2004
FNI 1D0-111 rM 55-10
\Peosolne,1/ Support,
FM 12-6 1-M 147FM 5-116 FM 55-1.FM 8-10
FM 104-25
FM 41.10 FM 1.111 1•101 10.8? FM 33-1
1.1¦ 1¦11MO MI
FM 1940.FM 44.1 -Jul. FM 1M-25 FM 46.1
FM 1W-15
FM 19-4 FAA 34-37.FM 11.45
Figure A-1. Army Service Component Command Capabilities and Functions.

The ASCC becomes intimately involved with decisions concerning competing demands for limited resources. He assists the theater CINC in the development of support priorities, particularly those affecting other services. To support the force-projection concept and in addition to projecting forces and support, the ASCC must also coordinate the projection of additional required support from CONUS, another theater, or an intermediate support base, using air lines of communication (ALOCs) and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Figure A-2 illustrates this situation.
In contingency operations, upon entry into the AO, US forces may be either opposed or unopposed. Each type entails a different mix of forces and capabilities. The existence of little or no in-theater support base may require that a large logistics organization, with augmentation from strategic and operational-level logistics organizations, accompany the deploying tactical unit. The synchronization of the deployment of CSS units, supplies, and C 2 with the increase in combat capabilities is critical.
Theater logistics support requires a seamless logistics profile, from strategic logistics--DLA, USAMC, and General Services Administration--to logistics field units. The historical C 2 and support structure provided in a mature theater may not be in place. Units must rely on a logistics system that operates on the basis of projecting and supporting force capability instead of supporting units and echelons. Implementation of concepts, such as split-based operations, total asset visibility, in-transit visibility, real-time communications, and pre-positioned materiel (on land and afloat), along with improved
DODDOA-01 1210 12/29/2004
strategic lift capability, ensures sustainment of the projected force. FM 100-16 describes these concepts
in detail.
Because of the changing nature of the force size, necessary time frame, and resource constraints, units
must be capable of providing mission-essential support before the arrival of doctrinal logistics units or
when deployment of logistics units would exceed what is required to support the force's mission.
Mission- and capability-oriented modular elements are designed to support combat-essential
requirements through sequencing capabilities into the AO. The capability projection of logistics support
must focus on two critical areas: essential requirements and the strategic end state. Decisions made early
in the process affect the end result. If a developed support infrastructure is absent or eliminated in an
area, an ASCC headquarters could serve as the nucleus for a theater base development process. One
example of a possible ASCC headquarters organization is shown in Figure A-3. For other examples refer
to FM 101-5.
Figure A-2. Contingency Operation without a Communications Zone.
DODD0A-011211 12/29/2004

C ots

DOS Chemical
Sys Auto
SWO IG Co mdt
Figure A-3. Army Service Component Command Headquarters Echelonment.
The ASCC headquarters conducts planning and coordinates major operations and support through flexible combinations of area and functionally oriented organizations. Headquarters management involves managing the organization and administration of the headquarters, including--

Coordinating and supervising movement, internal arrangement, space allocation, and
administrative support.

Supervising agencies that service the command, such as the American Red Cross; civilian safety personnel; morale, welfare, and recreation personnel.

Recommending manpower allocation, especially in the use of personnel authorized in large
numbers to the headquarters.

Allocating shelter in the headquarters area for troops, in coordination with the G3 for area
organizations and the G4 for provision of shelter.

Providing control and standardization of procedures within the headquarters. All staff officers are responsible for proper administrative activities within their own staff sections.

The ASCC is responsible for managing the Army's support base in a developed theater. Besides managing the Army's support base, the unified commander may designate the ASCC as the JRAC responsible for surface security of the entire JRA, organization and operation of the theater support base,
and conduct of rear operations for all land component services (Joint Pub 3-10.1).
DODDOA-01 1212 12/29/2004
A developed theater consists of forward-deployed resources and forces with some level of installation and HNS. In war, this theater support base, or JRAC, would be located in the intratheater COMMZ or in a dispersal area. The ASCC operates within the theater's developed infrastructure and C1NC's strategic priorities to receive forces and resources through seaports of debarkation (SPOD) and aerial ports of debarkation (APOD). The ASCC establishes the logistics infrastructure for the theater of operations and assists in establishing and adjusting theater LOCs. The ASCC receives, equips, marshals, stages, and moves units forward to the tactical assembly areas for employment. The ASCC continues to support and reconstitute these deployed ARFOR. Upon termination of conflict, the ASCC continues to provide support to the ARFOR to allow redeployment and reconstitution of the force. The theater organization with a COMMZ is depicted in Figure A-4.
Multifunctional Logistics Support
The CINC, with adVice from the ASCC, may organize logistical support in his AOR with single, subordinate commanders responsible for large geographic areas. Normally, the ASCC places these areas under the command of a logistics C 2 headquarters. The ASCC may further divide the support areas into smaller areas assigned to a logistics task-organized support element. The ASCC establishes as many logistics headquarters and logistics task organization elements as needed to efficiently support his force in theater. Figure A-5 illustrates this area command structure.
Logistics Command and Control Headquarters
The ASCC must provide total support to all ARFOR in theater. If the ASCC chooses to focus on operations and streamline his span of C 2, he may establish a deputy commander for support and make him responsible for oversight of the total support mission. Or, he may choose to retain control of the support function and orchestrate it through his deputy chief of staff for support or appropriate coordinating staff office--that is, DCSPER, deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG), or deputy chief of staff for resource management (DCSRM).
To orchestrate the many supply and service missions, the ASCC establishes a logistics C 2 headquarters in the COMMZ. It provides reception and operation staging to units located in or passing through the COMMZ. This reception and operation staging includes personnel and administration support, direct support (DS) maintenance, and supply, field services, and local transportation provision.
The logistics C 2 headquarters provides backup logistical support to corps or other subordinate units and performs general support (GS) maintenance to support the Joint Theater Logistics System (JTLS) under work load direction of its materiel management center (MMC). The logistics headquarters coordinates area functions, such as traffic circulation and population control, with host nation agencies and MPs and coordinates property maintenance activities with the engineers. This headquarters provides an organization for centralized control of all Army EOD efforts in the theater. This provision allows the ordnance organization commander, with direction from the ASCC's staff, to quickly focus EOD assets to critical locations or operations. FM 9-15 covers EOD structure and operations.

http://ati am. train. 12/29/2004
Subordinate Campaign Plan Modell
Copy No..

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of Signature

CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or code name)
References: Maps, charts, time zones (zulu), and other relevant documents
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organization (composition and relationships) for the campaign/subordinate campaign. Include detailed information in the command relationships annex (see also pa .h 5a).
1. Situation. Briefly describe the politico-military situation that the plan addresses (see commander's estimate).
Theater Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instruction, memorandums, or theater war plans that apply to the plan, including a theater campaign plan received from the theater commander.

Relate the theater commander's strategic intent to operational requirements in the theater of operation or joint operations area, including its subregional space and multinational elements.

List the theater commander's strategic and operational objectives and tasks assigned to the subordinate command.

List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (ROE and so forth).

Include predeployment (C-Day) actions as necessary.

Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data, including information on the following:

Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater of operations or joint operations area.

Operational concept (if known), to include the enemy's perception of friendly vulnerabilities and the enemy's intentions regarding those vulnerabilities.

DODD0A-011214 12/29/2004
Major operational objectives.

Commander's idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns.

Operational and sustainment capabilities.

Vulnerabilities related to the enemy's center of gravity.

NOTE: Assumed information should be identified as such. Reference may be made to the intelligence annex for detailed information.
Friendly Forces. State information on friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command.

Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.

Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition forces.

Protection of own operational center of gravity or other critical elements.

Assumptions. State assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.

Legal Considerations. State laws or agreements binding on the plan.

Public Affairs Considerations. Identify impact of global visibility, public interest, and media presence on the plan.

2. Mission. Integrate the operational objectives and tasks of the command and their purposes and relationships to achieve the theater strategic objectives (who, what, when, where, and why).
3. Joint Operations.
a. Operational Concept. Integrate the fundamentals of the campaign into a who, what, where, and how statement of operational intent. Restate the assigned operational concept for each phase of the theater strategic concept. Include the phased sustainment of major forces in the command. Include other concepts such as deception and psychological warfare during the subordinate campaign. State how the joint operations are a part of the CINC's unified operations. Include all aspects of operational design. State how operational advantage is to be achieved.
Subordinate organization.

Operational objectives.

Maneuver (operational).

Fires (operational).

Phases of campaign, major operation, or battle.

DODDOA-011215 007_15.htm 12/29/2004
(6) Timing.
Phase I.

Operational or tactical concept. Include operational or tactical objectives, scheme of maneuver, and timing for this phase.

Forces required by function or capability. Consider Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and special operations and space forces.

Tasks of subordinate commands and adjacent components.

Reserve forces location and composition. State "be prepared" missions.

Fires. Include general missions and guidance to subordinates and components Ensure that fires are complementary.

Mobility. Consider transportation; ports; lines of communication; transit and overflight rights; reinforcement, reception, and onward movement; and host nation support arrangements.

Annexes. Reference all annexes relating to each phase of the concept of operation. Such references show how activities such as deception, psychological operations, nuclear operations, special operations, rules of engagement, airspace management, interdiction operations, mine warfare operations, and so forth, relate to the overall concept.

Deployment. State briefly how deployments of units, replacements, and supplies into the theater affect the sequencing of operations. Include the details of such deployments in paragraph 4 and/or a logistics annex.

Phases II through IV. Cite information as stated in each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the subordinate campaign, at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant action initiated.

Coordinating Instructions. If desired, place instructions here that apply to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command. The checklist may be placed in an annex.

4. Logistics. Give a brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the campaign, With information and instructions applicable to the campaign by phase. The concentration of logistics in phases must be concurrent with operational phases. This information may be issued separately and referenced here. At a minimum, this paragraph should address the following:
Assumptions (including coalition requirements).

Supply aspects.

Maintenance and modifications.

Medical service.

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e. Transportation.

Base development.

Personnel service support.

Foreign military assistance.

Administrative management.

Lines of communication.

Reconstitution of forces.

1. Joint and multinational responsibilities.
Sustainment priorities and resources.

Interservice responsibilities.

Host nation considerations.

5. Command and Signal.

Command relationships. State generally the command relationships for portions of the campaign or the entire campaign. Indicate any shifts of command contemplated during the campaign, indicating the time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give the location of the commander, command posts, and succession to command.

Delegation of authority.


Communications. Plans of communications may refer to a standard plan or be attached in an annex. Include the time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal communications as appropriate.

Electronics. Plans of electronic systems may refer to a standard plan or be attached in an annex. Include electronic policy and other information as appropriate.

(Signed) .

ANNEXES: As required (see Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and theater campaign plan.)
DODD0A-01 1 217 12/29/2004 1. Joint Pub 5-0 describes how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPES process. Joint Pub 5-03-series further explains the process, including models of planning, messages, estimates, and OPLANs/CONPLANs.
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Major Operations Plan Model Operational-Levell

Copy No..

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of Signature

MAJOR OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)
References: Maps, charts, and other documents
TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the organization of the Army in theater to support the CINC's long-range strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting the operation. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, put the task organization in a separate annex (Annex A) that also outlines command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses from one phase to the next. Include task organizations for Army component support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:
Civil-Political Relationships. Embassies, country teams, non-DOD US Government agencies (CIA, Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], Agency for International Development [AID]).

Multinational Force Relationships. Host nations, allies, forces from regional/treaty

Joint Relationships. DOD agencies (DIA, National Sezurity Agency), unified and specified commands (subunified commands and JTFs when appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.

Relationships with Other Army Commands. HQDA, USAMC, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), other CONUS MACOMs, and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and army components of other unified commands.

Army in Theater Relationships. The structure that reflects unity of command within the ASCC or ARFOR.

Army components of subunified commands and JTFs.

Functional commands.

Area commands.

Major combat and combat support organizations directly under ASCC command in peacetime.

Army organizations providing operational-level support to the BCE and ACEs. 12/29/2004
(6) ARSOF, especially the theater army special operations support center.
1. Situation. Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation will be conducted. Include tactical information for the early phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or OPLANs. Designate the trigger event that signals execution of the OPORD.
Intelligence. Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence annex (Annex B) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components include the following:

A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which consists of--

A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/cultural factors.

Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.

A description of the enemy, which consists of--

Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity, and vulnerabilities to PSYOP.

Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.

Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or affiliated with US forces. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with major hostile powers.

Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces that may affect he execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that command.

Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. They will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the higher, joint, or multinational commander's intent, the end state desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.

Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of the unified/joint theater CINC. His charter is to further US in the theater and should be stated so that the ASCC/ARFOR, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part they play in achieving the CINC's strategic aim. •

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HQDA. Describe the missions, concepts, and intents of HQDA as they certain to the theater. In peacetime, the ASCC is a MACOM responding to CINC direction as well as to HQDA for Title 10 responsibilities. Include references to Army regulations or other service authorities.

Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps components of the unified command.

Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies. Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in this theater.

Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the CINCs objectives to further US policies.

Special operations forces. Describe the activities of SOF in the region that affect the operation.

US Coast Guard. Describe the role of the Coast Guard in the theater, especially its

counternarcotics role.

Department of State. . Highlight the contributions of US embassies and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with elements of the ASCC/ARFOR.

Other non-DOD US agencies. Describe the activities of US Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA and AID, as they affect Army operations.

Attachments and Detachments. Highlight critical elements of the Task
Organization/Command Relationship section (Annex A).

Assumptions. Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:

Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.

Consistency of US policy for the region such as the application of the War Powers Act.

Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

Effects of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the theater.

Adequacy of interagency support.

Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required actions.

Availability of resources.

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Warning times.

Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.

Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring nations.

The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.

The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.

2. Mission. Provide a clear, concise statement of the tasks to be achieved in all phases of the major operation. Include the commander's visualization of the end state to be achieved. Examples are restoration of an international boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces from a given geographical area. If for an MOOTW, provide a clear statement of the long-range, continuing aim of the theater army. Summarize tasks assigned by the CINC, tasks directed by HQDA, and tasks derived from the commander's analysis of the environment and his understanding of his superiors' intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:
Plan and organize for transition to war.

Support and sustain ARFOR and other designated forces.

Protect the force, its personnel, and family members.

Train ARFOR to maintain readiness.

Participate in security assistance efforts.

Conduct Army intelligence activities in conjunction with joint and multinational intelligence efforts.

Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD for an ARFOR in a conflict situation. Such peacetime operations include the following:

Security assistance.

Nation assistance.

Search and rescue.

Humanitarian assistance.




DODD0A-011222 12/29/2004 (8) Show of force.
3. Execution.
Conunander's Intent. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the commander's visualization (from start to finish) of the mission accomplishment by his command. This subparagraph links the mission to the concept of operations. It binds all subordinate activities to the overall objective.

Concept of Operations. Describe the commander's visualization of how the mission will be accomplished, to include his intent for the employment of the command as a whole. At the operational level, divide the concept into phases; the commander will specify the end state for each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The trigger event for the transition between phases is the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander's stated end state. The commander and his subordinates can also execute sequels within and at the conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an operations overlay (Annex C) and the deception plan (Annex D) in the concept.

(1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander prepares his concept by--
Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and integrating those augmentation cells from other components and agencies and subordinate Army units.

Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified command responsible for the target area, with other unified and commands (especially those involved in deployment), with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate US Government agencies.

Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints (Annex E), and ROE (Annex F) for the proposed operation with the host nation, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams.

Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of supplies and equipment.

Conducting necessary operations to support political and diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major operation.

Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the operation.

Stating the commander's concept to attain the end state for this phase by the command as a whole.

Setting forth the commander's scheme of operational maneuver, including close battle, deep battle, and rear operations when appropriate.

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