Army Field Manual FM 100-23-1: FM 100-23-1 HA Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Army Field Manual FM 100-23-1: FM 100-23-1 HA Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Operational-Level Roles and Responsibilities. Tactical Level Organization and Coordination. Domestic Operations. Appendices; How commanders should address issues in Humanitarian Assistance as if they were guided by international law.

Monday, October 31, 1994
Thursday, December 30, 2004

FM 100-23-1 Table of Contents Page 1 of 3
FM 100-23-1 FMFRP 7-16 NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 ACCP 50-56 USAFEP 50-56 PACAFP 50-56
FM 100-23-1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia
FMFRP 7-16 Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia
NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 Naval Doctrine Command Norfolk, Virginia
ACCP 50-56 US Air Force Air Combat Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
USAFEP 50-56 US Air Forces Europe
Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany
PACAFP 50-56 Pacific Air Forces Hickman Air Force Base, Hawaii
31 October 1994
FM 100-23-1

HA Multiservice Procedures for
Humanitarian Assistance

Table of Contents
Combat Air Forces Authorization
Executive Summary
Chapter 1 - Overview 12/28/2004

Types of Operations
Range of Operations
Environments of Operations
Principles of Operations
Other Considerations

Chapter 2 -Strategic -Level Roles and Coordination Strategic-Level Authorities International Authorities
Chapter 3 -Operational-Level Roles and Responsibilities The Unified Command Other Key Organizations Areas for Cooperation of Effort
Chapter 4 TacticalLevel Organization and Coordination Joint Task Force Tailoring Predeployment Deployment Employment Redeployment Transition and/or Termination
Chapter 5 - Domestic Operations Legal Authority Responsibilities Disaster Assistance
Appendix A - JTF Humanitarian Assistance Operations from 1983 through 1993 12/28/2004
Appendix B - Legal Issues Appendix C - Listing of Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations Appendix D - United Nations Organizations for Humanitarian Assistance Appendix E - Situation and Needs Assessment Appendix F - DOD and Office and Foreign Disaster Assistance Support Appendix G - Disaster Assistance Response Team Appendix H - Liaison Officers' Procedures and Checks Appendix I - Insignia of the United States Armed Forces Appendix J - Lessons Learned from Recent HA Operations Glossary References Authorization Letter
This publication is available through service publication systems.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
MARINE CORPS: PCN 140 071600 00 112/28/2004
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our rempective commands and other muimands as appropriate.

4.14 44,44
General. USA Lieutenant General. USMC Commander Commanding General Training and (›actririe Command Marina Coma Combat
Development Command
Rear Admiral. USN. General, USAF Commander Commander
Naval Doctrine Command Air Combat Command 12/28/2004
FM 100-23-1/FMFRP 7-161NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6 ACCP 50-56/PACAFF 50-56/USAFEP 50-56

The procedures in this publication are authorized for use throughout the
Combat Air Forces as indicated below.

US Air Forces Europe
General, USAF
MICHAEL L JONES Colonel, USAF Director of information Management

Pacific Air Forces
JOHN G. LORBER General, USAF Commander

Colonel, USAF
Director of Information Management 12/28/2004

This publication provides military forces, civilians, and volunteer organizations with information pertaining to humanitarian assistance (HA) operations where the size or extent of the assistance requires the formulation of a US military joint task force (JTF).

This publication provides common definitions, principles, and types of operations associated with HA. It describes the roles and functions of the military, civilian agencies, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations involved with HA at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This publication provides techniques for operational coordination between a JTF and other organisations at the operational and tactical levels. It suggests connectivity between the military and civilians involved with foreign humanitarian operations. HA. provides the JTF commander, his staff, and supporting components with information to assist in planning and executing HA operations. It provides nonmilitary agencies supporting HA operations with information regarding military HA operations.

All units supporting a humanitarian assistance JTF should use this publication for planning and training purposes. This publication applies to operations conducted by multiservice forces in a joint, interagency, or multinational environment. It can be useful to nonmilitary agencies or foreign Military unit* participating in coalition HA operations. The techniques and procedures presented are generic and apply worldwide.

Participating major service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this publication for joint procedural information. Ones they validate the information, OPRs should reference and incorporate it in the following service manuals,regulations, and curricula.
ARMY The Army will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Army doctrine and training publications as directed by the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
MARINE CORPS The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine Corps doctrinal and training publications as directed by the commanding general, USMarine Corps Combat Development Command.
DODDOA-0081 64

The Navy will validate and incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Navy doctrinal and training publications as directed by the commander, Naval Doctrine Command.
The Air Combat Command will incorporate the procedures according to Air Force Regulation 5-8 and HQ ACCIXPJ 01 5.1 (OPR: HQ ACC/XPJ). USAFE and PACAF will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures in accordance with applicable major command and other governing directives.

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the participation of the approving service commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary. Send comments and recommendations directly to—
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Air Combat CommandMTN: ATDO-J ATTN: XPJFort Monroe, VA 23651-5000 204 Dodd Boulevard, Suite 202DSN 680.3153, COMM (804) 727.3153

Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665.2778 DSN 674-2985, COMM (804) 764.2985
MARINE CORPS Commanding General
tIS Marine Corps Combat Development Command Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
US Agency for International Development2042 Broadway Street, Suite 214 Room 1262A Quantico, VA 22134-5021 320 21st Street NWDSN 276.3608, COMM (703) 640-3608 Washington, DC 20523.0008

(202) 647.7435
NAVY Commander Naval Doctrine Command
Director ATTN: N5 Air Land Sea Application Center 1540 Gilbert Street 114 Andrews Street, Suite 101 Norfolk, VA 23511-2785 Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2785

DSN 565.0565, COMM (804) 445-0565 DSN 574.5934, (804) 764-6934
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do notrefer exclusively to men. 12/28/2004

HA Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
This tactics, techniques, and procedures manual describes US military JTF involvement in
HA operations. Military and civilian after-action reports identify the need for expanded
joint and interagency procedures to enhance military and civilian interoperability. For a
mission to conclude effectively, HA teams must understand the mission and the partners
involved in the effort; that is the theme of this manual. This TTP describes the interaction
among military and civilian agencies in terms of three main levels of effort: strategic,
operational, and tactical.

Military involvement in humanitarian assistance is not new. In fact, military humanitarian civil assistance operations are conducted on a regular basis. This manual, however, pertains to large-scale situations requiring a military response in the form of a joint task force. JTF response would be necessary because of the need for a quick response reaction or the need for military logistics, security, or transportation capabilities. For HA, a JTF must work and coordinate with a number of national and international agencies and organizations who are also involved in the effort. Military members need to understand that organizations may have been operating in the area before the JTF arrived. Civilian organizations need to understand the nature of the responding military force as well. The bottom line is that military commanders are likely to work with and depend heavily on civilian organizations to complete their HA taskings. A JTF's HA mission cannot successfully conclude unless in-place organizations operate effectively. Successful interaction among organizations is key.

At the strategic level, national authorities and cabinet-level authorities determine broad policy and forms of response. This chapter discusses coordination considerations at the policy level, to include coordination with the United Nations (UN), other international organizations (I0s), and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVDs).

Regional commands and organizations finalize plans, determine the phases and timing of efforts, and pull resources together at the operational level. This chapter addresses central coordination that take place at the operational level and introduces the JTF level of response.

Tactical-level units execute the mission, which is the main thrust of this publication. This chapter provides detailed procedures and considerations for HA operations. It includes a discussion of the CMOC. It includes a discussion of JTF organization and planning responsibilities for predeployment, deployment, employment, redeployment, and transition and/or termination.
The final chapter presents an overview of domestic HA operations as prescribed by Army Field Manual 12/28/2004
1 Domestic Support Operations, 1 July 1993. 12/28/2004
Chapter 1

Humanitarian assistance (HA) is different things to different audiences. It may be confused
with peace operations, given the development of crises in Somalia, the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia, and Northern Iraq. Although HA operations may be conducted simultaneously
with peace operations, they are different in nature and purpose.

This chapter discusses the terminology and types of operations, range of operations,
environments of operations, and principles of operations peculiar to HA. United States (US)
military forces tasked for HA operations include all active and reserve components of the
US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and, when applicable, the Coast Guard. The
objective of these military forces is to execute humanitarian missions when directed by
cognizant legal authority.

HA includes programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or result in great damage or loss of property. HA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil
authorities or agencies that may have the primary, responsibility for providing HA I .
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are predominantly European national or international, nonprofit citizen's voluntary organizations. They are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief, and refugee and development programs. Examples of NGOs include, but are not limited to, religious; peace, disarmament, environmental, development, and human rights groups.
Private voluntary organizations (PVDs) are private, US-based, nonprofit organizations involved in humanitarian efforts including, but not limited to, relief, development, refugee assistance, environment, public policy, or global education. 12/28/2004
International organizations(I0s) are organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with global influence.
Peace operations is the umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities--activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two
complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).
Peacekeeping (PK) operations are neutral military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an
existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
Peace-enforcement (PE) is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions
designed to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to. reach a long-term political
settlement. The primary purpose of PE is the restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.

A chief purpose of military forces conducting foreign HA operations is to provide a secure environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to progress. As such, HA missions for US military may cover a broad range of taskings. In every case, the specific requirements placed on US soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will be situation-dependent. HA means vastly different things to different people, based on their specific perspective. HA operations can encompass both reactive programs, such as disaster relief, • and proactive programs, such as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) or civil support.
Disaster relief operations can be conducted across the entire range of military operations and can range from domestic natural disasters to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. HA missions in the area of disaster relief include efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, and civil conflicts. Potential roles for US forces include the construction of basic sanitation facilities, repair of public facilities, construction of shelters, provision of food and medical care, and immediate response to relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property.

Refugee programs are specific programs designed to support the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. UN classifications of persons in these two categories are important because of certain legal ramifications and sanctions associated with these designations. Department of Defense (DOD), in Joint Publication 1-02, defines these categories. Refugees are civilians who, by reason of real or imagined danger, have left home to seek safety across an international border. The UN definition of refugee is similar but specifies the person is "outside his country of origin." Displaced persons are civilians who are involuntarily outside the natural boundaries of their country. Programs include--

Administration of camps.

Care (food, supplies, medical care, and protection). 12/28/2004
• Placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations).
The UN coordinates international refugee and displaced person programs as directed by the secretary general of the UN.
HCA is a component of the Nation Assistance Program, under purview of the foreign internal defense
and development concept. HCA is normally a long-term proactive program coordinated by regional unified commands. Deployed military units conduct these activities, which include medical, dental, and
veterinary care and some local infrastructure construction and repair.
Nation assistance furthers the establishment of an effective local government supporting the goal of
crisis prevention. Nation assistance therefore includes those actions that assist in and support legitimate governments of host nations and counter attempts by destabilizing forces from within the affected nation. HCA is governed by Title 10, US Code, Section 401, which states that HCA--

Must be carried out in conjunction with host nation military and/or civilian personnel.

Shall complement and may not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided
to the host nation by another department or agency of the US.

May not be provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in
military or paramilitary activity.

May not be provided unless the Department of State (DOS) specifically approves such assistance.

Civil support is another long-term effort to assist local governments in domestic support areas such as repairs to infrastructures and actions that enable the existing government to govern. Civil support can also include environmental assistance--restoration, conservation, and protection of the environment. Civil support should not be considered a direct responsibility of HA operations; however, civil support­type activities invariably occur during HA and should be closely monitored to prevent expansion of the originally intended HA operation (see paragraph on Mission Creep in Chapter 3).
US military forces participate in three basic types of HA operations:

Those coordinated by the UN.

Those where the US acts in concert with other coalition forces.

Those where the US responds unilaterally.

The international process to conduct HA operations has been undergoing a period of rapid and fundamental change associated with the end of the Cold War. The UN has become more actively 12/28/2004
involved in worldwide HA missions. These include not only UN coordination of certain HA operations butin some cases the commitment of dedicated UN forces to the area of operations (AO).
UN-coordinated operations that involve military forces normally take the form of specifically designated peace operations. However, these operations can also be purely HA operations. In Somalia, for example, the UN agreed to provide security for relief efforts. on the part of NGOs and PVOs. This support included the tasking of UN observers to monitor relief operations, making it the first occasion to use military observers for humanitarian relief.
Certain HA operations may begin as a multinational or unilateral US response and later become UN­sanctioned. The UN often experiences significant time delays as the organization works through the process of achieving international consensus. A unilateral or multinational response to a crisis situation may be faster than a parallel UN response.
US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. A coalition is a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Multinational operations are likely to occur in large-scale HA operations. The development of clearly defined command relationships for each coalition is an essential ingredient for successful HA operations. The relationship depends on two factors.

The first factor is the HA mission requirements and the duration of the HA operation.

The second factor is the political sensitivity exerted by the coalition partners involved in the HA

During Operation Restore Hope, more than 40 countries offered initial assistance to participate in the HA effort. The types of forces, size of personnel commitments, dedication of supplies, and other contributions had to be carefully managed to match the requirements of the mission. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) developed a force data questionnaire and used it to gather information on each country's HA forces. This data was used to plan lift and support requirements and assist in the effective use of the forces once they reached Somalia. In addition, USCENTCOM organized a coalition working group and met frequently to review the current status of nations participating in the HA operation. These two techniques proved essential to managing the diverse contributions of coalition partners.
Based on USCENTCOM staff interviews
Foreign military forces receive guidance from their political leadership on how to interact with other members of the coalition and how to interact with specific agencies. The diverse political goals of contributing nations affect military and nonmilitary coordination and impact the command and control
(C2) structure.
Multinational HA operations provide unique and difficult challenges to coordination, which include
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language translation, cross-cultural sensitivities, and national perspectives. Early detailed planning stresses establishment of essential liaison requirements.
In specific HA operations, the US Government may direct US military forces to act in concert with other US Government departments without direct involvement of other nations. Such would normally occur in situations where the US decides to act on its own--for expediency or self interest--to rapidly respond to a crisis.
Ajoint force operation is a military operation in which more than one service participates. Virtually every large-scale HA operation will be a joint force operation organized as a joint task force (JTF). The need for a joint response is based on the complementary nature of US armed forces for actions in the theater of operations.
Each service brings to the HA mission certain unique capabilities such as Air Force airlift, Navy sealift and construction (Seabees), Army civil affairs (CA), and Marine combat service support (CSS), shipboard helicopters, and so forth. The JTF is the central focal point for coordinating all US military actions with other agencies, forces, and nations.
US military forces tasked to participate in a foreign HA operation will be part of a JTF, and, in all likelihood, that JTF will be part of a larger coalition response or multinational task force (MTF). The JTF is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. An example of a recent JTF to support HA was Operation Able Manner/Safe Harbor, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1991 and 1992. A multiservice response was required when large numbers of Haitian immigrants were intercepted by US Coast Guard cutters in the Windward Passage and brought to Cuba. The commander of the joint task force (CJTF) was a US Marine Corps brigadier general who directed the joint service operation.
Initially, the USS Tortuga (LSD 46) provided temporary messing, berthing, and medical support for up to 1,000 immigrants. As the JTF came on line, Army CA units, Navy Seabees, and Army engineer units established five holding camps to process and administer the Haitian immigrants. While their legal status was being determined, the JTF continued to provide security, food, medical care, and all aspects of public administration for the camps. (For additional examples of JTF responses, see Appendix A.)
Based on an interview with a participant of JTF Guantanamo
Individual services are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces that conduct HA operations. These forces must be capable of operating as individual units, with other services in a joint or multinational environment, or, as is expected in HA operations, within the context of an interagency scenario.
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Small-unit operations include tasking of individual units to provide tailored or specialized services. Such services, for example, would include tasking company-size medical units to provide emergency medical support in remote areas or short-term detachments of aircraft and personnel to provide quick-reaction transportation capabilities. Small-unit operations may be the precursor to large-scale HA missions or may be specifically designed to meet limited HA objectives.
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) represent a wide range of operations occurring in both domestic and foreign environments and include combat and noncombat operations. Specific operations include, but are not limited to--

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).

Strikes and raids.

Arms control, enforcement of exclusion zones, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Nation assistance.

Protection of shipping.

Humanitarian assistance.

Operations Urgent Fury, Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and Sea Angel and JTF Andrew are examples of MOOTW. As compared to war, MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations because of the overriding objective to limit potential hostilities. When conducted in foreign environments, MOOTW support the diplomatic instrument of national power, which highlights the criticality of both the military's supporting role and interagency operations for successful mission accomplishment.
HA operations are often conducted simultaneously with other military missions. In most short-term, foreign HA operations, neutrality is an important aspect. Military forces should be aware that some nonmilitary agencies involved in HA operations, especially non-US agencies, do not see the US military as neutral. However, when they comprehend the tremendous capabilities of the US military, with its unique warfighting and humanitarian abilities, they become more receptive to increased interagency operations.
Peace operations--especially peace-enforcement--goals and objectives may differ from HA goals and objectives both in scope and duration. Attitudes of host nationals or conflict belligerents may vary from helpful cooperation to forceful opposition, depending on whether the military force is or is not perceived to be an HA force or a peace operations force. Many peace operations include HA considerations, even when not expressed in the peace operation mandate and mission. HA-type missions that could occur in conjunction with peace operations include--

Providing food, potable water, shelter, transportation, and engineer support to the resident

Assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, especially to isolated communities.

Providing emergency medical treatment and medical assistance programs for the prevention of 12/28/2004
DODDOA-0081 73
• Providing extraction and evacuation of sick, injured, or wounded civilians.
HA is an important MOOTW mission that the US military is uniquely qualified to plan and execute. Unlike any other single organization, the military has the organizational structure, educated and trained personnel, essential equipment, rapid worldwide deployability, and ability to operate in austere physical environments.
Examples of MOOTW range from domestic support to combat operations. They include JTF Andrew, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Urgent Fury, and Operation Provide Comfort. MOOTW include a wide range of operations occurring in both domestic and foreign environments, which include both combat and noncombat operations. HA employs military assets to support noncombat objectives as part of MOOTW. Since MOOTW normally occur to support the political/diplomatic instrument, the military may not be in the lead. This highlights the criticality of interagency and NGO and PVO cooperation and coordination for mission success.
Based on input from the Center for Low-Intensity Conflict
The US force commander, in collaboration with other responding organizations, should assess the environment in which US forces will conduct HA operations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest climate for HA operations.
Once the operational environment is confirmed, the US force commander determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the assigned tasking. The environment determines the rules of engagement (ROE) to be used within the A0s. For HA, the more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission. Environments that military forces can expect to encounter in the conduct of HA operations may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
A permissive environment is conducive to HA operations. Little or no opposition or resistance to HA forces is expected. A permissive environment is normally associated with pure relief operations following a natural disaster or economic collapse, with assistance provided at the request of the host government. Nonhostile, anti-US interests may attempt to disrupt US military activities. The physical security environment may be permissive; however, other nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be employed to impair credibility or reduce effectiveness of US military activities.
The distinction between HA in a permissive environment and in a hostile environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction will result in inadequate planning and unrealistic expectations. HA operations in a permissive environment are characterized by--
• Commonality of purpose for all parties. 12/28/2004

A quantifiable problem, often a single, natural disaster.

Clear objectives, provision of support until normalcy returns.

Host nation cooperation.

An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended AO.
Hostile conditions, circumstances, and influences in the operational environment range from civil disorder or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. Forces conducting HA must be prepared for a full range of contingencies. Commanders can employ their forces to ensure the safety of the populace--defend the perimeter, provide escort convoys, screen the local populace, assist in personnel recovery operations, and so forth. HA operations in a nonpermissive environment are often characterized by--

Multiple conflicting parties.

Imminent danger to all parties.

Relief used as a significant weapon that can be manipulated by combatants for political gain.

Relief efforts that take on the overtones of CSS.

The more hostile the environment in which HA is conducted, the less predictable the force actions will be toward meeting defined mission objectives. HA forces must be prepared to counter actions by hostile guerrillas attempting to disrupt friendly forces and to counter mass actions by a previously friendly
populace. Commanders should not depend on their humanitarian mission to shield them from hostile acts. HA commanders, in conjunction with higher authority, must determine the appropriateness of the use of force. The effects of the environment on humanitarian activities are depicted in Figure 1-1. As the environment becomes progressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security increases, while the capability for humanitarian activities, such as food distribution and medical assistance, decreases. 12/28/2004
Fiyure 1-1. Effects of Operational Environment on Humanitarian Activities
HA commanders, in conjunction with higher authority, must determine the appropriateness of the use of
force. Ari unarmed HA force is acceptable only in a permissive environment. This kind of environment
would normally be found only when HA forces are called to respond to a natural disaster, such as in
Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh. In most HA situations, the force is armed. The CJTF must
determine the proper level and types of armament, to include riot control agents (RCA) or cayenne
pepper spray (CPS), when applicable.
In a region with diverse ethnic, racial, or clique components, warring factions may be present. Consent • of these factions makes relief efforts easier. In the absence of consent, a political or diplomatic decision is made if the situation demands armed intervention as a preliminary to render HA. The risks associated with forcible action have to be anticipated.
The major contributions that the US military provides to any HA operation is a responsible, self­contained force that assists other agencies in accomplishing humanitarian relief. Military forces are normally tasked to provide some sort of short-term response in an HA crisis situation, while civilian agencies supporting the same HA operation have a long-term perspective toward providing aid and assistance. Planners must consider the differing perspectives of assistance providers when coordinating
an HA operation.
Military commanders and planners tasked to support HA should consider a few broad and enduring principles to maximize the effectiveness of force employment. Such consideration minimizes situational reactions, improves efficiency, and encourages interagency cooperation when US military forces initiate HA operations.
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
To achieve the objective, military commanders and planners should--
• Know that HA operations have different objectives than combat operations. Military units
engaged in HA are tasked to supply a level of assets appropriate to the mission. Military units 12/28/2004
FM 100-23-1 Chptr 1 Overview Page 10 of 13 tasked with HA use a level of force appropriate to the mission.

Know that clarity in HA tasking and the military role in support of HA is essential.

Establish attainable and realistic HA goals.

Develop clear HA mission-termination end state standards and ensure that all involved military
and civil agencies understand them.

Inform HA forces of the parameters and terms of reference within which they function.

Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
To attain unity of effort, US military commanders conducting HA operations--

Support, cooperate with, and take direction from US civil governmental authorities.

Establish clear lines of authority for HA forces.

Appreciate political/diplomatic factors affecting the chain of command.

Anticipate problems in focusing unity of command.

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities to support strategic aims.
Commanders should balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for long-term objectives. They must be assured of the resources required to preserve and accomplish HA goals. The forces must be prepared to support the assigned HA objectives and provide the necessary resources to accomplish the mission.
Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.
To ensure security, US military commanders should--

Provide HA force protection against virtually any person, element, or group.

Know that HA success is proportional to the secure environment of the operation.

Not underestimate the security risks to the force in either permissive or hostile environments. An
inherent responsibility is the transition from a peaceful to combat posture, if needed.

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Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
US military commanders will--

Be constrained in the conduct of operations.

Be advised of, promulgate, and understand detailed ROE. The inappropriate use of force may
adversely affect legitimacy and neutrality.

Establish appropriate channels to modify the ROE for unforeseen contingencies.

Adhere to established procedures, particularly in dealing with the civilian populace.

Understand that restraint is essential because a single act could cause critical political

Promote the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
US military commanders and planners should--

Ensure that HA operations adhere to internationally sanctioned standards.

Know that host nation governmental authority should remain genuine.

Know that neutrality is critical in gaining legitimacy. The purpose, delivery, or distribution of
assistance should not be tied to the embracing or acceptance of any particular political, ethnic,
social, economic, or religious creed by the intended beneficiaries.

Other areas a commander must consider when conducting HA operations include organizational preparedness, force tailoring, cultural respect, funding authority, Title 10 authority, legal authority, media coverage, and mission termination.
A commander must anticipate requirements for C 2 structures. The C2 structure that directs the overall
HA operation (UN, JTF) must be organized and have sufficient resources to meet its responsibilities.
The C2 structure must also be prepared to coordinate with nonmilitary groups, such as the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is part of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID); mission donor coordination groups; UN agencies; and PVOs, NGOs, and I0s.
Information/intelligence is essential to successful HA operations. HA commanders must be prepared to
deal with the difficulties of gathering, processing, and disseminating information in an HA environment.
They must prepare forces for unique HA operations and anticipate equipping and training pipelines.
Operational effectiveness can be directly enhanced and in-theater precrisis training minimized by /fin/100-23-1/Chl.htm 12/28/2004
periodic command post exercises.
Commanders must consider types, numbers, education and training, and equipment of HA forces in relation to the required HA tasks. They must tailor forces to meet specific HA objectives and requirements as well as potential threats.
US forces tasked with HA missions should be aware of the cultural diversity integral to international HA. US cultural perspectives may not be relevant to many foreign HA recipients or to some NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. Military forces should avoid imposing ethnocentric standards on a group that resists those standards. For example, some cultures have clearly established guidelines for the consumption or avoidance of certain foods, the sanctity of religious structures, the appropriateness of certain types of behavior, and so on. Because of their beliefs, those cultures may refuse some forms of assistance.
Operations with a multinational task force present unique cross-cultural challenges for HA forces. Nations that are traditional military rivals may, in a disaster situation, support the same HA operation.
Extensive and effective liaison reduces cultural barriers.
The financial aspect of any HA operation is one of the biggest problems the CJTF faces. Logistics • support can quickly accrue a significant level of expense. The longer the HA operation lasts, the greater the commitment of resources. Every HA operation must address the legal authority and mechanisms that allow US forces to acquire and disburse supplies and services. All parties participating in the HA mission must understand the fiscal constraints imposed on military forces.
Normally, US military forces participatingin HA missions are reimbursed for expenses if certain criteria are met. USAID/OFDA coordinates payment of expenses for actions it requests DOD to perform. However, DOD must coordinate with USAID/OFDA before it expends the funds. Costs incurred or funds expended without prior USAID/OFDA coordination, or costs exceeding available USAID/OFDA resources, are not normally reimbursed without congressional action.
The President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as the National Command Authorities (NCA),
approve HA missions. DOS requests DOD capabilities. The CJCS, by the authority and at the direction of the SECDEF, orders overseas deployments. The HA commander should be aware of appropriate national and international directives, mandates, resolutions, or other documents related to the HA mission.
A military force is a legal, effective, and appropriate means for conducting an HA mission. To be
legitimate, that force must exercise its authority for reasonable purposes and in accordance with
international and domestic laws. HA forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. -US military forces conducting HA must know the legitimate interests, prerogatives, and authority of various levels of civil government and agencies involved in HA and act accordingly (see
Appendix B). 12/28/2004

Commanders at all levels should anticipate extensive media coverage of HA activities. News media representatives are most likely on the scene or will soon arrive. Their interest in such operations is natural and should be facilitated to the maximum extent possible. Media coverage can assist the HA mission and support US national objectives. The importance of understanding the media is not so that commanders can control it but so they can anticipate its impact on HA operations and plans. The NCA and others may also use media coverage to measure the success of the mission.
The CJTF and his staff should develop a detailed public affairs (PA) strategy for the HA operation. This strategy should incorporate SECDEF, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the supported commander in chiefs (CINC's) guidance. The CJTF and his staff maintain close coordination with the senior DOS representative in the AOR, as well as with other government agencies such as USAID and the US Information Service (USIS).
Commanders should initiate planning for mission completion at the earliest possible opportunity. Although determining the parameters of the mission is part of the initial tasking, commanders should anticipate elusive, ill-defined mission completion criteria.
Commanders should engage civil agencies in developing mission completion criteria and ensure that clear guidelines are established with host nation agencies.
1. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 September 1993. 12/28/2004
Chapter 2
This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of the principal governmental, civil, and
military organizations involved in formulating HA responses in foreign nations. It includes
an example of an interagency coordination process at the strategic level based on recent
activities associated with presidential review. Interagency coordination requirements at the
operational and tactical levels are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The information in this and
subsequent chapters provides joint force commanders (JFCs), their staffs, and supporting
unit commanders a basic understanding of governmental and civilian organizations and how
they relate to the overall HA scheme. A basic understanding of these organizations should
enhance the coordination process during HA operations.

Rarely can the resources and expertise of one US Government agency or department address the problems of all the participants in an HA operation. Therefore, true interagency coordination is essential for the effective development and implementation of policy. Such coordination is difficult because of differing budgetary authorities and the relative experience and competencies of the agencies involved. The complexity is compounded due to the imperative for intensive coordination at all levels of military engagement--strategic, operational, and tactical. While the armed forces have developed doctrinal techniques and procedures to facilitate coordination within their structures, they often do not match or 12/28/2004
harmonize with the techniques and procedures used by other goVernmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations.
At the strategic level, the US authority begins with the NCA and continues through senior DOS and DOD representatives, with cooperation from other cabinet authorities and the total involvement of the supported and supporting combatant commanders. In UN operations, strategic-level planning is not as clearly defined. One of the challenges for US military planners at strategic levels is to determine when and with what other organizations to begin the coordination process.
Authorities on the US national level include the NCA the US Congress, DOS, DOD, other cabinet-level departments, and USAID. The NCA is supported in its decision-making process by the National Security Council (NSC) and in interagency coordination by the Administrator for USAID, who is the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.
National Command Authorities
The President and SECDEF form the NCA. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the armed forces to execute military action. Only the NCA can authorize movement of troops and execution of military action. By law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action. The NCA may direct relief operations when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region of interest to the US, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation by itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of the armed forces. The NCA issues its orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commanders.
National Security Council
The NSC is the principal forum to consider national security issues requiring presidential decision. Its membership includes four statutory members--the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serve as statutory advisors to the NSC. The President may appoint other advisors. By directive of 15 September 1993, the NSC designated the USAID Administrator as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. The special coordinator (SC) performs his interagency coordination functions for the US in complex international emergencies through the interagency working group (IWG) which he chairs or cochairs with a representative of the NSC.
Cabinet-level authorities consist of DOS, DOD, USAID, and other cabinet-level authorities.
Department of State
DOS or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA. Usually, the ambassador declares a disaster based upon a request for assistance from the host country government and input from the US country team. The US ambassador in a given country has authority to declare a disaster in order to provide immediate relief assistance and start the process that may lead to increased US assistance.
To determine the policy for a particular relief operation, DOS may also lead an IWG in those cases not 12/28/2004
convened by the SC or NSC. DOS is organized in functional and regional bureaus. The key participating bureau is the regional bureau of the affected country and may include the bureaus of Refugee Programs, International Organizational Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (see Figure 2-1).
Mice of the Secretary

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NSW East Maas 001411$ ab Insemational Environmental and Scientific Affairs Foreign Sonia,MOWN
InterArnerican Affairs Consular Affairs

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international Organctation Affairs Coonanation
Figure 2-1. Department of State Organization
Department of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal officer for policy coordination within DOD. He is responsible for developing the military policy for international HA and foreign relief operations. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs proposes the policy and oversees the administration of existing statutory programs (see Figure 2-2). DOD officials participate in IWGs that the SC or NSC normally chair or cochair. DOD is represented in other IWGs on humanitarian emergencies that either it, DOS, or USAID may chair (see Figure 2-3). 12/28/2004

FM 100-23-1 Chptr 2 Strategic-Level Roles and Coordination Page 4 of 13
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Figure 2-3. Strategic-Level interagency Coordination Process
Joint Staff
The primary joint staff-level proponent for HA policy is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5. In addition, the Director for Logistics, J4, through the logistics readiness center (LRC), oversees the execution of logistics support for HA operations that the services normally carry out.
The Director for Operations, J3, gets involved when a military force is to be inserted into the AO as a part of the US response to the crisis. Figure 2-4 depicts the organization of the joint staff and illustrates 12/28/2004

FM 100-23-1 Chptr 2 Strategic-Level Roles and Coordination Page 5 of 13 those directorates that interface to support HA.
Figure 2-4. Joint Staff Interfacm for HA
Enthusiastic cooperation by supporting unified commands was also critical to
success. The Transportation Command's resident liaison officer effected much
of the coordination for the strategic movement of coalition forces into the
theater. Security assistance officers from US European Command and US
Pacific Command, as well as defense attaches worldwide, received and
responded to a USCENTCOM-developed questionnaire requesting critical
posture and support requirements data.
Operation Restore Hope--A USCENTCOM Perspective
The joint staff is responsible for designating the supported and supporting commands for any operation, in/100-23-1/Ch2.htm 12/28/2004
including HA missions. Once the relationships of supported and supporting CINCs have been established, detailed coordination at the staff level will progress.
Agency for International Development
USAID plays an important role in providing HA. Although not directly under the control of DOS, USAID coordinates activities at cabinet and country team levels. Its efforts are executed in three phases­-relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
The USAID organization for HA is shown in Figure 2-5. Relief is usually coordinated under the auspices of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response. The bureau coordinates its efforts through OFDA. This office, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, participates in planning at the operational level.
USAID Adrninissitor
Deputy Administrator
Private Voluntary Cl Amen= Schools and
Food for Peace
Cooperation Foreign Disaster Hospitals Abroad Assistance
Figur' 2-5. USAID Organization for HA
Other Cabinet-Level Authorities
NSC and DOS have the authority to augment the IWG by requesting required expertise from cabinet­level offices. Cabinet-level representation depends on the nature of the operation under consideration. The Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation (DOT); the Office of Management and Budget; and the US Information Agency may play a role in the development of the strategic plan. For example, the Coast Guard, as an agent for DOT, has capabilities that can significantly enhance joint HA efforts. These include maritime search and rescue, port safety and security, marine environmental response, maritime refugee processing, maritime interception force operations, and law enforcement on navigable waters.
Interagency coordination parameters begin at the strategic level. For greatest effectiveness, coordination _12/28/2004
must begin at the first signs of a developing complex emergency. Above all, successful coordination involves comprehensively engaging all the organizational and functional tools at the appropriate points and places on the disaster time line in order to deal with the crisis.
Response Triad
Each HA situation is unique and requires a unique response. Three essential elements--political, military, and humanitarian--are present whenever HA is provided. The critical coordination of these elements can be portrayed as a response triad, as illustrated in Figure 26.
Humanitarian Assistance
Figure 2-6. Elements of the Response Tried
USCENTCOM had to overcome the challenges of coordinating with a variety of civilian agencies. The Department of State formed the Government Interagency Task Force, Somalia to coordinate the US Government response to the crisis. Near-continuous communication between the joint staff and USCENTCOM sewed as the primary means of ensuring the unified commander's position received consideration in interagency policy discussions.
Operation Restore Hope--A USCENTCOM Perspective
Commanders of a large-scale HA must carefully balance these essential elements to ensure success. Each element complements the other two and each must be represented at every level of HA, from policy making to distribution of relief supplies in the field.
US governmental, civil, and military authorities; other governments; the UN; and NGO, PVO, and 10 relief agencies share responsibilities for the conduct of humanitarian relief operations. With so many organizations involved, planners at the strategic and operational levels may encounter problems because the strategic plans and goals of these organizations may not be compatible with military objectives.
An effective response can be described as a triad at both national and international organizational levels. The components of such a triad are humanitarian, political, and security organizations. Effective US
http: Han a/adl sc/view/public/296732-1/fm/100-23-1/Ch2.htm 12/28/2004
action in such an environment necessitates strong central coordination and leadership and should include interface with NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. The diverse participants compound the complexity of an operation. Appendix C discusses organizations that may be found in an AO conducting HA operations.
Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance
Through the NSC directive of 15 September 1993, the USAID Administrator plays the major interagency coordinating function for the US Government in his designated capacity as the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. The principal staff backup for discharging this central coordinating function is OFDA.
When the NCA determines that a US response to a complex emergency may be required, the SC may be
directed to convene an appropriate 1WG to recommend the policy and actions that should be followed. The IWG merges information received from all appropriate cabinet-level representatives, to include the US ambassador to the UN, regional organizations, and the US ambassador or chief of the mission. The
ambassador or chief of mission will usually gather input by consulting with the country team.
The IWG immediately develops an information collection plan and tasks all sources to implement the plan. The unified commander is an important source who will modify his own collection plan to support the requirement created by the complex emergency. This information is usually communicated through the country team but also follows channels.through the CJCS to the DOD representative on the IWG. Another potential source is the political advisor assigned to the CINC who can link directly with the DOS representative on the IWG. Figure 2-3 depicts the interagency coordination process at the strategic
Interagency Planning
Concurrently, the IWG develops a comprehensive strategy and plan of operations with tasks for each of the key participants. Key to the development of a sound strategic plan is the inclusion of all elements that should be involved in the crisis. The SC must ensure the integrity of this comprehensive process. In addition, to ensure a coordinated approach, the unified commander needs to consider how to integrate ongoing in-country programs under Title 10 authorities.
Key to the development of sound recommendations is including other elements that may be involved in the crisis. For example, DOS should consider the involvement of USAID, UN organizations, and NGOs, PVDs, and IOs that may be operating in the country. Various organizations may establish a crisis task force or crisis action team to manage the situation.
The difficulties in integrating strategic, operational, and tactical-level planning with the diverse mixture of other organizations involved can be minimized through an active interface role of the SC. The SC needs to facilitate the links between the military and those organizations whose structures and procedures are not as formally defined as those of the military. The SC is responsible for coordinating these planning and operational interfaces throughout the life cycle of a complex humanitarian emergency.
Integration of strategic, operational, and tactical-level planning with other organizations involved in the HA operation is difficult. The main reason for this difficulty is that other organizational structures are not as defined as those in the military. As a result, no comparable match exists to that of the US military _12/28/2004
This does not mean these organizations do not have a chain of command. Planning follows the concepts contained in each of their charters and often takes place on all levels. Further, some UN agency charters can be interpreted to have overlapping mandates. The organizations also tend to tailor their support to the crisis and, as a result, their network is more ad hoc than that found in a traditional military organization. For this reason, experience shows that relationships with organizations mature as an operation develops, and these relationships and linkages require constant nurturing. The roles and responsibilities of the organizations discussed below should provide military planners with the requisite knowledge to develop the interagency linkages needed to assure the success of an operation.
The UN is involved in the entire spectrum of operations, ranging from prevention to relief, through reconstruction and rehabilitation, to development. Usually, UN relief agencies establish independent networks to execute their humanitarian relief operations. Although the UN system seems to delegate as much as possible to the agency elements located in the field, a supervisory and support network can be traced from the UN headquarters to field officers.
A relief operation may occur due to manmade or natural causes. Although the UN may be involved in HA operations without a resolution from the Security Council or the General Assembly, the type of operations envisioned will probably be launched under the auspices of an approved UN resolution.
The UN organization for complex emergencies normally includes headquarters and field components. The UN Under Secretary General for the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), as.the UN emergency coordinator, normally serves as the headquarters component. Field-level organization currently relies on the resident coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP). The resident coordinator mobilizes and manages the UN country team and provides direction for the field relief effort. In most serious emergencies, the UN Secretary General may appoint a special representative who reports directly to the Secretary General on all matters but also to the UN emergency coordinator (UNDHA) on humanitarian matters.
Many UN staff elements may get involved in the provision of humanitarian relief. Planners must understand the differences between the two major arms of the UN that participate in HA. The UN organization in New York deals with issues of policy and international security. Additionally, this arm maintains the command and control center that coordinates UN peace operations around the globe.
The UN organization in Geneva, on the other hand, deals specifically with HA. Although the involvement of UN staff elements is governed by the specifics of the situation, UNDHA is generally held responsible for coordinating HA at the equivalent US military strategic level. Strategic and operational planners should consult representatives of this UN department when developing recommendations for the involvement of US military forces. This consultation may take place through USAID/OFDA rather than through direct UN-DOD/unified command interface.
United Nations Objectives
Military commanders of HA forces must have a working knowledge of the aims and objectives pursued by the UN organizations in the AO. This knowledge is essential during the planning process to reconcile the objectives of the military plan with UN HA objectives. These broad objectives are-- 12/28/2004

To keep the emergency from happening, or when an emergency threatens, to mitigate its effects.

To minimize human casualties and destruction of property by ensuring the survival of the
maximum number of victims through effective relief actions.

To reestablish self-sufficiency and essential services as soon as possible for all affected
populations, with special attention to the most vulnerable segments such as children, the disabled,
and the elderly.

To ensure that relief action promotes and does not impede rehabilitation and longer-term
development efforts. Activities should contribute to long-term development goals.

To protect the main effort and humanitarian relief implementers through judicious use of the
security component of the triad.

To find durable solutions as quickly as possible, with special attention to displaced and affected
populations, while assuring protection and assistance in the process.

United Nations Peacekeeping
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) take place around the globe, where over 70 nations have contributed more than 75,000 troops. US military forces may conduct HA simultaneously or in coordination with a UN PKO. Therefore, commanders and staffs should understand success factors for UN PKOs and apply them to HA, particularly in the mission-planning stages. Analysis indicates that for • UN PKO to be successful--

Peacekeeping forces must have the support of all belligerent parties.

Presence of the peacekeeping force must be tied to ongoing efforts for a negotiated settlement of
the dispute.

Hostile parties must be separated and substantially disarmed.

In addition, operations that do not meet these PKO success factors will have an even higher probability of failure when the following conditions exist:

The mandate is ambiguous or unclear.

The terrain is poor.

A clear cease-fire line does not exist.

Troops are deployed to cities.

Weapons are readily available.

The UN PKO chain of command is poorly disciplined.

United Nations Response 12/28/2004
The UN system is often called upon to assist the affected governments with large-scale relief operations. The level of assistance and its effectiveness depend largely on the coordination efforts at both the international and country levels. The nature of the emergency also plays a large role in determining the specific support required. UN prevention and response can also be categorized as a triad of humanitarian, political, and security components analogous to the US triad mentioned earlier. See Appendix D for more detailed descriptions of UN agencies that support HA.
Outside of the UN, the primary international organizations participating in HA involve groupings of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. It is critical to point out that these groups are distinctly different and have separate mandates and staff organizations. They should not be considered as one organization.
International Red Cress and Red Crescent Movement
Three Red Cross organizations make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent
Societies, and the individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations. The objective of the movement is to coordinate their entire range of activities. For example the statutes of the movement give the ICRC some flexibility in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions. Figure 2-7 depicts the relationships within the movement.
Figure 2-7. International Red Cross and And Crescent Movement Relationships
http :// .htm 12/28/2004
Neutrality is a vital aspect in the involvement of any Red Cross or Red Crescent organization in HA.
Their objective is to protect their neutrality in reality and in perception. The protection of this neutrality
is a key consideration for joint military planners and operators.
International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC is international only in the sense of its
worldwide operations; it is essentially all Swiss. The ICRC works for the application of the provisions of
international humanitarian law in armed conflicts and undertakes tasks incumbent upon it under this law.
Founded in 1863, this international organization is based in Geneva and derives its mandate from the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977.
The ICRC is distinct from the rest of the movement in that it has a protection mandate in addition to its
relief assistance work. It acts principally in cases of conflict, ensuring legal protection for victims and
acting as a neutral, independent humanitarian player in the most complex emergency situations. At times
the ICRC may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, but its mandate is to function during
armed conflict.
International Federation of ed Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This organization was formed in 1919 and consists of the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their own countries. The mandate of the federation is to provide humanitarian relief during
disasters. Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations may provide assistance to other federation members through their international alliance provisions.
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
are created by countries to provide for humanitarian relief within their own borders.
International Organization for Migration
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) performs three primary missions:

The processing and movement of refugees to countries offering them resettlement opportunities.

The provision of orderly and planned migration to meet emigration and immigration requirements
of losing and gaining countries.

The transfer of technology through the movement of qualified human resources to promote
economic, educational, and social advancement of developing countries.

The IOM has demonstrated a strong competence in capacity-building for indigenous governments and NGOs. Namely, it conducts interactive training workshops to increase knowledge of disaster management and build teamwork for interagency preparation and response for complex emergencies.
The JTF may find many NGOs and PVOs in the AO. Over 350 agencies, many of which are capable of
responding in HA operations, are registered with USAID. Some foreign-based organizations are not required to register in the US. USAID publishes a yearly report that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organizations. This report should be part of the combatant commander's library. Appendix C contains a description of NGOs and PVOs that have disaster-relief field experience. Disaster assistance evolution will likely expand the number of NGOs and PVOs in the future. 12/28/2004
NGOs and PVDs, as they are known in North America, are organizations, both national and international, that are constituted separately from the government of the country in which they are founded. They range from multimillion dollar organizations with decades of worldwide experience in disaster relief to newly created small organizations, dedicated to the particular disaster in question.
Military commanders and other decision makers should understand the following key elements about the NGO and PVO community:

Military interactions with the NGO and PVO community should be coordinated with the US country team, particularly OFDA disaster assistance response team (DART) representatives.

The characteristics, missions, and capabilities of individual NGOs and PVOs are diverse. All are involved in direct humanitarian aid with host populations. Each organization operates individually.

NGOs and PVOs provide the bulk of HA at the grassroots level. The military structure can
provide logistics and security assistance to remote and unsecured areas.

NGOs and PVOs may operate in areas of high risk, where other organizations are hesitant to go.

NGO and PVO assessments are often an excellent source of information on the HA situation.

NGOs and PVOs are funded primarily by donations from the public as well as governments and the UN. They may have scarce resources, both at the donor level and in the field.

NGOs and PVDs will probably operate in the affected area long after the military leaves. Therefore, military commanders should consider the implications of any US military HA projects they initiate in the field.

1. Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, 1994. 12/28/2004
Chapter 3
This chapter describes military and nonmilitary agencies involved at the operational level of
HA operations. Notional coordination frameworks are provided to illustrate potential
connectivity at the operational level. Additionally, the strategic elements the CINC
considers to organize his HA joint task force are presented as linkages to operational focus.

Readers will develop an understanding of how policy guidance leads to mission statements,
implied tasks, and plans of action for both military and civilian agencies. With better
understanding of these matters, action agencies and staffs can improve interoperability at
their level. Military planners must be aware of the interagency operations associated with
HA relationships and their impact on policy formulation.

The military's operational-level organization is the unified command, which is responsible for a region known as a theater of operations. The CINC establishes the operational objectives needed to transform national-level policy and guidance into effective HA operations. The CINC provides authoritative direction, initiates actions, sequences events, and applies resources to bring about and sustain the military contribution to HA.
Developing the HA military mission statement is a difficult but critical task for the CINC and his staff. The strategic mission statement should aim for an understandable and achievable strategic end state, even for a short-duration operation. The mission statement is normally coordinated through an interagency process that the CINC formulates with the assistance of USAID/OFDA. 12/28/2004
During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance and arranged support and resources for the operational commander. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanded a JTF/CTF composed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF) components, in addition to the forces provided by countries contributing to the US-led, combined coalition.
As the responsible unified command, USCENTCOM performed numerous tasks contributing to the success of Operation Restore Hope. Key areas included shaping a clear, achievable mission statement for the operational commander, shaping an international coalition, and orchestrating the transition to eventual UN control.
Based on Operation Restore Hope--A USCENTCOM Perspective
Mission Statement
Some key considerations in developing a mission statement include--

Higher strategic direction.

The desired end state.

Security of the operation.

Military assistance to USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.

Use of CA units.

The military command must have a clear and achievable statement so that the many participating military units can be tasked. The USCENTCOM mission statement for Operation Restore Hope is one example.
When directed by the NCA, the commander in chief, United States Central Command
(USCINCCENT) conducts joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the
major airports and seaports, key installations, and food distribution points; to provide open
and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organization
operations and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

Desired End State
The HA mission should produce a desired end state collaborated by strategic-level political, military, and humanitarian (response triad) participants. Whenever possible, the desired end state should be known before US forces are committed. However, this may not be possible. If the desired end state is not known and US forces have deployed, the unified commander may be required to formulate one. The concept of operations may include the desired end state and be used to develop the following:
• Measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 12/28/2004

Phases of the operation.

Information used to transition JTF responsibilities to other forces, organizations, or governing

Mission Creep
Military forces will undoubtedly receive numerous requests to perform additional tasks, as was the case in Somalia. The UN, for example, wanted the multinational force to expand its operation beyond the area of greatest need to establish a presence in the northern part of the country. The UN also pressed the force to begin disarming factional militia.
These tasks represented the phenomenon labeled mission creep. In essence, due to political agendas, key participants in the operation sought to expand the unified task force (UNITAF) activities and AOs beyond the initial, carefully limited scope of securing the environment for humanitarian relief operations. USCENTCOM had to work through the interagency coordination process to respond to the mission creep tendencies.
The mission creep phenomenon underscores the importance of developing a definitive mission statement early on--a statement that ensures parties involved understand the limits of the commander's charter. The phenomenon also points out the difficulty of achieving consensus when other agencies with key roles in the operation have differing views of the desired end state ....CINCCENT exercised patience and pragmatism in overcoming these attempts to change his mission without NCA directive.
Operation Restore Hope--A USCENTCOM Perspective
The unified CINC for the affected region is responsible for developing the military response to HA operations. In addition to the Title 10 responsibilities (see Chapter 1), the CINC may create a JTF to accomplish the HA mission. Once the CINC decides to organize a task force to execute an HA operation, he may organize and send a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area to acquire information necessary to develop a clear mission statement and plan for the operation. He may also opt to establish offices at his headquarters to administer the unique requirements of HA. These could include a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) or similar crisis action organization to assist the CINC in planning and executing the operation, a logistics operations center (LOC), and a liaison section.
Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
Assessment is a fundamental task for providing effective disaster relief and HA. The HAST deploys to the area of responsibility (AOR) to assess the existing conditions and the need for follow-on forces. Normally, the CINC deploys the HAST, which is made up of personnel from staff sections appropriate to the mission. If possible, the HAST leader coordinates with other staff sections prior to deployment to determine relationships and responsibilities. Additional details on situation and needs assessments is provided in Appendix E. The HAST should-- 12/28/2004

Conduct reconnaissance to determine the nature and extent of the food and water supply; loss of
life, injury, and illness; numbers of displaced persons; disruption of the government; presence of
medical representatives; status of communications and facilities; and destruction of property and

Formulate recommendations on HA missions and desired capabilities.

Establish liaison and coordinate assessments with host nation agencies, supported commanders or their representatives, US diplomatic personnel, and other relief agencies.

• Arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment in concert with the US •
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

In emergency cases, to relieve suffering and life-threatening situations,. the CINC can direct the HAST to begin HA-type missions. In such cases, the CINC and his staff identify relationships and authority with the host nation, embassy, and USAID personnel. Such emergencies require specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies (NGO, PVO, and I0 materials or military supplies). Prior to deployment, the CINC and his staff provide the HAST with the following:

Current HA operations.

A threat assessment, to include any medical threats.

Mapping, charting, and geodesy support.

Terms of reference for HA operations.

Persons to contact at embassies and DOS before contacting relief agencies.

PA guidance.

Logistics Operations Center
Logistics support requirements vary, depending on the magnitude of the operation and the type and amount of relief the host country requests. The LOC is the point of contact for implementing a timely and flexible logistics response for the CINC. This response includes alerting key logistics agencies, locating and releasing required supplies, moving supplies to, departure airfields and seaports of embarkation, and delivering supplies to the required area.
Movement of initial relief supplies and equipment is, in most cases, accomplished by airlift resources. These movements should include the coordination of types of supplies and arrival times with other US and foreign agencies involved in the effort. The LOC is also responsible for planning and coordinating aspects of force deployment and sustainment operations.
Coalition Unit Liaison Elements
In conjunction with US operations, other nations might deploy military forces to operate with the JTF. Some coalition units may provide liaison elements at the CINC as well as the JTF level.
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center 12/28/2004
The CINC may establish an HACC to assist with interagency planning and coordination. Staffing for the HACC should include a USAID and OFDA advisor/liaison officer who serves as the HACC director, an NGO/PVO advisor, a CA officer, a legal advisor, a PA officer, and other augmentation as required. The HACC provides the link among the CINC, USAID and OFDA, NGOs and PVOs, and other agencies that might participate.
Each CINC will establish an organizational structure to meet the humanitarian needs of that particular theater and operation. USCENTCOM established an HACC within the J5 Politico Military Division at the headquarters level to support Operation Restore Hope.
An example of an operational-level unified command, with appropriate sections unique to HA, is shown in Figure 3-1.
UN Security
— • UN
Unfilled Command Units
Figure 3-1. Unified Command Structure
The HACC's mission was to provide Operation Restore Hope coordination and liaison between HQ, USCENTCOM arid NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. The HACC assisted with US interagency planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance activities in Somalia, including the transition to UN control. The HACC helped facilitate the timely interagency staffing of actions regarding NGO, PVO, and 10 (UN) concerns that were elevated to the international headquarters level. The HACC also served a unique advocacy role, supported by its interagency staffing, by being able to represent both military-specific as well as NGO- and PVO-specific issues and concerns.
Based on the size and nature of HA operations, a CINC may designate a JTF to conduct the military's operation. Creating a JTF is one option available to a CINC. This paragraph provides an overview of a typical JTF headquarters staff and addresses CINC-level considerations in organizing the JTF and in selecting specialized forces for an HA response.
The CINC develops the HA mission statement and concept of operations based upon the direction of the NCA. Input--including requests from USAID/OFDA, situational factors (crises caused by man, weather, volcanic, or seismic activity), and the time military forces enter the disaster area--affects the mission statement. The CINC develops a list of requisite capabilities, based upon analysis of the foregoing, and tasks his components to identify forces for a specified set of capabilities. The components establish a 12/28/2004
force list (personnel, equipment, and supplies) with associated movement requirements. The CINC
approves or disapproves the components' force lists, establishes the JTF headquarters, and assigns
approved forces to the JTF.
Where one commander may choose to use a JTF to accomplish a given mission, another may choose an
alternate course of action; however, JTFs are ideally suited to perform the HA mission. They are
successful due to the adaptive nature of their command and control organization, the unique capabilities
of service components, and the ability to quickly deploy personnel and equipment to execute any
number of diverse HA missions.
The JTF may be a two-tier command, which simplifies the chain of command between the CINC and
JTF commander and minimizes potential confusion and logistics problems that could surface during
joint force operations. The CINC determines the command relationships for the JTF. This command
relationship may include a subunified commander or a service component commander who, based on
CINC guidance, establishes a JTF.
The CINC establishes the JTF when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require
overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF requires execution of responsibilities
and close integration of effort involving two or more services. The JTF is dissolved when the purpose
for which it was created is achieved. Joint Pub 3-0-1 provides general guidance relating to joint
operations and Joint Pub 5-00.2 2 discusses the JTF. Joint Pub 4-0 3 provides general guidance for
logistics support of joint operations.
To enhance coordination and execution, the JTF commander may define various geographical AOs
under the operational control of a component commander or a particular nation's forces as in the case of
multinational operations. Chapter 4 contains details concerning administration and operation of
geographic areas.
The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command
element, and forces required to execute the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF headquarters is
command, control, and administration of the JTF. During HA operations, the JTF headquarters must
provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Unique aspects
of the HA mission compel the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of
the capabilities and limitations of the components of the JTF. Additional and specific functional areas may be added to the JTF headquarters as necessary. See Figure 3-2 for a typical HQ JTF staff
organization. Areas that may be augmented by additional personnel include--

Staff judge advocate (SJA).


Health services.


Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC).

Meteorology and oceanography (METOC). 12/28/2004
• Communications.
Units I. .
I_J -1 JR
./6Personnel Intelligence ornntunIcalons
HQ Oantlti
Coovrortd so4 award
Specie• I advisor to CJTF _Coarinallors
Figure 3-2. Typical MQ JTF Staff Organization
Staff Judge Advocate. HA operations present unique requirements in regard to international and operational law. SJAs may be required to have expertise regarding--


Displaced and detained civilians.

Rules of engagement.

Psychological operations (PSYOP).

Medical support.

Laws of war.

Civil affairs.

Local cultures and customs.

Government and international laws and agreements.

Military-political liaison.

Claims and contingency contracting.

Humanitarian operations center (HOC) and civil-military operations center (CMOC) operations.

Consistency of legal advice is imperative. Attorneys from coalition forces should be integrated into the planning and relief effort at all phases of the operation. See Appendix B for additional information on 12/28/2004
legal issues.
Public Affairs. In most HA operations, the JTF establishes a joint information bureau (JIB) to
coordinate the release of information and news media requests for information. JIB personnel provide
command information (internal information) on the activities of US military personnel engaged in HA
operations and facilitate civilian news media representatives in their coverage of JTF activities.
Additionally, JIB personnel offer training in media relations for commanders, staffs, and other JTF
personnel. The JIB prepares and executes the JTF PA strategy. This strategy serves the public's right to
be informed while minimizing risks of disclosing unauthorized information through effective security at
the source.
PA supports the policies of maximum disclosure with minimum delay; open and independent reporting;
and full and balanced coverage of operations. PA provides factual information on all aspects of the
operation. A good PA plan fulfills the military's obligation to keep the public informed, minimizing the
risk through security at the source and operational security awareness.
Staff Surgeon. The surgeon is a critical JTF staff member during HA efforts. HA missions are often
conducted in areas where the biggest enemy is disease. The JTF surgeon's advice is critical for the
commander to protect the force and determine relief requirements.
Special Staff Sections. The JTF commander may establish additional sections within the JTF to
emphasize important functions such as coordination, logistics, security, and liaison. Chapter 4 elaborates
on the tasks and functions of these sections. Sections tailored for HA include the coalition liaison
section, the CMOC, and the LOC.
Coalition Liaison Section. This section is developed within the JTF. Its primary purpose is to coordinate and manage the high volume of military contributions offered by various countries. This responsibility may be assigned as an additional duty within the J3 section.
Civil-Military Operations Center. This section is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Logistics Operations Center. If formed, the LOC has the additional duty of tracking and managing coalition forces logistics needs and coordinating logistics management and flow with other agencies in the operation.
Special Operations Forces. SOF have capabilities well suited to the requirements of HA operations. However, their capabilities are often misunderstood. Certain SOF are well qualified to assist in US
Government-sponsored HA activities in remote areas, especially in a conflict environment. SOF teams are adaptable and capable of operating effectively in remote areas and urban areas isolated by disaster events. The teams may be able to provide detailed reports and assessments on conditions in the area. They deploy rapidly, have excellent radio communications capabilities, and work well with indigenous ethnic groups.
If SOF are assigned to the JTF, the CINC must clearly delineate their roles, missions, and functions. SOF have two inherent disciplines that can best be applied toward HA requirements: CA and PSYOP. CA units, PSYOP forces, and Army Special Forces operational detachments-A (SF ODA) comprise the
SOF team.
Civil Affairs Units. Army CA units are special operations forces. They are designed to perform a variety of functional area skills to support HA. Most CA units are in the reserve components and thus require a
http://ati sc/vi ew/public/296732-1/frn/100-23-1/Ch3 .htm 12/28/2004
presidential call-up. These units are organized to provide support to all levels of government. Reserve CA personnel routinely perform their functional area skills as part of their civilian jobs. This working knowledge is especially useful in assisting civil governments and their citizens in disasters.
The units' functional specialty capabilities are normally tailored to particular situations. They assess the damage to the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and manage a CMOC. CA units also serve as liaison between the military and local relief organizations; PVOs, NGOs, and I0s; the UN; and OFDA DART.
CA units are usually attached to the various maneuver commanders assigned to the JTF. When the JTF is employed, CA units establish and maintain relations between the JTF and host nation populace and authorities, as well as with NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied, and indigenous security forces; the host nation; and NGOs and PVOs.
CA units can provide the JTF with expertise on factors that directly affect military operations in foreign HA. These factors include--

Host nation agencies and other civil centers.

Ethnic differences and resentments.

Linguistic regions and subregions.

Social structures (familial, regional, generational).

Religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors).

Political structures (power distribution and entrenchment).

Economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth).

Linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics.

A cultural history of the area.

Historic relations with the west.

Attitudes toward the west/military forces.

CA units may include military forces carrying out activities that are normally the responsibility of the
local or indigenous government. Selection of CA units must be based on a clear concept of the CA mission requirements for HA. Joint Pub 3-57 4 provides specific guidance. The CINC should consider the following when employing CA units--

Most CA units and personnel need to be activated from the reserve establishment.

If the JTF conducts civic action programs, CA units should be assigned as a primary staff element. /fm/100-23-1/Ch3.htm 12/28/2004
• CA units support the unified commander, other JFCs or subordinate components of the JTF, and
the CMOC.

Psychological Operations Forces. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected foreign groups. These messages are intended to promote particular themes that can result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. Such information may include safety, health, and public service messages, as well as messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forces and operations.
Both the UN and relief agencies were proponents of UNITAF conducting civic actions projects. USCINCCENT supported the field commander's position of limiting this activity to short-term projects that did not compromise the UNITAF primary mission. A specific issue that surfaced during the initial stages of force development was the requirement for a large CA contingent.
USCENTCOM, in coordination with the interagency and UNITAF commander, determined that deployment of large numbers of CA personnel was unwarranted, given the limited scope of the operation. Future operations may involve mission tasks related to rehabilitation and reconstruction of civil administration. In such cases, a larger CA force may be appropriate for inclusion in the force list.
Operation Restore Hope--A USCENTCOM Perspective
PSYOP units are equipped with portable printing presses, loudspeakers, radio broadcasting stations, and other equipment that enables them to deliver messages in many diverse media. PSYOP personnel can provide a commander with real-time analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and the effectiveness of the information being disseminated.
PSYOP can play a significant role in HA operations. US and/or coalition forces may have to overcome hostile attitudes of the local populace. Forces involved in HA operations must avoid any hint of favoritism. The image to be projected is that of sympathetic competence; military forces are there to reduce the suffering of the indigenous people. The CJTF determines the requirements for a joint PSYOP task force to support a JTF in the earliest stages of planning for the operation. PSYOP forces can begin to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences prior to the introduction of forces. Their early introduction into the theater can reduce hostile attitudes and increase the acceptance of US forces supporting the HA
operation. Joint Pub 3:53 5 provides general guidance.
Army Special Forces Operational Detachments-A. Because only one active duty CA battalion exists for short-notice commitment worldwide, planners must have contingency options to have other forces fulfill critical functions based on the limited availability of these active duty and reserve personnel. SF ODAs are a possible alternative and can contribute to the HA effort in the following manner:

By identifying HA needs (areas and specific requirements) during the conduct of reconnaissance
or advance force operations.

By being cross-trained to perform CA liaison functions.

By serving as coalition support teams (CSTs) to provide liaison with coalition units. 12/28/2004
It may be beneficial to augment the CJTF's staff with a group of experts from the regional CINC's staff.
For example, the commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) would deploy his staff to the
forward area and work directly with the CJTF for the duration of the HA operation.
The deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) consists of designated experts in
communications, coordination, logistics, planning, and PA. The DJTFAC is equipped with the necessary
Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer terminals and
communications equipment to enter movement data and transportation requirements into the system or
data base. The DJTFAC is tailored to complement the normal staff of the CJTF.
Another augmentation example is the HAST employed by USCENTCOM. The HAST is made up of
representatives from various sections of the CENTCOM staff. This advance team is normally temporal
and may be subsumed into the JTF. Augmentation by the HAST can provide critical continuity between
the advanced party and the main task force.
Coordination of the military and civil aspects of HA operations is imperative. Interagency cooperation, planning, and connectivity are essential for success of the operation. Interagency frameworks introduced
at the operational level better enable the key organizations to orchestrate the total HA effort within the theater. An array of civilian agencies coordinates with military forces conducting HA. Some of these
agencies represent concerns of their respective governments, while others represent high-profile international organizations. Essential interactions take place at the operational level. Key organizations may include--

US Government agencies (USAID/OFDA).

NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.

Country team.

Unified commander (CINC).

Joint task force.

UN agencies and multinational forces.

NGOs, PVDs, and 10s.

Host nation.


USAID/OFDA administers the President's authority to coordinate the provision of assistance in response to disasters, as declared by the ambassador within the country or. higher DOS authority. USAID/OFDA has the authority to provide assistance, notwithstanding any other provision of law. This authority allows USAID/OFDA to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of 12/28/2004
i\TG-(N and PVOs and other sources of relief. USAID/OFDA is responsible for--

Organizing and coordinating the total US Government disaster relief response.

Responding to mission requests for disaster assistance.

Initiating the necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.

Coordinating assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs and PVOs.

The authority to provide foreign disaster relief comes from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides for assistance to--

Preserve •life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events that cause disasters.

Preserve life and minimize suffering by responding to natural and man-made disasters.

Foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness.

Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate responses to requests for aid.

Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs.

USAID/OFDA can coordinate directly with DOD for matters concerning defense equipment and
personnel provided to the affected nation and for arranging DOD transportation. DOD Directive 5100.46 6 establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (DASD HRA) is the primary point of contact. When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift),
USAID/OFDA pays for those services/commodities. The CINC should have a coordination linkage with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID/OFDA provides an excellent means for military and civilian operational-level coordination. For details on OFDA and coordination with DOD, see Appendix F.
USAID/OFDA has the capability to deploy a DART into the AOR to manage the US Government humanitarian relief effort. For details on the OFDA DART, see Appendix G. Once committed to an operation, USAID/OFDA should establish liaison with an HAST assembled by the appropriate CINC.
USAID/OFDA has operational links and grant relationships with many NGOs and PVOs that have relief programs outside the US. Other frequent USAID/OFDA collaborators include ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UNDHA, United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP). OFDA also coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems. Figure 3-3 depicts operational-level connectivity. 12/28/2004
Crisis Task Force
UM Spacial
Acsion Crow
Figure 3-3. Operational-Levet Connectivity
As the President's representative, the senior US diplomat in country is responsible for the overall
coordination of US foreign HA. OFDA assists the embassy and USAID in coordinating and conducting
operational assessments. These assessments vary in their results from provision of funding to the
provision of supplies and services and/or the deployment of an OFDA DART. Also, depending on the
nature of the situation, OFDA may request logistics support from DOD. If the SECDEF, through the
CJCS, supports the OFDA request, a CINC can provide military assistance.
Relationships with nonmilitary agencies should be based on an appreciation of missions, lines of
communication, and standardization of support. Not all NGOs, PVOs, and IOs appreciate military involvement in HA operations. Because of fundamental mandates or human rights beliefs, some NGO, PVO, and IO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces.
Cooperation among military and civilian activities is imperative for a successful operation. When joint operations occur, military and civilian leaders must outline clear roles and responsibilities. Cooperation
can be gained and maintained if agencies understand one anothers' missions. Commanders may find it beneficial to employ third parties for liaison and coordination with those NGOs and PVOs that are reluctant to establish direct contact. OFDA representatives have proven invaluable in providing
coordination and linkages among NGOs, PVOs, I0s, and the military at the operational level.
Planners may obtain information concerning relationships with government agencies, NGOs, and PVOs through lessons learned documents published by joint and individual service agencies. Logistics data bases, legal requirements, communications, existing support agreements, and desired end-state conditions provide basic areas for cooperation to ensure unity of effort in HA operations.
Military forces and NGOs and PVDs may gain some benefits from sharing automated data bases while
executing the HA mission. Three tracking systems used in HA include the Disaster Assistance Logistics
Information System (DAMS), the Commodity Tracking System (CTS), and a Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO) computer tracking system designated SUMA. One method of accessing these data
bases is through the OFDA DART.
Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System
DALIS was developed during Operation Provide Comfort by a joint team comprised of US Army
Reserve (USAR) personnel, who worked closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and OFDA DART in conceptualizing and developing an easy-to-use, automated logistics
management information system. Subsequently, the USAR team, at OFDA's request and funding
assistance, upgraded the software program.
DALIS is a comprehensive crisis-management tool that can be used to plan, track, identify, and locate
resources; identify requirements; reduce redundancies; facilitate coordination; and produce reports. It
tracks all aspects of UNHCR, governmental, and NGO and PVO logistics--including commodities--by
source, type, quantity and cost; human resources; donor; location; status; required-by and due dates; and
destination. It also automatically converts measurements to the metric system and costs into US dollars.

Many of the DALIS capabilities have been incorporated into the systems of disaster-relief organizations
in western nations. However, DOD has not completed its review of this prototype system for fielding.
Commodity Tracking System
OFDA developed CTS for UNHCR as a total commodity tracking, warehouse management, logistics
data base designed to support the relief effort in the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. CTS
is written in FoxPro and uses DALIS for its initial design. CTS has networking capabilities, which
DALIS lacks.
SUMA System
PAHO designed SUMA--an initial commodity-sorting and inventory system--to sort the initial
distribution of sorted and unsorted in-kind donations. PAHO has taken a different approach to
distribution of an emergency relief system. PAHO trains and supports local government ministries and
local PVOs on the use of the SUMA system.
Legal Requirements
A mutual understanding of governing regulations and other legal requirements applicable to military
forces and NGOs and PVOs is essential to promoting harmonious relations and preventing undesirable
incidents. For more discussion on legal issues, see Appendix B.
Support Requirements and Agreements
Clarifying support requirements will reduce misconceptions between the military and outside agencies. The JTF is usually tasked to support other agencies. Standardized support agreements and memorandums of understanding should address finding considerations. The JTF may need to establish a cost center for each supported agency. Appropriate authorities should negotiate support agreements through proper channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products and fuel, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support. 12/28/2004

Public Affairs Operations
The global visibility of HA operations, the presence of large numbers of civilian media representatives, and the intense interest of the media in covering HA operations requires careful coordination among military PA elements. The JIB, Combined Information Bureau (CIB), or Allied Press Information Center (APIC) coordinate information policies and procedures to ensure a synchronized PA effort, to prevent misunderstandings, and to facilitate HA operations.
Donation Assistance
A donation assistance program addresses the receipt and distribution of donations such as gifts and foodstuffs made by US civilians and organizations in response to the humanitarian effort for the country receiving HA. Donation programs are best coordinated at office of the secretary of defense (OSD) level through the unified. command, which provides guidance to the JTF.
At the JTF level, any donation program should stress that donations be sent to NGOs and PVOs that are better suited to determining the priority of providing donations to the affected area. The executive agent for the JTF donation program has typically been the command chaplain. Donations should only be accepted against identified needs, with an identified receiver, and with plans for the storage, transport, and distribution of the donated goods provided.
1-Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 1993.
2' Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, September 1991.
3' Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, September 1992.
4' Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, November 1993.
5' Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 30 July 1993.
6. Foreign Disaster Relief 4 December 1992 12/28/2004

Chapter 4

This chapter addresses key factors in planning and executing an HA mission--from forming the JTF through terminating it. Phases of the operation include predeployment planning, deployment, employment, redeployment, and transition and/or termination. This chapter identifies unique or critical considerations for HA operations that differ from standard military operations. Lessons learned from recent operations provide the basis for this chapter. Appendix A provides a list of past humanitarian assistance JTFs.
In addition to the JTF headquarters discussed in the previous chapter, special staff elements and functional commands mold the force to the particular nature of each HA mission. The JTF is tailored during the unified command's predeployment planning phase; therefore, all of these organizations are not required for a given situation.
The nature of HA may require a JTF to be tailored so that combat support (CS) and CSS forces (CA, engineer, medical, logistics) may have an equal or greater role than other assigned units. JTF organization and composition specific to HA are addressed in terms of special staff sections, consolidated functions, and areas of operations. Figure 4-1 presents a model of notional JTF organization for HA. /fintl 00-23-1/Ch4.htm 12/28/2004

Special FunCtional Awes,
Support MAGTF H arm —I Unts Lints
lask se
Command Farce
Art Base
Medical Gram Ampht

Support TF
¦••-1 Sec Pot
Task ARGForce
Coast Guard I
Figure 4-1. Notional HA JTF Organization
Coordinating and managing special functions in a unified manner may be of benefit to the JTF and the mission. Through proper integration of support methods, the JTF can eliminate duplication of effort and
conserve scarce resources. Examples of unified functions may include--

A joint task force support command (JTFSC).

A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB).

A joint movement center (JMC).

A coalition forces support team (CFST).

During Operation Restore Hope (Somalia 1 .992-1993), the JTF organized a JTFSC. The JTFSC was a functional component command of the JTF. The mission of the JTFSC was to "provide logistics and medical support for US forces and as directed/required coalition forces deployed in support of Operation
Restore Hope. . . provide common item support, interservice support, inland distribution of POL and dry cargo, and common used port operations as directed by the commander of the joint task force (CJTF)."
As a separate JTF component and coequal to other JTF service components, the JTFSC serves as an honest broker for setting theater logistics priorities and allowing certain efficiencies and economies of scale to be achieved in logistics operations. Additionally, the Army CSS units in the JTFSC contribute to the theater's line haul and water production requirements.
The J4 forms the JFUB. In a situation where a large number of coalition forces exist or US military forces operate within the same geographic area, allocation of facilities to accommodate all parties is necessary. The JFUB acts as the executive agent to deconflict real estate issues arising from multiple- 12/28/2004

user demands on limited facilities and recommends courses of action on unresolved issues. The JFUB can address coalition force accommodations, ammunition storage points, joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit facilities, and so forth.
The combatant commander establishes the JMC to provide support to HA operations. The JMC coordinates strategic movements with USTRANSCOM. In addition, it oversees the execution of transportation priorities. The JMC is responsible for planning movement operations and for monitoring the overall performance of the transportation system. It expedites action and coordination for immediate movements requirements to ensure effective and efficient use of transportation resources. The JMC is normally under the staff supervision of the senior logistics staff officer.
In a multinational HA operation, a CFST coordinates actions with coalition units. Duties of the CFST may include--

Welcoming and orienting arriving forces.

Providing initial staging sites, water, rations, and other support.

Assessing the capabilities of coalition forces and their potential for prospective JTF missions and

Determining political sensitivities (historic hostilities or assistance) between coalition countries
and the area of HA operations.

Receiving, processing, and providing intelligence to arriving coalition forces.

Briefing ROE to arriving coalition forces.

Conducting ongoing assessments of coalition capabilities and recommending appropriate

Briefing C 2 relationships and relationships with NGOs, PVOs, and UN agencies.

The supported CINC commences formal planning on receipt of the CJCS warning order. Initial planning might begin earlier, based on intelligence reports that alert the CINC of a possible HA support mission. Normally, the CINC's J2 or J3 has the lead on interpreting warning signals (such as starvation patterns, seismic or volcanic activity, civil war, or weather trends). Contingency plans for the affected area may already exist to support a HA-type operation.
The CINC determines whether the HA operation is a supporting operation or the main operation. The CINC's intent and the desired end state form the foundation for the mission. In many situations, the CINC will have plans or predesignated JTFs to conduct an HA-type mission. However, the CINC might use a standing JTF, a predesignated contingency JTF, or a newly designated JTF task-organized for the specific HA mission. The CINC organizes the JTF according to joint doctrine and established standing 12/28/2004
operating procedures (SOPs). Joint Pub 5-00.2 1 provides specific guidance for the JTF.
During planning, the JTF organization and staff must be tailored to meet the requirements of the HA
mission. Planners determine whether military units will operate under neutral humanitarian aid
authorities and, where possible, from neutral bases. Clarity of command, control, and communications
(C3) relationships among the JTF, DOS, USAID/OFDA, the UN, ICRC, the host nation, and NGOs and
PVOs reduces organizational conflicts and duplicative relief efforts.
The eventual transition of HA operations must be an integral part of predeployment planning. Transition activities must begin as soon as the JTF arrives in theater. To ensure that everyone understands and agrees to the transition plan, it should be part of the operations order (OPORD). Transition is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Readiiess—often the success of humanitarian missions to reduce suffering and save lives--hinges on the
timeliness of responding units. Predeployment plans should account for streamlined deployment
procedures that may be critical in disaster scenarios where time is crucial. Plans should also provide for
rapid deployment joint readiness exercises so that coordination and interagency relationships can be
tested and refined.
As discussed in Chapter 1, HA operations might involve coalition forces. In such a case, the JTF might
form the core of a larger CTF. 2 JTF planners should consider coalition operations. The new draft Joint
Pub 3-16 provides additional considerations. A key question of the JTF is what role the military force
will provide to the relief effort. Will the JTF provide the actual relief (food, logistics, medicine, transport
relief supplies) and provide security for the UN, ICRC, and NGOs and PVOs?
Upon being assigned a mission, the CINC organizes the appropriate JTF or a single component
command to accomplish the mission. As in all military operations, a JTF requires a clear mission
statement. The CJTF may have to develop and submit his own mission criteria up the chain of
command. For example, the mission statement for Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) included:

Provide medical care.

Provide clothing and shelter.

Move into the refugee camps.

Provide assistance for the aerial supply effort.

Organize the refugee camps.

Build a distribution system.

Provide transportation and/or supervise the distribution of food and water.

Improve sanitation.

Provide site and convoy security. Planners dictate the JTF's composition, which depends on the mission, initial estimates of the situation, 12/28/2004
and guidance from higher headquarters. As in all operations, major mission areas, such as force security, sustainment, and HA requirements, compete for limited time and assets. Planners should consider the possible need to augment HA JTFs with expertise not typically resident in most commands.
The CJTF should realize that the JTF will encounter NGOs, PVOs, and IOs in the operation. Often, these organizations are in the area before the force arrives, remain while the force accomplishes its mission, and stay in place once the force departs. These organizations are staffed with competent and knowledgeable people who are fully cognizant of the political and cultural traditions of the area. Coordination and cooperation with these organizations can be paramount to the success of the HA operation.
During planning, the JTF develops a subordinate campaign plan in order to outline the commander's intent. The phases of the plan for Operation Restore Hope are shown in Figure 4-2.
Phase I. Secure Lodgment and Establish Joint Task Force. Establish lodgment, gain control of the humanitarian relief supplies, and introduce follow-on forces.
Phase II. Expand Security Operations Out to Relief Distribution Sites. JTF expands lodgment by securing several inland bases to facilitate relief supply distribution.
Phase III. Expand Security Operations. Expand inland bases and security operations. Expand security of the humanitarian relief sectors (HMO deterring criminal activity and provide security for NGOs and PVOs.
Phase IV. Transition to UN Peacekeeping Forces and Redeploy. Active transition phase of standing down the JTF headquarters and forces. Phase IV ends when the JTF is relieved of responsibilities for military operations.
Figure 4-2. Campaign Plan for Operation Restore Hope
Area estimates or studies are key elements during planning. Current or complete area assessments or studies may or may not exist for the country or area in which the mission takes place. The CA direct support team is capable of updating area assessments. These studies should provide political, cultural, economic, military, geographic, PA, weather, and other information on the area.
HA mission assessments should focus on the factors that led to the HA mission and current situation. These assessments should identify the causes of the HA crisis and not just the symptoms. Tasking may involve the causes or may only address relief of the symptoms of the crisis. The military force must understand that its support to the HA mission may not solve the underlying causes requiring the HA.
Studies also assist planners in identifying information gaps for further intelligence-gathering such as on-


Host nation capability. 12/28/2004
DODD0A-00821 3

Food capacity.

Security risks.

Support assets.

Storage facilities and requirements.

Roads, air, and port capabilities.

Numbers of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs on the ground.

Assessments can answer some of these questions. IPB is tailored and expanded in scope to deal with the
ambiguities of HA operations and is critical for planning, force design, and time-phased force
deployment data (TPFDD) development. Additionally, USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs in the
area have experience and knowledge that can supplement traditional information sources.
HA missions require integrated logistics assessments. Assessments should include host nation and theater support capabilities. Remote and austere sites place a high priority on early deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks. Detailed logistics planning should include--

Identification of time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources necessary to
support the current operation.

Determination of logistics planning factors to be used for this operation and development of
logistics requirements. Additionally, the method to determine sources for all classes of supply
must be defined.

Identification of support methods and procedures required to meet the air, land, and sea lines of

Provisions for coordinating and controlling movements in the HA area of operations to adjust the
materiel flow commensurate with the throughput capability.

A description of the interrelationship between theater and strategic LOCs, to include the need for
airfields capable of supporting strategic and theater airlift aircraft.

Development of a country or theater concept of support.

Development of a plan to provide food, equipment, and medical supplies to relieve the suffering
in the absence of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.

The J4 should consider contracting for support capabilities to augment critical supplies, services, real estate concerns. and Contracting support can come from within the host nation or from outside the country. If support is contracted from inside the country, the country logistical resources should be able to support the country first and then the military requirements. Contracted supplies, transportation, labor, and services can aid the host nation's economy and facilitate the transfer of responsibilities back to the nation or NGOs and PVOs. Contracting customs vary by country or region, and contracted services and .12/28/2004 .
goods from one country may not be acceptable in the host country for a variety of legitimate reasons.
Logistics support to coalition countries can become a critical issue. Such support burdens US logistics forces but may help bring about the participation of other countries in the HA effort and hasten the departure of US forces. The JTF must establish movement priorities among JTF support requirements,
US Government-furnished HA materiel, coalition or UN requirements, and possible NGO and PVO HA
materiel. The JTF must work with coalition or UN forces and NGOs and PVOs to ensure their movement requirements are known. The primary means for originating and validating movement requests is the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The effective movement of materiel requires close coordination among the JTF service components, UN or coalition forces, NGOs and PVOs, the regional CINC, and USTRANSCOM.
Some JTF commanders have successfully developed a multinational logistics command to coordinate the vast array of logistical responsibilities that support a coalition mission. This useful and viable option
can be considered but should be focused toward certain common-use consumables such as fuel or rations. Other areas, such as medical and health service support, may require a more narrow national perspective when planning--for example, the provision of blood supply. For UN operations, the JTF commander should obtain specific guidance regarding procedures to be followed for seeking possible reimbursement for supplies and equipment associated with the operation.
The supported CINC establishes ROE, which are critical for force protection, for HA operations. Based on the CINC's guidance and the evolving situation on scene, the CJTF should be prepared to request changes to the ROE and forward them up the chain of command for approval.
All units in the theater must disseminate, understand, and rehearse ROE. Coalition forces must understand the ROE and reduce any discrepancies between the ROE and instructions from their military headquarters. Not all countries have the same ROE or interpret them the same. The CJTF should communicate ROE to other participants, such as NGOs and PVOs, as much as possible without compromising security.
Once the JTF finalizes the ROE, unit commanders must train the force to reinforce the rules. In a perfect situation, training would commence before deployment. Since HA operations may be time-sensitive, training in ROE is continuous. It may be beneficial to condense ROE into ROE cards and rehearse likely situations through HA exercises. Appendix B provides sample ROE for HA operations.
The international community has developed a proposed Code of Behavior for Military and Civil Defense Personnel in International Humanitarian Aid;however, this code is not approved. The JTF commander should know that--

The code exists.

The code has not been endorsed by any international organization and is not binding.

Some countries with forces and personnel involved in HA may use the code as a guide to
behavior. 12/28/2004

A copy of the code and other military and civil defense assets (MCDA) documents maybe
available through the UN or some other international organization involved in a large-scale HA

If available, appropriate JTF staff personnel should review the code.

During HA operations commanders face the difficult challenge of determining whether or not the force
is meeting mission objectives.
Commanders need to understand the progress of the mission to make informed decisions about resource
allocations and develop or modify military operations. The JTF may develop various MOEs, whether
quantitative or qualitative. No single, all-encompassing MOE checklist exists for HA operations. MOEs
change with different missions. MOEs cannot cover every aspect of a mission; therefore, commanders
should resist heavy reliance on them. A discussion of MOEs for domestic responses is presented in
Chapter 5.
Commanders need some means to evaluate operations. Based on past experience, staffs should keep
several factors in mind while developing and using MOEs in HA operations. Commanders should
ensure that MOEs are appropriate, mission-related, measurable, reasonable in number, sensitive, and
The MOEs should be appropriate to the objective of the MOE effort. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOEs should be broad and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scene commanders in making decisions, MOEs should be more specific and detailed.
MOEs should relate to the mission. If the mission is security, for example, MOEs should help commanders judge improvements in or problems in improving security. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help commanders judge improvements in living standards. If the mission expands, so should the MOEs.
MOEs should vary with changes in the command's performance in relation to the mission and opponents. Quantitative MOEs are likely to be measured more consistently than nonquantitative ones and thus, when appropriate, are preferable. When using nonquantitative MOEs, the command should establish clear criteria for their measurement and disseminate the criteria to prevent accidental mismeasurement or misinterpretation of the results.
Reasonable in Number
The number of MOEs should be neither so few that they are insufficient to fully portray the situation nor so numerous that they become unmanageable or not worth the effort expended.
Sensitive 12/28/2004
MOEs should change when the performance of the command or actions of opponents change; extraneous factors should not greatly influence them.
MOEs should respond to changes in the situation.soon enough for a command to detect and act on them.
Commanders should meet, but not be limited to, the above criteria. Accurate and measurable MOEs can
contribute to mission effectiveness in many ways. MOEs can help the CJTF answer the following

What tactics and/or strategies are or are not working?

Should the CJTF shift the mission emphasis or shift resource allocations?

Can the operation shift from one mission phase to another?

When is the mission complete?

Security and Level of Violence

Percentage of relief supplies (in tons) reaching distribution centers

Distribution centers to distribution points

Distribution points to feeding centers


Number of violent acts against JTF forces

Individual Acts

Organized Acts

Source: JTF (J2)

Number of violent acts against NGOs and PVOs

Individual Acts.

Organized Acts.

Source: NGOs and PVOs

Checkpoints and roadblocks manned by factions or bandits

Number and location 1 00-23-1/Ch4.htm 12/28/2004

Number of overt acts where tolls are extorted

Source: NGOs, PVOs, JTF (J2)

Decreasing NGO convoy security requirements

Number of security guards used

Source: NGOs and PVOs

Airfield capacity:

Number of airfields evaluated as transport aircraft-capable

Day-night capability
Source: Joint special operations task force (JSOTF), JTF (J3)
Water sources: number of gallons of potable water per day.
Source: JTF (J4), NGOs, and PVOs

Main supply routes (MSRs): Percent trafficability for key MSR lines of communication to relief sites
Source: JTF (J4), NGOs, and PVOs

Medical and Public Health
Crude mortality rates
Under-five mortality rates
Cause-specific mortality rates



Acute respiratory infections

Other diseases
Severe malnutrition measurements (less than 70 percent of height and weight measurements). 12/28/2004

FM 100-23-1 Chptr 4 Tactical-Level Organization And Coordination Page 11 of 30
Source: NGOs and PVOs
Market price of foods
Market price of animals
Household surveys (for example, how much food is available in the home?)
Food production (cultivation) and animal herds
Source: NGOs and PVOs, JTF
Involvement of I0s, NGOs, and PVOs is critical in the development of MOEs. Such involvement
encourages communication among the major participants, assists in data collection, clarifies mission priorities, and expedites transition and redeployment of military forces. To develop appropriate MOEs, the JTF should coordinate with military commanders and decision makers representing 10, NGO, and PVO activities. As they are identified, MOEs can then be organized into four main categories.

Security and level of violence.


Medical and public health.


For each category, a graphic identifies specific measures and potential information sources. The JTF assigns the section that coordinates these inputs and measures trends over time. Because these trends affect future plans, the J5 should coordinate this analysis. The frequency with which this data is collected and measured may vary by campaign phase.
Provisions should be made for CJTF input to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network (WIN) and the JOPES data base. The HA mission requires constant monitoring and updating to ensure timely decisions and allocation of assets to meet the emergency. See Joint Pubs
5-00.24 and 5-03.1. 5 During predeployment planning, countless questions require answers.
Predeployment Planning Considerations

What is the mission?

What is the status of hostile military/paramilitary forces in the area? 12/28/2004

Who are the key civilian leaders, community elders, and their supporters?

What is the status of existing public services, such as water, electricity, communications, sewage collection, transportation systems and assets, and relief agencies already in place?

What is the status of doctors, firemen, and police and their availability and levels of expertise?

What is the medical and nutritional condition of civilian personnel and the physical locations of medical facilities?

What are the unique shelter/food needs and host nation support availability (construction assets, food storage, materials handling equipment, and transportation capacity)?

What is the status of sanitation conditions within the AO?

What operational facilities and host nation resources are available to support HA forces?

What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?

What relief organizations are present and what functions are they perforrriing?

What is the international community's goal and plan for addressing the humanitarian crisis?

What is the communications security plan regarding communicating with NGOs, PVOs, UN agencies, and coalition forces? Do these agencies or forces require equipment augmentation?

What are the information-gathering and dissemination requirements? What information can be obtained from host nation, UN/coalition forces, and NGOs and PVOs?

What is the legal authority for the mission? What agreements or mandates apply to this operation? Are SJA personnel and assets planned for?

Have the appropriate ROE been prepared and published prior to deployment?

Has the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) been alerted and a request for a medical intelligence report on the area identified?

What is the priority of HA capability for the mission: medical, logistics, command and control, force security, and so forth?

What, if any, coordination systems are in place among PVOs, NGOs, and IOs in the host nation?

What coordination is required with the CINC, supporting CINCs, subordinate JTF commands, NGOs and PVOs based in the US, UN organizations, and DOS?

What are the liaison requirements?

Are interpreters available from the JTF, CINC, US agencies? .12/28/2004 DODDOA-008220

What are weather and terrain limiting factors?

What is the media presence and the public interest (global visibility) of the HA mission and

What is the health service support (HSS) mission? Is it clearly stated in the operational
commander's mission statement?

What medical intelligence is available for the AO? AFMIC provides information on factors that affect human performance capability and well-being such as infectious diseases, sanitation, venomous insects and animals, toxic plants, the environment, and military and civilian health care capabilities.

What is the mission's target patient population? Military only or are civilians also treated?

What is the local standard of care? Can it be continued after forces redeploy?

How do HSS systems receive logistics support? HSS logistics planning is an essential element of the overall planning process for a successful health care delivery system and should include supplies, equipment, medical equipment maintenance and repair, optical fabrication, blood management, transportation, and contracting.

Who provides medical laboratory support during assessments and the initial phases of the

The employment of the joint forward laboratory (JFL) in Somalia during Operation
Restore Hope was invaluable to the JTF surgeons in directing preventive medicine
efforts, and the laboratory's contributions were directly credited with helping minimize
morbidity due to infectious diseases among US personnel.

Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned
Deployment of the JTF is based on the severity of the situation, political considerations, and mobility assets. Requirements and decisions made during planning affect deployment. The JTF should be structured to deploy in force packages. Rapid response, austere conditions, and lack of infrastructure often place unique demands on the JTF. Initial phases of deployment require only the critical command, control, communications, security, and logistics capabilities. Follow-on forces deploy as capabilities expand to support the forces and conduct the HA mission.
Deployment planning and execution considerations for HA missions are fundamentally the same as in any military operation. Close coordination between the staff sections of the JTF is critical.
COORDINATION /fm/.100-23-1/Ch4.htm.12/28/2004
Coordination during the deployment phase is based on guidance developed during the planning phase and conditions as they change regarding the situation. The CJTF must continue to keep the lines of communication open with higher headquarters (CINC); service components of the CINC; subordinate and supporting commands; NGOs, PVOs, and 10s; the UN; and OFDA DART.
USTRANSCOM consists of the Military Traffic Management Command of the Air Mobility Command and the Military Sealift Command. These components provide movement schedules for requirements in the sequence requested by the CJTF. The JTF needs to update subordinate commands on changes to the deployment schedule or changes in the mission. Changes in the mission, such as HA to peace enforcement, may require a shift in force deployment. NGOs, PVOs, I0s, and UN agencies may require JTF support during deployment not already identified during predeployment planning.
Deployment Planning Considerations

Are command and control assets more crucial than immediate provisions of HA supplies?

Are the requirements of the JTF components being met?

Are these requirements complementary or contradictory to the mission?

Do the units being airlifted match up with the equipment (for example, is the JTF sending engineers to the area when their heavy equipment and construction material are not scheduled to arrive by ship for another two weeks)?

What are the NGO and PVO requirements for transportation, and has the military committed to transporting their supplies (funding and authority)?

Have preventive medicine units been scheduled for early deployment?

Will media coverage of the initial deployment focus on the JTF's first actions that alleviate the conditions requiring HA?

Will conflicting interests for mobility assets strain the JTF's deployment?

Will command and control assets, food and medical supplies, security forces, equipment assets, and foreign government restrictions affect the deployment?

How do planners ensure the CJTF's guidance and focus of effort is followed?

How will accurate and timely submission of information into WWMCCS and JOPES be maintained to schedule movements and keep higher and lower commands abreast of the deployment schedule, particularly deployment coordination of coalition forces?

How will the JTF account for personnel in order to report casualties, provide essential services such as mail, and determine the total numbers of personnel for the purpose of national/service reimbursement?

Two disparate types of operations were being conducted simultaneously 12/28/2004
during Operation Provide Comfort. One was the humanitarian effort and the other the security operation. In many ways they competed and conflicted with one another. The staff ran these as concurrent operations and often had to set aside specific times to focus totally on one operation or the other. Because of conflicting priorities, movement of relief supplies and humanitarian forces competed with the movement of security equipment, ammunition, materiel, and forces. Security operations had to precede humanitarian operations to dear areas of mines and potential hostile forces. While most civilian relief agendas grew more comfortable working alongside military forces performing humanitarian tasks, they were not comfortable around gun-toting security forces.
Operation Provide Comfort After-Action Report
Liaison teams or personnel (military and civilian) assigned up and down the chain of command ensure the JTF can identify concerns and issues. These teams are critical during the deployment phase. Liaison teams in the mission area are critical to keeping the JTF informed of changing conditions and events. They assist the JTF in determining how the HA operation is progressing and whether emphasis needs to shift to avoid further human suffering. The HAST (previously discussed in Chapter 3) can accomplish this critical liaison function if assigned to support or augment the JTF. Liaison procedures extracted
from Joint Pub 5-00.2 2 are provided in Appendix H.
Liaison personnel should be exchanged among major contributors to the force. Their functions include the identification of political and legal constraints, transportation capabilities, logistics requirements, and other factors affecting the employment of coalition units.
CJTF responsibilities during employment include force and resource monitoring and management, planning for current and future operations, execution, and reporting. The employment of a JTF for HA missions has some unique considerations.
HA is something most military forces have not normally trained to accomplish. Security concerns, global visibility, political considerations, acceptance, logistics, health factors, and unknown length of mission can affect the force and the mission. Integrating the coalition forces impacts on how the JTF assigns missions and organizes the area.
The mission of the JTF, although consistent in its overall direction to relieve the plight of the populace, may undergo major evolutions in its specific taskings during the early stages of the operation. This can be a positive development in that each new estimate of the situation leads to a necessary refinement or modification of the mission and tasks. Continuing on-scene estimates of the situation and rapid adjustment of the mission and tasks are appropriate. This is sometimes referred to as mission creep.
Employment Considerations /Ch4.htm 12/28/2004
. • What is the JTF's actual role in the HA mission?

Does the JTF provide support to the UN, ICRC, NGOs, PVOs, the actual HA?

Does the JTF conduct HA and then transition functions to the UN, ICRC, NGOs, and PVOs?

What is the relationship with an OFDA DART?

Is the HA operation part of a larger mission?

What are the force objectives?

How will the objectives of the mission be evaluated to determine success (quantitative or nonquantitative)?

What is the personal code of conduct for the HA operation?

Military coordination with the UN; NGOs, PVOs, and I0s; and OFDA DART and its on-scene representative is critical during the execution of the mission. In some cases, 50 or more NGOs and PVOs may be working in the AOR. These NGOs and PVOs may coordinate their efforts, but in some cases, they may operate independently of one another. Military concerns may not be compatible with the concerns of the NGOs and PVOs (security, mission priorities, support requirements, expectations).
Early in the operation, the JTF should establish a dialogue with OFDA DART, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs to ascertain capabilities and limitations and to facilitate future cooperation. This dialogue can be accomplished with a clear mission statement involving OFDA DART and NGOs and PVOs in mission planning--disseminating the view that OFDA DART and NGOs and PVOs are allies and partners.
Employment considerations and factors affecting the outcome of the HA mission depend on decisions made during planning and deployment. These factors include--

Getting minimum equipment on the ground to provide the basic service required.

Having sufficient equipment on hand for austere jump capabilities responsive to new missions and critical outages.

Transitioning key staff positions depending on the emphasis of the phase of the operation (air-to­ground operations).

Having each staff establish a continuity file.

Providing interpreters for PSYOP and CA teams when dealing with large crowds.

Preparing specialized briefing formats to deal with civil-military operations; briefings should emphasize the condition, activities, and especially the needs of the supported population; briefing UN, ICRC, NGOs and PVOs, and OFDA.

Establishing preventive medicine strategies to take precedence over therapeutic medicine in the initial stages of an HA situation; emphasizing sanitation and vaccinations. 12/28/2004

Deploying PA elements early.

Avoiding basing mission success on US or western standards; working toward building back the local infrastructure and health care system to the level in place before the disaster.

Encouraging civilian groups to step forward and coordinate their valuable expertise and

Coordinating use of transportation assets to ensure that urgent needs are met.

Ensuring coordination is conducted between transportation elements and the military police who may provide security and traffic control.

Developing plans for recovery operations of transportation assets, including contingency plans for replacement of vehicles.

Avoiding black market activity by controlling distribution of food by ration cards; using local trucks and drivers for distribution (to stimulate the economy) and monitoring frequently.

Determining requirements to repair MSRs.

Determining legal and fiscal authority to conduct civic action projects.

One consideration for organizing the AO is to designate HRSs. Geographic boundaries for such sectors should include ethnic or tribal boundaries, political affiliation, relief agency AO, political acceptance of certain coalition countries, and contiguous sectors with forces assigned (components assigned multiple sectors are connected).
Security is the CJTF's responsibility. JTF planners must specifically address security for NGOs and PVOs in ROE, the mission statement, or both. Depending on the environment, security forces may be necessary. ROE should contain guidance regarding which people JTF forces may protect. Hostile crowds, starving people, armed resistors, or bandits require appropriate responses. It may be necessary to first establish the environment for HA operations to commence peace enforcement. This requirement can adversely affect the speed and effectiveness with which assistance is provided to the area. Security of the JTF is a primary concern. Some concerns include--

Ports and airfields.

NGO and PVO requests.

US Government activities such as OFDA DART.

Host nation agencies.

HA recipients.

HA supplies, convoys, and MSRs. 12/28/2004
• HA distribution centers.
Convoy security for HA follows the same set of tactics for any military convoy operation. If the JTF is
tasked to provide convoy security or security for the NGOs and PVOs, then it should plan such with
input from all forces and agencies involved. The organization of the AO into component or HRS can
cause problems for convoy operations. A movement control center (MCC) established to coordinate
transportation coordinates all cross-boundary travel and security responsibilities for convoy operations.
In a hostile environment the JTF may have the added responsibility of weapons confiscation. JTF
planners must develop specific plans and procedures and disseminate them to all forces. In addition, the
ROE should address the use of force during weapons confiscation operations. Special consideration
must be given to the security forces employed by the NGOs and PVOs.
HA operations require intelligence information because they are politically sensitive, conducted in the
midst of civilian populations during times of crisis, and employ forces with substantial capabilities. The
commander must continuously and clearly identify information requirements to provide the necessary
resources to conduct intelligence operations.
Even more than with other types of military operations, successful HA operations are dependent upon
timely and actionable intelligence. As in other MOOTW, intelligence in HA operations must deal with
all aspects of the AO, to include personnel and organizations therein. In this environment, military
intelligence requirements include such subjects as political, ethnic, religious, and economic factors.
Some supporting intelligence publications are listed in the References section.
Host nation populations hold the key as to whether an HA mission succeeds. While US and/or friendly
armed forces are tasked to support humanitarian goals, each and every thing has a potential political,
economic, military, social, or religious impact on the population or segments of the population. The
primary intelligence effort should be to assess the agenda of every faction and determine how it may
affect friendly operations. Open sources are employed to determine patterns or methods of operation,
factional-associated geography, and factional-associated agendas. The resulting analysis is employed to-

Avoid obvious hostilities.

Prepare for nonobvious hostilities (ambushes and deliberate attacks on the HA force).

Employ appropriate force in order to accomplish the mission.

Human intelligence (people talking to or about people) is a significant portion of any HA intelligence
support program. However, it must be accomplished properly. Formal contact with NGOs and PVOs
should be directed through CMOC personnel. The result of increased focus on intelligence is units and military personnel with a greater situational awareness. This enhances the ability of US forces to make informed judgments about which areas to avoid, where to take extra precautions, and so forth, based upon their specific mission and the overall HA mission.
The ability to communicate with all of the military forces, NGO, PVOs, UN agencies, host nation 12/28/2004
agencies, and other organizations involved in the HA operation is imperative. See Figure 4-3. Communications with coalition forces, OFDA DART; NGOs, PVOs, and I0s; and other agencies should be established early in the operation.
I HN Government Us EmbassyI
V- , ....

HN lAitemy
I 4. ....61.
.lir I _ .0. GFORne
I 1 0,A
UN Special Reo

1 ...
1 • • Imo -. I R
.. '.
0.It. X

0. -' v.
4.14G0s end PVCIs
UN Agencies
HN Niunc*s
1 I
" -10"
Figure 4-3. JTF Coordinations
Most likely, nonmilitary agencies will have communications networks established for their own uses.
These networks may include commercially leased circuits (from the host nation communications
agencies and companies), commercially leased satellite services (such as INMARSAT), and high­
frequency (ham, long distance) and very high frequency (intravehicular convoy control type) radios. As
robust military communications most likely will not be available, close cooperation between nonmilitary
agencies and military forces will be required to maximize efficient use of available commercial and host
nation communications net works. As military communications assets are phased in for the operation,
NGOs, PVOs, and others can be expected to increasingly request access to those communications. Any
supporting plans must initially allow for very limited military communications and emphasize reliance
on commercial and host nation communications assets. In addition, these plans must closely address
needs for secure communications and requirements to control cryptographic materials (secure
telephones, keymat, and so forth) and releasability of cryptographic and/or classified information to
JTF planners must identify and plan frequency management for the operation. Regulations and orders
for integrating coalition forces into the frequency management program have to be deconflicted with
security requirements. The use of nonmilitary radios and communications equipment by OFDA DART, NGOs and PVOs, LIN, and ICRC can create deconfliction problems. Planners must also consider host nation requirements and restrictions.
PA considerations are important for several reasons. First, the public and the media have an intense level of interest in JTF operations; second, the members of the JTF need PA services; third, commanders and
soldiers of the JTF must be able to communicate their intentions and actions to interested audiences. These considerations can be met through planning for establishment of radio and television broadcast
stations and a JIB in the theater.
Medical considerations for the JTF in an HA environment are significant. The two areas to consider are
medical care for the JTF and coalition forces and medical care for the local populace. In general, JTF
medical assets support JTF personnel, while host nation facilities, NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC
health organizations support themselves and the civilian population. In most cases the AO is austere and
environmentally hostile. This can cause the JTF to suffer many medical and sanitation problems. Good
medical estimates and preventive medicine planned early in the operation can pay significant dividends.
These include immunizations for all personnel, prevention of insect-borne diseases, and prevention of
fly, water, and food-borne illnesses.
The JTF should use its preventive medicine assets. Intensive epidemiological monitoring, coupled with
sophisticated diagnostic capabilities (serology, bacteriology, parasitology) can help prevent development
of epidemics among deployed forces.

Title 10, US Code, prohibits use of military medical assets for treatment of civilians except when
specially authorized by the appropriate authority. This can cause problems for the JTF regarding the
perception that the US cannot and will not assist the area with medical care. The highly visible nature of
US cantonment areas naturally leads civilians to seek medical treatment from these facilities. Because
this issue is above CJTF level, he must plan early in the operation how to deal with civilian medical
Medical planners should attempt to coordinate with NGO, PVO, UN, and ICRC medical facilities
immediately upon commencing the operation. The JTF should create some type of central point or
organization for coordinating medical requirements. However, the differing policies and positions of
individual NGOs, PVOs, and I0s; military capabilities and policies; and host nation requirements can
create friction. A medical coordination agency formed at the HOC or CMOC can provide a viable
solution for medical requirements. Formation of this coordination agency by the JTF and early
cooperation by the parties involved in the operation increases efficiency and reduces redundancy. The
JTF must establish policies for treating civilians injured by JTF actions and provide air search and
rescue and/or medical evacuation assets for civilians.
The military often provides technical assistance in the form of advice, assessments, manpower, and
equipment to host nations or civilian agencies. NGOs, PVOs, and IOs may seek the advice of military
personnel to conduct projects necessary to accomplish their mission. Early in the operation, the CJTF
should determine policy regarding technical assistance to be provided to NGOs, PVOs, and I0s. Use of
military equipment and supplies to conduct civil action-type missions may be limited or forbidden. Early
in the operation, the CJTF should establish criteria to provide technical assistance to NGOs, PVOs, and
I0s. The JTF may conduct projects to build or improve infrastructure needed to complete the military portion of the HA mission, once approved and funded.
NGOs and PVOs, UN, and ICRC normally distribute food and other supplies by using their own or contract transportation assets. Use of military assets to conduct the actual delivery of supplies is usually discouraged unless the situation is life threatening. Plans to overcome problems or obstacles should be solicited from NGOs, PVOs, I0s, indigenous personnel, and the military.
Coordination for air operations follow normal airspace coordination procedures for any joint or coalition operation. The additional burden on coordination involves the HA cargo flights conducted by NGOs, 12/28/2004
PVOs, and I0s. During a large relief operation, increased numbers of arriving and departing flights may overwhelm the host nation airspace control system. In cases where no airspace control facilities exist, the JTF may have to establish an interim airspace coordination system, to include--

Broad policies and procedures.

Strategic and theater airlift requirements.

Airspace management procedures.

Procedures to coordinate both military and civilian sorties.

A good example of technical assistance occurred during Operation Restore Hope during the flooding of the lower Shabelle River. Through the CMOC, a PVO proposed a solution to contain the Shabelle river. The CMOC referred the PVO to the JTF engineer officer for advice. Following consultation, the PVO requested technical assistance in the form of equipment and operators to assist in building dikes. The CMOC and OFDA dispatched a team to the flood region, conducted an assessment, and validated the requirement for JTF support. Based on a need identified by the PVO, technical assistance in the form of advice, assessment, equipment, and personnel was provided by the JTF.
Operation Restore Hope CMOC Operations Officer
The JTF may or may not have air control authority over incoming NGO, PVO, and I0 flights. Close coordination and agreements with NGOs and PVOs over control of NGO, PVO, and I0 cargo flights reduce airspace safety concerns and add to the efficiency of delivering HA supplies.
Coordination with the host nation and a wide variety of relief organizations lies at the core of HA operations. Mission success depends on the US military turnover of HA responsibilities, including security, to the host nation or relief organization. Close coordination improves this process. Figure 4-3 does not attempt to illustrate all levels of liaison and coordination among participating agencies. It does, however, illustrate the many sources of input to the JTF in HA situations. CJTF options for this coordination use the HAST, the HOC, and the CMOC, which fall under the cognizance of the J3 and J5 staff sections.
Humanitarian Operations Center
To coordinate military operations with the requirements of the host nation or NGOs, PVOs, and I0s, the CJTF can request that a HOC be created. The HOC, if created, is usually collocated with the appropriate headquarters, such as the UN, conducting the operation. HOC functions include--

Developing an overall relief strategy.

Identifying and prioritizing HA needs to the JTF. 12/28/2004
• 'Identifying logistics requirements for NGOs, PVOs, and I0s.
The HOC is not as much a location or cell as it is a policy-making and governing body. In the military sense, the HOC does not command and control but attempts to build a consensus for team-building and unity of effort.
The HOC should consist of decision makers from the military forces command (JTF), UN agencies, DOS (USAID [OFDA DART)), regional NGO and PVO representatives, ICRC, and host nation authorities. The HOC coordinates activities and does not necessarily control. The organization of the HOC appears in Figure 4-4.
Director GroupsCornenittee
Deputy0inoctor DapetyDnector °saw harbsy (DART) tor)
Infomation Operations
LiaisonCantor JTF
Figure 4-4. Humanitarian Operations Center Organizations
The HOC normally has a UN director and deputy directors from the JTF and OFDA DART. Within the HOC the policymaking body is the standing liaison committee, which is comprised of UN, JTF, OFDA DART, and NGO and PVO representatives. HOC core groups'and committees meet to discuss and resolve issues related to topics such as medical support, agriculture, water, health, and education.
During Exercise Emerald Express conducted in January 1994, the 1st Marine Division used personnel and equipment from its artillery regiment to coordinate HA operations. This innovative concept was explored first because the mission-essential task list (METL) paralleled the requirements for HA coordination (for example, the skills matched); second, the artillery regiment was under-utilized during previous HA missions; and third, much of the artillery unit equipment (transportation and communications) was extremely useful during HA operations.
The liaison and coordination skills essential to fire support teams applied directly to HA. At the same time the supporting perspective possessed by every artillery officer, transferred directly to a military role in support of NGO and PVO food distribution. Additionally, it was unnecessary to establish ad hoc teams to meet coordination and liaison requirements because these units already existed.
Based on discussions with 12/28/2004

availability (seats on military aircraft), and access-related issues.

Coordinate medical requirements.

Chair port, rail, and airfield committee meetings for space and access-related issues.

Maintain 24-hour operations.

Maintain contact with regional and sector CMOCs.

Support CA teams, as required.

Facilitate creation and organization of a food logistics system for food relief efforts.

CMOC equipment includes: 2 GP Med Tents Fiumesomnt Lights
Admen Admin NCO 20 Chaim
9 Side Tablas 7 Fold Tables
Clerk 2 Map Boards
1 Indo Boards Comma Package
. El ch."
. . .
. . . ..

Watch or Info Board
Map Board.
Communication Table Fax /NOW*Mans
Dir Deo Consumed& Phone Short Wave Radio Sabot Radios
Figura 4-6. Proposed CMOC Layout
Normally, NGO and PVO requests come to the CMOC for action. The proposed NGO and PVO support request flow is based on operational lessons learned.
During many HA scenarios, shelter or housing may need to be provided to displaced individuals. A 12/28/2004
good reference for administration of camps is found in the UN HCR Handbook for Emergencies. The UN designates several categories of affected and displaced person programs. These include externally displaced refugees, displaced populations within a country, and affected populations within a country. CA personnel are trained to establish and administer displaced person and refugee camps.
Support Request Flow
NGOs and PV0s-

Prepare complete support request

Submit request to DART/CMOC



Validates requests

Submits requests to the CMOC

Logs requests

Assigns project number


Prepares project folder

Submits project folder to joint operations center (JOC)



Receives project folder and logs request

Approves request (uses the attached CA team to analyze the project and apportion the resources to complete the project)

Prepares detailed tasking order (file in folder)

Publishes detailed tasking order

Retains folder and monitor 12/28/2004
Individual unit providing support--

Receives mission

Analyzes the requirements

Commits the resources

Annotates resources expended

Completes the mission

Prepares after-action reports with all information

Submits after-action reports to the JOC


Receives after-action report from the unit and files in folder

Closes out folder

Returns folder to CMOC

Receives folder

Sends completed report to the NGO or PVO that requested the project. The forms used in the
CMOC may include DA 1594 (Staff Duty Journal, Conversation Record) and the locally
produced NGO/PVO Support Request Form.

The requirements for dealing with refugees and displaced persons are extensive. The key UN agency, when dealing with agencies, is the UNHCR. Cultural and religious requirements, acceptable food, medical support, proper registration, categories of refugees and displaced persons, security, camp locations, sanitation, and funding sources constitute some of the concerns. The ultimate goal is to return the refugee population to its home.
The JTF should work closely with embassies of coalition nations as well as with US embassies in the
region. In multinational operations, coalition forces may provide political advisors to their national
headquarters. US forces may have a foreign service officer assigned to support operations. The
assignment of political advisors provides a direct link to US embassies, DOS, and the political
representatives of coalition nations.
Liaison requires extensive personnel and equipment assets in an HA operation. Liaison personnel and 00-23-1/Ch4.htm.12/28/2004
teams must be able to communicate with their parent command as well as make certain decisions or . commit to carrying out assigned tasks. Liaison personnel should have direct access to their parent command, be kept informed of events and intentions, and be able to brief capabilities and limitations of their commands.
In coalition operations, liaison personnel should be exchanged with the larger contingents of military forces assisting in the operation. The CMOC provides the primary liaison for the JTF with NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and ICRC; although liaison throughout the AO is critical. Due to the presence of ICRC and NGOs and PVOs, liaison may be established with selected NGOs and PVOs, ICRC, and UN agencies. A reference chart of the US military rank structure and insignia is provided in Appendix I.
The need to provide quality personnel on liaison teams cannot be overemphasized. This lesson learned echoed at every level of the CTF. It is critical in joint and combined [multinational] operations to ensure an effective liaison system is in place. Liaison personnel must be highly competent, have direct access to their parent command, and be kept informed of events and intentions.
The teams with initiative; the trust and confidence of their commands; solid access and communications; and knowledgeable, bright personnel greatly enhanced the functioning of the entire organization. Extensive positioning of liaison personnel throughout Turkey and in the provinces along the Iraq-Turkey border permitted the CTF to coordinate efforts, which made for more efficient operations and a closer sense of cooperation, especially on a number of politically sensitive issues. Quality liaison personnel paid dividends in this role.
Report on Operation Provide Comfort
Redeployment decisions are based on political and military considerations. The JTF provides assessments for the military. The DOS representative provides the political considerations. The CINC uses this information to recommend redeployment plans to the JCS and NCA.
Simultaneous to JTF deployment, the CJTF should begin planning redeployment. Redeployment considerations depend on whether the JTF has accomplished all or some of its objectives. Redeployment of JTF forces begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for military forces diminishes. Forces not needed to accomplish certain objectives should be redeployed as soon as possible. For extended operations, the CJTF should establish a rotation policy.
The JTF should transfer its HA functions to host nation NGOs and PVDs, the UN, and/or ICRC as soon as possible. As this is accomplished, forces are freed to redeploy. As the operation progresses, political and military guidance will identify functions and units that need to remain in order to accomplish objectives not achieved. The requirement for the JTF to continue supporting HA operations must be identified earlier. This identification affects how the JTF plans for redeployment.
http :Nati am.tain. sc/view/public/296732-1/fm/100-23-1/Ch4.htm .12/28/2004
Transition in HA operations involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions to another organization. Transition can occur between service components within the JTF or from the JTF to the UN or host nation. Transition and/or termination is initiated once objectives have been met and authority has been received from national decision makers.
In HA operations, transition presents complex problems. If forces within the JTF are transitioning functions between service components, then the requirements follow standard military handover. If transition involves the JTF transitioning functions or areas back to the host nation, coalition forces, or a UN command, then the requirements may become less clear.
A transition plan is useful. It helps the staff identify transition issues. It is especially important to identify those parties or agencies that will receive functional responsibilities from the JTF. Considerations include which staff sections will write annexes, based on what the UN or transitioning organization will do. The transition plan should identify task force organization, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. In implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise, without military jargon.
Military operations end wham the objectives have been attained. The NCA define conflict termination objectives and direct the cessation of operations. Termination plans are designed to secure the major policy objectives that may be attained as the result of military operations. Termination plans must cover the transition to postconflict activities and conditions as well as disposition of military forces. Operation plans and termination plans should normally be prepared together, with the termination plan included as a supporting plan to the operation plan.
Extract from Joint Pub 5-0
One method of transitioning is by function. Another method is by locale. If possible, the transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Functions or areas would transfer only when a similar capability becomes available or is no longer needed. Procedures for transfer of equipment or supplies, either between components of the JTF or with the UN or host nation, must be determined.
JTF planners must identify fiscal guidance, reconstitution of assets, and availability and use of operations and maintenance funds. Several functional areas identified for transition include logistics, medical services, communications, local security, and engineer services. The JTF should develop a series of criteria on transition to be able to track the progress being made. This process may be measured by a statistical analysis of trends; for example, a reduction in infant mortality rates. Figure 4-7 is an example of transition categories and indicators from Operation Restore Hope. .12/28/2004