Army Field Manual: Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations

CHAPTER 5
Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations

The direction and supervision of interro­gation operations are critical to the success­ful performance of the interrogation ele­ment's mission. Direction and supervision are the responsibility of the senior interro­gator. These responsibilities fall into three categories: Advising, coordinating, and directing actual interrogation operations. FM 34-80 provides guidance for brigade and battalion IEW operations, and FM 34-25
proviaes guiaance tor corps tr. vv opera­tions. The supervisory duties discussed in this chapter are-
.
Advice and assistance.

.
Prepare and move to deployment site.

.
Establish a site for interrogation
operations.

.
Supervise the interrogation process.

.
Supervise the CED exploitation cycle.

.
Supervise administrative tasks.

ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE
The senior interrogator coordinates andprovides input to both the parent MI unit's S2 and S3 and the supported echelon's intel­ligence staff. This includes reviewing source evacuation plans and estimates, as well asadvising on the capabilities and limitations of the interrogation element. He must be able to discuss and provide advice on the interrogation element's deployment in order to most effectively support the intelligence collection effort. To accomplish this, the senior interrogator must be familiar with the intelligence annex to the supported echelon's operations order (OPORD). In addition, the senior interrogator must con­stantly coordinate with the division or corps G2, the interrogation teams, and the intelligence staffs of supported echelons. This is done preferably through liaison vis­its to these elements. This coordination is critical to ensure that information and information updates are passed to the inter­rogation teams and, in turn, are passed toOB personnel in an orderly, accurate, and timely manner. This ensures access to important information which may become
available between liaison visits.

PREPARE AND MOVE TO THE DEPLOYMENT SITE
The intelligence annex of the supported unit's OPORD indicates the exact location of the holding area. Once this is known, the
senior interrogator ensures the interroga­tion team moves to that location. Interroga­tion elements deploy with little more than their personal weapons and equipment. Assigned vehicles and radios may not be sufficient to move the entire element; espe­cially, when the element is deploying to more than one site. The senior interrogator makes arrangements for transportation and determines when it will be provided. Inter­rogation elements are not equipped for small unit movements. Unaccompanied deployment is a dangerous procedure and should he avoided. When this cannot be done, the following steps must be con­sidered to minimize danger during movement:
.
Confirm the element's exact
destination.

.
Obtain a safe route from the supported command, if this is not possible, then, select the route offering the best pro­tective terrain.

.
Identify checkpoint locations along the route. If checkpoints are not available, radio contact on a periodic basis should be established with the parent MI unit.

.
Obtain current call signs, frequencies, and passwords for unit areas that will be crossed during the movement.

.
Coordinate with all affected units. The safest method for deploying the inter­rogation element is to have them accompany one or more of the sup­ported echelon's subordinate units as they deploy. This method should be used whenever possible. When it is

DODD0A-010745

used, the senior interrogator must determine exactly when the element must arrive at the assembly area, the element's position within the marchorder, and what call signs, frequencies, and passwords will be used during the movement.
ESTABLISH A SITE FOR
INTERROGATION
OPERATIONS

Once the interrogation element has arrived at the designated holding area, the senior interrogator establishes a site for interrogation operations. The senior inter­rogator coordinates with the military police to ensure that the site is set up to enable operations between the interrogation opera­tions and the holding area. He also contacts the commander responsible for the opera­tional area. This commander authorizes a specific location close to the holding area and within its secure perimeter as the site for interrogation operations. The interroga­tion element's mission does not include per­forming its own perimeter security. The senior interrogator also contacts the officer in charge of the holding area and coordi­nates the following:
.
Screening site. A specific site for screening sources must be selected and agreed upon. The site must enable the screener to observe the sources while they are inprocessed and segregated. The site, however, must be shielded from the direct view of, and far enough away from the sources so they cannot see, hear, or overhear screening conversations.

.
Medical support. Procedures must be established to verify that any sick or wounded personnel have been treated and released by authorized medical personnel for interrogation.

72 Guards. Arrangements must be made for guards to escort each source selected for interrogation. The guard should accompany the source through­out the interrogation process.

.
Movement. Routes and procedures for movement must be arranged for trans-

portation of the source from the hold-
ing area to the interrogation opera­
tions area.
.
Evacuation. Evacuation procedures should have been previously estab­lished. These procedures should be dis­cussed so that all concerned are famili­ar with time constraints and procedures of exactly when and who should be evacuated.

.
Communications. Arrangements for
receiving and transmitting message
traffic must be made with the C-E
officer. These arrangements must pro­vide for primary and alternate electri­cal and courier channels.

.
Site preparation. An interrogation element must contain as a minimum, an operations and administrative area as well as specific areas to conduct interrogations. If the element will be exploiting CEDs, an area must also be designated for this activity.

The area, for the conduct of individual interrogations, is established in such a way as to ensure that interrogations taking place in one area cannot be heard by per­sonnel in another area. At a minimum, the interrogations area, whether a tent or a building, must have enough space toaccommodate the interrogator, source, guard, and an interpreter, if needed. Each area should have a table and at least three chairs. A light is required for night opera­tions. Field expedient replacements for this equipment are used as necessary.
SUPERVISE THE
INTERROGATION
PROCESS

The senior interrogator ensures that the interrogation process is started immediatelyupon receipt of the source. This process is continuous and can become confused if the senior interrogator does not closely super­vise the timely and orderly conduct of eachstep in the process. The three steps in the process are screening, interrogation, and reporting.
5.1

SCREENING

Screening determines who will be interro­gated on a priority basis and in many cases how many timco a source will be intorro gated. For this reason, the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collec­tion effort depends on qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a minimum.
He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.
INTERROGATION

The senior interrogator ensures thatsources are assigned for interrogation according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures that the high­est probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the time available is chosen.
The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened sources. He does this by comparing infor­mation gained during the screening process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular source.
At times, a situation will occur in which none of the available interrogators speaks the target language well enough to conduct an interrogation. When this occurs the senior interrogator coordinates with SI /G1 for procurement of native interpreters. The senior interrogator maintains a list of available interpreters. He compares this list with the qualifications of his subordinate interrogators and the information listed onthe screening report. Based on this compari­son, the senior interrogator can then assignthe best qualified interpreter and interroga­tor. Interrogators must monitor interpreters periodically to ensure their performance isaccording to the standards established by the senior interrogator.
REPORTING
The senior interrogator ensures that allreports are prepared and submitted in an accurate and timely manner. SALUTE reports must be generated immediately upon identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other reports which are generated by an interro­gation must be correctly and accuratelyprepared and submitted upon completion of the interrogation.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports generated in the interrogation pro­cess are transmitted within established time frames. Transmission procedures and time frames should have already been dis­cussed and verified with the site communi­cations officer upon arrival to the holding area.
SUPERVISE THE CED
PROCESSING CYCLE

The senior interrogator ensures that the three steps of CED processing: account­ability, exploitation, and evacuation are correctly and rapidly conducted (see Chap­ter 4).
SUPERVISE
ADMINISTRATIVE
TASKS

The senior interrogator ensures that three major functions are accurate and kept updated. These are maintaining the SITMAP, updating the collection mission, and maintaining the Army files.
SITUATION MAP
He ensures that the SITMAP is keptupdated by posting all known enemy unitsand activities within the supported unit's area of operations, according to the intelli­gence summary (INTSUM), intelligence report (INTREP), periodic intelligencereport (PERINTREP), and other intelli­gence reports. In addition, he ensures anydispositions obtained through interroga­tions are posted to the SITMAP as accu­rately as the information will allow.

DODD0A-010747

COLLECTION MISSION
UPDATE

Through previously discussed liaison vis­its and established communications, he ensures that all subordinate interrogatorsare kept abreast of any changes to the col­lection mission.
MODERN ARMY BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM
He ensures that files have been estab-lished for any documents, reference mate-rials, and blank forms that the interroga-tion element has in its possession. Thesame files must be generated for any docu­ments, reference materials, and blank forms that may be acquired or generated duringday-to-day interrogation operations. Heensures that these files are established, maintained, and disposed of according toAR 25-400-2.
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CHAPTER 6
Operational Environment
Interrogation operations are conducted within the context of the supported unit's day-to-day combat operations. This chapter will describe the interaction of interrogation elements with the echelons they support.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Interrogation assets are not organic to echelons below division except armoredcavalry regiments (ACRs) and separate bri­gades. At every echelon, division andhigher, interrogators are assigned to the MI unit supporting that echelon. MI unit com­manders are responsible for these assets and should become personally involved intwo key decisions affecting interrogators:
. Which collection target, sources, or CEDs will be given command priority.
• Where interrogators will be deployed within the area of operations.
COLLECTION PRIORITY
As previously noted, interrogators are trained to exploit sources and CEDs. This allows the all-source collection manager three exploitation options for the interroga­tion assets. They may exploit sources alone, CED alone, or attempt to exploit both simultaneously. In the past it was assumed that interrogators could accomplish the dual collection mission no matter what typeof combat operations were being supported.This may no longer be true. Unit manning, coupled with the amount of CEDs and sources, may prevent exploitation of bothsources and CEDs simultaneously.
Combat since World War II indicates that the volume of CEDs alone will overwhelm an interrogation element the size of that being projected for a heavy division. A flow of CEDs similar to that encountered in Grenada will supply enough targets to keep a light division's interrogators busy around-the-clock just screening and cate­gorizing the CEDs. Any attempt to conduct deeper exploitation would result in a tre­mendous evacuation delay and the end of timely reporting. Experience indicates that a division involved in a high intensity con­flict may have to process between 525 and 5,300 sources per week. While these figures are estimates, they demonstrate the inabili­ty of a division's own interrogators to simultaneously exploit both sources and CEDs. Divisions may receive additional interrogation assets from corps, dependingon their mission. Prior planning must be conducted to establish the availability of these assets, and their deployment within the division.
The density of interrogation assets and command emphasis on the collection effort determines mission requirements. The feasi­bility of a dual collection mission may also be the result of initial IPB by the com­mander's intelligence staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual collection effort, interrogation of sources has traditionally received the priority for two important
reasons:
. The greater intelligence potential of a source.
D The rate at which people forget
detailed information.

An individual's value system is easier to bypass immediately after undergoing a sig­nificant traumatic experience. Capture, andthe circumstances surrounding it, is signifi­cantly traumatic for most sources. Many former Vietnam prisoners of war indicated that a period of extreme disorientation occurred immediately after capture. Capturethrust them into a totally foreign environ­ment over which they had no control. Thestandards of behavior and conduct which they had previously accepted and lived by were of no use to them during this period. Most of them survived this initial period by clinging to very basic values (love of family and loyalty to friends or comrades). Human beings are very adaptable, however, and this initial vulnerability passes rather quickly. An individual's established values begin to assert themselves again within aday or two. When this happens, much of an individual's susceptibility to interrogation
is gone.

DODD0A-010749

Memory stores information in two areas: The five senses constantly transmit infor­mation to the brain's short-term memory. This data is stored there tempo­rarily and then shifted to the brain's long-term memory. The time at which this transfer takes place varies widely, butresearch shows that a great amount of detail is lost during that transfer. Studiesconducted on classroom learning indicatethat even though students know informa­tion stressed in class is important, by thenext day most of the information is forgot­ten. The percentage of information lostbeyond recall varies from study to study, but a 70-percent figure is a conservativeestimate. Much of the information of value to the interrogator is information that the source is not even aware he has. Although no research data is available in this area, it is reasonable to assume that this type of information will be lost even faster than classroom learning.
CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive and are screened for possible exploitation as quickly as possible. Interrogators were given the CED exploita­tion mission because of their linguistic ability. This makes printed and typed mate­rial readily exploitable, but many handwrit­ten documents are illegible. Information contained in undeveloped imagery and recordings is inaccessible to most interroga­tion elements. The intelligence value ofpainted, drawn, or engraved material can­not be exploited by many elements unless itis accomplished by explanatory informa­tion in writing. An example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, reg­istration points, or identifying terrain fea­tures. In spite of these limitations, an esti­mated 90 percent of all the informationcontained in CEDs can be exploited. The following illustration shows a comparison along a time line of the amounts of infor­mation available to the interrogator from the two collection targets. The comparisonassumes that the CEDs and the sources initially had the same amount of informa­tion, and that it was of equal intelligence value. Bear in mind that the figures used are conservative estimates, and that the time between the two target types might be even greater between 24 and 72 hours. The percentage of information available from sources drops sharply during the first 24hours after capture. This represents the rapid loss of what sources would consider to be insignificant details. A slower drop inthe percentage begins at 48 hours to repre­sent the resurgence of established value systems. This resurgence makes it harder for interrogators to obtain what informa­tion the source still remembers.
The supported echelon's intelligence officer determines the guidelines for priorityof exploitation. The commander's intelli­gence needs and the G2's or S2's estimate of the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to which these guidelines can be applied. Exploitation priorities are reviewed and changed when needed.
6-1

DODD0A-010750

ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION OVERTIME.
100
90
80
70 -
60
50 -
40 -
30 -
20

EPWS OR SOURCES
10
1

0.8.16.24.32.40.48.56.64.72 TIME SINCE CAPTURE IN HOURS
PERCENTOF INFORMATION

DEPLOYMENT SITES

Interrogation assets are not mobile enough to be quickly shifted in response to new developments. The initial deployment of these assets are guided by the exploita­tion priority established by the commander. Operations are conducted at an echelon that will allow interrogators the hest oppor­tunity to satisfy their assigned collection mission. When making the deployment decision, the following should also be considered:
.
Number of interrogators available.

.
Type and intensity of anticipated com­bat operations.

.
Support available at subordinate units.

The number of interrogators available limit the number of deployment sites that can he used. MI commanders at corps con­sider how many interrogators will be avail­able for interrogation operations after aug­mentation has been provided to subordinate divisions. The number of interrogators also plays a key role in deciding the level of intense or sustained collection operations they can conduct.
Intense collection employs all available interrogators with little or no provision for them to Test. The major disadvantage ofintense collection is that these interrogators become exhausted quickly. Interrogations amount to prolonged conversations under extreme stress. Once the available interro­gators are exhausted, collection stops until they recover or additional assets arrive. A severe decrease in interrogation effective. ness can be expected to begin between 12 and 18 hours after the onset of intense col­lection. Eighteen hours should be consid­ered the maximum period possible for intense collection. This kind of all-out effort can be justified when critical information must be obtained or confirmed quickly to forestall a major disaster. Similar problems can be expected during intense CED exploi­tation. Sustained operations can be main­tained for indefinite periods of time. They also allow the commander some rested interrogators to use on a contingency basis in a different location. The disadvantage of sustained collection is that operations are slower, exploiting fewer sources over a
given period of time.
The last important factor that should be considered in making deployment decisions is the area in which operations are to be conducted. This area must be capable of providing the support required by the inter­rogation element. This support includes-
.
Priority access to reliable means of
secure communications.

.
Adequate shelter and security.

.
A flow of CEDs and sources to exploit.

TASKING RELATIONSHIPS

The MI unit commander retains overall responsibility for the interrogators assigned to his unit. The manner in which these interrogators are tasked depends on how the MI unit is task organized for combat. If interrogators are deployed in general sup­port (GS) of the division, the MI battalion commander tasks them through his S3 and the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). If interrogators are deployed in direct support (DS) of a division's subordi­nate units, they are tasked by the com­mander of that unit through his S2. If at­tached to an IEW company, team tasking is directed through the team commander. Theofficers responsible for tasking interroga­tion elements ensure that the following steps are accomplished:
.
Collection missions that reflect the capabilities and limitations of interro­gators are assigned.

.
Interrogation reports are integrated
with information provided by other
collectors during the IPB process.

.
Copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, daily intelligence sum­mary (DISUM), and supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP) are disseminated to the interrogation ele­ment as they are published.

.
Close contact is maintained with the
interrogation element.

6-3

COLLECTION MISSIONS

Once the IPE process has produced initial results, all identified intelligence gaps are addressed by detailed collection require­ments. Any PIR and IR requesting informa­tion that interrogators can collect are iden­tified. The PIR and IR are then con­solidated into a collection mission and assigned to the interrogation element. The assigned collection mission is tailored according to the capabilities and limita­tions of interrogators (see Chapter 2). Tailoring collection missions ensures thatall intelligence gaps are covered and avoids unnecessary duplication.
Collection missions are tailored and assigned by the collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section subordinate to the G2 at corps and division. The samefunctions are performed at brigade and bat­talion by the battlefield information control center (BICC). These elements ensure thatthe assigned collection mission is passed by secure means, through established chan­nels, to the interrogation element. In addi­tion to PIR and IR, the assigned collection mission includes-
.
Specific events about which informa­tion is required.

.
Time frames during which the events must have occurred to be of value.

.
The date on which the information will no longer be of value.

.
Channels to be used to report the
information collected.

.
Higher, lower, and adjacent units authorized to receive copies of reported information.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE BATTLEFIELD
INTEGRATION

The CM&D section or the BICC must ensure that information reported by the interrogation element is integrated with information collected by other intelligence disciplines during the IPB process. Onemajor value of interrogation operations is that information obtained can cue other col­lection systems. Mission statements
6-4
obtained from sources often identify general -locations that imagery intelligence (IMINT) or SIGINT collectors can further exploit toproduce targeting data.

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION
Intelligence is used by interrogators as a source of prepared and control questions (see Chapter 3). The CM&D section or BICC ensures that current copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, SUPINTREP, DISUM, and any other intelligence reports are provided to the interrogation element. Intelligence is also used to revise and refinethe objectives of interrogation operations, to update the element's OB data base, and to keep the element's threat SITMAP current.

CONTACT
The CM&D section (through the MI bat­talion TOC) or the BICC maintains close contact with the interrogation element. This contact allows a two-way flow of communi­cation. The CM&D section or BICC needs the contact to accomplish the collection mission, IPB interrogation, and intelligencedissemination. They also use the contact to revise the interrogation element's collection mission as required. The interrogation ele­ment requires the contact to ensure that it receives current guidance, direction, and assistance in solving collection problems.
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Successful interrogation operations require support from a number of elements within their echelon of assignment, includ­ing all of the major staff organizations. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning that creates the overall • environment for interrogators. The intelli­gence staff's (G2 or S2) direct contribution to interrogation operations has already been discussed. Its general responsibilitiesare outlined below, along with those of other staff and support elements.

PERSONNEL (GI AND Si)
The GI and Si are responsible for: super­vising the medical support furnished to sources, maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified linguists within their command, and coordinating with the G5 for procurement and payment of other interpreters and translators needed to perform both intelligence and nonintelli­gence duties. The GI and S1 ensure that the echelon's operations plan contains complete provisions for source handling and evacua­tion. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff officers, as well as STANAG 2044 (see Appendix A for an extract). Its provisions must cover the following principles:

.
Humane treatment of all sources.

.
Prompt evacuation from the combat
zone.

.
Opportunities to interrogate sources.

.
Integration of procedures for theevacuation, control, and administra­tion of sources with other combat sup­port and combat service support (CSS) operations (through the provostmarshal).

.
Training for all troops on the provi­sions of international agreements and regulations relating to sources.

INTELLIGENCE (G2 AND S2)

The G2 and S2 are responsible for super­vising appropriate censorship activities relating to sources. They are also respon­sible for--
7 Projecting source capture flows.
Determining the number of interpre­
ters and translators needed to perform
intelligence duties.

. Controlling the procedures used to pro­cess and grant clearances to the inter­preters and translators who need them.

OPERATIONS (G3 AND S3)

The G3 and S3 are responsible for opera­tions, plans, organization, and training.Where military police assets are not avail­able, or not sufficient, they are responsiblefor obtaining, organizing, and supervising
the employment of additional personnel as guards. It is also responsible for-
.
Training of military police and guard personnel.

.
Providing G2 and S2 with details of planned operations.

.
Planning and supervising all PSYOP activities in support of tactical operations.

.
Evaluating, in coordination with the G2 and the G5, enemy PYSOP efforts and the effectiveness of friendlyPSYOP on target groups.

SUPPLY (G4 AND S4)

The G4 and S4 are responsible for the storage and maintenance of supplies and equipment needed by subordinate units toconduct source handling operations. They are responsible for delivering supplies and equipment to subordinate units as they areneeded. They also supervise—
O Acquisition of real estate and the con­struction of source holding area facili­ties in the communications zone (COMMZ).
.
Collection and distribution of captured enemy supplies. This is coordinated with the intelligence and operations staffs.

O Procurement and distribution of rations to source holding areas. Cap­tured enemy rations will be used to thegreatest extent possible.

.
Determination of requirements for use of source labor for the logistical sup­port needed in source handling operations.

.
Provide logistical support to interpre­ter personnel.

6-5

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (G5 AND S5)

The G5 and S5 are responsible for civil affairs (CA). They are also responsible for-
.
Advising, assisting, and making
recommendations that relate to
civil-military operations (CMO) and
CA aspects of current or proposed
operations.

.
Preparing estimates and conducting
studies and analyses for CMO
activities.

.
Preparing the portions of operations,administrative, and logistics plans and orders concerning CMO activities.

.
Determining the requirements for resources to accomplish the CMOactivities of the command, including CA units and personnel.

.
Maintaining a list of native linguists for interpreter support.

.
Coordinating with local US Govern­ment representatives and host-nation armed forces for the procurement of native linguists for interpreter support.

.
Recommending command policy con­cerning obligations between civil and military authorities and policy con­cerning the population of the area of operations and its works and activitiesarising from treaties, agreements, international law, and US policy.

.
Providing civil support for tactical and CSS operations and for preventing civilian interference with these operations.

• Coordinating military support of popu-lace and resource control programs.
.
Providing technical advice and assis­tance in the reorientation of sources and enemy defectors.

.
Coordinating the MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2 or S2.

ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
Besides the major staff elements, an interrogation element requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations. These elements include-
.
Communications. Secure, reliable communications must be available at or near the interrogation element's deployment site. Priority access to these communications must be arranged to support contact with col­lection management.

.
Staff judge advocate. This element can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation and application ofinternational regulations and agree­ments concerning handling of sources. It is also a channel for reportingknown or suspected war crimes.

.
Health service support. This element must clear all sick and wounded sources before they can be interro­gated. Seriously sick and wounded sources are evacuated through medical channels. If adequate facilities are not available in EPW hospitals, EPWs are admitted to military or civilian medi­cal facilities where the required treat­ment can be obtained. Medical inspec­tions are made and the weight of each EPW is recorded at least once a month. Provisions are made for the isolation of communicable cases, for disinfec­tion, and for inoculations. Retained medical personnel and EPWs with medical training are used to the fullest extent in caring for their own sick and wounded. FM 8-2 and FM 8-10 provide guidance for health service support.

• NBC protection. All EPWs will he pro-vided NBC protection. EPWs should beallowed to use their own NBC protec­tion equipment or if not feasible, thedetaining forces will exchange the EPWs' equipment for proper NBC gear. If EPWs do not have their ownNBC protection equipment, the detain-ing forces must provide them with proper NBC gear.

DODD0A-010755

.
Chaplain support. The unit ministry team, chaplain, and chaplain assistant provide for religious support. Coordi­nation is made with the S5 and G5 for religious support for refugees, dis­placed persons, and indigenous civil­ians. The unit ministry team provides for services for EPWs or assists bysupporting detained clergy of enemy forces, supporting other detainedclergy and providing for burial rites (combatants are granted, where possi­ble, the right to be buried according tothe rites of their religion). Religious preference of EPWs will be obtainedfrom their detainee personnel record form (see Appendix B).

E.
Inspector general. This element is a
channel for reporting known or sus­pected war crimes.

INTERROGATOR TRAINING

Commanders and supervisors must take a deep interest in the quality and quantity of training given to the interrogators assigned to their units. Commanders cannot wait for the start of hostilities to begin a compre-hensive training program. Interrogators require a high degree of proficiency in sev• eral complex skills that are difficult to mas­ter. These skills fade rapidly if not prac­ticed. The value and versatility of a commander's interrogation assets can he continually enhanced by a training pro­gram within his unit. An individual inter­rogator's contributions to the unit's overall collection effort are directly dependent on the degree of exposure he has had to-
. Language training that emphasizes
continuous improvement in military
and technical vocabulary, dialects
spoken in the target countries, and
slang or idiomatic expressions.

.
Area studies of the target countries that emphasize the inhabitants andthe economic, social, religious, and po­litical systems which shape the behav­ior of those inhabitants.

.
Principles of human behavior that emphasize the social and cultural characteristics of behavior considered acceptable in the target countries. As often as possible, training in these areas should be integrated with indi­vidual and collective training. This gives the unit the best return for thetraining time expended and gives theindividual interrogator the most realis­tic training possible.

Innovative training methods are devised and implemented in garrison as part of the scheduled training cycle. This training is based on the results of periodic evaluations of individual and collective performance. Army Training and Evaluating Programs are being developed which set the stan­dards for collective performance by interro­gation elements of various sizes.
6-7

CHAPTER 7
Strategic Debriefing
Strategic debriefing is the art of inter­viewing an individual in a strategic envi­ronment, that is, voluntary sources ofinformation to obtain usable information in response to command and national-level intelligence needs. Strategic intelligence provides support to national-level planners and operational commanders across the entire spectrum of conflict and is especially useful for long-range planning purposes. Strategic intelligence is collected in peace­time as well as wartime and often fills intel­ligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or from sensitive areas.
The objective of the strategic debriefing process is to obtain information of the highest degree of credibility to satisfy out­standing intelligence requirements. This avoids surprises of strategic nature and consequences. Strategic debriefing opera­tions will be discussed further in FM 34-5 (S). The types of sources encountered in strategic debriefing are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources. While there are other types, these represent thevast majority. Doctrine for strategic debrief­ing is provided in DIAM 58-13.
DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES

Due to the diverse nature of the various ­operations using debriefers, both outside the continental United States (OCONUS)and within the continental United States (COWS), specific duties and responsibili­ties peculiar to a particular operation will be detailed in unit SOPs. However, there are certain duties and responsibilities to debriefers regardless of assignment.
NOTIFICATION

Proper response to notification of the availability of a source will depend upon unit operations. The debriefer may have to respond spontaneously as in the case of walk-in sources. He may have the luxury of advance notice as in the case of an invita­tional interview.
7-0
PLANNING AND
PREPARATION

Planning and preparation for the stra­tegic debriefer are similar to that process already described in Chapter 3 with the fol­lowing considerations peculiar to the stra­tegic environment:
.
Prior intelligence reports pertaining to a particular source may not be readily available and the source's area of knowledgeability, personality traits,and potential intelligence value should be determined by the debriefer.

.
Pertinent intelligence requirements should be reviewed in an attempt to assess the source's potential to answer them.

.
Necessary maps, technical reference manuals, city plans, photographs, handbooks, and so forth should be assembled and organized in the antici­pated sequence of the interview.

.
An appropriate debriefing site mayneed to be selected with considerations given to legal agreements with host countries or particular directives within unit SOPs.

CONTACT AND INTERVIEW
APPROACH AND INITIAL CONTACT
In the approach and initial contact, basi­cally the same process is used as described before except that the sources for strategic debriefing are in a different legal status than EPWs.
QUESTIONING
The debriefer uses good questioning tech­niques and rapport and effective follow-up leads to ensure the answering of specific requirements.
RECORDING AND REPORTING
Comprehensive and logical note taking is •translated into comprehensible, logical, and

objective reporting within the parameters of the intelligence report procedures outlined in DIAM 58-13.
TERMINATION

An interview is terminated in a manner which enables any debriefer to recontact a source at a later date and resume the debriefing process. The debriefer ensures that the source receives all promised incen­tives. It is often necessary to provide trans­portation and lodging for sources. Such considerationg demand that the debriefer be familiar with the procedures for use of Intel­ligence Contingency Fund monies.
OPERATIONAL SECURITY

There is an obvious need for OPSEC before, during, and after any debriefing. Source confidentiality and the handling of classified materials demand constant and special attention.
LANGUAGE ABILITY

Maintaining a language proficiency is a basic requirement, and improvement of dia­lects, slang, and technical terminology is a must.
LIAISON

A debriefer may have the added responsi­bility of maintaining local liaison withhost-government agencies while OCONUS. Unit SOPs usually dictate the necessary and proper procedures.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
ENHANCEMENT

The debriefer keeps up with new scientific and technical development of target coun­tries. Intelligence agencies publish numer­ous reports and summaries which are readi­ly available to the strategic debriefer.
COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
Information gathered as strategic intelli­gence may be categorized into eight compo-nents. An easy way to remember these components is through the use of the acro­nym BEST MAPS:
. B—biographic intelligence.
• E—economic intelligence.
O S—sociological intelligence.

. T—transportation and telecommunica­tions intelligence.
O M —military geographical intelligence.
.
A—armed forces intelligence.

.
P—political intelligence.

.
S—scientific and technical
intelligence.

Each of these components can further bedivided into a number of subcomponents. These components and subcomponents arenot all-encompassing nor mutually exclu­sive. This approach is merely a means toenhance familiarization with the types ofinformation included in strategicintelligence.
BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or potential impor­tance through knowledge of their personali­ties and backgrounds. This component can be divided into a number of subcomponents:
O Educational and occupational
history—including civilian and mili­tary backgrounds of individuals.

C.: Individual accomplishment—notable . accomplishments of an individual inprofessional or private life.
C Idiosyncrasies and habits—including
mannerisms and unusual life styles.

C Position, influence, and potential—
present and future positions of power
or influence.

. Attitudes and hobbies—significant
interests that may affect an individu­al's accessibility.

Such biographic information is reported by preparing a message intelligence reportin accordance with the format in DIAM 58-13.
7-1

DODDOA-010758

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Economic intelligence studies the eco­nomic strengths and weaknesses of a coun­try. Its subcomponents are—
.
Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies.

.
Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.

C Manufacturing—information on
manufacturing processes, facilities,
logistics, and so forth.

111 Source of economic capability—any
means a country has to sustain its
economy.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

Sociological intelligence deals with peo­ple, customs, behaviors, and institutions. The subcomponents are-
.
Population—rates of increase,
decrease, or migrations.

.
Social characteristics—customs,
mores, and values.

.
Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.

.
Health, education, and welfare.

.
Public information—information ser­vices within the country.

TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE

Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies the role of transporta­tion and telecommunications systems dur­ing military emergencies and during peace­time. The subcomponents of this topic aretoo varied and numerous to cover.
MILITARY GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE

Military geographic intelligence studiesall geographic factors (physical and cultur-
7-2
al) which may impact on military opera­tions. Physical geography is concerned with natural or man-made geophysical features. Cultural geography provides demographi-cal information.
ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE
Armed forces intelligence is the inte­grated study of the ground, sea, and air forces of a country—often referred to as OB. It is concerned with-
.
Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics, politics, and so forth.

.
Tactics—military deployments and
operations doctrine.

.
OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.

.
Equipment—analysis of all military
materiel.

.
Logistics—procurement, storage, anddistribution.

.
Training—as carried out at all eche­lons to support doctrine.

.
Organization—detailed analysis of
command structures.

.
Manpower—available resources and
their conditioning.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect military opera­tions. Its subcomponents are-
.
Government structure—organization
of departments and ministries.

.
National policies—government actionsand decisions.

'0 Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
•
Propaganda—information and disin­formation programs.

•
Policy and intelligence services—
organization and functions.

. Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE

Scientific and technical intelligence stud­ies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of new processes, equipment, weapons sys-tems, and so forth. The subcomponents are-
.
Weapons and weapon systems.

.
Missile and space program.

.
Nuclear energy and weapons
technology.

.
NBC developments.

.
Basic applied science.

.
Research and development systems.

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Equally important to the components of strategic intelligence is an awareness of the strategic intelligence cycle and the debrief­er's role within that cycle. The first step is the identification of intelligence gaps. Ana­lysts translate these gaps into intelligencerequirements—the second step. In the third step, the strategic debriefer fulfills those requirements. The fourth step involvespreparation of an intelligence report. The fifth and last step is the preparation of anintelligence report evaluation by the origi­nator of the requirement. These evaluationsmeasure the quality of the information as well as the quality of the report writing.
7.3

DODD0A-010760

CHAPTER 8
Joint Interrogation Facilities
A conceptual void exists concerning the formation and use of a joint interrogation facility (JIF). This chapter provides general guidance to an EAC interrogation and exploitation (I&E) battalion commander on how to form a JIF (information on the organization of an EAC I&E battalion can be found in FC 34-124). STANAG 2033 pro­vides the authority for the use of a JIF.
Many contingencies exist worldwide under which the use of US forces could become necessary. These procedures are ingeneral terms and allow the I&E battalion commander the latitude necessary to form a JIF under those contingencies.
FORMATION

The JIF is not a TOE organization, but it is formed to meet specific requirements. It is task organized using I&E battalion assets. The personnel provided by other services and agencies will depend upon theater requirements.
Combined interrogation centers (CICs) are interrogation facilities which are manned by more than one nation and are not addressed. CICs, in the European theater, are established according to STANAG 2033. The operation of a CIC is determined by international agreement.
REQUIREMENT

In the constantly changing environment of today's world, our military forces could be called upon to enter into armed conflictin any level of intensity, anywhere on the globe. Unified and specified commands aretotally prepared and react as necessary tomultilevel threats of combat involvement.. An intelligence collection facility is requiredto provide support to these joint commands.
MISSION

The JIF provides support to joint com­mands for collection, analysis, and report­ing of intelligence information. The JIF provides this support through the interroga­tion of category A sources and exploitation of CEDs based on theater and national­level intelligence requirements.
ORGANIZATION
The intelligence collection facility is com­prised of interrogators, CI personnel, and analysts from the US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and from various other US national agencies as required. They are established under one commander to operate as a JIF in the exploitation of documents and personnel. The JIF is a field activity of the joint command organized tomeet theater requirements during crises or contingency deployments.
The organization of a JIF is tailored to meet the specific requirements of crises, contingency deployments, or military assis­tance operations to host nations. The Army component commander is designated as the executive agent for the establishment, organization, and functioning of the JIF. The EAC MI brigade commander, asso­ciated with the theater in question, will exercise command and control of the JIF.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The JIF, in meeting the specific require­ments of crises, contingency deployment, ormilitary assistance operations to host nations, is responsible for the following functions:
Develop guidance and operational
procedures for the conduct and man­
agement of all JIF functions.
Coordinate with participating agencies and units to develop personnel selec­tion criteria and assignment proce­dures necessary for partial or complete activation of the JIF.
0 Organize, direct, manage, and control resources assigned to or included within the JIF.

DODDOA-010761

.
Supervise and direct full or partialactivation of the JIF for the conduct of screenings and interrogation ofsources, translation and exploitation ofCEDs, and debriefing of captured or detained US personnel released or escaped from enemy control.

.
Coordinate through the Army compo­nent with the theater J2 to ensure compatibility of other service compo­nents' plans and actions pertinent to the establishment and operation of the JIF.

.
Coordinate through the Army compo­nent with the theater J2 the selection of suitable JIF operational sites.

.
Coordinate with the provost marshal for all site operations.

.
Coordinate and satisfy the intelligencecollection requirements of theater and service components from available

sources.

.
Perform liaison to theater, service components, and other agencies and organizations as deemed appropriate.

.
As directed, provide personnel asreplacement, backup, or augmentationfor service component interrogation organizations destroyed or depleted.

.
Develop contingency plans for the evacuation of the JIF and the destruc­tion of classified material. Selected sources, documents, and equipment will be evacuated with US forces.

USE

During crisis, contingency deployments,or military assistance to host nations, com­ponents will forward collection require­ments to the theater command J2. The J2 serves as the requirements control authorityand is responsible for the registration, vali­dation, and establishment of priorities for JIF collection requirements. The J2 exer­cises staff cognizance over JIF operations.
OPERATION

The JIF deploys mobile interrogationteams (MIT) to identify, screen, and inter rogate category A sources to satisfy theatercollection requirements and support service component interrogation operations. MIT interrogation reports are forwarded to theJIF, theater J2, and service components. In response to these interrogation reports, thetheater J2 prioritizes and forwards addi­tional collection requirements for specific sources to the JIF. The JIF directs the MIT to conduct further interrogations or coordi­nate evacuation of the source to the JIF for further interrogation.
Vita] information derived by MITthrough interrogation of sources or exploi­tation of CEDs is reported via secure com­munications to JIF and theater J2.
Based on collection requirements and MIT screening reports and interrogations, the OF identifies EPWs for priority evacua­tion to the theater camp for JIF exploita­tion. The JIF prepares and dissseminates source knowledgeability briefs (KB) to theater and national-level agencies. The JIF continually reviews the requirement to exploit these selected sources.
MIT assist lower echelon interrogators and intelligence specialists in the examina­tion and categorization of CEDs for evacua­tion to the JIF.
Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value. Initial reports are submitted electronically whenever possible to ensure that the information reaches the analysts in the least amount of time. Writ­ten reports are prepared according to the format contained in Appendix G. Copies of SALUTE and interrogation reports pertain­ing to specific category A sources accom­pany them when they are evacuated to theJIF. In situations where time-critical data is involved, secure voice SALUTE reports tothe theater J2 may be used to supplementprocedures.
Initial MIT reporting includes the inter­rogator's assessment of the category A source intelligence value. This assessment addresses the category A source's intelli­gence, experience, cooperation, and reli­ability. Any areas of special knowledge possessed by the category A source is alsoidentified.
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DODDOA-010762

COORDINATION

Effective coordination between the JIF and numerous component, theater, and national and host-government assets is necessary to ensure the success of JIF operations.
Theater J2 and service components' intel­ligence staffs require interface and coordi­nation with the JIF to ensure collection requirements are satisfied accurately and in a timely manner. The success of JIF opera­tions depends in part upon the screening, interrogation, and debriefing operations of division and corps interrogation and CI elements. The JIF establishes and main­tains working relationships with service component HUMINT collection managers and interrogation and document exploita­tion units at all echelons. Service compo­nent members attached to the JIF facilitate this interface.
Interface and coordination with compo­nent security and military police elements are required to ensure the timely evacuation and proper safeguarding and exploitation of sources.
The JIF is located in the immediate vi­cinity of the theater EPW camp. The loca­tion of the EPW camp is the responsibility of the military police EPW camp com­mander. Army component G2s and provost marshal staffs coordinate all EPW plan­ning about location.
Security arrangements for the EPW camp and planning for the segregation and safe­guarding of JIF sources are the responsi­bility of the EPW camp commander. Sources are identified, classified, and segre­gated according to their status, sex, nation­ality, languages, and intelligence category. JIF sources are segregated and safeguarded from other sources. Security of the JIF and control over the sources within the JIF are under the direction of the JIF commander.
Component security and military police units are responsible for the evacuation, safeguarding, and control of sources. JIF MIT at lower echelons coordinate with these units for access to a source and the source's subsequent evacuation to the JIF.
JIF coordination and interface with theater and service component CI elements are necessary at all times. CI teams located at the JIF and with the MIT facilitate this interface and coordination. The JIF and MIT assist CI elements in the identification and exploitation of all sources of CI interest.
.JIF coordination and interface with PSYOP and CA units are facilitated by direct access to members of these units con­ducting operations in support of military police EPW camps. PSYOP analysis con­cerning motivational and cultural factors of sources is of direct berrefit to JIF operations.
JIF coordination and interface with legal, medical, and chaplain activities and authorities supporting EPW camps are required to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention concerning the treat­ment and care of sources.
National agency access and participation in debriefings and interrogations conducted by the JIF are coordinated in advance through the theater .12. National agencies may establish liaison officers at the JIF.
Access to or knowledge of JIF operationsand activities by host governments is coor­dinated through the theater J2.
COMMUNICATIONS

To effect required interface and coordina­tion, the JIF requires secure communica­tions with the theater .12, service compo­nents, and the MIT. Secure record and voice communications circuits and telephone switchboard trunks are used. Interface and compatibility with service component inter­rogation and CI team communications arerequired.
CHAPTER 9
Low-Intensity Conflict
This chapter provides concepts and doc­trine concerning interrogation assets in LIC operations. Before discussing the use of interrogation assets in a LIC, we must understand the terminology and the US Army operational concept for LIC.
TERMINOLOGY

LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, mili­tary, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.
The definitions of mid- and high-intensity conflict limit their use to war between nations. These terms, defined here, will not be further discussed.
Mid-intensity conflict—war between two or more nations and their respec­tive allies, if any, in which the bellig­erents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelli­gence; mobility; firepower (excluding nuclear, chemical, and biological weap­ons); command, control, and communi­cations; and service support for limited objectives under definitive policy limi­tations as to the extent of destructive power that can be employed or the extent of geographic area that might be involved.
High-intensity conflict—war between two or more nations and their respec-tive allies, if any, in which the bel­ligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelli­gence; mobility; firepower (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weap­ons); command, control and commu­nications; and service support.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
FOR LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT

LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regu­lar forces.
The factors which lead to LIC are com­plex and, in many cases, cannot be resolved by short-term actions. Success in this envi­ronment is dependent upon the effective application of all elements of national power and clearly defined goals and objec­tives. Political objectives establish the lim­its and constraints for military operations, as well as other social, political, and eco­nomic programs. The difference between military operations in LIC and the war, as found in mid- or high-intensity levels, lies in the measure of military success. In the lat­ter, military success is measured in terms of winning campaigns and battles. In LIC, however, success will consist of achieving US national objectives without the pro­tracted commitment of US forces in a com­bat role. It must be noted that, should mili­tary intervention be necessary, a premature commitment of US soldiers to combat in a low-intensity situation may result in the loss of strategic initiative. Political, eco­nomic, social, and psychological initiatives are necessary to achieve lasting success in the LIC arena.
The US Army's mission in LIC can be divided into four general categories: peace­keeping operations, foreign internal defense (FID), peacetime contingency operations, and terrorism counteraction.
9-1

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Increasing world tension, continuing con­flicts, scarce resources, and general distrust have created environments in which a mili­tary force may be employed to achieve, re-store, or maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present situations that are often ambiguous and may require forces to deal with extreme tension and violence in the form of terrorism, sabotage, and minor military conflicts from known and unknown belligerents.
Given the worldwide nature of US national interests. it is vital to US security to maintain not only the capability to employ force, but also the ability to assist in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. US Army participation in peacekeeping opera­tions may be multinational in nature or may be conducted unilaterally.
Multinational peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. They may be undertaken in response to a request for assistance made to either a mul­tinational organization or to the US di­rectly. Historically, the United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of multina­tional peacekeeping operations, though re­gional organizations have acted in a simi­lar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.
Although unilateral peacekeeping opera­tions are possible, they are inherently sensi­tive and require tacit international appro­val. Unilateral peacekeeping operations conducted by the US require clear humani­tarian justifications.
The two common missions in peacekeep­ing operations are cease fire supervision and law and order maintenance.
Cease Fire Supervision

Peacekeeping forces can be deployed to observe and report on compliance withdiplomatically arranged cease fires. The force will require the capability for rapid deployment to perform its peacekeeping function and must be initially self­sufficient, have self-defense capability, andpossess effective internal and external communications. The terms of the cease fire agreement may call for the peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawals and dis­engagements of the belligerents, supervise the exchange of prisoners of war, or moni­tor demobilization.

Law and Order Maintenance
Peacekeeping operations also include res­toration or maintenance of law and order. Traditional civilian law enforcement func­tions are generally not performed by US military personnel. However, situations may arise which require limited support to duly authorized law enforcement authori­ties of a receiving state.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
FID encompasses those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of one government in any program taken by another government to preclude or defeat insurgency. Insurgencies cannot be over­come by military measures alone but by military support to national programs.
US Army forces operate in concert withother services, both US and host nation and with other US Government agencies. Opera­tions are conducted in support of plans developed by the host nation and the USGovernment.
US forces involved in YID must have an appreciation of the culture into which they are employed and should be selected, edu­cated, and prepared to ensure that US involvement and goals are understood and complied with. Language capabilities are important and must be developed to the maximum extent possible. Units should be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and arrive in the host country established as an effective, cohesive group, prepared to begin operations immediately.
US Army forces can assume various rela­
tionships with the host nation's militaryforces in FID operations. They can serve as advisors or instructors at all levels. Special forces units are specifically trained for this mission. Combat support. of CSS units may augment the host nation's efforts and serve to prepare the battlefield for US combat

forces, if required. US forces must assume
an unobtrusive support role to maintain
credibility of the host government.
The manner in which US combat forces are employed will vary with the situation. Because of their familiarity with local communities and population, it is generally better to use indigenous military assets in more populated areas and to employ US combat assets in remote areas.
When US Army combat troops are required for FID operations, planning for their withdrawal begins at the time of deployment. The withdrawal of Army units depends on the capability of the host nation forces to regain and maintain control.
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY
OPERATMNS

In certain environments, peacetime con, tingency operationS become necessary when diplomatic initiatives have been, or are expected to be, ineffective in achieving extremely time-sensitive, high-value objec­tives. Failure to influence a belligerent nation or activity through diplomatic means may necessitate the use of military forces to protect US national interests, rescue US citizens, or defend US assets.
Intelligence is a particularly critical part of all peacetime contingency operations. The rapid and tightly controlled introduc­tion of US combat forces is a part of contin­gency operations which requires precision planning. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence determines the success or fail­ure of these operations. Time for planning and execution is typically short, and intelli­gence assets must be able to anticipate requirements and provide comprehensive products on extremely short notice. City plans with complete detail of utilities, per­sonality profiles of local officials, and details of specific ports, airports, roads, and bridges are examples of information which must be made readily available. Intelli­gence gathering missions into sensitive areas are also conducted as required.
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

Terrorism, employed worldwide, may be sponsored by political or other terrorist groups within a nation, sponsored by an external source, or employed as a tactic of insurgents. It is clearly a dimension of war­fare which pays high dividends with mini­mum risk. Population areas, public trans­port conveyances, industrial facilities, and individuals are high-probability targets for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups increas­ingly threaten US interests throughout the world.
Terrorism counteraction consists of those actions taken to counter the terrorist threat. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken against terrorists. --Specially trained US Army forces are the main ele­ment used in counterterrorism operations.
Intelligence is essential to implementing effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures. Its purpose in terrorism counter­action is to identify and quantify the threat and provide timely threat intelligence. This includes the evaluation of terrorist capabili­ties, tactics, targets, and the dissemination of this information.
Terrorism counteraction varies according to the type of terrorist organization involved. Autonomous terrorist groups, for example, are vulnerable to intelligence and police-type operations. In a different arena, the actions of state-supported and state­directed groups would certainly be sensitive to measures taken against the supporting states.
INTERROGATION SUPPORT
TO LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT

The principles and techniques of interro­gation discussed elsewhere in this manual apply with equal validity to interrogations
9-3

DODD0A-010766

conducted in LIC operations. Specific appli­cations of the general principles and tech­niques must be varied to meet local pecu­liarities. However: because of these
peculiarities of LIC operations, this chapter provides additional guidelines for the con­duct of interrogations in support of such operations. Intelligence interrogations play a significant role in ascertaining the devel­opment of an insurgency in the latent or initial stage; the intentions, attitudes, capabilities, and limitations of the insur­gents: their underground organizations; and their support systems. In addition to the traditional military concepts of intelli­gence concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather, LIC operations have added a new dimension—the population. The major aim of both the threatened government and the insurgents is to influence the population favorably and win its support.

LIMITATIONS TO UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

US military or civilian participation in intelligence interrogations during LIC operations is generally limited to that per­mitted by the host government concerned. This limitation places certain restrictions on US military and civilian personnel engaged in such operations. The degree of participation will, therefore, be determined by combined US and host-country policies. Normally, the interrogator is asked to advise, assist, and train host-country per­sonnel who are members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other security agencies (FM 100-20). The interro­gator may also provide intelligence interro­gation support to committed US or allied forces during LIC operations. This will require effective, close coordination of the combined effort with host-country agencies. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by conducting a combined inter­rogation effort with interrogators of the host country. Further advantages of such a measure are the language capability and the intimate knowledge of the area— personalities, customs, ethnic differences and geography—possessed by the host country's interrogation personnel.

INTERROGATOR SKILLS
AND ABILITIES

LIC operations intelligence requirements demand detailed familiarity with the mili­tary, political, and front organizations of the insurgent enemy and the environment in which he operates.
The interrogator's familiarity with the areas of operations must include an under­standing and appreciation of the insur­gency, its objectives, history, successes, and failures. This understanding and apprecia­tion is required not only on a general coun­trywide basis, but also on an expanded basis within the interrogator's particular area of operation. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator fully grasps the importance that the insurgent organization places on the accomplishment of political objectives as opposed to military successes.
One measure of the interrogator's effec­tiveness is his ability to apply the appro­priate interrogation techniques to the per­sonality of the source. Interrogations associated with LIC operations dictate the need for skill in the full range of interroga­tion techniques so that the interrogator can conduct the many types of interrogationsdemanded.

ADVISOR AND INTERROGATOR RELATIONSHIPS

In some instances, US Army interroga­tors are assigned to a host country to assist in developing interrogation capabilities of host-country forces. FM 100-20 contains detailed information on advisor duties, techniques, and procedures. However, the operations and relationship of the advisor to host-country interrogators require special mention and are discussed below.
Advisor Qualifications

The advisor must he a qualified, experi­enced interrogator with an extensive intel­ligence background. He requires area orien­tation and must have language ability, and a personality favorable for working with indigenous peoples. The following are nor­mal functions of an interrogation advisor:
.
Establish a working relationship with his counterparts through development of mutual respect and confidence.

.
Provide advice for effective collection through interrogation.

.
Assist in establishing combined inter­rogation centers.

.
Provide on-the-job training for indi­genous interrogators.

.
Assist in the establishment of neces­sary file systems to support interroga­tion operations.

.
Conduct appropriate liaison with all
units participating in the combined
interrogation center.

• Keep the senior Army intelligence
advisor informed on operations and
activities within his area.

.
Provide the financial support, as autho­rized, for interrogation operations to his counterpart.

.
Conduct appropriate coordination with other US intelligence advisors.

Counterpart Relationship

The advisor's accomplishments depend upon the relationship established with his counterpart. This relationship is influenced by the personalities of each. Ideally, thisrelationship should develop as the counter­part's knowledge of the area combines with the professional knowledge of the advisor.Before he provides advice to his counter­part, the advisor should observe the opera­tion of the unit and become familiar with the area and the local situation. For con­venience, his office should he adjacent to that of his counterpart. However, the advi­sor should not interfere with the routine administrative duties that must he accom plished by his counterpart.
Above all, the advisor must remember that his is an advisory role and not that of a supervisor or commander. He advises the counterpart rather than individuals within the unit. This is important, for advising individuals could result in advice which • would he contrary to the orders of the coun­terpart. In reality, advice is totally accepted only when the counterpart is convinced that the advice is sound and appropriate of thesituation.
In cases where the advisor may observe brutal methods in handling and interrogat­ing captives and other detainees, he mustnot participate in these acts and, further, should remove himself and any other USpersonnel for whom he is responsible fromthe scene. Local theater policies and direc­tives normally assign other specified actions for the aevisor in a situation of this sort. Such policies and directives may include advising the counterpart of the undesirability of such action and the report­ing of the incident through US channels. The advisor must comply with any such theater (or other command) policies and directives.
Advisor Operations

The advisor must emphasize that devel­opment of a combined interrogation effort is of the utmost importance to successful operations. This combined capability is achieved by uniting the interrogation resources of all intelligence forces (except tactical) within a specific geographic area of responsibility (that is, national, province, district). Most likely, the advisor will find that in many host countries, interrogation responsibilities will be assigned as follows:
.
Civilian police—suspects and insur­gent political cadre.

.
Military interrogators—captured
military insurgents and those military
insurgents who have rallied to the
legally constituted government.

.
Indigenous military counterintelligence—insurgent infiltra­tors and deserters from host-country forces.

The advisor must stress the integration of all interrogator resources to achieve econo­my of force and unity of effort. Often this task will be complicated by personalities of
9-5

DODDOA-010768

the host country, military, and civilian offi­cials. But if harmonious working relation­ships are established with the key person­alities involved, the advisor can succeed in
integrating all available resources.

The interrogator (advisor) should estab­lish liaison with US advisors working with host-country tactical forces operating within his area. From these advisors he can be constantly informed of insurgents cap­tured by these tactical forces. The interro­gator (advisor) and tactical unit advisor, working together with their respective counterparts, can ensure effective interro­gation of these captured insurgents. Fur­ther, the advisors can assist in achieving the required coordination between host­country tactical units and area forces to improve handling and exploiting interroga­tion sources.
THE SOURCE

The status of insurgents in LTC opera­tions differs from that of recognized bellig­erents; the field of interrogation will
encompass a wider variety of sources
involved in operations.

LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENTS
EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and are governed by the guidelines and limita­tions provided by the Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subver­sive underground elements who are seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency do not hold legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host-government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions beyond the basic protectionsin Article 3. The insurgent will he subject to the internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of US forces, however, will he gov­erned by existing agreements with the host country and by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

POPULATION

LIC operations place the population in the position of a prime target. Therefore, the population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The population with which the interrogator will have to deal may be com­posed of friendly, hostile, or completely indifferent elements. In dealing with these population elements, as well as with theinsurgents, the desires of the host country must be considered. There is a need to gain the support of the population to deprive the insurgents of their primary sources of sup­port. Such a need places a burden upon the interrogator to learn more about the people—their customs and taboos (by ethnic groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear of foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philo­sophy or outlook on life, and other facets of their political, economic, and social institu­tions. Since CI elements are tasked with the mission of countersubversion, the primary responsibility of identifying insurgent operations within the population is placed upon CI personnel. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator maintain close and continuous coordination with CI personnel to ensure complete exploitation ofthe population.

INSURGENT VULNERABILITY
TO INTERROGATION

The individual insurgent may lack many of the conventional psychological supports which are helpful in resisting interrogation. Often he is in conflict with his own people, perhaps of the same ethnic group, religion, environment, or even, in some cases, his family. Further, the insurgent has no legal status as an EPW and, therefore, realizes he may he considered a common criminal. The insurgent often expects to receive harsh and brutal treatment after capture. If he doesnot receive this harsh treatment, the psy­chological effect may make him amenable to the interrogator. In addition, the shock effect normally induced by capture willfurther increase his susceptibility to inter­rogation. Therefore, the individual insur­gent may rationalize cooperation with theinterrogator as the best course of action for his survival.

DODDOA-010769

Although the insurgent often lacks con­ventional psychological support, as pre­viously discussed, the interrogator should realize that other support may have been furnished him through intensive political and psychological indoctrination and train­ing to resist interrogation. Indoctrination sessions using such techniques as self and group criticism can give insurgents a strong group identification and fanatical belief in the insurgent cause.
The entire range of insurgent activity is vulnerable to mass interrogation of the populace. Since the insurgent's operations are often contingent on the support of the populace, members of the populace inevita­bly learn the identities and activities of the insurgent. With large numbers of people knowing him, the insurgent is vulnerable to mass screening and interrogation pro­grams. Success of such programs may be enhanced by the insurgent's previously committed acts of terror, tax collection, and forced recruitment, which will have alien­ated some members of the population.
HANDLING OF INSURGENT
CAPTIVES AND SUSPECTS

Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrectionagainst a constituted government which falls short of civil war. It is not usually a conflict of international character, and it is not a recognized belligerency. Therefore, insurgent captives are not guaranteed full protection under the articles of the Geneva Conventions relative to the handling of EPWs. However, Article 3 of the Conven• tions requires that insurgent captives be humanely treated and forbids violence to life and person—in particular murder, muti­lation, cruel treatment, and torture. It further forbids commitment of outrages upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, passing of sentences, and execution withoutprior judgment by a regularly constituted court.
Humane treatment of insurgent captivesshould extend far beyond compliance withArticle 3, if for no other reason than to render them more suceptible to interroga-tion. The insurgent is trained to expect bru­tal treatment upon capture. If, contrary to what he has been led to believe, this mis­treatment is not forthcoming, he is apt to become psychologically softened for inter­rogation. Furthermore, brutality by either capturing troops or friendly interrogators will reduce defections and serve as grist for the insurgent's propaganda mill.
Special care must be taken in handling insurgent suspects, for their degree of sym­pathy with the insurgency usually is not readily apparent. Improper handling of such persons may foster sympathies for theinsurgency or induce them to remain pas­sive at a time when the host country requires active support from its citizens.
INSURGENT METHODS OF
RESISTANCE

Recognizing vulnerability to interroga­tion, the insurgent counters by taking any of the following actions:
.
Keeps his forces ignorant of future operations, unit designations, and true names of leaders.

.
Assigns multiple designations to units, frequently changes them, and uses aliases for names of leaders.

.
Hires informants to watch and reporton the people and commits reprisals against those who provide information to the government.

.
Instructs his forces to remain silent upon capture for a given period of time. This lapse in time tends to decrease the value of the information which is ulti-. mately revealed to hostile interrogators.

.
Provides plausible cover stories to hide true information.

.
Indoctrinates his forces with ideologi­cal training.

.
Publicizes cases where captives have been killed or mistreated by capturing forces.

.
Screens his recruits carefully.

.
Uses cellular structure to restrict
knowledge of personnel and
operations.

9-7

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF SOURCES
The characteristics and knowledge of interrogation sources vary widely, based upon the position, status, and mission of the insurgent within his organization. The interrogator's appraisal of these factors, coupled with his own knowledge of the source and the organization to which he belongs, will assist in quickly evaluating the informational potential of each source. Interrogation sources vary and include the combatant, terrorist, propagandist, courier, political cadre, e nd intelligence agent. They may be young or old, male or female, edu-cated or illiterate. General characteristics and knowledgeability of the more common types are discussed below.
Main and Local Forces

The main force combatant is the best indoctrinated, trained, led, disciplined, and equipped of all insurgent forces. He will know more, but may be inclined to reveal less than a local force insurgent or a member of the village militia. When prop­erly interrogated, however, he can be expected to be a fruitful source of informa­tion on his unit and its personnel; current and past military operations; supply and base areas; status of training and morale: some information of higher, lower, and adjacent units; routes of infiltration and exfiltration; tactics and general information on his area of operations. In short, he may be likened to the more conventional pris­oner of war and will be knowledgeable on topics akin to that type of individual. He will differ, however, in that his knowledge of units other than his own will be far less than that of the conventional prisoner of war. Generally speaking, the local force insurgent soldier (the second component of the insurgent regular armed forces) will be almost as valuable as a main force soldier for interrogation purposes. His knowledge will depend primarily upon the methods of operation used by the insurgent movement in the employment of its regular armed forces.

Militia

Compared to the main and local forceinsurgent, the local village militia member is often poorly trained, disciplined, and equipped. While he is not likely to be a prof­itable source of information on regular force units, his native familiarity with the area in which he operates makes him a most valu­able source on local terrain, insurgent infrastructure, food and weapons caches, lines of communications and logistics, intel­ligence operations, and OB information on his own militia unit. When cooperative, he, likewise, can be used to identify local insur­gent sympathizers within his area.

Political Cadre

This individual is a profitable interroga­tion source for obtaining information on the composition and operation of the insur­gent's political structure. At the lowest level (hamlet and village) he normally wears"two hats," one as the political leader, the other as the commander of the militia. At higher levels the individual is more political in orientation and can provide information on cell members, front organizations, sym­pathizers, and nets. He is also knowledge­able on the military units within his area, their lines and methods of communications, and future plans and operations of both the political and military organizations.

Sympathizer

This individual may be a sympathizer in fact or one of circumstance—that is, through blackmail, terror, or relatives being held hostage. In either event, if skillfully interrogated, the sympathizer can become the most fruitful source of information on one of the greatest and most perplexing questions of insurgency—"How do you tell the difference between friend and foe?" The sympathizer coerced into assisting theinsurgent is, of course, the most useful type of individual, but care must be taken to pro­tect him after he has revealed useful information.

Defectors
These individuals are perhaps the best source of information available during LIC.

DODD0A-010771

They are usually cooperative and easily susceptible to direct approach interrogation techniques. The most important feature of interrogating defectors is the capability to exploit physically the individual who voluntarily agrees to accompany friendlypersonnel into tactical operations areas. The primary methods of exploiting defec­tors are to use them as tactical guides and advisors, as informants, as aides in interro­gation and document analysis, and as advi­sors on enemy agent net modus operandi. It should be noted, however, that some of these techniques involve personal dange­for the defector, and for that reason, he should be provided appropriate protectiveequipment. Coercion cannot be used to induce his cooperation. However, when defectors are employed to accomplish objec­tives, as discussed in FM 34-60, they will becontrolled only by qualified CI personnel.
INTERROGATION
OPERATIONS

SCREENING TECHNIQUES

The screening of insurgent captives and suspects is the key to productive interroga­tion by CI personnel. Screening is a twofold operation conducted to identify insurgents or their sympathizers in the population and, of these, to find the most knowledgeable individuals for interrogation. Techniques for accomplishing these functions are var­ied and depend mainly upon the imagina­tion and ingenuity of screener personnel. For this reason, only the most resourceful interrogators should be selected as screen­ers. Examples of successful screening aids and techniques are discussed below.
Local Leader

The local leader, whether a government official, religious personage, teacher or vil­lage elder, is a useful screening assistant. This individual knows the people, their hab. its and activities. He knows the legitimate resident from the stranger and can often point out insurgents and their sympathizers in his area. However, since the local leader is vulnerable to insurgent terror or repri­sals, his overt use in screening may be sometimes limited. When employed in an
overt capacity, he will always require pro­tection later. The mere fact that a man is a constituted local leader should never be viewed as prima facie evidence of loyalty to the host-country government. A leader may be secretly or tacitly supporting the insur­gency or may, for personal political rea­sons, discredit political rivals with false accusations.

Insurgent Captive
The insurgent captive can be used as a"finger man" in a police-type line-up, an excellent means of mass screening. As the entire population of a community files past, the captive points out those individuals loyal to the insurgency. A police "mug file" is a useful variant of this technique. Here the captive reviews photographs taken from family registries.
Agent or Friendly
Civilian

The line-up or the "mug file," described above, is most productive when friendly agents and civilians are used as screening assistants. However, care should be taken to hide the identity of these individuals by placing them behind a harrier or covering their faces. An excellent source for employ­ment of this technique is the individual who has close relatives within the government or its military forces.

Area Cordon

A good method to screen a community is to cordon off the area and restrict the inhabitants to their homes. All movement thereafter must be strictly controlled and regulated. With this accomplishment, each member of the community is questioned regarding the identities of party members and sympathizers for the same length of time and with the same questions. If the desired information is not obtained after completion of all questioning, the process should begin again and continue until peo­ple start to talk. Once information is
9-9

obtained, the members of the local insur­
gent infrastructure are apprehended simul­
taneously and removed from the commu­
nity for intensive, detailed interrogation.

Informant Technique

This technique involves placement of a friendly individual among a group of sus­pects or captives. The individual acts out the role of an insurgent sympathizer to gain the confidence of the group and to learn theidentity of the true insurgents and their leaders.

INTERROGATION OF ILLITERATES
The interrogation of illiterate sources requires special questioning techniques. The interrogator is after facts, and eliciting such simple data from illiterates as "size" or
"how many" is often difficult. The interro­gator must agree on common terminology with his source so that he can communicate and obtain the information he desires. He can use a system of holding up fingers on his hands, marking on a piece of paper, or using matchsticks, pieces of wood, or other materials to determine numerical facts. In determining types of weapons, the interro­gator can show actual weapons, photo­graphs, or drawings of weapons from which the source can make a comparison with what he actually saw. Description of colors can be made from pieces of materials or color charts. Direction of movement may befound out by location of the sun, stars, or landmarks familiar to the source. Time can be determined by the position of the sun, locating a traveled route and then comput­ing how rapidly the source walked, or find­ing out how often he stopped and how many meals he ate. The methods discussed are examples of common terminology or reference points which an interrogator employs. Additionally, knowledge of the specific habits of the populace and of the area allows the interrogator to select a defi­nite term of reference.
APPENDIX A
STANAG Extracts
Extracts from STANAGs 1059, 2033, 2044, and 2084 pertaining to intelligence interrogations and document exploitation are being provided in this Appendix for your information. The extracts have been copied as they appear in the STANAGs and are not reformatted. Copies of STANAGs can be obtained from Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19120.
EXTRACT FROM STANAG 1059
NATIONAL DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR USE BY NATO FORCES

2. The following national distinguishing letters shall be used whenelier it is
necessary to use abbreviations in staff work and communications, including
publications, documents, communications, orders or other media, to identify a
NATO nation or any part of NATO Forces. The distinguishing letters are to be
used to denote the countries concerned in all documents or papers, ir­respective of whether they are in the English or French language. Whenever the

NATO nations are listed in any paper or document, they are to be listed in the
order shown in both English and French versions.
.

Belgium BE

.

Canada CA (see Note I)

.

Denmark DA

.

France FR
Federal Republic of Germany.

GE

.

Greece GR

.

Iceland IC

.

Italy IT

.

Luxembourg LU

.

Netherlands NL

.

Norway NO

.

Portugal PO

.

Spain SP

.

Turkey TU

.

United Kingdom UK (see Note 2)

.

United States US

Notes: 1. The national distinguishing letters for Canada are not to be used to
identify Canadian Army formations which have the word "Can­adian/Canadienne" in their official designation.

A-1

DODDOA-010774

2. The letters "UK" denote the United Kingdom, or a force or part of a

force provided solely from the United Kingdom. The letters "BR" may,
however, be used in special cases to denote a force comprising units
or elements of more than one country of the British Commonwealth.

3. When used to identify a National Force or component of a National Force the
distinguishing letters are to be bracketed immediately following the Force,

formation or unit number.
.

Examples: 12(US) Army Group
5(FR) Armoured Division
6(NL) Infantry Brigade
5(IT) Infantry Regiment

National distinguishing letters for components of Army Forces smaller than a

division are to be used only when it is necessary to avoid confusion.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033
EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033
INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

21. Interrogation Serial Number. In order to avoid errors in cross-checking
the information obtained fray interrogating PW, the origin of information
repeated in intelligence reports will be indicated in brackets. To this end,
every PW interrogated is to be given an interrogation serial number as a
source of information (not to be confused with the internment serial number
discussed in STANAG 2044 which is given to PW for administrative reasons).
This number is to be allocated by the first interrogation unit to interrogate
him officially. It is to be noted on the Tactical Interrogation Report. Only

one interrogation serial number is to be allocated to each prisoner; it will
not be changed or re-allocated subsequently. The system of allocating the
interrogation serial number is given in Annex B.
ANNEX B TO STANAG 2033
(Edition No. 4)

DODDOA-010775

SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING AN INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBER
TO A PRISONER OF WAR

I. Every PW selected for interrogation shall receive an interrogation serial

number as a source of information, (not to be confused with an internment
serial number discussed in STANAG 2044, which is given to all PW for
administrative reasons). This interrogation serial number will be allocated
to the PW by the first team of interrogators officially interrogating him and

responsible for his selection. This number will be constituted as follows:

a.
Two letters, in accordance with STANAG 1059, indicating the
nationality of the unit which captured the prisoner (e.g. BE, CA, GE, etc.).

b.
Two letters indicating the service or enemy forces to which the
prisoner belongs:

Army.AR.Marines .MR
Navy .NV.Airborne .AB
Naval Air Arm....NA.Police PL

.
Air Force.A=.Irregular .IR

c.
Four or five figures as required, to designate the team which carried
out the first official interrogation.

d.
A number to identify the prisoner himself. Every prisoner selected
for interrogation will receive a personal number, allocated in numerical order
and given by the first team to interrogate him officially. This number,
preceded by a dash will be added to the code number constituted as described
above.

A-3

DODD0A-010776

2. Table showing how numbers are allocated to teams of interrogators:

a. NATO Forces;
SACEUR.1.000 - 4.999.5.000 - 6.999

-SACLANT :.
CINCNORTH :.-7.000 - 7.999

1.000 - 1.999.CINCHAN :.

CINCENT.2.000 - 2.999
CINCSOUTU.

3.000 - 3.999

a. National Forces:
BELGIUM.: 16.000 - 16.999

: 10.000 - 10.999 -ITALY.
CANADA.: 17.000 - 17.999

: 11.000 - 11.999 -LUXEMBOURG.
DENMARK.: 18.000 - 18.999

: 12.000 - 12.999 -NETHERLANDS.
FRANCE.: 19.000 - 19.999

: 13.000 - 13.999 -NORWAY.
-PORTUGAL.

: 20.000 - 20.999

-SPAIN.: 24.000 - 24.999
Federal Republic
of Germany: 14.000 - 14.999 -TURKEY.: 21.000 - 21.999
GREECE.

: 15.000 - 15.999 -UNITED KINGDOM : 22.000 - 22.999
-JNITED STATES : 23.000 - 23.999

3. Example of an interrogation serial number:

"BE-AR-2207-137"
BE.

: Belgian capturing unit.
AR.

: Prisoner is a member of enemy army forces.
2207 : The team of interrogators which allocated the number is part of a
force attached to CINCENT.

137 : He is the 137th prisoner interrogated and numbered as such by
this team.

9. Categories of PW According to Intelligence Value. According to their
value of intelligence, PW may be divided for convenience into the following
broad categories which are not listed in any agreed order or priority.

DODDOA-010777

a. Categories A. High level PW whose broad or specific knowledge of the
enemy war ettort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay
by specially qualified interrogators and at the highest level. This category
will normally include all:

(1)
General officers or equivalent, who have knowledge of sufficient
value to NATO to warrant detailed interrogation.

(2)
Chiefs of Staff of formations down to and including divisions or
the equivalent.

(3)
Heads of staff sections down to army group/army level or the
equivalent.

(4)
Scientific personnel.

(5)
Technical personnel with up-to-date knowledge of radiological,
biological, and chemical weapons or any other type of equipment.

(6)
Psychological personnel.

(7)
Political officers.

(8)
Other officials, war correspondents, supply contractors, etc.,
who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistics capabilities or political and
economic factors.

(9)
Personnel with a knowledge of enemy communications and
especially cyphers or cryptographic equipment.

(10)
Officers serving intelligence appointments or organizations.

(11)
Personnel who are intimately associated with or have a working
knowledge of items of major intelligence importance.

(12)
Flying personnel whose mission, subordination, training and
knowledge of enemy locations and movements is thought likely to be of
considerable intelligence interest.

(13)
Officers, warrant officers and senior Non Commissioned Officers
(NCO) of special purpose forces.

A-5

DODD0A-010778

b. Category B. PW who have enough information on any subject of

intelligence interest to warrant a second interrogation.
Category C. PW who have only information of immediate tactical value

c.
and do not therefore warrant a second interrogation.

Category D. PW who are of no interest to intelligence.

d.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2044
PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH PRISONERS OF WAR

7. PW Processing-Stage 1-The Capture. As far as practicable, the
responsibilities of the capturing unit are:

a. To disarm the PW without delay and to remove all their military

documents and equipment, except for clothing and protective equipment (Article
18 of the Convention). Tagging should then be carried out as described in
Annex C.

b. To segregate, for the purpose of interrogation, PW according to rank,

grade and service, sex, nationality, deserters, civilians and political
indoctrination personnel. Such segregation is not to violate the requirements
of Article 16 of the Convention.

c.
To treat PW with correctness but to permit no talking or
fraternization that may prejudice future interrogation.

d.
To arrange for naval and air force PW to be interrogated by naval or

air force interrogators as appropriate. To place adequate guards around
crashed enemy aircraft.

e. To segregate, as soon as possible, from PW and other captured enemy
personnel, enemy nationals who identify themselves as defectors. These
personnel will be screened to ascertain whether they possess information of
ground, naval or air interest. Upon determination of primacy of interest, the
defector will be interrogated by that service. Subsequently, to send a report

DODD0A-010779

along staff channels, as may be prescribed by the commander concerned, giving
details of the alleged defector and asking for disposal instructions.

f. To segregate from other personnel, captured personnel claiming to be

special agents of an allied service and send a report on such personnel to the
appropriate staff.

g.
To inform PR of their rights under Section V of the Convention.
(Relations of Prisoner of War with the Exterior.)

h.
To escort PW to the nearest collection point or PW Holding Area as
quickly as possible.

8.
PW Processing-Stage 2-Evacuation and Holdin&. If the situation has
prevented the capturing unit from fulfilling the responsibilities listed in
para. 7 above, the unit administering the collection points should do so
without delay. If PW bypass the collection points these responsibilities will
be fulfilled by the unit administering the Corps of Army PW Holding Area.
Then if possible the following should be carried out:
Completion of Detainee Personnel Record. The Detainee Personnel Record
(Appendix B) is to be used as the basic Prisoner of War Personnel Record. The
form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in
one of the NATO languages. It remains a national responsibility to provide
translation keys in the language of the prisoner concerned.

9.
PW Processing-Stage 3-PW Camp. If any of the responsibilities or duties

listed in paras 7 and B above or arising from the Convention have not been
fulfilled they must be so fulfilled by the PW Camp authorities. In addition
prisoners will be allotted internment Serial Numbers which are to be
consecutive and composed of prefix code letters identifying the capturing
nation in accordance with STANAG 1059.

10. Handling of Personal Property. The procedures set forth in Annex B are
to govern the handling of personal property, including money.

A-7

DODD0A-010780

11., Financial Accountability. Financial accounts, pay and work records, and

receipts for property and money are to be in accordance with the terms of the

Convention.

ANNEX B TO STANAG 2044
(edition no. 4)

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HANDLING OF PROPERTY AND HONEY
OF PRISONERS OF WAR

1. No attempt has been made to standardize a list of those effects of

personal use, sums of money and articles of value to be impounded, confiscated
or to remain in the possession of the prisoners. Policies in these matters
are to be individually determined by the nations. Likewise, nations are
independently to determine policies with regard to the conversion of foreign
currencies into their own currency. When laying down these policies, nations

are to ensure that the appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention of 1949
are complied with.

2. In addition to issuing receipts to the prisoners for articles and sums of
money which are impounded for reasons of security, such impounded articles and
money are to be listed in the.appropriate space on the Prisoner of War
Personnel Record. Sums of money are not be taken away from PW except on order
of an officer. That record must be maintained up to date by the addition of

items taken from the prisoners subsequent to the initial entry and by the
deletion of items returned to , the prisoners.

3. In the event of an international transfer of prisoners, their impounded
articles and money which has been cooverted into the currency of the detaining
nation are to accompany them and must be clearly accounted for on the Prisoner
of War Personnel Records which also accompany the prisoners. The appropriate

representative of the receiving nation is to verify and sign for the articles
and money received. Money taken from the prisoners in the currency of the

DODD0A-010781
— - -
detaining nation and that which has been converted into the currency of the

detaining nation at the request of the prisoners is not to be the subject of

transfer. Such money is accounted for in the certificate required to be

issued to the prisoners at the time of the transfer by the tranferring nation,

showing the amounts standing to the credit of their accounts, and need not to

be the subject of concern to the nation receiving the prisoners. It should be

clearly indicated on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record that such money,

although initially listed on the form as impounded money, is not included in

the articles and money delivered to the receiving nation.

4. Impounded articles and money, except money initially in the currency of
the Detaining Power or subsequently converted to same and credited to the
prisoner's account, which for any reason do not accompany the prisoner at the
time of an international transfer, must be sent to the Prisoner of War

Information Bureau of the nation receiving the prisoner.

ANNEX C TO STANAG 2044

(edition no. 4) STANDARDIZE CAPTIVE AND EQUIPMENT/DOC•MENT TAG GENERAL
1. A standardization tag is considered necessary for temporary use in identifying captured personnel and equipment or documents captured with personnel, before formal documentation can be completed. This tag should
contain on one side the minimum necessary information in a standard format.

The reverse side may be used for national handling instructions. The tag is

not to be used for labelling captured equipment or documents not associated
with captured personnel. The procedure for dealing with such equipment is

covered by STANAG 2084.

2. The tag which is in 3 parts will be used as follows (Note

a. Top part (marked "A")

A-9

DODD0A-010782

To serve as identification of captured personnel before completion of
the Prisoner of War Record; and to serve as a substitute identifying card when
required.

b.
Middle part (marked "8")
For administrative purposes according to national requirements.

c.
Bottom part (marked "C")
To mark document and/or equipment.

3.
The form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit
and in one of the NATO official languages.

4.
A specimen tag and description is at Appendix 1 to this annex.
PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS

5.
Each captive is to be tagged by the capturing unit as soon as possible.

6.
If a captive possesses equipment or documents, the capturing unit is to
complete the bottom part of the tag (C) and affix it to the equipment or
documents as soon as possible.

7.
The tag number is to be preceded by the printed national code (see STANAG
1059) -e.g. BE, CA, FR, etc...
NOTE 1: Those nations which do not wish to use 3 part tags many have only a 2

part tag consisting of the top and bottom parts (marked A and C).

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2084
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

3. Document. For the purpose of this agreement, "document" is defined as any
recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics
including, but not limited to, all:

a.
Written material, whether handwritten, printed or typed.

b.
Painted, drawn or engraved material.

c.
Sound or voice recordings.

DODD0A-010783

d.
Imagery.

e.
Punched cards, punched paper tape, printed output and associated
material.

f.
Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process.

PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS (CED).

General.

17.
CED are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for
intelligence purposes with minimum of delay.

18.
CED associated with CEE (i.e. ATO marked TECUDOC) will be handled as
described in part I. All other types of CED will he handled as described in
this part. Such documents are to be divided into categories as follows:

a.
Category A. Documents containing infonaation concerning subjects pf
(sic) priority intelligence imterest [sic].

h.
Category B. Cryptographic documents, encrypted items and all other
documents relating to enemy communications systems.

c.
Category C. Documents considered of less intelligence value.

d.
Category D. Documents containing no information of intelligence value.

19. In principle CED belong to the nation of the capturing unit, but in
order to ensure that information of tactical intelligence interest is ef­ficiently utilized, such documents should be handled through command channels
in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final, thorough investiga­
tion will be the responsibility of the capturing nation.

20. CED associated with a PW, or copies thereof, should follow th, PW dur­ing the PW interrogation process. Otherwise, the exploitation of CED should be
carried out in accordance with the principles laid down for CEE in Part I,
paras. 6 - 10.

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DODD0A-010784

EXPLOITATION PROCESS

21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever
feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be
combined.

a.
Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tacti­cal value by capturing unit.

b.
Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 18),
reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence
staffs.

c.
Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dis­

semination by CDU or other special elements.
MARKING OF CED

22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows:
National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059.
Designation of capturing unit including service.
Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated

sequentially by the capturing unit.
Date-time of capture.
Place of capture (UTH co-ordinates).
Summary of circumstances under which the CED was obtained.
Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or
known.

25. Reproduction and dissemination of CED and translation as necessary
will be carried out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation
process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and
lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted
to appropriate NATO and national staffs.

DODD0A-010785

APPENDIX B
Sample Detainee Personnel Record

DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD
P.¦ Vw e. 1RN IsNA me AN ISO& 111 ••••••••• MoNv1•00CSPSIL mar1 -TO SI COMPLIITtO AT MINI Of POOC011UPPO
I. iNTIANMINTSSIMAL NO. (1.111 7. NAME (1441. /1/.3 NINON (14.30 r. NANA (33477
CAND I

• . INSNIT SVC NO. /14(1 A 7v03 141) 4. DATE OF CAPTuAI (411.33/ 7. OATS OF MATO, (1440) IONAL) / A
In
1 11 1E LAM
(A•mmer••• NM pick

17. PNYSICAL CONDITION MO, (S. Pm CAMP LOCATION (POMO B. ENEMY UNIT M-
O ARM OP SVC 1351 131. MOSC (1111-351 123 CIVILIAN OCCUPATION /44410133. VIC.CAPTUNI UN A 3.. COOPS ASIA OF CAPTURE 1101 IIS. 'LACS OF CAPTURE OS. PONES MINVILO 37. PLACE OP SISTA
OS. •0041711 70 WHICH MAIL POPP". MAV ila 077.7 73. F87173114
28. MOTHS PIM MAIDEN NAME
31. PSANAPIPart NOME A00031131 OP P OF Ps/a/opt TO IS
33 137Ne PI PANT ICULAAS • POPROM ID CARO 34. 01 1174/Ou ARKS
I. EPPECTE AND MON1 • OP P/ AR I it
.1110551so17 .10•ftlaw,
77. PHOTO
0,4070 PPOOTO 11401 PAPPOO

• 7 lismeArAlbol 4V .tot, 35 SIGMATUAI
40 OATS ,,,,,,, 0 PLACE

DA FORM 42374. Awe SS 'To:. 08 NAT SE MQMOL5T1
DODDOA-010786

PART II — TO SE MAINTAINED SY UNIT NAVIN° CUSTODY •maa. LAST NAME Iv PIPIT NAOMI M. INTIIIVIAMENT SIXIAL NUM/SR M. MEDICAL RECORD • . IMMUNIZATION (Yeeeinallom amd Innocalmaaft ANA Dem,
N. MAJOAILLNEEEEE AND PNYS/CAL OE PICTS ISM DPP.) I. 111.00D OROUP
ZS. INTIMOMPIT ¦ MPLOMMNT °VALI, ICATiONS
M. Saetious OP FF PUNISLIMENTS. AND ESCAPES ISM 0•1•0
• 7. PROM viaelltiew, TAANSPIRS TO IL•ealtan) DATE
M. RalwARKS :::q
M. • .NMC., STATUS AT TWE• INET IrCIERN•TioNAL TRANSF ER a. CS PITIPICATE OP f.01101T BALANCE /ISM° TO Es* (A•••••• • I• ••••sla, I. LOCATION pa PINANCP L T a AT TIME OP SECOND MT( MIATiONAL TRAMPER a. CIF 1 mart OF C RE DIT AAAAAcg I U TO [Pm ¦ AMONAI IP woods, a. LOCATION SI ¦ ATiON a. REASON E. MODS 12. PINANCIAL 5T•TVII AT TIME OP IATION • . OEM IF MATS OP CREDIT BALANCE ilaMO TO SIM 1.10,../11 Is waIlliSI I. LOCATION AAAAA la Of DA IVAN nit It ALIO SS O. MAT IN flOURIES la DATE A. MAT IN FIGURES a DATE DATE 1. ANT IN a iausig P. DATE
B-1

DODD0A-010787

APPENDIX C
Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card
DATE ISSUED
EPW IDENTITY CARD
For we of this torn', me AR 110.8;
The oroponons ...nay Is DCSPER.

LAST NAME

FIRST NAME GRADE
Plootogrvii)
SERVICE NUMBER POWER SERVED

PLACE OF BIRTH TEDF BIRTH
SIGNATURE OF BEARER
.........

i
F I JUL 4315 OBSOLETE.
DA FORM 2662•R, May 82
(front)

ss BLOOD TYPE
In

6 z TAU curd ia issued to prisoner. of
x

.1 in erur in the custody of the United States Army. This cud must be carried at all times by the EPW
55 to whom it Is issued.
APPENDIX D
Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag
TTACH TO NV 0
. DATE OF CAPTURE I I NAME I / SERIAL NUMBER I ) RANK I / DATE OF BIRTH ( I UNIT ( / LOCATION OF CAPTURE ( CAPTURING UNIT ( I SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE I ) ) ¦ Search Thoroughly Tag Correctly I. I Report Immediately I. I Evacuate Rapidly I.I Segregate by Category
WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS ( Safeguard from Danger/Escape I.I
P W
FORWARD TO UNIT I / DATE OF CAPTURE I NAME( I SERIAL NUMBER ( FIANK I I DATE OF BIRTH I UNIT I / LOCATION OF CAPTURE I I / ) /
CAPTURING UNIT I / SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE ( /
WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS i /
ATTACH TO ITEM ( / DATE OF CAPTURE ( NAME I I SERIAL NUMBER I RANK ( I DATE QF BIRTH I UNIT I I LOCATION OF CAPTURE ( .1¦..... I / I C , I
DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS ( I
DOCUMENT AND I I FRONT 0 WEAPONS CARD I STANAG
D-1

DODDOA-010789

APPENDIX E

Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report
SALUTE REPORT FORMAT
TO: DTC:
FROM: REPORT NO:

1.
SIZE/WHO:

2.
ACTIVITY/WHAT:

3.
LOCATION/WHERE:

4.
UNIT/WHO:

5.
TIME/WHEN:

6.
EQUIPMENT/HOW:

7.
REMARKS

a.
SOURCE:

b.
MAF DATA:

DODDOA-010790

SAMPLE JINTACCS SALUTE
REPORT

(UNCLASSIFIED)
SALUTE REPOT
TO: G2, V Corps. DATE: 230950Z Aug 85
FM: Team 1, LPW Section. 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD) REPORT NUMBER 08-0175
1. (U) SIZE/WHO: Company-size tank unit.

2.
(U) ACTIVITY/WHAT: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (number unknown).

3.
(U) LOCATION/WHERE: West bank of FULDA River, southwest of BEBRA (NB 5547). Exact location unknown to source.

4.
(U) UNIT/WHO: Amph Tank Co/Recon Bn/56th MRD.

5.
(U) TIME/WHEN: Mission to be completed no later than 232300Z Aug 85.

6.
(U) EQUIPMENT/HOW: Using assigned weapons and equipment.

7.
(U) REMARKS:

a.
(U) SOURCE: EPW assigned interrogation serial number US-AA-2235-1.

b.
(U) MAP DATA: GERMANY, 1:50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242.

(UNCLASSIFIED)
E-1

DODD0A-010791

APPENDIX F
Sample Screening Report Format and Report
REPORT FORMAT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY'
SCREENING REPORT
Report Number: Date/Time:
PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit/Report No.)
B. CAPTURE DATA
1.
Captive Tag Number:

2.
Capturing Unit:

3.
Date/Time of Capture:

4.
Place of Capture:

5.
Documents Captured (Disposition):

6.
Equipment Captured/ Disposition:

7.
Circumstances of Capture:

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
1.
Full Name / Rank / Service Number:

2.
Date / Place of Birth:

3.
Sex / Marital Status / Religion:

4.
Full Unit Designation / Unit Code:

5.
Duty Position:

DODDOA-010792

Military Education / Experience:
7.
Civilian Education / Experience:

8.
Languages Spoken (Proficiency):

D. OBSERVATIONS

1.
Physical Condition of Captive:

2.
Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3.
Assessment of Attitude / Behavior:

4.
Assessment of Knowledgeability:

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1.
Screener's / Interpreter's Name(s):

2.
Place of Screening:

3.
Screening Code:

4.
Remarks:

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
Senior Interrogator's Name:

2.
Interrogate (Y/N):

3.
Remarks:

F-1

DODD0A-010793

SAMPLE SCREENING REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
let Brigade IPW Team, 123rd CEWI
APO New York 09166

SCREENING REPORT
Report Number: 001 .Date/Time: 150345ZAUC 89
PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit/Report No.)

B. CAPTURE DATA

1.
Captive Tag Number: PIA

2.
Capturing Unit: C Trp/let Sqdrn/8 ACR

3.
Date/Time of Capture: 150330ZAUG 89

4.
Place of Capture: NB645162

5.
Documents Captured (Disposition): lxID Card (retained by EPW),
1xS01 (evac w/EPW)

6.
Equipment Captured/ Disposition: None

7.
Circumstances of Capture: pulled out of stream near SETZELBACH
(NB6416)

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1.
Full Name / Rank / Service Number: Kiril Dimitrievich
GRECHKO / JrSGT / 4911623

2.
Date./ Place of Birth: 11 NOV 67 / KIEV, UkSSR, USSR

3.
Sex / Marital Status / .Religion: Male / Single / None

4.
Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: WNA / CNB-677

5.
Duty Position: WNA

6.
Military Education / Experience: WNA

DODDOA-010794

7.
Civilian Education / Experience: 10 yrs compulsory

8.
Languages Spoken (Proficiency): Ukrainian (N), Russian (FL)

D. OBSERVATIONS

1.
Physical Condition of Captive: Tired and wet.

2.
Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3.
Assessment of Attitude / Behavior: A little shaken but
cooperative

4.
Assessment of Knowledgeability: Probably will answer FIR #5

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1.
Screener's / Interpreter's Name(s): SGT PEREZ

2.
Place of Screening:

3.
Screening Code: .

2B

4.
Remarks: Source may respond to futility approach

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1.
Senior Interrogator's Name: SSG RIVERA

2.
Interrogate (Y/N): .

3.
Remarks Assigned SSG Gonzalez

Yes

F-3

DODD0A-010795

APPENDIX G
Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

TACTICAL INTERROGATION
REPORT FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
TACTICAL

INTERROGATION REPORT
NAME OF PRISONER: INTERROGATOR:
CATEGORY: A B C D.UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH

INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:

INTG SERIAL NO: MAPS USED
DTG OF INTG: . LANGUAGE USED:
INTO REPORT NO: INTERPRETER:

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1.
Rank, full name, service number, and position:

2.
Date and place of birth:

3.
Nationality: Ethnic:.Religion:

4.
Knowledge of languages and proficiency:

5.
Unit formation or organization:

6.
Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances
of capture:

B. CAREER:

1.
Premilitary:

2.
Military:

C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

DODD0A-010796

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

1.
Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability:

2.
Specialist knowledge:
3.' Discussion of approach technique:

D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1.
List of documents:

2.
Details of money and valuables:

E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1.
Personal equipment:

2.
Weapons:

NOTE: The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information which will con­
tribute to the satisfaction of a commander's intelligence requirements.

Since these requirements will differ in scope at, each level of command,

when conducting PIR and IR interrogations nonapplicable paragraphs may

be deleted. Part 1 must always be included according to STANAG 2033

PART II — INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. DOI is .unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

B. TEXT:

1. MISSIONS:

a. EPW: (and full unit designation)

(1)
Time of capture:

(2)
Future:

(3)
Past:

b.
Unit: (full unit designation)

(1)
Present:

(2)
Future:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-1

DODD0A-010797

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (PATE)
(3) Perot:
c. Unit: (full unit designation):

(1)
Present:

(2)
Future:

(3)
Past:

2. COMPOSITION (Level of knowledgeahility) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):
a.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeahility) had (C 2 , directly
subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit
designation):

h.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (C 2 , directly
subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit
designation):

3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeability):

a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(number x total
personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full
unit designation of attached/detached personnel:

(2)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(number x total
personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full
unit designation of attached/detached personnel:

(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elements, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).
b. Weapons and equipment (level of knowledgeability):

(I)
Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(2)
Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahility):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
DODDOA-010798

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(3)
Other weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgcability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution).

(4)
Armored vehicles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution
of armored vehicles:

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution
of armored vehicle

(5)
Other Vehicles: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(6)
Communications Equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledge-
ability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(7)
NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
Individual:
((1))Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:
((2))Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
Vehicular:
((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:
((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(8)
Sp°r"1 ;z.a.to level of knowledgeability);

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-3

DODDOA-010799

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

4. DISPOSITIONS:

a. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid

coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of
information. (H/S):

b. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated
activities, 6-digit grid coordinate - physical description,
security measures, DOI. (H/S):

5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability):

a.
Offensive:

b.
Defensive:

c.
Special operations:

6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability):

a.
Individual:

b.
Unit:

c.
Special:

7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeability):

a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

b.
Replacements and Reinforcewents (tie-in to level of
knowledgeability):

(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

c.
Combat experience (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

d.
Morale (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

8. LOGISTICS (level of knowledgeability):

a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Weapons:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKINC PAPERS (DATE)
DODD0A-010800

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(2) Ammunition:
b. Vehicles and POL (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Vehicles:
(2) POL:
c. Food and water: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Food:
(2) Water:
d. Communications equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
e. Medical (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(I) Individual equipment:
(2) Vehicular equipment:
(3) Personnel:
(4) Facilities:
(5) Evacuation procedures:
f. NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Individual:
(2) Ve"icular:
g. Specialized equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
9. ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA (level of knowledgeability):
10. MISCELLANEOUS (1,vel of knowledgeability):
a. Personalities (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
LAST NAME.FIRST NAME MN/1.
RANK POS.
FUD
(tie-in to
tie-in)
(tie-in to
tie-in)
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
G-5

DODD0A-010801

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

b. Code names/numbers (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
Code name;

(2)
Code number:

c.
Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Radio frequency:

(2)
Call sign:

d.
Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e.
Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO:

f.
PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
DODD0A-010802

SAMPLE TACTICAL
INTERROGATION
REPORT

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

( ) NAME OF PRISONER: SCHULTZ ( ) INTERROGATOR: SFC JONES
( ) CATEGORY: A (8) D

C.
( ) UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH

INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:
Team 1, Interrogation
Section, 241st MI Bn, 23d Div
(ARMD)

( ) INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR 2235-1 ( ) MAPS USED: Germany,
1:50,000, EISENACH -HUNFELD,

USACGSC 50-242
( ) DTG OF INTG: 230930ZAug 85 ( ) LANGUAGE USED: Russian
( ) INTG REPORT NO: ( ) INTERPRETER: None

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)

A. ( ) PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1.
( ) Rank, full name, service number, and position:
JrSgt Georg SCHULTZ, 1634921, Squad Leader.

2.
( ) Date and place of birth: 12 Jun 62, KIEV, UkSSR, USSR.

3.
( ) Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: Germat. Religion: none.

4.
( ) Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N), German
(FL).

5.
( ) Unit formation or organization: 1 MR Sqd (MRS), 2 MR Pit (MRP),
3 MR Co (NRC) 3 MR Bn (NRB), 44 MR Regt (MRR), 32 MR Div (MRD),
(1MRS/2/3/3/44/32MRD).

6.
( ) Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and
circumstances of capture: 221800ZAug 85, NB655498, 1st Plt/A/2/1/23 Div
(ARMD), captured during a counterattack across the main road northwest of
BAUHAUS (N8662495).

( ) CAREER:

B.

1.

( ) Premilitary: 10 years civilian education, civilian occupation:
coal miner.

2. ( ) Military: 5 years military service, attended NCO school in July
1982.

(DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
INSTRUCTIONS)

G-7

DODDOA-010803

C. ( ) ASSESSMENT 0‘ INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

1.
( ) Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was
of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative,
answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were
noted by use of repeat and control questions.

2.
( ) Special knowledge: None

3.
( ) Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the
direct approach.

D. ( ) DOCUMENTS CARRI-D AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1.
( ) List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to
source).

2.
( ) Details of money and valuables: None

E. ( ) EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.

1.
( ) Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to
source).

2.
( ) Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through
supply channels)

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. ( ) DOI is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this
report.

B. ( ) TEXT:

1. ( ) MISSIONS:

a. ( ) EPW:

(1)
( ) Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2)
( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3)
( ) Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on
Hill 456.

b.
( ) Unit: (2MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD).

DODD0A-010804

(1) ( ) Present: Defend Hill 456 w/antitank Plt/3/44/32 MRD in
support.
(2) ( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456 until ordered to

rejoin 3 MRC/3/44/32MRD.

(3)
( ) Past: Assault and secure Hill 456; set up perimeter defense.

c.
( ) Unit: (Amph Tank Co, Recon Bn, 32 MRD).

(1)
( ) Present: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (no. unk) on the west side of the Fulda River, SW of BEBRA (N85547) NLT 232300ZAug 85. (H/S U/I Sqd Ldr, Amph Tank Co. DOI: 220900ZAug 85.)

(2)
( ) Future: Unk.

(3)
( ) Past: Unk.

2. ( ) COMPOSITION: (32 MRD and U/I MRL unit).
a.
( ) 32 MRD had 44 MRR and 1 x Recon Bn.

h.
( ) 4 MRR/32 HAD had 3 x MRD, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

c.
( ) 3 MR11/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRC, dsg 1, 2, 3 and 1 x AT Plt.

d.
( ) 3 HRC/3/44/32 MRD had a Co HQ and 3 x MRP, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

e.
( ) Ea MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRS, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

f.
( ) Recon Bn/32 MRD had 1 x Amph Tank Co. ( ) U/I MRL unit.

3. ( ) STRENGTH: (3 MRC/3/44/32 MRD).
a. ( ) Personnel: (3 MRC)

(1)
( ) 3 MRC had 103 x pers. (6 x OFF, 102 x EM) (H/S Plt Sgt, 2 MRP/3 MRC, DOI: 201800ZAug 85).

(2)
( ) Co HQ/3 MRC had 9 x pers. (3 x Off--CO, PO, TO 6 x EM--1SC, BMP driver, 1111P gunner, I x PRE gunner, and 2 x riflemen).

(3)
( ) 2 MRP/3 ?IRC had 33 x pers. (1 x Off--Plt Ldr, 32 x EM--Plt Sgt and 31 x Plt mbrs).

(4)
( ) 1 MRS/2/3/ MRC had 10 x pers. (Sqd Ldr, sniper, RPG-7 gunner, 2 x PKM gunners, BMP driver, BMP gunner, and 3 x riflemen).

G-9

DODDOA-010805

b. ( ) Weapons and equipment: (3MRC).

(1) ( ) Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MAC).

(a) ( ) 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.

(b)
( ) 1 x 7.U2mm AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver,
sniper, and PKM gunners.

(c) ( ) 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.

(2) ( ) Crew-served weapons: (1MRS/2/3 MRC).

(a)
( ) 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.

(b)
( ) 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.

(3)
( ) Other weapons: (1MRS/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand
grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.

(4) ( ) Armored vehicles: (2MRP/3 MRC) 3 x BMP, ea armed with

1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea
MRS/2MRP.

(5) ( ) Other vehicles: 2MBP/3MRC)

(6) ( ) Communications equipment: (2MRP/3MRC) 3 x R-123
transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/2MRP.

( ) NBC equipment: (3MRC).

(7).

(a)
( ) Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1
x set U/I protective clothing, and 1 individual decors kit.

(b)
( ) Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration
system.

( ) Specialized equipment: Unk.

(8).

4. ( ) DISPOSITIONS:

a. ( ) CP, 3 MRC/3/44/32MRD location vicinity NB660495, in the last
house on light surface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (N36649). Security measures
and collocated units: UNK. (Ws Plt Sgt, 2MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD DOI: 220800ZAug

85.)

b.
( ) U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx
500 meters N along a light surface road to NB654494. Guns were pointing west.
Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DUI: 2209302Aug85.

c.
( ) U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from N5659495 to NB654496,
traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units:
UNK. DOI: 221600ZAub 85.

DOD0OA-010806

5. ( ) TACTICS: (2MRP/3/3/4432MRD) Defensive tactics used by the 2MRP

at Hill 456 were based on the use of boiling oil and catapulting large stones
over the perimeter.

6.
( ) TRAINING: (3MRC/3/44/32MRD) Political training by the PO, 3MRC
had since 1 Aug 85 involved increased emphasis on perfidy of the NATO Alliance
and especially the FRG in planning an invasion of the GDR.

7.
( ) COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (3MRC/3/44/32M0).

a. ( ) Losses: (2MRS/2/3MRC).

(1)
( ) Personnel: 1 x KIA on 21 Aug 85, when the 2 MRS BMP was
destroyed by an U/I US missile.

(2)
( ) Equipment: The 2 MRS BMP was completely destroyed by
the same U/I US missile on 21 Aug 85.

h.
( ) Replacements/Reinforcements: (2MRS/2/3MRC).

(1)
( ) Personnel: 1 x EM arrived as replacements for 2 MRS/2/3
HRC at 221430ZAug 85. The replacements arrived already formed in a MRS and
appeared to be well-trained troops;

(2)
( ) Equipment: A new BHP arrived at 2214302Aug 85.

c.
( ) Combat experience: None prior to current offensive.

d.
( ) Morale: (3MRC) Morale in the 3 HRC was excellent, due to
successes in the early stages of the offensive.

e.
( ) Additional information: None.

8. ( ) LOGISTICS: (3MRC/3/44/32M0).

a. ( ) Weapons and ammunition: (2MRP/3MRC).

(1)
( ) Weapons: All weapons are in good condition. Spare
parts for all weapons were stored in the BMP. No shortages of weapons.

(2)
( ) Ammunition: All ammunition in the 2 HRP was in good
condition and in adequate supply.

b.
( ) Vehicles and P01.: (3MKC).

(1)
( ) Vehicles: All BMPs were in good condition. Each BHP
carries its own spare parts and tool kit.

(2)
( ) POL: POL resupply to the 3 MRC is delivered by truck of
an U/I unit each evening at about 2000 hours. No shortages of POL.

G-11

DODD0A-010807

c. ( ) Food and water.(3MRC).

(1)
( ) Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 2120u02Aug 85.

(2)
( ) Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d.
( ) Communications equipment..(2MRP/3MRC) All transceivers were in good working order.

e.
( ) Other: (3MRC).

(1)
( ) Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2)
( ) NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspeCted in early Aug 85.

9.
( ).ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: .None.

10.
( ).MISCELLANEOUS:.(3MRC/3/44/32MRD).

a.
(.).Personalities:.(3MRC).

b.
( ) Code naMeicoch number: Unk.

c.
( ) Radio frequencies/call signs: ( MRC).

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN/I RANK POSN FUD
HOFBAUER FNU MNU Cpt • 3MRC
KAEMPERT FNU MNU SrSgt 1SG 3MRC
BECK Cosmos MNU JrLt PltLdr 2MRP/3MR.
CUCHENKO Franz MK! SrS,t P1tLdr 2MRP/3MRC

(1)
( ) Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2)
( ) Call signs: (2MRP/3MRC) Call signs for 22 Aug 85 were

us follows: IMRS/2MRP, AFCS 25; 2MRS/2MRP, AFCS 22, 3MRS/2MRP, AFCS 19. Call signs are changed at 2400 hours daily by unit SOI.
DODDOA-010808

d.
( ) Passwords: Challenge for 22 Aug 85 is DZIEN; countersign is DOBRY. Both are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOP.

e.
( ) Obstacles: Unk.

f.
( ) PSYOP: Unk.

G-13

DODD0A-010809

APPENDIX•H
Approaches
DIRECT APPROACH

The direct approach is the questioning ofa source without having to use any type of approach. The direct approach is often called no approach at all, but it is the most effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell us that in World War II, it was 85 percent to 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 percent to 95 percent effective. The direct approach works best on lower enlisted per­sonnel as they have little or no resistance training and have had minimal security training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct approach is always to be tried first. The direct approach usually achieves the maxi­mum cooperation in the minimum amountof time and enables the interrogator to quickly and completely exploit the sourcefor the information he possesses. The advantages of this technique are its sim­plicity and the fact that it takes little time.For this reason, it is frequently used at the tactical echelons where time is limited.
INCENTIVE APPROACH

The incentive approach is a method of rewarding the source for his cooperation,but it must reinforce positive behavior. This is done by satisfying the source's needs. Granting incentives to an uncooperdtive source leads him to believe that rewards can be gained whether he cooperates or not. Interrogators may not withhold a source's rights under the Geneva Conventions, but they can withhold a source's privileges. The granting of incentives must not infringe on the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already entitled to. This can be effective only if the source is unaware of his rights or privileges.
Incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An interrogator must not promiseanything that cannot be delivered. Interro­gators do not make promises, but usually infer them while still sidestepping guaran­tees. If an interrogator made a promise that he could not keep and he or another inter-
H- 0
rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and would most probably not cooperate. Insteadof promising unequivocably that a source will receive a certain thing, such as political asylum, an interrogator will offer to dowhat he can to help achieve the source's desired goal; as long as the source cooperates.
The incentive approach can be broken down into the incentive short term (received immediately) and incentive long term (received within a period of time). The determination rests on when the source expects to receive the incentive offered.
EMOTIONAL APPROACH

The emotional approach overrides the source's rationale for resisting by using and • manipulating his emotions against him. The main emotions of any source at the time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be ex­ploited or turned into hate for someone else.For example, the person who caused the source to he in the position in which he now finds himself. The source's fear can be built upon, or increased so as to override his rational side. If the situation demands it and the source's fear is so great that he cannot communicate with the interrogator, the interrogator may find that he has to decrease the source's fear in order to effec­tively collect information from him. There are two variations of the emotional approaches: Emotional love, emotional hate.

EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH

For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the cir­cumstances in which he finds himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the interrogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of success. This approach usually involves some incentive; such as communication with the source's family, a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives, and so forth. A good interrogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reach­ing the breaking point. Sincerity and con­viction are extremely important in a suc­cessful attempt at an emotional love approach as the interrogator must show genuine concern for the source and for the object to which the interrogator is directing the source's emotion. If the interrogator ascertains that the source has great love for his unit and fellow soldiers, he can effec­tively exploit the situations by explaining to the source that his providing information may shorten the war or battle in progress, thus saving many .of his comrades' lives. But, his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This places a burden on the source and may motivate him to seek reliefthrough cooperation with the interrogator.
EMOTIONAL HATE APPROACH

The emotional hate approach focuses onany genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The interroga­tor must correctly pick up on exactly what it is that the source may hate so that the emo­tion can be exploited to override the source'srational side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's regime, his immediate superiors, officers in general, or his fellow soldiers. This approach is usually most effective on a member of racial or reli­gious minorities who has suffered discrimi­nation in both service and civilian life. If a source feels that he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the interrogator can point out that if the source cooperates and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source an opportunity for revenge. By using a con­spiratorial tone of voice, the interrogator can enhance the value of this technique. Phrases, such as "You owe them no loyaltyfor the way they have treated you," whenused appropriately, can expedite the success of this technique.
One word of caution, do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of thesource's background or life until your assessment indicates that the source feels a negative emotion toward it. The emotional hate approach can be much more effectively used by drawing out the source's negative emotions with questions that elicit a thought-provoking response. For example, "Why do you think they allowed you to be captured?" or "Why do you think they left you to die?" Do not berate the source's forces or homeland unless you are certain of his negative emotions. Many sources may have great love for their country, but still may hate the regime in control. The emo­tional hate approach is most effective with the immature or timid source who may have no opportunity up to this point for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feelings.
INCREASED FEAR UP
APPROACH

The increased fear up approach is mosteffective on the younger and more inexperi­enced source or on a source who appearsnervous or frightened. It is also effective on a source who appears to be the silent, confi­dent type. Sources with something to hide, such as the commission of a war crime, or having surrendered while still having ammunition in his weapon, or breaking his military oath are particularly easy to breakwith this technique. There are two distinct variations of this approach: the fear up (harsh) and the fear up (mild).
FEAR UP (HARSH)

In the fear up (harsh) approach, the inter­rogator behaves in a heavy, overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear. Great care must be taken when doing this so that any actions taken would not violate the Geneva Conventions. This technique is to convince the source that he does indeed have something to fear and that he has nooption but to cooperate. A good interrogatorwill implant in the source's mind that the interrogator himself is not the object to befeared, but is a possible way out of the trap.
The fear can be directed toward reprisals byinternational tribunals, the government of the host country, or the source's own forces. Shouting can be very effective in this varia­tion of the tear up approach.
FEAR UP (MILD)

The fear up (mild) approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of inter­rogator as there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, table banging violence. It is a more correct form of blackmail when the circumstances indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of coincidence; the soldier was caught on thewrong side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could be a terrorist), or a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his mili­tary oath and is now a traitor to his coun­try, and his own forces will take care of thedisciplinary action). The fear up (mild) approach must be a credible distortion ofthe truth. A distortion that the source will believe. It usually involves some incentive; the interrogator can intimate that he might be willing to alter the circumstances of the source's capture, as long as the source coop­erates and answers the questions.
In most cases, shouting is not necessary. The actual fear is increased by helping the source to realize the unpleasant conse­quences that the facts may cause and then presenting an alternative, which of course can be effected by answering some simple questions. The fear up approach is dead­end, and a wise interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.
DECREASED FEAR DOWN
APPROACH

The decreased fear down approach is usedprimarily on a source who is already in a state of fear due to the horrible circum­stances of his capture, or on a source who isin fear for his life. This technique is really nothing more than calming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or that for him the war is mercifully over and he need not go intocombat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rap­port and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming the source, it is a good idea to stay initially with nonpertinent conversation and to care­fully avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works quickly in develop­ing rapport and communication as the source will readily respond to kindness.
When using this approach, it is important that the interrogator meets the source at the source's perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the interrogator's per-spective level. If a prisoner is so frightenedthat he has withdrawn into a shell or regressed back to a less threatening state of mind, the interrogator must break through to him. This may be effected by the interro­gator putting himself on the same physical level as the source and may require somephysical contact. As the source relaxes somewhat and begins to respond to the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator can then begin asking pertinent questions.
This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source that he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough to resist the interrogator's pertinentquestions. If this occurs, reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will rapidly bring the desired result to theinterrogator.
PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH

The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing perti­nent information by using flattery or abuse.It is effective with a source who has dis­played weaknesses or feelings of inferioritywhich can be effectively exploited by the interrogator. There are two techniques inthis approach: the pride and ego upapproach and the pride and ego downapproach.
A problem with the pride and ego
approach techniques is that since both
variations rely on trickery, the source will
eventually realize that he has been tricked
and may refuse to cooperate further. If this
occurs, the interrogator can easily move
into a fear up approach and convince the
source that the questions he has already
answered have committed him, and it
would be useless to resist further. The inter­
rogator can mention that it will be reported
to the source's forces that he has cooperated
fully with the enemy, and he or his family
may suffer possible retribution when this
becomes known, and the source has much
to fear if he is returned to his forces. This
may even offer the interrogator the option
to go into a love-of-family approach in that
the source must protect his family by pre­
venting his forces from learning of his
duplicity or collaboration. Telling the
source that you will not report the fact that
the prisoner talked or that he was a severe
discipline problem is an incentive that may
enhance the effectiveness of the approach.
PRIDE AND EGO UP APPROACH
The pride and ego up approach is most
effective on sources with little or no intelli­
gence or on those who have been looked
down upon for a long time. It is very effec­
tive on low ranking enlisted personnel and
junior grade officers as it allows the source
to finally show someone that he does indeed
have some "brains." The source is con­
stantly flattered into providing certain
information in order to gain credit. The
interrogator must take care to use a flatter­
ing somewhat-in-awe tone of voice and to
speak highly of the source throughout the
duration of this approach. This quickly
engenders positive feelings on the source's
part as he has probably been looking for--this type of recognition all his life. The
interrogator may blow things out of propor­
tion using items from the source's back­
ground and making them seen noteworthy
or important. As everyone is eager to hear
themselves praised, the source will eventu­
ally "rise to the occasion" and in an attempt
to solicit more laundatory comments from
the interrogator, reveal pertinent
information.
Effective targets for a successful pride and ego up approach are usually the socially accepted reasons for flattery: appearance, good military bearing, and so forth. The interrogator should closely watch the source's demeanor for indications that the approach is getting through to him. Such indications include, but are not limited to, a raising of the head, a look of pride in the eyes, a swelling of the chest, or a stiffening of the back.
PRIDE AND EGO DOWN
APPROACH

The pride and ego down approach isbased on the interrogator attacking the source's sense of personal worth. Any_source who shows any real or imagined inferiority or weakness about himself, his loyalty to his organization, or his capture in embarrassing circumstances can be easily broken with this approach technique. The objective is for the interrogator to pounce on the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the interrogator that he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride, the source will usually involuntarily provide pertinent information in attempting to vindicate himself. The source who is susceptible to this approach is also prone to make excuses and give reasons why he didor did not do a certain thing, often shifting the blame to others. Possible targets for the pride and ego down approach are the source's loyalty, technical competence, leadership abilities, soldierly qualities, or appearance. If the interrogator uses a sarcastic, caustic tone of voice with appro­priate expressions of distaste or disgust, the source will readily believe him.
One word of caution, the pride and egodown approach is also a dead end in that, if it is unsuccessful, it is very difficult for the interrogator to recover and move to another approach and reestablish a different type ofrapport without losing all credibility.
H-3

FUTILITY TECHNIQUE
APPROACH

The futility approach is used to make the source believe that it is useless to resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. There are really many different variations of the futility approach. There is the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talkssooner or later," futility of the battlefield situation, and futility in the sense that if the source does not mind talking about history, why should he mind talking about his missions, they are also history.
If the source's unit had run out of supplies (ammunition. food, fuel, and so forth), it would be relatively easy to convince him that all of his forces are having the same logistical problems. A soldier who has been ambushed may have doubts as to how he was attacked so suddenly and the interrogator should be able to easily talk him into believing that the NATO forces knew where he was all the time.
The interrogator might describe the source's frightening recollections of seeing death on the battlefield as an everyday occurrence for his forces all up and down the lines. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented by the interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice.
Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating withthe interrogator. When employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of propor­tion. If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be easily led to believe that all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is hinging on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation effort if he is told that all the other source's have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may need to be convinced that the situation on the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to paint a black picture for the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation.
The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques.
"WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH

The "we know all" approach convincesthe source that we already know every­thing. It is a very successful approach forsources who are naive, in a state of shock, or in a state of fear. The interrogator must organize all available data on the source including background information, knowl­edge about the source's immediate tactical situation, and all available OB information on the source's unit. Upon initial contact with the source, the interrogator asks ques­tions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his specially prepared list. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies the detailed answer. Through the careful use of the limited number of known details, the interrogator must convince the source that all information is already known; therefore, his answers are of no conse­quence. It is by repeating this procedure that the interrogator convinces the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known. When the source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins inter­jecting questions for which he does not have the answers. After gaining thesource's cooperation, the interrogator still tests the extent of that cooperation by peri­odically using questions for which he has the answers. This is very necessary; if the interrogator does not challenge the source when he is lying, the source will then know that everything is not known, and that he has been tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.
There are some inherent problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The interrogator is required to prepare everything in detail which is very time consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory as working from notes may show the limits of the information actually known.
"ESTABLISH YOUR IDENTITY" APPROACH

The "establish your identity" approach was very effective in Viet Nam with theViet Cong, and it can be used at tactical echelons. The interrogator must he aware, however, that if used in conjunction with the file and dossier approach, it may exceed the tactical interrogator's preparation resources. In this technique, the inter­rogator insists that the source has been identified as an infamous criminal wanted by higher authorities on very serious charges, and he has finally been caught posing as someone else. In order to clear himself of these allegations, the source will usually have to supply detailed information on his unit to establish or substantiate his true identity. The interrogator should initially refuse to believe the source and insist that he is the criminal wanted by the ambiguous "higher authorities." This will force the source to give even more detailed information about his unit in order to convince the interrogator that he is indeed who he says he is. This approach works well when combined with the futility or "weknow all" approach.
REPETITION APPROACH

Repetition is used to induce cooperationfrom a hostile source. In one variation of this technique the interrogator listens carefully to a source's answer to a question. . and then repeats both the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the interrogator and to gain relief from the monotony of his method of questioning. The repetition technique must be used carefully, as it will generally not work when employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. In fact, it may provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and delay the interrogation. In employing this technique, the use of more than one interrogator or a tape recorder has proven to he effective.
FILE AND DOSSIER
APPROACH

The file and dossier approach is when the interrogator prepares a dossier containing all available information obtained from records and documents concerning the source or his organization. Careful ar­rangement of the material within the file may give the illusion that it contains more data than what is actually there. The file may be padded with extra paper, if neces­sary. Index tabs with titles such as educa­tion, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are particularly effec­tive. The interrogator confronts the source with the dossiers at the beginning of the interrogation and explains to him that intelligence has provided a complete record of every significant happening in the source's life; therefore, it would be useless to resist interrogation. The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the source. If the technique is successful, the source will be impressed with the voluminous file, conclude that everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation during the interro­gation. The success of this technique islargely dependent on the naivete of thesource, the volume of data on the subject,and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the source.
H-5

"MUTT AND JEFF" ("FRIEND AND FOE") APPROACH
The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") approach involves a psychological ploy which takes advantage of the naturaluncertainty and guilt which a source has as a result of being detained and questioned.Use of this technique necessitates the employment of two experiencedinterrogators who are convincing actors.Basically, the two interrogators will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. For example, the firstinterrogator is very formal and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source.He might be strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. The goal of the technique is to make the source feel cut off from his friends.
At the time the source acts hopeless and alone, the second interrogator appears (having received his cue by a hidden signal or by listening and observing out of view of the source), scolds the first interrogator for his harsh behavior, and orders him from the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of human sensitivity. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the source have, in common, a high degree of intelligence andan awareness of human sensitivity above and beyond that of the first interrogator.
The source is normally inclined to have afeeling of gratitude toward the second interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source inan effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the second interrogator can hint that since he is of high rank, having many other duties, he cannot afford to waste time on an uncooperative source. He may broadly infer that the first interrogator might return to continue his questioning. When used against the proper source, this trick will normally gain the source's completecooperation.
H-6 .
RAPID FIRE APPROACH

The rapid fire approach involves a psychological ploy based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heardwhen he speaks, and it is confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an un­related question. This technique may he used by an individual interrogator or simultaneously by two or more interro­gators in questioning the same source. In employing this technique the interrogatorasks a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next question is asked. This tends to confuse the source, and he is apt to contradict himself, as he has little time to prepare his answers. The interrogator then confronts the source with the inconsis­tencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator. In attempting to explain his answers, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further interrogation.
The interrogator must have all his ques­tions prepared before approaching the source, because long pauses between ques­tions allow the source to complete his answers and render this approach ineffec­tive. Besides extensive preparation, this technique requires an experienced, compe­tent interrogator, wiirrhas comprehensiveknowledge of his case, and fluency in thelanguage of the source. This technique is most effective immediately after capture,because of the confused state of the source.
SILENCE APPROACH

The silence approach may he successful when employed against either the nervous or the confident-type source. When employ­ing this technique, the interrogator says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source, but force him to break eye contact first. The source will become nervous, begin to shift around inhis chair, cross and recross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out questions such'as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the interrogator is ready to break the silence, he may do so with some nonchalant question such as, "You planned this operation a long time, didn't you? Was it your idea?" The interrogator must be patient when employ­ing this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding, but it usually will when given a reasonable chance.
H-7

DODDOA-010817

APPENDIX I
interrogation Guides
EXAMPLE 1,
QUESTION GUIDE FOR
SUPPORT OF TACTICAL
INTERROGATION

RIFLEMEN
Some of the specific topics on which a

captured enemy rifleman may be ques­
tioned are-
O Identification of source's squad, pla­toon, company, battalion, regiment,
and division.

D Organization, strength, weapons, and disposition of squad, platoon, and company.
.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.

.
Location and strength of men and weapons at strongholds, outposts, and observation posts in the source's immediate area.

O Mission of the source immediately before capture as well as mission of source's squad, platoon, company, and higher echelons.
.
Location and description of defensive installations, such as missile sites, antitank ditches and emplacements, minefields, roadblocks, and barbed wire entanglements in source's area before capture. Description of weapons with which these locations are covered.

.
Names and personality information of small unit commanders known to the source.

.
Possible identifications of support
mortar, artillery, and armored units.

• Status of food, ammunition, and other supplies.
.
Morale of troops.

.
Casualties.

C Defensive and protective items of NBC equipment, status of NBC training and defensive NBC instructions, and offensive capability of NBC operations.
.
Status of immunizations; new shots,
booster shots more frequently than
normal.

O Stress on care and maintenance of
NBC protective equipment.

.
Issuance of new or different NBC pro­tective equipment.

E Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
.
Civilian supply.

O Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

MESSENGERS
Messengers are frequently chosen on the basis of above average intelligence and the ability to observe well and remember oral messages and instructions. Messengers, who have an opportunity to travel about within the immediate combat zone, gener­ally, will have a good picture of the current situation and are excellent prospects for tactical interrogation. The following topics should be included when questioning a messenger source:
. Nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable period of time, as well as the names of persons who originated these mes­sages, and the names of persons to whom messages were directed. Des• cription of duty positions of such personalities.

DODDOA-010818

.
Information as to the extent to which messengers are used in the applicable enemy unit, routes of messengers, and location of relay posts.

.
Location of message centers and com­munication lines.

.
Condition of roads, bridges, and alter­nate routes.

.
Location of CPs and the names of
commanders and staff officers.

.
Location of artillery, mortars, and armor seen during messenger's move­ment through the combat area.

.
Location of minefields and.other de­fensive installations.

.
Location of supply and ammunition
dumps.

.
Description of terrain features behind the enemy's front lines.

.
NBC weapons, installations, and
units.

.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

.
Use of radio equipment in applicable enemy units.

SQUAD AND PLATOON
LEADERS AND COMPANY
COMMANDERS

Squad and platoon leaders, as well as company commanders, generally will pos­sess information on a broader level than that discussed up to this point. In additionto the information possessed by the rifle­men, they may be able to furnish informa­tion on the following subjects:
.
Plans and mission of their respective units.

.
Organization of their units as well as their regiment and battalion.

.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.

• Disposition of companies, regiments, and reserves of each.
.
Identifications and general organiza­tion of supporting units such as artillery, armor, and engineer units.

.
Location, strength, and mission of
heavy weapons units.

.
Offensive and defensive tactics of
small units.

.
Quality and morale of subordinate
troops.

.
Doctrine for employment of NBC
weapons.

.
Doctrine for defense against NBC
weapons.

.
Status of NBC defense SOP and cur­rent NBC training.

.
Communications procedures and
communications equipment.

.
Issuance of NBC detection equipmentand detector paints or paper.

.
Morale of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

.
Instructions on handling and evacua­tion of US and allied prisoners.

.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

RADIO AND TELEPHONE
OPERATORS

Radio and telephone operators, like mes­sengers, are frequently familiar with theplans and instructions of their command­ers. In general, they can be expected toknow the current military situation even more thoroughly because of the greater volume of information which they normally transmit. Topics to be covered when ques­tioning communications personnel are-
. Nature and exact contents of messages sent and received during a given tacti­cal situation.

DODDOA-010819

.
Code names or numbers of specific enemy units, such as those appearing in enemy telephone directories, and in other SOI such as unit identification panel codes.

.
Major enemy units to your front and their code names.

.
Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs, call words, and operat­ing frequencies.

.
Names and code names of command­ers and their staff officers.

.
Types, numbers, and basic characteris­tics of radios and telephone equipmentused at company, regiment, and divi­sion level.

.
Identification and location of units
occupying front line positions.

.
Location of artillery and mortar
positions.

2 Information on enemy codes and
ciphers.

.
Code names given to operations or to specially designated supply points such as supply points for special weapons.

.
Names and signals designating vari­ous types of alerts.

DRIVERS

Questions directed by the tactical interr6-gator to captured drivers should concern the aspects of the enemy situation which the prisoner would know because of his driving assignments. In dealing with EPW drivers of command and staff vehicles, supply vehi­cles, and vehicles drawing weapons, the fol­lowing topics should be examined:
.
Identification and location of com­mand posts of higher, lower, and sup­porting units.

.
Names and personal character traits ofcommanders and staff officers.

.
Plans, instructions, orders, and con­versations of commanders and staff
officers.

.
Attitudes of commanders and staff
officers toward each other, civilians,
units under their command, and the
general military situation.

.
Routes of communications and their

condition.
.
Tactical doctrines of commanders.

.
Command and staff organization.

.
Supply routes and road conditions.

.
Location of supply points and types of military and civilian supplies.

.
Sufficiency or lack of both civilian andmilitary supplies.

.
Types, numbers, and condition of mili­tary and civilian supply-carryingvehicles.

.
Location of artillery and mortar
positions.

.
Troop movements and troop assembly areas.

.
Location of truck parks and motor
pools.

.
Organization of antitank and air
defense artillery units, weapons, and
strength.

• Location of antitank and air defense artillery positions.
.
Names of commanders of antitank and air defense artillery units.

.
Mission of antitank and air defense
artillery.

.
Types and status of ammunition.

.
Voluntary or forced evacuation or
movement of civilians.

.
Morale and health of civilians.

PATROL LEADERS AND
PATROL MEMBERS

The degree of patrol activity on the partof the enemy is often a good indication of enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrolleaders and members of enemy patrols upontheir capture include-
. Specific mission of the patrol.

.
Exact routes used and time of depar­ture and return of patrol.

.
Location of enemy forward edge of the battle area, general outpost, combat outpost, and outposts.

.
Location of platoon, company, regi-ment, or division headquarters.

.
Routes of approach and enemy positions.

.
Enemy strongholds and fields of fire.

.
Machine gun and mortar positions of the enemy.

.
Observation posts and listening posts.

• Condition of bridges and location of fords.
.
Description of key terrain features.

.
Location and description of defensive positions such as antitank weapons, roadblocks, mines, barbed wire entan­glements, gaps in wire and safe lines, trip flares, booby traps, tank traps, and ambushes.

.
Other reconnaissance objectives, agen­cies, and patrols.

.
Organization and equipment of tacti­cal reconnaissance agencies in regi­ments and divisions.

.
Passwords and counter signs of patrols and line units.

.
Patrol communication system and range or radios.

C Names of commanders, staff officers, and particularly of intelligence officers of enemy unit.

.
Coordination of patrol activities with other units such as rifle companies, mortar units, and artillery units.

.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability ofmedicine.

MEMBERS OF MACHINE GUN
AND MORTAR UNITS

Members of machine gun and mortar units can be expected to know, on the basis of their experience or observation, the following:
.
Location of their own, as well as other, machine gun and mortar positions and projected alternate positions.

.
Organization, strength, casualties, and weapons of the source's unit.

.
Targets for machine guns and mortars.

.
Names of small unit leaders.

.
Status of weapons crew training.

.
Disposition of small rifle units, squads,and platoons.

.
Supply of ammunition to include typeof ammunition in the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical and bio­logical ammunition.

.
Location of forward ammunition
points.

.
Characteristics of weapons used.

.
Food and other supplies.

.
Morale.

.
Effect of our own firepower upon their positions.

.
Availability of nuclear capability.

.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The liaison officer is the commander's agent for accomplishing coordination among the headquarters of lower, adjacent,and higher units. The liaison officer also may be called upon to effect coordination between infantry units and supporting or supported armor and artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units. Topics to be covered when questioning a captured liai­son officer are as follows:
1-3

.
Contents of field orders, such as com­position of attacking forces; location and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans forattack, defense, or withdrawals; and plans for communication and coordi­nation among units.

.
Location of lower, adjacent, higher,
and supporting unit CPs as well as
location of supply and communica­tions installations.

.
Locations of observation posts and
outposts.

.
Assembly areas for troops and
supplies.

.
Disposition of regiments, battalions, and companies of a division.

.
Identification and disposition of
reserves.

.
Status of supplies of all types.

O Civilian social and economic
conditions.

.
Evacuation or movement of civilians.

ARMORED TROOPS

Topics to be covered when questioningcaptured armored troops are as follows:
.
Unit identifications.

.
Designation and strength of support
ing or supported infantry units.

.
Types and characteristics of tanks
employed.

.
Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of these tanks.

O Means of communications between tanks and between tanks and infantry.
. Missions and objectives.
C Routes of approach.
C Armored units in reserve.
C Location of tank parks and assembly

areas.

. Location of impassable terrain
features.

.
Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank coordination.

.
Location of tank repair depots and
POL dumps (to include resupply and
refueling techniques).

.
Effect of weather on tank operations.

.
Armored reconnaissance missions.

.
Number of newly assigned personnel
in unit. within last 30 days.

.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

.
Status of ammunition and POL
resupply.

.
Location of ammunition supply points.

.
Ammunition supply to include type in the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical ammunition.

.
Measures for defense against NBC and radiological attack to include type of NBC defensive equipment installed in the tank.

.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

ARTILLERYMEN
Topics to be covered when questioning captured artillerymen are as follows.

Forward Observers
Topics for interrogation of forward observers include-
. Location, organization, and number of guns of the battery or battalion whose fire the source was observing and directing.
. Location of front lines, outposts, and
observation posts.

. Location of alternate observation
posts.

DODD0A-010822

.
Location and probable time of occupa­tion of present or alternate gun positions.

ueployment of artillery.

.
Characteristics of guns, including
caliber and range.

.
Targets for the various types of fire
during different phases of combat.

.
Nature of the infantry-artillery com­munications net.

.
Type and location of artillery fire
requested by infantry units.

.
Identification of corps or other sup­porting artillery units.

.
Plan of attack, defense, or withdrawal of enemy units.

.
Methods of coordinating artillery fire with infantry maneuver.

.
Mission and objectives of source's unit as well as of supported units.

.
Routes of approach and their condi­tion. Characteristics of terrain features.

.
Methods of observing and directing artillery fire, including information such as types of aircraft employed.

.
Methods of counterbattery fire andmethods of protecting enemy positions from counterbattery fire.

.
Use and location of dummy artillerypositions.

.
Types of artillery ammunition used for various targets, new types of ammuni­tion, and conservation of fires and rea­sons for conservation.

• Location of artillery and infantry unitcommand posts.
.
Trafficability of routes appropriate formovement of heavy artillery.

.
Names of commanders, staff officers, and their attitudes toward each other and toward infantry commanders.

.
Number of newly assigned personnelin unit within last 30 days.

.
Effect of our artillery upon the enemy units.

.
Location and numbering of defensive concentrations.

.
Location of ammunition supply points.

.
Radio channels used for fire control
nets.

.
Identification and location of support­ing battalions.

.
Availability of nuclear fire support.

.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

Artillery Firing Battery
Personnel

Interrogation of a source from a firing battery should cover the following topics:
.
Measures of defense against friendly
artillery fire.

.
Counterbattery protection for artilleryinstallations.

.
Effect of friendly counterbattery fire.

.
Location of battery ammunition
points.

.
Disposition of local security weapons.

.
Direction and elevation of fire.

.
Instructions concerning the use of
ammunition.

.
Names of battery and other
commanders.

•
Detailed description of artillery weap­ons used.

•
Status of weapons crew training.

.
Information on food supplies and
morale of military and civilians.

.
Measures for defense against NBC
attack.

1-5

DODD0A-010823

. Types and amount of ammunition, to include chemical and nuclear ammuni­tion, in the basic load or on hand.
• Location of chemical and biological
ammunitions.

. Location of targets marked for chemi­cal and biological fires.
Air Defense Artillerymen

Interrogation of a source from an air defense unit should cover the following:
.
Location and number of air defense
weapons.

.
Detailed description and characteris­tics of air defense guns and missiles used.

.
Shape, size, and location of ground
radars.

.
Organization of air defense units.

.
Types of areas defended.

.
Nuclear capability.

.
Methods of attack against friendly air­craft, by type of aircraft.

• Avenues of approach and altitudes most and least advantageous to enemy air defense.
. Methods of identifying unknown
aircraft.

MEDICAL CORPSMEN

Although medical personnel are entitled to special protective measures under the provisions of international agreements, they can be, and are, interrogated without infringement of any existing laws or rules of warfare. Topics to be covered when inter­rogating enemy medical personnel are as follows:
.
Number of casualties over a given
phase of combat operations.

.
Weapons accounting for most
casualties.

.
Key personnel who have been
casualties.

.
Conditions of health and sanitation in enemy units.

.
Ratio of dead to wounded.

.
Commander's tactics in relation to the number of casualties.

.
Adequacy and efficiency of casualty
evacuation.

O Weapons most feared by the enemy.
.
Location and staffing of aid stations
and hospitals.

.
Organization of division, regiment,
and battalion medical units.

.
Status and types of medical supplies.

.
Use and characteristics of newly devel­oped medicine or drugs.

O Data on your wounded, sick, or dead in the hands of the enemy.
• Skill of enemy medical personnel.
. Information on mass sickness or epi­demics in the enemy forces.

O Types of treatment and medication for NBC casualties.
. Supply and availability of materials
used in the treatment of NBC
casualties.

•
Special training or treatment of NBC casualties.

•
New or recent immunizations.

.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

.
Relocation or movement of civilians.

.
Civilian supply.

.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

.
Location and present condition of ci­vilian hospitals, factories producing medical supplies, and warehouses and stores containing medical supplies.

ENGINEER TROOPS

Topics for questioning of captured engi­neer troops are as follows:
O Mission of supported unit.

.
Exact location and pattern of existing minefields, location of bridges, build­ings, airfields, and other installations prepared for demolition, and types of mines or explosives used.

.
Doctrine pertaining to the use of mines and booby traps to include types of mines, characteristics of firing devices, and minefield patterns.

.
Location of roadblocks and tank traps and how constructed.

.
Condition of rDads, bridges, and streams or rivers for trafficability of personnel, vehicles, and armor. Weight-carrying capacity of bridges and location and description of fords.

.
Location of engineer materials andequipment such as road material, bridge timber, lumber, steel, explo­sives, quarries, rock crushers, saw­mills, and machine shops.

0 Location of dummy vehicles and tank and gun positions.
.
Location of camouflaged positions and installations.
Water supply and locations of water
points.
Organization, strength, and weapons
of engineer units.
Presence of other than organic engi­neer units at the front and mission of such units.
Number of organic trucks, tractors,
and other engineer vehicles.

.
Location of new or repaired bridges.
Use of demolitions.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

Relocation or movement of civilians.

Civilian supply.

0 Health of civilians and availability ofmedicine.
Location and present condition of ci­vilian power plants, water works, and sewage disposal plants.

0 Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and specialequipment.
RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS
Topics for questioning captured recon­naissance troops are as follows:
.
The reconnaissance plan, march order, time schedule, and specific missions of all elements, means of coordination and communication between elements, and the unit headquarters and higher headquarters.

.
Nature of orders received from higher headquarters.

.
Identification, organization, composi­tion, strength, means of transporta­tion, and weapons of the unit.

.
Routes of approach used by the unit.

.
Identification, composition, organiza­tion, strength, and disposition of the main body of troops and reinforce­ments. Routes to be used.

• General quality of troops of the recon­naissance unit and of the main body.
.
Radio communication equipment and frequencies used.

.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size,night vision devices, and special equipment.

LOCAL CIVILIANS
Civilians who have recently left enemy-held areas normally have important information and often give this information readily. This information is usually of par­ticular importance to the CA and PSYOP personnel of the unit. The following topics should he included when questioning local civilians:
.
Location of enemy front lines and
major defensive positions.

.
Location of artillery positions.

.
Location and nature of minefields in
enemy rear area.

1-7

DODDOA-010825

.
Description of key terrain.

.
Condition of roads, bridges, and major buildings.

.
Enemy policy and attitude toward
local civilians.

O Human and material resources of the area.
.
Morale and esprit de corps of local
civilians.

.
Data on important civilian personali­ties remaining in enemy areas.

.
Health and medical status of local
populace.

.
Effect of friendly operations on ci­vilian populace.

.
Instructions to prepare for defensive
measures against NBC attack.

.
Recent immunizations.

POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA
PERSONNEL

Personnel recently acquired through combat operations and who are identified as being involved with political and PSYOP should be questioned. As a minimum, the following topics should be included:
. Policy, plans, and objectives.
O Organization and training.
. Current and past activities, to include themes of any propaganda programs.
•
Enemy analysis of our weaknesses and strengths.

•
Target audiences for propaganda,
including priorities.

. Effects of friendly PSYOP.
E Analysis of enemy weaknesses and
strengths.

. Enemy counterpropaganda activities.

GUERRILLA PERSONNEL

Topics for interrogation of captured guer­rilla personnel are as follows:
.
Area of activities.

.
Nature of activities.

.
Strength.

.
Equipment.

.
Motivation.
O Leadership.

E1
.
Contacts

.
External direction or support.

EXAMPLE 2,
QUESTION GUIDE FOR
NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL AND
'CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

Some specific questions for information on NBC operations are as follows:
.
What items of NBC protective equip­ment have been issued to enemy troops? Is there any differentiation in issue of items for particular areas? If so, what items for what areas?

.
Are there any new or recent immuniza­tions indicated by sources during interrogations?

.
What immunizations have enemy
troop units received, as indicated in
captured immunization records?

O Are enemy troops equipped with pro­tective masks? Is the individual required to carry the mask on his per­son? Are there any sectors where the mask is not required equipment for the individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask?
• Is protective clothing issued to enemy troops? If so, what type of clothing or articles? If special clothing is used, is it for any particular geographic area?
.
Have enemy troop units constructed
NBC protective shelters? If so, what
type?

.
Are enemy fortifications, individual and collective, provided with overhead cover?

(

DODD0A-010826
. Are enemy troops issued any protective footwear or other means to provide protection against penetration by liq-
1,4A .r...vs+e9
uswa IC.

.
Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles provided with specially installed pro­tective equipment to protect the crew incase of chemical attack?

.
Are enemy troops issued any type of individual protective items, includingantidotes or protective ointment, for first aid?

.
Are there any areas for which addi­tional or unusual NBC safety precau­tions have been established?

.
What is the size and composition of enemy NBC specialist troop units?Where are they located? Why?

.
Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions con­cerning consumption of food and water or handling of livestock in areas that may be overrun by enemy forces?

.
What training, if any, have enemy troops received in the use of incapacitating-type agents and theirdissemination?

.
What items of chemical detection equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Are the items operated con­stantly, irregularly, or not at all? Is there any differentiation made regard­ing their use in certain areas?

.
What type of radiation-measuring instruments are issued to enemy troop units and what is their range or limit? How are they distributed?

.
How many hours of training with radiation measuring instruments haveenemy monitoring and survey person­nel received?

.
How many hours of NBC traininghave enemy troops received? Howmany hours training are devoted indi­vidually to chemical, biological, andradiological operations? Have enemy troops received any special or acceler­ated training as opposed to what is considered routine?

. Do enemy units have decontamination materials on hand? If so, what type and in what quantity?
E Have sources observed decontamina­tion stations or installations estab­lished in enemy areas? If so, what istheir location and composition?
. Are enemy troop units issued biologi-cal sampling kits or devices? If so, what is their type and composition?
• Have sources observed any cylinders or containers which might contain bulk chemical agents?
.
Have sources observed any tacticalaircraft equipped with accessory tanks which indicate a spray capability?

.
Are sources aware of location of dumps of chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and bulk chemical agents?

.
Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket units have chemical ammunition on hand?

.
At what radiological exposure or dose are troops required to relocate?

.
Are there any problem areas or short­comings in NBC material?

The following PIR and IR are applicable for internal defense operations in appro­priate theaters of operations?
.
What types of tunnels and caves and
modification are used in defense
against riot control agents and explo­sive gases?

.
What defensive material and instruc­tions are issued for defense against riotcontrol agents?

.
What defensive measures are taken
against defoliation and anticrop
agents?

1.9

APPENDIX J
1949 Geneva Conventions
1. The United States is a party to the following Geneva Conventions of 1949:
¦
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS.

¦
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS Sea.

¦
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GPW.

¦
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GC.

2.
These treaties will be strictly observed and enforced by United States forces without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its specific relations with any other specified country. Military commanders will be instructed which, if any, of these treaties, or component parts thereof, are not legally binding in a given situation. On 10 August 1965, the US Secretary of State notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Geneva Conventions as a whole would apply to the Vietnam conflict. Future armed conflict involving the United States will most likely be subjected to the same laws on a unilateral basis.

3.
Those articles of the above-referenced treaties directly applicable to this manual are quoted below. (See FM 27-10 for full explanation of these treaties.)

(GWS, GWS Sea, GPW, GC, Art. 2) SITUATIONS TO WHICH LAW OF WAR ARE APPLICABLE
DODD0A-010828

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the State of War
ltl not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the ter­ritory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
(GWS, GPW, GWS Sea, GC, Art. 3) INSURGENCY
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
¦ Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
•
violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

•
taking of hostages;

• outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
• the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
J•1

¦ The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanita­rian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
(GPW, Art. 4) PRISONERS OF WAR DEFINED
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
¦
Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

¦
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

•
that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

•
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

•
that of carrying arms openly;

•
that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

¦ Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
I

DODD0A-010830
¦
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

¦
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

¦
Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spon­taneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

B.
The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

¦
Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied coun­try, if the occupying Power considers is necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

¦
The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent Powers on their territory and • whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exceptions of Article 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these per­sons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C.
This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

J-3

DODD0A-010831

(GPW, Art. 13) HUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
¦
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. An unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

¦
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

¦
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

(GPW, Art. 17) QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS
¦
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on.the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

¦
If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

¦
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equiva­lent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

¦
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

J•4
¦ Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the
preceding paragraph.

¦ The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
(GC, Art. 31) PROHIBITION OF COERCION
¦ No physical or moral c‘.bercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.
J-5

DODDOA-010833

abn ACR AF AG AKM amph amt AOE approx armd at ATGL Aug
BEST MAPS
BICC BMP bn
C2 C3
3CCM CA C-E CED CEE CEWI CINCAFMED CI CIC CINCENT CINCHAN CINCNORTH CINCSOUTH CM&D CMEC CMO co COMMZ CONUS COSCOM CP CPR CSS
Glossary- 0 GLOSSARY
airborne
armored cavalry regiment
Air Force
Adjutant General

designation of a type of Soviet rifle amphibious amount
Army of Excellence approximately armored
antitank
antitank grenade launcher
August
B - biographic intelligence
E - economic intelligence
S - sociological intelligence

T - transportation and telecommunications intelligence
M - military geographic intelligence
A - armed forces intelligence
P - political intelligence

S - scientific and technical intelligence
battlefield information control center
designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier
battalion
command and control

command, control, and communications
command, control, communications countermeasures
civil affairs
Communication-Electronics
captured enemy document
captured enemy equipment

combat electronic warfare and intelligence
Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Mediterranean
counterintelligence
combined interrogation center

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
Allied Commander in Chief Channel
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
collection management and dissemination
captured material exploitation center
civil-military operations
company
communications zone
continental United States
corps support command
command post
common point of reference
combat service support

DODD0A-010834

DCPR destination common point of reference
decon decontamination
det detachment
DIAM Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DISCOM division support command
DISUM daily intelligence summary
div division
DOI date of information
DS direct support
dsg designated
DTG date-time group
.
E east
.

ea each
.

EAC echelons above corps
.

EM enlisted man
.

EPW enemy prisoner of war
evac..evacuation
EW electronic warfare
.

FID foreign internal defense
.
fl fluent
.

FM field manual
.

FNU first name unknown
.

FRG Federal Republic of Germany
.

FUD full unit designation
.

GI Assistant Chief of Staff, Gl, Personnel
.

G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
.

G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations
.

G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics
.

G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs
.

GDR German Democratic Republic
.

GS general support
H/S hearsay HPT high-payoff target HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
IAW in accordance with
ID identification
ICPR initial common point of reference
i.e. that is I&E interrogation and exploitation IEW intelligence and electronic warfare IMINT imagery intelligence intel intelligence intg interrogation INTREP intelligence report INTSUM intelligence summary
Glossary-1

IPB.intelligence preparation of the battlefield IPW.prisoner of war interrogation IR.information requirements
J2.Intelligence Directorate
JIF.joint interrogation facilities
JrLt.junior lieutenant
JrSgt.junior sergeant

KB.knowledgeability briefs
KIA.killed in action

ldr.leader
LIC.low-intensity conflict

MARSTA.martial status
mbr.member
MHz.megahertz
MI.military intelligence
MIT.mobile interrogation teams
MN/I.middle name/initial
MOSC.military occupational specialty code
MR.motorized rifle
MRB.motorized rifle battalion
MRC.motorized rifle company
MRD.motorized rifle division
MRP.motorized rifle platoon
MRR.motorized rifle regiment
MRS.motorized rifle squad

N.north/no
NATO.North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC.nuclear, biological, chemical
no.number

OB.order of battle
OCONUS.outside continental United States
off.officer
OPORD.operation order
OPSEC.operations security

PERINTREP.periodic intelligence report
pers.personnel
PIR.priority intelligence requirements
PKM.designation of a type of Soviet weapon
PKT.designation of a type of Soviet weapon
plt.platoon
PO.political officer

Glossary-2 POC POL pos PSYOP
REC recon refit RPG-7 RSTA
S Si S2 S3 S4 S5 SACEUR SACLANT SAEDA
SALUTE SFC SIGINT SIR SITMAP SOI SOP aqd sqdrnSrSgt STANAG SUPINTREP svc SVD SW
TCAE TEC HDOC TOC TOE
UCMJ UIC UkSSR U/I unk US USA USACGSC USSR
point of capturepetroleum, oil, and lubricants position psychological operations
radio electronic combat
reconnaissance

regiment. -
designation of a type of Soviet antitank grenade launcher
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
south Adjutant (US Army) Intelligence Officer (US Army) Operations and Training Officer (US Army) Supply Officer (US Army) Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment sergeant first class signals intelligence specific information requirementssituation map signal operating instructions standing operating procedure squad squadronsenior sergeant standardization agreement supplemental intelligence report service designation of a type of Soviet rifle southwest
technical control and analysis element
technical document
tactical operations center

table of organization and equipment
Uniform Code of Military Justice unit identification code Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic unidentified unknown United States United States ArmyUnited States Army Command and General Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
Glossary-3

DODD0A-010837

.

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (grid) .
W west
.

WNA would not answer .
Y yes
Glossary•4
r

DODD0A-010838
REFERENCES
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.
Army Regulations (ARs)
25-400-2.The Modern Army Recordkeeping System 190-8. Army Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program
Field Manuals (FMs)
19-40. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons21-26. Map Reading27-10. The Law of Land Warfare
34.1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations34-60. Counterintelligence 34-60A (S/NOFORN) Counterintelligence Operations (U) 100-2-3. The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment 100-5. Operations 100-20. Low Intensity Conflict
Department of Army Pamphlets (DA Yams)
27-161-1.International Law Vol 1
Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAMs)
58-13 (S).Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U)
Miscellaneous Publications
The Hague and Geneva Conventions Uniform Code of Military Justice
Department of Army Forms (DA Forms)
1132. Prisoners Personal Property List-Personal Deposit Funds
Reference-1

DODDOA-010839

COMMAND
Command publications cannot he obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Deter­mine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.
Field Circulars (FCs)
8-2. Medical Intelligence in the Airland Battle, 31 Mar 86. Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Houston, Texas 78234-1600
34-124 MI Bn/Co Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), Oct 85. United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000
PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS
Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint dis­tribution. They may not he obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1.
Field Manuals (FMs)
34-5 (S).Human Intelligence Operations (U)34-25. Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in orderto understand this publication.
Field Manuals (FMs)
8-10. Health Service Support in Theater of Operations33-1. Psychological Operations34-80. Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Operations

Reference-2
air-land battle, 2-0, 2-5, 2-6
area of interest, 2-0
area of operations, 2-0
initiative, 2-0
doctrine, 2-0

analysis, 2-2
approach, 3-0, 3-3, 7.0
approaches, 3-4, 3-7, H-0
decreased fear down, H-2
direct, H-0

emotional, H-U emotional hate, H-0 emotional love, H-0 "establish your identity", H-5 fear up (mild), H-2 fear up (harsh), H-1 file and dossier, 11-5 futility technique, H-4 incentive, H-0 increased fear up, H-1 "Mutt and Jeff' ("friend and foe"), H-6 pride and ego, H-2 pride and ego down, H-3 pride and ego up, H-3 rapid fire, H-6 repetition, H-5 silence, H-6 "we know all", H-4 assess the source, 3-5 breaking point, 3-6 commander's information requirements, 3-6 commander's priority intelligence requirements, 3-6 contact, 7-0 establish and develop rapport, 3-5 establish and maintain control, 3-4, 3-5 establish and maintain rapport, 3-4 Geneva and Hague Conventions, 3-5 initial contact, 7-0 interview, 7-0 manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses, 3-4 phase, 3-4 planning and preparation, 3-3 selecting, 3-3 sincere and convincing, 3-6 smooth transitions, 3-6 techniques, 3-4, 3-6 UCMJ, 3-5
INDEX
battlefield information control center,
6-4
contact, 6-4
DISUM, 6-4
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
PERINTREP, 6-4
SUPINTREP, 6-4

captured enemy documents, 1-1, 1-2, 4-0, 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, A-11 accountability, 4-1, 4-13 Air Force-related documents, 4-5 captured material exploitation center, 4-9 captured with a source, 4.11 categories, 4-4 category A, 4-4 category B, 4-4 category C, 4-5 category D, 4-5 communications and cryptographic documents, 4-4 confiscation, 4-12 date-time group, 4-0detainee personnel recorddisposal, 4-11 electronic warfare, 4-9 evacuation, 4-1, 4-12 exploitation, 4-4, 8-0 handling, 4-0 impounded, 4-12inventory, 4-2 log, 4-2, 4-3 maps and charts of enemy forces, 4-5 Navy-related documents, 4-5 recognition, 4-12 recording documents category, 4-.5 returned, 4-12 SALUTE report, 4-4, 4-8 screening, 4-4 SIGINT, 4-9 STANAG 1059, 4-0 STANAG 2084, 4-0 tag, 4-1technical control and analysis element, 4-4, 4-9 technical documents, 4-4, 4-5, 4-9 trace actions, 4-2 translation reports, 4-6, 4-8 translating, 4-5 transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10
Index-1

DODDOA-010841

categories
document, 3-2, 4-4, A-11 source, 3-1, 3-2, 8-0, A-4, A-5, A-6 combined interrogation center, 8-0 STANAG 2033, 8-0
collection management and
dissemination, 6.4

contact, 6-4
DISUM, 6-4
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
PERINTREP, 6-4
SUPINTREP, 6-4

command, control, and
communications, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6

countermeasures, 2-4
programs
counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4
agents, 3.1 agent or friendly civilian, 9-9 air-land battle, 2-5 black list, 2-5 command, control, and communications programs, 2-2, 3-4 deception, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5 element, 3-1 enemy agents, 2-5 gray list, 2.5informant technique, 9-10 insurgent captive, 9-9 interrogation operations, 9-9 local leader, 9-9 operations security, 2-2, 2-4 priority intelligence requirements of counterintelligence interest, 3-1 radio electronic combat, 2-5 rear operations, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5 reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, 2-5 saboteurs, 2-5 screening techniques, 9-9 sympathizers, 2-5 special purpose forces, 2-5 terrorists, 2-5 white list, 2-5
echelons above corps, 1-2, 4-5
electronic warfare, 2-2, 2-6
capabilities and limitations, 2-6
combat effectiveness, 2.6
Index-2
command, control, and communications, 2-6
compositions, 2-6
counterintelligence, 2-2
dispositions, 2-6
electronic technical data, 2-7
IR, 2-6
logistics, 2-7
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
missions, 2-6
OB elements, 2-7
PIR, 2-6
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
training, 2-6

high-intensity conflict, P, 9-I
human intelligence, 2-7
cooperative and friendly, 1-2
hostile and antagonistic, 1-2
human sources, 1-1
neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2

information
all-source intelligence, 2-2 analyze information, 2-3 area of operations, 2-1 collection assets, 2-1 collection missions, 2-1 collection requirements, 2-1combat, 2-2, 2-3 components of strategic debriefing, 7-1 armed forces intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 biographic intelligence, 7-1 economic intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 military geographical intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 political intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 scientific and technical intelligence, 7-1, 7-3 sociological intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 transportation and telecommunications intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 direct targeting data, 2-2
electronic technical data, 2.7
imagery intelligence, 6-4
interrogation operations, 2-0
military intelligence, 2-0, 2-4
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
OB elements, 2-7
OB data base, 3-3
signals intelligence, 6-4

DODDOA-010842

situation map, 3-3
strategic debriefing, 7-0
duties and responsibilities, 7-0
notification, 7-0
planning and preparation, 7-0

targeting data, 2-3
terrain features, 2-1
weather conditions, 2-1

information requirements, 2.3, 2-6, 3-0, 3-1, 3-4, 3-6, 3-8
intelligence and electronic warfare,
2-0, 2-2, 2-4, 2-7, 3-3
all-source intelligence, 2-2 CED, 2-7 collection, 2.2 combat information, 2-2 command, control, and communications
programs, 2-2
counterintelligence, 2-2
deception, 2-2
direct targeting data, 2-2
electronic warfare, 2-2
operations security, 2-2
processing, 2-2
rear operations, 2-2
reporting, 2-2
sources, 2-7
situation development, 2-2
target development, 2-2

intelligence annex, 5-0
deployment site, 5-0
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 2-0, 2-2
battlefield information control center, 6-4 collection management and
dissemination, 6-4
collection missions, 6-4
intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2
military intelligence, 2-0
weather and terrain, 2-2, 2-3

interpreter, 3-14, 3-15
interrogation, 3-14
methods, 3-14
preparation, 3.14
reports, 3-15

interrogation, 1-0, 3-0, 3-3, 6-0, 8-0
accuracy, 1-0
advisor operations, 9-5
agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
and the interrogator, 1-0

approach, 3-0 area cordon, 9-9 battlefield information control center, 6-4 CEDs, 4-0 collection management and
dissemination, 6-4 collection mission, 6-4 collection priority, 6-0 command relations, 6-0 contacts, 6-4, 7-0 counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4 defectors, 9-8 deployment site, 6-3 detainee personnel record, 3-0 EPW captive tag, 3-0 examine documents, 3-0 foreign internal defense, 9-1 illiterates, 9.10 information requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6,4 informant technique, 9-10 initiative, 1-0
prisoner of war, 1.0 insurgent captive, 9-9 insurgent vulnerability to interrogation,
9-6 intelligence, 1-0 intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-0,2-2 intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
2-0 joint interrogation facilities, 8-0 legal status of insurgents, 9-6
local leader, 9.9 low-intensity conflict, 9-1, 9-3 main and local forces, 9-8 military police, 3-0 militia, 9.8 mission, 8-0 national agency, 8-2 objective, 1-0
order of battle, 1-0, 2-3
interrogation, 1.0
interrogator, 1.0

OB elements, 2-7 observe the source, 3-0 operational environment operations, 2-0, 9-1, 9-9 peacekeeping operations peacetime contingency operations, 9-1 plan, 3-4 planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-4political cadre, 9.8 population, 9-6 prescreening, 3-0priority intelligence requirements, 3-0, 3-1,
6-4
Index-3

DODD0A-010843

principles of, 1-0
process, 3-0
question guards, 3-0
questioning, 3-7
reports, 3-15
screeners, 3-0, 3-1
screening, 3-0, 9-9
security, 1-1
site, 3-14, 6-3
situation map, 3-3
source, 3-0
support relationships, 6-4

additional, 6-6
chaplain, 6-7
communications, 6-6

health service, 6-6 inspector general, 6-7 NBC protection, 6-6 staff judge advocate, 6-6civil-military operations (G5 and S5),
6-6 intelligence (G2 and S2), 6.5 operations (G3 and S3), 6-5 personnel (01 and SI), 6-4supply (G4 and S4), 6-5

sympathizer, 9-8
termination, 3-12
terrorism counteraction, 9-1
with an interpreter, 3-14

interrogator, 1-0, 3-14
accessible information overtime, 6-2 adaptability, 1-3 advisor operations, 9-5 advisor qualifications, 9-4 advisor relationships, 9-4 alertness, 1.2 and the interrogation, 1-0 approach techniques, 1-4 capabilities and limitations, 2-6 combat effectiveness, 2-6 common characteristics of sources, 9-8 compositions, 2-6 counterintelligence, 2-4 counterpart relationship, 9.5 credibility, 1-3 dispositions, 2-6 enemy material and equipment, 1-5entry-level training, 1-4 electronic technical data, 2-6 foreign language, 1.4 hot and cold leads, 3-9 information requirements, 2-6intelligence assets, 2-0
Index-4
intelligence and electronic warfare
operations, 2-2
international agreements, 1-5, 1-6
knowledgeability of sources, 9-8
law of land warfare, 1-5
logistics, 2-7
long-term memory, 6-1

map reading, 1-5 map tracking, 1.5, 3-10 miscellaneous data, 2-7 missions, 2-6 motivation, 1.2 neurolinguistics, 1.5 objectivity, 1-3 order of battle, 1-4 OB data base, 3-3 patience and tact, 1-3 perseverence, 1-3 personal appearance and demeanor, 1-3 personal qualities, 1-2 population, 9-6 priority intelligence requirements, 2-6 role, 2-0 security, 1-5 self-control, 1-3 short-term memory, 6-1 situation map, 5-3SALUTE, 3-9 specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4 strength, 2-6 tactics, 2-6 target country, 1-4 tasking relationships, 6-3 The Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1.5 training, 2-6 writing and speaking skills, 1-4

joint interrogation facility (JIF), 8-0, 8-2
CA units, 8-2
category A sources, 8-0
communications, 8-2
coordination, 8-2
debriefing, 8-2

division and corps interrogation and CI
elements, 8-2
EPW camp, 8-2
exploitation of documents, 8-0
formation, 8-0
Geneva Conventions, 8-2

HUMINT collection, 8-2 interrogation, 8-2division and corps interrogation and CI
elements, 8.2
interrogation reports, 8.1
knowledgeability briefs, 8-1

mission, 8-0 mobile interrogation teams, 8-1 national agency, 8-2 operation, 8-1 organization, 8.0 PSYOP, 8-2 requirement, 8-0responsibilities, 8-0 SALUTE, 8-1 screening, 8-2 division and corps interrogation and CI elements, 8-2 use, 8.1
low-intensity conflict, P, 1-6, 9-1
advisor and interrogator relationships,9-4 advisor operations, 9.5advisor qualifications, 9-4 area cordon, 9-9 cease fire supervision, 9-2 common characteristics of sources, 9.8 counterpart relationship, 9-5defectors, 9-8 foreign internal defense, 9-1, 9.2 Geneva Conventions, 9-7 handling of insurgent captives and suspects, 9.7 humane treatment, 9-7 illiterates, 9-10 informant technique, 9-10 insurgent captive, 9-9 insurgent methods of resistance, 9-7 insurgent vulnerability to interrogation, 9-6 interrogation operations, 9-9 interrogator skills and abilities, 9-4 interrogation support to, 9-3 knowledgeability of sources, 9-8law and order maintenance, 9.2 limitations to US assistance, 9-4 local leader, 9-9 main and local forces, 9-8 militia, 9-8 peacekeeping operations, 9-1, 9-2peacetime contingency operations, 9-1, 9-3 political cadre, 9.8 population, 9-6 screening techniques, 9-9source, 9-6 sympathizer, 9-8 terminology, 9.1 terrorism counteraction, 9-1, 9-3
mid-intensity conflict, 9-1
modern Army recordkeeping system,
5-3

operations security, 2-2, 2-3, 2.4, 7-1
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, 2-5

order of battle, 1-0, 1-4, 2-3, 2-7
data base, 3-2
elements, 2.7

planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
documents captured with a source, 4-11
EPW captive tag, 3-0
evaluation of documents, 4-12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
interrogation, 3-14
observe the source, 3-0
preparation, 3-14
questioning guards, 3-0, 3.3, 3-4
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0

priority intelligence requirements, 2.3, 2-6, 3-0, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-8, 3-13
commander's, 3-6
of counterintelligence interest
supported commander's, 3-1

procedures
accountability, 4-1, 4-13 administrative tasks, 5.2 area cordon, 9-9 assign category, 3.1 captured document log, 4-2, 4-3captured document tag, 4-1 captured enemy documents, 4-1, 4.9, A-11 captured material exploitation center, 4-9categories of PW, A-4 chaplain, 3.7 collection mission update, 5-3collection priority, 6-0 commander's information requirements,3-0, 3-1 commander's priority intelligencerequirements, 3-0, 3-1communications, 5-1 communications and cryptographicdocuments, 4-4 confiscation of documents, 4-12 counterintelligence operations, Pdate-time group, 4.0 detainee personnel record, 3-0 disposal of documents, 4-11
Index-5

DODD0A-010845

documents captured with a source, 4.11 document evacuation, 4-1, 4-8, 4-9, 4.12 document inventory 4-2 electronic warfare, P, 4-9 evaluation of documents, 4-12 examine documents, 3-0 guards, 5-1 high-intensity conflict, P humane treatment, 9-7 impounded documents, 4-12 intelligence and electronic warfare
operations, 5-0
intelligence annex, 5-0
intelligence cycle, 7-3
interpreter, 3-15
interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
interrogating, 3-8, 3-15
interrogation guides, I-0, 1-8

armored troops, 1-4
artillerymen, 1-4
drivers, 1-2
engineer troops, 1-6

guerrilla personnel, 1-8 liaison officers, 1-3 local civilians, 1-7 medical corpsmen, 1-6 members of machine-gun and motor
units, 1-7 messengers, I-0 patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2 political and propaganda personnel, 1-8 prisoner of war captive tag, D-I prisoner of war identity card, (3-0 reconnaissance troops, 1-7 radio and telephone operators, I-1 riflemen, 1-0 squad and platoon leaders and

company commanders, 1-1 interrogation site, 3-14, 5-1 liaison, 7-1 low-intensity conflict, P medic, 3-7 medical support, 5-1 methods of interpretation, 3-14military police, 3-0 modern Army recordkeeping system. 5-:3 movement, 5-1 neurolinguistics, 1-5 nuclear, biological, and chemical, 1' planning and preparation, 3-3 prepare and move to deployment site,
3.14, 5.0, 5.1
priority, 4-8, 4-9
prisoners of war, 2.7
question guards, 3-0

Index-6
question guide for NBC operations, 1-8 humane treatment, J-4 insurgency, J-1 1949 Geneva Conventions, J-0 prisoners of war, J-2 prohibition of coercion, J-5 questioning of prisoners, J-4
recognition of documents, 4-12
recordkeeping, 3-12
Red Cross, 3-7
returned documents, 4-12
S2, 5-0

S3, 5-0 SALUTE, 3-9, 4.4, 4-8, E-0 sample detainee personnel record, B-0 screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1 screening report format, F-1, F-2 senior interrogator, 5-2 signals intelligence, 4-9 source evacuation, 5-1 STANAG extracts, A-1 STANAG 1059, 4-0, A-2 STANAG 2033, 8-0, A-2 STANAG 2044, A-6 STANAG 2084, 4.0, A-10 tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7 technical control and analysis element,
4-4, 4.9
technical documents, 4-4, 4-9
termination, 3-13
trace actions, 4-2
translation report, 4.8
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4.10

processing, 2-2
approach, 3-0 cycle, 5-2 EPW captive tag, 3-0 intelligence and electronic warfare, 2.7 intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2 interrogation, 3-0, 5-2 observe the source, 3-0 planning and preparation, 3-0 prescreening, 3-0 questioning, 3-0 reporting, 3-0 screeners, 3-0
.screening, 3-0, 5-2
documents, 4.4
source, 9-9

termination, 3-0

prohibition against use of force, 1-1
international law, 1-1, 1-5
law of land warfare, 1-5

DODD0A-010846

legal status of insurgents, 9-6 question guide for NBC operations, 1-8
humane treatment, J-4
insurgency, J-1
prisoners of war, J-2
prohibition of coercion, J-5
questioning of prisoners, J-4

The Hague and Geneva Conventions, P, 1-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-7, 8-2, 9-6, 9-7, J-1 Uniform Code of Military Justice, P, 2-7, 3-5
questioning, 3-0, 3-7, 7-0
collection mission, 6-4
collection priority, 6-0
guards, 3-3
hearsay information, 3-9
hot and cold leads, 3-9
information requirements, 3-9
interrogation, 5-1
interrogation guides, I-0, 1-8

armored troops, 1-4 artillerymen, 1-4 drivers, 1-2 engineer troops, 1-6 guerrilla personnel, 1-8 liaison officers, 1.3 local civilians, 1-7 medical corpsmen, 1-6 members of machine-gun and motor
units, 1-7 messengers, I-0 patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2 political and propaganda personnel, 1-8 prisoner of war captive tag, D-1 prisoner of war identity card, C-0 reconnaissance troops, 1.7 radio and telephone operators, I-1 riflemen, 1.0 squad and platoon leaders and
company commanders, I-1
map reading, 1 -5
map tracking, 1-5, 3-10

destination common point of reference,
3-10 exploit dispositions, 3-11 initial common point of reference, 3-10 point of capture, 3-10 segment and exploit the route
segments, 3-11
missions, 2-6
modify sequences of, 3-3
OB elements, 2-7
PIR, 2-6, 3-9

question guide for NBC operations, 1-8 questioning of prisoners, J-4
questioning techniques, 3-7
compound and negative, 3-9
control, 3-8
direct, 3-7
follow-up, 3-8
leading, 3-8
nonpertinent, 3-8
prepared, 3-8
repeated, 3-8
vague, 3-8

recognition of documents, 4.12
recording information, 3-12
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8
sequence, 3-9
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
training, 2-6

reporting, 2-2, 3.0, 3-13, 7-0
DISUM, 6-4
documents captured with a source, 4-11
information requirements, 3-9, 3-13
intelligence annex, 5-0
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
interrogation reports, 8-1
PERINTREP, 6-4
preparation of, 3-15
priority intelligence requirements, 3-9,

3-13
questioning, 3-0
record information, 3.1
recording documents category, 4.5
S2, 5-0
S3, 5-0
SALUTE report, 8-1, E-0, E-1
sample translation report, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10
screeners, 3-1
screening code, 3-1
screening report, 3-1, F-0, F-2
situation map, 5-3
SALUTE, 3-1, 4-6
SUPINTREP, 6-4
tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7
translation, 4-6
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10
writing and speaking skills, 1-4

screening, 3-0, 4.4, 5-1, 5-2, 8-2, 9-9
assign category, 3-1
categories of PW, A-4
CEDs, 4-0
CEDs captured with a source, 4-11

Index-7

DODD0A-010847

code, 3-1
EPW captive tag, 3-0
evaluation of documents, 4.12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
observe the source, 3-0
prescreening, 3-0
priority intelligence requirements of

counterintelligence interest, 3-1
question guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
recognition of documents, 4-12
report, 3-1, F-0, F-1, F-2
SALUTE report, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1
sources, 2-7
techniques, 9-9

senior interrogator, 3-3, 3-4
administrative tasks, 5-2
advice and assistance, 5-0
CED processing cycle, 5-2
collection mission update, 5-3
communications, 5-1
establish site, 5-1

interrogation, 5-1

screening, 5-1
evacuation, 5-1
guards, 5-1

intelligence annex, 5-0 interrogation operations, 5-0 interrogation process. 5-1 medical support, 5-1 movement, 5-1 planning and preparation, 3-3 prepare and move to deloyment site, 5-0,
5-1
recordkeeping, 5-3
reporting, 5-2
S2, 5-0
S3, 5-0
screening, 5-2
situation map, 5-3

situation development, 2-2
terrain, 2-2
weather, 2-2

sources, P, 1-1, 1-4, 2-7, 3-0, 9-6, 9-8
accessible information overtime, 6-2 agent or friendly civilian, 9-9captive tag, 3.0 captured enemy documents, 1-1, 4-11, 4.12,
4-13
category A, 8-0
cooperative and friendly, 1-2

Index-8
corps or echelons above corps, 1-2 defectors, 9-8 hostile and antagonistic, 1.2 human intelligence, 2-7 human sources, 1-1 illiterates, 9-10 imagery intelligence, 6-4 informant technique, 9-10 insurgent captive, 9.9 interrogation operations, 9.9 knowledgeability briefs, 8.1 local leader, 9-9 long-term memory, 6-1 main and local forces, 9-8 militia, 9-8 neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2 political cadre, 9-8 prisoner of war, 1.0, C-0, D-1 sample detainee personnel record, B -0 screening, 9.9 short-term memory, 6.1 signals intelligence, 6-4 sources of information, 1-1 sympathizer, 9-8

target development, 2-2
combat information, 2-3 combat operations, 2.4 command and control, 2-4 command, control, and communications,
2-3, 2-4 command, control, and communications
countermeasures, 2.4
counterintelligence, 2-4
high-payoff targets, 2-3. 2-4
high value targets, 2 2

-
information requirements, 2-2 intelligence officer, 2-3 operations security, 2-3, 2-4 order of battle, 2-3 priority intelligence requirements, 2-2, 2-3 radio electronic combat, 2-3 specific information requirements, 2-2,
2-3, 2-4
battalion, 2-3
brigade, 2-3

targeting data, 2-3
weather and terrain, 2-3

termination, 3-0, 3-12, 3-13, 3-15, 7-1
phase, 3-12
questioning, 3-0
returned documents, 4-12
source evacuation, 5-1

training, 1-4, 2-6
enemy material and equipment, 1-5entry-level training, 1-4 foreign language, 1-4 international agreements, 1-5 interrogator, 6.7 language, 6-7, 7.1map reading, 1-5 map tracking, 1-5 neurolinguistics, 1-5 order of battle, 1-4 scientific and technical enhancement, 7-1 security, 1-5specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4 target country, 1-4
translating, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7
Index-9

DODD0A-010849

FM 34-52
8 MAY 1987
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JOHN A. WICKHAM. JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
• R. L. DILWORTH
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 A, Require­ments for Intelligence Interrogation (Qty rqr block no. 278).
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987 726-041/41055
DODD0A-010850