AR 15-6 Investigating: Report by AR 15-6 Investigating Officer on Shooting Death of Iraqi Detainee, FOB Packhorse, Tikrit Iraq, Sept. 11, 2003

Narrative: On 11 Sep 03, 1 LT_SPC_ J and SPC ere performing guard duty at the FOB Packhorse detention facility. 1 LT the Officer of the Guard, was standing less than twenty feet away from
SPC n the breezeway portion of the. facility facing into the facility's
back yard when he heard a shot fired (Exhibit A). SPC a member of the guard force, was standing between 1 LT^and SPC when the
shot was fired. SP as stan ing in the ha wayof the isolation
cell portion of the face i y. At some point, SPC looked away from the detainees in isolation in order to speak to SPC xhibit B). Within a few seconds of turning back to see the detainees, rifle, placed the selector on fire, and sho_(Exhibit C)._s handcuffed with plastic "flexicuffs" at the time he was shot. Nither1 LT^nor SPC_.aw_pull the trigger. They were not in a position to see
ctivity. The other detainee in the isolation cell,_____ _ s brother), saw SPC_ire his weapo, utt
l 4^'
s activity either (Exhibit D). Upon hearing the shot, 1 L1 to assess the situation. According to 1 LT
tated, ' e was standing ri• ht u • next to the wire." Initially, 1 LT not see ani! • o • e a en , and asked he had Inde d
®t'tie detainee. SPC_.tated again that he had shot— because he was standing next to the wire (Exhibit A). When 1 LT^noticed that_as bleeding, he moved to the radio in the breezeway an called the. 4th FSB TOC (Packhorse Mike) for assistance. SPC , who was guarding prisoners at a building directly across from t e dete tion facility entrance, left his position to assess the situation at the main detention facility.
Upon arriving at the scene, SPC asked for a combat lifesaver's bag
and SPC_went to the storage c oset in the interview office to retrieve it (Exhibit E). _ .nd SPC_,erformed first aid on _this time. SPC_ ent into the enterview office and sat down. At around 2320, SSG_an._medics, arrived. They assessed condition an transported him by ambulance to the aid station (Exhibit F). Upon
arrival at the aid station, more life-saving steps were taken. 1 LT^ esician's assistant on duty at the time, declared — dead at approximately 2330 hrs (Exhibit G). The body, was phoTographed by CPT with 1 LT_assisting, as part of the 4 th FSB's initial inquiry.
Facts.
a._ was a detainee at the FOB Ironhorse Detention Facility when he died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen on 11 Sep 01 at
approximately 2315 hours. He had turned himself at FOB Arrow on 02 Sep 03 upon learning that he was a targeted individual from Operation Arrow Sky,
conducted by TF 4-42 (Exhibit H). He and his brother,
were in separate isolation cells at the detention facility. _ad been
incarcerated in the isolation cell since 8 Sep 03. had been seen by_

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medics earlier in the day on 11 Sep. He had complained of joint and back pain
and couldn't sleep. The medics advised the guards, SPC included, that the detainee should be allowed to get up and walk aroun in order to reduce his back and joint pain. Furthermore, the detainees in isolation had been told not to speak and to stay away from the concertina wire or they would
be shot. According to 1LTile he did not see any indication that the concertina wire had been moved at the time of the shooting. According to INTSUM reporting, the brothers were alleged Saddam loyalists (Exhibit H).
Cii)(6)‘4
P_
D Co., 4th FSB, shotallar nce when he
observed standing an• ouching the single strand concertina wire at his
cell. SPC

did not give a verbal warning prior to firing his weapon.
A round had already been chambered in the weapon. SPC as
aware that the medics had suggested that e allowed to stand walk
around in his cell in order relieve some of the joint and shou er pain

been experiencing while being held in the cell (Exhibits A and B).
c. SPC equested a lawyer before any questioning could be
done. He provided a s atement on DA Form 2823 during 4 th FS.B's initial in uir
but he was not read his rights (Exhibit B). In that statement, SP
stated that the detainee had been fidgeting with his handcuffs ear ler in e y.
Furtherne—det-a-i had been told not to speak. According to fhe
statement, at about 2315 hours, aid something in Arabic.

SPCallarif
grat who had been speaking with S
turned to look at the detainee and saw him standing near the wire andtouching it. At that instant, SPC alliallipaised his weapon and fired.
d. There are conflicting accounts about the training that the guards received
prior to assuming their duties at the detention facility. SPC

and
SPC

were on their second full day of detention guard duty. They had
receive a briefing from 1 LT on their duties, but SPCM/Vid not recall
any instructions with res ec to graduated force JAW TF Ironhorse FRAGO 422

(Exhibit C). SPC
elieved that they could shoot a detainee if the detainee approached the wrre without permission. 1ra/stated that he gave that order but with the understanding that verbal warnings and other measures would first be considered before applying lethal force. No rehearsals or drills had been conducted.
e. The guard force had wooden clubs readily available in order to deal with belligerent detainees using less than lethal force (Exhibit J). Upon initial set-up of the detention facility, the guard force did not have weapons inside of the detention facility. At some point between the initial set-up of the facility and 11 Sep 03, the 1 st BCT Commander instructed the 4 th FSB to have guards carry weapons inside of the wire to ensure the presentation of authority (Exhibit K).
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2 . 020496

Report by AR 15-6 Investigating Officer on Shooting Death of Iraqi
Detainee, FOB Packhorse, Tikrit Iraq, 11 Sep 03
f.
The guard force has no written instructions and there is no written battalion guidance for the operation of the detention facility. Guards received their instructions verbally by the shift leader, in this case, 1LTartExhibit A).

g.
TF Ironhorse FRAGO 422, IVIaintenance of Law and Order, dated 16 May 03, provides guidance for the use of graduated force and specifically identifies a "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot, Shoot" methodology (Exhibit L).

h.
Paragraph 3-2f, Army Regulation 190-14, The Carrying of Firearms by Law Enforcement Personnel and Personnel Performing Security Duties, states that, "Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed." Furthermore, paragraph 3-2g requires that personnel give an order to halt before firing (Exhibit M).

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i. the other isolated detainee in the detention facility, stated that he received no warnings about what would happen if he tried to escape. He stated that none of the other prisoners rovided the information. One prisoner held in the general population cell stated he (6)
had received a briefing on what would happen if he tried to escape (Exhibit D).
j. SPC was described as overly aggressive by 1 LT The other guards, SPC and PFC , described SPC as
being unnecessarily vulgar owards the detainees. Also, SP had banged wooden clubs on the cell doors unneceiai and had used vulgar language toward the prisoners on 10 Sep. 1 LT had corrected that behavior
(Exhibits A, E, and N).
k. There is no indication that the detainee had been physically abused prior to being fatally shot. He had adequate medical attention for his aching back and joints; the guards understood that the detainees could stand up and stretch in order to relieve some of the discomfort. Adequate food and water had been given to the detainee (Exhibit G and 0).
Findin s: The convergence of several conditions resulted in the shooting of 00)(G7)4 on the evening of 11 Sep 03.
a. Statements reveal that there is sufficient cause to believe that SPC
OMR/knowingly or not, was in violation of Army use of force policy and TF Ironhorse directives governing the use of deadly force. No verbal warning was given, and no lesser means of force was considered before applying deadly force. Furthermore, the fact that as handcuffed and his position on the
floor in his cell once he was shot provide fficient doubt abou' intent to escape (Exhibits A, B, C, and V).
t Patti
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b. There are insufficient instructions for guards in performing their duties. There are no written SOPs or post instructions for guards (Exhibits A and K). Instructions are given verbally by the shift leader, and the guards on-duty that evening had a different understanding of their responsibilities. For example, SPC
nd PFC4War did not have a round chambered in their weapons prior to t e s oting—even though they were guarding isolated detainees—while SPC
affirand SPC did. 1LTalf did not have a round chambered in his weapon, either. SPC nd PFciiiphad an understanding of the use of force as it applied to the application of deadly force (Exhibit E and N). SPCInhad not heard of graduated force or differing levels of force, nor did he remember receiving a briefing which covered verbal warnings prior to shooting an escaping detainee (Exhibit C).
c. The combination of loaded weapons within the confines of the detention facility, in addition to the inadequate number of guards on duty, created an environment conducive for the quick escalation to the use of degdly force. There were lenty of wooden clubs available to use in applying less than deadly force. SPC ad used a club before in order to rattle the cage doors.
9(Z) 3 —There were guards on duty at two different buildings with 56 detainees on 11 September. While the majority of detainees were in the general population, incarcerated in a large open room, there were eight others held in isolation cells who required'increased visual surveillance. It is difficult for guards to maintain adequate situational awareness over such a dispersed operation. Furthermore,
d. The isolation cells in which the 1M brothers were held were unkempt
and hada...barriers. There were MRE boxes in the cells which could (r 6 3
provide materials for sed as the barrier in place of the Furthermore cell doors coul ave been improved, thus making it more difficult for detainees to move or negotiate, and making it clearer for guards to determine a detainee's intent to esca e. Without a witness who might have see s actions which'''. 0,3A caused SPC to shoot, it is difficult to determine respect to crossing the wire on the evening of the shooting.
e. Based on comments by the interviewees, the detention facility had been visited on numerous occasions by leaders in the chain of command. Shift leaders were either a senior NCO or an officer. The officer in charge of detainee operations was on site daily. The battalion commander had inspected on numerous occasions. The brigade commander had inspected the facility and provided guidance in handling the detainees. Detainees were adequately fed, had plenty of water, and received adequate medical attention. Detainees were allowed to conduct hygiene and had access to latrines.

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Recommendations:
a. A criminal investigation should be initiated immediate) in order to
determine possible violations of the UCMJ by SPC Statements
from 1LTar, SPC , and PFC indicate that SPC
exhibited overly aggressive behavior when around the detainees.
handcuffed when he was shot, and SPC 1110111did not apply graduated
force JAW established regulations and orders.

b.

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d.
Clear the facility, especially holding cells, of MRE boxes, equipment, etc., that can be used as weapons or projectiles.

e.
Improve the barrier system for the isolation cells. Two stacked strands of concertina wire would allow guards to better determine a detainee's intent to breach the wire and escape.

f.
Improve the facility's wire perimeter entrance to ensure that the entrance is closed off when not in use.

g.
Develop a written SOP and provide guards with post instructions to ensure that guards are aware of approved prpcedures for the use of force, detainee handling, briefing procedures, and security of special population/isolated detainees.

h.
Train the guard force on the SOP and ensure that rehearsals and drills are conducted to deal with special situations, such as medical emergencies, attempted escapes, and fights between prisoners.

FRANK Y. RANGEL, JR. MAJ, MP Investigating Officer

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SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)
THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)
( 6)((o)
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JR, MAJ, MP
(Recorder)) fficer).4P—resi4e44)--
(Member)) (Member)
Member)) (Member)
SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)
To the extent indicated in Inclostire , the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.
(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the
reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)
'(Member)) ,)(Member)
SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6) The ...dings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)
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